


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
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## CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

# DISTURBANCES IN CHINA.

[In continuation of "China No. 3 (1900)".]

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.*  
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## Correspondence respecting the Disturbances in China.

[In continuation of "China No. 3 (1900)."]

No. 1.

*Sir Chihchen Loféngluh to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received June 29.)*

THE Chinese Minister presents his compliments to the Marquess of Salisbury, and, referring to the interview he had with his Lordship yesterday, has the honour to forward him the following translation of the telegram from the Viceroy at Nanking and Woohang, the purport of which he communicated to Lord Salisbury at the interview above mentioned:—

“In view of the exceedingly critical state of affairs in the north of China, the Undersigned, the Viceroy of the Liang Kiang and Liang Hu Governments, whilst hoping to see things taking a more favourable turn, have deemed it expedient to take special measures for the preservation of order in the provinces under their jurisdiction in the event of the disturbances ever extending to them.

“With the object, therefore, of arriving at an understanding with the Treaty Powers with respect to any concerted action which eventualities may call for, the Undersigned have framed the following Articles, and instructed the Taotai at Shanghai to submit them to the Consular Body at Shanghai as the basis of such action:—

“1. That the Chinese authorities and the Consular Representatives of the Treaty Powers shall consult with each other, and act conjointly, in protecting native and foreign life and property, and this they severally recognized as being the sole object of the proposed understanding.

“2. That the duty of protecting Shanghai shall be confided to the Treaty Powers.

“3. That in the region of the Yang-tsze Valley, including the towns of Soochow and Hangchow, the responsibility for the maintenance of order shall pertain to the Viceroy of the Liang Kiang and Liang Hu Provinces, who, within the limits aforesaid, undertake to give adequate protection to foreign life and property, merchant and missionary; and with this object, they do further undertake to issue stringent and imperative orders to all officials subordinate to them to suppress all inflammatory placards and punish all instigators of animosity between foreigners and the people.

“4. That the foreign war-ships already stationed at the Treaty ports in the Yang-tsze shall be maintained as heretofore, but on condition of their crews not being allowed to go ashore.

“5. That the Viceroy shall not be held responsible for the consequences of any disturbances which the entrance of foreign ships of war into the Yang-tsze may occasion, unless such entrance shall have been sanctioned by them.

“6. That no foreign ships of war shall pass near to, or anchor opposite to, or in the vicinity of the Woosung and Yang-tsze forts; neither shall they go through any exercises in the neighbourhood of the forts which, by being misunderstood, might bring about a collision between them and the forts.

“7. That foreign ships of war shall not cruise or anchor near to any of the Government powder-magazines, and that no foreign sailor or other person shall be allowed to approach such magazines. The ammunition contained therein being solely intended for the preservation of order and the security of life and property, and being under the perfect control of the Viceroy, no apprehension should be entertained lest it should be used for any other purpose.

“8. That foreigners and missionaries shall for the present refrain from travelling in places in the interior where it might be difficult to give them adequate protection.

"9. That any measures which the Powers may take for the defence of Shanghai shall be conducted in the least obtrusive manner possible, and so as to avoid exciting the fears of the populace, some of whom might otherwise avail themselves of the occasion to create disturbances which it might not be easy to control.

"The above are the only measures which, in the opinion of the Undersigned, would suffice for the maintenance of order and tranquillity in the Yang-tsze Provinces, in the event of their being afflicted by the troubles now agitating the metropolitan district and certain parts of Shantung.

"The Consuls are requested to communicate them to their respective Governments, who, it is earnestly hoped, may be able to give them their approval.

(Signed)

"LIEU KWUN-YIH, *Viceroy of the Liang Kiang.*

"CHANG CHI-TUNG, *Viceroy of the Liang Hu.*"

P.S.—An Imperial Rescript has just been received, stating that the foreign Legations continue to receive the plenary protection of the Imperial Government.

*Chinese Legation, June 29, 1900.*

No. 2.

*Viscount Gough to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 3.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 3, 1900.*

GERMAN Government have decided to dispatch 1st Division of 1st Squadron to China, namely, 1st protected cruisers. An extraordinary brigade made up of soldiers volunteering will likewise be formed, about 7,000 strong.

No. 3.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 3, 1900.*

THE French Ambassador, who called on me to-day, expressed a wish that the Powers should come to an understanding as to the number of troops to be sent by each to China.

I questioned his Excellency as to the precise object that these contingents were to attain.

M. Cambon replied that he thought we should be guided by the opinion of those on the spot, and he proposed that the question should be referred to a Council of the Admirals at Taku.

I expressed some apprehension that advice coming from such a Council might represent the opinion of a less competent majority, and not that of the most weighty members of it. I should prefer that each Power should seek the opinion of its own authorities as to what ought to be done, and what force was necessary to do it. To this view M. Cambon assented.

With regard to the proposals drawn up by the Viceroys at Nanking and Hankow, and submitted to the Consular Body at Shanghai as a basis for joint action in certain eventualities, M. Cambon stated that the proposed arrangement indicated in many respects the course which the French Government was disposed to follow, but that they were not prepared to bind themselves by authorizing their Consul-General to sign it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Pauncefote.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 3, 1900.*

THE American Ambassador, in speaking to me to-day with regard to the crisis in China, said that the United States' Government were quite willing that Japan should, with the assent of the other Powers, send an expedition for the rescue of the Peking Legations.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 5.

*Viceroy of Nanking to Chinese Minister.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh, July 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nanking, July 3, 1900.*

WE, the Viceroys of the Liang Kiang and Liang Hu Provinces, undertake to hold ourselves responsible for the security of foreign life and property within our respective jurisdictions, as well as in the Province of Chekiang, so long as the Treaty Powers do not land troops in either the Yang-tsze Valley or the Province of Chekiang.

(Signed)

LIEU KUN YIH.  
CHANG CHITUNG.

## No. 6.

*Consul Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Canton, July 4, 1900.*

I HAVE received privately a copy of an Imperial Decree to Li Hung-chang and the Viceroys of the Yang-tsze Provinces, which has since been published in a newspaper, to the following effect:—

“June 26.—You are aware of our dilemma about the armed bands (meaning Boxers), who must be either destroyed or pacified, and of the hostilities commenced by the foreign Powers.

“You have estimated your resources and advise peaceful measures. The Boxers are now in Peking, and have made their way into every part; their hatred of foreign missionaries is implacable. Were it attempted to suppress them by force, a catastrophe would be precipitated in the capital, and the inhabitants would be plunged in misery. We can now only employ the means we cannot control; a remedy for the state of affairs must be sought later. We are quite helpless, and war is being forced upon us. Hesitate no longer. Collect forces and money for the defence of the provinces you govern.”

Li Hung-chang, at an interview yesterday, said that he was determined to avoid, as far as possible, all warlike operations here. I would recommend that the Powers make a united declaration that they will not make any attack on the Bogue forts or Canton.

## No. 7.

*Mr. Choate to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 5.)*

My Lord,

*American Embassy, London, July 5, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in the present critical posture of affairs in China, my Government deems it appropriate to define its attitude, so far as present circumstances permit this to be done, and has instructed me to advise your Lordship that it adheres to the policy initiated by it in 1857, of peace with the Chinese nation, and of furtherance of lawful commerce and of protection of the lives and property of its citizens, by all means guaranteed under extra-territorial Treaty rights,

and by the law of nations. If wrong be done to its citizens, it proposes to hold the responsible authors to the utmost accountability. It regards the condition at Peking as one of virtual anarchy, whereby power and responsibility have practically devolved upon the local provincial authorities. So long as they are not in overt collusion with rebellion, and use their power to protect foreign life and property, my Government regards them as representing the Chinese people, with whom it seeks to remain in peace and friendship.

The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other Powers—

1. In opening up communication with Peking, and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger.

2. In affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property.

3. In guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests.

4. In aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire, and a recurrence of such disasters.

My Government considers that, with the information at present at hand, it is too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but its policy is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territory and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by Treaties and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

I shall be pleased to have a brief interview with your Lordship as soon after the perusal of this note as you can conveniently accord it to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

No. 8.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 5, 1900.*

I AM to-day communicating to the Chinese Minister a Memorandum in the following words:—

“The Chinese Minister is requested by Her Majesty’s Government to transmit by telegraph, in such a manner as will insure the message reaching the Government at Peking, notice that they will be held personally guilty if the members of the European Legations and other foreigners in Peking suffer injury.”

Inform Government to which you are accredited.

No. 9.

*Memorandum by the Marquess of Salisbury.*

THE Chinese Minister called at this Office on the 4th instant and asked my view with respect to the arrangements proposed by the Viceroy of Nanking and Hankow, to the Consular Body at Shanghai, with regard to the joint action to be taken in the case of certain eventualities.

I answered that I could fully recognize the excellent spirit in which these proposals were devised; but that Her Majesty’s Government could not accept them as a contract which they were bound to execute. I pointed out that they involved the renunciation of rights which Great Britain possesses under the Treaties, and that they impose on Her Majesty’s Government duties which belong to the Chinese Government.

So far as it appears to Her Majesty’s Government to be expedient to execute their provisions they will gladly do so, but each case must be judged on its merits.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

*Foreign Office, July 5, 1900.*

\* Also to Lord Currie, Viscount Gough, Sir H. Rumbold, Sir C. Scott, Lord Fauncefote, and Mr. Whitehead

No. 10.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Currie.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 5, 1900.*

COUNT COSTA called at this Office to-day, and inquired what answer Her Majesty's Government had given to a communication from the French Government proposing that the Powers should take steps to co-ordinate their action in China and come to an understanding on the subject.

He was informed that the communication, as made here and at Vienna, had taken the shape of a proposal that the Governments should instruct their respective Commanders to report what amount of force was required for the operations they contemplated, in order that the contingents to be supplied by each might then be settled; that I had seen no objection to each Government consulting its naval or military Commander, and that I thought this preferable to a request for a joint expression of opinion by all of them in council; that we had already consulted our Admiral, who, after consultation, had stated that a force of 40,000 or 50,000 men would be required for an advance on Peking.

Count Costa said that M. Visconti-Venosta had told the French Ambassador that Italy would be ready to take part in any joint action that might be determined upon.

The Italian Government had announced in the Chamber the measures they were taking. They were sending three additional ships of war to Chinese waters, raising the total to six, with crews sufficient to admit of a force being landed. They were ready to send more troops if necessary.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 11.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 5, 1900.*

YUAN-SHIH-KAI, Governor of Shantung, is reported to have received orders from Prince Tuan in Peking to march with 18,000 well-drilled troops on Nanking, and to capture it.

Anarchy will spread throughout the Empire if this attack is made, and if we have not a very strong force here to support the Viceroy.

No. 12.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 6, 1900.*

THE Chinese Minister called on me this evening with a message from Li Hung-chang, who wished to inform me that, in his opinion, the Legations at Peking were still unhurt.

He also wished to consult me as to the possibility of obtaining from the Treaty Powers either a guarantee of the territory of China, or a self-denying Ordinance in any action circumstances may call on them to take in the present disturbed state of the country.

The Minister stated that Russia had been consulted in the same sense, and had expressed her willingness to guarantee the integrity of the Chinese Empire.

I said I was much gratified to hear this; but I could, naturally, not give an answer on so grave a demand without consulting my colleagues, and I would do so without delay. All I could say was that the policy apparently pursued by Russia was entirely in harmony with the principles and objects of this country, and I should be very glad to find the aims of the two Powers entirely coincident.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 13.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 7.)*

(Extract.)

Paris, July 5, 1900.

I FOUND M. Delcassé very dejected yesterday at the news of the desperate situation of the members of the Diplomatic Body and the other Europeans at Peking.

His Excellency said that the sole preoccupation of himself and his colleagues at this moment was the duty of attempting their rescue, and that the reflection that the whole of Europe appears to be powerless to enforce this rescue as against the Chinese was overwhelmingly terrible to him.

In answer to my remarks that the deficiency of force at the command of the European Powers could be best redressed by encouraging the co-operation of the Japanese to the fullest extent, M. Delcassé said that he also regarded Japan as the most important available factor for the object which all the Powers interested must have in view. He hoped, therefore, that the division which the Japanese Government was understood to have mobilized would be dispatched at once.

He proceeded to enlarge upon the necessity that no jealousy or afterthought should be allowed to hinder unity of action and of direction on the spot. It would never do that the efficiency of the collective European forces, already far too weak and inconsiderable, should be frittered away by isolated action on the part of each.

His Excellency, in connection with this consideration, observed that he need hardly, he supposed, assure me that he, personally, and, he was convinced, his colleagues also, had no other thought at this moment than the rescue of those in danger, if such a rescue be still possible.

I could not but express my approval of all that M. Delcassé said, but I asked him whether he had no definite suggestion to make, or any message which I might report to your Lordship.

Upon this, his Excellency informed me that he had already, yesterday morning, instructed the French Representatives to propose to the Governments of the Powers interested the publication of an identic or collective warning to the *de facto* Government or authorities at Peking, declaring that they will be held personally responsible for the lives and safety of all the Europeans in the capital.\*

M. Delcassé explained that he thought that, while, on the one hand, it is to be conjectured that in one way or another this warning will reach those for whom it is intended at Peking, it will, on the other, show clearly to Europe and to the world at large the solidarity of the agreement between the Powers.

His Excellency seemed to me to attach more importance to this latter point than to the efficacy which such a notification may have at Peking. Indeed, he seemed to acquiesce in the opinion I expressed, that those who had seized upon power in the Chinese capital were hardly likely to be influenced by any warning from the European Powers.

I have no doubt that even before the receipt of the telegram which I dispatched to your Lordship after my interview with M. Delcassé, you will have received from the French Embassy the message forwarded from Paris in the forenoon.

But I thought it as well to lose no time in reporting the version given of it to me by M. Delcassé himself.

## No. 14.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 7.)*

My Lord,

Paris, July 6, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the urgent note which I have addressed to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of to-day's date,† informing him that Her Majesty's Government have suggested to the Government of Japan that reinforcements should be sent by them to China with the least possible delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

\* See "China No. 3 (1900)," p. 96.

† See "China No. 3 (1900)," p. 102.



## Inclosure in No. 14.

*Sir E. Monson to M. Delcassé.*

M. le Ministre,

*Paris, July 6, 1900.*

I AM instructed by Lord Salisbury to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have this day thought it advisable to suggest to that of Japan that the greatest dispatch should be used by them in sending reinforcements to China.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

## No. 15.

*Viscount Gough to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 7.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, July 5, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy and translation of a Memorandum, which I have this day received from the Imperial German Government, on the subject of the warnings which it has been proposed to address to the authorities at Peking as to the penalties which would be inflicted in the event of the members of the foreign Legations in Peking being murdered.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GOUGH.

## Inclosure in No. 15.

*Memorandum.*

(Translation.)

THE Government of His Majesty the Emperor and King cannot, indeed, at the present stage of the Chinese crisis, anticipate any material result from the collective declaration of the Powers, proposed in the *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy, to the effect that all persons in power in Peking, whatever their rank, should be held personally responsible for any act of violence committed against the personnel or property of the foreign Legations in Peking.

Guided, however, by the conviction that no means should be left untried, unless hopeless from the outset, for the rescue of the foreigners besieged in Peking, the Imperial Government are very ready to take part, on their side also, in the proposed collective declaration, and to instruct the Imperial Consul in Tien-tsin by telegraph accordingly.

The Government of His Majesty consider, however, that they should give prominence to the fact, that neither would they have held aloof, if the proposal of the Consuls at Tien-tsin, to threaten the destruction of the Chinese Imperial tombs had met with the concurrence of the other Powers. It appears to the Imperial Government in this connection, that the opinion of the Consuls, who, from their immediate vicinity are best qualified to judge the situation, is not without weight, they being unanimously convinced that the threat to destroy the tombs of the present Imperial house would exercise a salutary effect on the rioters, whose principal leader is himself a Prince of the said Imperial house.

It should be observed, in conclusion, that the message from the Imperial Consul refers to tombs near Peking. Consequently the tombs in Manchuria would not be those in question, but rather the so-called "Eastern" tombs, situated near Ma-lan-yu, on this side of the Great Wall.

*Berlin, July 4, 1900.*

## No. 16.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 7, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegrams of the 6th instant,\* the Viceroy would be glad to know that a force was ready and prepared to hasten to support them should the necessity arise, but they are not anxious at present for more force at the ports.

The Viceroy has not expressed any wish that troops should be landed at any ports. Yuan-Shih-Kai, Governor of Shantung, will support the Viceroy Liu's policy and refuses to march on Nanking.

## No. 17.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, July 8, 1900.*

I COMMUNICATED to-day to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs your Lordship's telegrams of the 6th July.†

Viscount Aoki said that three batteries of artillery and one regiment of infantry started on the 6th July. Dispatch of troops was proceeding as rapidly as possible.

## No. 18.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 8, 1900.*

CHINA. I have informed Count Lamsdorff, as instructed in your Lordship's telegram of the 6th July.† His Excellency mentioned the possibility that Japan might want a mandate for separate action or special conditions for her co-operation, by which the accord in the common task of rescue and protection might be endangered.

In his opinion, it is essential for the success of the combined effort that action should be identic and on equal conditions, and that although every contribution of force promptly available for co-operation should be welcomed, no one Power should be given a mandate for separate action, or any special conditions, or any claim to preponderating voice in guidance based on the relative amount of force supplied or the services rendered to the common cause.

## No. 19.

*Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 9, 1900.*

ITALY is sending about 2,000 men to China.  
Details follow by post.

## No. 20.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 10, 1900.*

THE Boxers are reported to have appeared at Wenchow, where they are openly drilling, and declare that they intend to kill all native converts and foreigners. In consequence of these rumours a gun-boat is going up the river, but I suggest that the

\* See "China No. 3 (1900)," p. 103.

† See "China No. 3 (1900)," p. 102.

foreigners should withdraw if the danger becomes serious, as the gun-boat cannot be spared for any length of time. It would be advisable, I think, for the people to come away from all the smaller ports whenever the danger is pressing, as there are not sufficient gun-boats to protect every port.

## No. 21.

*Consul Tratman to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Chefoo, July 10, 1900.*

CONSUL at Newchwang writes:—

All Protestant missionaries safely out of Manchuria, but some Danish surrounded 80 miles south-east of Newchwang, and foreign rescue party started to relieve. All Protestant missionaries safely out of Shantung Province.

## No. 22.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 10, 1900.*

THE Japanese Chargé d'Affaires called here on the 5th instant and asked me whether Great Britain proposed to send more troops to China beyond those already under orders from India. I replied that this would depend to some extent on the course of affairs in South Africa, but that we had already from 10,000 to 12,000 *en route* or under orders, and our officers on the spot estimated that from 40,000 to 50,000 in all would be required for an advance on Peking.

M. Matsui then inquired what other nations were doing. I replied that from our information France was sending about 8,000, Germany about 9,000, America about 3,000, and Count Lamsdorff stated that Russia had already 10,000 at Taku and Tien-tsin.

I pointed out that these reinforcements would probably meet the immediate emergency, but they could in many instances not be available till the latter part of August when it would be too late to relieve the Legations, and the rains would render operations difficult, and I asked what Japan intended to do, and whether she would not utilize her proximity by sending a considerable force immediately to relieve the Legations.

M. Matsui replied that his Government would be willing to do the same as other Powers, but they apprehended difficulty if they did more, and thought a much larger number of troops than 50,000 would be required to relieve Peking. If they sent 15,000 now, which would be as much as other Powers, they would be beaten back.

I pointed out that the opportunity of effective intervention now lay with Japan, and that although we could not, owing to distance, place a large body of troops promptly on the spot, we had supplied thirty-four ships, and should shortly have eleven more on the station, so that we were doing all we could in the common cause.

I urged him to move his Government to consider these points.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 23.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, July 11, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 6th July, I was sent for to-day by Viscount Aoki, who told me that in consequence of the friendly assurances given by your Lordship, it had been decided by the Japanese Government to send to China one or two more army divisions; the material difficulties of landing and supplies will determine the date of mobilization and departure of these.

No. 24.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 11, 1900.*

FOREIGN community at Wenchow. With reference to your telegram of the 10th July, you should consult Senior Naval Officer, and act in concert with him, and report joint recommendation as to withdrawal of foreigners in this and other cases that may arise.

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No. 25.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 12, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 11th instant, both in regard to Wenchow and other cases, the Senior Naval Officer and myself have all along acted in complete concert.

Her Majesty's ship "Pigmy" left on the 10th July for Wenchow, under instructions, if the place was unsafe, to bring away all foreigners.

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No. 26.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tōkiō, July 12, 1900.*

I HAVE sent the following telegram to Admiral Seymour:—

"Lieutenant-General Terauchi, Second in General Staff, is being sent by the Japanese Government to discuss with you and Admiral Alexeieff a scheme of combined operations."

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No. 27.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1900.*

I APPROVE the action reported in your telegram of the 12th instant, with a view to providing for the safety of foreigners at Wenchow.

Foreigners at smaller ports should, in view of the impossibility of detailing a man-of-war for every port, be advised to withdraw as soon as they are threatened by serious danger.

You should, in concert with the Senior Naval Officer, arrange to hire a vessel or vessels to remove refugees from any port to which it is impossible to send a man-of-war.

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No. 28.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1900.*

THE Governor of Hong Kong telegraphs on the 10th July as follows:—

"The following is an extract from a Proclamation issued by Yu, Governor of Hupei, and the Viceroy of Hankow:

"We have made arrangements with the Consuls of various Powers that so long as ships of war do not come up the Yang-tsze the lives and property of foreigners shall be protected by local officials. Peking has been notified of this Agreement by telegraph."

The Chinese Minister communicated to me, on the 29th ultimo, a long telegram which he had received from the two Viceroy, containing an Arrangement in nine Articles which the Taotai at Shanghai had been instructed to submit to the Consular Body at that place.

Lofêngluh called here again on 4th July, and I informed him that I recognized fully the excellent spirit in which these proposals were devised. At the same time, I pointed out to him that they imposed on Her Majesty's Government duties which properly belonged to the Chinese Government, and that they involved the renunciation of Treaty rights, and I said that Her Majesty's Government would gladly execute their provisions so far as it appeared to them expedient to do so, but that it was impossible for us to accept them as a contract which we were bound to execute, and each case must be judged on its merits.

## No. 29.

*Count Lamsdorff to Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London.—(Communicated July 13, 1900.)*

LE 11 Juin notre Ministre à Tokio nous communiqua que le Gouvernement Japonais s'était déclaré prêt, vu la situation pleine de péril à Pékin, d'envoyer ses troupes en Chine afin de sauver, conjointement avec les autres États, les Représentants des Puissances assiégés à Pékin et secourir les étrangers se trouvant dans l'Empire, parmi lesquels le Japon compte de nombreux sujets. Tout concours au but indiqué ne pouvait rencontrer que l'accueil le plus sympathique de la part de toutes les Puissances. D'autre part le Japon, grâce aux conditions géographiques pouvant, par l'envoi d'un contingent considérable, faciliter essentiellement la tâche des détachements internationaux se trouvant déjà à Tien-tsin nous nous empressâmes d'informer le Cabinet de Tokio que nous ne voyions aucune raison d'entraver sa liberté d'action à ce sujet, d'autant plus qu'il avait exprimé la ferme résolution d'agir en complet accord avec les autres Puissances. La décision prise par le Gouvernement Japonais, dans les conditions indiquées, était toute naturelle, vu le danger qui menaçait tout autant ses Représentants à Pékin, que ses nombreux sujets résidant en Chine; mais, à notre point de vue, l'accomplissement de cette tâche ne saurait impliquer des droits d'une solution indépendante des affaires à Pékin, ni d'autres privilèges, à l'exception, peut-être, d'une plus grande indemnité pécuniaire, si plus tard les Puissances avaient considéré nécessaire d'en demander une.

Presque simultanément nous reçûmes du Cabinet de Londres une communication à ce sujet, dans laquelle il s'agissait déjà non d'une décision spontanée du Cabinet de Tokio de participer à l'action collective des Puissances, mais d'une mission donnée, par l'Europe au Japon, d'envoyer en Chine des forces considérables non seulement pour sauver les Légations et les sujets étrangers, mais aussi en vue de répression du mouvement insurrectionnel provoqué par les Boxers et l'établissement de l'ordre à Pékin et Tien-tsin.

Cette manière de poser la question pourrait à notre avis dans une certaine mesure enfreindre les principes fondamentaux qui avaient déjà été acceptés par la majorité des Puissances comme bases de leur politique relativement aux événements en Chine, savoir: le maintien de l'union entre les Puissances, maintien du régime gouvernemental existant en Chine; exclusion de tout ce qui pourrait mener au partage de l'Empire; enfin le rétablissement par les efforts communs d'un pouvoir central légitime capable lui-même d'assurer au pays l'ordre et la sécurité. Le ferme établissement et la stricte observation de ces principes fondamentaux sont, à notre avis, absolument indispensables pour atteindre le but principal: le maintien d'une paix durable en Extrême-Orient.

Le Gouvernement Impérial considère qu'en face des événements menaçants en Chine, qui concernent les intérêts vitaux des Puissances, il est urgent d'éviter tout malentendu ou omission qui pourraient avoir des suites encore plus dangereuses.

(Translation.)

ON the 11th June our Minister at Tôkiô informed us that the Japanese Government had declared their readiness, in consideration of the perilous situation at Peking, to send their troops to China with a view to saving, conjointly with the other States,

the Representatives of the Powers who were besieged in Peking, and to rescuing the foreigners resident in the Empire, among whom are many Japanese subjects. Any co-operation, anything tending to the attainment of the objects indicated, could only meet with the most sympathetic reception from all the Powers. Moreover, Japan, being able, thanks to geographical conditions, by the dispatch of a considerable contingent, to facilitate essentially the task of the international detachments already at Tien-tsin, we hastened to inform the Cabinet at Tôkiô that we saw no reason to interfere with their liberty of action in this respect, especially as they have expressed their firm resolution of acting in complete harmony with the other Powers. The decision taken by the Japanese Government, under the above-mentioned conditions, was a very natural one, in consideration of the danger which menaced their Representatives at Peking, as well as their numerous subjects resident in China; but, from our point of view, the accomplishment of this task could not confer the right to an independent solution of matters at Peking, or other privileges, with the exception, perhaps, of a larger pecuniary indemnity, should the Powers consider it necessary, later on, to demand one.

We received almost simultaneously a communication on this subject from the Cabinet of London, which had reference, not to a spontaneous decision on the part of the Cabinet at Tôkiô to participate in the collective action of the Powers, but to a mission given by Europe to Japan, to send considerable forces to China, not only to save the Legations and the foreign subjects, but with a view to the suppression of the insurrectionary movement provoked by the Boxers and the re-establishment of order at Peking and Tien-tsin.

This way of putting the question might, in our opinion, to a certain extent encroach on the fundamental principles which had already been accepted by the majority of the Powers as the bases of their policy relative to events in China, that is to say, the maintenance of the union between the Powers; the maintenance of the existing system of government in China; the exclusion of anything which might lead to the partition of the Empire; finally, the re-establishment by common effort of a legitimate central Power, itself capable of assuring order and security to the country. The firm establishment and strict observance of these fundamental principles are, in our opinion, absolutely indispensable to the attainment of the chief object: the maintenance of a lasting peace in the Far East.

The Imperial Government considers that, in view of the threatening events in China, which concern the vital interests of the Powers, it is urgently necessary to avoid any misunderstanding or omission which might have still more dangerous consequences.

## No. 30.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 13, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 12th instant:

The Consular Body here rejected the Agreement which was submitted to them as telegraphed by the Governor of Hong Kong. I communicated to your Lordship its exact effect in my telegram of the 27th June, and the following is the full text of our reply as conveyed by the Senior Consul to the Taotai of Shanghai:—

“I am directed by my colleagues to express our pleasure at receiving yesterday from your Excellency and from his Excellency Shêng the assurances from their Excellencies Chang-Chih-Tung, Viceroy of Wuchang, and Liu-Kun-yi, Viceroy of Nanking, that they undertake to keep the peace and to protect life and property in their province, and to hold themselves responsible for any damage done by riot or insurrection. We beg to thank their Excellencies, and to express our high estimation of their good intentions.

“We desire you to inform their Excellencies that the Admirals of the allied fleets at Taku have made public Proclamation that they only fight against Boxers and those who strive to prevent rescue of foreigners in danger at Peking and other places. We desire you to assure their Excellencies that our Governments had no intention, and now have no intention, either individually or collectively, to take any action or to land any force in the Yang-tsze Valley so long as their Excellencies are able to and do maintain rights of foreigners in their provinces provided for by the Treaties with the Government of China.”

## No. 31.

*Consul Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Canton, July 13, 1900.*

AN Imperial Edict, received yesterday, orders Li Hung-chang to go to Peking. He leaves Hong Kong on the 17th July for the North.

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## No. 32.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 13, 1900.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 11th instant, I have to state that Her Majesty's Government are willing to assist the Japanese Government up to 1,000,000*l.* if they at once mobilize and send forward without delay, for the relief of the Peking Legations, a further force of 20,000 men in addition to the troops which you stated, in your telegram of the 6th instant, were being dispatched.

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## No. 33.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 14, 1900.*

A TRANSLATION of an Imperial Edict, dated the 29th June, was communicated to me yesterday by the Chinese Minister. It purports to give an account of what has occurred up to that date for the information of the Chinese Representatives abroad, who are therein directed to remain at their posts. It states that the Legations continue to receive the protection of the Chinese Government, but admits the murder of the German Minister at Peking, at the same time attributing all the trouble that has arisen to the attack on the forts at Taku.

I told Lo Fêng-luh that our military measures were directed towards the preservation of the Legations, and other foreigners at present detained in Peking, and the recognition of the sacred character of a foreign Legation duly accredited and received. Beyond this, I said that Her Majesty's Government had no objects beyond securing the principles which all civilized Governments acknowledged.

I also told the Chinese Minister that I was at a loss to understand why he should be in receipt of direct communications from his Government at Peking, while none were permitted to reach us from our Minister there.

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## No. 34.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 14, 1900.*

IT appears that the Yang-tsze Viceroy is somewhat disturbed in mind by the fear that the partition of China will be the result of the present trouble.

I think that they would be strengthened in the position they have taken up if Her Majesty's Government could assure them that Great Britain had no intention of the sort, and would use her influence with the Powers to prevent such partition.

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## No. 35.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Consul Scott.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 14, 1900.*

WE are of opinion that, in the present circumstances, Li Hung-chang will promote the cause of order more efficiently by staying at Canton than by proceeding to Peking.

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## No. 36.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 14, 1900.*

THERE is no doubt that the Boxer movement is spreading, and may develop into a Chinese national uprising throughout the Empire against foreigners.

To-day bad news comes from Hankow, Hunan, and Wenchow. The loss of Shanghai would be irreparable ruin to foreign trade and influence, as it is the shipping and commercial base of all China north of Foochow. The navy and volunteers cannot hold it against all contingencies. I would therefore urge strongly that a British force should without delay be sent to Hong Kong or Wei-hai Wei, and that their transport should be kept with them ready to leave for Shanghai at eight hours' notice. Five hundred cavalry, one battery of artillery, and 2,000 infantry would be an adequate force. The Senior Naval Officer at Shanghai concurs in this suggestion,

## No. 37.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 14, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report the arrival here of the entire foreign community of Wenchow.

## No. 38.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, July 14, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 13th July Viscount Aoki, after consulting with Marquis Yamagata, informs me that as no combined plan of campaign has been agreed upon, the Japanese Government do not consider that the dispatch of further reinforcements would at present be opportune.

The Japanese Government might reconsider this decision, Viscount Aoki added, if General Terauchi's mission, to which I referred in my telegram of the 12th July, should prove successful, and further troops be demanded by the Military Commanders.

## No. 39.

*Consul Fraser to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Chungking, July 14, 1900.*

AFTER the incendiarism and looting of houses and effects which took place on the 10th June the missionaries and their families are housed and treated in the provincial capital of Yunnan, where the Viceroy is by way of protecting them. I have received a telegram from his Excellency stating that under his protection they were safe.

## No. 40.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 15, 1900.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 14th instant, you may assure the Viceroys that Her Majesty's Government are entirely opposed in policy to the partition of China.



No information has been received here suggesting that measures of this description are contemplated by any of the Powers.

It is of the most vital importance for the preservation of the Chinese Empire that order should be maintained by the Yang-tsze Viceroy.

## No. 41.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 15, 1900.*

RUSSIAN Chargé d'Affaires communicated on 13th July a message from Count Lamsdorff, stating that on the 11th June Russian Minister at Tôkiô had reported offer of Japanese Government to send troops to China conjointly with other Powers for preservation of Representatives at Peking and of foreigners throughout China. This action on the part of Japan was quite natural, as her geographical position enabled her to send considerable reinforcements at once to Tien-tsin, and she has numerous subjects residing in China.

The Russian Government at once informed the Cabinet of Tôkiô that they saw no reason for interfering with Japan's liberty of action in this respect, the more so, as she had expressed the firm resolution of acting in complete accord with the other Powers. But the accomplishment of this task did not, according to the view of the Russian Government, imply any right to an independent settlement of affairs at Peking, nor other privileges, except, perhaps, a larger pecuniary indemnity if eventually the Powers should consider it necessary to demand one.

Count Lamsdorff states that almost simultaneously he received from Her Majesty's Government a communication which already mentioned not a spontaneous decision of the Cabinet of Tôkiô to participate in the collective action of the Powers, but a mission to be given by Europe to Japan to send to China considerable forces not merely to save the Legations and foreigners, but also with a view to the repression of the insurrectionary movement set on foot by the Boxers and the establishment of order at Peking and Tien-tsin. This manner of stating the question might, in the opinion of the Russian Government, infringe to a certain degree the fundamental principles which had already been accepted by the majority of the Powers as the basis of their policy, namely, the maintenance of union between the Powers, maintenance of the existing system of government in China, exclusion of anything which might lead to partition of the Empire, in fact, the re-establishment by joint efforts of a legitimate central Government capable of assuring order and security. The Russian Government consider that strict observance of these fundamental principles is indispensable for maintenance of durable peace in the Far East, and that it is essential to avoid all misunderstandings or omissions which might have dangerous consequences.

I have replied that Her Majesty's Government have never suggested that the action of Japan should confer on her any rights to an independent solution or any other privileges. They have never spoken to the Russian Government of a mission given by Europe to Japan. The fundamental principles of which Count Lamsdorff speaks have never been accepted by Her Majesty's Government, nor have we as yet discussed with other Powers the circumstances to which those principles might possibly apply. Her Majesty's Government have not expressed an opinion in favour of any steps except those which point to the relief of the Legations and of other foreigners.]

## No. 42.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 16.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, July 4, 1900.*

I HAD to-day the first opportunity since Count Mouravieff's death of conversation with Count Lamsdorff, who held a reception of the foreign Representatives.

His Excellency expressed regret at having been unable to receive me earlier, but hoped that the answer which he had sent me to your Lordship's inquiry about a Japanese expeditionary corps to Northern China had made it clear that Russia had no desire to place the slightest difficulty in the way of the prompt dispatch of such a Japanese force as your Lordship had named. The Japanese Government, as appeared

from the communication they had made to the Russian and other Governments, had not asked for a mandate to act independently in the restoration of order in Tien-tsin and Peking, but was desirous to co-operate loyally in this emergency with the European forces.

There would be grave objections to giving a mandate for single action to any one Power in the face of so grave a crisis as the present, when every other consideration must be subordinated to the one common and pressing aim of rescue and protection; and any importation of elements of rivalry and jealousy would be fatal to its success.

Any available force that could be promptly sent by any Power to hasten the work of relief would be most welcome.

Russia had so far been able to contribute the most effective aid in the seizure of the Taku forts and the relief of Tien-tsin, but had no desire to found on that fact any claim for a privileged position in the common task before us.

Under the circumstances, the Russian Government had adopted the only course possible at such a distance from the scene of action: they had given the fullest powers to M. de Giers to take any immediate action he thought necessary, and to call up from Vladivostock or Port Arthur any amount of force necessary to keep up communications with the coast and protect the Legations; and Admiral Alexeieff and the authorities at Vladivostock had been instructed in this sense. Unfortunately there were doubts whether this telegram had ever actually reached Peking, and at present the Russian Government was greatly embarrassed by want of prompt and detailed information from the Admiral as to the amount of force already landed and immediately available, and the measures which had been taken and were in contemplation; he understood that the Russian force already landed amounted to 10,000, but the telegrams had been unaccountably delayed and were very meagre and he was anxious for the particulars, which I at once gave him, of the latest items of information from our Admiral at Taku and Consul at Tien-tsin and the dates at which they had been dispatched and received.

It was impossible, he added, for the Government of St. Petersburg to dictate a course of action to their authorities on the spot, who had the fullest powers. There was, he thought, no confidence to be placed in the contradictory rumours from Peking which reached Europe through Chinese sources, but there could be little doubt that a complete state of anarchy now prevailed in the Chinese capital.

The Empress was at the time said to have fled from Peking, and he had thought it possible that she might be endeavouring to join Li Hung-chang somewhere, and if so, that the latter might have made use of the Empress as a constituted authority to endeavour to restore order, and come to terms with the European Powers.

The latest reports, however, asserted that the Emperor was a prisoner at Peking in the power of Prince Tuan, who had usurped the authority and led the anti-foreign crusade.

Count Lamsdorff's view of the situation at present seemed to be that if we could only rescue our Legations and the Europeans, and bring them in safety to the coast, the allied forces should confine themselves to holding in strength the position they now occupied at Taku and Tien-tsin, and not attempt to restore order in the interior but let the conflagration there burn itself out, and wait until it resulted in some apparent authority emerging at Peking with whom the Powers could deal, and whom they could render responsible.

At present there was no one in the capital whom we could menace or even address; in the opinion of the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg, who had his son and other relations there, the movement had become essentially anarchical, and Chinese and Europeans were being massacred and pillaged indiscriminately.

Count Lamsdorff had not heard directly of the course unanimously recommended by the Consular Body at Tien-tsin, but he entirely shared your Lordship's view that the effect of its adoption would not only be quite inoperative on the factors of the disturbance, but extremely hazardous and difficult to execute, and he thought that if there were any authorities which a menace or warning could reach, the proposal to warn them collectively that they would eventually be held responsible in their persons and property for any injury to the foreign Legations or Europeans in Peking was a much more practical suggestion.

There was one point on which Count Lamsdorff laid particular stress in his conversation with me: it was that the European Powers should proceed on the assumption that they were not in a state of war with the constituted Government of China, but with rebels and anarchists, otherwise the whole population of China would be

aroused against us, and none of the constituted authorities would have sufficient influence to accept our support in restoring order.

Count Lamsdorff concluded by expressing a desire to be placed in possession of any information or suggestions which your Lordship might desire to offer to him, and by promising to keep me promptly informed of any later news which the Russian Foreign Office might receive from China; he laid emphasis on the necessity of maintaining a complete accord between all the European Powers with regard to their action in China.

## No. 43.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 17, 1900.*

IT appears that the Boxer movement is spreading rapidly. The telegraph wires in Shansi, Shensi, and Honan have been cut, and orders given to kill foreigners and burn churches. The Governors of Kwangsi, Shansi, Shensi, Honan, Hunan, and Hupei are now all reported to have declared in favour of the rising. The Viceroy of Hankow may also be carried away by the flood, although he still remains firm.

I have received the following telegram from Her Majesty's Consul at Kiukiang:—

"I have received news to-day that at Ching-te-chen the Roman Catholic Mission was burnt, native converts killed, and the banks pillaged on the 11th July. The officials at Tao-chow ordered the Mission to withdraw immediately, declaring themselves unable to protect it. The Mission is since believed to have been burnt. The Mission has been withdrawn from Foochow (near Poyang Lake)."

## No. 44.

*Consul Fraser to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Hankow, July 17, 1900.*

I BELIEVE that the Viceroy's hands would be strengthened by a public assurance that the Emperor and Empress-Dowager will be treated by the foreign Powers respectfully and honourably, as the Empress is not considered by the Viceroys and official classes as really to blame for the present situation, or as having usurped the Throne. A guarantee of their Majesties' personal safety would do good, and would probably lessen opposition in the North if this assurance is impossible.

The Viceroy wished me to see him and hear his views on this urgent matter, but I replied that I could not do so until I had obtained instructions from your Lordship on the subject.

## No. 45.

*Consul Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Canton, July 17, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Li Hung-chang started this afternoon from Canton.

## No. 46.

*Consul Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Canton, July 17, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Li Hung-chang has been appointed Viceroy of the Province of Chihli.

## No. 47.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 17, 1900.*

OFFICIAL messenger publishes telegram from engineer in charge of second section East Chinese Railway, stating that on 2nd July he was informed by Chinese General Tsuen that he had received orders to take offensive against all Russians who did not immediately withdraw over frontier. Engineer collected staff, and reached frontier safely 13th July. A telegram from Military Governor, Amur, dated 14th July, states that steamers with ammunition were stopped at Chinese town Aigun, Chinese officers stating that they had orders to stop navigation, and were fired upon, but reached Blagovestchensk safely. One officer, six men wounded.

On 15th July, quite unexpectedly, heavy fire was opened on Blagovestchensk; three Russians killed, six wounded.

## No. 48.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 17, 1900.*

THE French Ambassador called at this Office to-day and informed Sir T. Sanderson that the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that the Chinese Minister in that capital had received a message from the Empress-Dowager of China, dated the 2nd July, stating that the Legations were then still safe, and that she was giving them such protection as she could.

The message had come via Pao-Ting-Fu, and was said to have been sent without the knowledge either of Prince Tuan or of the Tsung-li Yamên.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 49.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 17, 1900.*

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to inclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram received to-day from Consul-General Warren at Shanghae,\* from which it is anticipated that the disturbances in the north may before long extend to Shanghae.

From other advices received here, it is felt that the threatening state of affairs on the Yang-tsze makes it desirable that a portion of the Indian troops should be halted at Hong Kong as they arrive.

Consul-General Warren, in a previous telegram, estimated the force necessary to defend Shanghae as follows:—

500 cavalry.  
1 battery of artillery.  
2,000 infantry.

Matters have now assumed a more threatening character, and it may be that the military authorities would advise a larger force.

Lord Salisbury would be glad to know if Lord George Hamilton agrees in this opinion, and whether he thinks it desirable that General Gaselee should, under the changed circumstances at Peking, proceed to the north. It is urgently pressed by Consul-General Warren, who is in touch with the Senior Naval Officer, that the troops detained should be ready to sail at a few hours' notice.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 50.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 18.)*

Sir,

*India Office, July 18, 1900.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant, and to acquaint you, in reply, for the information of the Marquess of Salisbury, that the following telegram has this day been sent to Hong Kong:—

*“From Secretary of State for War to General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong,  
July 18, 1900.*

*“Following for Gaselee from the Secretary of State for India:—*

*“We hear ‘ominous reports as to spread of revolt and consequent danger to Shanghai. You should stop there on your way north, and divert such troops as seem absolutely necessary for its defence if, in your judgment, the position is critical. Whilst we are alive to the necessity of rapidly augmenting the international forces at Tien-tsin, European interests at Shanghai are too important to be imperilled. Telegraph your views as soon as possible from Shanghai.’”*

2. Whether a large force will be required for Shanghai largely depends upon the information of the next few days.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) J. STEDMAN, *Major-General,  
Military Secretary.*

No. 51.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 18.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, July 18, 1900.*

VISCOUNT AOKI has informed the German Chargé d’Affaires that on the 13th July the Emperor of Japan received a telegram from the Emperor of China dated about a week before from Peking, and sent by Chinanfu.

The Emperor of China states that without danger to his own life he could not suppress the Boxers, and expresses the hope that the friendship between China and Japan will not be altered by the persecution of the Legations and the murder of Mr. Sugiyama.

Viscount Aoki had replied through Chinese Minister in Tókió in the Emperor’s name, that the gravest breach of international law which any country could commit was an attack on Diplomatic Representatives.

Until the suppression of the insurrection there could be no question of amicable negotiations.

No. 52.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 18, 1900.*

OWING to the Shah’s visit Count Lamsdorff could not receive the foreign Representatives yesterday or to-day, and I could not speak with his Excellency with regard to your Lordship’s telegram of 15th July.

I am at a loss to understand how the question which I was instructed to put to the Russian Government on the 26th ultimo could have been understood by them as proposing that an independent mandate should be given to Japan.

I distinctly said when I saw Count Lamsdorff that I did not understand the idea as proposing that a separate mandate should be given, but as inviting the co-operation of the reinforcements most promptly available.

No. 53.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1900.*

RUSSIAN Chargé d'Affaires has made following communication :—

In view of inquiries addressed to Imperial Government concerning the ulterior military measures which the Powers may have to undertake in China, the latter considers it urgent to come immediately to a positive understanding on the subject.

A question of the most important nature at once presents itself, that of the unity of action of all the international detachments on Chinese territory; or, otherwise expressed, the question of the concentration in one single hand of the general command and direction of all these detachments.

The Imperial Government gather that the opinion of the foreign Cabinets differs on this point; some think that the international forces may be put under the orders of the Senior Commander, others that the number of troops of a certain nationality should affect the selection of the Commander-in-chief.

Either method, being based on a casual circumstance, subject to frequent changes, is open to serious practical inconvenience.

In these circumstances, it would seem useful to establish by common agreement more stable principles for the unity of action so necessary for success against the insurrectionary movement in China.

Considering that the efforts of the Powers tend to the same object, equally serious for all, the Imperial Government think that special importance should not be attributed to the activity of this or that detachment. Whether the troops of any nationality be concentrated in the rearguard or be at the head of a column, whether it defends positions already conquered, undertakes reconnaissances, or guards lines of communication; all this, independently even of the numerical strength of the detachment should have the same value in the view of the Powers as contributing to the accomplishment of the work undertaken in common.

I send some observations on this communication in a separate telegram.

No. 54.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1900.*

THE communication recited in my preceding telegram was considered yesterday by the Cabinet, but before we can express any opinion on it, we find it essential to have some further explanations as to its meaning and intention.

It speaks in first paragraph of the ulterior military measures which the Powers may have to take in China, and it suggests in second paragraph that for the purpose of these measures the general command and direction of all the international detachments on Chinese territory should be concentrated in one single hand for the purpose of securing unity of action.

What is the meaning of these phrases?

What are the "ulterior military measures" to which allusion is made? Does the sentence imply, as the juxtaposition of expressions would seem to indicate, that "all the international detachments on Chinese territory" are to be employed upon these ulterior military measures? and that for that purpose all these detachments are to be concentrated under the single hand of the General Commanding?

These phrases make it matter of the greatest interest to know the views of the Russian Government with respect to this proposed General Commanding, the manner of his choice, and the powers to be placed in his hands. The rest of the telegram throws little light upon this subject.

Count Lamsdorff condemns without hesitation the plan of selecting such a Commander in deference to superior rank, or to the greater size of the contingent he commands.

I entirely concur with Count Lamsdorff in thinking that the appointment of a General Commanding in pursuance of these considerations would not be satisfactory.

The observations made in the two last sentences of the telegram appear to be

intended to bear on this question. But I am not able to trace the deduction which Count Lamsdorff means to draw from them.

You should place these observations before Count Lamsdorff, and request further explanations of the points raised in them, urging especially the importance of some definite understanding as to the nature, scope, and object of the military operations which he contemplates.

No. 55.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Currie.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1900.*

FROM inquiries addressed to me, I gather that the Russian communication, recorded in my telegram of the 15th July to Sir C. Scott, has been made to all the Powers.

You should communicate to Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of my reply, recorded in the same telegram, explaining that nothing has passed between the Russian Government and Her Majesty's Government in any way justifying the statement that any European mission to Japan has been suggested or contemplated by us.

We shall be glad to know what view is taken by other Powers of the fundamental principles proposed by the Russian Government. We are in agreement with the desire to avoid anything which may tend to the partition of China, but it seems altogether premature, in our present ignorance of the condition or intentions of the authorities at Peking, to speak of the re-establishment by the joint efforts of the Powers of a Central Government, by which order and tranquillity can be guaranteed.

No. 56.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 21.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 21, 1900.*

I WILL endeavour to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day and speak to him in the sense of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday on the subject of the mandate to Japan.

There is no doubt that the demand made by China for French mediation will be discussed at the Cabinet Council which is to be held this morning.

No. 57.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 21.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 21, 1900.*

I PLACED unofficially in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon a Memorandum in fulfilment of the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of 20th July.

His Excellency stated that he himself had never said anything to imply that Her Majesty's Government desired that a mandate should be given to Japan, and declared himself in ignorance of nearly all that had passed between the British and Russian Governments as detailed in your Lordship's telegram of the 15th instant to Sir Charles Scott.

No. 58.

*Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 21.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 21, 1900.*

THIS afternoon Mr. Townley saw Italian Foreign Minister and made the communication as instructed in your Lordship's telegram, dated yesterday.

\* Also to Sir E. Monson, Sir H. Russell, Viscount Gough, and Lord Pauncefoot.

M. Visconti-Venosta stated that the Italian Government had received a communication from the Russian Government similar to that made on the 13th instant to your Lordship. His Excellency had informed Russian Chargé d'Affaires that the Italian Government had received no proposal from Her Majesty's Government that Europe should give a mission to Japan to send forces to China.

Italy was most desirous, his Excellency said, for the maintenance of the accord between the Powers; she was opposed to all action which might lead to a partition of the Chinese Empire, would assist in any joint action for the relief of the Foreign Legations, and would act in concert with the other Powers in any measures which it might be found necessary later to take for the establishment of a Government competent to restore and preserve order.

## No. 59.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 21.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 21, 1900.*

IN conversation to-day I submitted to Count Lamsdorff the observations on the Russian communication contained in your Lordship's telegram of 20th July, and I invited further explanation on the points which they raised.

His Excellency said that the communication had as its object to provoke an exchange of opinion between the Governments concerned as to the necessity of the general command and direction of the international detachments being concentrated in one hand. In Paris this necessity seems to be felt, and here and at Berlin the arguments in support of it are appreciated.

It was meant to apply only to the present field of combined action in Pechili, and Count Lamsdorff gathers that, in the opinion of the military authorities on the spot, although hitherto the operations have proceeded successfully and without friction, the time has come to determine the responsibility for general direction by some agreement between the Governments.

His Excellency cannot possibly indicate what ulterior measures may be necessary or their eventual scope, the rescue and protection of foreigners being the primary common aim.

It is his personal view that if the Governments are in agreement that it is essential for the success of the effort that there should be a single general direction, then the views of their military authorities on the spot as to the most satisfactory and practical way of giving effect to it, and as to the nature and scope of the military measures which can be undertaken, should be ascertained by each Government by telegraph.

These were points on which the Russian Government had not yet been able to form any definite opinion.

## No. 60.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 21, 1900.*

THE Chinese Minister called here this afternoon in my absence and announced to Mr. Bertie that at 2.30 p.m. to-day he received from the Viceroy of Nanking a telegram informing him that on the 18th instant an Imperial Decree was issued ordering the punishment of the criminals who assassinated the German Minister. In the same Decree, he said, it was stated that it was fortunate that the protection afforded to the other Ministers had been effective, and that they were all right.

Lofêngluh also said that he had received a similar telegram from the Taotai of Shanghai.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.



## No. 61.

*Mr. Choate to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 22.)*

My dear Lord Salisbury,

*American Embassy, London, July 22, 1900.*

I HAVE received from the Secretary of State a cable which arrived at 11 o'clock last night, stating that the President has received from Emperor Kwang Hsu a telegram, dated the 9th July, appealing to the long-continued friendly relations maintained between the two countries: he addresses the President in all sincerity and candour, with the hope that he may devise measures and take the initiative to bring about a concert of Powers for the restoration of order and peace, and asking a reply which he awaits with anxiety.

The President accepts this as evidence that the Emperor Kwang Hsu is living and in the exercise of Imperial functions, and desires a friendly accord with the Powers.

He has instructed me to communicate this to you, and as it seems important, I send a special messenger down with it.

Yours very truly,  
(Signed) JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

## No. 62.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 22, 1900.*

A MEMORIAL from various Viceroy and Governors, praying that the foreign Ministers might be protected, has been submitted to the Throne by the Governor of Shantung. The following translation of an Imperial Decree, dated 10th July, is in reply to it:—

“It is written in the Confucian work ‘Spring and Autumn,’ that Envoys shall not be killed. How can it then be supposed that the Throne’s policy is to connive at allowing the troops and populace to vent their wrath upon the foreign Ministers? For a month past, excepting the murder of the German Minister by the riotous people, which offence is being vigorously investigated, the other Ministers are being protected by the Throne with a ceaseless energy, and fortunately have suffered no harm.”

Sheng received a telegram on Friday from the Governor of Shantung, transmitting a message in cypher to the United States’ Government from their Minister. This message was undated, but purported to have left Peking on 18th July. It was to the effect that the United States’ Minister was in the British Legation under fire from shot and shell. The date given by the Chinese to the United States’ Minister’s telegram is, your Lordship will observe, the same as that of the above-quoted Decree, and the assurances given in the latter are not borne out by the former.

I telegraphed yesterday to the Governor of Shantung, asking why we had had no message from Sir C. MacDonald, and how it was that a message from Peking could reach Chinan-fu in two days. He assures me, in reply, that there is no telegraphic communication, but that the United States’ Minister’s telegram was sent by the Tsung-li Yamên by a messenger travelling 600 *li* (roughly, 200 miles) a-day. He cannot explain why Her Majesty’s Minister has not telegraphed. He begs me not to be anxious, as he has already had several reliable messages to the effect that the Ministers and others are all living and unharmed.

## No. 63.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 22, 1900.*

THE object of the message communicated on the 13th instant by the Russian Chargé d’Affaires, and reported in your Lordship’s telegram of the 15th July, has been explained to me by Count Lamsdorff.

His Excellency said that it was in order to clear the Russian Government at once from the odious and entirely undeserved charge that they had hesitated to accept

Japan's assistance, and had thereby assumed the grave responsibility of hindering the prompt relief of the Legations, this charge had been insinuated in the press and other quarters.

His Excellency admitted that in the message which I communicated to him no mention had been made of any European mandate to Japan for independent action, and that co-operation was indicated in the arguments used by me, but he said that at Berlin your Lordship's question had been understood to imply an European mandate, and that it was possible to so interpret the words used "an expedition to restore order at Peking and Tien-tsin, if Japan is willing to undertake the task."

Although the misunderstanding had been promptly cleared up, unjust deductions had been drawn by the public press, and it ought to have been made quite clear by the instructions sent to the Russian Minister at Tôkiô that all available prompt assistance from Japan, equally with the Powers concerned in meeting the common danger, would be gladly welcomed by Russia.

I had, I said, no reason to believe that any doubts on this point had been entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 64.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 23.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, July 21, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a Memorandum which I have to-day left with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, by the communication of which I hope to have carried out your Lordship's instructions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

Inclosure in No. 64.

*Aide-mémoire.*

LE 13 Juillet dernier le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie a transmis à Lord Salisbury une communication du Comte Lamsdorff d'après laquelle le Ministre de Russie à Tokio avait fait savoir à son Excellence que le Gouvernement Japonais était prêt à envoyer des troupes en Chine pour collaborer avec celles des autres Puissances à la protection des Légations et des étrangers.

Le Gouvernement Russe a répondu qu'il ne désirait entraver en aucune façon la liberté d'action du Japon, mais que, dans son opinion, cette action ne devrait impliquer aucun droit à une solution indépendante, ni aucun privilège au delà d'une indemnité pécuniaire plus élevée, dans le cas où les Puissances seraient d'accord pour en exiger une plus tard.

Le Comte Lamsdorff déclare avoir reçu presque simultanément une communication du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans laquelle allusion est déjà faite non pas à une décision spontanée du Cabinet de Tokio de s'associer à l'action collective des Puissances, mais plutôt à un mandat que donnerait l'Europe au Japon pour l'envoi en Chine d'une armée considérable dans le but non seulement de sauvegarder les Légations et les étrangers mais également de supprimer le mouvement révolutionnaire et de rétablir l'ordre à Pékin et à Tien-tsin.

Cette façon d'énoncer la question constituerait, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Russe, une infraction des principes fondamentaux de l'action collective acceptés par la majorité des Puissances comme base de leur politique, savoir le maintien de l'accord entre les Puissances, le maintien du système de Gouvernement tel qu'il existe en Chine, l'écartement de tout ce qui pouvait amener la partition de l'Empire Chinois, bref, le rétablissement par l'action collective des Puissances d'un Gouvernement Central légitime capable d'assurer l'ordre et la sécurité. Lord Salisbury a répondu que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté n'a jamais fait de proposition qui ait pu faire supposer que l'action du Japon dût lui conférer des droits à une solution indépendante, ou aucun autre privilège. Le Gouvernement Britannique n'a jamais fait mention au Gouvernement Russe d'un mandat donné au Japon par l'Europe. Les principes fondamentaux dont parle le Comte Lamsdorff n'ont jamais été agréés par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, qui n'a même pas

discuté jusqu'à présent avec les autres Puissances les circonstances auxquelles pourraient s'appliquer ces principes. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne s'est jamais exprimé en faveur d'aucune action sauf celle qui amènerait la délivrance des Légations et des autres étrangers.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté attacherait le plus grand prix à savoir les vues du Gouvernement de la République sur les principes fondamentaux qu'a proposés le Gouvernement Russe. Il partage le désir d'éviter tout ce qui pourrait amener une partition de la Chine, mais il lui semble prématuré de parler du rétablissement par l'action collective des Puissances d'un Gouvernement Central en Chine capable d'assurer l'ordre et la sécurité étant donnée l'ignorance absolue qui existe au sujet de la situation des autorités à Pékin et des intentions qui les animent.

*Paris, le 21 Juillet, 1900.*

(Translation.)

*Memorandum.*

ON the 13th July the Russian Chargé d'Affaires transmitted to Lord Salisbury a communication from Count Lamsdorff, according to which the Russian Minister at Tôkiô had intimated to his Excellency that the Japanese Government was prepared to send troops to China to assist those of the other Powers in protecting the Legations and foreigners.

The Russian Government replied that they had no wish to hinder the liberty of action of Japan, but that, in their opinion, this action must not imply any right to an independent solution, nor any privilege beyond that of a higher pecuniary indemnity, if the Powers were agreed to demand one at a later time.

Count Lamsdorff states that he received almost simultaneously a communication from Her Majesty's Government, in which allusion is made not to a spontaneous decision of the Tôkiô Cabinet to associate itself with the joint action of the Powers, but rather to a mandate that Europe would give to Japan to send to China a large army, not merely with the object of protecting the Legations and foreigners, but likewise of suppressing the revolutionary movement and re-establishing order at Tien-tsin.

This way of putting the question would, in the opinion of the Russian Government, constitute an infringement of the fundamental principles of collective action such as had been accepted by the majority of the Powers as a basis of their policy, namely, the maintenance of harmony between the Powers, as also of the existing system of Government in China, the avoidance of everything which might lead to the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire; in short, the re-establishment, through the collective action of the Powers, of a legitimate Central Government capable of insuring order and security. Lord Salisbury replied that Her Majesty's Government never made a proposal which could have given rise to the supposition that the action of Japan should entitle that country to any claims to an independent solution or to any other privilege. The British Government have never mentioned to the Russian Government any mandate given by Europe to Japan. The fundamental principles of which Count Lamsdorff speaks have never been accepted by Her Majesty's Government, who, up to the present, have not even discussed with the other Powers the circumstances to which these principles might apply. Her Majesty's Government have never expressed themselves in favour of any plan of action other than that which would effect the deliverance of the Legations and of other foreigners.

Her Majesty's Government would attach the greatest value to an intimation of the views of the Government of the Republic on the fundamental principles proposed by the Russian Government. They share the desire to avoid everything which might bring about a partition of China, but, in view of the absolute ignorance which exists regarding the situation of the authorities at Peking, and of the intentions by which they are animated, it seems to Her Majesty's Government premature to speak of the re-establishment, by the joint action of the Powers, of a Central Government in China capable of insuring order and security.

*Paris, July 21, 1900.*

No. 65.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 24.)*

My Lord,

Shanghai, June 18, 1900.

I HAVE to-day had the honour to telegraph to you to the effect that Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Hankow, at an interview with the Viceroy Chang Chih Tung, communicated to his Excellency your Lordship's assurance that Her Majesty's Government would support him in keeping order on the Yang-tsze. The Viceroy professed to be taking steps, and to be confident that he and Viceroy Liu at Nanking would be able to prevent disorder.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

No. 66.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 24.)*

(Extract.)

Vienna, July 22, 1900

I CALLED upon Count Szécsen yesterday by appointment and communicated to him the substance of the reply returned by your Lordship to the communication made to you on the 13th instant by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, as recorded in your Lordship's telegrams to me of the 20th July.

I left with Count Szécsen an *aide-mémoire* on the subject, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy.

His Excellency, after listening attentively to the explanations I gave him in compliance with your Lordship's instructions, said that a communication similar to that referred to by your Lordship had been received here from the Russian Embassy some time ago. The Russian Circular was of a purely retrospective character, and referred to circumstances which now unfortunately belonged to the past.

With reference to the explanations I had been charged to give him, his Excellency said that it was well known that there had been no proposal to confer a European mandate upon Japan.

As regards the view which was taken by the Imperial Government of the fundamental principles enunciated by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, Count Szécsen said that they held to the maintenance of union between the Powers, and although their direct interests in China were small, were opposed to anything that might lead to a partition of that Empire.

Inclosure in No. 66.

*Aide-mémoire.*

UNE communication a été faite à Lord Salisbury à la date du 13 Juillet par le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie au sujet d'une proposition du Gouvernement Britannique ayant pour but de conférer au Japon une mission pour le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la sécurité en Chine. Un pareil mandat, d'après le Gouvernement Russe, enfreindrait jusqu'à un certain point les principes fondamentaux qui ont déjà été acceptés par la majorité des Puissances comme base de leur politique; à savoir le maintien de l'accord entre les Puissances; le maintien de la forme de Gouvernement existant en Chine; l'exclusion de tout ce qui pourrait tendre à un partage de cet Empire; en somme, le rétablissement par les efforts concertés des Puissances d'un Gouvernement Central légitime capable d'assurer l'ordre et la sécurité.

Comme il y a lieu de croire que pareille communication a été adressée aux différents Cabinets, Lord Salisbury désire également porter à la connaissance de ces Cabinets la réponse qu'il a faite à la communication Russe.

Lord Salisbury tient à constater que dans les pourparlers qui ont eu lieu avec le Gouvernement Russe il n'a été dit rien qui puisse justifier l'assertion que l'Angleterre aurait suggéré, ou eu en vue, le décernement d'un mandat de la part de l'Europe au Japon.

Lord Salisbury serait heureux de savoir ce que pense le Gouvernement Impérial et

Royal des principes fondamentaux exposés par le Gouvernement Russe. Le Gouvernement Britannique se joint au désir exprimé d'éviter tout ce qui pourrait tendre à un partage de la Chine, mais, dans son ignorance actuelle de l'état et des intentions de l'autorité existant aujourd'hui à Pékin, il lui paraît pour le moins prématuré de parler d'un rétablissement par les efforts concertés des Puissances d'un Gouvernement Central capable de garantir l'ordre et la sécurité.

(Translation.)

*Memorandum.*

A COMMUNICATION has been made to Lord Salisbury by the Imperial Russian Government, dated the 13th July, relative to a proposal of the British Government to intrust to Japan a mission for the re-establishment of order and security in China. Such a mandate, according to the Russian Government, would, to a certain extent, violate the fundamental principles which have already been accepted by the majority of the Powers as the basis of their policy; that is to say, the maintenance of harmony among the Powers; the maintenance of the existing form of Government in China; the exclusion of everything which might tend to a partition of the Empire; in a word, the re-establishment by the concerted efforts of the Powers of a legitimate Central Government capable of insuring the maintenance of order and security.

As there is reason to believe that a similar communication has been addressed to the different Cabinets, Lord Salisbury wishes also to inform these Cabinets of the reply which he has made to the Russian communication.

Lord Salisbury wishes to record that in the *pourparlers* which have taken place with the Russian Government, nothing has been said which could justify the assertion that England had suggested, or had in view, the giving, on the part of Europe, of a mandate to Japan.

Lord Salisbury would be glad to know what the Imperial and Royal Government think of the fundamental principles set forth by the Russian Government. The British Government associate themselves with the desire expressed to avoid everything which might tend to a partition of China, but being at present ignorant of the state and intentions of the existing authority at Peking, it would appear to him to be, to say the least, premature to speak of a re-establishment by the concerted efforts of the Powers of a Central Government capable of guaranteeing the maintenance of order and security.

No. 67.

*Imperial Decree issued at Peking on the 21st of the 6th moon (July 17), and received in London on July 21.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, July 24, 1900.)*

THE present disturbance in our foreign relations is to be traced to the antipathies which have long existed between the native Christians and their fellow subjects, and to the irritation occasioned by the Treaty Powers in attacking and occupying the forts at Taku.

The Court of Peking attach much importance to the maintenance of friendly relations with the Treaty Powers, and would view any interruption of them with sincere regret; and it was for this reason that, notwithstanding the hostilities at Taku, we have repeatedly issued Imperial Decrees enjoining the metropolitan and provincial authorities to accord plenary protection to the foreign Legations in Peking and foreigners residing in other parts of the Empire. And as the disturbances which called for these Decrees still continue unabated, and as large numbers of foreigners are resident in divers parts of China, we now command the Tartar Generals, the Viceroy and Governors of provinces to make themselves acquainted with their various places of abode, whether at the Treaty ports or at the Foos, Chows and Hsiens in the interior, so that our Treaty obligation to give adequate protection to them may be fulfilled, and further untoward incidents prevented from occurring.

We were shocked to learn last month that Mr. Sugiyama, the Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, had been killed, and some time afterwards that Baron von Ketteler, the Minister of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, had been assassinated at his post in Peking. We now command that the parties to these outrages may be sought for and arrested without delay, in order that they may be punished according to law.

Since the outbreak of hostilities at Tien-tsin there have doubtless been many peaceful missionaries and other foreigners, unconnected with these hostilities, who, at the hands of disorderly persons, have suffered in person or property. Let the Governor of Peking and the Viceroy of Chihli cause their cases to be severally investigated and reported to us for our information.

Recently in other parts of the Empire bandits and unruly persons have committed many acts of oppression, arson, rapine, and murder. The Viceroys and Governors of provinces and the high territorial military authorities are commanded to take stringent measures for the restoration of order and tranquillity in their respective Governments, and the extermination of the parties by whom these outrages were committed.

Let this, our Imperial Decree, be promulgated in every part of the Empire.

Respect this.

No. 68.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1900.*

A TELEGRAM from General Gaselee states as result of conference with you and Senior Naval Officer that a force of 3,000 men is necessary for defence of Shanghae, and that in your opinion this might be arranged with Viceroy of Nanking.

You reported in your telegram of the 7th July that Viceroys were not anxious for further force at that date.

Has situation since changed in this respect, and could force of 3,000 now be landed with full concurrence on their part?

No. 69.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1900.*

THE Chinese Minister in the course of conversation asked me what answer we proposed to give to the appeal which he had placed in our hands from his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China. I replied that whenever the European Ministers should return to us unhurt, we should be very glad to discuss, and to discuss in the most favourable manner, any appeal which the Imperial Government of China might have to make to Her Majesty's Government, but as long as there remained this terrible doubt as to the fate which they might have incurred at the hands of the Chinese soldiery or the Boxers, it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to enter into further negotiations with that of the Empire.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 70.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1900.*

M. CAMBON laid before me, by direction of M. Delcassé, a proposition with respect to the command of the naval forces belonging to the Allied Powers in the China Sea, but I was not able to ascertain from what he said that he had more in his view than that the Commanders of the ships should as much as possible consult together, so that their force might not be wasted in defending the various points at which European interests were attacked. I assured him that we entirely agreed with the necessity of full consultation between the Allied Naval Commanders before any decision was taken.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 71.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 25, 1900.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's telegram of the 24th instant.

The Viceroy of Nanking is still firm and declares his ability to keep the peace. Her Majesty's Consul at Nanking is endeavouring to ascertain the views of the Viceroy as to the landing of troops. Considerable quantities of ammunition are reported as being sent to Kiang-yin and other forts, and guns are being mounted at various points on the banks of the Yang-tsze.

Three guns have been mounted upon the Wusing fort, though I am informed by the Viceroy that he gave orders that this should not be done. The Governor of Suchow seems to doubt his ability to keep the peace. It will be necessary to occupy Shanghai even without the consent of the Viceroy, should they be unable to control their people. I am withdrawing the women and children from the Yang-tsze ports. Many have left already.

## No. 72.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 25, 1900.*

THE situation is causing some alarm to the American-China Association here, and they propose to ask the United States' Government to send a force to occupy Shanghai either jointly with us or alone.

## No. 73.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1900.*

I UNDERSTAND that the Emperor of Russia has, in the case of a direct appeal made to His Majesty by the Emperor of China (who is understood to be Kwang-su), acted in the same way as other Sovereigns, and has insisted that, before replying, he should be satisfied as to the safety of his Minister, and should be placed in direct communication with him.

## No. 74.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Newport, July 25, 1900.*

THE text of the appeal of the Emperor of China to the President of the United States for his mediation has been made public by the United States' Government.

It refers to the recent outbreaks of mutual antipathy between the people and the Christian Missions which caused foreign Powers to suspect that the Government was favourable to the people. This brought about the capture of the forts at Taku. It appeals to the President to devise measures to effect a concert of the Powers with a view to the re-establishment of peace and order.

The President, in his reply, states that he understands from the message of the Emperor that the malefactors who have disturbed the peace and committed the late atrocities are in rebellion against the Imperial authority. If that be the case, the President would urge upon China—

1. To give public assurance whether the foreign Ministers are alive, and, if so, in what condition.
2. To put the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers in immediate and free communication with their respective Governments.
3. To place the Imperial authorities of China in communication with the relief

expedition with a view to securing co-operation for the protection of the foreigners and the restoration of order.

The reply then states that if these conditions are fulfilled and the other Powers assent, the friendly good offices of the United States' Government will be placed at the disposal of the Emperor of China.

The press here affirms that the Chinese Minister in Washington has received a message from Sheng to the effect that protection has been afforded to the foreign Ministers, who have also been supplied with food, and that they will now be sent under escort from Peking to Tien-tsin.

## No. 75.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir H. Rumbold.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1900.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador called at this Office to-day and read to Sir T. Sanderson a telegram from his Government, stating that the Austro-Hungarian vessels "Elizabeth" and "Aspern" are being sent to China under the command of Rear-Admiral Montecucoli, who, on arriving in Chinese waters, would also assume command of the two Austrian vessels already out there.

His Excellency stated that in view of the comparatively small amount of Austro-Hungarian interests in China, his Government did not propose to send any military force; but the squadron would be prepared, if occasion arose, to land a considerable detachment in order to give evidence of the desire of Austria-Hungary to act with the other Powers interested.

Count Deym added that the Austro-Hungarian Government wish to show their readiness to participate in the joint work of humanity and civilization undertaken by the Powers, and that their Commanders would proceed in complete accord with the other Admirals as regards any operations.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 76.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 26, 1900.*

IT is feared that there has been a terrible massacre in the Province of Shansi. It is reported that five more foreigners have been murdered there.

## No. 77.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 26, 1900.*

THE Viceroy at Wuchang is most anxious to obtain a loan of 500,000 taels on the security of his cotton mills. He requires it in order to pay his troops. In the face of a formal Peking Edict to the effect that all provincial loans must stand on their merits, the manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank here cannot make it on his own responsibility. The Bank is willing to advance this sum if Her Majesty's Government will guarantee it.

I would suggest the advisability of Her Majesty's Government taking this opportunity of confirming the Yang-tsze Viceroy's assurances of support in an effective manner, and of strengthening their power.



No. 78.

*Viscount Gough to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 27.)*

My Lord,

Berlin, July 25, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies and translations of a *note verbale* handed to the Imperial Foreign Office on the 21st instant by the Chinese Legation in Berlin, which purports to contain a direct message from the Emperor of China to the German Emperor asking for the latter's assistance.

The reply of Count von Bülow is likewise inclosed, in which his Excellency declines to submit the Chinese message to the German Emperor so long as the fate of the Europeans in Peking is unknown, the murder of Baron von Ketteler remains unatoned, and no proper guarantees for the future given.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GOUGH.

Inclosure in No. 78.

*Note Verbale.*

(Translation.)

ON the 21st instant the Chinese Legation at Berlin handed the following *note verbale* to the Imperial Foreign Office:—

“The Imperial Chinese Legation have the honour to bring the following telegram from the Imperial Council of State to the notice of the German Foreign Office. This telegram was dispatched to Yuen-shi-kai, Governor of Shantung, for further transmission to Yü-lien-yuen, Taotai of Shanghai, to be forwarded thence to this Legation.

“The Emperor of the Tatsing dynasty sends greeting to His Majesty the German Emperor. China and Germany have long lived in peace together, and on neither side has there subsisted any mistrust. Outbreaks of hatred have recently taken place between the Chinese population and the (native) Christians, during which Baron von Ketteler, Imperial German Minister, was unexpectedly murdered by the insurgents, which gives us occasion to express our profound regret. The inquiry had been commenced for the arrest and punishment of the murderer, when the suspicion arose among all the foreign States that the attitude of the Imperial Government towards the population in their persecution of the Christians was one of connivence. Thereupon followed first the capture of the forts of Taku, hostilities commenced, and the evil increased in complexity. The situation in which China at present finds herself will be difficult to put straight, especially as the Chinese Government have not the intention of ever allowing the existing good relations to undergo a change, for it is only owing to the circumstances at present prevailing that the Government have to their regret been forced into a position of constraint.

“For the removal of the universal feeling prevailing against the Chinese Government, and for a clearing up of the situation, there remains the one means of an appeal to the assistance of Germany. Therefore we open our heart to your Majesty in this letter, in the hope that the continuance of the friendly relations will thereby be assured, and that your Majesty may be moved to conceive a plan for the attainment of this end, and to assume the direction in order to bring about the former peaceful state of things. We pray that your Majesty will return us a favourable reply, our gratitude for which to your Majesty will always remain alive.

“Given the 23rd day of the 6th moon of the 26th year of the reign of Kwangsü.”

July 19, 1900.

The Imperial Chinese Legation were thereupon handed the following *note verbale* on the 24th instant:—

“Berlin, July 21, 1900.

“The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State, Count von Bülow, has received the *note verbale* from the Imperial Chinese Legation of the 21st instant, inclosing a telegraphic communication from His Majesty the Emperor of China to His Majesty the Emperor and King. Count Bülow does not find himself in a position to submit this telegram to His Majesty the Emperor and King so long as the fate of the

foreign Missions shut in in Peking and of the other foreigners there has not been cleared up, and so long as the Imperial Chinese Government have not made atonement for the outrageous murder of the Imperial Minister, and given adequate guarantees that their conduct in the future will be in accordance with the law of nations and with civilization."

## No. 79.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 27.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, July 25, 1900.*

THE afternoon issue of the "Havas Agency" contains the text of the letter addressed by the Emperor of China to the President of the French Republic, dated the 19th instant, and transmitted telegraphically by the Governor of Shantung. The letter, after insisting upon the ties of friendship which have always existed between the two countries, implores the President to take the initiative with a view of remedying the situation, and begs for a speedy and a favourable answer.

A copy of the "Havas Agency" sheet is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

## Inclosure in No. 79.

*Extract from the "Agence Havas" of July 25, 1900.*

*Informations.*

L'EMPEREUR DE CHINE a adressé au Président de la République la lettre suivante, qui a été transmise télégraphiquement par le Gouverneur du Shantung, le 23 de la lune Chinoise (19 Juillet, 1900) :—

"La Chine est, depuis plusieurs années, liée d'amitié avec votre honorable pays, Toutes les affaires concernant nos rapports sur les frontières du Quang-Si et du Yunnan ont été discutées et réglées par la voie de la conciliation. Il n'existe pas de griefs entre nous.

"Récemment, la population et les Chrétiens s'étant trouvés en hostilité, des gens rebelles du peuple ont profité de l'occasion pour se livrer à leurs déprédations, d'où il est résulté que les nations étrangères ont soupçonné la Cour de faire preuve de partialité envers le peuple et de jalousie envers les Chrétiens. Depuis eurent lieu l'attaque et la prise des forts de Takou; après quoi l'action militaire et les malheurs se sont succédé, rendant la situation d'autant plus compliquée et dangereuse.

"Comme nous pensons que, dans les relations internationales de la Chine avec l'étranger, votre honorable nation a les rapports les plus cordiaux avec la Chine, et que la Chine est aujourd'hui pressée par les circonstances jusqu'au point de s'être attiré la colère universelle, pour arranger ces difficultés et pour résoudre ces complications, il n'est pas possible que ce ne soit pas seulement sur votre honorable pays que nous comptons.

"C'est pourquoi, nous ouvrant à vous en toute sincérité, nous vous exposons nos sentiments intimes, et, avec une entière franchise, nous vous adressons cette lettre dans l'unique espoir que vous trouverez, M. le Président de la République, le moyen d'arranger les choses et que vous prendrez l'initiative de transformer la situation actuelle.

"Nous vous prions, en même temps, d'avoir la bonté de nous adresser une bienveillante réponse que nous ne pouvons nous défendre d'attendre avec une anxiété extrême.

"Le 23<sup>e</sup> jour de la 6<sup>e</sup> lune de la 26<sup>e</sup> année (19 Juillet, 1900).

(Signé) KOUANG-SIU.

(Translation.)

THE Emperor of China has addressed to the President of the Republic the following letter, which has been communicated by telegraph by the Governor of Shantung, the 23rd of the Chinese moon (19th July, 1900) :—

“For many years China has been united in friendship with your honourable country. All the business in connection with our relations on the frontiers of Kwangsi and Yünnan has been discussed and settled in a conciliatory manner. We have no complaint to make of each other.

“Latterly, hostility having broken out between the population and the Christians, some rebels among the people have taken advantage of the circumstances to engage in depredations, whence it has come that foreign nations have suspected the Court of showing partiality towards the people and jealousy towards the Christians. Afterwards there occurred the attack on, and capture of, the Taku forts; after which military action and misfortune succeeded each other, rendering the situation all the more complicated and dangerous.

“As we think that, in the international relations of China with foreign countries, your honourable nation has the most cordial relations with China, and that China has, under the pressure of circumstances, drawn universal anger on to itself, we cannot do otherwise than count on your honourable country to arrange these difficulties and solve these complications.

“Hence it is that, opening our hearts to you in all sincerity, we inform you of our innermost feelings, and address you with perfect frankness this letter, solely guided by the hope that you will find, M. le Président de la République, a means of arranging matters and of taking the initiative in improving the present situation.

“At the same time we beg you to be good enough to address a favourable reply to us; this we are awaiting with the utmost anxiety.

“The 23rd day of the 6th month of the 26th year (19th July, 1900).

(Signed) “KOUANG-SIU.”

No. 80.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Shanghai, July 27, 1900.

PROTECTION of Shanghai.

With reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 24th instant and my reply of the 25th instant, Her Majesty's Consul at Nanking has just telegraphed to me as follows :—

“Send for the troops. The Viceroy leaves to your discretion the number.”

No. 81.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Shanghai, July 28, 1900.

I REQUESTED Her Majesty's Consul at Nanking yesterday to inform me of the exact terms on which the Viceroy consents to the friendly occupation of Shanghai.

He has to-day replied that everything is left to my discretion, and that the Viceroy's consent is unconditional. His Excellency will not refuse absolutely, but will raise objections if any other Powers intimate that they intend to station a garrison at Shanghai. He will state to-morrow on what date he can receive the Admiral.

No. 82.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 28, 1900.*

THE Consular officer at Hangchow telegraphs as follows:—

“Nine members of the China Inland Mission at Chuchow, four being those from Chiang Shan, are reported by Father Witteib, a Roman Catholic, to have been **mas-**sacred. It is also reported that six employés have been killed by the Sub-Prefect.

“Ching train-bands are said to have committed the outrage.”

No. 83.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 28, 1900.*

THE French Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent me a Memorandum, which, although dated the 21st July, has only reached me this morning, expressing entire concurrence in your Lordship's views on the subject of China and Japan, as stated in the inclosure of my despatch of the 21st instant.

No. 84.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1900.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires has, under instructions from his Government, called the attention of the Marquess of Salisbury to information which has reached them to the effect that part of the Chinese fleet has taken refuge at Hong Kong, and part at Shanghai.

M. Lessar states that, in view of the importance of insuring the security of the vessels transporting the reinforcements sent to the Far East by the European Powers, it is considered by the Russian Government to be of urgent importance to arrive at an understanding in regard to the measures necessary for the safety of communications by sea, and for preventing by joint efforts the danger of possible offensive operations by the Chinese fleet.

A communication has also been made by the German Embassy, to the effect that the German Government hear from Shanghai that the movements of the Chinese ships of war give cause for uneasiness.

They are of opinion that it will be impossible to control the importation of arms into China unless the Chinese war-ships be isolated and watched, and that unless this be done they will be a danger to the European ships conveying troops.

The German Government ask the opinion of Her Majesty's Government on the subject.

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to ask what are the views of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in regard to the danger apprehended by the Russian and German Governments from allowing continued freedom of action to the Chinese navy, and what reply they advise should be made to those Governments.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 85.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 30.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, July 21, 1900.*

ON receipt of your Lordship's telegram this morning, I at once sought an interview of Count Lamsdorff, and read to him the observations which your Lordship had passed on the communication which the Russian Chargé d'Affaires had made to Her Majesty's

Government of the views of his Government concerning the ulterior military measures which the Powers may have to undertake in China, and the question of concentrating in one single hand the command and direction of all the foreign detachments which may have to undertake such measures.

I said that Her Majesty's Government had carefully considered this communication, but found it essential to have some further explanations as to its meaning and intentions before expressing an opinion.

It was, I added, especially important to have some definite understanding as to the nature, scope, and object of the military measures which the Russian Government contemplates in this communication.

Speaking of these ulterior measures in the two first paragraphs of the communication, his Excellency had, I observed, mentioned the necessity of unifying the general command by an understanding between the local military authorities.

Did this, I asked, imply that all the international detachments on Chinese territory were to be employed on the contemplated military measures, and for this purpose all concentrated under the single hand of one General commanding the manœuvre of his choice.

I ventured to point out to his Excellency that "Chinese territory" was a very wide expression, and that we were scarcely yet able to gauge the extent of the danger which the Powers had to face, or assign to it any precise geographical limits.

Count Lamsdorff said that he wished at once to clear up any possible misunderstanding on this point.

The ulterior military measures contemplated in M. Lessar's communication were to be understood as exclusively confined to the present field of action of the international detachments, which might be roughly defined as the Province of Pechili. As regards other parts of China where danger might equally break out, it was clear that the direction of any necessary military measures would have to be undertaken independently.

For instance, Russia would have to take independent military action in the north of China bordering on her own territory and on her railway, and it was to be assumed that other Powers would act similarly in the south and centre of China, where their own territory and special interests were more immediately concerned.

The question of a single hand to command and direct ulterior military measures of the international detachments now acting together in Pechili was the one raised, and he regarded it as important to secure unity of action.

It was impossible to form any precise opinion at present as to the nature and scope of the military operations which might soon be necessary; their immediate object was clearly the rescue and protection of foreigners, and up till now all the international detachments employed appeared to have acted in this task loyally together without friction and with considerable success; but it appeared that the military and naval authorities on the spot considered that, for the success of any larger ulterior measures which might have to be undertaken, it was essential that unity of action should be secured by an agreement to place the direction and command in one single hand.

This necessity seems to have been strongly felt by the French Government, and the arguments in its favour were appreciated, if I rightly understood Count Lamsdorff, at Berlin as well as St. Petersburg.

I then said that your Lordship had expressed a concurrence with Count Lamsdorff's view that the plan of selecting a Commander-in-chief in deference to superior rank or to the greater size of the national contingent commanded by him would not be satisfactory, as these considerations were based on circumstances subject to frequent change; but that, although the observations in the last two sentences of M. de Lessar's communication seemed to bear upon the question of an alternative plan, your Lordship had been unable to trace the deductions which his Excellency meant to draw from them.

Had his Excellency, I asked, formed any definite opinion as to the plan to be followed in selecting a Commander-in-chief and determining the powers to be given him?

Count Lamsdorff replied that he had not, and the object of his communication was to elicit an expression of opinion on this point from the different Governments addressed with the idea that from the answers received ("du choc des opinions") would result some practical suggestion which might meet the views of all.

His personal idea had been that each Government, on receiving this communication, would, before replying to it, confer with its military authority on the spot, and ascertain his views as to the necessity of a single command, the best plan to be adopted

in the selection, and also as to the ulterior military measures which they, with their better knowledge of local circumstances, considered it imperative or impossible to undertake.

I have lost no time in telegraphing the upshot of my conversation with Count Lamsdorff to your Lordship.

No. 86.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 30.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, July 23, 1900.*

IN the course of my interview with Count Lamsdorff last Saturday, I took an opportunity of referring to the message which he had sent to your Lordship on the 13th instant through the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London in explanation of the attitude of the Russian Government on the question of a Japanese military expedition to co-operate with the international relief forces in China.

I said that I had no instructions to speak to his Excellency on this subject, as your Lordship's reply to M. Lessar had no doubt already reached him, and had cleared up any possible misunderstanding of the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government in this matter.

Speaking, however, entirely on my own authority, I could not help expressing some surprise that the question that I had been instructed to put to his Excellency on the 26th ultimo had apparently been interpreted by him as proposing to give Japan a European mandate for independent action in China.

I had, I reminded him, in my private letter of the same date, given him the exact terms of the question which, in his absence, I had desired M. Hartwig to put to him, and had added at the same time that I was authorized to urge on his consideration when replying to it, the fact that the detachment of 10,000 men which we were sending from India, and the prompt reinforcements which it was assumed Russia was also sending, could not possibly reach their destination in time to rescue the Europeans at Peking, and relieve the two expeditions which were at present surrounded.

Count Lamsdorff said that the sole object of the message which he had desired M. Lessar to communicate to your Lordship was to clear up any possible misunderstanding of the light in which the Russian Government had viewed the Japanese proposal to co-operate with the other Powers by sending a military expedition to China.

It had been asserted in the public press, and in other quarters, that Russia had hesitated to sanction the dispatch of Japanese troops to China, and the odious and entirely undeserved conclusion had been drawn that in doing so, Russia had prevented timely aid being sent to rescue the Legations and Europeans at Peking.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The Russian Government was eager to welcome any available forces that could promptly be sent to assist in the common humanitarian task, and Japan had an equal interest and right with other Powers to do so, as her own Legation was in danger, and the number of her countrymen in China and her interests at stake were very considerable.

He received my message almost simultaneously with M. Isvolsky's report of the communication made to him by the Japanese Government, and he thought that the best way to avoid any confusion was to reply to your Lordship's question by communicating to me the exact terms of the instructions sent to M. Isvolsky for his reply to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It was quite true that your Lordship's question did not mention a mission to be given by Europe to Japan, and that the considerations which I had been authorized to urge in favour of approving the dispatch of a Japanese expedition indicated co-operation in the rescue of the Legations, and of the two expeditions at that time reported to be in difficulties; but the words used, "an expedition to restore order at Peking and Tien-tsin," and "if Japan is willing to undertake to do so," were different to the words used in the Japanese communication, and might bear that interpretation. They had evidently been so construed at Berlin, where a desire was also evinced to ascertain the views of the Russian Government as to the answer to be returned to your Lordship's question.

Count Lamsdorff said that any misunderstanding that might have existed was now a thing of the past, but that the Russian Government could not allow for one moment

such an odious suspicion as that of her having in any way, even unintentionally, thwarted the work of rescue to remain uncontradicted in any quarter.

Count Lamsdorff said that he had communicated his answer to me the very moment he was in a position to do so, and had brought his letter himself to the Embassy on his return from Peterhof, but that on hearing that I was on the point of dispatching the Queen's messenger, and knowing that I must in consequence be very busy, he had not asked to see me.

I said that I regretted that I had not known of his visit at the time, for however busy, I was always at his disposal for an interview.

I assured him, however, that I had no reason whatever to believe that the suspicion to which he had alluded as causing him so much pain had for a moment been entertained in official circles in England.

I had, I said, assured your Lordship by telegraph on the 4th instant that the Russian Government would gladly welcome the arrival of all reinforcements promptly available from Japan to co-operate in the common humanitarian effort in China.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

No. 87.

*Viscount Gough to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, July 28, 1900.*

ON receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 20th instant, instructing me to communicate to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the substance of your Lordship's reply to Count Lamsdorff respecting an alleged European Mission to Japan, I called at the Imperial Foreign Office, and, in the absence through illness of Count von Bülow, left a *note verbale*, in the sense of your Lordship's instructions, with Herr von Derenthall, of which a copy is inclosed herewith.

Count von Bülow is now with the Emperor at Bremerhaven, but I learnt to-day from Herr von Derenthall that, although any remarks on your Lordship's reply to Count Lamsdorff would probably be communicated through Count Hatzfeldt, the German Government now thoroughly understood that neither from your Lordship nor from Tôkiô had any proposal been made that a Mission should be confided by Europe to Japan.

Inclosure in No. 87.

*Note Verbale.*

ON the 13th July the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London communicated to the Marquess of Salisbury a message from Count Lamsdorff.

This message described the offer of the Japanese Government, made on the 11th June, to send troops to China, and also gave the reply of the Russian Government.

The message went on to describe a communication received by Count Lamsdorff from Her Majesty's Government on the same subject, and to make comments thereon.

The Marquess of Salisbury's reply to the above message was to the effect that Her Majesty's Government had never suggested that any rights to an independent solution or indeed any other privileges would be conferred on Japan by her proposed action, nor had Her Majesty's Government ever spoken to the Russian Government of a mission given to Japan by the European Powers. The fundamental principles spoken of by Count Lamsdorff in his message had never been accepted by Her Majesty's Government, nor had they as yet discussed with other Powers the circumstances to which these fundamental principles might possibly apply. The only steps in favour of which Her Majesty's Government had expressed an opinion were the steps which point to the relief of the Legations and other foreigners.

Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to communicate to the Imperial German Government Lord Salisbury's reply, and to explain that nothing has passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government which would justify

a statement that Her Majesty's Government had suggested or contemplated any European mission to Japan.

Her Majesty's Government would be glad to know what view is taken by the Imperial German Government of the fundamental principles proposed by Russia.

Her Majesty's Government agree in the desire to avoid anything that might tend to a partition of China, but as nothing is known of the condition of the authorities at Peking or their intentions, it would seem entirely premature to speak of the re-establishment by joint efforts of a Central Government qualified to guarantee order and tranquillity.

*Berlin, July 22, 1900.*

No. 88.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 30.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, July 28, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, copy of a Memorandum which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, recording the entire concurrence of the French Government in the views of Her Majesty's Government, as stated in the Memorandum which I left with M. Delcassé on the subject of the affairs of China, copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch of the 21st instant.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

Inclosure in No. 88.

*Memorandum.*

EN remerciant son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre des explications que celui-ci a bien voulu lui fournir, par son aide-mémoire remis le 21 de ce mois, relativement aux vues dont s'inspire le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans la recherche des moyens les plus prompts et les plus efficaces pour mettre fin à la crise actuelle en Chine, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères est heureux de constater l'accord qui existe entre Lord Salisbury et lui dans la manière d'envisager la co-opération du Japon.

A cet égard, le Gouvernement de la République n'a cessé de déclarer, dès le début de la crise, que l'action des Puissances en Chine devait rester solidaire et collective, et que tous les participants n'auraient à prétendre qu'à des droits égaux. Le Japon, par conséquent, ne pourrait être considéré que comme un collaborateur de plus à l'œuvre commune, sans avoir à réclamer aucun privilège exclusif.

Or, telle est également l'opinion formulée par son Excellence le Premier Secrétaire d'État de la Reine dans sa réponse au Cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg, dont Sir Edmund Monson a eu l'obligeance de résumer le sens.

Quant aux principes fondamentaux sur lesquels reposerait tout d'abord l'action collective des Puissances, ils se dégagent assez naturellement, semble-t-il, des circonstances qui ont déterminé cette action.

Il suffira de mentionner : (1) la nécessité d'un accord aussi complet que possible en vue notamment d'opérations concertées pour sauvegarder les existences qui peuvent être encore préservées dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire Chinois ; (2) intégrité de la Chine ; écarter tout ce qui pourrait amener au partage de ce pays ; (3) enfin, le rétablissement, l'établissement ou reconnaissance d'un Gouvernement Central Chinois pouvant garantir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans le pays.

*Paris, le 21 Juin, 1900.*

(Translation.)

IN thanking his Excellency the British Ambassador for the explanation which he was good enough to furnish in his Memorandum of the 21st instant relative to the aims held in view by Her Majesty's Government in the endeavour to discover the promptest and most efficacious means for putting an end to the present crisis in China,



the Minister for Foreign Affairs is happy to note the accord existing between him and Lord Salisbury in regard to the view they take as to the co-operation of Japan.

On this point, the Government of the Republic has never ceased to declare, since the outbreak of the crisis, that the action of the Powers in China should remain uniform and collective, and that those concerned should not claim anything but equal rights. Japan accordingly can be considered as one additional participator in the common action, without being entitled to claim any exclusive privilege.

Now, such is likewise the opinion put forward by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State in his reply to the St. Petersburg Cabinet, of which Sir E. Monson was good enough to communicate the substance.

As regards the fundamental principles on which would rest at first the collective action of the Powers, they are quite naturally apparent from the circumstances which have determined this action.

It will be enough to mention: (1) the necessity for as complete an agreement as possible in view notably of the operations that may be concerted for safeguarding those lives which can still be preserved throughout the Chinese Empire; (2) the integrity of China; to avoid everything that might lead to the partition of that country; (3) lastly, the re-establishment, establishment or recognition of a Central Chinese Government capable of guaranteeing order and tranquillity in the country.

*Paris, June 21, 1900.*

No. 89.

*Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received July 30.)*

*Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank,  
July 29, 1900.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a telegram received by the China Association from Shanghai late last night, which I beg to recommend to your most serious consideration.

Although I feel sure that Her Majesty's Government are fully alive to the importance of Shanghai, I venture to point out that the results of any disaster to that port would be much more far-reaching than is generally realized.

In proportion to the male population, there is a much larger number of women and children in Shanghai than at any of the other Treaty Ports. No doubt many of the well-to-do class have already left for places of greater safety, but, even then, several hundreds of white women and children, not to speak of Eurasians, must always be in the place.

It is too shocking to contemplate what might happen to these helpless creatures in the event of Chinese soldiers breaking loose.

From a commercial point of view, the destruction, or even partial destruction, of Shanghai would be most disastrous, not only to those immediately interested in Shanghai, but (and this is the point I wish especially to impress upon Her Majesty's Government) to a very large commercial circle besides private individuals in the country.

The value of British goods and property in Shanghai at the moment may be counted by millions. These goods belong to Manchester and other houses all over the country, and are financed both by English and Eastern banks.

In the event of the property being destroyed, these banks would claim from the English shippers, who, in most cases, would be ruined.

Their fall would bring down others, and the result would be a panic more disastrous and wide-spread than any which has been witnessed in the present generation.

There is a very considerable number of people now retired in this country who live on what they derive from Shanghai property, incomes varying from 100*l.* to 30,000*l.* per annum.

All that would go, in the event of any catastrophe, to swell the distress, so that in fact there would be few homes in the United Kingdom which would not suffer either directly or indirectly from the fall of Shanghai.

There is so much nervousness at present regarding Chinese matters, that there is a danger of a commercial panic should Shanghai be even seriously threatened.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, who will soon be appealing to the country for money, will at once realize what a situation, as described above, would mean to him and to the country.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EWEN CAMERON.

Inclosure in No. 89.

*Copy of a Telegram communicated by Mr. Keswick, 30th July, on behalf of the China Association who have seen the above letter from Sir E. Cameron, and support and entirely indorse the considerations urged therein.*

*Shanghai, July 28, 1900.*

ADVISE China Association from China Association, Shanghai:—

Unfriendly attitude reactionary provincial authorities increasing military preparations recognized in responsible quarter, pointing urgent necessity British Government forthwith provide force detached service Shanghai. No troops at present available in case of emergency. It is considered certain Chinese will attempt create diversion here elsewhere prevent advance Peking. For this reason alone precautionary measures urgently necessary where vast interest future security prestige all Europeans involved, while immediate action will prevent reactionary officials. Hesitation certain increase present attitude and lead hopeless confusion later on. There is every reason to believe all the Powers welcome initiative Great Britain in the interest of all concerned. American co-operation, if offered, acceptable. Any attempt concerted general international occupation most undesirable.

No. 90.

*Li Hung-chang to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 30, 1900.*

I HAVE, conjointly with other Viceroys and Governors, memorialized the Throne to urge the immediate sending of foreign Representatives under escort to Tien-tsin or the restoration to them the freedom of telegraphic communication with their respective Governments. The Imperial approval will be communicated to you as soon as it is obtained.

Please persuade the Foreign Office not to send any more reinforcements, and instruct those already sent not to make any advance. This is very important.

No. 91.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

[Sent through Chinese Minister.]

Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1900.*

PRAY let us know where and how you and other Europeans are. We have heard nothing since your letter of 4th July to Consul at Tien-tsin.

This message is forwarded through Chinese Minister in London.

No. 92.

*Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 31.)*

My Lord,

*Rome, July 22, 1900.*

AS I was in the country when your Lordship's telegram of the 20th July arrived, Mr. Townley called upon the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon, and communicated to his Excellency the answer which your Lordship had returned to the Russian message relative to the affairs of China.

M. Visconti-Venosta replied that the Italian Government had received a communiqué from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires couched in apparently similar language to that employed in the message handed to your Lordship. His Excellency said that the Italian Government was prepared to maintain the association of Italy with the common action of the Powers, the most important point being, in their opinion, the maintenance of the accord between the Powers, both with a view to arriving at a solution of the present problem, and in the general interests of peace.

The principles enumerated in the Russian message had not, his Excellency said, formed the subject of any formal agreement between the Powers, but they had found expression substantially, with only slight variations of form, in the communication made by M. Delcassé on the part of the French Government, in the language held by the Cabinet of Berlin, in M. de Bülow's Circular, and now finally in the message of the Russian Government.

The Italian Government shared the views expressed by your Lordship that no action should be taken which might lead to an eventual partition of the Chinese Empire.

As to the measures which the Powers would now have to adopt in order to re-establish at Peking a Chinese Government capable of giving the necessary guarantees for the security of foreigners, M. Visconti-Venosta had no *à priori* objection to any arrangement which circumstances might render advisable, and he added that the Italian Government is in principle disposed to adhere to any solution which will secure the adhesion of the Powers and the maintenance of the accord between them.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) CURRIE.

No. 93.

*Acting Consul-General Fraser to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 1.)*

My Lord,

Hankow, June 20, 1900.

ON the 14th instant I received from Her Majesty's Consul-General, Shanghai, the telegram, of which copy is inclosed, inquiring how I thought the Viceroy Chang would receive an offer of support. I replied that I thought an offer of present material aid would be welcome, but that the Viceroy would be very jealous for China's independence. On receipt of Mr. Warren's telegram of the 16th instant, I sought an interview with the Viceroy, which is described in Inclosure No. 4. As I expected, the Viceroy received the offer to support him with Her Majesty's ships, if he took measures to keep order, with cordial expressions of goodwill to England and assurances of his determination to afford protection and keep the peace; but his Excellency deprecated any naval demonstration on the Yang-tsze.

This morning, however, I learnt by telegram from Her Majesty's Consul at Nanking that the Viceroy there had received a telegram from the Viceroy Chang to the effect that I had promised to telegraph to Her Majesty's Government not to send any of Her Majesty's ships up the river. I at once asked for an interview with the Taotai, who lives close at hand and was present at my interview with the Viceroy, and pointed out the serious misunderstanding that seemed to exist as to the Viceroy's request. The Taotai assured me that I had understood his Excellency Chang correctly, and that there was no question of restricting the usual visits of Her Majesty's ships to Yang-tsze ports. He undertook to move the Viceroy to telegraph to Nanking accordingly. I trust that the mistake arose simply from a clerk's use of the Chinese words "war-vessels" instead of "naval force" in the Viceroy Chang's telegram; but in order to remove any doubt on the point I have sent a note to his Excellency explaining that the only request of his that I can lay before your Lordship is that there may not be a demonstration by the fleet, and that the decision thereon rests entirely with Her Majesty's Government.

After I had requested the interview with the Taotai I received a despatch from him covering instructions from the Viceroy, in which his Excellency reiterates strongly his and his colleague at Nanking's intention to safeguard our interests along the river, and their objection to a naval demonstration. I have the honour to forward translation of that portion of his despatch. The remainder merely begs me to recall all women and children from outlying Mission stations (a step already taken), to supply a list of missionaries and their stations and chapels, and to warn missionaries and others to

exercise the utmost discretion in moving about in the interior, and to be forbearing in their dealings with the natives.

So far as I can learn the immediate neighbourhood is quiet, and no outbreak need be apprehended unless affairs in the north go awry. A Mission station some 70 miles to the westward was destroyed in a sudden riot on the 14th, but no lives were lost, and the authorities profess to be taking energetic action against the offenders.

As your Lordship's instructions came through Her Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghai, this despatch, with its Inclosures, has been sent to him under flying seal. A copy will be forwarded to Her Majesty's Minister in Peking as soon as communication with the Legation has been restored.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. H. FRASER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 93.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to Acting Consul-General Fraser.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, June 14, 1900.*

I HAVE telegraphed to Foreign Office urging protection of interests in Yang-tsze Valley, and the arriving at an understanding with the Viceroy. Do you think your Viceroy would be inclined to co-operate with us if assured of support?

Inclosure 2 in No. 93.

*Acting Consul-General Fraser to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Hankow, June 15, 1900.*

YOUR private telegram of yesterday.

In my opinion, Viceroy would welcome support if material and apparent, but would be jealous of Chinese independence.

Inclosure 3 in No. 93.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to Acting Consul-General Fraser.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, June 13, 1900.*

I AM authorized by Lord Salisbury to inform Viceroy that, if measures are taken by him to maintain order, he will be supported by Her Majesty's ships. Will you please convey to Viceroy this assurance, and inform me how it is received?

Inclosure 4 in No. 93.

*Acting Consul-General Fraser to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

Sir,

*Hankow, June 18, 1900.*

IN confirmation of my telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to inform you of an interview which, in prompt acquiescence with my request made on receipt of your telegram of the 16th June, the Viceroy Chang granted me yesterday morning.

There were present, also, the Customs Taotai T'sên and the Secretaries Kaw Hung Beng and Liang.

So soon as the attendants had withdrawn I explained that the want of energy of the northern officials had led to men being landed by various Powers, and, in consequence, to a very serious situation.

I then produced an English copy of Lord Salisbury's message which I translated into Chinese and handed to Mr. Kaw, who also translated it in almost identical terms.

The Viceroy, who listened with intense interest, at once assured me that he was fully aware of his duty to maintain order and afford protection in his jurisdiction, not only because of Treaty obligations, but also for his own interest and reputation. He

was in telegraphic communication with Nanking, and he and his colleague Liu were of one mind and were taking all possible precautions against outbreaks, whether anti-foreign or not, on the part of Secret Societies or bad characters.

Although such case, as the sudden riot near T'ien-mên, to which I had referred, might occur, they would be dealt with so promptly and thoroughly so as to make them rather a warning than an encouragement to the disaffected.

His Excellency did not desire the presence of a British squadron, which would be misconstrued by his people just now, but he repeatedly assured me that he and the Viceroy at Nanking were of one mind as to the advisability of acting in concert with Britain (binding themselves to England was his phrase), and should he come to doubt his ability to maintain order, he would at once consult through Her Britannic Majesty's Consul with Lord Salisbury.

As to events in the north, he ascribed them to the Empress-Dowager's listening to the "stupid men of no experience who pretended that the suppression of the Boxers would involve injustice to loyal subjects," and he was especially vehement against Tung-Fu Hsiang and his Kansuh army.

The Viceroy suggested that missionaries should be particularly careful at this juncture, and expressed readiness to provide special guards for any specified chapel and station. He was gratified to hear that I had advised the calling in of all women and children from outlying places.

His Excellency was most cordial throughout the interview, and the Taotai told the Commissioner of Customs later in the day that the Viceroy was exceedingly pleased with my visit and Lord Salisbury's message, by which his hands were strengthened.

In my opinion the Viceroy's promises are sincere, and the only danger is the remote risk that his troops may not be so loyal and trustworthy as his Excellency undoubtedly believes.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. H. FRASER.

Inclosure 5 in No. 93.

*Taotai Ts'ên to Acting Consul-General Fraser.*

(Translation.)

(Extract.)

June 19, 1900.

TO-DAY I received the following communication from his Excellency the Viceroy Chang:—

"I (the Viceroy) must therefore urgently instruct you (the Taotai) to at once inform the British Consul-General that I shall exert myself to protect [foreigners] within my jurisdiction, and to prevent bad characters from making trouble. If any lawless crew does create a disturbance before we are on our guard, the might of the regular troops will amply suffice to put them down and crush them immediately, nor will such a movement on any account be allowed to spread. Yesterday I was consulting with the Viceroy of Nanking by wire, and he informed me that he, too, had everywhere issued stringent orders for the protection [of foreigners], his idea being that he and I should co-operate in looking after the lower Yang-tsze. We both ask the British Consul-General to inform his Government that at present bad characters are being put down in the Yang-tsze district, and that foreign assistance is not required. If the British fleet suddenly comes up the Yang-tsze to assist, not only will no advantage be gained, but on the other hand the people will, we fear, become suspicious, and other countries will follow Britain's example, thus rendering the readjustment of affairs impossible. As to the fear that other countries may take the initiative in entering the river to meddle, if the British Government do not make the first move, the other countries will not do so. Britain need, therefore, be under no apprehension."

(Taotai's card.)

## No. 94.

*Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour.—(Communicated by Admiralty, August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Admiralty, July 30, 1900.*

IN a recent telegram you mention an opinion of British community and others that 5,000 troops were minimum for defence of Shanghai, but that 10,000 would properly meet requirements. General Gaselee, on the other hand, mentioned 3,000. What is your own unbiassed view as to what is necessary for safety? It would take several weeks before a force could be made up to 10,000, including those in transports, which have not yet left Hong Kong for Taku.

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## No. 95.

*Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty.—(Communicated by Admiralty, August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, July 31, 1900.*

YOUR telegram of the 30th July.

I have now been able to visit Settlement and suburbs and form my own opinion, which is that 3,000 with gun fire and men from the ships now in the river would probably suffice—5,000 certainly would. But if ships all had to go away, 5,000 would be required if serious attack made.

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## No. 96.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 1, 1900.*

I AM informed by the English Baptist Mission that a telegram has been received from Mr. Morgan at Sian-fu (in Shensi) to the following effect:—

“Fifty missionaries murdered, fear welfare of Christians. Eleven of us starting. Obtain protection in Hunan and Hupei.”

These massacres are becoming general, and I have the gravest fears for the safety of all foreigners now up country. I am trying to obtain protection asked for.

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## No. 97.

*Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 1, 1900.*

I AM informed by Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as soon as signature of King can be obtained, Royal Decree prohibiting the exportation of arms to China will be issued.

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## No. 98.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1900.*

WITHDRAWAL of Europeans.

Naval and military authorities at Shanghai would be much hampered in any operations until all Europeans are withdrawn from riverine ports.

You had better give definite instructions to the Consul at Chungking to leave with the European community.

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*Mr. Choate to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 2.)*

My Lord,

*American Embassy, London, August 2, 1900.*

UNDER instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, on the 30th July last, the Secretary of State of the United States, in answer to a suggestion of Li Hung-chang that the Ministers might be sent under safe escort to Tien-tsin, provided the Powers would engage not to march on Peking, replied that the Government of the United States would not enter into any arrangement regarding the disposition or treatment of Legations, without first having free communication with Mr. Conger, the American Minister at Peking; that the responsibility for their protection rests upon the Chinese Government; and that power to deliver at Tien-tsin presupposes power to protect and open communication with them, and this was insisted on.

This message was delivered by Mr. Goodnow, our Consul at Shanghai, on the 31st ultimo, to Li Hung-chang, who then inquired whether "if free communications were established between Ministers and their Governments, it could be arranged that the Powers should not advance on Peking pending negotiations."

To this inquiry the following reply was sent, on the 1st August, by the Secretary of State:—

"I do not think it expedient to submit the proposition of Earl Li to the other Powers; free communication with our Representatives in Peking is demanded as a matter of absolute right, and not as a favour. Since the Chinese Government admits that it possesses the power to give communication, it puts itself in an unfriendly attitude by denying it. No negotiations seem advisable until the Chinese Government shall have put the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers in full and free communication with their respective Governments, and removed all danger to life and liberty. We would urge Earl Li earnestly to advise the Imperial authorities of China to place themselves in friendly communication and co-operation with the relief expedition; they are assuming heavy responsibility in acting otherwise."

Should your Lordship wish to see me with regard to the above, I shall hold myself at your disposition.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

No. 100.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 1, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of 26th July, I should be glad to be informed whether Her Majesty's Government are willing to guarantee the loan which the Viceroy of Wuchang asks for. He has helped me considerably in bringing in missionaries from the interior, and has provided them with money and escorts. He has thoroughly committed himself to us, and will lose his authority and have to go over to the other side unless assisted. The great danger in Hankow is that, if not paid, there will be a mutiny of the troops.

No. 101.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 1, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of 5th July,\* the situation is every day becoming more serious. The Viceroys at Nanking and Wuchang have declared themselves loyal to the Empress-Dowager, and have stated distinctly that they will be unable to carry out the agreement of neutrality entered into with foreign Governments unless it is guaranteed that her person shall be respected. The Viceroys, while preserving peace in their districts to the best of their ability, are at the same time arming all along the whole

\* See "China No. 3 (1900)," p. 101.

line of the Yang-tsze, and are preparing for attack. When the allied forces approach Peking, I fear they will find a very strong force opposed to them, as the Viceroy is further dispatching troops to the north for the protection of the Emperor and Empress-Dowager.

No. 102.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 2, 1900.*

THE Chinese are convinced that when the relieving force approaches Peking the Ministers and surviving Europeans will be murdered. Li Hung-chang himself has expressed this opinion. I would suggest informing the Manchu Government, through their Minister at London, that they will be held responsible for any outrage of the sort, and further, that their ancestral tombs at Mukden and Peking will be utterly destroyed. Ridiculous as this may appear, I am assured on good authority it is very likely to prove effective, as the Manchus have a great respect for their ancestors, and this threat will deter them.

No. 103.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 3.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, August 3, 1900.*

IN reply to your letter of the 28th ultimo, respecting the danger apprehended by the Russian and German Governments from allowing continued freedom of action to the Chinese ships of war, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will inform the Secretary of State that, by the latest telegraphic advices received from the Commander-in-chief on the China Station, all the Chinese cruisers of any fighting value are at the present time in the Yang-tsze, above the Kiang-yin forts, from which position they show no signs of moving. So long as they remain there no danger to vessels carrying reinforcements for the various nationalities is possible from them, and the difficulty of replenishing their coal supply must act as a deterrent on any extended cruising at sea.

Should they, however, leave the Yang-tsze, it will be necessary to watch them, and Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour has already received instructions on this point.

The Chinese torpedo boats are now at Canton, and unless they leave that anchorage, constitute no danger to shipping.

Their sphere of action is also limited by their coal supply, but should they leave Canton their movements will be watched and reported on by Her Majesty's ships.

My Lords do not consider it desirable to interfere in any way with the Chinese ships so long as they take no part in the present disturbances, and continue to act as neutrals; but it would be necessary for active measures to be resorted to if, in the opinion of Her Majesty's naval officers on the spot, such a course were desirable.

I am to add that there is a strong force of Her Majesty's ships now at Woosung capable of dealing with this matter if necessary.

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. J. THOMAS, *Pro Secretary.*

No. 104.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 3.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, August 3, 1900.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram, dated the 2nd August, from the Commander-in-chief, China, relative to the attitude of the Viceroy, Nanking, and the Chinese ships in Yang-tsze River.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.



## Inclosure in No. 104.

*Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shiakwan, August 3, 1900.*

HAVE seen Viceroy, who returns my call to-morrow. He is very friendly, and, I believe, anxious to maintain peace in Yang-tsze Valley.

Referring to your telegraphic inquiry, Chinese ships are together; believe them not anti-foreign, but well disposed towards British. Rear-Admiral Chin commanding, who now looks to Viceroy for orders.

Consider that one ship should still remain at each of the five ports in the river, with discretion to move in case of sudden war. Ichang-fu ship uncertain as yet.

Viceroy sees no reason for landing troops Shanghai, but evidently does not wish large force. He agrees to moderate force, say 3,000. He hopes no foreign men-of-war will come up the river. I recommend that they should not.

## No. 105.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 3.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 3, 1900.*

A COMMUNICATION appears in the Official Gazette of yesterday, of which following is a summary:—

“The complete impotence of the Government of Peking to arrest the insurrectionary movement in China, and to restore order in the capital, a state of affairs conducive to serious complications, inspired the Emperor of China to address to the Emperor a request for His Imperial Majesty’s mediation.

“The anti-Christian troubles are attributed by the Emperor of China to the evil proceedings of agitators acting in their own personal interest. When, at the instance of the Russian Minister, the Government decided to take repressive measures, it was already too late to allay the excitement against the foreigners caused by the spreading of false rumours among the lower classes.

“The Chinese Government, from fear of compromising the safety of the Legations, and of provoking a general rising against the foreigners at the ports, did not dare to take decisive measures against the insurgents, the result being that the Powers have suspected the Chinese Government of complicity with the anti-Christian movement, and have decided to take military measures, which threatened to still further complicate the situation.

“The Emperor of China has therefore addressed a request to the Emperor of Russia to find some means for saving the country, and to take the initiative in carrying it out.

“The Emperor has replied to the above telegram stating that, while deploring the serious events now happening in China, the uncertainty of what is taking place in Peking and the absence of news respecting the fate of the Russian and foreign Representatives render all idea of mediation in favour of China very difficult at the present moment.

“The efforts of Russia have but one object in view, namely, to assist in the re-establishment of order and tranquillity in the Chinese Empire, and, inspired by their traditional friendship for China, the Imperial Government have decided to render to the Chinese Government every assistance with a view to repressing the present troubles.

“The Emperor hopes that the Emperor of China will take the most effective measures for the pacification of this vast Empire, and for the security of the lives and property of the Russian and all other foreign subjects residing in China.”

## No. 106.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1900.*

I HAVE received your telegrams of the 1st August regarding the proposed loan to Viceroy at Hankow.

In the event of the loan being made, how do you propose to prevent its being applied to sending troops to the north, to arming the Yang-tsze, or to some purpose of a similar nature?

## No. 107.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1900.*

I HAVE received your telegram of the 2nd August.

The threat to destroy the tombs of the Manchu dynasty would be very repugnant to public opinion here in Europe, and we are also informed that it would create a bad impression in China generally.

With regard to the warning that we should hold the Chinese Government personally guilty for any injury to the members of the Legations, please refer to my telegram of the 5th July.

## No. 108.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Choate.*

Dear Mr. Choate,

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1900.*

I AM much obliged to you for your note of yesterday informing me of what has passed between the Government of the United States and Li Hung-chang with regard to the proposal of the latter that the advance on Peking should not take place, pending negotiations for the establishment of free communication between the foreign Representatives and their Governments.

I need hardly assure your Excellency that I entirely concur in the terms of the reply of the Secretary of State.

Messages of a similar kind have reached me from the Emperor through the Chinese Minister, and I have always said that no negotiations were possible until I was in a position to communicate freely with Her Majesty's Minister in Peking.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 109.

*Foreign Office to Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1900.*

I LAID before the Marquess of Salisbury your letter of the 29th ultimo calling attention to the serious condition of affairs at Shanghai.

The considerations on which you have dwelt have received and are continuing to receive the most earnest attention of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

## No. 110.

*Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty.—(Communicated by Admiralty, August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shiakwan, August 3, 1900.*

VICEROY returned visit to-day, and renewed his assurances of friendship for Great Britain, which country he was satisfied was only seeking to promote trade. He will consent to one British ship remaining at each of ports in the nominal list, but particularly desires no other foreign ships should come up the river, as in the present excited state of people he fears they might think foreigners had come to seize their country. The Chinese would fight in order to prevent their country being taken from them. He said to me that he and Viceroy Chang-Chi-Tung are of one mind on the above points. I promised to advise my foreign colleagues not to send any of their ships up the river.

Recommend 3,000 troops be sent Shanghae when ready.

Leave for Shanghae to-morrow.

## No. 111.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Pauncefote.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1900.*

THE following statement of policy in China was made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government in the House of Commons on 2nd August:—

Great Britain will, in concert with other Powers, press forward by every means the relief of the Legations at Peking, and regards it as imperative to impress upon China the sanctity of Envoys, and the power of Europe to protect or avenge them.

As regards the Yang-tsze district and the adjacent region, assurances have been given to the Viceroys that the ships and forces of Great Britain will co-operate as far as possible with them in quieting unrest and securing order, and provision is being made for the due fulfilment of this assurance.

Her Majesty's Government are opposed to any partition of China, and believe that they are in accord with other Powers in this declaration.

Her Majesty's Government hold that the future Government of China, whether directed from Peking or decentralized, must be a government by the Chinese, and they are not prepared to substitute for this an European Administration.

Similarly, they hold that in the common interest much caution should be observed in any scheme which may be entertained for organizing Chinese troops under foreign officers.

Compensation must be made by China for the effects of the existing disturbances.

## No. 112.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghae, August 5, 1900.*

I HAVE received following from Consul at Hankow:—

“My information is that 5,000 troops, mostly recruits, none foreign drilled, have been sent north. Taotai protests simply in obedience to Decree to aid in suppressing Boxers. Loan is wanted to supply troops to keep peace in remote parts, as Viceroy cannot spare his own good men. Repayment in ten annual instalments; mining rights as security besides Treasurer's and Viceroy's seal, or perhaps water and electric light concessions. Prompt answer wanted. Viceroy has hitherto done nothing to cause suspicion of good faith so far as I know.

“It is reported that another 5,000 troops are gradually to go north overland.”

\* Also to Sir C. Scott, Sir E. Monson, Lord Gough, Lord Currie, Sir H. Rumbold, and to Acting Consul-General Warren, with instructions to repeat it to Tôkiô, Canton, Hong Kong, and Wei-hai Wei.

No. 113.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 6.)*

My Lord,

*Newport, Rhode Island, July 27, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 25th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the full text of the letter in which the Emperor of China requested the good offices of the President of the United States to bring about the concert of the Powers for the restoration of peace and order, together with Mr. McKinley's reply to this appeal.

These documents were communicated to me officially by the United States' Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE.

Inclosure in No. 113.

I.

*Translation of a Cablegram received by Minister Wu on July 20, 1900, from the Taotai of Shanghai, dated July 19, 1900.*

HAVE received a telegram from Governor Yuan (of Shantung), dated the 23rd day of this moon (19th July), who, having received from the Privy Council (at Peking) a despatch embodying an Imperial letter to the President of the United States, has instructed me to transmit it to your Excellency. The Imperial message is respectfully transmitted, as follows:—

“The Emperor of China to his Excellency the President of the United States, greeting:

“China has long maintained friendly relations with the United States, and is deeply conscious that the object of the United States is international commerce. Neither country entertains the least suspicion or distrust towards the other. Recent outbreaks of mutual antipathy between the people and Christian Missions caused the foreign Powers to view with unwarranted suspicion the position of the Imperial Government as favourable to the people and prejudicial to the Missions, with the result that the Taku forts were attacked and captured. Consequently there has been clashing of forces with calamitous consequences. The situation has become more and more serious and critical. We have just received a telegraphic Memorial from our Envoy Wu Ting-fang, and it is highly gratifying to us to learn that the United States Government, having in view the friendly relations between the two countries, has taken a deep interest in the present situation. Now China, driven by the irresistible course of events, has unfortunately incurred well-nigh universal indignation. For settling the present difficulty, China places special reliance in the United States. We address this message to your Excellency in all sincerity and candidness, with the hope that your Excellency will devise measures and take the initiative in bringing about a concert of the Powers for the restoration of order and peace. The favour of a kind reply is earnestly requested, and awaited with the greatest anxiety.

“*Kwang Hsü, 26th year, 6th moon, 23rd day  
(July 19, 1900).*”

It is, therefore, my duty to transmit the above with the request that your Excellency, in respectful obedience of Imperial wishes, will deliver the same to its high destination and favour me with a reply.

(Signed) YU LIEN-YUEN,  
*Taotai at Shanghai.*

*Kwang Hsü, 26th year, 5th moon, 23rd day  
(July 19, 1900).*

## II.

The President of the United States to the Emperor of China, greeting :

I have received your Majesty's message of the 19th July, and am glad to know that your Majesty recognizes the fact that the Government and people of the United States desire of China nothing but what is just and equitable. The purpose for which we landed troops in China was the rescue of our Legation from grave danger and the protection of the lives and property of Americans who were sojourning in China in the enjoyment of rights guaranteed them by Treaty and by international law. The same purposes are publicly declared by all the Powers which have landed military forces in your Majesty's Empire.

I am to infer from your Majesty's letter that the malefactors who have disturbed the peace of China, who have murdered the Minister of Germany and a member of the Japanese Legation, and who now hold besieged in Peking those foreign diplomatists who still survive, have not only not received any favour or encouragement from your Majesty, but are actually in rebellion against Imperial authority. If this be the case, I must solemnly urge upon your Majesty's Government to give public assurance whether the foreign Ministers are alive, and, if so, in what condition.

2. To put the diplomatic Representatives of the Powers in immediate and free communication with their respective Governments and to remove all danger to their lives and liberty.

3. To place the Imperial authorities of China in communication with the relief expedition so that co-operation may be secured between them for the liberation of the Legations, the protection of foreigners, and the restoration of order.

If these objects are accomplished it is the belief of this Government that no obstacles will be found to exist on the part of the Powers to an amicable settlement of all the questions arising out of the recent troubles, and the friendly good offices of this Government will, with the assent of the other Powers, be cheerfully placed at your Majesty's disposition for that purpose.

(Signed) WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

July 23, 1900.

By the President :

(Signed) JOHN HAY,  
*Secretary of State.*

No. 114.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 6.)*

My Lord,

*Newport, Rhode Island, July 27, 1900.*

IN accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram of the 20th July, I communicated to the Secretary of State the substance of your Lordship's reply to the message from Count Lamsdorff, as reported in your telegram of the 2nd July, and I at the same time requested Mr. Hay to favour me with the views of the United States' Government on the "fundamental principles" proposed by the Russian Government.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of my note, and of the reply which I received from Mr. Hay.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires had verbally communicated Count Lamsdorff's message to the Secretary of State on the 13th instant, and had inquired at the same time whether the United States had joined in giving any special mandate to Japan, or whether any arrangement had been entered into for special compensation for the action of Japan.

Mr. Hay replied that no such arrangement had been made nor suggested to the United States from any quarter.

In reply to my inquiry as to the view taken by his Government of the "fundamental principles" enunciated by Count Lamsdorff, Mr. Hay states that M. de Wollant's communication, which was made orally, was not sufficiently explicit to enable him

to comply with my request. I accordingly addressed a further note to Mr. Hay stating those principles, and inquiring whether they suggest any further observations on his part.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 114.

*Lord Pauncefote to Mr. Hay.*

Dear Mr. Secretary,

*Newport, July 21, 1900.*

IN my absence from Washington I beg to communicate to you, in the form of a Memorandum, the reply of Lord Salisbury to the message from Count Lamsdorff, which, it is understood, has been delivered to all the Powers by the Russian Representatives. His Lordship wishes me to explain that nothing which has passed between the British and Russian Governments in any way justifies the statement that a European mission or mandate to Japan was ever suggested by or in the contemplation of Her Majesty's Government.

They would be glad to learn the view taken by your Government of the "fundamental principles" which the Russian Government propose.

In the wish to prevent anything tending to the partition of China, they entirely concur, but to speak of the re-establishment by joint efforts of a Central Government which can guarantee tranquillity and order seems to Her Majesty's Government altogether premature in our present ignorance of existing conditions and of the intention of the authorities at Peking.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 114.

*Memorandum.*

ON the 13th instant the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London communicated to the Marquess of Salisbury a message from Count Lamsdorff purporting to give an account of what had taken place with reference to the offer of the Japanese Government to send troops to China for the relief of the foreigners and the suppression of the insurrection, and particularly with reference to a supposed suggestion of a mission to be given by Europe to Japan with that object.

In that message Count Lamsdorff declared the fundamental principles which, he stated, had been accepted by the majority of the Powers as the basis of their policy.

Lord Salisbury understands that Count Lamsdorff's message has been communicated to all the Powers, and his Lordship has instructed the Undersigned to convey to the United States' Government the substance of his reply to it, which is as follows:—

Her Majesty's Government never made any suggestion that any right to an independent solution or to any other privileges should be conferred on Japan by reason of her action, nor have they ever suggested to Russia, or contemplated that Japan should receive any European Mission. They have never accepted the fundamental principles stated by Count Lamsdorff, nor has any discussion as yet taken place between them and the other Powers as to the circumstances in which the application of those principles might possibly be fitting. Except as regards steps for the relief of the Legations and other foreigners, Her Majesty's Government have not expressed an opinion in favour of any particular course of action.

Inclosure 3 in No. 114.

*Mr. Hay to Lord Pauncefote.*

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

*Department of State, Washington, July 23, 1900.*

I HAVE the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your personal note of the 21st instant, communicating to me, in the form of a Memorandum, the reply of Lord Salisbury to the message of Count Lamsdorff in respect to the purposes of Russia in

dealing with the Chinese crisis, and to the offer of Japan to aid in the movement undertaken by the powers in China.

The purport of Count Lamsdorff's message was communicated to me by the Russian Chargé on the 13th instant, comprising the statements that the aims of his Government included the preservation of life and property of Europeans in China, the relief of the endangered Legations, and the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire. M. de Wollant asked whether the United States had joined in giving any special mandate to Japan, or whether any arrangement had been entered into for special compensation for the action of Japan. I answered that no such arrangement had been made, nor suggested to the United States from any quarter.

M. de Wollant's communication, orally made, is not explicit enough to enable me to comment upon the "fundamental principles," to which Lord Salisbury's request relates, if, as I infer from your letter, Count Lamsdorff's announcement speaks of the re-establishment by joint efforts of a Central Government in China which can guarantee tranquillity and order. The views of this Government in that regard were expressed in my circular cablegram of the 3rd July, when, in declaring it to be the purpose of the President (besides fulfilling his duty to protect American life and interests) to co-operate in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters, I said:—

"It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result, but the policy of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by Treaty and International Law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

I am, &c.  
(Signed) JOHN HAY.

No. 115.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 6.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1900.*

AN announcement is made in the "Fremdenblatt" of the measures taken by Government to prevent the export of material of war from China. In addition to the directions given in this respect in the ports of the Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian Consular Agents have been instructed to guard against Austrian or Hungarian vessels accepting consignments of arms destined for China, and, in suspicious cases, told to report at once by telegraph with a view to enabling the authorities at home to take the necessary steps at once.

No. 116.

*Mr. Raikes to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 6.)*

My Lord,

*Brussels, August 3, 1900.*

WITH reference to Sir F. Plunkett's telegram of the 1st instant, I have the honour to state that a Royal Decree, dated the 2nd August, has been issued provisionally forbidding the exportation of arms and munitions of war to China.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR RAIKES.

No. 117.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 6.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty. August 6, 1900.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram, dated the 3rd August, from Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, China, and of latter's reply, dated the 5th August, relative to the landing of troops at Shanghae.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 117.

*Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Admiralty, August 3, 1900.*

YOUR telegram of the 3rd instant.

Please telegraph if we correctly understand that the 3,000 troops may now be sent to Shanghae, and landed there with the consent of the Viceroy. If that is so, it simplifies the situation, and is much better than keeping force at a distant spot such as Wei-hai Wei.

Inclosure 2 in No. 117.

*Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*August 5, 1900.*

YOUR telegram of 3rd August.

It is correctly understood that 3,000 troops may now be landed at Shanghae with the Viceroy's consent. Consul-General is asking Viceroy to issue Proclamation to assure Chinese that they are for the defence of settlements only. This force should be landed Shanghae on arrival China. Any additional troops might be kept Hong Kong or Wei-hai Wei, in case they are required.

No. 118.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 8.)*

[Delayed in Siberia.]

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghae, August 5, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day, I find, on careful inquiry, that well-informed Chinese are convinced of the sincerity and loyalty of Yang-tsze Viceroy to Her Majesty's Government. It is fully realized by them that the policy of Prince Tuan is a suicidal one, with only one possible end. The troops that they are sending north are raw recruits of two months' training, and badly armed. They are keeping their best troops in these regions to keep peace and maintain order, but a very large number of them are Kolaohui men, who will certainly cause trouble if their pay is in arrear, though without sympathy with the Boxer movement.

It is absolutely essential that the Hankow Viceroy should raise loan before next pay day, and the Provincial Treasuries are quite exhausted from loss of trade and revenue. They can assure proper application of loan to intended purpose by handing over to Her Majesty's Government Lingtzu or receipts given by the different Generals to Provincial Treasury on receipt of pay of troops.



## No. 119.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 6, 1900.*

THE massacre at Chuchow (near Chiangshan) is officially acknowledged by the Governor of Chekiang. He informs me that five British subjects were suddenly attacked and murdered. The District Magistrate was also killed in trying to protect them. The Prefect, Taotai, and General of that district have been all cashiered for their negligence.

The Governor is, I believe, sincere in his desire to prevent such outbreaks, and expresses the deepest regret at the sad occurrence.

As far as I can see, the officials in Central and Southern China, although they cannot always be successful, are doing their very best to prevent this sort of thing.

## No. 120.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, August 4, via Chefoo, August 6, 1900.*

NEWS of Legation up to 1st August has been received by Japanese Consul. This afternoon allied force will move out.

## No. 121.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 6, 1900.*

WE take it for granted that, in all cases where the withdrawal of European residents is advised by British Consuls in concert with naval officers, British Consular officers will communicate with their foreign colleagues in order that all nationalities may receive similar warnings and thus have every possible facility afforded them.

This should be communicated to other Consuls as you think necessary, and please consider it as a standing instruction.

## No. 122.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 7.)*

(Extract.)

*Tókió, June 25, 1900.*

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd instant, and I at once went to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, taking with me a paraphrase of your Lordship's telegram above referred to, which I left with Viscount Aoki, and copy of which I have the honour to inclose.

His Excellency seemed pleased to receive this communication, especially as regards the concluding paragraph, to the effect that Her Majesty's Government had given orders for the dispatch of a considerable force from India, but he did not give any direct answer, merely saying that he would submit it to his colleagues in the Cabinet.

I pointed out that some time must necessarily elapse before the troops from India could reach Taku, whereas Japanese troops could be sent there in three days, and that this was the meaning of your Lordship's reference to the favourable geographical situation of Japan.

His Excellency replied that although Japan had made great progress, she was not yet in a position to take an independent line of action in so grave a crisis, and that it was imperative for her to work in line with other Powers.

## Inclosure in No. 122.

*Memorandum.*

HER Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed by Lord Salisbury to ask the Japanese Government, in view of the critical condition of the Legations at Peking and of the forces sent to their relief, whether it is not their intention to send a further force to their assistance. The urgent necessity for immediate action, and Japan's favourable geographical situation, makes her intentions of grave importance in this difficult matter. Her Majesty's Government have sent instructions to India for the dispatch of a considerable force.

## No. 123.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 7.)*

My Lord,

*Tókió, June 26, 1900.*

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that Mr. Uchida, Director of the Political Department in the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, called upon me at 1.30 this afternoon, on Viscount Aoki's behalf, and informed me, in connection with the inquiry contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd instant,\* that the Japanese Government have decided to mobilize one division, making a total of about 13,000 men, including the two detachments which have already been sent to Taku.

I inquired whether the remaining 10,000 men would be dispatched to China at once, to which Mr. Uchida replied in the negative, adding, however, that transports would be ready to receive them, and that they could be embarked at the shortest notice in case of emergency.

I understand that this communication, the substance of which I had the honour to report in my telegram of this day's date,† is considered by Viscount Aoki as a reply to the inquiry made in your Lordship's telegram above referred to.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. B. WHITEHEAD.

## No. 124.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 7.)*

My Lord,

*Tókió, July 5, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 2nd instant,‡ I called on Viscount Aoki and handed him a Memorandum of its substance, copy of which I have the honour to inclose. His Excellency promised to submit it at once to the Premier, Marquis Yamagata, and "see what could be done."

He then read me a few telegrams confirming the desperate situation at Peking, and said that he considered it impossible to relieve the Legations, because the approach of a foreign army would be the signal for their massacre. He had tried to get into communication with the Chinese Government through the Viceroys Liu, Chang-Chi-Tung, and Li Hung-chang, but they also appeared to be out of touch with the capital.

Viscount Aoki went on to say that the difficulties of an expedition to Peking at this season were almost insurmountable, as maize was standing high in the whole plain, and there were no roads along which artillery or cavalry could advance. The Chinese had also opened the sluices of the Pei-ho, and the water in that river had consequently fallen so much that boats drawing more than 3 or 4 feet of water could not navigate it. He considered that for a successful attack on Peking a force of at least 70,000 men would be necessary, and he seemed doubtful whether the forces at present landed could even hold Tien-tsin and Taku.

Late on the same evening I again saw Viscount Aoki, who told me that during the

\* See "China No. 3 (1900)," p. 69.

† See "China No. 3 (1900)," p. 76.

‡ See "China No. 3 (1900)," No. 235, p. 90.

afternoon the Cabinet had held a meeting, at which Marquis Ito had also been present, and had decided to make a proposal to the Powers, which he was then drafting, and would communicate to me on the following day.

His Excellency repeated his fear that the Legations could not be saved, but said that the Powers had Treaty rights to uphold and their prestige in China to vindicate, and the Japanese Government held that a joint military expedition on a large scale and the capture of Peking was imperative. In order to avoid friction, however, it was necessary that an agreement should previously be arrived at between the Powers on all questions such as the supreme command of the international forces or the spheres of operations of the several contingents.

On the following day, the 4th July, Viscount Aoki called upon me in the evening, and handed me the Memorandum of which I inclose a copy. In doing so, he said that in consequence of the further suggestion contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 2nd instant, the Japanese Government had decided to send at once 2,500 men beyond the force already dispatched, but he repeated that the material difficulties of landing and supplies were so great that it would be almost impossible to send more at a time.

I saw Viscount Aoki again this afternoon, and informed him that I had forwarded his communication to your Lordship.

On my return to the Legation I received your Lordship's telegram of the 4th July, and immediately forwarded its substance to his Excellency in the private note of which I have the honour to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. B. WHITEHEAD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 124.

*Memorandum communicated to Viscount Aoki, July 3, 1900.*

THE British Vice-Admiral at Tien-tsin reports that on the 29th June despatches were received from Peking by a Chinese runner confirming the murder of the German Minister, and stating that the situation was desperate, that all foreigners were in great distress, and were hoping for relief every hour, and also that a large Chinese army was advancing on Tien-tsin.

Rear-Admiral Bruce, at Taku, had a long consultation with the Russian General, and they agreed that the combined forces which have till now been landed, with all reinforcements expected, amount to only about 20,000 men, and that with this force it may be possible to hold the base, Taku-Tien-tsin, and probably also Peh-tai-ho, but that an advance beyond Tien-tsin would not be possible.

Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government would be glad to learn whether the Japanese Government propose taking any additional measures.

Inclosure 2 in No. 124.

*Memorandum.*

IMPERIAL Government have also received reports confirming the very grave situation in North China, and they perceive that the present trouble is much more deep-rooted, and has far wider bearings than it might appear. Consequently, whilst the Imperial Government are perfectly ready to take full share in the concerted action—and, indeed, have determined to send at once a certain number of troops in addition to those already dispatched, in order to meet immediate necessity—yet, in view of the fact that much larger forces than those already landed, or now on the way, are deemed absolutely necessary for the advance on Peking, or even to hold the base, Taku-Tien-tsin, efficiently; and, further, having in view the almost insurmountable difficulties, especially at certain seasons, by reason of the nature and climate of the locality, Imperial Government deem it highly advisable that the Powers concerned should, at this juncture, exchange their views concerning the measures to be taken in common to avert the impending danger and to meet all eventualities in future.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 124.

*Mr. Whitehead to Viscount Aoki.*

Dear Viscount Aoki,

*Tōkiō, July 5, 1900.*

I HAVE this moment, on my return from your Excellency's reception, received a telegram from Lord Salisbury, in which, after repeating the inclosed message from Admiral Seymour, his Lordship says that this indicates a position of extreme gravity, and instructs me to communicate it at once to your Excellency, Lord Salisbury goes on to say that Japan is the only Power which can send reinforcements, and that no objection has been raised by any European Power to this course.

I think this shows that Lord Salisbury believes there is still some hope of rescuing the Legations, and hopes that Japan will make the effort.

Believe me, &c.  
(Signed) J. BEETHOM WHITEHEAD.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 124.

*Telegram from the Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.*

THE following telegram has just been received from Admiral Seymour, dated Tien-tsin, the 30th June:—

“Chinese couriers arrived from Peking with a short message, dated 24th June, stating that the condition there was desperate, and asking for help at once. Couriers, on being interrogated, stated that all Legations, except British, French, German, and part of Russian, are destroyed. Europeans gathered in British Legation have provisions, but ammunition is scarce. One gate of the city near Legation is held by Europeans with guns captured from Chinese. Five marine guard killed and one officer wounded. There is not much sickness at present.

“I propose to remain at Tien-tsin at present, unless there are naval operations in the Yang-tsze, or elsewhere.

“Vice-Admiral Alexeieff is expected, and will be Senior Officer of all nations here.

“Chinese inundated country near here yesterday from the Grand Canal, their object being probably the defence of the city to the south.

“There is no injury to us, and general health is good.

“All agreed that no advance on Peking possible for many days at least, on account of the want of force and transport.”

## No. 125.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 7.)*

My Lord,

*Shanghai, June 27, 1900.*

ON the 23rd instant I had the honour to send you a telegram to the effect that it was certain that the Tien-tsin Concessions had been bombarded by Imperial troops under direct orders from the Peking Government, and that it was probable that a like fate had befallen the Legations at Peking, from which place there had been no news since the 13th June, with the possible result that when communication with the capital should be re-established we might find a new Emperor on the Throne, the Legations attacked, and a Decree issued to kill all foreigners.

The Nanking Viceroy seemed well disposed, but I expressed the opinion that Shanghai should be rendered unassailable, as I considered that a strong force here and at Woosung would prevent hostilities.

The presence here of the “Undaunted,” “Daphne,” and “Waterwitch” did not show a sufficient amount of naval strength to insure confidence.

There were, I said, several thousand Chinese troops at Woosung and around Shanghai, and about 5,000 more at Soochow, twelve hours' distant, all armed with modern weapons and supplied with modern artillery, so that they would destroy Shanghai in a few hours. Her Majesty's Consuls at Chungking and Ningpo had both asked for gun-boats, but none could be spared. The situation I considered most serious

and likely to become more so unless we had a speedy success in the north. Li Ping Hêng, former Governor of Shantung and a firm supporter of the Empress-Dowager, was at the Kiang-yin forts and his influence would certainly not be on the side of order.

I have since heard from Her Majesty's Consul at Chinkiang that he has learnt on reliable authority that Li Ping Hêng has several times telegraphed to the Viceroy Liu K'un-yi begging him to order the forts to fire on any foreign men-of-war coming up the river, but that the Viceroy has flatly refused to do so, and has given orders to the officers in command of the forts that they are not to fire a shot without distinct instructions from him. I have no doubt that both the Viceroy at Nanking and the Viceroy at Hankow are thoroughly honest in their declarations of determination to keep the peace. There is danger, however, in the action of some of their subordinates, who evidently would not be averse to stirring up trouble. I have brought to the notice of his Excellency Liu K'un-yi the fact that large shipments of arms and ammunition are being made from the Kiangnan Arsenal here to Kiang-yin Forts, that ammunition is being sent from the same arsenal through the creeks to various places in the district, and that fresh guns are being mounted in the Woosung Forts. His Excellency replies that all this has been done without his knowledge and that he will put a stop to it.

There is great excitement amongst the natives here who are leaving the place in thousands. To stop this exodus, if possible, the Consular Body has issued a notice which has been posted in Chinese throughout the Settlements, a translation of which I have the honour to inclose. There is now a very considerable force of warships here, English, American, and Japanese, and I do not consider it likely that any serious trouble will arise. There is uneasiness at some of the smaller ports but gun-boats will be sent there as soon as it is possible, and I think that for the moment the situation is secured.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

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Inclosure in No. 125.

*Proclamation to Chinese by Consular Body, Shanghai.*

(Translation.)

OWING to the troubles in the north, many rumours have been circulated in Shanghai which have unsettled the minds of the people. In their ignorance of the true state of affairs, they have frightened themselves and each other, and in fleeing homewards from Shanghai have in many cases fallen a prey to robbers.

We, the Consular body at Shanghai, have consulted with the Chinese authorities regarding the protection of life and property in this neighbourhood, and have agreed to act in co-operation in putting down any disturbance that may occur. The Municipal Council holds the volunteer corps in readiness for the protection of the Settlement, and our war-ships have taken up their positions in the river for the same purpose, and for that alone.

With such precautions both on shore and afloat, and with the cordial co-operation of the Chinese authorities, there is no reason why the troubles in the north need spread into these parts.

There is no cause for alarm, and we hereby give notice to all that the presence of foreign men-of-war in the river is only a measure of precaution for the protection of the Settlement, and that there is no foundation of truth in the idle rumours with which many persons are now exciting themselves.

(Signature of Senior Consul.)

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No. 126.

*Consul Playfair to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 7.)*

My Lord,

*Foochow, June 26, 1900.*

IN consequence of the operations undertaken by the allied forces in the north for the suppression of the Boxers, communication with Peking, whether by post or telegraph, has been entirely cut off since the first week in June. On this account I venture to make

to your Lordship direct a report on the state of affairs at Foochow, which in the ordinary course I would have addressed to the Legation at Peking.

On the 22nd of this month the French Consul received from his Consul-General at Shanghae the text of a notification from the allied Admirals addressed to the provincial officials of the Empire apprising them that the operations at Taku were for the suppression of the Boxers and the protection of foreign lives. This announcement coincides, fortunately, with the view of the situation already adopted by the Viceroy here; a view which mitigates the anxiety which I should otherwise have felt for the safety of the foreign residents at this port. On the first intimation of the trouble the Viceroy, of his own motion and without any demand on my part, sent to let me know that he had moved additional troops into Kien-ning and Ku-cheng, where the inhabitants are known to be turbulent, and had detailed an extra force for the protection of foreigners on Nantai; and he expressed his determination to repress all attempts at disturbance on the part of the populace in his jurisdiction.

In view of the favourable attitude of the authorities and the peaceful demeanour of the Foochow people, I have not thought it necessary to apply for naval protection, considering that Her Majesty's ships are already fully occupied and that there are many ports in China where their presence would be essential for the protection of life and property. My colleagues of the Consular Body for the most part share my views.

The Viceroy, in acknowledging to the French Consul the receipt of the Admirals' notification, said he had instructed his subordinates that the position of foreign residents remained the same, and that they were to be unmolested and protected as before. I venture to draw the attention of your Lordship to the very friendly, satisfactory, and sensible attitude of the Viceroy when confronted by a problem of some difficulty.

The Church Missionary Society has, I understand, called in to Nantai its lady members in the city of Foochow and in the country, but the measure does not seem to me necessary, and had not been suggested by me. Fortunately, it is in July that such a migration to Kuliang, a health resort in the hills above Foochow, usually takes place, so that the movement will appear to the Chinese an ordinary one, and not inspired by panic.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. M. H. PLAYFAIR.

No. 127.

*Liu Kwung Yi to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.*—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, August 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nanking, August 6, 1900.

A TELEGRAM from the Governor of Chekiang gives the information that Chu Chow suffered from the disturbances of rebels. English missionaries to the number of five persons were murdered. The Magistrate of Hsi-ngan, who went to suppress the disturbances, also fell victim to the rebels.

The Governor lost no time in sending troops to restore order, and the place is now in peace again.

The local officials, both military and civil, the Chentai, the Taotai, and the Prefect who are responsible for the disturbances, are duly cashiered. Orders have been given to arrest the principal parties who are guilty of the crime, and to be punished in accordance with law.

The parties, either foreign missionaries or the Chinese native converts, who suffered, either in person or in property, will be reported upon and indemnified.

Please convey my deep regret to the Marquess of Salisbury, and assure his Lordship that rigid measures shall be taken to administer justice to all parties concerned.

No. 128.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received August 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 7, 1900.

THE following is a translation of a *note verbale* which was handed to me by Herr von Derenthall this afternoon:—

His Majesty the Emperor of Russia has stated to our Most Gracious Sovereign that

it would afford him especial satisfaction to place the Russian troops operating in the Province of Chi-li under the supreme command of Field-Marshal Count Waldersee. His Majesty the German Emperor is ready to undertake the task thereby devolving upon him, as he has reason to assume that also other Governments besides Russia consider that a German supreme command would be of advantage; for example, the Japanese Government have given it to be understood that they would prefer a German supreme command to the supreme command of another Power more extensively interested in East Asiatic affairs.

The Government of His Majesty the German Emperor would be grateful for a communication as to the views held by Her Majesty's Government upon the subject of the supreme command, and as to the manner in which they would be disposed to connect the British troops in the Province of Chi-li, with the army operating under Field-Marshal Count Waldersee.

No. 129.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Goschen.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 7, 1900.*

A PROCLAMATION, prohibiting the export of arms and ammunition to China, was issued here yesterday. Represent to the Danish Government, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, the desirability of adopting similar measures.

No. 130.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 7, 1900.*

THE French Ambassador spoke to me on the 31st ultimo on the importance of an agreement among the Naval Commanders in Chinese waters for the distribution of ships of war to the various ports where protection was required for the European communities, so that there should be no waste of strength.

His Excellency subsequently informed Sir T. Sanderson that the Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian Governments, who had been consulted, had agreed that such an arrangement would be desirable.

I have to-day informed M. Cambon that Her Majesty's Government entirely agree with his Excellency in principle, but do not wish to fetter the discretion of the British Admiral in the movements of the ships under his orders. They have no doubt, however, that the Admiral will communicate freely with his foreign colleagues in all matters in which there is to be combined action, and where consultation on any particular matter involving danger to Europeans may be necessary.

His Excellency expressed a wish that the consultation should extend to the action of individual vessels at isolated ports, even where no combined action is contemplated. I pointed out, however, to his Excellency, that the very different position of the various Powers in respect to naval force in China would make any such arrangement very difficult.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 131.

*An Imperial Edict issued August 2.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh August 8.)*

IN view of the existence of hostilities between certain Chinese subjects and foreign Powers caused by the anti-Christian feelings of the Chinese people, we have afforded reasonable protection to the foreign Representatives in Peking, and the Tsung-li Yamên has sent to the Legations letters of inquiries and proposals for their safe conveyance under escort to Tien-tsin, to avoid the apprehension of further attack from rebels before the complete restoration of peace and order in the capital. We

have now, on the advice of Li Hung-chang and Lew Kwung Yih, to authorize Yung-lu to appoint beforehand, good and reliable high civil and military officials, with selected troops of soldiers for the purpose of escorting them from Peking to Tien-tsin as soon as they have fixed the date of departure. If there be any rebels *en route* trying to endanger the safety of the party, the officials in charge have to destroy the rebels at once, so as not to commit any blunder.

Before their departure from Peking, the freedom of telegraphic communication in plain words with their respective Governments, is hereby to be restored to the foreign Representatives, in order to show the candidness with which I have always treated them.

Respect this.

No. 132.

*Li Hung-chang to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.*—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh August 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Shanghai, August 5, 1900.

THE Imperial Edict of the 2nd August is the self-evident proof of the immediate conveyance of the foreign Representatives under escort to Tien-tsin.

Please ask Lord Salisbury to instruct the Commander-in-chief not to make any further advance, and wait for negotiations.

No. 133.

*Shéng to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.*—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh August 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Shanghai, August 7, 1900.

IMPERIAL Edict of the 5th August last authorizes the restoration to the foreign Representatives the freedom of code-telegraphic communication with their respective Governments.

No. 134.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received August 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tien-tsin, August 5, 1900.

THE Chinese have been driven out of Pei-tsang and are in full retreat.

No. 135.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received August 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Handed in Tsinan Yamén, August 7, 1900.

Peking.—I received to-day, 3rd August, your telegram, undated, forwarded through the Chinese Minister.\*

State of affairs mentioned in my letter of 4th July continued until 16th July, when shell and cannon fire ceased, but rifle fire from Chinese positions held by Government troops and Boxers has continued intermittently ever since, but since then casualties have not been numerous.

The following British have been killed:—David Oliphant, Warren, Captain Strouts and Privates Scadding and Phillips, Royal Marines. Twenty-six British wounded, including Captains Halliday and Wray, Students Townsend and Peachey, and Morrison, "Times," correspondent. All the wounded doing well, except Marine Private Sawyer. Rest of British in Legation well.

Total killed in garrison 60, wounded 110.

Over 200 women and children refugees in this Legation.

We have strengthened our fortifications, and can hold out ten days unless severely attacked.

\* See No. 91.



Chinese Government are trying to persuade foreign Envoys to leave Peking for Tien-tsin with wives and families. Remembering Cawnpore we have no intention of leaving unless under escort of European troops, and we are temporizing to gain time.

Up to date, Chinese Government have refused us permission to send cypher messages to our Governments.

No. 136.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 8.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, August 8, 1900.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 6th instant, from the Rear-Admiral, China Station.

Copies have also been sent to the War Office and India Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 136.

*Rear-Admiral Bruce to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Chefoo, August 6, 1900.*

ALLIES, about 12,000, attacked Chinese strongly entrenched position at Hsiku, about 2 miles outside Tien-tsin, early this morning. Chinese driven out and retreated to the northwards pursued by allies, who occupied Peitsang. Transport following up troops by road and river. Advance to Peking begun.

No. 137.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 8.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, August 8, 1900.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 7th August, from the Commander-in-chief, China, relative to the dispatch of British troops to Shanghai, together with Admiralty reply. Copies have been sent to War Office, India Office, and Military Intelligence Department.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 137.

*Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 7, 1900.*

VICEROY has, I hear, told Shanghai Taotai that British troops will come here. When may I expect them, so as to be prepared?

Inclosure 2 in No. 137.

*Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Admiralty, August 8, 1900.*

YOUR telegram of the 7th instant.

General Officer, Hong Kong, has been directed to place himself in communication with you, and to send on the troops to Shanghai by the route, and in the manner you suggest, taking your advice as to whether a portion of the brigade should go at once or wait till the whole has arrived from India.

## No. 138.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 8, 1900.*

COUNT LAMSDORFF informs me that the services of Count Waldersee have been offered by the German Emperor to take the general command of the operations of the international forces in Pechili, and that the idea will meet with no objection on the part of the Russian Government.

## No. 139.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 8, 1900.*

AN Imperial Edict received from Peking was communicated to Count Lamsdorff to-day by the Chinese Minister. After explaining the situation, it says that negotiations are proceeding with the Foreign Ministers with a view to all Europeans in Peking being sent to Tien-tsin under a safe escort of troops, in company with High Court Dignitaries, who would be responsible for their lives and safety to the Throne, and that before leaving the Ministers are to be allowed to communicate direct with their respective Governments *en clair*.

In reply Count Lamsdorff observed that he awaited confirmation of the information in this Edict by a direct communication from the Ministers themselves.

His Excellency has received no official news of any engagement or of an advance on Peking. The latest telegram from Admiral Alexieff says, on the contrary, that it was agreed by all the Commanders that it was quite impossible to advance on Peking before the middle of the month. A reconnaissance in force from Tien-tsin may, he thinks, possibly have been made.

## No. 140.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 9.)*

My Lord,

*Newport, Rhode Island, July 30, 1900.*

AS I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my despatch of the 27th instant, I communicated to Mr. Hay the fundamental principles enunciated by the Russian Government as governing the action of the Powers in relation to China, and I inquired whether they suggested any further observations on his part.

In a note Mr. Hay replied that no further comment from him on the subject is necessary beyond that given in his letter of the 23rd (Inclosure 3 in my above-mentioned despatch), inasmuch as his citation therein from his Circular telegram of the 3rd July expresses the President's views as to the eventual conditions under which order and responsible government may be restored in China, while deeming it premature to forecast the means of bringing about those results.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE.

## No. 141.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, August 4, 1900.*

[Figures of this Telegram communicated by Chinese Minister August 9.]

THE Corps Diplomatique has to-day been informed by the Tsung-li Yamên that the foreign Governments have on many occasions asked the Chinese Ministers that we should leave Peking under sufficient escort. Yamên ask us, therefore, to fix the date of our departure from Peking, and to arrange conditions of departure.

We have answered that we are referring the matter to our Governments to have their instructions, without which we cannot leave our posts.

In order to allow us to leave in security, it is essential that foreign troops come to take us away, and that they should be in sufficient numbers to escort 800 Europeans, of whom 200 are women and children, 50 wounded, and more than 3,000 native Christians whom we cannot leave here to be massacred. Under no conditions would it be safe to trust to a Chinese escort.

All the foreign Representatives are sending to their Governments the above telegram.

No. 142.

*Mr. Choate to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 9.)*

My Lord,

*American Embassy, London, August 9, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Chinese Minister at Washington communicated on the 8th instant to the Secretary of State of the United States an Imperial Edict, dated the 2nd August, in reponse to the Joint Memorial of Li Hung-chang and Lin Kun-yi, proposing the sending of the foreign Ministers from Peking to Tien-tsin.

The Edict reads as follows:—

“Throughout the disturbances recently caused by our subjects on account of Christian Missions, which have resulted in a conflict of forces, it has been found necessary to afford protection to all the foreign Ministers in Peking on repeated occasions. The Tsung-li Yamên sent notes inquiring after their welfare, and as Peking has not yet been restored to order, and precautionary measures may not secure absolute safety, the foreign Ministers are being consulted as to the proposed plan of detailing troops to escort them safely to Tien-tsin for temporary shelter, so that they may be free from apprehensive anxiety or fear. We hereby command Jung Lu to appoint, as a preliminary step, trustworthy high civil and military officials, who, together with reliable and efficient troops, shall, at such time as the foreign Ministers may agree upon for leaving Peking, escort and protect them throughout their journey. Should lawless characters manifest evil designs upon the Ministers, or attempt to rob them, or in any way create trouble, they (the high officials) shall at once repress them without fail. If the foreign Ministers before leaving Peking should desire to communicate with their respective Governments, and if their telegraphic messages should be in plain language, the Tsung-li Yamên shall at once attend them without delay, thus manifesting the utmost friendliness of the Imperial Government. Respect this.”

Wu Ting-fang also communicated to the Secretary of State a cablegram received by him, on the morning of the 8th instant, from Yu Lien-yuen, Taotai of Shanghai, which reads as follows:—

“Have received telegram from Governor Yuan Shih-kai, to the effect that the Tsung-li Yamên received, on the 5th August, an Imperial Edict allowing all the foreign Ministers free communication with their respective Governments in cypher.”

In reply, the Secretary of State, on the evening of the 8th instant, handed to the Chinese Minister the following signed Memorandum:—

“We are availing ourselves of the opportunity offered by the Imperial Edict of the 5th August, allowing to the foreign Ministers free communication with their respective Governments in cypher, and have sent a communication to Minister Conger, to which we await an answer. We are already advised by him in a brief despatch, received the 7th August, that Imperial troops are firing daily upon the Ministers in Peking. We demand the immediate cessation of hostile attacks by Imperial troops upon the Legations, and urge the exercise of every power and energy of the Imperial Government for the protection of the Legations and all foreigners therein. We are also advised, by the same despatch from Minister Conger, that, in his opinion, for the foreign Ministers to leave Peking, as proposed in the Edict of the 2nd August, would be certain death, in view of the fact that the Imperial troops are now firing upon the Legations, and in view of the doubt

expressed by the Imperial Government, in its Edict of the 2nd August, as to its power to restore order and secure absolute safety in Peking, it is evident this apprehension is well founded, for, if your Government cannot protect our Minister in Peking, it will presumptively be unable to protect him upon a journey from Peking to the coast. We therefore urge upon the Imperial Government that it shall adopt the course suggested in the 3rd clause of the letter of the President to His Majesty the Emperor of China of the 23rd July, 1900, and enter into communication with the relief expedition, so that co-operation may be secured between them for the liberation of the Legations, the protection of foreigners, and the restoration of order. Such action on the part of the Imperial Government would be a satisfactory demonstration of its friendliness and desire to attain these ends."

I am instructed by my Government to communicate the foregoing to your Lordship, for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

No. 143

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1900.*

IN reply to your telegram of the 7th instant, I have to state that, in the event of the Powers who have forces in Pechili determining to put these forces under the supreme direction of Count Waldersee, Her Majesty's Government will most gladly concur in that policy. The British Commanders will receive instructions in this sense; and Her Majesty's Government will view with great satisfaction an arrangement by which so distinguished a soldier is placed at the head of the international forces.

It will be necessary to draw up instructions which go more into detail if the project goes forward.

No. 144.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 9, 1900.*

THE unpledged securities of the Yang-tsze Provinces are amply sufficient to secure repayment of the loan which it is proposed that Her Majesty's Government should guarantee.

The hypothecation of the *li-kin* in districts not included in the 4½ per Cent. sterling Loan issued at 90 in the year 1898 might be suggested to the Viceroy as security, the collection to be handed over to the control of the Imperial Maritime Customs.

It is most important to strengthen the Viceroy in their present position, for, if they were overthrown, the result would be a rising, the suppression of which would involve the expenditure of much time, and the employment of large forces, and this would be inevitably followed by the partition of China. The firm position held by the Viceroy has for the time being checked the plans of the Peking Government for a general uprising against foreigners, which, but for this, would certainly have been carried out.

No. 145.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, August 9, 1900.*

AT request of Viscount Aoki, I have sent following to Vice-Admiral Seymour to-day:—

"Viscount Aoki has heard that you have made a proposal to Viceroy of Nanking that troops should be sent from Hong Kong for the protection of Shanghai. His

Excellency inquires whether you have taken into consideration the danger of such action precipitating disturbances and exciting population in Yang-tsze region, which it is of the highest importance to avoid. He begged me to ask you what are your actual proposals."

## No. 146.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tōkiō, August 9, 1900.*

WITH reference to Sir F. Lascelles' telegram of the 7th August, a telegram has been received from the German Emperor by the Emperor of Japan with regard to Count Waldersee's appointment to supreme command. His Majesty has signified his consent in his reply.

## No. 147.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 9, 1900.*

I HAVE just seen the French Minister for Foreign Affairs at the funeral service for the King of Italy, and he declared that he knew nothing of the appointment of Count Waldersee as Commander-in-chief in China beyond what he had seen in the papers. He could not, in reply to my inquiry, give me any idea of what the French answer would be, and assured me that he could not see me again to-day, being occupied all the afternoon with the President.

## No. 148.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1900.*

PLEASE endeavour to ascertain views of the Government to which you are accredited as to what action should be taken in view of the position of Europeans in Peking as described in the telegram which they have no doubt received from their Representative there, as we have from ours in the telegram of which a repetition has been sent to you.

## No. 149.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1900.*

THE Japanese Minister came to the Foreign Office to-day and was received, in my absence, by Mr. Bertie.

He said he had come to inquire whether the German Government had proposed to Her Majesty's Government that Count Waldersee should have supreme command of the international forces at Tien-tsin.

Mr. Bertie replied that Her Majesty's Government had received such a proposal from the German Government, and asked whether that Government had made a like proposal to Japan.

Baron Hayashi explained that the Japanese Government had received the suggestion, but had not yet replied to it. Viscount Aoki wished first to know what view Her Majesty's Government took of it. His Excellency was inclined to think that, as Count Waldersee would be the officer of the highest rank, it would be well to adopt the German suggestion. Baron Hayashi asked what answer had been, or would be, made by Her Majesty's Government.

\* Also to Lord Currie, Sir F. Lascelles, Sir H. Rumbold, Sir C. Scott, Lord Pauncefoot, and Mr. Whitehead.

Mr. Bertie informed him that the matter was under consideration.

Baron Hayashi said that the proposal emanated from the German, not the Japanese, Government.

Later in the day I informed Baron Hayashi that Her Majesty's Government had accepted the proposal of the German Government. I have acquainted you by telegraph of the terms of our acceptance.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 150.

*Consul Fulford to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Chefoo, August 8, 1900.*

RUSSIANS bombarded and took the native city of Newchwang on the 4th August in consequence of attack on foreign quarter by mob.

Russians have temporarily occupied the Settlement, giving assurance to foreigners of Treaty rights and privileges.

Native city not much damaged; foreigners and foreign quarter all safe.

No. 151.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 10, 1900.*

I GAVE Herr von Derenthall this morning a paraphrase of the telegram from your Lordship of yesterday's date relative to the appointment of Count Waldersee. The warmest thanks were expressed by his Excellency for the prompt and friendly manner in which the proposal had been accepted by your Lordship. He said that your Lordship's reply, which was among the first received, would be at once communicated to the Emperor, who, he felt sure, would be much pleased.

I understand that, with the exception of the Italian Government, who have accepted Count Waldersee as Commander-in-Chief, the other Governments have not as yet sent in their replies.

No. 152.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 10, 1900.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding telegram I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Herr von Derenthall has been instructed by the Emperor to suggest that Military Representatives should be sent to Count Waldersee's headquarters by the Powers, to act as intermediaries between the different Commanders and him, so that the action of the supreme command in China might be simplified.

No. 153.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 10, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to your telegram of 9th August, that Herr von Derenthall informed me this morning, in reply to my inquiry that the steps to be taken in view of the present position of the Europeans in Peking were under the earnest consideration of the German Government, but no conclusion had yet been arrived at by them.

## No. 154.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 10, 1900.*

COUNT LÜTZOW states that although the Austro-Hungarian Government have not formally agreed to the proposed appointment by the German Government of Count Waldersee to be Commander-in-chief of the allied forces in China, there is no doubt that this appointment will be agreeable to the Emperor and his Government.

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## No. 155.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 10, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, no telegram has reached Count Goluchowski from the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires at Peking similar to the one sent by Her Majesty's Minister on the 4th instant. Count Goluchowski says that he finds it difficult to offer any opinion as to the best course to be pursued in view of the present position of affairs, and would rather await the expression of the views of the other more interested Powers on the subject.

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## No. 156.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Newport, Rhode Island, August 10, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 9th August, I have the honour to report that the United States' Government yesterday informed the Chinese Government, by telegraph, that, according to reports received from their Minister at Peking, the Legations were being daily fired upon by the Imperial troops, and that, since they were unable to afford Mr. Conger proper protection in Peking, they were therefore presumptively equally incapable of protecting him on his journey to the coast, whereby he would be exposed to certain death.

The United States' Government demand that the attacks on the Legations by the Imperial troops should immediately cease. They urge the Chinese Government to pursue the course proposed to them already in the President's message of the 23rd July, namely, to co-operate with the relief army for the protection of foreigners, the re-establishment of order, and the liberation of the Legations.

I am sending by to-day's mail the full text of this note, and am awaiting the reply of the State Department to my inquiry whether they have any further suggestion to make in answer to your Lordship's question.

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## No. 157.

*Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, August 10, 1900.*

FOLLOWING refers to the Foreign Office telegram of 9th August:—

The Foreign Minister, whose opinion I have asked in regard to the foreign Representatives at Peking, has promised to reply to me shortly. As yet he has not received the telegram from the Italian Representative.

His views generally are that before the European troops make an attack upon the city, endeavours should be made to come to an understanding with the authorities at Peking.

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No. 158.

*Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, August 10, 1900.*

I AM informed by the Marquis Visconti-Venosta that the Italian Ambassador in Berlin has reported the nomination of Count Waldersee, and has added that it was expected that Japan would concur, and it was hoped that England would also.

In regard to the latter point, the Foreign Minister said he earnestly hoped that the European Powers would not find China a source of discord. He had replied in the affirmative to the German proposal.

No. 159.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 10, 1900.*

A TELEGRAM, practically identical with that received from Sir C. MacDonald of the 4th instant, has been received by the Russian Government from their Minister at Peking.

No. 160.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 10, 1900.*

THE telegram from Sir C. MacDonald of 4th August has been communicated to the Russian Government.

Count Lamsdorff told Mr. Hardinge, who saw him this afternoon, that he had just had a long interview with the Chinese Minister, and had spoken very strongly indeed to him, threatening that unless the Legations were immediately relieved from their present painful situation, the attitude of the Russian Government would change to one of hostility.

A proposal had been made by the Chinese Minister that the foreign Ministers, their families, and other Europeans, should leave Peking with an escort, commanded by a certain General (Count Lamsdorff had forgotten his name), and accompanied by certain distinguished Mandarins, whose presence with them should serve as a guarantee.

In reply, Count Lamsdorff said that if any harm whatever befell the Ministers, either in Peking or on their road to Tien-tsin, the Emperor of China and his Ministers would be held directly responsible; that he was not in a position to appreciate the value of the Mandarins who might be deputed to accompany the Ministers as a guarantee for their safety, since those in Power in Peking might select Mandarins whom they would be glad to get rid of, but that if the safe removal of the Ministers were sincerely desired by the Chinese Government, and an escort acceptable to the Ministers could not be provided by them, the very simple expedient remained for them of applying for a sufficient escort of international troops from the allied forces, who could escort the besieged foreigners to Tien-tsin, coming under the white flag to receive them as far as the walls of Peking, without entering the city. It was, in the meantime, absolutely incumbent on the Chinese Government, as an earnest of their good faith, to supply the Legations with any provisions they might wish for.

In reply, the Chinese Minister had promised that he would telegraph immediately and energetically to Peking in the above sense.

In Count Lamsdorff's opinion the transmission of cyphered messages by the Ministers from Peking is a promising sign, and his Excellency is hopeful that their departure may be successfully negotiated.

General Kuropatkine is convinced that it is impracticable for the allied forces to advance as far as Peking for another two or three weeks, and others possessing local knowledge share this view.



No. 161.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 10, 1900.*

IF the Viceroy of Wuchang will execute an assignment of the *li-kin* revenue of his provinces not already appropriated to the Chinese  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per Cent. Loan, Her Majesty's Government are prepared to advance to him, through the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the sum of 75,000*l.* for a period of 10 years at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

You should arrange with the Viceroy the terms as to repayment (presumably annual), and you should also settle the periods and amounts of advance.

You should also take care that the money is not used for the equipment of troops to proceed north, but devoted to the payment of the troops retained in the province.

Communicate with the Senior Naval Officer, and act in concert with him on this subject.

No. 162.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 10, 1900.*

I HAVE received, through the Chinese Minister, a telegram from the Viceroy of Nanking, saying that he hears that 2,000 British troops are to be landed at Shanghai, and that France and America will also land troops there. The Chinese, he adds, are removing themselves to places of safety, as this report has caused great apprehension amongst them. The Viceroy wishes the force limited to a small number, as he does not, in view of the large naval force at Woosung, see the necessity of so large a land force, which he thinks will cause great complications, and will provoke other Powers to similar action.

Were not arrangements made by you that the Viceroy should issue a Proclamation assuring the Chinese that the defence of the Settlements is the only object for which the force is to be landed ?

No. 163.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 10, 1900.*

THE proposal of the German Government that Field-Marshal Count Waldersee shall be Commander-in-chief of the international expedition to Peking has been accepted, so far as they are concerned, by Her Majesty's Government, and subject to further instructions, which have not yet been drafted by them.

No. 164.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 11.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, August 11, 1900.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 8th August, from Rear-Admiral Bruce at Taku, relative to the taking of Yangsun.

Copies also sent to War Office, India Office, and Military Intelligence Department

I am, &c.  
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

\* Also to Sir E. Monson, Lord Currie, Sir C. Scott, Sir H. Rumbold, and Lord Pauncefote.

## Inclosure in No. 164.

*Rear-Admiral Bruce to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Taku, August 8 (via Chefoo, August 9), 1900.*

FOLLOWING telegram received from General Officer Commanding:—

“Yangsun taken 6th August. Troops exhausted by heat and long march. Allies remain there two or three days, then rush to Peking. Fight lasted four hours. Chinese severe losses. Extended four miles. Enemy demoralized.”

## No. 165.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 11, 1900.*

THE following telegram has been received from Acting Consul-General at Hankow:—

“The Viceroy has sent the Taotai to express his satisfaction at the declaration of policy which was made in the House of Commons, and to assure us that relying on the support of Her Majesty’s Government, he is determined to disregard any orders to leave his post or to break his agreement with us, which he may receive from Peking.

“He informed me that, having heard that Yung Lu, the President of the Board of Revenue and favourite of the Empress-Dowager had been cast into prison by order of Prince Tuan, he feared that the latter was still usurping the power.

“The leader of the Black Flag troops wished to bring several thousand men through Hankow on his way to Peking, but the Viceroy directed him to proceed by Shashih. The troops have not yet left Kwangtung and probably will not do so. They would be four months on the way.

“The Viceroy is anxious about the loan and cannot understand the delay in granting the guarantee.”

## No. 166.

*Li Hung-chang, Lew Kwung Yih, Chang Chih Tung, and Sheng Suen Hwai to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, August 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nanking Yamén, August 10, 1900.*

IN view of present disturbances in the north, though the foreign Settlements in Shanghai are to be protected by the Treaty Powers, yet the protection of the Yang-tsze Valley is the sole duty of the Viceroys, and we assure that no rebels could enter our jurisdiction without being crushed.

In addition to twenty foreign men-of-war now being stationed near Shanghai, of which the majority are English, we now hear that Great Britain is going to land at Shanghai 2,000 Indian troops. This report has caused great apprehension among the Chinese merchants and people, and they are now moving away from Shanghai, and the city is quite deserted. It is impossible to say that the people of other ports will not give a wrong interpretation of the state of affairs in Shanghai, and such a misinterpretation is sure to give rise to great complications and disturbances, which will greatly injure commercial interests.

We have to ask you to move Lord Salisbury to stop the proposed landing of such a big force.

## No. 167.

*An Imperial Edict, issued August 7, received by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh August 11.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, August 11, 1900.)*

THE present hostilities between certain Chinese subjects and foreign nations are caused partly by the misunderstanding of the foreign Powers and partly by the mismanagement of the Chinese local authorities. It would be a misfortune to the whole

world, and contrary to the wishes of China, should such a complication be allowed to evolve out by itself.

Let, therefore, Li Hung-chang be appointed as Minister Plenipotentiary, and negotiate by telegraph with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs of Treaty Powers, to obtain first the suspension of hostilities, and then have the satisfactory settlements submitted to our approval of all the existing difficulties.

Respect this.

No. 168.

*Memorandum communicated by Japanese Minister, August 11, 1900.*

IN view of the anxiety held by the Chinese Government to send foreign Ministers temporarily to Tien-tsin and to suspend the advance of the combined forces to Peking, the Imperial Government propose that the Powers concerned should agree to an armistice for a certain time pending further negotiations with the Chinese Government, on condition—

1. That the Chinese Government shall order their troops and rebels to retire beyond a certain distance, which is to be determined by the Commanders of the combined forces.

2. That a part of the combined forces shall freely advance to Peking to escort the Ministers and foreigners back to Tien-tsin.

The Imperial Government apprehends that on the approach of combined forces to Peking all the foreigners there will be massacred, that Empress-Dowager and Emperor will flee into the interior, and that anarchy will prevail in the capital.

No. 169.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 11, 1900.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that he only received the official communication of the proposed appointment of Count Waldersee as Commander-in-chief, which formed the subject of your Lordship's telegram of 8th August, after he had seen me at the funeral service the day before yesterday.

In a matter of such moment no decision can be taken without a plenary meeting of the Cabinet in the presence of the President of the Republic, and as five of the Ministers are absent from Paris, no such Council can be held before the 14th instant, after the President's return from Marseilles.

I told his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government had accepted in principle, subject to the unanimity of the other Powers, and to the drawing up of such instruction as might be by them considered necessary after deliberation.

No. 170.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 11, 1900.*

I DISCUSSED to-day with the Minister for Foreign Affairs the situation of Europeans at Peking, which formed the subject of your Lordship's telegram of 9th August.

He said at once that, in his opinion, no other course was permissible than to advance to the rescue of the Representatives as quickly as possible, and thus comply with the urgent appeal which has been received from them all.

As for the proposal that the Ministers should proceed to Tien-tsin under Chinese escort, it could not be listened to in view of their own conviction of its resulting in their massacre.

It was the business of the Generals on the spot to arrange the advance with all reasonable precautions to avoid the risk of a check.

No. 171.

*Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, August 11, 1900.*

I HAVE communicated to the Marquess Visconti-Venosta the substance of your Lordship's telegram of 10th August in regard to Count Walderssee.

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No. 172.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 11, 1900.*

MY telegram of 10th August.

In reply to his telegram, the Russian Minister in Peking has been authorized, by order of the Emperor, to proceed to Tien-tsin with the whole staff of the Legation and the troops which have been disembarked, but only in the event of the Emperor of China and the Chinese Government having given the surest guarantees that the journey will be made in complete security.

The Russian Minister has been instructed at the same time to point out the serious responsibility which will weigh upon China and upon the Emperor himself in the event of the slightest infringement of the inviolability of all those who may proceed to Tien-tsin at the same time as the Russian Minister, in the event of such a measure being possible.

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No. 173.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 11, 1900.*

THE Japanese Minister called to-day and was received in my absence by Mr. Bertie.

Baron Hayashi asked whether Her Majesty's Government had received notice of Li Hung-chang's appointment to act as negotiator between the Chinese Government and the Powers for the conclusion of an armistice and peace.

Mr. Bertie replied that Her Majesty's Government had received no such intimation.

Baron Hayashi then handed to him the paraphrase of a telegram from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that a telegram had been received from Li Hung-chang on the 10th instant announcing his appointment as Plenipotentiary, and that the Japanese Government desired to know the views of Her Majesty's Government on the subject.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 174.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, August 7, via Chefoo, August 10, 1900.*

YESTERDAY Yangtsun was taken.

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No. 175.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, August 8, via Chefoo, August 10, 1900.*

A MESSENGER has just returned from Peking, having been unable to deliver despatches. He reports that he was there from the 1st to the 4th August, and that, until night of the 4th August, no firing took place. Then foreign troops opened fire and were replied to. No guns, however, were heard.

On the 6th August Chinese troops were met in full retreat. General "Ma" was missing, supposed to have been killed or wounded.

After audience of Empress-Dowager, Li-Ping-Heng had left Peking.

No. 176.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Communicated by Chinese Legation. August 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, August 8, via Shanghai, August 8, 1900.*

WE have been informed by Yamèn of appointment of Li Hung-chang as Plenipotentiary to negotiate with foreign Powers.

I earnestly hope that advance of the relief force will not be delayed by any negotiations.

No. 177.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1900.*

A TELEGRAM, dated Nanking, the 10th instant, from Li Hung-chang, the Viceroy of Wu-chang and Nanking, and Sheng, has been communicated by the Chinese Minister. The telegram states that it is the duty of the Viceroy to protect the Yang-tsze Valley, and that great apprehension has been caused amongst the Chinese by the reported intention to land 2,000 Indian troops at Shanghai, and that they are deserting the city in consequence; that the state of affairs at Shanghai may be misinterpreted by the population of other ports, and that great complications and disturbances will be the consequence.

They therefore request that orders may be given to stop the landing of such a big force.

No. 178.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1900.*

THE French Minister for Foreign Affairs has stated to Her Majesty's Ambassador that he is not aware of imminent danger to Europeans necessitating the intended landing of British troops at Shanghai, as announced to the Consular Body by Admiral Seymour and yourself. He has also stated that, in the event of British troops being landed there, French troops will also be landed.

No. 179.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, August 12, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of 9th August, a suggestion made to the Powers by the Japanese Government will doubtless have been communicated to your Lordship by Baron Hayashi.

Acting under instructions from his Government the Chinese Minister here asked Viscount Aoki on the 9th instant to telegraph to Baron Nishi and instruct him to leave Peking. This his Excellency refused to do, stating that in view of what had occurred no confidence could be placed in a Chinese escort, and inquiring in what way the Peking Government would guarantee that the Foreign Ministers would not be attacked *en route*.

## No. 180.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1900.*

PENDING further orders from here, the actual landing of troops at Shanghai should not take place except in the case of evident emergency.

## No. 181.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 12, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Herr von Derenthall states that Italy, Russia, and Austria agree to send military representatives to the headquarters of Count von Waldersee, whose appointment has been consented to by Japan and the United States.

The delay of the French Government in sending an answer Herr von Derenthall attributes to the fact that M. Loubet is not empowered to place French troops under the command of a foreign Commander-in-chief unless the consent of the Council of Ministers has been obtained, and no Council can be held before the 14th instant

## No. 182.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1900.*

THE following is our latest military news:—

On the 6th August Yangtzu was taken by the International Relief Column, and they were at Nan-tsai-tsun, and intending to press on to Peking on some date not specified, but subsequent to 8th August.

Strong pressure has been brought to bear on the Chinese Government by the Russian Government to supply provisions to the Legations.

## No. 183.

*Verbal communication made to Chinese Minister by Mr. Bertie, August 12, 1900.*

THE Chinese Minister at Petersburg has proposed that the Legations and Europeans should leave Peking with an escort under the command of a Chinese General, and in company of certain distinguished Mandarins, whose presence would the Minister says, serve as a guarantee for the safety of the Ministers, their families, and other Europeans.

Lord Salisbury is not in a position to appreciate the value of the security thus offered, but if the Chinese Government are sincere in their desire for the safe removal of the Ministers, and are unable to provide an escort acceptable to the Ministers, the Chinese Government should apply to the allied forces for a sufficient escort of the international forces, who, without entering the city, might come under the white flag as far as the walls of Peking to receive the besieged foreigners, and to escort them to Tien-tsin.

Meanwhile it is absolutely incumbent on the Chinese Government, as an earnest of their good faith, to supply the Legations with such provisions as they may desire.

Unless the Legations be immediately relieved from their present painful situation, the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards the Chinese Government will be changed, and the Emperor of China and his Ministers, as well as all those concerned in any harm done to the Ministers and other Europeans, either in Peking or on their road to Tien-tsin, will be held directly responsible.

No. 184.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 13.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, August 10, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy and translation of a *note verbale* which was handed to me on the evening of the 7th instant by Herr von Derenthall, the substance of which I had the honour to communicate to your Lordship by my telegram of the 7th instant.

Inclosure 1 in No. 184.

*Note Verbale.*

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the Emperor of Russia has stated to our Most Gracious Sovereign that it would afford him especial satisfaction to place the Russian troops operating in the Province of Chi-li under the supreme command of Field-Marshal Count Waldersee. His Majesty the German Emperor is ready to undertake the task thereby devolving upon him, as he has reason to assume that also other Governments besides Russia consider that a German supreme command would be of advantage; for example, the Japanese Government have given it to be understood that they would prefer a German supreme command to the supreme command of another Power more extensively interested in East Asiatic affairs.

The Government of His Majesty the German Emperor would be grateful for a communication as to the views held by Her Majesty's Government upon the subject of the supreme command, and as to the manner in which they would be disposed to connect the British troops in the Province of Chi-li with the army operating under Field-Marshal Count Waldersee.

*Berlin, August 7, 1900.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 184.

*Note Verbale.*

HER Majesty's Government will view an arrangement by which so distinguished a soldier as Count Waldersee is placed at the head of the international forces with great satisfaction, and if the Powers who have forces in the Gulf of Pechili should decide to put those forces under the supreme command of the Field-Marshal, Her Majesty's Government will very gladly concur in such a policy, and will give instructions to their Commanders in this sense.

It will be necessary that instructions which go more into detail should be drawn up if the project goes forward.

*Berlin, August 10, 1900.*

No. 185.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 13.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, August 10, 1900.*

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship, by my telegram of to-day, that Herr von Derenthall had expressed his warmest thanks for the prompt and friendly manner in which you had agreed to the appointment of Count Waldersee as Com-

mander-in-chief in Chi-li. As a matter of fact, your Lordship's reply was one of the first to be received.

The Italian Government have already signified their consent, both through their Ambassador here and by a telegram from the King to the Emperor.

The French Ambassador informed me this morning that he had no information on the subject, but that he thought it probable that his Government would accept.

The United States' Chargé d'Affaires is also without instructions as yet, but thought that his Government would agree when they knew that Her Majesty's Government had done so.

No. 186.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 13.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, August 11, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy and translation of an Imperial Decree, dated the 6th August, prohibiting the export from Germany to China of arms and war material.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

Inclosure in No. 186.

*Decree respecting the Prohibition of the Export of Arms and War Material to China, dated August 6, 1900.*

(Translation.)

WE, William, &c.,

Decree :

§ 1. The export of arms and of war material to China and to the European Settlements on the Chinese Coasts, as well as to any ports in the neighbourhood of China, from any part of the Empire is forbidden until further notice.

§ 2. The Chancellor of the Empire is empowered to permit exceptions to be made to this prohibition in consideration of the destination of the goods, and to make the necessary conditions for the insurance of this destination.

§ 3. The present Decree comes into force on the day of its promulgation.

(Signed) Count von BÜLOW. (Signed) WILLIAM.

Published in Berlin, August 10, 1900.

No. 187.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghae, August 13, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegrams of 12th August, I have the honour to inform you that the Municipal Council of Shanghae brought to the notice of Admiral Seymour that Shanghae was in a defenceless position, and asked him to land 10,000 men. On the 28th July, the Consuls informed the Council that the present defence force of police and volunteers could not be regarded as adequate for the purpose, and they requested the Admiral to take steps to secure the safety of the place. The Admiral conferred with the Senior Naval Officer of the other Powers and asked for a force of 3,000 men, the number he regarded as sufficient for immediate contingencies.

The Viceroy at Nanking had previously expressed his consent that British troops should be landed in such numbers as we should think necessary. In the course of an interview with the Admiral at Nanking, the Viceroy again expressed his consent, the number to be landed being fixed at 3,000.



On the 9th instant, Admiral Seymour and I informed the Consular Body that our troops would arrive here on the 12th. Our notification was not replied to.

On the 11th August the Viceroy objected to the landing of the troops on the grounds that other Powers would take similar steps, and that there would be general apprehension amongst the Chinese. Since it became generally known that British troops were about to occupy Shanghai, the exodus of Chinese has ceased; people are returning and a sense of security prevails again.

Yesterday the Viceroy again agreed to the landing of British troops, provided no other nationalities followed suit.

On the 13th instant, the Taotai formally assented to our occupation of Shanghai in a Proclamation in which he pointed out that Chinese would share in the protection afforded by the troops.

## No. 188.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 13, 1900.*

THE Chinese Minister has been desired by Count Lamsdorff to make it quite clear to the Government at Peking and to Li Hung-chang that only when the Ministers and other Europeans now imprisoned in Peking are in a place of safety can the Russian Government enter into negotiations with the latter.

Further that it was impossible to trust the Central Government to protect them on their way to Tien-tsin since it has been unable to ensure their liberty and protection in Peking, and they should not, consequently, if sincere, place any obstacle in the way of the advance of a detachment of European troops to act as an escort; they should supply the Legations with provisions at once and the arrangements which it is proposed to make for the safe passage of the Ministers and other Europeans from the Legations into the care of the international detachment, and for having the road cleared of all armed forces likely to molest them should be communicated in detail.

I understand that a Circular, proposing a very similar course for their adoption, has been addressed by the Japanese to the European Governments and it is, in Count Lamsdorff's opinion, important that the language held to the Government at Peking and to Li Hung-chang by all the Governments interested should be very firm and identic.

The presence of so large a number of Christian Chinese refugees with the Legations whom M. de Giers as well as M. Pichon report cannot be abandoned, does much, in Count Lamsdorff's opinion, to embarrass the situation.

It is important, he thinks, that the present advance should not be for hostilities but exclusively for relief and escort purposes and that this should be understood at Peking. We would be free to use other language when this has been accomplished and our Legations and the Europeans are in safety.

According to the Chinese Minister conveyances for the women and children and sick and wounded of the party could easily be obtained.

## No. 189.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 13, 1900.*

A PROPOSAL has been made by the Chinese Government that a Chinese force should escort the Legations from Peking.

In reply I have informed the Chinese Government through their Minister here that I am unable to appreciate the security offered by this proposal, but that if the Chinese Government are really desirous for the safe removal of the Ministers and cannot provide an escort acceptable to them, the allied forces should be asked for a sufficient international escort to go under a white flag as far as the walls of Peking, and that the besieged foreigners should be received and escorted to Tien-tsin by this force.

I further said that in the meantime the Chinese Government must supply the

Legation with provisions, and that unless the Legation was immediately relieved from its present situation, Her Majesty's Government would change their attitude towards the Chinese Government and would hold as directly responsible the Emperor of China and his Ministers as well as all those concerned in any harm done to the Ministers and other Europeans in Peking or on the road to Tien-tsin.

No. 190.

*Mr. Choate to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 13.)*

My Lord,

*American Embassy, London, August 13, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, under instructions from my Government, that on Saturday, the 12th instant, the Chinese Minister at Washington delivered to the Secretary of State the text of an Imperial Edict, forwarded by Privy Council from Peking, dated the 8th August, appointing Earl Li Hung-chang as Envoy Plenipotentiary on the part of China to conduct negotiations by telegraph with the Powers concerned for the cessation of hostile demonstrations pending negotiations through him for the settlement of whatever questions may have to be dealt with.

And I have further to inform your Lordship that on the afternoon of the same day a Memorandum, of which the following is a copy, was delivered to Minister Wu as the response of the Government of the United States to the foregoing communication :—

*“ Memorandum.*

“The Government of the United States learns with satisfaction of the appointment of Earl Li Hung-chang as Envoy Plenipotentiary to conduct negotiations with the Powers, and will, on its part, enter upon such negotiations with a desire to continue the friendly relations so long existing between the two countries. It is evident that there can be no general negotiation between China and the Powers so long as the Ministers of the Powers, and the persons under their protection, remain in their present position of restraint and danger, and that the Powers cannot cease their efforts for the delivery of these Representatives, to which they are constrained by the highest considerations of national honour, except under an arrangement adequate to accomplish a peaceable deliverance.

“We are ready to enter into an agreement between the Powers and the Chinese Government for a cessation of hostile demonstrations on condition that a sufficient body of the forces composing the relief expedition shall be permitted to enter Peking unmolested and to escort the foreign Ministers and residents back to Tien-tsin, this movement being provided for and secured by such arrangements and disposition of troops as shall be considered satisfactory by the Generals Commanding the forces comprising the relief expedition.

“(Signed)

“Dated 12th August.”

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

No. 191.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 13, 1900.*

M. LESSAR called here to-day and informed Sir T. Sanderson that a telegram had been received from the Russian Minister at Peking, dated the 11th August, stating that the siege continued, and that the foreign Representatives had declined the offer of the Chinese Government that they should proceed temporarily to Tien-tsin in view of the absence of sufficient guarantee for their security.

M. Lessar stated that, by order of the Emperor, the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg had been requested to inform the Tsung-li Yamèn by telegraph that the Imperial Government considered the actual position intolerable, and held the Emperor and the Chinese Princes entirely responsible for the slightest breach of the inviolability of the

Russian Minister and Russian subjects. With regard to the proposal that the foreign Legations and residents should proceed to Tien-tsin, the Imperial Government considered that the Ministers and the numerous Europeans could only accept it if the Chinese authorities took the measures indispensable for their protection against every eventuality on the way.

The Russian Government consequently considered it necessary to warn the Chinese Government that inasmuch as the departure of the Ministers from Peking would take place solely on the pressing advice of the Chinese authorities, the Powers will not accept any excuse or justification in the event of an attack on their inviolability.

The Tsung-li Yamèn ought to make known in detail the measures they intend to take for the efficacious protection of the Representatives during the journey from Peking to Tien-tsin.

If the Powers found these measures insufficient, they could perhaps make a joint proposal to the Chinese Government that an international detachment should be dispatched bearing a white flag or some other sign agreed upon, whose only object would be to act as a safe escort for their Ministers on their journey to Tien-tsin.

Sir T. Sanderson informed M. Lessar that on hearing from Sir C. Scott of the communication to this effect made by Count Lamsdorff to the Chinese Minister, I had decided to support it by a similar communication to the Chinese Minister here, which had been made yesterday, and of which the terms had been telegraphed to Sir C. Scott.

M. Lessar also communicated a further telegram from his Government, inquiring as to the attitude of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the appointment of Li Hung-chang as Plenipotentiary to open negotiations with the Powers, and stating that the Russian Government is of opinion that the demands suggested in their preceding telegram should be discussed without delay, and their immediate execution insisted upon. Only when that had been done could they enter upon negotiations with Li Hung-chang, who ought to proceed to Tien-tsin for that purpose.

Sir T. Sanderson informed M. Lessar he believed Her Majesty's Government to be entirely in accord with this view of the Russian Government, that no answer had as yet been returned to the announcement of Li Hung-chang's appointment to negotiate, but that any decision on that subject would be communicated to him.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 192.

*Sir C. MacDonal*d to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Peking, August 10, *vid* Shanghai, August 14, 1900.

[The figures of this Telegram were communicated by the Chinese Minister,  
14th August.]

LI HUNG-CHANG, as stated in my telegram of yesterday, is appointed Plenipotentiary, with full powers to arrange all matters with the Foreign Offices of the Powers.

March of troops on Peking should not be delayed by any negotiations whatever. We are still being fired at daily, and our supplies are and have been entirely cut off, so that we must surrender unless we are shortly relieved.

No. 193.

*Mr. Thornton* to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Lisbon, August 14, 1900.

DECREE issued prohibiting provisionally exportation and re-exportation of arms, parts of arms, and munitions of war from Portugal and Colonies to Chinese ports.

No. 194.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 11, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 11th August, arrangements have been made by Her Majesty's Government with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank for an advance of 75,000*l.* to be made to the Viceroy of Wuchang. Has he agreed to the security? If so, you should also obtain from him an acknowledgment of receipt, and an undertaking to repay in the specified terms with interest, and you should stipulate, if possible, for delivery of receipts from the Generals in acknowledgment of the sums handed to them to enable them to pay the troops under their command.

No. 195.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 15.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, June 28, 1900.*

IT is difficult to obtain any information as to what is occurring in this neighbourhood, as there are no means of communication.

The Chinese servants in the British Concession have been gradually disappearing since the beginning of the month, and when the Chinese forts began to shell the Concession, those who had not already left lost no time in escaping. The whole of the official staff of Chinese employes in this Consulate deserted, and only one male and one female servant remained in my house.

At the same time it became almost impossible for any Chinese to enter our lines, either here or at Taku. A cypher message to the Rear-Admiral which I wrote on the lining of a man's sock was the cause of the poor fellow's death. Many messengers were sent here from Sir E. Seymour's force while at Wuku, but only one of them reached me, and the body of one was seen just outside our lines when the force arrived.

As no news reached Tien-tsin from Taku, and in spite of all our efforts to communicate with the fleets we were uncertain whether any of our messages had been received, Mr. James Watts, a young Englishman in Tien-tsin, volunteered to ride down by night with despatches, and, under the escort of three Cossacks, reached Taku safely. His intimate knowledge of the country made the feat possible, but the bravery of his act was not diminished through its not being foolhardy. The service which he rendered was of great value to the community, and I have much pleasure in bringing it to your Lordship's knowledge. The distance by road from Tien-tsin to Taku is about 32 miles, but as the time occupied on this occasion was about twelve hours, a very considerable detour must have been made.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

No. 196.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 15.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, July 2, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a Protocol, dated the 16th June, which was forwarded by his Excellency Admiral Hildebrand to the French Consul-General for transmission to the Viceroy, demanding the surrender of the Taku forts before 2 A.M. on the 17th ultimo.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

Inclosure in No. 196.

*Protocol.*

PROTOCOLE de la réunion tenue sous la présidence de son Excellence l'Amiral Hildebrand, le plus ancien des officiers présents sur rade.

Les Puissances alliées, dès le début des troubles, ont mis sans opposition des détachements à terre, pour protéger leurs concitoyens et le Corps Diplomatique contre les rebelles connus sous le nom de Boxeurs.

Tout d'abord, les Représentants de l'autorité Impériale ont paru comprendre leur devoir et fait des efforts apparents pour le rétablissement de l'ordre, mais maintenant ils montrent clairement leur sympathie pour les ennemis des étrangers, en amenant des troupes sur les lignes du chemin de fer et en garnissant de torpilles l'entrée du Pei-ho. Ces actes prouvent que le Gouvernement oublie ses engagements solennels vis-à-vis des étrangers, et comme les chefs des forces alliées ont l'obligation de rester en communication constante avec les détachements à terre, ils ont décidé d'occuper provisoirement, de gré ou de force, les forts de Takou.

Le dernier délai pour leur remise aux forces alliées est 2 heures du matin le 17 Juin (2 heures A.M.).

Ceci sera communiqué au Viceroy du Petchili à Tien-tsin et au Commandant des forts.

(Signé) Amiral HILDEBRAND, *Doyen des Officiers présents sur rade.*

(Suivent les signatures des Amiraux et Commandants des navires des forces alliées.)

*A bord du croiseur Impérial Russe, le 16 Juin, 1900,  
à 11 heures du matin.*

Pour copie conforme :

Le Consul-Général de France, doyen du  
Corps Consulaire,  
(Signé) J. DU CHAYLARD.

(Translation.)

PROTOCOL of a meeting held under the presidency of his Excellency Admiral Hildebrand, the Senior Naval Officer here.

The allied Powers, since the beginning of the troubles, have landed detachments without opposition for the protection of their nationals and Diplomatic Body against the rebels, who are known by the name of Boxers.

At first the Representatives of the Imperial authority seemed to understand their duty, and made apparent efforts to re-establish order, but now they clearly show their sympathy for the enemies of the foreigners by placing troops on the railway lines, and by placing torpedoes in the entrance to the Peiho. These acts prove that the Government forgets its solemn engagements towards foreigners, and as the Commanding Officers of the allied forces are bound to remain in constant communication with the detachments on land, they have decided to occupy provisionally, by consent, or by force, the Taku forts.

The limit of time for their surrender to the allied forces is 2 o'clock in the morning of the 17th June (2 A.M.).

This will be communicated to the Viceroy of Pechili at Tien tsin and to the Officer Commanding the forts.

(Signed) Admiral HILDEBRAND, *Senior Naval Officer.*

(The Signatures of the Admirals and Captains of ships of allied forces here follow.)

*On board the Russian Imperial cruiser,  
June 16, 1900, at 11 A.M.*

Certified copy,  
French Consul-General, Doyen of the  
Consular Corps,  
(Signed) J. DU CHAYLARD.

## No. 197.

*Acting Consul-General Fraser to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 15.)*

My Lord,

*Hankow, July 3, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to forward translation of a Proclamation just issued by the Viceroy and the Governor at Wuchang. The Proclamation seems to be satisfactory, especially in the skilful way in which the Imperial sanction for their Excellencies' arrangement with the foreign Consuls is invoked. The words which I have rendered "naval squadron" literally mean "a company or group of war-junks or large vessels," and so do not impair the right of Her Majesty's ships to visit the Yang-tsze ports.

The people have a report, which on private information I know to be well founded, that the Peking Government issued a Decree chiding the Southern authorities for their presumption and ignorance of the real state of affairs in the North, and calling upon them to join in the war of extermination against foreigners. The Viceroy and his colleagues ignore this, and all other orders issued since the Northern Government began hostilities, on the ground that they do not express the Imperial views.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. H. FRASER.

Inclosure in No. 197.

*Proclamation by Chang, Viceroy of Hu Kiang Provinces, and Yü, Governor of Hupei, issued in obedience to an Imperial Rescript to safeguard their territory.*

(Translation.)

WHEREAS in the North the disturbances of ruffians having led to a rupture with the Powers, men's minds are agitated and the political situation involved;

And whereas we had the honour to receive, on the 25th and 26th June, transmitted Decrees to the effect that at present in the capital every effort continued to be made to protect the Legations of the Powers, and that the Viceroys and Governors of the provinces must take such measures as in their judgment the crisis necessitated to preserve their territories;

And whereas it is, of course, our duty to devise means to carry out reverently these Imperial orders, we have, with his Excellency Liu, Viceroy of the Liang Chiang Provinces, carefully devised a joint scheme to preserve the integrity of the south-eastern provinces.

That is to say, we have agreed with the Consuls of the Powers, that, provided only the naval squadrons of the fleets of the Powers do not enter the Yang-tsze, the local authorities shall do their utmost to protect the lives and property of all foreigners in our provinces. And we have reported to the Throne, by telegraph, the successful negotiation of this scheme. This is a perfect plan to safeguard the lives of individuals and families of the people of these parts. But, as it is quite possible that, until the present scheme, as reported to the Throne, is understood among the populace, local ruffians and wicked folk may find pretexts to stir up trouble to the detriment of the public interests. We therefore hasten to issue this Notice for the information of all classes—civilians and military alike.

Know ye that the present hostilities in the North were not intended or expected by the Court, and that the present Imperial orders that in the capital the Legations continue to be protected, and in the provinces at present the Concessions and chapels are still to be protected, in accordance with the Treaty provisions promulgated year after year, are both designed to maintain the public interest intact. Now that the Powers are willing to leave protection to us, and to keep the naval squadrons of the fleets out of the Yang-tsze, the inhabitants and trade may both remain as undisturbed as usual, and local ruffians will not have a chance to make disturbance. Very many are the blessings secured by thus safeguarding the lives of individuals and families of the people in the Yang-tsze and inland provinces, and utterly wrong would it be lightly to give cause for strife. Thus may we humbly embody the desire of the Court to see to the integrity of the State.

Gentry and Elders are especially bound earnestly to impress on others that thus may the peace of the unimpaired territory of the Empire be secured, and thus may the perfection of the heavenly sympathy of our divine dynasty be the more displayed.

From the date of this Notification, should any concoct lying tales, and delude men's minds, or assemble crowds and disturb the Concessions and chapels, they shall be straightly sought out and dealt with as local bandits and Secret Society ruffians.

At every point strong forces have been posted promptly to extirpate utterly such evil scoundrels as seek pretexts to stir up disturbances with the design of starting riots.

Should soldiers or police make trouble, or be guilty of violence, they will at once be punished under martial law.

Our aim is, by keeping the people and traders undisturbed, and maintaining the peace of the country, to second humbly the meaning of the Imperial commands to preserve our territories by such measures as in our judgment the crisis necessitated.

Let all obey in fear and trembling this special urgent Proclamation.

Dated K.S. XXVI, vi (July 1900).

No. 198.

*Acting Consul-General Fraser to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 15.)*

My Lord,

Hankow, July 7, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of a Chinese document which reached me through the Spanish Mission priests, and which I believe to be a copy of an authentic Decree issued by the Peking Government with reference to its war with the European Powers.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. H. FRASER.

Inclosure in No. 198.

*Decree dated June 26, 1900.*

(Translation.)

I, TING-CHIEH, have the honour to forward this reverent copy of a Decree received by me on the 27th June, having been handed out by the Grand Council on the 26th June, and forwarded at 600 *li* (200 miles a day) by the Board of War:—

“We yesterday announced to Li Hung-chang, Li Ping-hêng, Liu K'un-yi, and Chang Chih-tung the facts that it was equally difficult to repress or to soothe the feud of the Society men against the converts, and that hostilities were first resorted to by the Powers.

“The reluctance of you Viceroys and Governors, after considering the position and estimating your strength, to provoke foreign enmity lightly may well be the policy of tried Ministers consulting the interests of their State.

“But, unfortunately, in the present case the Boxer bands have spread over the whole capital, and their numbers are not less than several hundred thousand. From soldiers and people up to princely and ducal palaces, from all alike, comes one cry of hatred of the foreign religion: the two cannot exist together. Repression meant intestine trouble and the utter ruin of the people. The only course, therefore, was to turn the movement to account, while slowly devising reformation. The warning in your memorial not to endanger the State by believing their heretical talk leaves out of account the helpless position in which the Court is placed.

“Did ye Viceroys and Governors realize how great is the crisis in the capital ye would surely be unable to eat and sleep in peace, and so anxious to do your duty that ye could never think of making one-sided representations.

“The present state of things is one in which the incitement and pressure of providential opportunity and human affairs have combined to render war inevitable. Do not any of ye Viceroys and Governors longer hesitate and look on, but with all speed provide troops and supplies, and vigorously protect the territories, for any remissness it is ye that shall be called to account.

“Let this be enjoined by telegram on—

“Li Hung-chang, Governor-General of Liang Kwang.

“Li Ping Hêng, Admiral of the Yang-tsze.

“Yü-lu, Governor-General of Chihli.

“Liu K'un-yi, Viceroy of Liang Chiang.

“Chang Chih-tung, Viceroy of Hukwang.

- "Hsu Yang-k'nei, Governor-General of Chekiang and Fukien.  
 "Kuei-chün, Governor-General of Szechuan.  
 "Tseng-ch'i, Military Governor of Moukden.  
 "Ch'ang Shun of Kirin, and Shou-shan, of Helu Chiang.  
 "Wei Kuang T'ao, Governor of Shansi.  
 "Ting Chen-to, Governor of Yünnan.  
 "Yuan Shih K'ai, Governor of Shantung.  
 "Yü-ch'ang, Governor of Honan.  
 "Lu Chu'an-liu, Governor of Kiangsu.  
 "Wang Chih-ch'un, Governor of Anhui.  
 "Sung-shou, Governor of Chiang-si.  
 "Yü Ying-liu, Governor of Hupei.  
 "Yü Lien San, Governor of Hunan.  
 "Tuan-ts'ai,  
 "Liu Shu T'ang, Governor of Chêkiang.  
 "Yao Ying-ch'i, Governor of Ili.  
 "Tê-shou,  
 "Huang Tung-sen, Governor of Kwang-si.  
 "Shao Chi-ch'êng, Governor of Kwei-chow."

Copy is being telegraphed to the others.

(Received June 29, 1900.)

No. 199.

*Consul Wilkinson to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received August 15.)

My Lord,

*Ningpo, July 6, 1900.*

IN the present impossibility of communicating with Her Majesty's Minister, I have the honour to report direct to your Lordship on the condition of affairs in this district. That condition is on the whole satisfactory.

Ningpo, as your Lordship is aware, is the official residence not only of the Taotai (Intendant) of this, the Ning-shao-t'ai, circuit, but also of the T'it'ai, or Commander-in-chief of the provincial forces. It is situated some 11 miles up the Yung River, the mouth of which is commanded by the Chinhai Forts. The great bulk of its not inconsiderable trade is carried on with Shanghai by means of two large river steamers, one under the British, the other under the Chinese flag. Running on alternate week-days, these steamers arrive at Ningpo at 6 or 7 o'clock in the morning, and leave at 4 in the afternoon.

In this way then, should any outbreak occur at the port between 4 P.M. and 6 A.M. (on any day except Sunday, when the Chinese steamer remains here), the foreign community would have, in the absence of a ship of war, no place of retreat afloat for their women and children. Nor, owing to the configuration of the ground—a flat plain intersected everywhere by canals—could a refuge be found ashore. The adult male residents, exclusive of missionaries, do not exceed in number twenty-five, for the arming of whom there were, besides fowling-pieces, the dozen Martini-Henry rifles stored at this Consulate, the only Consulate at Ningpo.

Under these circumstances my first proceeding, when news of events in the north appeared to render precautionary measures advisable, was to ascertain through Her Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghai, whether a vessel of war could be spared either to form a guardship here or to visit the port from time to time. Mr. Warren replying that there appeared no prospect of a gun-boat being spared for the present, I had in contemplation to discover from the two Shipping Companies (Messrs. Butterfield and Swire, and the China merchants) whether it would not be possible to cause our daily steamers (the steam-ships "Peking" and "Kiangtien") to overlap, so that one at least should always be in harbour here. This course I was, and am, very reluctant to adopt, since it would to a large extent dislocate trade and alarm the natives. Moreover, for a cause to which I shall refer later, these steamers are at present in great demand for the conveyance of Chinese passengers, and their owners would naturally demur to any interruption in the traffic not most imperatively called for.

There remained to so impress upon the local authorities their obligation to put down disorder and protect foreigners as to insure that they would use their best endeavours to this end. It so happened that the English text of the Joint Declaration



by the allied Admirals (dated Taku, the 20th June), had appeared in the foreign press of Shanghai. I was able then, when calling upon the Taotai on the 23rd ultimo, to hand to him an informal translation of this document, and I took the opportunity to point out to him, as impressively as I was able, how advantageous observance of the neutrality therein proposed would, in the certain event of the overthrow of the Boxers by the allies, prove to those officials who had kept the peace and protected foreigners. The Taotai Ch'eng-hsün, though a Manchu, has had considerable experience of foreign affairs in the province, and appeared to readily admit the force of my argument.

A few days after my visit I received (on the night of the 26th) the authorized Chinese text of the Declaration by telegraph from Mr. Warren, and the following day I officially transmitted this to the Taotai. I have now the honour to inclose translation of his reply, which I regard as entirely satisfactory.

In the meanwhile the Commander-in-chief called upon me and assured me in the most emphatic terms that he would maintain order. He deprecated the dispatch hither of a foreign war-vessel, but promised that if such visit, of which he begged me to notify him in advance, was contemplated, he would give orders to the Clinhai Forts not to oppose her entrance. Similar assurances of good-will and set purpose to protect foreigners have been given by the Prefect and Magistrate. Of the sincerity of these officials I have little doubt, for they are astute enough to see that their interest at this crisis lies in keeping the peace; their power to enforce their wishes depends on the amenability of their troops, and that on the absence of popular excitement.

Unfortunately, for some cause or other, probably the somewhat ostentatious parading of the volunteers, the native community of Shanghai has taken alarm, and a great number of natives of this district are flocking back to Ningpo with their families. The daily steamers have arrived crowded to the danger point, and extra boats have been put temporarily on the line. (I inclose a Return of passengers brought hither between the 26th June and this date (6th July)—a total of 17,361, as against a normal average of some 4,000 for an equal period.) These passengers pass into the interior, spreading exaggerated reports of events in the north, and increasing everywhere the cost of food and conveyance. It is to this source that will be traceable any uneasiness that is being felt, and I readily assented to the Taotai's request that I would communicate with Shanghai and suggest that steps should be taken to discourage this exodus.

So far very few anti-foreign placards have appeared. The latest, I am told, threatens our extermination on the 13th, or, if it cannot be effected then, on the 15th of this moon (the 10th or 12th instant), but I have not myself seen it, nor do I attach importance to it. The Taotai has issued a satisfactory Proclamation, of which I have the honour to inclose translation, and copies of which I am requesting him to furnish me for the inland Mission stations. I am ascertaining from the local representatives the names and present whereabouts of the missionaries in the interior, in order that should it be necessary they may be recalled to the coast; but for the reasons I have already given I do not, I am happy to say, regard these persons as being in any present danger. Meanwhile, I have just learnt from the Rev. H. Moule that, under advice from his father, the Bishop of Mid-China, the missionaries at Shaohsing have all left, with the exception of the Rev. W. H. and Mrs. Warren. There was, however, Mr. Moule informs me, no apparent necessity for this step, as the people were friendly and quiet, and he can find explanation of his father's telegram only in some possible disturbance at Hangchow, where, it may be observed, a Manchu garrison is stationed.

Should any noteworthy developments occur in the position of affairs here, I will not fail to report them to your Lordship, sending my despatch, as I am sending this present one, under flying seal through Her Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghai.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. WILKINSON.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 199.

*Ch'eng, Intendant of the Ning-shao-t'ai Circuit, to Consul Wilkinson.*

(Translation.)

THE Intendant had the honour on the 27th instant to receive the following despatch from Her Majesty's Consul:—

“I received last night a telegram from Mr. Warren, Her Majesty's Consul-General

at Shanghai, informing me that the local authorities there had embodied, in a Proclamation warning people to preserve order, a telegram from the allied Admirals at Taku, of which the Chinese text was as under:—

“[\*A Notification. The Admirals hereby notify the Governors-General, Governors, and the local officials, civil and military, of the different provinces that the present military operations have for their sole object the suppression of the Boxer insurgents and the more speedy relief of the Ministers and others, their compatriots, at Peking, and that this and no other is their purpose. Jointly resolved by the Admirals of the Powers, at Taku, June 20.]”

“I have the honour to request that you also will cause Proclamations to be issued and disseminated, in order that this resolution of the Admirals may be made known to the people at large and a stop put to the fabrication of idle rumours.”

The Intendant would observe, in reply, that the outbreak of the Boxer insurgents in the north is no concern of the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Ningpo is situated in an out-of-the-way corner of the sea-coast, and no comparison is possible between it and Shanghai. Though there have been idle rumours of late, still the Intendant has already issued Proclamations, and, in concert with the garrison, has directed his subordinates to keep watch and ward night and day. Men's minds are now composed; but if the present Notification were embodied in a Proclamation, suspicion might be aroused among the populace and the evil-disposed take heart; the proceeding, in short, would not have a quieting effect. Moreover, the Intendant is in receipt of instructions from his Excellency Liu, Governor of the Province, directing him to “arrest without fail all malefactors and put to death the guilty, exerting himself to protect foreign merchants and missionaries.” As far as this port is concerned, foreigners, officials, and private individuals alike may, since both the Governor and the Intendant are exerting themselves to protect them, take heart, and there is no need, it would seem, for the dispatch of war vessels to preserve the peace.

The Intendant is communicating with the Commander-in-chief, and is issuing instructions to his own subordinates to search out, arrest, and condignly punish malefactors and to protect without fail all chapels and foreign buildings. Meanwhile he begs that the Consul will inform Mr. Consul-General Warren of this his present reply, and will do him the honour to himself acknowledge its receipt.

*Kuang Hsü, 26th year, 6th moon, 3rd day*  
(June 29, 1900).

Inclosure 2 in No. 199.

NUMBER of Native Passengers arrived from Shanghai from June 26 to July 6, 1900.

Date.	Name of Vessel.	Number.
June 26, 1900 ..	Steam-ship “Pekin” .. ..	601
“ 27, ” ..	“ Kiangtien ” .. ..	1,308
“ 28, ” ..	“ Pekin ” .. ..	1,454
“ 28, ” ..	“ Kansu ” .. ..	464
“ 29, ” ..	“ Kiangtien ” .. ..	1,857
“ 29, ” ..	“ Kungping ” .. ..	1,173
“ 30, ” ..	“ Pekin ” .. ..	997
“ 30, ” ..	“ Whampoa ” .. ..	587
July 1, ” ..	“ Kiangtien ” .. ..	1,474
“ 1, ” ..	“ Kungping ” .. ..	777
“ 3, ” ..	“ Pekin ” .. ..	1,226
“ 4, ” ..	“ Kiangtien ” .. ..	1,902
“ 5, ” ..	“ Pekin ” .. ..	1,287
“ 6, ” ..	“ Kiangtien ” .. ..	1,560
“ 6, ” ..	“ Kungping ” .. ..	694
	Total .. ..	17,361

## Inclosure 3 in No. 199.

*Proclamation by Ch'eng, Intendant of the Ning-shao-t'ai Circuit.*

(Translation.)

IN regard to the outbreak of Boxer insurgents in the region of Chih-li, Imperial orders have been frequently transmitted by telegraph to rigorously arrest and condignly punish the ringleaders and to disperse their followers. Ningpo is an open port of trade, a common resort from all quarters, and a place therefore where malefactors can easily conceal their traces. Rumours of late have been very frequent, and fears are not groundless, that vagabond militiamen and robbers visiting the port may combine with local scoundrels to seize this opportunity for furtive practices. It becomes imperative then to maintain close watch and ward, in order to render the trading classes secure and to keep the populace tranquil.

For the effectual defence of the various chapels and dwelling-houses of foreigners in the city, its suburbs, and campo, the Commander-in-chief has been requested to send a detachment from the nearest troops; the Prefect has been instructed to revive the system of wards and households, and the Magistrate to select able-bodied runners, while picked men have been detailed from the city guard, and orders issued to the police to co-operate with them in zealous watch and scrutiny.

In addition to these measures, the present Notification is issued for observance by persons of all classes in this Prefecture. Be it known to all of you that "the concocting of tales causing trouble is an offence not light, and that in the peaceful following of his usual avocations lies man's profit and happiness." Ningpo is an open port, where natives and foreigners have mixed for years. Trades of every nation have consistently maintained cordial relations with our people, and it is but right that all should show themselves friendly and amiable, and should take measures for mutual protection. Above all, do not wantonly give way to suspicion and doubt, and so bring upon yourselves remorse and chagrin. Should any ill-conducted scoundrels dare to concoct tales and excite the multitude, seeking occasion to create disturbance, the said soldiery, runners, and police shall promptly and without fail arrest them and send them to the Magistracy in order that they may be punished with the utmost severity. No indulgence whatever shall be shown to them.

The Intendant loves the people as his own children, and will keep the law firm as the hills. Let every one in awe obey! A special Proclamation.

*Kuang Hsü, 26th year, 5th moon, 29th day  
(June 25, 1900).*

## No. 200.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 15.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, via Chefoo, August 10, 1900.*

I AM informed by the Japanese Consul that Hsu-ching-cheng and Yuan-chang were beheaded on the 29th July, and that Ministers of Yamên are now all Manchus. Also that the Viceroys of Canton, Nanking, and Wuchang have been impeached by Li-ping-heng.

Above-mentioned Li-ping-heng, I see in "Peking Gazette," was still in Peking on the 4th August, and had been received in audience almost daily.

## No. 201.

*The Viceroy of Nanking to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, August 15.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nanking, August 15, 1900.*

TELEGRAM received.

Satisfactory arrangements have been made between myself and Admiral Seymour and Consul Warren with regard to the landing of several hundred troops at Shangbae.

Rumours have been stopped. The people have been pacified. The peace and order of the Yang-tsze Valley will therefore be maintained.

Please convey my best thanks to Lord Salisbury.

## No. 202.

*Li Hung-chang to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.*—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, August 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 15, 1900.*

I HEAR that the allied forces are now approaching Thung-chow.

I have asked the Government to send High Commissioner to meet their Commander, and to make arrangements for the suspension of hostilities, and I will proceed to Peking also very soon. The Treaty Powers fully appreciate now the difficult position in which both the Emperor and Empress-Dowager are now situated. I strongly and most respectfully ask them to stop their forces at Thung-chow, and not to enter the city walls so as to terrify the Emperor and Empress-Dowager, to shed the blood of innocents, and to cause irreparable damages to the present dynasty, and to hurt the feelings of 400,000,000 of the Chinese population. All of them would feel most grateful to Lord Salisbury if his Lordship would consent to my humble request.

(The same request forwarded to Russia, France, Germany, America, and Japan.)

## No. 203.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 15, 1900.*

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. M. GRIERSON has been appointed to post on staff of Count Waldersee. You should inform German Government.

He is now in South Africa, but will, it is hoped, join Count Waldersee at Colombo about the 7th September.

## No. 204.

*M. Cambon to Foreign Office.*—(Received August 15.)

Cher M. Bertie,

*Ambassade de France, Londres, le 15 Août, 1900.*

JE viens de recevoir communication de la réponse de M. Delcassé à la demande qui lui a été adressée par le Gouvernement Chinois pour faire donner l'ordre aux Ministres étrangers de quitter Pékin.

Je vous en envoie copie. Cette réponse a été remise au Ministre de Chine à Paris.

Votre bien dévoué,  
(Signé) PAUL CAMBON.

(Translation.)

Dear Mr. Bertie,

*French Embassy, London, August 15, 1900.*

M. DELCASSÉ'S reply to the request which was addressed to him by the Chinese Government that the foreign Ministers should receive instructions to leave Peking has just been communicated to me.

I send you a copy of it. This reply has been handed to the Chinese Minister at Paris.

Yours, &c.  
(Signed) PAUL CAMBON.

Inclosure in No. 204.

*Memorandum.*

LE Représentant de la Chine à Paris nous a communiqué un télégramme du Tsung-li Yamèn en date du 6 Août et dans lequel le Gouvernement Impérial voulant obtenir l'ordre aux Ministres étrangers de quitter la capitale, ordre qui ne saurait leur être donné tant que la route ne sera pas sûre, s'exprime comme il suit :—

“En retardant ainsi, s'il arrive quelque accident, qui en portera la responsabilité ?”

Ce sera sans aucun doute le Gouvernement Chinois. Son devoir strict est de protéger les Ministres étrangers autant et plus que lui-même. Et s'il est vrai qu'il a les plus grandes peines à les défendre et à se défendre contre les rebelles, qu'il ordonne à ses troupes de s'effacer devant les forces internationales. Celles-ci doivent et sauront rendre libre la route de Tien-tsin à la capitale et accomplir l'œuvre de protection qui leur incombe. Le Gouvernement Chinois comprendra, nous voulons encore l'espérer, que le seul moyen pour lui de prouver la sincérité des dispositions qu'il proclame et de limiter ses responsabilités, c'est de cesser d'y mettre obstacle.

*Paris, le 10 Août, 1900.*

(Translation.)

THE Representative of the Chinese Government at Paris communicated to us a telegram from the Tsung-li Yamên, dated the 6th August, in which the Imperial Government, desiring to obtain the order for the foreign Representatives to leave the capital, an order which cannot be given as long as their safe-conduct is not assured, express themselves as follows :—

“Should any accident take place in thus delaying the departure, on whom will the responsibility fall ?”

The responsibility will undoubtedly rest with the Chinese Government. It is their duty to protect the foreign Ministers as much as, and even more, than themselves. And if it is true that they experience great difficulty in defending the foreigners and in defending themselves against the rebels, let them command their troops to give way to the international forces. These latter must and can keep the road from Tien-tsin to the capital, and fulfil the task incumbent on them of protecting the foreigners.

We will further hope that the Chinese Government will understand that the sole means of proving the sincerity of the arrangements announced by them, and of limiting their responsibilities, is to cease to put obstacles in their way.

*Paris, August 10, 1900.*

No. 205.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 15.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 15, 1900.*

ALL the members of the Consular Body have telegraphed to their respective Governments urging that it would endanger the safety of Shanghai if the 2,000 Indian troops which have arrived at Woosung were to be recalled, and proposing that the forces should be landed in Shanghai under international agreement. It is advisable that additional troops be immediately dispatched by the allies for the efficient protection of this port.

No. 206.

*Mr. Goschen to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 16.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Copenhagen, August 16, 1900.*

A PROVISIONAL Law was published to-day forbidding the export of arms and ammunition to China from Denmark and Danish West Indies.

No. 207.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 16.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Newport, August 16, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to state that I learn from the United States' Government that they consider that their views on the proposal of the Russian Government for securing the safety of the foreigners now confined in Peking have been expressed

by anticipation in the third paragraph of the Memorandum handed to the Chinese Minister at Washington on the 12th instant, which the United States' Ambassador in London has communicated to your Lordship.\*

Mr. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, tells me that the above is, in substance, the reply which he has returned to the inquiries addressed to him on the subject by members of the Diplomatic Body.

No. 208.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 16, 1900.*

LANDING of British force at Shanghai.

With reference to your telegram of 13th August: Admiral has been authorized to join with you in arranging for the disembarkation of troops, with the consent of the Chinese authorities, but without giving any guarantee as to the action of any other Power. This has been done in view of the evident feeling of the Consular Body that the presence of troops is desirable, and of communication received yesterday from the Viceroy, through the Chinese Minister here, withdrawing objections previously made.

No. 209.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.†*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 16, 1900.*

IN reply to Li Hung-chang's message,‡ repeated to you in my immediately preceding telegram, I have to-day informed the Chinese Minister that, until the British Legation has been allowed to return to Tien-tsin under the escort of an adequate European force, Her Majesty's Government can enter into no such negotiations.

No. 210.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 16, 1900.*

THE Swedish and Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires has asked, under instructions from his Government, that British protection may be afforded to Swedish and Norwegian missionaries attached to British Missions in China.

The Marquess of Salisbury proposes to inform him that the British gun-boats on the River Yang-tsze will protect so far as they are able all Europeans, without distinction, but that the attention of Her Majesty's Naval and Consular Officers in China will be called to the desire expressed by the Government of Sweden and Norway in regard to these Swedish and Norwegian missionaries.

I am directed by his Lordship to suggest that instructions accordingly may be sent to Her Majesty's naval authorities in Chinese waters.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

\* See No. 190.

† Also to Embassies and Shanghai.

‡ See No. 202.

## No. 211.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, via Chefoo, August 12, 1900.*

DIRECTIONS are given to Yung-lu in an Imperial Edict, apparently dated 2nd August, to prepare to escort foreign Ministers to Tien-tsin, and Tsung-li Yamèn is instructed to forward despatches *en clair* from them to their respective Governments.

By an Edict of same date, Christian villagers in arms against the Imperial troops are promised pardon if they raze their earthworks and submit. In one instance mentioned in Edict this has actually happened.

## No. 212.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, undated, via Chefoo, August 17, 1900.*

ACCORDING to a reliable authority I hear that the allied forces captured Tungchou early on 12th August with little resistance, and are resting on account of fatigue. I also hear that 15th August has been fixed for the general attack on Peking.

## No. 213.

*Documents communicated by the French Embassy, August 17, 1900.*

*Traduction d'une Pièce remise par le Ministre de Chine le 12 Août, 1900.*

*Télégramme du Grand Conseil, transmis par le Taotai de Shang-Haï, et reçu aujourd'hui, 11 Août.*

(A.)

NOUS avons reçu le Décret Impérial suivant :—

“ Dans l'occasion présente, où des hostilités ont éclaté entre la Chine et l'étranger, les nations étrangères n'ont pas été sans se méprendre. Les autorités locales Chinoises ont aussi, dans certains cas, agi d'une façon qui n'était pas bonne. Les faits de guerre se sont suivis et des malheurs se sont produits, contrairement à l'amitié première. Ce n'était pas là, en définitive, la voie à suivre pour sauvegarder nos relations. Nous ordonnons que soit donné à Li Hung-chang le titre de Ministre Plénipotentiaire, qu'il demande immédiatement par télégraphe aux Ministères des Affaires Étrangères des différentes nations d'arrêter, tout d'abord, les hostilités et aussi qu'il discute de façon convenable et séparément les affaires sur lesquelles il y a lieu de s'entendre définitivement, et au sujet desquelles il demandera que nous rendions des Décrets, pour qu'il y soit donné une suite conforme.”

Respect à ceci :

Prière d'informer le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

*Le 8 Août, 1900.*

En outre :

*Télégramme reçu de Li Hung-chang.*

“ J'ai reçu le Décret suivant : . . . (même teneur). ”

“ Je vous prie de vous entendre avec le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, le priant de donner d'abord des ordres pour arrêter les hostilités, après quoi sera discutée une commune solution. J'espère que vous me répondrez.”

*Le 15 (-9) Août, 1900.*

(B.)

Le Gouvernement Japonais a récemment saisi le Gouvernement Français d'une proposition tendant à ce qu'une suspension d'armes fût notifiée au Gouvernement Chinois sous la condition que ce Gouvernement autorisât l'entrée à Pékin d'un contingent international suffisant pour escorter jusqu'à Tien-tsin les étrangers enfermés dans la capitale.

M. Delcassé a déclaré que cette proposition lui paraissait appeler la même réponse que celle qu'il avait faite à une demande d'armistice du Gouvernement Chinois (réponse dont M. Cambon a communiqué le texte à Mr. Bertie par lettre particulière le 15 Août), et par laquelle il faisait observer que le seul moyen de prouver la sincérité de ses dispositions à l'égard des Ministres étrangers était d'ordonner à ses soldats de s'effacer devant les troupes internationales.

*Albert Gate, le 17 Août, 1900.*

(Translation.)

*Translation of a Paper communicated by the Chinese Minister, August 12, 1900.*

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*Telegram from the Grand Council, transmitted by the Taotai of Shanghai, and received to-day, 11th August.*

(A.)

WE have received the following Imperial Decree:—

“On the present occasion, when hostilities have broken out between China and foreign countries, foreign nations have not avoided mistakes. The Chinese local authorities have also in certain cases acted wrongly. Warlike acts have followed and misfortunes have been caused, in opposition to former friendship. That was certainly not the way to safeguard our relations. We command that the title of Minister Plenipotentiary be given to Li Hung-chang, and that he immediately request the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the different nations by telegraph first to suspend hostilities, and also that he discuss in a suitable manner and separately the affairs which must be definitely settled between us, and concerning which he shall ask us to issue Decrees, in order that it may be followed by proper action.”

Respect this.

Pray inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*August 8, 1900.*

Further :

*Telegram received from Li Hung-chang.*

“I have received the following Decree: . . . (same as above).

“Pray make representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and request him first to give orders for the suspension of hostilities, and afterwards the solution will be discussed. I hope to have a reply from you.”

*August 15 (-9), 1900.*

(B.)

A proposal was recently made to the French Government by the Japanese Government for notifying the Chinese Government of an armistice, on condition that an international contingent, sufficient to escort the foreigners shut up in the capital as far as Tien-tsin, be authorized to enter Peking.

M. Delcassé declared that this proposal appeared to call for the same reply as that which he had returned to a demand for an armistice on the part of the Chinese Government (the text of the reply of which M. Cambon communicated to Mr. Bertie



in his private letter of the 15th August), and in which he called attention to the fact that the only means of proving the good faith shown by the Chinese Government in their arrangements with regard to the foreign Ministers was to command the soldiers to give in to the international troops.

*Albert Gate, August 17, 1900.*

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No. 214.

*Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty.—(Communicated by Admiralty August 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 17, 1900.*

TROOPS will commence landing here to-morrow. Remainder of 3,000 will come up from Hong Kong.

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No. 215.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 18.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, August 17, 1900.*

THE terms of the French reply respecting the Command-in-chief in China of Count Waldersee are given in a communiqué published by the Havas Agency yesterday afternoon to the following effect:—

“The French Government has informed the German Government that as soon as Marshal von Waldersee shall have arrived in China, and shall have taken in the Councils of the Commanders of the International Corps d’Armée the eminent position due to his superior rank, General Voyron, the Commander of the French Expeditionary Corps will not fail to place his relations with the Marshal upon a proper footing.”

The French expression used in the last sentence runs as follows: “ne manquera pas d’assurer ses relations avec le Maréchal.”

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No. 216.

*Consul Tratman to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 18.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Chefoo, August 17, 1900.*

ACCORDING to intelligence brought by a Japanese torpedo-boat, just arrived from Taku, Peking was taken 16th August. The Legations are reported to have been safely relieved.

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No. 217.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 18.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 18, 1900.*

AN identic note has been addressed by the Viceroy at Wuchang and Nanking to all the Consuls-General at this port requesting them to urge their respective Governments to guarantee the personal safety of the Emperor and Empress-Dowager. The Viceroy promises that if they are unharmed they will unswervingly hold to their agreement for the preservation of peace and order in the south-eastern provinces.

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## No. 218.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received, vid Chefoo, August 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, August 16, 1900.*

THE Legations at Peking were relieved on the 15th August. Sir C. MacDonald and the staff of the Legation are in good health.

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## No. 219.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received, vid Chefoo, August 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, August 16, 1900.*

THE Japanese Consul communicated to me the following information:—

“On the morning of the 14th August allied forces attacked Peking on the east side, commencing with artillery fire.

“The enemy, who resisted obstinately, held the wall. The Japanese and Russians advanced on north side of ‘Tungu’ Canal, and the English and Americans on south side. During the night the Japanese blew up the ‘Tung Chih’ gate on east side of Tartar city. English and Americans entered Chinese city by ‘Tung Pien’ gate. Parties were at once detached from both forces and united at Legation. Ministers and their staffs are all well. Chinese lost 400 killed, while the Japanese lost 100 killed and wounded, including three officers.”

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## No. 220.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received, vid Chefoo, August 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, August 17, 1900.*

A JESUIT priest here has received news that the Protestant and Catholic missionaries in Tai Yuan-fu, in Shansi, were invited by Governor Yu Hsien to his Yamên on the 9th July, and were executed there, five on the spot, and the rest, men, women, and children, in the space in front of audience hall. A Roman Catholic soldier, who says he was present, brought this intelligence.

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## No. 221.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 19, 1900.*

ON the 17th instant the substance of a telegram, dated 16th August, from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was communicated by the Russian Embassy at this Court, stating that the Russian Minister at Peking had telegraphed to St. Petersburg on the 9th instant that the Legations continued to be besieged by the troops, by whom they were surrounded, and that they were deprived of external communications and bombarded. M. de Giers added that their provisions would not last more than ten days.

Count Lamsdorff stated that with a view to putting an end to this grave situation energetic and simultaneous representations to the Chinese Government on the part of all the Powers seemed to him urgently necessary, both through the Representatives of China in the different States, and through Li Hung-chang, who was Plenipotentiary designate, and eventual negotiator with the Powers.

Count Lamsdorff concluded by stating that he had made a categorical declaration to the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg, and had requested him to telegraph to Li Hung-chang immediately.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

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No. 222.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 20.)*

My Lord,

*Shanghai, July 13, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt to-day of your telegram of the 12th instant with reference to the arrangement come to by the Consular Body with the Viceroy for the preservation of peace in Central and Southern China.

I have to-day telegraphed to your Lordship that this arrangement is as reported to you in my telegram of the 27th June, which was approved in your telegram of the 28th June. Subsequent to the receipt of your Lordship's approval a letter was sent by the Consular Body to the Delegates of the Viceroy embodying this arrangement. I have the honour to inclose a copy of this letter.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

Inclosure in No. 222.

*Senhor Valdez to Taotai Yu.*

Sir,

*Shanghai, June 27, 1900.*

I AM directed by my colleagues to express our pleasure at receiving yesterday from your Excellency and from his Excellency Shêng Ta-jên the assurances from their Excellencies Chang Chih Tung, Viceroy at Wuchang, and Liu Kun-yi, Viceroy at Nanking, that they undertake to keep the peace and to protect life and property in their provinces, and to hold themselves responsible for any damage done by riot or insurrection. We beg to thank their Excellencies, and to express our high appreciation of their good intentions.

We desire to inform their Excellencies that the Admirals of the Allied Fleets at Taku have made public proclamation that they only fight against Boxers and those who strive to prevent the rescue of the foreigners in danger in Peking and other places. We desire you to assure their Excellencies that our Governments have had no intention, either individually or collectively, to take any action or to land any force in the Yang-tsze Valley so long as their Excellencies are able to and do maintain the rights of the foreigners in their provinces, as provided for by the Treaties with the Government of China.

(Signed) JOAQUIM MARIA TRAVASSOS VALDEZ,  
*Consul-General for Portugal and Senior Consul.*

No. 223.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 20.)*

My Lord,

*Newport, Rhode Island, August 10, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the text of the note addressed to the Chinese Government, which was delivered to the Chinese Minister at Washington on the evening of the 8th for transmission to the authorities at Peking.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have been informed by Mr. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, that the text of this Memorandum, as well as the text of the Imperial Chinese Edicts of the 2nd and 5th August, as communicated to him by the Chinese Minister, have been telegraphed to the United States' Ambassador in London for communication to your Lordship.

P.

Inclosure in No. 223.

*Extract from the "New York Herald" of August 10, 1900.*

UNITED STATES' DEMAND ON CHINESE GOVERNMENT.—The State Department this morning made public the following Memorandum sent yesterday to the Chinese Government through Minister Wu:—

"We are availing ourselves of the opportunity offered by the Imperial Edict of the 5th August, allowing to the foreign Ministers free communication with their respective Governments in cypher, and have sent a communication to Minister Conger, to which we await an answer.

"We are already advised by him, in a brief despatch, received the 7th August, that Imperial troops are firing daily upon the Ministers in Peking. We demand the immediate cessation of hostile attacks by Imperial troops upon the Legations, and urge the exercise of every power and energy of the Imperial Government for the protection of the Legations and all foreigners therein.

"We are also advised by the same despatch from Minister Conger that, in his opinion, for the foreign Ministers to leave Peking, as proposed in the Edict of the 2nd August, would be certain death. In view of the fact that the Imperial troops are now firing upon the Legations, and in view of the doubt expressed by the Imperial Government in its Edict of the 2nd August as to its power to restore order and secure absolute safety in Peking, it is evident that this apprehension is well founded, for if your Government cannot protect our Minister in Peking, it will presumptively be unable to protect him upon a journey from Peking to the coast.

"We therefore urge upon the Imperial Government that it shall adopt the course suggested in the third clause of the letter of the President to His Majesty the Emperor of China of the 23rd July, 1900, and enter into communication with the relief expedition, so that co-operation may be secured between them for the liberation of the Legations, the protection of foreigners, and the restoration of order. Such action on the part of the Imperial Government would be a satisfactory demonstration of its friendliness and desire to attain these ends.

(Signed)

"ALVEY A. ADEE,  
"Acting Secretary.

"Department of State, Washington,  
"August 8, 1900."

No. 224.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 20.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, August 18, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy and translation of a communication which I have received from the Imperial Foreign Office, containing a copy of a communication made by them to the Chinese Legation here.

I have, &c.

(In the absence of Sir Frank Lascelles),

(Signed) LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 224.

*Imperial Foreign Office to Sir F. Lascelles.*

(Translation.)

*Foreign Office, Berlin, August 17, 1900.*

THE Foreign Office has sent the inclosed communication to the Imperial Chinese Legation here, in reply to several communications from them.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 224.

*Memorandum.*

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Government, as is known, considers it the immediate and imperative duty of the Imperial Chinese Government to promptly release the foreigners shut up in Peking. While this duty remains undischarged, the Imperial Government can enter into no negotiations with the Chinese Government or with any of their Representatives. The deliverance of the besieged is at present in the hands of the allied troops marching on Peking. It is left to their Commanders to take the proper measures. Negotiations respecting the release, and especially those regarding the question as to whether and under what conditions it is or is not necessary for the allied troops to enter the Chinese capital can, therefore, be entered upon from the Chinese side with the Commanders of the allied troops only.

*Berlin, August 17, 1900.*

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## No. 225.

*Li Hung-chang to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, August 20.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 19, 1900.*

TREATY Powers all declared that the sole object of their advancing forces to Peking was to rescue their Ministers. Now they have realized their object; the allied forces are now in Peking, and they find their Ministers, staffs, &c., all well and unharmed. The cessation of hostilities and the conferences for the settlement of all difficulties could now be arranged.

I have therefore to request the British Government to appoint their Plenipotentiary, or to give full power to their Representative in Peking, to open the negotiations.

I will proceed to Peking as soon as I get a definite information from the British Government.

The same application to the American, Japanese, Russian, German, and French Governments.

Please convey the above message to Lord Salisbury, and request a reply.

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## No. 226.

*Viceroy of Liang Kiang and Liang Hu to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, August 20.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nanking, August 20, 1900.*

PLEASE convey to Lord Salisbury our assurances that we and other Viceroy and Governors will always hold ourselves responsible for the maintenance of peace and order of the provinces in the south and east of China within our jurisdictions to afford protection as agreed upon.

When we heard the report that their Majesties the Emperor and the Mother-Empress were still in Peking when the allied forces entered the city, we requested, through the Consular Body, the Powers not to give their Majesties the slightest alarm, and proposed a certain condition for an answer within two days for the sole object to gratify the hope of all the Chinese subjects. But it is now known that their Majesties had left Peking before the arrival of the allied forces. We now make the above assurance once more.

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No. 227.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 20.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 20, 1900.*

FEARS have been expressed by the Viceroy of Wuchang that, when the time comes for the final settlement of affairs in China, he will not be given a voice in the matter, in spite of his allegiance to Her Majesty's Government, throughout the present trouble in the north.

Can you assure him, and also the Viceroy of Nanking, that their advice will be taken and given every consideration.

No. 228.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 20, 1900.*

RUSSIAN occupation of Chinese custom-house at Newchwang.

The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank have informed us that the Chinese custom-house at Newchwang has been taken possession of by the Russians, and that they are collecting revenue for Provisional Government, retaining Chinese staff.

It is further stated by the bank that this information has been officially confirmed to the Acting Inspector-General of Customs by the Russian Admiral.

You should inquire what the facts are in regard to the receiving and disposal of the customs duties at Newchwang, so far as Russian action is concerned.

No. 229.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 21.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, June 16, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose translations of two telegrams which were sent by General Nieh to the Viceroy at Tien-tsin on the 11th June.

The first was dispatched, as I understand, in answer to a telegram from the Viceroy desiring General Nieh to escort the foreign guards on their way to Peking, a friendly act which was followed by his Excellency giving instructions for a train to be placed at the disposal of the guards.

I wish to draw attention to these acts, as they were done in our interest and with the object of assisting the relief party to reach Peking speedily.

The result to the Viceroy is expected to be his disgrace, and possibly his execution.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

Inclosure in No. 229.

*Translation of two Telegrams from General Nieh to Viceroy.*

(1.)

I PREVIOUSLY telegraphed asking that the foreign Envoys might be requested by the Yamèn to order the foreigners in Tien-tsin to postpone going up to Peking.

Besides I have issued repeated Proclamations, all to the effect that the railway is State built. Now, when the foreign troops suddenly come and begin to repair the railway, alarm and suspicion are aroused amongst the people, and I am afraid that they may be excited into a rebellious movement, when it would be difficult for my troops to escort and protect them. I accordingly send you this telegram, and request you to inform the different foreign Envoys and Consuls. This is my earnest request.

(2.)

This day at noon over 1,000 foreign troops armed with quick-firing guns and stores were proceeding straight to Peking in the train; I was just going to stop them when I received a message in reply from the Railway Office Telegraph saying that the special train to convey the foreign troops to Peking was provided by the Viceroy's orders.

It seems to me that if foreign troops are coming in in such numbers, coast defence is important, and as there is absolutely no use in my troops remaining at Yang Ts'un, I had better order the officer in command of the cavalry to return to Lu T'ai to guard against eventualities.

I humbly beg you will give instructions in compliance with this.

No. 230.

*Li Hung-chang to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.*—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, August 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Shanghai, August 21, 1900.

THE Emperor and the Mother-Empress left Peking; the Boxer insurrectionists are entirely dispersed. There is no necessity of any further military operations. I should feel uneasy if the allied forces, at a great expense, be still kept at Peking.

I have therefore, besides the cessation of hostilities, to request the withdrawal of their troops therefrom.

I renew the application for the appointment of a Plenipotentiary for Peace Conference.

Please communicate the above to Lord Salisbury, and move his Lordship to grant a favourable reply.

Repeat this telegram to your colleagues at other Courts.

No. 231.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 21, 1900.

REFERRING to your telegram of the 20th August, you are authorized to inform the Viceroys of Nanking and Wuchang that, whenever the time for settlement arrives, their advice will be asked for, and will receive all due consideration, so far as Her Majesty's Government is concerned.

No. 232.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received August 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Peking, August 15, 1900.

THE Legations were relieved yesterday afternoon. The first to enter was a British force. I have reported casualties of garrison separately *en clair*.

It is not yet plain whether the Chinese Court has fled, or whether any Government remains here. Palace and the greater part of city is still held by Chinese troops.

No. 233.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received August 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 22, 1900.

A REPLY to Li Hung-chang's message of the 19th has been sent by Count Lamsdorff to the effect that Russian Government can only enter into negotiations in common with the other allied Treaty Powers, and before returning a further answer they must consult them. A Circular telegram has been sent to Russian Representatives, instructing them to ascertain views of Governments to which they are accredited.

Meanwhile, Count Lamsdorff does not know what to think of the silence of our Ministers in Peking, since the date of their reported relief, and the absence of direct news from our forces there, as to what further object than relief they are at present pursuing. On this point he feels rather uneasy, and is at a loss to understand whether the Ministers remain in Peking by choice or by compulsion, or by what authority the further operations are decided.

The Russian Minister's last telegram was dated two days before the reported relief, and did not betray any very excessive alarm for his safety, but asked that as he had burnt his cypher by way of precaution, a new one should, if possible, be sent out to him.

## No. 234.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 22, 1900.*

NEWCHWANG customs:

Your Lordship's telegram of the 20th instant.

I spoke to Count Lamsdorff to-day on the subject of Russian action regarding Newchwang customs. His Excellency said that any steps taken could only be of a provisional and temporary nature, but he has promised to inquire what are the real facts of the case.

## No. 235.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 23.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, June 28, 1900.*

ON the 14th instant a Chinese, who has for years been in the employment of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and in whom great confidence is placed by his employers, called to tell me, confidentially, that the bank's Chinese agent in Peking had learnt through an official in the Chün Chi Ch'ü, or Grand Council, that the Empress-Dowager had resolved to destroy the Legations on the 16th June.

The agent had at once taken flight from Peking, had called on General Nieh at Yang-tsun, and found that the General had received the same intelligence, and he had come on with General Nieh by special train to Tien-tsin.

Both my informant and the Peking man were positive that the news conveyed to me could be relied upon; but I did not telegraph it to your Lordship till it had reached me through another and independent source, and even then I did not feel confident in its truth, though I did not feel justified in disregarding the story.

I felt so strongly the necessity of not allowing any time to elapse if such an atrocity were in contemplation that I wrote to the Viceroy a letter, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, urging his Excellency to memorialize the Throne on the obligations imposed on all countries to protect the Ministers accredited to their Governments in the most effective manner possible.

The Viceroy was throughout the afternoon in constant conference with General Nieh and other leading Chinese officials, and it was, I believe, suggested to him by one of them that he should advise his Government to offer to escort the foreign Ministers and their staffs to Tien-tsin.

On the 15th he wrote me a reply, a translation of which is inclosed, to the effect that it was not within his province to memorialize the Throne on such subjects, and that there was no cause for uneasiness about the Legations.

The same day he wrote to the doyen of the Consular Body a letter in which he desired M. du Chaylard to acquaint the Consular Body that his Excellency had memorialized the Throne, and asked that an offer should be made to escort under a good guard any members of the Legations who desired to leave Peking and bring them to Tien-tsin.

The letter was discussed the same afternoon at a Consular meeting, and a reply was sent to the Viceroy thanking him for his letter, and adding that of course the decision of any such question rested with the Legations.



At the same time news reached us that the Admirals proposed to take the Taku forts without delay on account of torpedoes being laid down in the river and the concentration of troops in Taku and the approach to Tien-tsin.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 235.

*Consul Carles to Viceroy Yü Lu.*

(Translation.)

MR. CARLES presents his compliments to his Excellency Yü Lu, Viceroy of Chihli, &c.

In consequence of the riotous conduct of the Boxers the foreign Ministers resident at Peking have desired their Governments at Peking to send guards for their protection.

There are at present all kinds of wild stories current in Tien-tsin, in which the native population believes, and which are causing great excitement.

Within the last few days a member of the Japanese Legation has been murdered by soldiers under General Tung's command.

Mr. Carles begs to remind his Excellency of the International Treaties which have been in force for forty years, and of the stipulations therein contained for the treatment with all honour of foreign Ministers resident in China, and for similar treatment of the Ministers of China sent to foreign Courts.

The Ministers accredited by Governments to other Powers are dignitaries of high rank, to whom no disrespect of any kind should be shown; but at the present time it would appear that Chinese statesmen in Peking have forgotten the obligations placed on them by Treaty.

If such is the case, Mr. Carles considers it his duty to ask the Viceroy to memorialize the Throne in plain terms on the subject of existing Treaties, and to ask that His Imperial Majesty will instruct the high officers in Peking and the Provinces to act in conformance with such Treaties, so that there may be no cause for complaint of lack of respect.

His Excellency is asked to reflect most carefully on the far-reaching consequences which would be entailed through such conduct.

June 14, 1900.

Inclosure 2 in No. 235.

*Viceroy Yü Lu to Consul Carles.*

June 15, 1900.

I AM in receipt of your note referring to the reported murder of one of the staff of the Japanese Minister. The same report has reached me here. At the present moment the telegraph line is interrupted, and I am unable to obtain precise details.

It does not fall to my duty to report to the Throne about such an unexpected outrage; also my Government will certainly thoroughly investigate and severely punish the offenders.

I previously received a note from the Tsung-li Yamên stating that on the 12th June the Empress sent the four Ministers Ch'i, Chao, Hsü, and Na to the various Legations to inquire after the health of the Ministers' wives, and request the Ministers to order the troops on their arrival to remain peaceably in their Legations, in order to consolidate friendly relations.

At time of writing the Yamên said all the Legations were quiet, and the various Consuls need not be suspicious or uneasy, on account of the difficulty of communication between Tien-tsin and Peking.

I beg to append this additional information to the forgoing.

Compliments.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 235.

*Viceroy Yü Lu to French Consul-General at Tien-tsin.*

June 15, 1900.

I RECEIVED yesterday a confidential letter from the Imperial Court to the effect that the troops sent up to protect the various Legations were already numerous and sufficient for protective purposes, and no more could be allowed in, lest alarm should be aroused in men's minds.

Yesterday I heard that further troops were entering Peking.

Accordingly the Minister Chang, together with Hwang, Customs Taotai, proceeded at once to consult with you about the whole affair.

I have now memorialized the Throne, asking the issue of a Decree to send energetic officers and troops to protect the Legations and foreign residences in Peking with redoubled zeal; and if any of their Ministers and their families desire to come down to Tien-tsin, that on receipt of a communication addressed to the Tsung-li Yamên a proper escort under high officials should accompany them to Lang Fang with a larger number of troops, whence they can come on by rail.

With respect to this road and the railway, it is China's duty to send troops to keep order and afford protection, and effect speedy repairs.

It is accordingly my duty to request you to take note, and I trust that you will consult with your colleagues.

Compliments.

## No. 236.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received via Chefoo, August 23.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, August 20, 1900.*

THE Japanese Consul has received intelligence of the capture of gates of Imperial city in Peking on the 17th August, and flight of Emperor, Empress-Dowager, and Court. The Japanese are said to have rescued foreign missionaries imprisoned in Palace.

## No. 237.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 23, 1900.*

WE have sympathized most deeply with you in your prolonged sufferings and anxiety, and I am glad now to be able, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, to congratulate you, your family, and all British subjects on your providential escape.

## No. 238.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 23, 1900.*

WITH regard to the appointment of Li Hung-chang as negotiator:

I have informed the Chinese Minister, in reply to communications made to Her Majesty's Government by him on behalf of Li Hung-chang, that Her Majesty's Government cannot take any decision as to accepting the latter in this capacity until they shall have heard your views on the subject.

No. 239.

*Mr. Choate to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 23.)*

My Lord,

*American Embassy, London, August 23, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, under instructions from my Government, that the Chinese Minister at Washington communicated to it a telegram from Earl Li Hung-chang, dated the 19th instant, reciting that as the relief force had rescued the Legations, their declared purpose was accomplished, and a second telegram from the same source, dated the 21st instant, saying that Peking is occupied, the Boxers dispersed, and fighting stopped. Li Hung-chang accordingly asks suspension of hostilities, withdrawal of troops, and appointment of Envoy to negotiate.

The following answer was made to the Chinese Minister yesterday by my Government:—

“While the condition set forth in the Memorandum, delivered to the Chinese Minister 12th August, has not been fulfilled, and the Powers have been compelled to rescue their Ministers by force of arms, unaided by the Chinese Government, still this Government is ready to welcome any overtures for a truce, and invite the other Powers to join when security is established in the Chinese capital, and the Chinese Government shows its ability and willingness to make, on its part, an effective suspension of hostilities there and elsewhere in China. When this is done, and we hope it will be done promptly, the United States will be prepared to appoint a Representative to join with the Representatives of the other similarly interested Powers, and of the authoritative and responsible Government of the Chinese Empire, to attain the ends declared in our Circular to the Powers of the 3rd July, 1900.”

In instructing me to communicate this information to your Lordship, the Secretary of State, assuming that Her Majesty's Government has received a similar communication, expresses the desire to be informed what reply your Lordship has made thereto.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

No. 240.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, via Taku, August 24, 1900.*

THE situation here is very complicated. The whole of the city, except the Palace, which is believed to be undefended, has been occupied by the allied force. Chinese Government makes no sign; Chinese army still exists in vicinity, also large numbers of Boxers. Telegraph wire repeatedly cut, and other communications with Tien-tsin irregular and uncertain. Rumours of intended attacks are prevalent.

It is useless to attempt serious negotiations with the Chinese Government until the Chinese military power is disheartened and completely crushed, and communications with Tien-tsin are made thoroughly secure.

No. 241.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, via Taku, August 24, 1900.*

IT was unanimously agreed, at a meeting of the Ministers and Generals held to-day, 18th August, that the establishment of railway communication between here and Tien-tsin as soon as possible was most essential.

No. 242.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.*

(Telegraphic.)

August 25, 1900.

AS Her Majesty's Government specially pressed for action of Japan in sending forces to effect the relief of Legation, I think you may, without presumption, express to Minister for Foreign Affairs their earnest admiration of the gallantry and efficiency displayed by the Japanese forces in the recent operations, which contributed to the success of the expedition so very largely.

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No. 243.

*Consul Mansfield to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Amoy, August 26, 1900.

JAPANESE men-of-war have landed at Amoy an armed force and guns.

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No. 244.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 27.)*

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, August 13, 1900.

WHEN I attended Count Lamsdorff's reception on the 8th instant, I found his Excellency somewhat perplexed by the contradictory telegrams received from North China, some of which reported that the allied forces were already advancing towards Peking, while others fully confirmed the report which the Russian Government had received of the unanimous opinion of the military authorities at Tien-tsin that such an advance would be impossible for some weeks, not only on account of the season, but of the difficulty of transporting heavy artillery.

He was inclined to think that the reported advance must have been a preparatory reconnaissance in force of the allied troops, or an attempt to secure an important bridge on the line of eventual advance. Until the position was clearer, and we obtained more accurate information, diplomacy, he thought, must be content to leave the decision of this and of ulterior measures in the hands of the Commanders at Tien-tsin.

On my remarking that under these circumstances I presumed that the general question, of confiding the general direction of the military operations of the international forces to a single hand was for the moment in abeyance, his Excellency at once replied that the German Emperor had offered, if the Powers concerned wished it, to place the services of Field-Marshal Count Waldersee at their disposal for the general command of the allied forces, and that the Russian Government had at once replied that for their part they were quite prepared to entertain this offer.

I inquired for what operations this command was contemplated, as I supposed that if the offer was generally accepted, Count Waldersee could scarcely reach Tien-tsin within two months' time from the present date.

Count Lamsdorff said that he understood that the journey to Tien-tsin could be accomplished in about a month, and that the contemplated operations would naturally be confined to the province of Pechili, the actual field of operation of the allied forces.

When I saw Count Lamsdorff this morning I was able to tell him that Her Majesty's Government had already accepted the German Emperor's proposal to confer the general command of an international expedition to Peking on Field-Marshal Count Waldersee, subject to instructions which had not yet been drafted.

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No. 245.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 27.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, August 22, 1900.*

WHEN I called at the Foreign Office to-day, I asked Count Lamsdorff what reply he had returned, or intended to return, to Li Hung-chang's two urgent appeals.

He said that he had only as yet received the one similar to that communicated to your Lordship of the 19th. He presumed that he would receive the second, which I read to him, to-day.

He had told the Chinese Minister to inform Li Hung-chang that the question of negotiations was one which the Russian Government could only approach in concert with the other Treaty Powers, who were all acting together. He had at once instructed the Russian Representatives at the different Courts concerned to ascertain the views of those Governments as to the reply to be returned to Li Hung-chang, and when he was able to do so, would let him know the views of the Russian Government.

Count Lamsdorff's opinion seemed to be that we could do little until we heard directly from our Ministers at Peking, and he awaits their communications with great anxiety.

No. 246.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 27.)*

My Lord,

*Newport, Rhode Island, August 16, 1900.*

IN the last paragraph of my telegram of the 10th instant I had the honour to inform your Lordship that I had addressed a note to Mr. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, inquiring as to the views of the United States' Government concerning the course that should be adopted by the Powers in view of the position of the foreigners in Peking, as described in the telegram sent by all the foreign Representatives there to their Governments, dated the 4th August.

I have now received a note from Mr. Adee, in which he states that the correspondence exchanged with the Chinese Minister at Washington on the 8th and 12th instant, which was telegraphed to the United States' Ambassador in London for communication to your Lordship, sufficiently explains the position of the United States' Government with regard to the question of securing the safety of the Legations and their inmates by their peaceful delivery to the relief expedition.

The Memorandum respecting the views of the United States' Government on the Russian proposal, copy of which is inclosed in my despatch of to-day's date, will afford, in the opinion of Mr. Adee, such further light as he is at present able to throw on the subject.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE.

No. 247.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 27.)*

My Lord,

*Newport, Rhode Island, August 16, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a Memorandum communicated to me by Mr. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, embodying the reply returned by him to the inquiries of the foreign Representatives in Washington as to the attitude of the United States' Government in regard to the Russian proposal to send an international detachment under a white flag as far as the walls of Peking, to effect the peaceful delivery of the foreign Envoys.

Mr. Adee informs me that on the 12th instant the Secretary of War telegraphed to General Chaffee the substance of the Memorandum of that date which was handed to the Chinese Minister at Washington, particularly quoting, for his information, the third paragraph.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE.

## Inclosure in No. 247.

*Memorandum in response to the Inquiries made of the Acting Secretary of State on the 12th instant, having reference to the proposal of the Russian Government to send an International Detachment under a White Flag as far as the city walls of Peking to effect a peaceful bringing back of the Foreign Envoys now in Peking.*

THE views of the Government of the United States upon this proposal have been expressed, in anticipation, in the third paragraph of the official Memorandum handed to Minister Wu on the 12th instant as a reply to his communication of the Imperial Edict of the 8th August, appointing Earl Li Hung-chang Envoy Plenipotentiary to negotiate with the Powers now co-operating in China for the relief of the Legations in Peking.

It was therein said:—

“We are ready to enter into an agreement between the Powers and the Chinese Government for a cessation of hostile demonstrations on condition that a sufficient body of the forces composing the relief expedition shall be permitted to enter Peking unmolested and to escort the foreign Ministers and residents back to Tien-tsin, this movement being provided for and secured by such arrangements and dispositions of troops as shall be considered satisfactory by the Generals commanding the forces composing the relief expedition.”

This Memorandum was cabled in full on the evening of the 12th to the Representatives of the United States at the capitals of the several Powers now co-operating in the movement of relief, to be by them communicated to the Governments to which they are respectively accredited. The paragraph above quoted appears to embrace the point presented in the Russian proposal, inasmuch as the approach of an international detachment to Peking, under a white flag, and the delivery and reception of the foreigners there would necessarily depend upon some prior understanding with the Chinese Government and the adoption of such adequate arrangements and dispositions as may be satisfactory to the Commanding Generals for the realization of the desired end. Whether such a peaceful detachment should enter Peking, or receive the foreign Legations and their inmates outside the city walls of Peking, would appear to be a detail to be arranged between the Military Commanders and the Chinese authorities, having in view that, if the latter alternative is adopted, the foreigners would have to pass through some 2 miles of the dense Chinese city before reaching the outer gate. It may be that some intermediate course, such as receiving the Ministers and others at the gate of the inner Tartar city, will prove practicable.

*Department of State, August , 1900.*

## No. 248.

*Count Hatzfeldt to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 27.)*

(Translation.)

My Lord,

*German Embassy, August 24, 1900.*

UNDER instructions from my Government I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Field-Marshal Count Waldersee started from Berlin for China on the 20th instant. On arriving in the Chinese Province of Chihli he will take over, in accordance with the commands of His Majesty the Emperor and King, the functions in connection with military measures in Chihli assigned to him in virtue of, and in conformity with, the declarations made by the Powers.

I venture, therefore, to express the hope that before the arrival of the Field-Marshal, the Commander of the British forces will receive the necessary instructions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. HATZFELDT.

No. 249.

*Mr. Choate to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 27.)*

My Lord,

*American Embassy, London, August 27, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, under instructions from my Government, that a note was received by it from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Russian Embassy at Washington, dated the 17th instant, stating that he had received a communication from his Government informing him of a Resolution of the Admirals of the allied fleets in China interdicting the Plenipotentiary of the Chinese Government, Earl Li Hung-chang, from all communication with the Chinese authorities, in the event of his arrival at Taku.

The note further stated that, inasmuch as this Resolution was inexplicable, in view of the fact that all the Powers had recognized the utility of admitting the services of Earl Li Hung-chang in the eventual negotiations for peace, and that it would be impossible for the latter to fulfil his mission in the character of Chinese Plenipotentiary if he were denied communication with the officials of his Government, it would be desirable that the interested Governments should give orders to countermand the above-mentioned decision of the Admirals.

Upon receipt of this note, my Government made inquiry of Admiral Remy, commanding the American fleet at Taku, and at first received from him the answer that no such Resolution had been adopted. He afterwards, however, cabled that the Admirals had agreed to write to the dean of the Legations in Peking for instructions, in case Earl Li Hung-chang should arrive at Taku, and meanwhile not to allow the latter to communicate with the Chinese shore authorities. From this last proposition Admiral Remy dissented.

My Government holds the same view as that expressed in the note of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires. In the interests of peace, and in order that the just demands of all the Powers against China may be effectively presented, it would seem important that the Chinese Plenipotentiary should be able to communicate both with his own Government and with its Military Commanders, whose action will be necessary to any suspension of hostilities.

The Chinese Minister at Washington is without any powers or advices. Earl Li Hung-chang is *prima facie* authorized by Imperial Decree to negotiate, and is the only representative of responsible authority in China, so far as my Government has been advised. My Government has therefore instructed its Representatives in China in the spirit of the Russian note above mentioned.

The United States' Government would deem any misunderstanding or divergent action on this subject by the Representatives of the Powers in China a misfortune, and would be glad to learn from other Powers if there are reasons not known to it which, in their judgment, should lead to a view different from that which it takes.

I am therefore instructed to lay this matter before your Lordship, and to express the desire of my Government to be informed, at as early a date as may be convenient, of your Lordship's views on the subject.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

No. 250.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 27, 1900.*

THERE is a report that the Governor of Shensi has telegraphed to Li Hung-chang, informing him that he is in receipt of trustworthy information that the Emperor and the Empress-Dowager arrived at Tatung in Shansi on the 21st instant. Their Majesties travelled from Peking along the Hsuanhua road (marked in Waeber's Map of North-eastern China). The General Officer Commanding our forces has been informed of the above report.

No. 251.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 28.)*

My Lord,

*Tôkiô, July 10, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a note which I addressed to Viscount Aoki on the 7th instant, in obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 6th July, stating that Her Majesty's Government have taken steps to cause the Government at Peking to be informed that they will be held personally guilty if the members of the Legations, or other foreigners in Peking, suffer injury.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. B. WHITEHEAD.

Inclosure in No. 251.

*Mr. Whitehead to Viscount Aoki.*

M. le Ministre,

*Tôkiô, July 7, 1900.*

IN compliance with telegraphic instructions which I have received from the Marquess of Salisbury, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that his Lordship yesterday communicated to the Chinese Minister in London a Memorandum in the following words:—

“The Chinese Minister is requested by Her Majesty's Government to transmit by telegraph, in such a manner as will insure the message reaching the Government at Peking, notice that they will be held to be personally guilty if the members of the Legations, and other foreigners in Peking, suffer injury.”

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) J. B. WHITEHEAD.

No. 252.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 28.)*

(Extract.)

*Tôkiô, July 24, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 18th instant, I have the honour to inclose an extract from the “Japan Times,” of the 20th, giving the text of the telegrams exchanged between their Majesties the Emperors of China and Japan, dated respectively the 3rd and 13th instant.

Although I saw Viscount Aoki twice on the day following the dispatch of the second telegram, his Excellency did not mention the matter to me.

In the course of the conversation I had with his Excellency yesterday evening, I asked whether he could tell me from whom the telegram attributed to the Emperor of China really emanated. His Excellency replied that he had tried to ascertain this, but could not reply with certainty; he thought it probably came from a body which might be described as the Privy Council.

Inclosure in No. 252.

*Extract from the “Japan Times” of July 20, 1900.*

JAPAN AND CHINA.

*Important State Documents.*

ON the 11th instant, his Excellency Li Sheng-toh, the Minister of China at Tôkiô, called at the Foreign Office and submitted the following telegraphic message from His Imperial Master addressed to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:—



## HIS IMPERIAL CHINESE MAJESTY'S TELEGRAM.

“ We, the Emperor of China, to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Greeting !

“ Our country being on terms of intimate friendship and mutual reliance with your Majesty's country, it was a great shock to us that the Chancellor of your Majesty's Legation was about a month ago attacked and put to death. Profoundly touched by this sad event, we caused steps to be taken for the arrest and punishment of the perpetrators of the crime. But the Powers, suspecting that in the prevailing conflict between our Christian and non-Christian subjects our Government was supporting the non-Christians against the Christians, attacked and occupied the forts of Taku. Thus hostilities were commenced, and the situation has become more and more complicated.

“ From the general trend of events in the world, we are persuaded that the East and the West confront each other ; and that your Majesty's country and ours are the only Powers that maintain their ground in the East. It is not China alone which is made the object of the ambitious longings of the Powers that assert their strength in the West. Should China fail to hold her own, we are afraid that your Majesty's country might also find the situation untenable. The interests of the two countries are therefore linked together, and we venture to hope that your Majesty may find it possible to set aside for the present questions of minor importance and make common cause with us in the maintenance of our general interests. China is at the present moment so completely occupied in conducting military operations for the suppression of the insurgents, that it is impossible for her to take proper measures for averting the dangers from outside and for bringing the complication to a successful termination. We are therefore constrained to rely on the support of that country which, like our own dominions, forms part of Asia.

“ Under these circumstances, we present this message to your Majesty in the spirit of absolute frankness and truthfulness, and beg that your Majesty will take such action as may be deemed adequate in your judgment to restore order and peace under your powerful guidance. We also most earnestly beg your Majesty to favour us with a reply.

“ The 7th day of the 6th month of the 26th year of Kuang Hsü (3rd July, 1900).”

In answer to the above, the following reply from the Emperor was handed on the 4th instant to the Chinese Minister, who doubtless at once transmitted it by wire :—

## HIS IMPERIAL JAPANESE MAJESTY'S REPLY.

“ We, the Emperor of Japan, to His Majesty the Emperor of China, Greeting !

“ The report that we received some time ago announcing the murder of Sugiyama, Chancellor of our Legation at Peking, has so far lacked all positive confirmation, and it has therefore been a cause of profound grief and regret to us to be assured of the correctness of that report by the telegram just received from your Majesty.

“ Since that sad event took place, the insurgents in the northern parts of your Majesty's dominion have become more and more violent, and their lawlessness has been unbounded. They have, we are informed, not only surrounded and attacked the foreign diplomatic Representatives, the members of their suites, and other foreigners, but have even massacred the Minister of a certain Power. We are further informed that your Majesty's troops fail not only to afford any relief to the foreign Ministers, but to suppress the insurgents. We need not remind your Majesty of the fact that, under international law, Diplomatic Agents are entitled to the highest respect, and that their person is inviolable. Any offence against their person is therefore a direct contravention of international law, and it is not necessary to point out the extreme gravity of the responsibility that would be incurred when the offence consists in their murder.

“ If your Majesty's Government earnestly suppresses the insurgents and rescues the foreign Representatives, their suites, and other foreigners, we trust the difficulties of the situation might not prove insurmountable. We wish your Majesty to understand that the suppression of the insurgents and the rescue of the foreign Representatives are duties which your Majesty owes no less to your own country than to the other nations of the world, a duty the fulfilment of which does not admit of the least delay

or hesitation. Since last month the Powers have dispatched large forces to Tien-tsin, and Japan has likewise found it necessary to send her troops. In taking this step, the object kept in view has been to suppress the insurgents and to rescue the diplomatic Representatives and other foreigners. Beyond that the Powers have no ulterior motive. If your Majesty's Government should lose no time in rescuing the Ministers of foreign nations from their dangerous position, such action on your Majesty's part would, we trust, be recognized as an indication of your Majesty's sincere wish to avoid rupture with foreign nations, and it would lead to the mitigation of the dangers impending over your Majesty's country.

"Our Government, as is known to your Majesty, entertains feelings of cordial friendship for your Majesty's country, so that should circumstances make it necessary, Japan will not decline to use her good offices on behalf of China. If your Majesty's Government, therefore, at once suppress the insurrection and actually rescue the foreign Representatives, Japan will be prepared to use her influence, in eventual negotiations between your country and foreign nations, with a view to conserve the interests of your Empire.

"It is our earnest wish that this telegraphic reply to your Majesty's message will receive the serious consideration of your Majesty.

"The 13th day of the 7th month of the 33rd year of Meiji (13th July, 1900)."

No. 253.

*Note communicated by the Japanese Minister, August 28, 1900.*

THE port of Amoy, with its neighbouring districts, has frequently been the basis of secret and dangerous attempts against the security of the Formosan Islands. Recently some riotous movements have been started there threatening the safety of the foreign residents, and an outrageous act has already been committed by the burning of a Japanese temple.

Under these circumstances the Imperial Government have decided to land at Amoy a small Japanese force for the protection of our Consulate, as well as of the foreign community at that locality.

No. 254.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, August 28, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram informing me of Li Hung-chang's telegraphic message, I have the honour to report that he is said to be on his way to Peking. M. de Giers, the Russian Minister, appears to be disposed to open negotiations with him.

I think that we must ask him to produce fresh powers. Those he possesses were given him by telegraph, and their probable object was to arrest the occupation by force of Peking. They may, therefore, possibly no longer be valid.

To delay negotiations would not, in my opinion, entail any loss upon us, seeing that it will not be possible for some time to come to arrive at a general settlement.

The punishment of those taking a prominent part in the recent outbreak against foreigners is of great importance in its bearing on the future. Unless severe punishment is inflicted on individuals—the Boxer movement being far from crushed—it will only be a question of time for a recurrence of the present crisis.

No. 255.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 28, 1900.*

THE Chinese party known as the Reform party, of whom Kang Yu-wei is at the head, are at present seeking to create disturbances in the ports on the Yang-tsze by stirring up the Kolao-hui and other Secret Societies. The Reformers declare that they

bear no ill-will towards foreigners, that the restoration of the Emperor and overthrow of the present Administration is their aim. At Hankow some forty members of the Reform party have been arrested, and several have been beheaded. I have given the leading men to understand that if they adopt such courses they can expect no sympathy from Her Majesty's Government, who are pledged to give their support to the Viceroys in their endeavours to preserve peace and order.

No. 256.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 28, 1900.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires called at the Foreign Office to-day, and, in my absence, made the following communication to Mr. Bertie, respecting the intentions of the Russian Government in North-East China and their reasons for the decision which they had taken.

M. Lessar said that from the beginning of the troubles in China the efforts of the Imperial Government had been directed, firstly, towards protecting the Russian Representatives and their nationals in Peking against the rebels, and, secondly, towards assisting the Chinese Government in their struggle against the revolt, in order promptly to re-establish order in the country.

When the other Powers interested decided to send troops to China with the same object, the Imperial Government proposed, as a basis of common action, the following fundamental principles :—

1. The maintenance of the agreement between the Powers ;
2. The maintenance of the existing system of Government in China ;
3. The exclusion of everything which might lead to the partition of the Empire ;

and

4. The establishment, by common effort, of a legitimate central Power, capable, in itself, of assuring order and security to the country.

With regard to these principles, M. Lessar said an agreement had been come to between nearly all the Powers. The Imperial Government, having no other object in view, remained faithful to these principles, and intended in the future strictly to adhere to the programme laid down therein.

The progress of events, such as the attack by the rebels on Russian troops at Newchwang and the hostilities committed by the Chinese along the Russian frontier, including the bombardment of Blagovestchenk without any provocation, had forced Russia to occupy Newchwang and to send troops into Manchuria. These temporary measures had been solely dictated by the absolute necessity of repelling the aggression of the Chinese rebels, and not with interested motives, which are absolutely foreign to the policy of the Imperial Government.

Directly the pacification of Manchuria was attained, and the necessary measures had been taken to insure the security of the railroad, concerning the construction of which there was a formal understanding with the Chinese Government, embodied in the Concession granted to the "Société des Chemins de Fer de la Chine Orientale," Russia would not fail to withdraw her troops from Chinese territory, provided that such action did not meet with obstacles caused by the proceedings of other Powers.

It was clear, M. Lessar said, that the rights of foreign States and international Companies interested in the open port of Newchwang or in the railways reconstructed by Russian troops remained inviolable and assured.

In the occupation of Peking, which had been accomplished more quickly than could have been hoped the first and most important object of the programme had been attained, namely, the rescue of the Legations and of the foreigners besieged in Peking. The second object which they had in view, namely, to render assistance to the Central Government in the restoration of order and in the re-establishment of regular relations with the Powers, had been hindered for the moment by the departure from Peking of the Emperor, Empress-Regent, and Tsung-li Yâmen.

In these circumstances, the Imperial Government saw no reason for the Legation to remain in Peking, accredited to an absent Government, and proposes to withdraw M. de Giers and the personnel of the Legation to Ten-tsin, accompanied by the Russian troops, whose presence in Peking now becomes useless, in view of the decision taken, and many times expressed by Russia, not to exceed the limits of the task which she had undertaken at the beginning of the disorders. Directly, however, the legitimate

Chinese Government had resumed the reins of power, and nominated Representatives furnished with full powers sufficient to negotiate with the Powers, Russia, in concert with the other States, would proceed to appoint Representatives, and would dispatch them to the place chosen for the *pourparlers* of the negotiations.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 257.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, July 17, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that after the capture of Tien-tsin I ascertained that the troops employed on its defence, and who were held in reserve, consisted approximately of the following forces:—

1. About 1,000 men engaged recently by the Tien-tsin Salt Commissioner for the defence of the city itself. These men bore the badge of the Tien-tsin Salt Commissioner (Lu). Their bravery under a tremendously hot gun-fire from 4-inch and 12-pr. guns excited the greatest admiration. The south wall is lined with their bodies. Those of them who were not killed have dispersed or have been disbanded as they were for special service.

2. The Viceroy's own body-guard of about 1,000 men, who have accompanied him on his retreat to Ta Shaotzü-K'on, a village a few miles west of Tien-tsin on the Grand Canal. These men are said to be indifferently armed.

3. The forces under General Ma, who have been brought hither from Shan Hai Kuan. They are constantly stated to consist of thirteen camps, three of which are of cavalry. This would make a force of 5,000 infantry and 750 cavalry. These troops were probably encamped along the Lu Tai Canal and to the north-west and north-east of the city, and are said to have retired upon Yangts'un.

4. A certain number of men belonging to troops which were raised some years ago by Li Hung-chang, and who are known as Lien Chün and Huai Chün. They appear to have been employed outside the south gate of the city at the time that the city was attacked, but to have escaped with heavy loss.

These men with the artillery retired upon Hsi K'u, six of the central buildings in which are said to have escaped destruction, when that arsenal was fired on Admiral Seymour's force withdrawing from the place on the night of the 25th and 26th June.

The intention of the Chinese was to fortify this arsenal and utilize it to stop our advance, but the place was captured yesterday by the Russian troops.

As General Nieh has been killed and his force broken up, there are therefore, so far as I can ascertain, only General Ma's troops and those who have escaped from Hsi K'u, who are likely to oppose an advance from Tien-tsin towards Yangts'un.

The Boxers in Tien-tsin are said to have been shot down by Imperial troops a few days before the city was captured, because they refused to occupy the most exposed positions, and in this neighbourhood, at any rate, the influence of the Boxers is probably on the wane.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

No. 258.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, July 17, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Commanding Officers of the allied forces held a meeting yesterday to provide for the government of the city, and agreed to appoint a Military Governor with a Staff.

To-day it was agreed to appoint a Board of three officers—British, Japanese, and Russian—each to have an equal voice in the control.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

No. 259.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

My Lord,

*Shanghai, July 21, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Clennell, Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Kiukiang, reporting serious anti-foreign riots and attacks on missionaries which have occurred in the Province of Kiangsi.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

Inclosure in No. 259.

*Acting Consul Clennell to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

Sir,

*Kiukiang, July 17, 1900.*

I HAD the honour to inform you to-day, by telegraph, that news has been received of several serious riots in the interior of this province, all, apparently, directed against the Roman Catholics.

This news has come to me somewhat as a surprise, as the Taotai assured me on the 10th instant, in reference to another matter, that the entire Province of Kiangsi was at that time free from disorder. Also Protestant missionaries from the interior, while reporting some uneasiness and a few trifling thefts from their premises at Nanch'ang, have represented the interior of Kiangsi in general to be in its normal condition. It is true that the Protestant missionaries from Nanch'ang, Wuchên, and Huk'ou have deemed it safer to come into the port, but this has been merely a precautionary measure, and I had no evidence of anti-foreign action since the appearance of a very offensive placard at Huk'ou about the 26th May.

The Roman Catholic priests and sisters who have come in this morning from Ching-tê-chên and Jaochow report that their premises at the former place were burnt on the 11th July, including an orphanage and the dwelling-house of the missionary, Père Ciceri. Some days previously native banks in the town had been burnt. Many native Christians were killed and their dwellings burnt. The populace declared that an Edict had been received from the Emperor—perhaps meaning the usurping Prince Tuan—commanding the destruction of all foreigners. It is the belief of my informant, Père Fatiguet, that a document of this nature had really been received from the present usurping power at Peking, and that, although ignored by the responsible officials, it had come into the hands of a Secretary, and had been by him issued to the people.

At Jaochow intense excitement prevailed. An attack was made on the very large Roman Catholic establishment in that city, and the officials, declaring that they were powerless to protect the missionaries, advised the priest and the four sisters resident there to go away. They have accordingly come into Kiukiang. It is believed that the mission-house and convent were burnt soon after their abandonment. The Roman Catholic missionaries from Foochow (above Nanch'ang) are also on their way to that place, though it is not known whether any riot has actually occurred there.

In calling your attention to these occurrences, I would point out that, as far as I know, they are the first anti-foreign riots that have occurred during the present crisis within the provinces under the jurisdiction of his Excellency the Viceroy of Liangkiang.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. J. CLENNELL.

No. 260.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

My Lord,

*Shanghai, July 24, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of an Imperial Decree received from the Taotai at Hankow by the Acting British Consul-General at that port, and by him forwarded to me.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

Inclosure in No. 260.

*Imperial Decree.*

(Translation.)

ON the 17th July the Grand Secretariat had the honour to receive the following Decree:—

The present strife between China and foreigners began with disturbances between people and converts. Later the seizure of the Taku forts excited actual warfare. The Court, sensible of the importance of foreign relations, was still loth lightly to break them off utterly. There have, therefore, been promulgated repeated Decrees enjoining the protection of the Legations, and also directing every province to protect missionaries. At present, although hostilities have not abated, the traders and subjects of the Powers living in China, who are very many, should all alike be protected. Let the Tartar Generals, Viceroys and Governors concerned, ascertain what foreign merchants and missionaries there are at the various ports and in each Prefecture and district, and in accordance with the Treaties afford all alike genuine protection; there must not be the least remissness.

Last month the Japanese Secretary, Shan-shan-p'in, was murdered—a most horrible deed; and soon after the German Envoy was also murdered. That the said Envoy, while stationed at the capital carrying on international business, should come to harm, is a still more deplorable event; and it is proper to renew the strict orders to enforce the arrest of the murderers without fail for prosecution.

Let the Governor of Peking and the Viceroy of Chihli order their subordinates to ascertain in each case the foreigners and missionaries wantonly killed and the property injured or lost since the present fighting began at Tien-tsin, on account of disturbance apart from warlike operations, and await the settlement of all claims together.

As to the recent burning, slaying, robbing and harrying of peaceful folk by local banditti and rebellious people at various places, this is indeed outrageous; let the Viceroys and Governors concerned, and the various high officers in command of troops ascertain the real circumstances, and, as opportunity offers, suppress such offenders so as to quiet disorder at its source.

This is to be circulated for the general information.

No. 261.

*Acting Consul-General Fraser to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

My Lord,

*Hankow, July 18, 1900.*

IN confirmation of my telegrams of yesterday and to-day, I have the honour to report on two visits from the Viceroy's Secretary, Mr. Ku Hung-ming, yesterday morning and afternoon.

Mr. Ku, who was educated in England, but remains a conservative Chinese, has, I believe, considerable influence with his Excellency Chang Chih-tung, who employs him to convey private messages to foreign authorities.

Mr. Ku began by expressing the anxiety of the Viceroy and his allies as to the treatment likely to be meted out by the Powers to the Emperor and the Empress-Dowager, impressing upon me that any personal indignity would of course drive Their Majesties to commit suicide. I replied that I saw no reason to fear any disrespectful treatment, as Their Majesties were protected by their rank and station.

He proceeded that what was feared was bodily restraint of any kind; and I

rejoined that I did not suppose a cell with a sentry at the door was within the bounds of likelihood. This declaration seemed to relieve him and he went on to say that as Her Majesty's Government had disclaimed any intention to dismember China, he supposed we should support the reigning dynasty. On my expressing a doubt of there being an Emperor to support, he protested that to a Chinese regicide was an impossible crime. I explained that my meaning was that Their Majesties might have been driven by the anarchy in Peking to imitate the last Emperor of the Ming dynasty. This he thought conceivable of the Emperor but not of the Empress-Dowager, whose force of character had saved the Throne in the convulsion of the Taiping rebellion. And he added that the Nanking Viceroy, as one of the few survivors of those days, was bound to Her Majesty by the strongest ties of personal veneration and devotion—feelings shared in nearly as great measure by his Excellency Chang and the other allies—so that they could not face the world and hold their positions after her fall.

I interposed that the retention of power by Her Majesty appeared to me hardly open to discussion, since public opinion in Europe held strongly that she had fostered the Boxer movement, and had grasped power from the unwilling Emperor.

This view he combated with vehemence, asserting that Her Majesty resumed power only to relieve the Emperor, who found himself unequal to the burden, and that her position was thus quite constitutional. He confessed that Her Majesty had thought the Boxers would constitute a species of "landwehr" against invasion, but denied that at that time they had announced any hostility to foreigners and Missions. On my remarking that her policy had proved unfortunate, he protested that it was she who had kept the Viceroys Liu and Chang in office, and that she was the victim of calumny. He argued that logically the maintenance of the Chinese Empire involved the support of the Throne, and that the Empress alone was capable of swaying the restored sceptre—of course in the name of the Emperor.

Finally, he implored me to see the Viceroy and learn for myself how strongly his Excellency held the views enunciated by him. I replied that it was useless for me to do so until I was in possession of your Lordship's views. On this he begged me to save bloodshed by telegraphing to your Lordship, asseverating that a public declaration by the Powers that Their Majesties would be treated with honour and respect would cause all good Chinese to refuse to offer any opposition to our arms in the north, for it was the demand that the Empress-Dowager should abdicate her position that had caused the present outbreak in the capital.

I impressed upon him my grave doubt whether at the most more than a guarantee of personal safety could be obtained; and he left.

In the afternoon he called again to ask whether I had telegraphed, and to regret that I had not said "personal safety and liberty." He repeated that both Viceroys had intense respect for the Empress, and that the suspicion that Her Majesty would receive severe treatment would paralyze their efforts to maintain order and carry out their undertaking as to foreign lives and property.

For this reason I had the honour to supplement my telegram this morning.

Mr. Ku made no secret of the fact that all the Southern High Authorities are moving troops northward "to support the dynasty."

This afternoon he has written to me declaring that, in view of the newspaper comments, the Viceroy is in despair as to the final settlement of the present trouble, because he and his allies apprehend the forcible deprivation of the Empress-Dowager of power, although he told me that, in accordance with historical precedent, Her Majesty might be urged to retire by the high officers after a settlement had been formulated.

It is, of course, open to the Viceroy to disavow his emissary in the future, but I have recorded his views because they seem to explain the anxiety of the Viceroys, already telegraphed to your Lordship through Mr. Warren, to be assured that they shall have a voice in the final settlement of the Chinese question, and the delight of his Excellency Chang Chih-tung when he received the Decree of the 29th June, which satisfied him that he was not acting as a rebel in protecting foreigners.

I venture to submit my personal conviction that unless the susceptibilities of the Viceroy and his allies are regarded, the present compact as to the Yang-tsze Provinces will not be adhered to, and may very possibly be broken without notice or warning.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. H. FRASER.

No. 262.

*Consul Playfair to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

My Lord,

*Foochow, July 19, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a communication I addressed to the Viceroy, embodying the Foreign Office telegram received from Shanghai, and translation of his Excellency's reply.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. M. H. PLAYFAIR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 262.

*Consul Playfair to Viceroy Hsü.*

Sir,

*Foochow, July 16, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I yesterday received a telegram from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghai to the following effect:—

Following received from Foreign Office: "You may assure Viceroy that policy of Her Majesty's Government is entirely opposed to partition and they have heard no information suggesting that any Power contemplates measures of this description. Maintenance of order by the Viceroys is of the greatest importance for preservation of the Chinese Empire."

As desired by Her Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghai, I have accordingly the honour to communicate the above to your Excellency; and I am requested at the same time to point out how important this declaration is in its bearing on the interests of the Chinese Empire and how much weight Her Majesty's Government attaches to the maintenance of order by the Viceroys and Governors in the provinces under their jurisdiction.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. M. H. PLAYFAIR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 262.

*Viceroy Hsü to Consul Playfair.*

*Küangsu, 26th year, 6th moon, 22nd day  
(July 18, 1900).*

(Translation.)

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 16th instant bringing to my knowledge a telegram from the British Foreign Office dwelling on the importance of the maintenance of order by the high authorities in the provinces of China (despatch of the 16th July quoted).

The safety of the persons and property of all foreigners resident in Fuh-kien, whether officers, merchants, or missionaries, has already been the subject of deliberation between myself and the several Consuls, and it was undertaken that the authorities would do all in their power to maintain order to insure the mutual friendly relations of China and other countries. I have already dispatched soldiers and officers to make rigorous and searching inquiry; the civil and military officials everywhere have been made responsible for the due execution of my orders; I have also issued a Proclamation addressed to the whole civil and military population, and have let it be widely known that Chinese and foreigners have no intention but of remaining on terms of amity.

On receipt of the despatch under acknowledgment, I have reiterated my instructions and beg that you will make my action known.



No. 263.

*Consul O'Brien-Butler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

My Lord,

*Shanghai, July 20, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with instructions received from Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, I proceeded to take up my appointment as Consul at Wênchow, at which port I arrived early in the morning of the 9th instant.

I found a very unusual state of affairs prevailing. The British Consulate was crowded with refugee missionaries, and the Commissioner of Customs, Mr. Amoy Lay, had rented the old British Consulate for himself and his family, and had removed there from his house in the city. Adding in the Customs officials who usually live there, the whole foreign community was thus on "Conquest Island," the safest place in times of danger, the only exceptions being a missionary and a Customs officer, who remained in a house on a hill which afforded a commanding view of the surrounding country, two French priests, and three Japanese merchants (the only ones of any foreign nationality at the port).

I was told that the Boxer propaganda had been actively carried on in the Wênchow Prefecture, that rebel flags had been planted in various localities, and that the missionaries had received warnings from various sources that they and their converts were to be slaughtered.

The Taotai, I learnt, was an old opium smoker, well-meaning, possibly, but utterly incapable, who had done absolutely nothing to prevent the threatened disturbance. I was told, further, that the Prefect, the civil official next below the Taotai, was a Manchu, and ferociously anti-foreign, and that the Acting General was equally anti-foreign, and had taken care to circulate Prince Tuan's obnoxious Edict, which otherwise was not published, among his subordinates.

Mr. Compton, the Consular Constable, informed me that he had, at the request of the missionaries, sent a courier overland to Ningpo with a despatch addressed to Her Majesty's Consul at that port, reporting the state of affairs at Wênchow, and requesting that a gun-boat might be sent as soon as possible.

I was told that the Taotai himself was anxious that the missionaries should leave, and strips of paper for sealing up their houses during their absence arrived at the Consulate from him soon after I landed. The Customs Staff he said he could protect, but he could not be responsible for the safety of the missionaries. These, I must say, were not at all anxious to go away and leave their converts to the tender mercies of the crowd. I told them, however, when they consulted me, that their presence would be of very little use, for, if a general attack were made on the Christians, the probability was that, so far from being able to protect them, they would perish with them.

As soon as I reached the Consulate office I addressed a despatch to the Taotai informing him that the High Authorities of the Centre and South of China had dissasociated themselves from the North, and that, consequently, those parts of the Empire were at peace with all foreign Powers. I begged him to at once issue a Proclamation to inform the people of this fact, so that their minds might be set at rest, and to threaten with dire penalties any person who should venture to molest foreigners or Christian converts or to injure their property. I further told the Taotai that in the event of any foreign vessel of war visiting the port it should be treated in a friendly way, as belonging to a friendly Power.

The next morning (July 10th) I made my introductory call on the Taotai, and, after a few remarks suitable to the occasion, I proceeded to discuss the state of affairs at Wênchow. I went over the points alluded to in my despatch of the day before, explaining them more fully, and telling him that while crediting him with a sincere desire to protect foreigners and their property, I had grave doubts as to his ability. The new Prefect and the Acting General, I told him, were both extremely anti-foreign, and already news was coming in of anti-Christian riots. The Taotai affected to treat this news as mere idle rumour, ridiculed the idea that there were Boxers in or near the city, assured me that everything was perfectly quiet, and that there was no occasion whatever for alarm. He admitted that he could not control the Acting General, and did not attempt to deny this man's anti-foreign feelings. He also begged that no foreign war vessel should come to Wênchow, as this would certainly cause trouble.

I endeavoured to reassure him on this point, telling him that so far from causing trouble, the presence of a man-of-war would effectually prevent any trouble arising. It was, however, of no use to argue on the subject; the Taotai continued to urge that the

protection of foreigners should be left to the native authorities, and that foreign men-of-war ought to keep away.

After leaving the Taotai's Yamên I had a long talk with Mr. Lay, and in the afternoon with the missionaries. I informed them that in view of the extreme loneliness of the port, which is only visited as a rule by a single steamer about three times a-month, and is without telegraphic connection with other places, it was, in my opinion, inadvisable that foreigners should remain there during the present troublous times, unless a steamer, man-of-war, or merchant vessel, were permanently stationed at the port, to take away the residents in case of need.

Mr. Lay thereupon wrote and informed the Taotai that he intended to close the custom-house and withdraw the staff for a time. This stirred that very inert official to action. The Proclamation corresponding to the one published at other ports embodying instructions received from the Viceroy, Liu Kun-yi, as to the state of affairs, and warning people not to molest foreigners, &c., which ought to have been published before my arrival, was posted up the same evening. The people at length knew the Taotai's mind, but it was too late. The Wênchow populace all along had been quiet enough, but it was the soldiery and the country-people that were to be feared; and as regards the latter there had been no time for the Proclamation to be posted in the country districts.

The Taotai returned my call on Wednesday morning (the 11th July). As he intended to call on Mr. Lay at about the same time and as I had no suitable place to receive him in, my house being full of refugees, I arranged with Mr. Lay that we should both see him at the same time at the Customs office. During the whole time of his visit he tried to persuade us to remain. He wanted the missionaries to go, but showed pretty plainly that he feared he would "lose face" if we, and especially the Customs, should abandon the port. He made the most lavish promises of protection; he would plant soldiers (he had in fact already done so) at the custom-house and the Consulate, and would place his small steamer, of about seventy tons burden, at our disposal to take the foreigners away if necessary. I told him that if he could protect some of the foreign community he could protect all; but I gave him plainly to understand that our intention to leave was based, not on disbelief in the sincerity of his promises of protection, but on our fear that he would not be able to carry them out. With the Prefect and especially the General hostile to us we feared that in the event of trouble, he, the Taotai, would suffer with us rather than be able to protect us. Throughout the interview, I could not help feeling that the Taotai was bent on keeping us at Wênchow whatever might happen, and was hoping that the efficiency of the measures of protection he offered us might never be tested by an actual riot occurring.

Soon after the Taotai left a number of the Wênchow gentry called on Mr. Lay and myself with a view to persuading us to stay. We told them practically what we had told the Taotai. It came out that they were particularly anxious that the "Poochi," the regular merchant-steamer plying between Wênchow and Shanghai, should not cease running. I told them that our absence would not affect the movements of that vessel, which would depend entirely on ordinary considerations of trade, affected possibly by the state of public security at the port.

On Tuesday already I was informed of outrages, which showed that the trouble with the Boxers was coming to a head. Five Christian Chinese arrived at Wênchow from a small seaport about 50 miles to the south, and reported that the Boxers had a list with the names of twenty-eight Christians, and were openly declaring that they intended to have as many heads. These ruffians were armed with large knives or swords. At another place, about 65 miles to the south of Wênchow, a chapel was broken into, and the native pastor's life threatened. At P'ing-yang district city, 40 miles south of Wênchow, a missionary's house was broken into, and the windows and shutters were smashed, and a number of articles stolen. The missionary himself was one of the refugees I met at Wênchow. His house was only saved from complete destruction by the efforts of the District Magistrate, who knelt down to the rioters in coolie clothes and begged them to spare it, and not involve him in trouble and expense. In this town, too, a missionary school with a printing-office attached was broken into. As an instance of the ignorance of the mob, I may mention that the printing type was all carried away, the people declaring that the small pieces of lead were the foreigners' bullets.

On Wednesday I heard of further outrages directed against native Christians and their property. The Protestant church at P'ing-yang was reported to have been totally destroyed, together with the houses of the Christians there. (The Roman Catholic church was reported to the priest at Wênchow as being still intact.) In the afternoon we heard that the Boxers were active in destroying at a distance of only 16 miles from

Wênchow. It was evident that they were gradually approaching the city, and all doubts as to the advisability of leaving the port were set at rest. Finally, news came to us from three distinct sources that a party of Boxers about 3,000 strong was starting from a place only 10 miles distant with the intention of attacking the churches and foreigners in the city of Wênchow itself. The most circumstantial account was brought to the Roman Catholic priest by a native Christian, who said that the rioters were advancing very slowly, as they were destroying the Christian property they found on the way, and, besides, had to offer certain sacrifices *en route*. It was expected that they would reach Wênchow at about dawn on Thursday. On receipt of this news I sent word to all the foreigners to come on board the "Poochi" as soon as possible, and steam was at once got up. Owing to the falling tide, however, we could not leave that night, but we moved away from the pontoon and anchored in the stream, and prepared to give the Boxers a warm reception on their arrival.

The next morning early we heard that the advance guard of the rebels had arrived at the gates of the city, which were being kept closed by the officials. The tide being favourable, we did not think it advisable to stay any longer to ascertain what the mob intended to do, so we started at about 7 o'clock for Shanghae.

The total number of passengers on board the "Poochi" was 39, consisting of 19 men, 10 ladies, and 10 children. To the above nineteen men can be added the captain and five officers of the "Poochi," making a total of 25 men for defence purposes. Our arms consisted of a dozen rifles and bayonets, which I removed from the Consulate, and a few sporting guns and revolvers.

The evening before the steamer left I addressed a letter to the Taotai, informing him that I and a number of the foreign residents of Wênchow were proceeding to Shanghae, and asking him to take efficient measures for the protection of our property during our absence.

The Taotai at once replied that he would take every care that the property of all the foreigners should be respected.

Soon after reaching the open sea Her Majesty's ship "Pigmy" was sighted steaming towards us. In response to a signal from her, the "Poochi" stopped, and an officer came on board and informed me that the "Pigmy" had orders to proceed to Wênchow, take away any foreigners that might wish to leave, and at once return to Woosung.

I told him that all the foreign residents of Wênchow were with me on board the "Poochi," and that no object would be gained by the "Pigmy" going on to that port. I added that if she did it was extremely likely, considering the anti-foreign attitude of the General there, that she would be fired on by the forts at the mouth of the river.

I have endeavoured above to report as succinctly as possible the state of affairs which I found prevailing at Wênchow and in its neighbourhood, and I venture to express a hope that your Lordship will approve of my action in advising the foreign residents of that port to withdraw for a time.

I am sending this despatch to your Lordship under flying seal through Her Majesty's Consul-General here.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) P. E. O'BRIEN-BUTLER.

No. 264.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghae, August 29, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to add, in continuation of my telegram of the 27th instant, that information from the same source states that the Emperor and Empress-Dowager have arrived at Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi. They arrived there on the 26th, and purpose to remain there for the time being.

I have communicated the above to the General Officer Commanding the forces, and am repeating to Tôkiô.

No. 265.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 29, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report the arrival here on the 27th August of the German Minister. He has assumed the duties of his office, and is in consultation with local officials. The German man-of-war "See Adler" is about to leave to-morrow for Hankow. I have to report also more frequent disquieting rumours from the Yang-tsze region.

No. 266.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 29, 1900.*

I HAVE been informed by the Japanese Consul-General that his Government has instructed him to acquaint me that the Japanese Government has thought it necessary, in view of the riotous attitude of the natives towards foreigners, and the burning of a Japanese temple, to land a small force at Amoy for the protection of the Consulate and the foreigners resident there.

No. 267.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 29, 1900.*

I HAD a conversation with Count Lamsdorff to-day, in which his Excellency urged on me very strongly the Emperor's views as to the necessity for the allied troops and the Legations to evacuate Peking promptly and retire to Tien-tsin.

A Circular telegram expressing these views has been sent to Her Majesty's Government and to the other Governments interested, communicating the considerations on which they were based, and the instructions accordingly sent to M. de Giers and the Russian General at Peking. Count Lamsdorff trusts that these views may be found to be in accordance with those of Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency did not conceal from me the serious fears he entertained with regard to the danger of confiding to a small international force, which had proved sufficient for its declared object of relieving the Legations, the additional task involved in the re-establishment and maintenance of order in Peking, where no Chinese Government exists at present, and where, as long as the troops of the foreign Powers remain, none is likely to exist.

It is solemnly declared in the Circular that His Imperial Majesty has firmly decided to evacuate all points on Chinese territory temporarily occupied by his troops as soon as the restoration of relations and order has been effected; and, further, that control over the railway lines now provisionally held, as well as the Customs at Newchwang, will be given up, and handed over again to their former management.

Instructions have been received by my French and Italian colleagues to point out to the Russian Government the possibly dangerous consequences that might ensue from the withdrawal from Peking of the international forces and the Missions. I understand, however, that the Russian General and Minister have received positive instructions, and Count Lamsdorff holds that complications even more serious and dangerous might be brought about by the prolonged presence at Peking of the international troops than by their withdrawal. His Excellency's opinion is that when the Emperor and Empress-Dowager have returned to Peking, the allies will be able to conduct more successful negotiations with them from their position at Taku and Tien-tsin.

No. 268.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 30.)*

My Lord,

*Newport, Rhode Island, August 20, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a paper which I have received from the United States' Department of State, embodying the correspondence which passed on the 16th instant between the Department and the Chinese Minister at Washington, relative to the request of Li Hung-chang that the Commanders of the allied forces should be instructed to stop their advance at Tung Chow.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE.

Inclosure in No. 268.

CHINESE CORRESPONDENCE, AUGUST 16, 1900.

*Communications exchanged between the Chinese Minister, Mr. Wu Ting-fang, and the Acting Secretary of State.*

## I.

*Memorandum handed to the Acting Secretary of State by the Chinese Minister, August 16, 1900, 9 A.M.*

A CABLEGRAM from Earl Li Hung-chang, Envoy Plenipotentiary of China, dated the 15th August, and received by Minister Wu at 7 P.M. on the same day:—

“The allied forces are approaching Tung Chow. I have memorialized the Imperial Government to depute envoy to negotiate an armistice with the several Commanders on the spot. I will also shortly proceed to Peking. The Powers, being fully aware of the embarrassing position in which their Majesties the Empress-Dowager and the Emperor are placed, are earnestly requested to telegraph instructions to their respective Commanders after arriving at Tung Chow with their forces to stop their further advance to the capital, so as not to cause alarm and fear to their Majesties, and calamities to the people, for such advance would shake the foundations of the Ta Ching Empire, and wound the feelings of all her people, high and low. For a compliance with this appeal the millions of people of the Empire will be profoundly grateful to the Powers. Please communicate this cablegram at once to the Secretary of State.”

## II.

*Memorandum in reply communicated to the Chinese Minister, August 16, 1900, 4 P.M.*

*Memorandum.*

Foreseeing that there would be insufficient time after receiving a reply to our Memorandum of the 12th August to get instructions to the relief column before it had reached Peking, we sent on the same day to the General commanding the American forces in China the following despatch:—

“Fowler, Chefoo, for Chaffee.

*Adjutant-General's Office, Washington,  
August 12, 1900.*

“August 12.—Secretary War directs me to inform you that Li Hung-chang, appointed by Chinese Government to negotiate with Powers, requests cessation of hostilities. We have replied that we are ready to enter into agreement between Powers and Chinese Government for cessation of hostilities on condition that sufficient body of the forces composing the relief expedition shall be permitted to enter Peking unmolested,

and to escort foreign Ministers and residents back to Tien-tsin, the movement being provided for and secured by such arrangements and dispositions of troops as shall be considered satisfactory by Generals commanding the forces composing relief expedition. We have communicated this to all the Powers. Japanese Government take same position. We have not heard from other Powers.

(Signed) "CORBIN."

And two days ago, in view of the rapid progress of the relief expedition, we sent the following :—

"Fowler, Chefoo, for Chaffee.

*Adjutant-General's Office, Washington,*  
"August 14, 1900.

"August 14.—In anticipation of acceptance by Chinese Government of condition in our reply to them cabled you the 12th August. If Chinese authorities communicate willingness to deliver Ministers and persons under their protection to relief column at Peking, under arrangements which you consider safe, you are authorized to make and carry out arrangement in concert with other Commanders, without referring it here. From informal communications with Representatives of other Governments here, we believe all to take substantially same position. Question whether you should insist upon entering Peking and going to Legations, or will receive delivery at gate of inner Tartar city, or at outer wall, taking risk of Ministers passing through city with only Chinese escort, you and the other Generals must determine.

"By order, Secretary of War.

(Signed) "CORBIN."

We are advised by Minister Conger that the attacks by Imperial troops upon the Legations in Peking have not ceased. While these attacks continue we cannot stop the advance of our forces towards Peking. If such attacks cease the above-quoted instructions will be allowed to stand, and they would seem to provide for all the action required under the circumstances stated by Earl Li in his despatch.

(Signed) ALVEY A. ADEE,  
*Acting Secretary.*

*Department of State, Washington,*  
August 16, 1900.

No. 269.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, August 23, 1900.*

THE situation here remains unchanged except that communications with Tien-tsin are somewhat better; it is essential that Shanghai be connected with Tien-tsin by cable, and that the railway be pushed on as quickly as possible. On the 20th August, the Summer Palace was occupied by Russians. On Saturday there is to be a meeting of Ministers and Generals as to allied occupation of Imperial Palaces.

No. 270.

*Mr. Adee to Mr. Choate.—(Communicated by Mr. Choate, August 30.)*

*August 29, 1900.*

THE Russian Chargé yesterday afternoon made to me an oral statement respecting Russia's purposes in China to the following effect: that, as already repeatedly declared, Russia has no designs of territorial acquisition in China; that, equally with other Powers now operating there, Russia has sought safety of Legation at Peking, and to help the Chinese Government to repress the troubles; that, incidentally to necessary defensive measures on Russian border, Russia has occupied Newchwang for military purposes, and as soon as order is re-established will retire troops therefrom, if action of other Powers be no obstacle thereto; that the purpose for which the various Governments have co-operated for relief of Legations in Peking has been accomplished; that, taking the position that as the Chinese Government has

left Peking there is no need for her Representative to remain, Russia has directed Russian Minister to retire with his official personnel from China; that the Russian troops will likewise be withdrawn; and that, when the Government of China shall regain the reins of Government and afford an authority with which the other Powers can deal and will express desire to enter in negotiations, the Russian Government will also name its Representative, holding these views and purposes. Russia expresses hope that the United States will share the same opinion to this declaration. Our reply has been made by the following Memorandum:—

“The Government of the United States receives with much satisfaction the reiterated statement that Russia has no designs of territorial acquisition in China, and that, equally with the other Powers now operating in China, Russia has sought the safety of her Legation in Peking, and to help the Chinese Government to repress the existing troubles. The same purposes have moved, and will continue to control, the Government of the United States, and the frank declarations of Russia in this regard are in accord with those made to the United States by the other Powers. All the Powers, therefore, having disclaimed any purpose to acquire any part of China, and now that adherence thereto has been renewed since relief has reached Peking, it ought not to be difficult by concurrent action through negotiations to reach an amicable settlement with China, by which the Treaty rights of all the Powers will be secured for the future, the open door assured, the interests and property of foreign citizens conserved, and full reparation made for wrongs and injuries suffered by them.

“So far as we are advised, the greater part of China is at peace, and earnestly desires to protect the life and property of all foreigners, and in several of the provinces active and successful efforts to suppress the Boxers have been taken by the Viceroy, to whom we have extended encouragement through our Consuls and naval officers. This present good relation should be promoted for the peace of China.

“While we agree that the immediate object for which the military forces of the Powers have been co-operating, viz., the relief of the Ministers at Peking, has been accomplished, there still remain the other purposes, which all the Powers have in common, which are referred to in the communication of the Russian Chargé, and which were specially enumerated in our note to the Powers of the 3rd July. These are to afford all possible protection everywhere in China to foreign life and property; to guard and protect all legitimate foreign interests; to aid in preventing the spread of the disorder to other provinces of the Empire, and a recurrence of such disorders; and to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed by Treaty and international law to friendly Powers, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. In our opinion these purposes could best be attained by the joint occupation of Peking, under a definite understanding between the Powers, until the Chinese Government shall have been re-established, and shall be in a position to enter into new Treaties, with adequate provisions for reparation and guarantees of future protection. With the establishment and recognition of such authority, the United States would wish to withdraw its military forces from Peking, and remit to the processes of peaceful negotiation our just demands.

“We consider, however, that a continued occupation of Peking would be ineffective to produce the desired result, unless all the Powers unite therein, with entire harmony of purpose. Any Power which determines to withdraw its troops from Peking will necessarily proceed thereafter to protect its interests in China by its own method, and we think that this would make a general withdrawal expedient. As to the time and manner of withdrawal, we think that, in view of the imperfect knowledge of the military situation resulting from the interruptions of telegraphic communication, the several Military Commanders at Peking should be instructed to confer and agree together upon the withdrawal as a concerted movement, as they agreed upon the advance. The result of these considerations is that, unless there is such a general expression by the Powers in favour of continued occupation as to modify the views expressed by the Government of Russia, and lead to a general agreement for continued occupation, we shall give instructions to the Commander of the American forces in China to withdraw our troops from Peking, after due conference with the other Commanders as to the time and manner of withdrawal.

“The Government of the United States is much gratified by the assurance given by Russia that the occupation of Newchwang is for military purposes, incidental to the military steps for the security of the Russian border provinces menaced by the Chinese, and that as soon as order shall be re-established Russia will retire her troops

from these places, if the action of the other Powers be not an obstacle thereto. No obstacle in this regard can arise through any action of the United States, whose policy is fixed, and has been repeatedly proclaimed. Signed. Dated 29th August."

You will communicate the foregoing to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and invite early consideration and response.

## No. 271.

*Memorandum communicated by Chinese Minister, August 30, 1900.*

A TELEGRAM from his Excellency Li Hung-chang, under date Shanghai, the 30th August, 1900, 2 P.M., received by Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh, in London, at 10.30 A.M. the same day:—

"The Imperial chariots are expected to arrive at Tai Yuen-fuh either to-day or to-morrow, where they will soon leave for Hsi An-fuh.

"The telegraphic wire in Shansi has been cut by Yu Hien, the Governor of the province, but the line in Shensi is still in good working order.

"Please repeat the above to your colleagues at other Courts."

(Signed) LI HUNG-CHANG.

## No. 272.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 30, 1900.*

I AM in receipt of information that the local Chinese authorities have received news to the effect that two Ministers of violently anti-foreign sentiments are coming southwards under Imperial command to investigate the conduct of the Yang-tsze Viceroy. It is said also that the Viceroy at Nanking has urgently appealed to Li Hung-chang and Sheng to go to Nanking to confer with him. The situation in these parts will become most serious if the first intelligence is true.

## No. 273.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, August 30, 1900.*

TO-DAY a French force consisting of 600 marines, one mountain battery, and one company of Annamites was landed here. The Japanese are acquiring quarters for troops, and other Powers also will probably land men.

## No. 274.

*Consul Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Canton, August 30, 1900.*

FOLLOWING is sent in view of news which may possibly be sent from newspaper correspondent in Canton:—

At present there is not any cause for anxiety. A careful watch is being kept upon events. The officials have been taking active measures to keep down rumours and show determination to prevent disturbance. Restlessness is being caused among native authorities and the people by the absence of all news respecting Peking. The latest official intelligence was dated the 15th August.



## No. 275.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 30, 1900.*

WITH regard to the proposal of the Russian Government to withdraw their Representative and troops to Tien-tsin, Count Lützow states that the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, who has been wounded, is already on his way there. The Austro-Hungarian Government will not object to the withdrawal of the troops provided that the other Powers agree.

## No. 276.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 30, 1900.*

THE following communication made by the Japanese Minister to-day:—

“The Emperor and Empress-Dowager having gone to Shansi and no responsible Government being in existence in Peking, the Powers concerned are unwilling to recognize the authority of Li Hung-chang to conduct peace negotiations.

“As this state of dead-lock cannot be permitted to continue, and as it will certainly augment present difficulties and lead to endless troubles, the Imperial Government deem it absolutely necessary that the Powers should at once take necessary steps to induce the Emperor and Empress-Dowager to return as early as possible to the capital and form responsible Government for the purpose of opening the peace negotiations.”

Telegraph this to Mr. Warren, with instructions to telegraph it to Tien-tsin for Sir C. MacDonald.

## No. 277.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 30, 1900.*

FOLLOWING communication made by Japanese Minister to-day:—

“As the Chinese authorities assured our Consul at Amoy of their ability to protect the lives and property of foreign residents there, the Imperial Government have ordered the withdrawal of those marines who had been guarding the Japanese Institution in the native town. The rest of the marines will also be withdrawn as soon as peace and order of the port will be insured.”

Telegraph this to Mr. Warren.

## No. 278.

*Foreign Office to Count Hatzfeldt.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, August 30, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to state, in reply to your note of the 24th instant, that instructions have been sent to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Gaselee, Commanding the British Forces in Pechili, in conformity with the communication which Her Majesty's Ambassador made to the German Government on the 10th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

## No. 279.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, August 31, 1900.*

VISCOUNT AOKI informed me on the 29th instant that it was on account of the burning of a Japanese temple and recent riots, and with no object other than the protection of the Japanese Consulate and foreign residents at Amoy that marines had been landed there.

Viscount Aoki adds that the Japanese Consul at Amoy having received assurances that the Chinese authorities are prepared to maintain order, his Government have already ordered guards to be withdrawn from native town, and when they are satisfied that order is insured, will also withdraw those in port.

## No. 280.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 31, 1900.*

I HAVE asked M. Delcassé his views with regard to the communications made by the Russian, the American, and the Japanese Governments.

His Excellency replied that from the outset of the trouble in China France and Russia had gone hand in hand, and that it was hardly necessary, therefore, for him to add that France approved the declaration of policy made by Russia, and adopted it as far as it was applicable to French interests.

His Excellency considers that the practical part of the proposal made by the United States' Government deals chiefly with the withdrawal of their troops from Peking. He agrees in the opinion that such a withdrawal would be expedient if it would facilitate and accelerate the commencement of negotiations for peace, and if it could be effected without the appearance of a retreat (which would compromise European prestige in the eyes of the Chinese). The question, however, was one which could only be settled by the Commanders of the foreign contingents on the spot; but as the troops would probably only be transferred to Tien-tsin, it might be hoped that the Chinese would not be thereby encouraged to look upon the Europeans as worsted.

Of the Japanese suggestion as to the return of the Emperor and of the Empress-Dowager M. Delcassé had not heard.

Briefly, the view of the French Government is that the chief object to be pursued is to terminate the present situation as expeditiously as possible, but to do this the establishment of a really responsible Government is essential. M. Delcassé believes, from the report furnished by M. Decrais of his interview with your Lordship, that you are of the same opinion.

His Excellency laid great stress upon the necessity that the Chinese negotiators should produce credentials indisputably valid.

## No. 281.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 31, 1900.*

IT has been intimated by the Russian Government that the rescue of the Legations in Peking was the most important object of the Russian programme, and that the attainment of this object had been effected. The rendering of assistance to the Central Chinese Government in the re-establishment of order and in the restoration of regular relations with the Powers was the second object which the Russian Government had in view. This object was hindered for the moment by the Emperor, Empress-Dowager, and Chinese Government having left Peking.

The Russian Government in these circumstances saw no reason for their Legation to remain in Peking accredited to an absent Government, and now proposes to withdraw M. de Giers, as well as the staff of the Legation to Tien-tsin, accompanied by the Russian troops. In view of the decision which has been arrived at and which has been expressed by Russia many times, viz., not to exceed the limits of the task which

she had taken in hand at the commencement of the disorders, their presence at Peking now becomes useless. The moment, however, that the reins of power have been resumed by the legitimate Government of China, and Representatives have been nominated, furnished with full powers sufficient to carry on negotiations, the Russian Government would, in concert with other States, proceed to appoint Representatives for that purpose.

Please report whether you have heard anything of this resolution so announced, and whether any preparations are being made to carry it out?

Is it expedient, in your opinion, that a similar course should be taken with regard to the British Legation?

Would future negotiations be impeded if you were to withdraw to Tien-tsin? Do you consider it likely that a similar course will be adopted by the other Powers?

## No. 282.

*Memorandum communicated by Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh, September 1, 1900.*

A TELEGRAM from his Excellency Li Hung-chang, under date Shanghai, 26th August, received by Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh in London, 31st August, 10.30 P.M. :—

“Have memorialized the Throne for the appointment of Prince Ching, Yung Lu, Viceroy Lew Kwung Yih, and Chang Chih Tung as co-Plenipotentiaries to open negotiations for peace with the Treaty Powers.

“Prince Ching and Yung Lu, in case they form the members of their Majesties' suite, have to be sent back to Peking with post haste.”

## No. 283.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 1, 1900.*

PRÉPARATIONS were being made here for the accommodation of 2,000 German troops. The German Minister and the United States' Commissioner, Mr. Rockhill, who has just arrived here, had interviews to-day with Li Hung-chang.

## No. 284.

*Consul Mansfield to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Amoy, September 1, 1900.*

LANDING of Japanese troops at Amoy: my telegram of the 26th August.

Most of the Japanese force has been withdrawn under orders from Tôkiô, and I expect shortly the withdrawal of the remainder.

## No. 285.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 1, 1900.*

THE following is the substance of a telegram from Li Hung-chang to Chinese Minister of the 26th August :—

“The Throne has been memorialized by me for the appointment of the following

\* Also to Mr. Whitehead.

officials as co-Plenipotentiaries to commence negotiations for peace with the Treaty Powers: Prince Chung, Yung Lu, and the Viceroys Chang Chih Tung and Liu Kun Yih.

“Prince Chung and Yung Lu will have to be sent back to Peking at once, in case they form part of their Majesties’ suite.”

## No. 286.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 1, 1900.*

BY order of the Emperor the German Embassy has made a communication to the following effect:—

Orders have been given by the Emperor for two companies of the German East Asiatic Corps, about 500 men, to be landed at Shanghai. His Majesty lays stress on the fact and wishes Her Majesty’s Government to understand that the object of the landing is not anti-British, but to support the policy of Her Majesty’s Government in defending Shanghai and in maintaining order.

## No. 287.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 2.)*

(Telegraphic)

*St. Petersburg, September 2, 1900.*

TEXT of Circular to the Russian Representatives has been published in “Official Gazette,” and I am forwarding it by post to-day. A statement is also made that the Russian Minister and General at Peking have received orders to transfer without delay to Tien-tsin staff of Russian Legation, together with Russian troops and subjects, local conditions being at the same time taken into account.

## No. 288.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 2, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 30th ultimo, repeating to you a telegram from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister at this Court, we have not been informed of the existence at this moment of any means of persuading the Emperor and Empress to return to Peking.

You should repeat this to Mr. Warren and instruct him to telegraph it to Tien-tsin for Sir C. MacDonald via Chefoo.

## No. 289.

*Consul Fraser to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 3.)*

(Extract.)

*Chungking, July 15, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 28th June I detained the steamer “Pioneer” as a possible means of escape in case of riot or an organized attack breaking out here. On the same day I wired to your Lordship, through the Shanghai Consulate-General, that I had detained the vessel, and I mentioned that there is great anxiety here

on account of the absence of a gun-boat ; that I had wired to the Admiral (through the Consulate-General at Shanghai) on the 19th June but had no reply yet ; that communication with Her Majesty's Minister at Peking was impossible ; that I would report by mail ; and that the whole of the Consular Body here are of my opinion as to the necessity of the measures which I have taken. This telegraphic report I now beg to confirm.

I have to respectfully thank your Lordship for your two telegrams which reached me on the 6th July, one approving my action in detaining the steamer, and informing me that a war vessel could not be expected here before the end of October ; the other giving me discretion as to bringing the Europeans down the Yang-tsze if their position has become too perilous for them to remain.

Up to the present the local Mandarins have refused to obey the Edict and telegram from the *de facto* "Central" Government (away in the north) ordering war on foreigners, and have taken the cautious course of treating these commands as spurious. The attitude of the local Mandarins has been correct, with the exception of an attempt of the Taotai, on the 27th June, to leave Chungking without taking the usual course of informing the Consuls and the invariable course of informing the Commissioner of Customs. The Consular Body was just in time to stop him by local pressure, and by a joint telegram to the Viceroy at Ch'engtü. It is believed by both foreigners and the respectable Chinese merchants here that this departure would have led to a disturbance, and perhaps it was meant as a signal for such, for this Taotai has before been implicated in anti-foreign riots (in 1886, when Taotai here), though his conduct of late years has been apparently impeccable. However that may be, his attempt to desert his post caused great alarm, and there was widespread relief when it was known that the Consuls had succeeded in keeping him at it.

On the 26th June the Pa Hien (Chungking "District Magistrate") made a clever capture, just in time, of a gang of Secret Society members who had, under pretence of theatrical performances, assembled at a temple in the city. The chief man, a priest, has been lately exhibited standing in a cage at the city gates, so that the people may see that he has been captured, and he will, I hear, ultimately be condemned to a long incarceration. If the Pa Hien had not been so prompt a bad riot would have certainly occurred here immediately.

On the 13th July the Taotai sent his interpreter to me with a message to the effect that he was apprehensive lest, if a disturbance broke out, he might not be able to protect quickly enough the few British subjects, who have taken refuge on the hills near, from the filth and heat of this native city. I am doing what I can, and am having some success in getting the ladies to go down river now, as in the confusion of a hasty departure hereafter, under pursuit by hostile natives, they and their children would be the first attacked, being the weakest and least likely to be armed ; at the Tien-tsin massacre of 1870 it was almost exclusively women who suffered, and in the Ku-ch'êng massacre of 1895 it was exclusively women and children (all English). I have also warned British subjects in the interior that they had better leave as the situation is sure to become worse and troubles more general. At and near Ch'engtü troubles are beginning, and the Missions are threatened by would-be incendiaries at Chungking.

I inclose translation of the Empress' Edict and telegram.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 289.

*Edict of the 5th month, 28th day (June 24, 1900).*

(Translation.)

WE have received from Jülu a Memorial reporting that the foreigners had started trouble and suddenly seized a pretext for acts of war, but that in successive battles, lasting for several days, victories had been obtained.

The reading of this Memorial greatly rejoiced and comforted us. China had lived in peace and harmony with all countries for years, but, after all, affairs have come to an open rupture owing to the hatred between the people and the converts to Christianity.

Relying on their strong iron-clads and powerful armies, they [the foreigners] attacked the forts of our port of Taku, and issued from Tzū-chü-lin [*i.e.*, the foreign quarter of Tien-tsin] in all directions to fight. But Jülu was everywhere at once, offering resistance ; and also our Boxer troops aided him with all their heart and strength, opposing the rampart of their bodies to the assailing cannon and bayonets.

On the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd [25th, 26th, and 27th June] our forces destroyed two

war-vessels and killed many of the enemy. The people's resolution had become like walls to protect their country, and the firmness of their minds raised the martial spirit of the troops.

The Boxers who helped the troops so much in these actions are men of the people; with them, the State need not use a soldier nor spend a dollar. Even the little children wielded arms in defence of their altars and fields. In all their dangers the spirits of their ancestors, of the gods and sages, protected them. The myriads of the people are actuated by one ideal.

We hasten to promulgate this Edict in praise of the patriotic Boxers, and to assure them that those of them who are in distress will be cared for.

When these troubles are over we intend to bestow on them special marks of our favour. Let these people's soldiers only still continue, with united hearts and utmost efforts, to repel aggression and prove their loyalty, without failing, till the end. This is our earnest desire.

Reverence this.

Inclosure 2 in No. 289.

*The Empress-Dowager of China to the Viceroy of Szechuan Province.*

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Dated 5th month, 29th day (June 25, 1900).*

IMPERIAL Edict :

At present war has broken out between China and foreign countries. At Tien-tsin, in Chihli, our Generals have gained victories with the patriotic Boxers helping the Government troops, and an Edict has already been issued to praise and congratulate these. Such patriotic people are to be found in all parts of the Empire and if the Viceroys and Governors of all the provinces are able to unite and organize forces, we can put an end to foreign insults, and shall accomplish great results. Report immediately what steps are being taken. The provinces bordering on the river or the sea should particularly act quickly. Bring this 600-li a-day urgent Edict to public notice.

Respect this.

No. 290.

*Consul Playfair to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 3.)*

My Lord,

*Foochow, July 23, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the full text of the English version of the assurances offered by the Chinese authorities for the acceptance of the Consular Body.

This instrument is in effect a declaration on the part of those authorities that they hold themselves bound by the Treaties in force, in spite of the warlike operations going on in North China, and is practically an adherence to the Agreement entered into by the Yang-tsze Viceroys, with the exception that the authorities here require no reciprocal assurances, and that the Consuls are not asked to bind the Powers they represent to any course of action.

The clause relating to gun-boats stood in the original draft submitted to the Consular Body as follows:—

“Since the neighbourhood of Foochow is extremely peaceable, and since the Chinese local authorities do their utmost to extend protection, there is no need for the vessels of war of the Powers to visit the port, as their so doing might excite suspicion and alarm among the people, and so give rise to disorders.”

This request for an expression of opinion was subsequently modified to the wording as it stands at present, whereby the right of men-of-war to come and go as usual is recognized.

The Chinese word used to define this Agreement is the same as that employed to designate a Treaty. This instrument can, however, hardly be dignified by that title. It is rather what I called it, “assurances” that the Treaties in force are still to be held

binding. It gives no new privilege, and takes none away. As far as foreigners are concerned, it is an unnecessary document, and is useful only as reassuring us as to the intentions of the Chinese authorities under circumstances where doubt might have been legitimate.

To these authorities themselves it has, however, a very real value, as testifying to the people of Foochow that their officials stand on good terms with the Representatives of foreign Powers. The one danger to which the foreign community is exposed is a popular rising, with which the authorities might find themselves unable to cope. From the officials, I am convinced, we have to expect nothing but good. They have shown themselves not only willing, but anxious to give us no cause for complaint, and to provide for our safety by every means in their power.

The understanding of the 14th July, and the trust shown in the assurances of the Chinese authorities, will strengthen their hands and will enable them, I hope, to fulfil the obligations which they have assumed. The document is, however, long, and to submit the text in full would have detailed a telegram of at least ten times the length of that I sent on the 14th instant to your Lordship. Its signature was agreed to by the Consuls of Russia, the United States, France, Japan, and Holland.

I therefore pray that your Lordship will approve my having temporarily accepted the assurances of the Chinese authorities pending the receipt of your Lordship's sanction.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. M. H. PLAYFAIR.

Inclosure in No. 290.

*Convention entered into by the Consuls at Foochow and the Local Authorities on the subject of mutual Protection.*

(Translation.)

WHEREAS the Governor-General and Governors of the Liang Kiang, Liang Hu, Liang Kuang, and Anhui Provinces have now agreed, in consultation with the Consuls of the Powers at Shanghai, on the steps to be taken for their mutual protection; and whereas the Consuls have communicated the terms to their Foreign Offices, and have received their sanction to the drawing up of, and signing of, such a Convention; now therefore the Province of Fuh-kien has decided to act in accordance with the Convention entered into by the Liang Kiang and the above provinces:—

1. The Chinese local authorities are willing to do everything in their power to protect from injury the lives and property of the foreign Officers, merchants, and missionaries resident in Fuh-kien. The same will be true of Amoy.

2. At places in Fuh-kien should bad characters spread false reports for the injury of foreigners, the local authorities will conscientiously effect the arrest and punishment of such bad characters, and no indulgence will be shown.

3. The present Convention is made for the mutual protection from injury of the people, business, and property of Chinese and foreign countries. It must be explicitly declared that whatever disorders may happen elsewhere, these rules will be observed by both parties.

4. Since the neighbourhood of Foochow is very quiet, and the people and the local authorities have agreed to do their utmost to secure full protection, and the Representatives of all foreign nations have assured the Viceroy of Central and Southern China that they will not attack places in Central and Southern China so long as the local authorities maintain order, the people therefore should be informed that they have nothing to fear should foreign war-vessels call at this or other ports as they have been in the habit of doing heretofore.

We, the Consuls, will inform the Admirals of our several nations that while single war-vessels may come and go to Foochow as usual heretofore, it is not desirable that a number of vessels should come here at this time, lest the people might be alarmed.

5. The Consuls of the Powers are requested to communicate this Convention to their Foreign Offices, to be placed on record as a precaution.

6. This Convention shall be made in the Chinese, English, and French languages, two copies of each, and shall be signed by the Viceroy, Tartar-General, and the several Consuls. One copy shall be deposited with the Senior Consul, and the other with the Bureau of Foreign Affairs.

7. In this Convention, in cases where the text is not clear, the Chinese version shall be deemed correct.

True copy :  
 (Signed) G. M. H. PLAYFAIR.  
 Foochow, July 14, 1900.

## No. 291.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 3.)*

My Lord,

Shanghai, July 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 24th July, reporting that General Sir Alfred Gaselee, K.C.B., had telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India that he had, as a result of a conference with the Senior Naval Officer and myself, recommended the employment of a force of 3,000 men for the defence of Shanghai. Your Lordship refers to my telegram of the 5th instant, in which I stated that the Viceroys were not then anxious for more force here, and asks whether the situation has undergone any change.

I have to-day replied that Her Majesty's Consul at Nanking is endeavouring to ascertain the opinion of the Viceroy, Liu K'un Yi, as to the landing of British troops at this port. The Nanking Viceroy is still firm and anxious to keep order in these parts. In this he is supported by the Wuchang Viceroy, but the latter's position is less strong, as he has not the same control over his Generals as his compeer at Nanking.

The forts on both sides of the Yang-tsze have been strengthened with additional guns, and men and ammunition have been moved in. At the Wusung forts extra guns have also been mounted.

The Boxer movement is on the increase, and further murders of foreigners are reported from Shansi.

Shanghai is, as far as foreigners are concerned, the commercial metropolis of China, and is looked upon both by Chinese and Europeans as a point of safety, and it is, therefore, a matter of vital importance that we should show ourselves in a position to hold it against every emergency.

I have instructed Her Majesty's Consuls at the Yang-tsze ports to send away the women and children without causing a panic. The majority are seeking refuge at Shanghai, and it is now more than ever essential that every precaution should be taken for the defence of this place, where so many thousand foreigners are congregated.

I have, &c.  
 (Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

## No. 292.

*Memorandum communicated by Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh, September 3, 1900.*

THE purport of a telegram from his Excellency Li Hung-chang, under date Shanghai, the 2nd September, 6.45 A.M., received by Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh in London at 9 A.M. the same day:—

“Have received by telegraph an Imperial Decree from His Majesty the Emperor of China, under date the 19th August, urging me, as Plenipotentiary, to propose to open peace negotiations with the Treaty Powers.

“I memorialized, as per telegram under date the 26th August, to the Throne for the appointment of Prince Ching, Yung Lu, and the Viceroys Lew Kwung Yih and Chang Chih Tung as co-Plenipotentiaries, and have now to request the Ministers resident at the different Courts to make the necessary explanations, and to use their efforts to persuade the Foreign Offices in favour of opening the peace negotiations as soon as possible.”



No. 293.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 3, 1900.*

CIRCULAR communication made by the Russian Government to the Powers and reply by the American Government.

You should inform the Government to which you are accredited that no answer has yet been received by Her Majesty's Government to the communication which they have addressed to their officers at Peking. They are not able to form a confident judgment on the important questions raised in the Russian Circular, until further information reaches them from Her Majesty's Minister and from the General Commanding the British forces in that city.

No. 294.

*Acting Consul-General Fraser to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 3.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Hankow, September 3, 1900.*

SINCE the failure of the attempted rising all is quiet here.

The Viceroy here specially requests both me and Mr. Warren to telegraph to your Lordship expressing his hope that Her Majesty's Government will take the lead in putting an end to hostilities and opening negotiations with Li Hung-chang. His Excellency fears that the Secret Societies may be encouraged to rise again by the capture of Peking, which, he says, has caused perturbation along the Yang-tsze, and has paralysed trade, and that possibly the rising might succeed, which would mean devastation of all the ports on the Yang-tsze.

No. 295.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 3, 1900.*

REFERRING to my telegram of the 1st instant respecting the proposed landing of German troops at Shanghai, I have informed the German Embassy that I do not consider that the landing of the forces mentioned would be in any way unfavourable to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and I have at the same time expressed through the German Embassy my thanks for the courteous communication made to me by the Emperor's direction.

No. 296.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 3.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 3, 1900.*

THE withdrawal from Peking would, according to the information at my disposal, expose the motives of the Powers to certain misconstruction by the Chinese; and until the return of the Emperor and Empress-Dowager, which should be made a condition precedent to negotiations, the bad effects of such withdrawal could only be obviated by a continuance of our military occupation of Peking.

\* Also to Mr. Hardinge, Sir E. Monson, Lord Currie, Sir F. Lascelles, Sir F. Plunkett, and Lord Pauncefote.

No. 297.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, August 31, 1900.*

THE Empress-Dowager is probably at Paoting-fu or in the neighbourhood of that place.

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No. 298.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, via Taku, September 2, 1900.*

LADY MACDONALD and myself, as well as all British subjects and their families lately besieged in Peking, return most grateful thanks to Her Majesty's Government for their sympathetic message; we had many very anxious moments, but never doubted that our country would strain every nerve to save us.

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No. 299.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tien-tsin, September 2, 1900.*

IT is reported by a messenger from Fenchou-fu in Shansi that six Americans were killed at Taku, 50 miles east of that place, on the 31st July.

He also states that a party of three men, four women, and three children left Fenchou-fu under escort on the 15th August, and that when 10 miles out they are reported to have been shot. The messenger has a rag on which is written, "This man will tell our situation and is trustworthy." It is dated the 13th August, and signed C. W. Price.

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No. 300.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, September 5, 1900.*

THE substance of your telegram of 3rd September has been communicated to Count Lamsdorff, who quite understands our desire for fuller information of position at Peking before deciding our course of action.

Information is also anxiously awaited from the Russian Minister and General, together with their acknowledgment of receipt of their instructions.

In the meantime, while paying full tribute to the pacific sentiments and aims set forth in the Russian Circular, the answers from other Governments, including Germany, have not expressed entire agreement as to expediency of immediate withdrawal from Peking of the foreign troops, as well as the Legations and Europeans.

Count Lamsdorff seems scarcely to have expected a prompt agreement, and says that the object of the Circular was not to influence judgment of other Powers, but to give them early intimation of the course which the Emperor, while continuing to operate cordially with the other Powers in aims and objects agreed upon, has decided to follow as regards his own troops.

No precise date has been fixed for the withdrawal of these troops. The General is to take into consideration local conditions, and communicate with other Commanders, but to withdraw from Peking as soon as practicable, even without waiting for others.

The considerations which the United States' and other Governments urged against evacuating Peking now would, in Count Lamsdorff's opinion, be equally applicable to evacuation at any later date.

The continued presence of foreign troops in the capital would prevent the Emperor of China from returning and any recognizable national Government being set up, and the allied forcés can scarcely wish to police the capital permanently, but to open diplomatic negotiations with some duly accredited Plenipotentiary of a legal Government as soon as possible.

He maintains his opinion that the Powers could do this more effectually by concentrating their forces in strength at Tien-tsin and Taku in touch with the coast, and by their Governments leaving perhaps detachments near Peking, gradually restoring and securing the line of communications, if necessary, up to the walls of the capital, so that the formidable force which will then have been collected under the leadership of the German Commander-in-chief would be able to promptly enforce the demands of the allies if negotiations fail, and if the formal declaration of hostilities with ulterior measures becomes unavoidable.

No. 301.

*Foreign Office to Consul Playfair.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 5, 1900.*

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 23rd July, inclosing the full text of the assurances given by the local Chinese authorities to the Consular Body at Foochow.

His Lordship approves your action in having temporarily accepted the assurance of the Chinese authorities pending the receipt of his instructions.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 302.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 6, 1900.*

IT is the intention of his Excellency Li Hung-chang to start for Tien-tsin and Peking immediately after the Chinese festival on the 8th instant. He hopes to begin negotiations as soon as he reaches Tien-tsin with any of the foreign Ministers who may have left the capital and come to Tien-tsin.

No. 303.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir H. Rumbold.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 6, 1900.*

COUNT BERCHTOLD, Secretary to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, called at this Office on the 13th ultimo, and left with Sir T. Sanderson a Memorandum stating that the Chinese Government had communicated to the Austro-Hungarian Government the Imperial Edict of the 7th ultimo, according to the terms of which Li Hung-chang was named Plenipotentiary, with a view to his entering into negotiations with the Powers. It was stated that Li Hung-chang's mission had become necessary owing to the hostilities which the Powers had begun in China, and the origin of which was to be found partly in misunderstandings between the Powers and partly in the negligence of the Chinese officials. His Excellency was instructed to negotiate an armistice with the Powers interested, with a view to entering into *pourparlers* with

them, so as to regulate all contentious questions, and to submit the conclusions come to to the approbation of the Chinese Government.

It was further stated in the Memorandum that the Japanese Minister at Vienna had suggested in a similar communication to Count Goluchowski, a proposal from his Government, to the effect that the Powers interested ought, in view of this desire expressed by the Chinese Government, and of the probability of a massacre of strangers at Peking, as well as of the flight of the Emperor and Empress-Mother at the approach of the allies, to grant an armistice to the Chinese Government. At the same time the Japanese Government considered that the concession of an armistice should only be granted on condition that the Chinese Government gave the necessary orders for the Chinese troops and rebels to retire to a distance which would be indicated by the Commanders of the allies, and allowed the foreign troops to advance on Peking, with the object of escorting the besieged persons to Tien-tsin.

The Memorandum concluded with a request on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government to be informed as to what reply I proposed to make, in the event of similar steps being taken by the Chinese and Japanese Governments in London.

Sir T. Sanderson explained to Count Berchtold the communications which I had made to the Chinese Minister on the subject, the substance of which was forwarded to you in my telegram to Sir C. MacDonald of the 23rd August, and informed him that a similar statement had subsequently been made to the Japanese Government.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 304.

*The London Chamber of Commerce to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 7.)*

*Botolph House, Eastcheap, London,  
September 6, 1900.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to append a copy of a very important telegram dispatched from Hong Kong and received here to-day.

The expression of the views of the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce on the disastrous effect upon our relations with China which would result from the withdrawal from Peking of the allied forces before an adequate and satisfactory settlement of the grave questions at issue with that Empire had been obtained, is deserving of your Lordship's most earnest consideration. The message conveys the opinion of commercial men fully acquainted with the character of the Chinese, with the problems that have to be solved, and who represent interests of vast magnitude.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) W. KESWICK,  
*Chairman of the East India and China Trade Section  
of the London Chamber of Commerce*

Inclosure in No. 304.

*Telegram from Hong Kong to London Chamber of Commerce.*

*September 6, 1900.*

PLEASE communicate Foreign Office as follows:—

“Hong Kong Chamber Commerce earnestly advocates maintaining allied forces Peking until proper government established, and guilty officials punished. Earlier withdrawal most disastrous foreign prestige throughout China.”

## No. 306.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 7, 1900.*

THE Chinese Representative at St. Petersburg has telegraphed to Li Hung-chang urgently begging him to send a Memorial to the Throne through the Governor of Shensi (the person most likely to know where the Court is to be found), in the following terms:—

An Edict should be issued to show China's severity and ability to maintain order when the European troops are withdrawn; announcing the intention of the Emperor and Empress-Dowager to return to Peking shortly, and the task of restoring order in the capital should be intrusted to capable officials.

He thinks that the adoption of this course would allay the apprehensions of the allies who would consent to the withdrawal of their troops from Peking.

## No. 307.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, September 7, 1900.*

IN reply to the Russian Government's Circular communication, Viscount Aoki handed a Memorandum to-day to the Russian Minister, the substance of which is as follows:—

“The Japanese Government before coming to a decision as to the withdrawal of the whole of their troops from Peking, intend to recall that portion which may be deemed tactically superfluous, or which is in excess of the number actually required.

“They think it would be prudent for the Powers to continue jointly exercising their military pressure in Chih-li for some time longer, with a view to restoring tranquillity and order in that province.

“In view of Japan's proximity to North China, it will be relatively easy for her in case of need to send troops again, and therefore the Imperial Government feels assured that no bad results will be caused by the measures which they propose to take.

“They further declare that, while consenting, in certain eventualities, to the temporary withdrawal of their Legation, they will always be prepared to co-operate with the Powers concerned in any further action which, in the common interest, they may deem necessary.”

I have repeated the above to Sir Claude MacDonald, through Shanghai.

## No. 308.

*Consul Mansfield to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Amoy, September 7, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that the Japanese and British landing parties withdrew this morning. The incident closed without any friction, and the refugees are returning.

No. 309.

*Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, September 7, 1900.*

THE Italian answer, which has been shown to me by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, is to the following effect:—

Italy does not object in principle to the removal of her Minister to Tien-tsin, but wishes to have his opinion before instructing him.

The opinion is expressed that a previous understanding is desirable before withdrawal from Peking.

If, however, a final decision has been taken by Russia, Italy hopes that she will act in concert with the Powers on all future questions.

In regard to the withdrawal of troops, Italy will await reports from Commander, but fears the withdrawal would encourage the Chinese to resist.

No. 310.

*Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 8.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, September 6, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's instructions contained in your telegram of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the note in which I informed M. Delcassé that Her Majesty's Government must await the reports from their Minister and General at Peking, for which they had telegraphed, before expressing an opinion upon the acceptability of the Russian proposals for the evacuation of that capital.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

Inclosure in No. 310.

*Sir E. Monson to M. Delcassé.*

M. le Ministre,

*Paris, September 4, 1900.*

WITH reference to the conversation which I had the honour to have with you on the 31st ultimo, respecting the proposals of the Russian Government as to the evacuation of Peking, and the answer of the United States' Government thereto, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to inform the Government of the Republic that Her Majesty's Government have not yet received from their Diplomatic and Military Officers at Peking any reply to the communication addressed to them requesting information as to the situation. Until such information shall be furnished to them by the British Minister and the British General in that city, Her Majesty's Government will not be able to form any confident judgment upon the very important questions which are raised in the Russian communication above referred to.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 311.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 8.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, September 6, 1900.*

I AM commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State, extracts from a letter from the Commodore, Hong Kong, dated the 2nd August, relative to affairs in South China.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) H. J. VAN SITTART NEALE.

## Inclosure in No. 311.

*Commodore Powell to Admiralty.*

(Extract.)

*"Tamar," at Hong Kong, August 2, 1900.*

HER Majesty's ship "Mohawk" arrived from the Australian Station on the 27th ultimo, and left on the 30th for Kiung-chau and Pakhoi. I have given Commander Freeman orders to inform Her Majesty's Consul at each place that the "Mohawk" will remove any Europeans who may wish to leave, remaining only long enough for this purpose, and then returning to Hong Kong.

Her Majesty's ship "Robin" is at Wuchau, and the "Sandpiper" at Canton, the latter having been cruising in the Delta. Affairs continue to be quiet at Canton, where the "Redpole" also remains.

Two shallow draught gun-boats, the "Argus" and the "Vigilante," are being reconstructed by the Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock Company for the French; they are to be commissioned, when ready, for service on the West River. The "Argus" is nearly completed.

## No. 312.

*British and Foreign Bible Society to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 8.)*

146, Queen Victoria Street, London,  
September 7, 1900.

My Lord,

THE representatives of the Church Missionary Society, the London Missionary Society, the Wesleyan Missionary Society, the China Inland Mission, and the British and Foreign Bible Society, who are at present in China, have cabled to London messages in which they state that any premature settlement at the present juncture would be fatal. They evidently consider that such a policy would tend greatly to increase the dangers to which Europeans are exposed and would lead to disastrous consequences.

The Secretaries of the above Societies in London—in conjunction with those of the Baptist Missionary Society and the English Presbyterian Missionary Society—deem it their duty to lay these communications before your Lordship as expressing the united opinion of experienced men, who have had prolonged opportunities for knowing China and the Chinese.

On behalf of the Secretaries of the above-named Societies, I have, &c,

(Signed) JOHN SHARP,  
Senior Secretary.

## No. 313.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 8, 1900.*

YESTERDAY a courier brought to Shanghai a Decree of the 24th August to the following effect:—

Li Hung-chang must act as Plenipotentiary, and make the best terms he can as quickly as possible. Being at this distance, we will not interfere. Telegraph a reply, and allay our anxiety.

The Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg has also wired to Li Hung-chang that the Russian Foreign Office had not yet received a definite reply from the Powers as to the withdrawal of the troops from Peking. Russia intends to abide by her agreement, but hopes China will afford every assistance, and not force Russia to reconsider her position.

The Chinese Minister adds that he has telegraphed to the Chinese troops in Ili not to repeat the indiscretion they committed in Manchuria.

## No. 314.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 10.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, August 30, 1900.*

WHEN I attended Count Lamsdorff's reception at the Foreign Office yesterday, his Excellency, who had just returned from attendance on the Emperor and Empress's departure from St. Petersburg, informed me of the important decision which His Majesty had, before starting, taken in ordering the withdrawal from Peking of his troops and of the Russian Legation and other Russian subjects who had been besieged there.

Count Lamsdorff said that he had already addressed a Circular telegram to the Russian Representatives at the Courts of the Allied Powers, informing them of the decision and enabling them to explain to the Governments to which they were accredited the considerations which had prompted these instructions.

This Circular also reasserted the Emperor's loyal adherence to the aims and objects which all the Powers concerned in China were unanimous in pursuing, and reaffirmed the disinterested character of His Majesty's policy, and his firm desire to withdraw his troops from all Chinese territory which they had been obliged for protection to temporarily occupy, as soon as order and the *status quo ante* had been re-established in North China.

His Excellency urged these considerations again very strongly in conversation with me.

They were in every respect consistent with the view which Count Lamsdorff has not ceased to take, since assuming charge of the Foreign Office, of the requirements of the present situation in the Far East.

He recapitulated to me the points which Russia had from the first indicated, as, in her opinion, best adapted for the guidance of the allied forces in their common action and aim.

To these the Emperor intended to continue firmly to adhere. We had been proceeding, he reminded me, on the assumption hitherto that we were not in a formal state of war with the recognized Government of China, but with a nation in a state of rebellion. Our first aim was to release our imprisoned Representatives and their countrymen, and place them in safety.

The second was to assist the national Government to restore order, to obtain compensation, and guarantees against the recurrence of similar disorders and dangers to our Treaty interests and rights in China.

At the same time all idea of a partition of China, or of infringing in any way on her territorial integrity or independence was, by common consent, strongly deprecated.

The first aim—the release of our Legations—had been happily accomplished. Circumstances had fortunately combined to admit of an earlier advance with a small force on Peking in response to an urgent appeal from our Ministers than had been contemplated as safe, or even feasible, by the military authorities on the spot. Now that this had been successfully accomplished, the next thing, in the Emperor's opinion, was to escort the released Legations and Europeans to a place of safety near the coast, and suspend further military action in order to give place to the action of diplomacy.

The recognized Government had fled from Peking; there was no authority in the capital at present with which the foreign Governments could deal; and the continued presence within its walls of foreign troops who were not of sufficient strength to undertake the serious responsibility, even if we desired it, of permanently policing and maintaining order there, was not only, in his opinion, highly inexpedient, but very dangerous.

The Emperor of China would certainly not return to his capital while foreign troops were in occupation of it, and any idea of following the Court into Shan-si and bringing it back by the aid of foreign bayonets, or as prisoners, would be fatal to the success of the other aims which the Powers were pursuing.

It was equally impossible to entertain the idea of the Powers creating themselves a new Government at Peking which would not be recognized as a national one by the Chinese.

What we had to do, in his opinion, was to try and get as soon as possible into negotiation with some authority who could satisfy us that he or they possessed genuine full powers from the recognized Government of the country. This had decided the Emperor, as far as his own troops and Ministers were concerned, to order their withdrawal from Peking, after taking local circumstances into consideration and communicating with the Commanders of the other foreign detachments, but they were to obey these instructions



at the earliest practical date, and leave even if the other detachments remained in Peking.

Count Lamsdorff went on to develop very clearly his own personal view of the best position for the allied forces to take up at the present conjuncture.

It has been urged on his consideration that an immediate evacuation of Peking by the allied forces would be interpreted by the Chinese as a triumph for them, and would be followed by a fresh rising, disorders, and massacres, and a consequent loss of foreign prestige in China.

He had weighed this consideration very carefully, but was still firmly convinced that the continued presence of our troops in the capital, after the release and safe conduct of our Legations and the Europeans to the coast, would be fraught with even more disastrous consequences.

It was impossible to entertain seriously the proposal which had been put forward in some public quarters that the allied forces, lowering themselves to the level of savagery of the Chinese, should, before leaving Peking, inflict some indelible mark of their presence there which would impress itself on Chinese memory, as razing the city to the ground, or perpetrating some other equally barbarous act of vandalism, and his Excellency dreaded the possibility of the foreign troops there getting out of hand, and yielding to the temptations of pillage and other acts of violence.

By withdrawing their detachments from the precincts of Peking, and concentrating them in a strong position near the coast such as the base now occupied at Taku and Tien-tsin, the allied forces would remain with a firm grip on the throat of the capital and be in communication with their ships and Governments with their supplies.

It was evidently in his Excellency's opinion most desirable to keep military action well in hand, and not to let it lead foreign policy instead of following its guidance.

In this respect he referred to various erroneous impressions created by the incorrect reproduction in the press of some Russian military telegrams.

It had been assumed that Russia was taking advantage of the present crisis to extend her territory and influence at the cost of China, by permanently occupying territory on the right bank of the Amur in Manchuria, and at Newchwang and by seizing control of the customs, and lines of railway in which foreign capital was interested.

This was entirely incorrect; Russia had no such intention; and any places which she had been obliged by the attack of Chinese rebels on her frontier to occupy temporarily, she intended when the *status quo ante* and order were re-established to restore to their former position.

She was also prepared to hand over as soon as possible to the regular authorities of the Chinese Customs the management and control of the custom-house at Newchwang, which had been temporarily taken in hand by the occupying force, and, in accordance with the official declaration already made to me, the control of any Chinese railways which had also been provisionally assumed would be restored to the former management on the termination of hostilities, and indemnity only claimed for the expenses incurred in repairing and managing the lines.

This, Count Lamsdorff said, had been expressly stated in the Circular instruction to M. Lessar, which he had been instructed to communicate to your Lordship.

The object of this Circular, he said, was to give the Governments with which His Imperial Majesty was cordially co-operating in China the earliest intimation of the instructions sent to M. de Giers and General Linevitch, and he trusted that your Lordship would see in the statement of the considerations on which they were based a fresh proof of the Emperor's desire to follow a line of general policy and aims in agreement with those of Her Majesty's Government, and other Powers equally concerned in minimizing the dangers to their interests of the present serious crisis in China.

His Excellency said that M. de Lessar had reported that an early intimation of your Lordship's views on the subject of this Circular, which had at once been forwarded to you, had been promised as soon as they could be ascertained.

I said that I was of course unable as yet to state what view your Lordship was likely to take of the Russian proposal for an immediate evacuation of Peking, but I felt sure that your Lordship would be grateful to him for having supplied a clear exposition of the views and intentions of the Emperor of Russia in this respect, and I reminded him of the statement of policy made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government in the House of Commons, which I had communicated to him unofficially, and which seemed in most essential points to agree very closely with the policy of the Imperial Government, which he had just been explaining to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

No. 315.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 10.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, September 5, 1900.*

ON receipt of your Lordship's telegraphic instructions yesterday, I at once called on Count Lamsdorff and informed him that Her Majesty's Government had not as yet received any answer to the communication which they had addressed to Peking, and would, therefore, not be in a position to form a confident judgment on the important questions raised in his Excellency's Circular telegram, which M. Lessar had communicated to your Lordship, until they had received from Her Majesty's Minister and General in the Chinese capital fuller information as to the position there.

Count Lamsdorff said that he quite understood this. He was himself anxiously awaiting similar information from M. de Giers and General Linevitch, and, at any rate, an acknowledgment by them of the instructions sent to them.

It would almost look as if the delay were caused by the insecurity or interruption of communications between Peking and Tien-tsin, and this caused him serious anxiety.

I told his Excellency that I had also received communication of the answer returned by the United States' Government to the Russian Circular, and inquired whether he regarded it as satisfactory, and what replies had been received from other Governments.

Count Lamsdorff replied that the American answer was of the same undecided character as that of the replies which he had received from other Governments; they had none of them committed themselves to an expression of entire agreement with the view of the Russian Government as to the expediency of a prompt evacuation of Peking by the allied military forces, nor had he, in fact, expected such an agreement. They had generally expressed entire adherence to the principles and aims set forth in the Russian communication, and the German Government, when doing so, entirely agreed to the expediency of withdrawing the Legations without delay from Peking, but was doubtful of the prudence of withdrawing the military forces as well from the Chinese capital at the present moment.

It was clear that none of the Governments could form a decided opinion on this point until they had received fuller information as to the position from their own Ministers and Generals on the spot.

The object of the Circular communication, which the Emperor had desired him to address to the other Governments co-operating in military measures in China, was to give them the earliest possible intimation of the instructions which he had caused to be telegraphed to the Russian Minister and General in Peking, desiring that they should withdraw to Tien-tsin as soon as it was possible for them, in consideration of local circumstances, to do so.

They were to communicate with the Commanders of the other foreign detachments before doing so, and, although no precise date had naturally been fixed for the evacuation, they were to leave as soon as they considered it practicable, without delaying their departure until the other detachments had received similar instructions.

Count Lamsdorff said that although the Emperor had decided on this course for his own troops, His Majesty had no desire to influence by his action the decision of other Governments, who might not be able to take the same view of its expediency.

Count Lamsdorff said that he had carefully weighed the considerations urged on his attention by the American and other Governments, who apprehended the possibility of serious consequences, and a misapprehension of motive in the withdrawal of the allied forces now occupying Peking. The objections urged to evacuation at the present moment would, in his Excellency's opinion, apply with equal force to an evacuation at any later date, and, if acted on, might entail the occupation for several years of Peking by an international force.

His Excellency went over again the arguments which he had used at our last interview, reported in my despatch of the 30th ultimo.

He repeated his firm conviction that the Emperor of China and the recognized Government would never return to the capital while it was occupied by foreign troops.

The Emperor and Court were confidently reported to be now out of reach in the Province of Shansi, and to be still entirely under the baneful influence of Prince Tuan, who had accompanied them.

Under such circumstances, negotiations with them, or with a duly accredited Plenipotentiary of the recognized Government, was impossible.

The only way to get a legitimate Government back to Peking was to withdraw the allied forces outside the precincts of the capital.

He repeated that the allied forces would, in his opinion, be able to exercise more effectual pressure on any Chinese Government by concentrating themselves in a strong position outside the capital, in touch with their base on the coast, where their strength would be receiving constant reinforcement.

It might be desirable, in view of any necessity for ulterior military measures, that detachments should be left on the line of communication to keep it open, and it was very important that the railroad should be repaired and put in working order, and gradually secured, if necessary, up to the very walls of Peking.

If, which he did not think probable, negotiations came to nothing, and the Powers were obliged to declare formal war against the Chinese Government, or proceed to enforce their demands, they could, with the formidable force which would by that time have been collected at Tien-tsin and Taku, be able to advance rapidly on the capital under the leadership of the experienced Commander-in-chief whose services have been placed at their disposal.

He did not like the position in which the allied detachments now found themselves at Peking, and was convinced that their remaining there would be fraught with more serious and dangerous causes of embarrassment than could possibly ensue from their withdrawal.

I learn from my Austro-Hungarian colleague that his Government, in replying to Count Lamsdorff's Circular, expressed a desire to regulate its action entirely in accordance with that of the other Powers, and with the agreed principles of policy and common aim in China referred to in this communication; but, as their interests in the Far East and participation in the common action were so much inferior to those of other Governments concerned, they did not feel justified in pronouncing a decided opinion on the expediency of the immediate withdrawal of the military forces from Peking, the more so, as their Chargé d'Affaires there, who had been wounded, was already leaving, and the Austrian detachment in Peking was a very small one.

The French Government, I understand, while agreeing in principle with the Russian Government, has urged a full consideration of the possible consequences of immediate evacuation, and desires to receive fuller information as to the position before deciding the date of withdrawing their forces.

The Japanese Government appears to entertain serious apprehension of the consequences of a premature withdrawal of the allied forces now occupying Peking.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

No. 316.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 2, 1900.*

AT a meeting of the Generals the Russian General officially announced that he was instructed to keep 15,000 men in Peking during the winter. The German General made a similar statement. The Japanese General stated that he was instructed to keep 20,000 men there.

No. 317.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 3, 1900.*

PRINCE CHING entered the Tartar city escorted by Bengal and Japanese cavalry, and had taken up his residence at his house in the Japanese quarter.

## No. 318.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 4, 1900.*

AT a meeting of foreign Ministers to-day the Russian Minister announced that he had been instructed that, as no properly-constituted Government existed at Peking, he was to proceed to Tien-tsin, and await further instructions.

Seeing that Prince Ching is now in Peking under orders from the Emperor, and as it is believed he has full powers to negotiate, the withdrawal of the foreign Ministers would be a mistake.

## No. 319.

*Li Hung-chang to Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Lofêngluh, September 10.)*

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 9, 1900.*

I HAVE received from the Privy Council the communication of the following Imperial Decree, dated Ta-Tung-fuh, Shansi, August 27, 1900 :—

“ We hereby summon the Grand Secretary Li Hung-chang, who has been furnished with full powers to negotiate with the Plenipotentiaries of the allied Powers, to come, without delay, to Peking, in order to co-operate with Prince Ching in the transaction of important State affairs. Respect this.”

The Privy Council has been commanded by a former Imperial Decree to instruct Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Customs, to apply to the allied Commanders-in-chief for an escort to accompany your Excellency from Shanghai to Peking.

In obedience to the Imperial command, I shall shortly leave Shanghai, and you are to request Lord Salisbury to be so good as to issue the necessary telegraphic instructions to the Commanders of Her Majesty's marine and land forces at Taku, Tien-tsin, and Peking, to afford me their protection. The Chinese Ministers at other Courts have been instructed to make communications to the Governments to which they are severally accredited in the same sense.

## No. 320.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 10.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 10, 1900.*

A TELEGRAPHIC Edict has been received by Li Hung-chang ordering him to sail at once for the North, and, together with Prince Ching, to commence the peace negotiations. He was instructed to arrange with Sir Robert Hart for a safe-conduct of the steamer bringing him, which delays his departure for a time.

## No. 321.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. Scott.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 10, 1900.*

WITHDRAWAL of British forces from Peking.

You should inform Russian Government that communications have been received by Her Majesty's Government from their officers in the Far East in a somewhat

imperfect form. Without forecasting the course which it will be expedient to pursue in the future, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the time when it would be expedient to withdraw the British forces from Peking has not arrived.

No. 322.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Herbert.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 10, 1900.*

THE French Minister called at the Foreign Office to-day and showed to Mr. Bertie the telegraphic instructions which had been sent to the French Minister at Peking.

They are to the effect that the French Government adhere to the views of the Russian Government that the object of the expedition to Peking, namely, the relief of the Legations being accomplished, there is no reason to remain there.

M. Pichon is, therefore, to arrange with the Russian Minister and General to leave, as soon as possible, with the Legation staff and French troops and such native Christians as may desire to accompany the party.

The French Government are of opinion that with the large international force which there will be at Tien-tsin and Taku, there is no doubt that any return of lawlessness on the part of the Chinese can easily be repressed from those bases.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 323.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 11, 1900.*

THE Emperor and Empress-Dowager were at Ku Kuan on the 7th September. (This place is marked latitude 37° 50', longitude 113° 52', on Waeber's Map.) As Prince Ching is in Peking, Li Hung-chang will start for the north on the 14th instant. The Third Peace Commissioner is Jung Lu, who, although reluctant to go, is nevertheless prepared to obey orders. Li Hung-chang has advised him to confess his complicity in the attack on the Legations, and see if he will be then accepted by the Powers.

This message is repeated to Her Majesty's Legation at Tôkiô and to Sir C. MacDonald.

No. 324.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, September 11, 1900.*

THE statement made by the Russian General at Peking, reported in Sir C. MacDonald's telegram of the 2nd instant, must be in reference to some orders previously given him by the Russian Commander-in-chief in China. Positive instructions to withdraw were dispatched to the Russian General on the 25th August. He has not yet acknowledged their receipt, and M. de Giers, in a telegram dated the 4th September, expresses his surprise that his numerous requests to be furnished with general instructions should have remained unanswered.

The Russian Foreign Office have already dispatched six messages to their Minister, and have caused these to be repeated to Taku, so that they should be transmitted to their Legation at Peking.

No. 325.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received September 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, September 11, 1900.*

I CALLED to-day on Count Lamsdorff, and made to him the communication contained in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday's date.

In reply, his Excellency begged me to make it quite clear to Her Majesty's Government that the different course decided upon as regards the Russian troops was not in any way to be taken as indicating the slightest intention of separating the general action and policy of Russia in China from those of the Powers who might prefer to keep their detachments in Peking. It was, however, considered desirable to have the Russian troops as well as the Russian Minister as soon as possible in a position where communication with their Government would be easy and rapid.

He assured me that, on the contrary, the Emperor was more firmly determined than ever to continue in loyal cooperation with all the other Powers and to abide by his agreement with them as to common aim and direction, and the Russian action and aims would be faithfully kept within the limits of the statement made in Count Lamsdorff's Circular communicated to the Powers.

He assured me, further, that there was nothing more foreign to the Emperor's mind than to entertain the selfish aims or motives for his action which certain foreign newspapers had credited him with.

The Chinese Minister in St. Petersburg has been requested by Count Lamsdorff to impress on Li Hung-chang as well as on the Emperor of China a firm conviction of the entire solidarity of the views of Russia and of other Governments, and to warn them seriously against interpreting the departure of Russian forces from Peking as in any way indicating the slightest separation of her action in exerting common pressure on the Chinese Government from that of other Powers.

When doing so, however, he appears to have expressed a personal opinion that an early withdrawal from Peking of the other foreign forces would be facilitated by a prompt return of the Imperial Court to the capital.

I gathered from Count Lamsdorff that as far as had as yet been decided, the German and Japanese Governments were not prepared to withdraw their forces from Peking at present, but that the American and French Governments would withdraw their Legations and forces as soon as the Russians withdrew theirs.

No. 326.

*Sir C. Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received September 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, September 11, 1900.*

THE Chinese Minister here has made a similar communication to that repeated in your telegram of 10th September\* to the Russian Foreign Office and to the Austrian Ambassador. It is dated the 7th September from Shanghae. Prince Ching is not mentioned in the Imperial Edict, but Count Lamsdorff has learned that he is to co-operate with Li Hung-chang in negotiating for peace, and he considers the news good. The addition of certain other names to the list of negotiators would, in his Excellency's opinion, have been satisfactory.

Count Lamsdorff is convinced, by the form and text of the Imperial Edict, that the Emperor himself has issued it, and granted the full powers to arrange and conclude terms of peace.

No. 327.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.*—(Received September 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 7, 1900.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's telegram of the 31st August.

The Russian Minister, as stated in my telegram of the 4th September, announced his departure in two days, and leaves Peking to-morrow. There was no mention of

\* No. 319.

the departure of the Russian General. I think that a general massacre of Christian converts and of all Chinese who have shown themselves friendly to foreigners would most certainly ensue if all foreign troops leave now.

I am of opinion that the departure of the Legations now would be most inexpedient, and I think that their withdrawal from the capital would hinder future negotiations. The Court would be alarmed by such a step, and it would probably cause the departure of Prince Ching, who, with some diplomacy, has been persuaded to return here.

When the Corps Diplomatique have once succeeded in persuading the high officials, and possibly the Emperor, to return here, and Plenipotentiaries have been appointed with unrestricted powers, we might request these Plenipotentiaries to come to Shanghai to conduct the negotiations, as that place is in closer touch than Peking with Europe.

Peking would be preferable to Shanghai or Tien-tsin in which to carry on negotiations if telegraphic communication were properly restored.

In my opinion, a General would have considerable difficulty in getting into touch with the Court if unaided by the Ministers.

## No. 328.

*Mr. Herbert to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, September 12, 1900.*

M. DELCASSÉ says he would have no objection to Li Hung-chang as a negotiator if he really can furnish *bonâ fide* credentials, but he has returned no answer to his latest communication.

M. Delcassé, in conversation this afternoon, argued strongly in favour of Russian proposal for withdrawal, and made use of much the same language as that held by Count Lamsdorff to Sir C. Scott, as reported in latter's telegram to your Lordship.

Since 29th August no telegram from M. Pichon has been received.

## No. 329.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 12, 1900.*

IT is stated by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Emperor will continue to co-operate loyally with the other Powers on the lines of the Russian Circular, notwithstanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Peking.

This has been impressed upon the Chinese Minister at Peking by Count Lamsdorff.

## No. 330.

*Foreign Office to Consul Carles.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 12, 1900.*

THE Marquess of Salisbury read with interest your despatch of the 28th June, reporting the feat performed by Mr. James Watts in riding with despatches through the Chinese lines from Tien-tsin to Taku.

\* Also to Sir F. Lascelles, Sir H. Rumbold, Lord Currie, Sir C. Scott, Lord Pauncefote, and Mr. Whitehead, for Shanghai and Peking.

His Lordship desires you to express to Mr. Watts his high appreciation of this courageous and public-spirited act, and to inform him that your report of it has been laid before the Queen.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

## No. 331.

*Sir C. MacDonuld to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 10, 1900.*

PEACE Plenipotentiaries: Your telegram of the 1st September.

With the exception Yung Lu, several of whose troops were killed by us on the barricades opposed to us during the siege, I see no objection to the Plenipotentiaries named. One of Ching's standards was also captured by us. I would suggest instead the present Viceroy of Fuhkien, Hsu Ying Kuei.

## No. 332.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 13.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, September 13, 1900.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram, dated 7th September, from Rear-Admiral Bruce at Taku.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 332.

*Rear-Admiral Bruce to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Taku, September 7, 1900.*

I HAVE been informed, on Japanese authority, Emperor and Empress were at Sianfu 3rd September. Prince Ching, the progressive leader, was coming to Peking 2nd September. Yu Lu, Viceroy of Chihli, committed suicide, with family, at Tungchow; several members of Reform party paid private visits to Japanese General a few days ago.

## No. 333.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 13, 1900.*

TO-MORROW his Excellency Li Hung-chang starts for Tien-tsin. He hopes, with his colleagues, Yung Lu and Prince Ching, to begin the peace negotiations. He urges Yung Lu to see the Emperor privately, and insist on the punishment of the Prince and the others who abetted the Boxer movement as a preliminary to the peace negotiations. He fears that his mission will fail unless he can meet the foreign Ministers with an assurance that the guilty will be condignly punished.



## No. 334.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 13, 1900.*

A REPORT is current here that the Russians are about to send a force to Chingwantao. If a force is sent to Chingwantao, it is desirable that it should be an international one. In this view Sir Edward Seymour concurs.

## No. 335.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 13, 1900.*

I HAVE received the following telegram, dated the 12th instant, from Sir Claude MacDonald, to be repeated to you :—

“The withdrawal of all troops now would mean a general massacre of all converts and such Chinese as have shown themselves friendly to foreigners. Tung-fu Hsiang, with troops and Boxers, is still at Paoting-fu, 12 miles from Peking. The temples and the western hills are full of Boxers. It is dangerous to ride out without an escort into the country. When Prince Ching arrived here on the 3rd, he had to ask for an escort to protect him against Boxers and disbanded troops. Is the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg aware of this state of things ?”

## No. 336.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead (for Acting Consul-General Warren and Sir C. MacDonald).\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 13, 1900.*

I AM informed that the French Government will act in accordance with the Russian proposal, to which they adhere.

## No. 337.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 14.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, July 23, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that events have shown that the Viceroy Yü Lu, after his conference with General Nieh on the 14th ultimo, to which I referred in my despatch of the 28th June, determined to cast in his lot with the Empress-Dowager's party at all costs.

The rapid concentration of troops upon Taku, and the placing of mines in the river there, immediately followed upon that conference; and the continuous bombardment of the foreign Concessions was undoubtedly an act for which the Viceroy was responsible.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

## No. 338.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 14.)*

My Lord,

*Shanghai, August 7, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of two Imperial Decrees of the 2nd August, communicated to me officially by his Excellency, Shêng.

Both Decrees lay the blame for the present situation on the missionaries and their

\* Also to Mr. Hardinge, Sir F. Lascelles, Sir F. Plunkett, Lord Currie, and Lord Pauncefote.

converts. The first Decree provides for the escort of the Ministers to Tien-tsin, and significantly alludes to the possibility of their being attacked *en route*. It also allows for messages *en clair* being transmitted on their behalf by the Tsung-li Yamên. In view of this, I yesterday sent a message to Sir Claude MacDonald, to which a reply might come within five days.

The second Decree begins with a declaration of neutrality towards civilian foreigners, but commands a campaign of extermination against native converts, unless they are willing to throw in their lot with the Imperialist side. The Boxers are called "Patriots," and the acts of violence committed in their name are provided for in advance by the allusion to robbers and banditti pretending to be "Patriots."

These Decrees are considered by local Chinese to imply a certain degree of weakening in Prince Tuan's power in the capital. On the other hand the reports—which appear to be quite authentic—of the execution of two Tsung-li Yamên Ministers, Hsü Ching Ch'êng and Yüan Ch'ang, clearly show that whether Prince Tuan's individual authority has or has not decreased, the capital is in a state of indescribable confusion, in which the anti-foreign party is absolutely predominant, and which renders the situation of foreigners there most dangerous.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 338.

*Imperial Decree of August 2, 1900.*

(Translation.)

WHEREAS on account of the recent troubles in the capital between the populace and missionaries and their converts, war has broken out between China and the foreign Powers;

And whereas all the Ministers of foreign countries resident in Peking should be protected; the Prince and Ministers of the Tsung-li Yamên have frequently addressed to them letters of encouragement and inquiry, pointing out that in view of the disorder prevailing in Peking full measures of protection were difficult to carry out, and the Tsung-li Yamên therefore suggested that they should proceed under escort to Tien-tsin, where they could retire for the time being, and avoid all cause for alarm.

We accordingly command the Grand Secretary Yung Lu to select reliable military and civil officers of high rank to escort the Ministers to Tien-tsin with an armed guard. When the Ministers have fixed a date for leaving Peking they shall be escorted with every care *en route*, and any attack upon them by banditti shall be rigorously punished, while no pains shall be spared to render their journey safe.

Before leaving Peking, each Minister shall, if he desires, communicate with his Government *en clair*, and the message shall be transmitted by the Tsung-li Yamên without any delay.

The good feeling of the Throne towards the strangers from afar will thus be apparent.

Inclosure 2 in No. 338.

*Imperial Decree of August 2, 1900.*

(Translation.)

DURING the present outbreak of hostilities between China and the Powers, the foreign merchants, Missions, &c., throughout the Empire must be considered as outside the sphere of hostilities. All Viceroys and Governors have, therefore, already been commanded to protect them as usual, and now that our troops are massing round Peking, all general officers marching with their forces towards the capital shall also respect this command, and make arrangements for the protection of all foreign merchants and missionaries, in order to assist the Throne in demonstrating its kindly feeling towards the strangers from afar.

With regard to native converts, these are also children of our State and of the same origin as ourselves; but since the troubles began between the "Ch'üan" (Boxers) and the Christians, the converts in many places have taken up defensive positions in their villages, intrenching themselves and throwing up earthworks to resist the Imperial troops. Such people as these are acting as rebels, and must absolutely be exterminated. However,

if they repent, in fear of the punishment due to them, and adopt a new line of conduct, the net of destruction may be opened, and they may be allowed to escape.

Recently the General Sung Ch'ing reported that the converts at Ta Po Tien, in the Pao-ch'i district,\* when exhorted by him, all expressed their willingness to cast aside their weapons and destroy their fortifications. They then scattered and returned to their villages. It is therefore evident that these converts are not all of their own free will banditti and robbers. In all cases where converts express their willingness to surrender in the above manner, we hereby command all military and local authorities to act in the same way towards them, and not to put them to death indiscriminately. But all cases of robbers and banditti pretending to be patriots, and wreaking their vengeance on the converts, must be investigated and dealt with according to their circumstances, in order that disorder may be put a stop to.

Obeys this.

No. 339.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 14.)*

My Lord,

Shanghai, August 7, 1900.

I HAD the honour to telegraph to you yesterday that the Governor of Chekiang admitted the murder of five British subjects at Ch'ü Chou.

These are the missionaries referred to in my telegram of the 28th July, and it would appear that the four who were supposed to have left Ch'ang Shan for Ch'ü Chou decided to remain at their posts, and are, it is to be hoped, still unharmed.

The Governor expresses the deepest regret at the sad occurrence, and has degraded the Prefect, Taotai, and General of the place for their negligence. Unfortunate as these repeated massacres of isolated missionaries are, they are not, as far as I can judge, due to any remissness on the part of the officials in these parts, all of whom are endeavouring to the utmost of their power to preserve peace and order.

I inclose copy of Mr. King's despatch of the 6th August reporting on the case.

I have just ascertained that the names of the murdered persons are Mr. and Mrs. D. B. Thompson, Miss Sherwood, Miss Manchester, and Miss J. E. Desmond.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

Inclosure in No. 339.

*Consul King to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

Sir,

Hangchow, August 6, 1900.

WITH reference to my letter of the 31st ultimo and my telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to inform you that I am in receipt of a communication from the Governor to the following effect:—

His Excellency states that five foreigners were killed at Ch'ü Chou, but does not mention on what date.

With regard to the others who were reported to have been killed while passing through Ch'ü Chou in their flight from Ch'ang Shan or elsewhere, he says no trace can be found, but that search is being made for them.

His Excellency adds that the Chên T'ai, Taotai, and Chih Fu, of Ch'ü Chou, are to be deprived of their posts for maladministration, and that all officials not discharging their duties properly and with due zeal will be punished.

He states, in conclusion, that he has requested the Viceroy at Nanking to inform the Chinese Minister in London and also the Consular Body at Shanghai of the foregoing, and expresses more than once his deep and sincere regret at what has occurred.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. KING.

\* About 60 miles east of Peking.—TRANSLATOR.

## No. 310.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 14, 1900.*

THIRTY-NINE adults and ten children of the China Inland Mission in Shansi and Chihli are unaccounted for. They have not been heard of since the early part of May. It is reported that some of them are held for ransom by Boxers and rebels.

The Head of the Mission inquires if anything can be done to rescue them, and have them escorted to some Treaty port.

The above has been sent to Her Majesty's Minister.

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## No. 341.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 14, 1900.*

HIS Excellency Li Hung-chang left at 1 P.M., in a British steamer, for Lien-tsin, the steamer flying a flag denoting that he is a Plenipotentiary.

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## No. 342.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 14, 1900.*

ACCORDING to the Report of the China Inland Mission, 23 missionaries (including females) have been killed in Shansi, 11 in Chekiang, and 4 in Chihli, making a total of 38. Seventy-three persons are missing in Shansi, of whom sixty-three are British. No news of them has been received since end of June, and there is but little hope for their safety.

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## No. 343.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.\**

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 14, 1900.*

A COMMUNICATION has been made by the Russian Government respecting their intentions, of which the following is a summary.

It had been their first object to protect Russian Legation and nationals in Peking, their second to assist the Chinese Government to restore order.

The Russian Government adhere to the principles communicated to you in my telegram of the 20th July.

Russia had been forced to occupy Newchwang and send troops to Manchuria by the progress of events, such as the attack on Russian troops at Newchwang and the hostilities of Chinese along the Russian frontier, including the bombardment of Blagovestchensk.

Russia will withdraw from Chinese territory when the pacification of Manchuria is attained and the security of the railroad assured, provided such action does not meet with obstacles caused by the proceedings of other Powers.

The inviolability of the rights of foreign States and international Companies in Newchwang and in the railways repaired by Russian troops is to be maintained.

The first object had been effected by the rescue of the Legations.

The departure from Peking of the Emperor, Empress-Regent, and Tsung-li Yamên, to whom Minister is accredited, had temporarily hindered the second object.

\* Also to Lord Currie, Sir F. Lascelles, Sir H. Rumbold, Sir C. Scott, and Lord Pauncefoot.

It is therefore proposed by the Russian Government to withdraw to Tien-tsin their Minister, his staff, and the Russian troops.

Russia will, in concert with other States, appoint Representatives to negotiate, when the legitimate Chinese Government resume power and nominate Plenipotentiaries.

No. 344.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 15.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 15, 1900.*

WITH reference to the missionaries in Shansi, I have long since asked the assistance of the Viceroy in rescuing them and bringing them to a place of safety.

With the co-operation of the Governor of Shansi they have succeeded in rescuing large numbers, but Shansi is out of their jurisdiction, and their power in that province is limited.

The Governor of Shansi is Yu Hsien, an official of rabidly anti-foreign sentiments. It is upon him that the responsibility lies for massacre of so many missionaries in Shansi. We can expect no assistance from him, and there is no chance of recovering the missing missionaries without help from outside.

No. 345.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 15, 1900.*

THE exportation of arms and ammunition from the United Kingdom to China has been forbidden by a Proclamation issued on the 7th September.

Do all you can to prevent the Chinese from obtaining such ammunition and arms, and issue instructions to other Consuls in the same sense.

Consuls will receive all possible aid to enable them to act effectively from naval officers who have been instructed accordingly. It must be remembered, however, that belligerent rights of search and detention do not exist.

No. 346.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 15, 1900.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 14th of this month relative to the position of missionaries in the interior, I am afraid that the measures which the Chinese authorities themselves may be disposed to take constitute the only hope of rescue.

You should consult with the Viceroy as to what can be done by them in the matter, at the same time impressing on them that retribution will certainly follow should the missionaries be killed.

No. 347.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 17.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, August 1, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of the "Règlements Généraux d'Administration de la Ville de Tien-tsin," which have been submitted to the General Officers Commanding the allied forces at Tien-tsin for approval and confirmed by them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

## Inclosure in No. 347.

*General Regulations for the Administration of the City of Tien-tsin.*

LA ville de Tien-tsin ayant été occupée par les troupes alliées il a été décidé de constituer une Administration provisoire sous forme de "Conseil du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Cité Chinoise de Tien-tsin."

La juridiction de ce Conseil s'étendra sur la ville même de Tien-tsin et sur les territoires environnants jusqu'au rempart de terre (mud wall) à l'exception :—

1. Des concessions étrangères : Allemande, Anglaise, Française, et Japonaise.
2. Des arsenaux, camps, chemins de fer, télégraphes, et autres institutions militaires déjà occupées par les troupes alliées.

Le Gouvernement Provisoire s'occupera des questions suivantes :—

1. Rétablissement de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans l'enceinte de la cité sur le territoire soumis à sa juridiction.
2. Prescription dans la cité, sur ce territoire et aux environs, de mesures sanitaires afin de prévenir les maladies épidémiques et autres.
3. Il facilitera aux troupes alliées le cantonnement et leur procurera des vivres et des moyens de transport, bêtes de somme, charrettes, bateaux, coolies, &c.
4. Il dressera l'inventaire et prendra les mesures nécessaires pour conserver la propriété mobilière et immobilière appartenant au Gouvernement Chinois, ainsi que celle des particuliers, délaissée par ces derniers.
5. Il prendra des mesures pour prévenir la famine parmi les indigènes.

Le Gouvernement Provisoire sera représenté par un Conseil composé de trois membres jouissant des mêmes droits, élus par la réunion des Commandants Militaires des Puissances alliées opérant dans le Pétchili.

Le Conseil étant émanation de toutes les Puissances jouira sur le territoire qui lui est confié d'une indépendance absolue et fera droit, dans la mesure du possible, à toutes les demandes qui lui seront adressées, tant par les Commandants des troupes alliées que par les Consuls des Puissances étrangères.

En cas de divergence entre le Conseil et un des Commandants des troupes alliées ou entre le Conseil et un des Consuls, la question sera soumise à l'arbitrage de la réunion des Commandants supérieurs des troupes alliées ou à celui du Corps Consulaire, selon le caractère du différend.

Si un arrangement ne peut être obtenu par cette procédure, le différend sera soumis à la décision de leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

Le Conseil aura le droit :—

1. D'établir et de publier des Règlements aux questions intéressant le Gouvernement Provisoire.
2. D'imposer aux indigènes des droits, taxes, et contributions et de percevoir les impôts dus au Gouvernement Chinois.
3. Saisir ou prendre sous son contrôle toutes les valeurs ainsi que les documents, qui se trouveront dans les bâtiments Gouvernementaux et dans les locaux privés, délaissés par leurs propriétaires.
4. De disposer, suivant ses nécessités, de tous les biens meubles appartenant au Gouvernement, à l'exception de ceux qui appartiennent à l'Administration Militaire, et de procéder à la vente des biens, meubles, et immeubles confisqués chez les habitants indigènes.
5. D'employer les sommes mises à la disposition du Conseil pour les dépenses nécessaires.

Il est entendu qu'il sera fait au Conseil une avance de fonds par les Puissances auxquelles appartiennent les membres du Gouvernement Provisoire à l'effet de faire face aux premières dépenses avant la régularisation de la situation financière de la ville. Les sommes seront remboursées sur les premiers fonds provenant de la perception des taxes et impôts.

En outre de ses droits de haute police le Gouvernement Provisoire sera également investi du pouvoir judiciaire. Il pourra, en conséquence, infliger des amendes aux indigènes, confisquer leurs biens, et au besoin les punir de bannissement et de la peine de mort ; en ce qui concerne les étrangers, tant militaires que civils, le Conseil n'exercera sur eux que des droits de police. Les étrangers qui contreviendront aux Règlements seront arrêtés et procès-verbal de leur interrogatoire sera immédiatement dressé.

Ils seront ensuite remis dans le délai de vingt-quatre heures aux autorités Militaires ou Consulaires dont ils relèvent.

Le Gouvernement Provisoire sera assisté sous son contrôle par le service ci-après :—

1. Chancellerie Générale du Conseil.

2. Service de sûreté.

3. Service de santé.

4. Trésorerie.

5. Administration des biens du Gouvernement, ainsi que de ceux délaissés par les particuliers.

6. Section militaire.

7. Section judiciaire.

8. Bureau de l'alimentation publique.

En dehors de ces services généraux, chaque membre du Conseil a un cabinet particulier.

Les fonctions de chacun de ces services sont définies par leur dénomination même ; quant aux détails du service, ils seront déterminés par des instructions spéciales du Conseil.

Chaque section administrative est composée d'un Chef de Service et d'un certain nombre d'employés suivant les besoins.

Le personnel de l'Administration peut être choisi parmi les militaires et parmi les civils.

Toutes les personnes attachées au service d'un Gouvernement étranger qui feront partie de l'Administration de Tien-tsin conserveront leur poste actuel, ainsi que le traitement additionnel dans les mêmes proportions que celui alloué à ceux qui feront partie du Gouvernement Provisoire sans occuper de position officielle.

Il sera établi trois catégories de traitements, selon la position des fonctionnaires :—

Chef de Service, 800*l.* par an.

Sous-Chef ou adjoints, 600*l.* par an.

Employés secondaires, 300*l.* par an.

Les salaires du personnel indigène seront fixés par le Conseil.

*Tien-tsin, le 10 (23) Juillet, 1900.*

(Translation.)

THE town of Tien-tsin having been occupied by the allied troops, it has been decided to constitute a Provisional Administration under the form of "Council of the Provisional Government of the Chinese city of Tien-tsin."

The jurisdiction of this Council will extend over the city of Tien-tsin itself and over the surrounding territories as far as the mud wall, with the exception of—

1. The foreign Concessions : German, English, French, and Japanese.

2. The arsenals, camps, railways, telegraphs, and other military institutions already occupied by the allied troops.

The Provisional Government will deal with the following questions :—

1. The re-establishment of order and security within the boundaries of the city on the territory subject to their jurisdiction.

2. The ordering of sanitary measures in the city, on this territory, and in the surrounding country, in order to prevent epidemic and other diseases.

3. They will facilitate the quartering of the allied forces, and will procure them provisions and means of transport, beasts of burden, carts, boats, coolies, &c.

4. They will draw up an inventory of, and will take the measures necessary for preserving, the moveable and immovable property belonging to the Chinese Government, as well as that of private individuals left behind by them.

5. They will take measures to prevent famine among the natives.

The Provisional Government will be represented by a Council composed of three members enjoying equal rights, elected by a meeting of the Military Commanders of the allied Powers operating in Pechili.

The Council, deriving its authority from all the Powers, will enjoy absolute independence on the territory confided to it, and will comply as far as possible with all requests addressed to it either by the Commanders of the allied forces or by the Consuls of the foreign Powers.

In case of a difference of opinion arising between the Council and one of the Commanders of the allied forces, or between the Council and one of the Consuls, the question will be submitted to the arbitration of the assembled Commanders of the allied forces or to that of the Consular Body, according to the character of the dispute.

If an arrangement cannot be come to by this procedure the difference will be submitted to the decision of their respective Governments.

The Council will have the right—

1. To draw up and publish Regulations upon questions interesting the Provisional Government.

2. To impose upon the natives duties, taxes, and contributions, and to collect the taxes due to the Chinese Government.

3. To seize or take under its control all the securities, as well as the documents which shall be found in the Government buildings and in private houses deserted by their owners.

4. To make use, according to its requirements, of all the moveable property belonging to the Government, with the exception of that belonging to the Military Administration, and to proceed to the sale of the confiscated personal and real property of the native inhabitants.

5. To employ the sums placed at the disposal of the Council for the necessary expenditure.

It is understood that an advance of funds shall be made to the Council by the Powers to which the members of the Provisional Government belong, with a view to meet the first expenditure before the finances of the city have been put in order. The sums will be repaid out of the first money available from the collection of taxes and dues. Besides their rights of police, the Provisional Government will also be invested with the judicial power. They will, in consequence, be able to inflict fines upon the natives, to confiscate their goods, and, if necessary, punish them with banishment or the death penalty. As regards foreigners, both military and civilian, the Council will only exercise police rights over them. Foreigners who contravene the Regulations will be arrested, and a record of their examination will be drawn up immediately. They will then, within twenty-four hours, be handed over to their own military or Consular authorities.

The Provisional Government will be assisted, under their control, by the following Departments, which will be under their control :—

1. General chancery of the Council.

2. Police Department.

3. Sanitary Department.

4. Treasury.

5. Administration of the property of the Government as well as of that abandoned by private persons.

6. Military section.

7. Judicial section.

8. Office of public food supplies.

Besides these general Departments each member of the Council has a private office.

The functions of each of these Departments are defined by their designations. As regards the details of the Department, they will be determined by special instructions of the Council.

Each administrative section is composed of a Head of Department and of such a number of employés as may be required.

The personnel of the Administration may be chosen among soldiers and civilians.

All persons attached to the service of a foreign Government who shall be members of the Administration of Tien-tsin will keep their present posts, as well as the additional salary, in the same proportions as that allotted to those who are members of the Provisional Government without occupying an official position.

There will be three categories of salaries, according to the position of the functionaries :—

Head of Department, 800*l.* a-year.

Deputy head or assistants, 600*l.* a-year.

Secondary employés, 300*l.* a-year.

The salaries of the native personnel will be fixed by the Council.

*Tien-tsin, the 10th (23rd) July, 1900.*



No. 348.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, July 29, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of some pages from the Viceroy's register of telegrams sent by his Excellency from the 10th to the 15th ultimo.

The pages were found in the Viceroy's Yamên and given to me by Mr. Evans, of the British and Foreign Bible Society.

The record of these telegrams appears to prove beyond question that the telegraph line to Peking was interrupted on the 11th June, that the Viceroy was doing his best to protect the missionaries in different parts of the province, and that he was in accord with the Viceroys and Chang Chih-tung and probably Liu K'un-yi up to the 15th June as to the policy to be pursued.

The receipt, on the 15th June, of Imperial Orders seems to have forced the Viceroy and General Nieh to assume an attitude of hostility towards foreigners, which they had not taken up to that date.

With regard to the British missionaries mentioned, I am glad to be able to report that Dr. Cochrane escaped from Chao Yang via Newchwang, and that the Missions at Lê Ling and Hsiao-chau in the south of this province threw themselves, at my suggestion, under the protection of the Governor of Shantung, and were escorted to the coast whence they took sail to Chefoo.

I am still without definite information as to the fate of those in Pao Ting-fu, but fear that some, if not all, have been killed.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

Inclosure in No. 348.

*Register of Telegrams dispatched by the Viceroy of Pechili.**June 10, 1900.*

(Translation.)

No. 299.—To Tsung-li Yamên.

Consular Body has written officially that about 1,000 men will be sent to Peking for protection of Legations.

No. 300.—To two Commissioners (Financial and Judicial at Paoting-fu).

Whether the action taken by Kang Yi and Chao Shu-chiao is successful or not, though the troops are ordered by them to retire, it will still be necessary to take careful measures for defence.

No. 301.—To Railway Office.

300 German soldiers have arrived at station. Permission is requested for their carriage to Peking.

No. 302.—To two Commissioners (Paoting-fu).

The Missions in Paoting-fu are in great danger. Request that vigorous measures should be concerted for their protection.

No. 303.—To Hsing and Yang (Military Commandants).

Reply on behalf of General Nieh. The necessary supplies have already been dispatched.

*June 11, 1900.*

No. 304.—To Se-ling-e (Lieutenant-General in Fengtien).

English Consul writes that Mission at Chao Yang is in great danger. Orders for its protection are requested.

No. 305.—To Wu Taotai (Nanking Arsenal).

Requests him to visit Liu K'un-yi, Chang Chih Tung, Yu Taotai, Tsen Taotai, and requests that funds from Huai Au be transmitted.

No. 306.—To Shen Taotai (Tung-chou).

Peking-Tien-tsin telegraph interrupted. Propose to dispatch telegrams by soldiers from your office in order to secure dispatch.

No. 307.—To Sheng Hsüan-huai (Railway Commissioner, &c.).

Instructions have been given to the Local Magistrates in Paoting-fu and Chengting-fu to do their best to protect foreigners there.

No. 308.—To Li An Tang (Brigadier-General at Tung-chou).

Reply to telegram. The Military Ordnance Office (in Tien-tsin) has been written to issue shell after inquiry. Two companies can be withdrawn.

No. 309.—To Hsiug (Military Commandant) for transmission to Yang.

Reply to telegram. For the present can only be stationed temporarily. When it is seen what action is taken by Kang Yi, definite instructions can be given as to movements.

No. 310.—To Hsing.

Your letters have been received.

No. 311.—To Chang (Colonel at Paoting-fu).

On card sent to Kang Yi, you should speak of me as "later born." Why do you speak of me as foolish elder brother?

*June 12, 1900.*

No. 312.—To Hsing Commandant.

Telegram has just been received from General Nieh asking that instructions be transmitted to Commandant Yang to remove his force quickly to protect Paoting-fu.

No. 313.—To two Commissioners at Paoting-fu.

United States' Consul writes for speedy protection of missionaries of his country.

No. 314.—To two Commissioners at Paoting-fu.

English Consul writes that Missions are in great danger. Hope that prompt protection will be afforded.

No. 315.—To Colonel Chang (Paoting-fu).

Orders have already been given to Commissariat Office to issue provisions for camp recently enrolled.

No. 316.—To Commissariat Office.

Asks that provisions be issued to camp recently enlisted by Colonel Chang.

No. 317.—To Li, Taotai (at Chefoo).

Admiral Yeh has already been told that if there is any alarm at Chefoo he is to land and afford protection.

*June 13, 1900.*

No. 318.—To Railway Office.

Further telegram received and repeated despatches written to French Consul not to increase force. If he insists on increasing by force, consult with Chang Yi.

No. 319.—To Chang Taotai.

Force taken to Lai-shui may be withdrawn back to Tien-tsin.

No. 320.—To Sung Ch'ing (General at Shanhaikuan).

I hear that Russian troops from Port Arthur are proceeding to Shanhaikuan and Peitaiho. Is this the case?

No. 321.—To Shan Commander-in-chief.

Further details regarding Boxer rebels.

No. 322.—To Yuan Shih K'ai, Governor of Shan Tung.

The United States' Consul writes regarding Mission at Pang-chia-chuang, in Tê-chou, asking for protection.

No. 323.—To Yuan Shih K'ai.

English Consul writes regarding three British missionaries who on their way to Ho Nan stopped for a time at Tê-chou; on account of the road not being quiet they dare not advance. He also asks that if rebels threaten the Missions at Chichou and Laoling, on the border of Shan Tung, you will send troops for their speedy protection.

*June 14, 1900.*

No. 324.—To Liu-kun-yi (Viceroy at Nanking).

Reply to two telegrams.

No. 325.—To General's Yamên at Peking.

Sent on behalf of General Nieh.

- No. 326.—To General Mei (in south of Chihli Province).  
 Foreigners from Chi-chou put on board boat. Very good.  
 (They were escorted from their home and sent under military escort. An officer came here by General Mei's orders to report their safe arrival.—W. R. CARLES.)  
 No. 327.—To Shang (Magistrate at ? ).  
 Consult with General Mei as to condition and action of rebels.

June 15, 1900.

- No. 328.—To two Commissioners.  
 Sent on behalf of General Nieh. Imperial orders have been received commanding brigade to be all stationed at Tien-tsin. Requests Commandants Hsing and Yang.  
 No. 329.—To two Commissioners.  
 Five camps under Hsing and Yang are ordered by Emperor to Tien-tsin. General Nieh must be consulted as to their detention (at Paoting-fu).  
 No. 330.—To Ting-chieh, Financial Commissioner (at Paoting-fu).  
 Lu (Governor of Kiang Su) detains Magistrate Lo. What will you do in the matter ?  
 No. 331.—To Colonel Chang at Paoting-fu.  
 Acquaint Chang Taotai if they (the Boxers) are tranquillized (by peaceful measures), he may withdraw his camps to Tien-tsin.  
 No. 332.—To Liu Kun Yi (Viceroy at Nanking).  
 Telegraph to Peking is interrupted. Memorial by telegraph can be transmitted hence by mounted messenger.  
 No. 333.—To Chang Chih-tung (Viceroy-at Wuchang).  
 My Memorial to the Throne agrees entirely with that of your two Excellencies. Your Memorial has been sent on by mounted messenger.

No. 349.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, July 31, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of an Imperial Edict of the 18th instant, enjoining protection of the Legations in Peking, and of foreigners generally throughout the provinces.

Provision is also to be made for losses incurred by foreigners through proceedings which were not acts of war.

The high authorities are at the same time instructed to put down the pillaging, murdering, and maltreatment of law-abiding people, which has taken place at the hands of brigands and rebels.

With reference to the last paragraph, the information which has reached me within the last few days is to the effect that the Boxers, who were disheartened for a time by the capture of Tien-tsin by the allied forces, and through the loss of some of their leaders, are now mustering in great force in villages and towns 20 miles to the west of Tien-tsin, and also in places lying a few miles off the high road to Peking.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

Inclosure in No. 349.

*Imperial Decree.*

(Translation.)

THE commencement of difficulties between foreign Powers and China in the present instance was due to the mutual differences between Christians and people.

Subsequently the Taku forts were captured, which caused hostilities to break out; but the Court rightly attaching great importance to foreign relations was loth to be hasty in breaking them off, and repeatedly issued Edicts ordering the protection of the Legations, and instructed the Viceroys to protect missionaries. Hostilities have not yet ceased, and there are great numbers of merchants of every country in China; it is

right that they should all receive protection, and we order Commanders-in-chief, Viceroy, and Governors concerned to ascertain what foreign merchants and missionaries there are in the Treaty ports, as well as in the various Prefectures, Departments, and districts of the interior, and to continue to be vigilant in affording them every one proper protection, in accordance with Treaty; there must be no remissness.

When the Japanese Secretary, Sha Shan Bin, was killed last month, we were profoundly astonished at (such an) extraordinary occurrence, but this is not all, for now there is the further case of the German Minister\* being killed.

The said Minister\* being resident in Peking for the performance of international duties, his suddenly being wounded and killed is all the more greatly to be lamented, and it is our duty to issue stringent orders for the apprehension of the murderers and their punishment.

As regards murders of foreigners and missionaries at Tien-tsin, subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities (not including casualties caused in the fighting, but only those due to wanton disorder), and damage to and loss of property, we order the Prefect of Peking and the Viceroy of Chihli to order their subordinates to investigate the cases, and, after receiving instructions, to deal with them collectively.

The burning by brigands and rebels in various places, and the pillaging, murdering, and maltreatment of law-abiding people is still more intolerable, and the said Viceroy and all military commanders of troops and high officials are hereby commanded to investigate the real facts, and act as opportunity serves for the suppression of the rebels, so that the disturbance may be cut off at its source.

Let this general Decree be made known. Respect this!

Dated 22nd of 6th moon, 18th July, 1900.

No. 350.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

Tien-tsin, August 6, 1900.

I HAD the honour of telegraphing to your Lordship yesterday that the Chinese had been driven out of Peitsang and were in full retreat.

The allied forces had moved out of Tien-tsin the previous day, from 16,000 to 20,000 strong, and made the attack early yesterday morning, capturing Peitsang at 7 A.M.

The Russians, French, and Austrians were checked in their advance through the country on the east bank of the river having been purposely inundated by the enemy.

But the forces on the west bank of the river moved rapidly forward. General Gaselee's intention was to advance to Yangtsun as soon as possible.

The Japanese force has lost heavily. Our own casualties, so far as is known, are few.

The field telegraph was not in working order this morning, and it is not known what point has been reached, nor have full details of yesterday's action been received by General Dorward.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

P.S.—The weather is very favourable to an advance. Very little rain has fallen, and the temperature is lower than is customary at this season.

W. R. C.

No. 351.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 17.)*

My Lord,

Tien-tsin, August 6, 1900.

IT is extremely difficult to obtain any trustworthy information about the situation in Peking.

But it would appear that during the latter part of June and the first half of July the

\* The word used is an objectionable term.

Empress-Dowager, either purposely or otherwise, lost control of the Government, and that Prince Tuan was for some time the guiding spirit.

The Boxers in the province had for months previously claimed Tung Fu-hsiang as their patron, but after the irruption of Boxers into the capital on the 13th June, Prince Tuan assumed the position of being their head.

Kang Yi and Chao Shu-chiao had shown great sympathy with the Boxer movement, and after the riots at Feng Tai, and the murder of Messrs. Robinson and Norman at Yung-ching, were sent to preach to the Boxers on the doctrine of peace. On their return from this mission they appear to have been somewhat discredited, and not to have been so prominent at Peking as before.

Prince Ching and the Grand Councillor Jung-lu appear to have been the only persons among the leading statesmen in Peking who acted as any check on Prince Tuan or General Tung.

The capture of Tien-tsin by the allied forces acted temporarily as a shock, which made it necessary for the anti-foreign party to reconsider their line of action. An informal armistice was accordingly arranged, and the Empress-Dowager and Emperor were brought again to the front.

The presents of "provisions" which were sent to the Legations in token of the Imperial desire for their welfare, consisted, according to news brought from Peking, of fruits and cakes sent from the Palace. The Chinese text of the telegram received from the Governor of Shan Tung by the Consular Body at Chefoo, dated Chinan Fu, the 2nd August, only speaks of vegetables, fruit, and eatables, a present which may have been sent more to "relieve the anxiety of foreign Governments," to quote the words of the Tsung-li Yamèn's message, than to supply the Legation with food.

From the Edicts which I have seen it seems to me probable that they are not the Edicts of any individual Ruler, but of the dominant party of the hour.

The same thing is visible in the attacks made upon the Legations. If the destruction of the Legation had been ordered by the Empress-Dowager the guns on the city walls could have effected this without much loss of life to the Chinese.

I imagine that the Empress-Dowager has preferred to remain in the background and thence watch with interest the struggle for life made by the foreigners in the Legations, who, in her opinion, must have enjoyed the same security as that of a mouse played with by a cat, and have afforded the same amusement to the spectator.

The issue of the struggle must to her mind have been beyond doubt, and the only question have been whether their death would result from starvation or massacre.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

No. 352.

*Consul Fraser to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 17.)*

My Lord,

*Ichang, August 7, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that at noon on the 2nd August I received at Chungking your Lordship's orders (conveyed through the Consulate-General at Shanghai in a cypher telegram) to remove myself and the European community from Chungking by the British steamer "Pioneer."

I had for weeks past been shipping away missionary families from Chungking and from the interior in native boats, otherwise it would have been impossible to succeed, as I did, in removing to the "Pioneer" that same evening all but a few persons who had, like those removed, ample time to go by the "Pioneer," but bravely refused to go, in spite of all remonstrances, and chose to stay behind and affront danger with the view of helping those expected from the interior during the next few weeks. The names of these gallant men deserve to be recorded: Mr. Wm. Hyslop, China Inland Mission; Mr. Brill, of Chicago; and Mr. Nicolson, of A. J. Little's.

On the afternoon of the 2nd August the demeanour of the native populace was markedly more threatening. They yelled at me, "Kill the foreign devil," but did not resort to any violence. With half-a-dozen other armed Europeans, including a Frenchman and a German, I was able to get through the least frequented streets (or rather alleys) and the quietest of the City gates without molestation at about 8 P.M. just before it closed for the night, and, the night being bright, we were able to fetch up at the "Pioneer," anchored and moored on the other side of the Yang-tsze, without accident, except that

some valuable things were snatched from the baggage bearers. To save the Taotai's "face," however, I sent him a letter to say I had obtained leave of absence for a time, but hoped soon to return.

The Japanese Consul wrote to me regretting his inability to leave for a few days. He was to leave by native boat in a day or two, he told me; and Captain Mori, of the Japanese steamer "Ta Jüan," told me, on the "Pioneer's" arrival at Ichang, that the Consul would be here soon by native boat with his nationals.

The French priests, including a Bishop, had long ago made known their firm intention of staying till the last. The French Consul sent his archives on board on the evening of the 2nd, with the Consular doctor (and Acting Chancellor), Dr. Laville, of the French army. The French Consul asked me to detain the steamer till 8 A.M. of the 3rd, but I informed him the "Pioneer" must leave at daylight. She left about 6 A.M. on the 3rd.

The American Acting Vice-Consul, Mr. Lewis, a missionary, was picked up by the "Pioneer" from a native boat *en route* with others.

Starting with twenty-six passengers, we picked up daily native boats with European, Canadian, and American refugees (all missionaries), until, before arrival at Ichang, we had ninety passengers on board, including many women and a score of children. One of the refugee parties we picked up were in serious difficulties, the skilled boatmen having deserted and an *ex tempore* crew hired to replace them, a dangerous expedient amongst these furious rapids and whirlpools. The picking up of refugees made the journey down, which should be for the "Pioneer" less than twenty-four steaming hours for the 400 miles, last two days and a-half, and we arrived at Ichang on the afternoon of the 5th August instead of on the afternoon of the 4th. Yesterday I sent to your Lordship a telegram, reporting that Chungking community to the number of ninety had arrived at Ichang with me, including, besides sixty-three British subjects, twenty-four Americans, two Germans, and one Frenchman.

As Captain Plant says he could take the "Pioneer" up again, I am keeping that vessel until I receive from Admiral Seymour a reply to an urgent telegram which I sent to his Excellency immediately on arrival here, submitting a suggestion that she should go up again with some men and some light ordnance. Most of the Chungking refugees have gone on to Hankow by other steamers. More are expected here soon from up-country.

I cannot conclude without referring in terms of the highest praise to the help given me throughout the crisis by Captain Plant, Mr. Moorhead, Acting Commissioner of Customs, and Mr. J. Holton Bush, of the Pritchard-Morgan Syndicate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) M. F. A. FRASER.

No. 353.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 17.)*

My Lord,

Shanghai, August 11, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a report on the situation at Kiukiang, dated the 6th instant, which I have received from the Acting British Consul at that port.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

Inclosure in No. 353.

*Acting Consul Clennell to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

Sir,

Kiukiang, August 6, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that the unrest which prevailed here during the greater part of July has greatly subsided during the last ten days, though reports of naval movements on the lower river seem to be still causing alarm among certain sections of the natives, and a gradual exodus to the interior continues.

I attribute the cessation of excitement in part to the action of the officials, and in part to the fact that 500 Hunanese soldiers, who had been quartered close to the back of the Concession since the 3rd July, were removed on the 27th, their place being taken by a "ying" of Kiangsi men, whose behaviour has been scrupulously correct, praise I cannot bestow upon their predecessors. In particular, the new soldiers did good service in extinguishing and keeping order at a rather serious fire on the 31st July, which threatened to involve the Roman Catholic hospital.

There are now about 3,000 soldiers of one sort or another at Kiukiang; as many more at Huk'ou, a few at Takut'ang, and perhaps others at places in the vicinity. The numbers vary from day to day, and reliable information is hard to obtain. The activity lately observed at Matung is said to have ceased.

Three Chinese gun-boats, the "Pao Min," "Chin-ho," and "Feiting" have visited Kiukiang since the 20th July. I have telegraphed their names and dates of their departure to the Foreign Office. They all landed guns, small arms, and military stores. The "Feiting" is still here.

The force both of men and of guns, of which eighteen have, I am told, been added during the present crisis, seems now (if it should unfortunately be directed against us) far too considerable to be coped with by one gun-boat.

I have sent a report on the military movements observed since my arrival here to await Captain M. E. Willoughby, care of Her Majesty's Consul at Chinkiang, the place appointed to be Captain Willoughby's head-quarters.

The officials appear imbued with the idea that an Agreement exists under which our Government undertakes not to enter the Yang-tsze in force or to occupy Wusung, and have expressed themselves several times in conversation, and at least once in a Proclamation, as if their obligation to protect us were contingent on our adhering to this understanding. On the 7th July, Her Majesty's ships "Linnet" and "Woodcock" happening to have been in this port simultaneously for two days, the Chên't'ai wrote to protest against their joint presence.

The impression that this is their view is strengthened by the communication to me on the 4th instant of an Imperial Edict, dated the 24th July.

You are doubtless acquainted with this document, and have observed that, while it protests against the idea of China desiring to take the offensive against the Powers, it also emphasizes the necessity of protecting Chinese territory against invasion. As it reaches the Kiukiang Taotai through his Excellency the Viceroy at Nanking, who orders the Taotai to obey it, it seems fair to assume that his Excellency acknowledges it as a command, which he is bound to obey.

While I think they will ultimately side with the winner in the present troubles, the publication of the Decrees of the 29th June and of the 17th and 24th July is sufficient evidence that the officials in these provinces have so far by no means renounced their allegiance to the Government to which they owe their appointment. They acknowledge freely enough that "the northern affair has been mismanaged;" they admit, though with much reserve, that high officials in the capital have been guilty of criminal conduct (denying, for instance, that Prince Tuan ever proclaimed himself Emperor); but, if they saw a chance of success, my impression is that they would gladly employ all the forces at their disposal to defend the Manchu dynasty, perhaps even to reinstate it if it should be overthrown.

They would like peace to be preserved on the Yang-tsze, but are hedging against either event. Prudence and a regard for their revenue restrain them from violent courses, and so far they have preserved order, on the whole, exceedingly well, but they have not as yet thrown in their lot with the allied Powers.

Since the riot at Jaochou on the 21st July, I regret to say that several smaller disturbances in the interior have been reported, *e.g.*, at Wu Paitzu (near Chichou, Hupei), at Wuch'êng, and one or two others. No Europeans have been injured in person, but several chapels have been destroyed.

The rumour of a riot at Ki An has not been confirmed; on the contrary, my last news is that all was quiet there, and the officials doing their duty.

The situation at Yung Hsin Hsien (near Hunan border) was reported to be critical. The resident missionaries (three Finnish and one Canadian) had left.

At Kanchou all was quiet; the women and children have arrived here in safety.

At Linkiang Mr. Lawson was requested by the officials to remain, as the place was considered safe. Accordingly, after escorting his family to Kiukiang, he has returned to his station.

All the British and American missionaries at Nanch'ang, Nank'ang, Wuch'êng,

Jaochou, Huk'ou, and, in general, the nearer parts of Kiangsi have arrived here or gone on to Shanghai.

When I last heard, it was intended to leave two unmarried men at Fuchou and Chiench'ang, recalling all others in that region.

The district which gives me the gravest anxiety is the Kuanghsin Valley. At a recent date there were in that region the following Protestant lady missionaries:—

At Anjên, 4; at Kueich'i, 9; at Yi Yang, 3; at Ho K'ou, 4; at Yang K'ou, 3; at Kuang-fêng, 3; and at Yü Shan, 10. Total, 36.

None of these have come in as yet, and by last accounts Yü Shan and Yi Yang were in a very disturbed state. I am in possession of an inflammatory placard from Yi Yang.

What with the Jaochou riot on the one side and the rebellion in Chêkiang on the other, I can only regard this section of the country as in a very critical position.

Mr. Orr Ewing left a week ago to visit these stations, and will, I still trust, be able to take steps for the removal of these ladies to places of safety. He left armed with despatches from the Taotai to the Magistrate at Anjên and the Prefect of Kuanghsin Fu.

As I have informed you by telegram Kuling is quite quiet, but almost evacuated. I believe that at this moment the only foreigners there are Messrs. Broomhall, Bevis, and Ambler. There is a Chinese guard of twenty men, who have hitherto behaved well and to whom a substantial reward has been promised if they continue to do so.

One case of theft has been reported to me; the stolen articles were found on the thief's person, and he was handed over to the Magistrate here.

Work still continues at the new school-house. As the evacuation of Kuling has thrown a large number of people out of employment, I think that we have reason to be both surprised and rejoiced that its consequences were not far more serious than they have been.

Several foreign houses are left vacant in Kiukiang itself. I have a case in my hands where a house in the city, evacuated by the Misses Johnston and left in charge of the officials, has been entered and pillaged of property worth probably 470 to 500 dollars.

There is a half-caste family of four children still in Kiukiang, otherwise no foreign women and children.

Import trade was lately pretty nearly at a standstill, except coal from Japan.

Export trade, however, is brisk, cargo being shut out from steamers, and the Russian tea factories are working busily.

I received from the Taotai last night a letter saying that six men (named) had been executed for participation in the Chingtê Chên riot.

The recruits who took part in the Jaochou riot, having been enlisted by an officer specially deputed by the Viceroy, appear to have been sent down to Nanking to be dealt with.

The telegram which I sent you yesterday, inquiring whether there was any necessity for removing the male community was prompted by one received from Admiral Seymour by the Commander of Her Majesty's ship "Linnet," in which Sir Edward asked to be informed immediately the community was withdrawn.

While drafting the present despatch I received your reply. I am very glad to learn that you see no present need to withdraw from this port, for I feel that to do so, unless we are absolutely driven out, would be a fatal mistake.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. J. CLENNELL.

No. 354.

*Consul Wilkinson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 17.)*

My Lord,

*Ningpo, August 10, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, with one exception, all British missionary ladies within the circuits whose centres are Ningpo and Wenchow have been withdrawn either to Shanghai or to Ningpo.

The accompanying map, taken from the Decennial Reports, 1891, of the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs, shows this Province of Chekiang as divided into fourteen



Prefectures. These fourteen are grouped into four circuits, each presided over by a Taotai (Intendant), thus:—

No.	Circuit.	Prefectures.	Seat of Government.
1	Hang-chia-hu ..	Hangchow, Kashing, Huechow ..	Hangchow.
2	Ning-shao-t'ai ..	Ningpo, Shaohsing, Taichow ..	Ningpo.
3	Wen-ch'ü ..	Wenchow, Ch'üchou ..	Wenchow.
4	Kin-ch'ü-yen ..	Kinhwa, Ch'üchou, Yenchow ..	Ch'üchou.

Affairs in the first of these circuits would naturally fall to Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Hangchow to report; those in the second and third to Her Majesty's Consuls at Ningpo and Wenchow respectively. The fourth has been a no-man's-land; but as it forms the upper basin of the Ch'ien-t'ang River, at the mouth of which Hangchow is situated, I informally suggested some time since to Her Majesty's Acting Consul at that port that he should regard it as included in his sphere of duty. It is for this reason that I have not reported to your Lordship any of the recent unhappy occurrences in the Kinhua and Ch'üchou Prefectures. The western portion, moreover, of the Shaohsing Prefecture is more readily accessible to Hangchow than to Ningpo, and as, for that reason, the members of the Missions who suffered through the disturbances at Chuchi in the early part of last month betook themselves to Hangchow, I have assumed that Mr. King has reported through Mr. Warren the nature and extent of their losses.

From Wenchow Prefecture all the missionaries, Catholic as well as Protestant, withdrew on the 12th ultimo. Three members of the China Inland Mission revisited the port on the 30th July. They found their Mission compound intact, and quiet apparently restored in the city itself; but no satisfactory steps were being taken to stop the persecution of converts in the country districts.

The Brigadier, Intendant, and Prefect all wrote urging them to bring their families back to the port, and reside there, preferably on Conquest Island, but, in any case, close together, for better protection. They decided, however, "to await the time when those in authority would be not only willing but able to protect foreigners from the fanatical Secret Society men now so numerous in the hill country round Wenchow."

In the remaining Prefecture of the Wen-ch'ü circuit, Ch'üchou (not to be confounded with Ch'üchou), the resident missionaries, though affiliated to the China Inland Mission, are all Germans. Since the date of the recent troubles there, July 11th, no positive news has been received at Ningpo from or of them. It is reported, however, that they have retreated into Fuhkien Province.

As regards my own more particular charge, the Ning-shao-t'ai circuit, I hesitated for a long time to advise British missionaries to come in from the interior. For one thing, the authorities here, the Provincial Commander-in-chief and the Taotai, were loyally discharging their duty to protect foreign life and property, and I did not wish to initiate a measure which might seem to show that I, the only Consul at Ningpo, distrusted their ability to maintain order. For another, anything resembling a general exodus on the part of the missionaries would be exceedingly likely to cause a panic among the natives, and probably provoke attacks upon chapels and converts. At the same time it was impossible to be altogether blind to two sources of danger: the resentment felt, by officials and people alike, at what they consider undue interference by the missionaries on behalf of their converts, and the outrage on Chinese decorum caused by the keeping up by unmarried girls of households with no apparent male head. The former of these sentiments was fortunately not acute in this circuit, at least in regard to Protestant Missions; but the latter might at any time afford to the ill-disposed an excuse for mischief, as in the interior of Ning-shao-t'ai alone there were at least four establishments of unmarried missionary ladies, including among their inmates eleven British subjects. Accordingly I wrote, on the 24th ultimo, to the Director at Shanghai of the China Inland Mission, suggesting to him the advisability of withdrawing during the present troubles all unmarried missionary ladies from the interior of Chekiang. He replied that he was sending by telegraph instructions to this effect to his agents at Ningpo.

To those agents I expressed a verbal opinion that it would be more satisfactory if the married ladies also were brought in, stating at the same time that I did not consider the necessity equally strong. As regards their husbands and the unmarried missionaries, I

wished them to be guided by the condition of affairs in their respective neighbourhoods, of which condition I requested that I might be kept promptly informed. I took the opportunity to deprecate a too common practice among missionaries in the interior, of supplying to the newspapers full details of current events while keeping their Consuls in ignorance. A letter in this sense I addressed to their Director, who, I am happy to say, promptly replied that he "heartily agreed with the views expressed, and would impress upon his missionaries not only the advisability but the necessity of communicating to their Consul any facts regarding the situation in their districts."

On consideration of all the circumstances, the local agents of the China Inland Mission resolved to bring in from the interior not the ladies alone, but the whole of their missionaries. In one instance it has so far been found difficult to effect this. Mr. and Mrs. Richardson are stationed at T'ai-p'ing, a district town in T'aichow Prefecture. According to the last letter received from them, dated the 31st July, "outside the city for miles around it is not only unsafe at night, but in the day also. The officials have requested us not to travel, so that we are practically prisoners within the city walls." The Taotai, on my application, has promised to provide an escort for the Richardsons sufficiently large to insure a safe journey to the coast, and to instruct the Magistrate to guard their premises during their absence. I should observe that the disturbers of the peace in that district are not Boxers or anti-foreign rioters, but ordinary brigands such as have been the bane of T'aichow Prefecture for many years. These bandits are encouraged to more active mischief by the present disturbed condition of the Empire at large.

To avoid multiplying in this Report names of places and persons, I am appending in tabular form a list of missionaries resident in this province at the end of June last, showing their present situations. I trust to be able shortly to report that all belonging to this circuit are in safety.

For some reason the United States' Consul-General at Shanghae has, it is evident, arrived at the conclusion that even Ningpo is not secure, for he has advised his nationals to leave this port, and with one exception they have already gone or are on the point of going. I do not find myself in agreement with him. I believe that the Commander-in-chief and Intendant, with the officials under them, are bent on preserving the peace, and that unless some more pronounced intervention on the part of the allies takes place at Shanghae or in the Yang-tsze Valley too abruptly to allow time for its discounting here, peace will be preserved. Last month the Imperial Maritime Customs revenue at Ningpo was the highest on record, 100,742 Haikwan taels, and harvest prospects continue excellent. On the other hand, the exodus of Ningpo Chinese from Shanghae, to which I referred in my despatch No. 8 of the 6th ultimo, and which had abated by the 15th of that month, has recommenced, while news has just reached me of the contemplated withdrawal of foreigners from Hangchow.

In the meantime, the Provincial Government has taken the noteworthy step of deputing to at any rate the four Prefectures of Ningpo, Shaohsing, T'aichow, and Wenchow officials of the expectant rank of Prefect, specially charged with the care of Mission property. The Deputy to Ningpo, Wang Ch'in, called upon me on the 4th instant, when I took the opportunity to urge the claims to consideration of the converts who in some parts of the province, notably near Wenchow, are apparently abandoned by the authorities to the tender mercies of their heathen neighbours. I am not sure whether the mission of these Deputies is prompted by a sincere desire on the part of the Provincial Government to protect chapels and so avoid reclamation, or whether the many expectants of office at Hangchow have taken advantage of the situation to secure temporary employment. But, as I have said, I credit without reserve the local authorities at Ningpo with the wish and intention to maintain order.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. H. WILKINSON.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 354.

*Map of Chekiang Province.*

[Not printed.]

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Inclosure 2 in No. 354.  
MISSIONARIES in Chekiang Province, June-August 1900.  
(Except those in the Hang-chua-hu Circuit.)

Mission.	Name.	Nationality.	Station.	Remarks.
American Baptist	Rev. J. R. and Mrs. Goddard	American	Ningpo	Left for Shanghai.
Ditto	Dr. and Mrs. Grant	British	"	Remain at post.
Ditto	Miss Stewart	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss Corbin	American	"	Left for Shanghai.
Ditto	Miss Goddard	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Rev. T. D. and Mrs. Holmes	"	Kinhwa	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss Righter	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss Minniss	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss Relyea	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Rev. C. E. and Mrs. Bousfield	British	Shaohsing	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss Newell	American	"	Ditto.
American Presbyterian	Rev. J. E. and Mrs. Shoemaker	"	Yüyao	Mr. Shoemaker is at Ningpo; wife has left for Shanghai.
Ditto	Miss Morton	"	Ningpo	Left for Shanghai.
Ditto	Miss Cunningham	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss Rolleston	"	"	Ditto.
China Inland	Rev. J. Meadows	British	Shaohsing	Remains at post.
Ditto	Miss Meadows	"	"	Has come to Ningpo.
Ditto	Rev. W. H. and Mrs. Warren	"	"	Mr. Warren remains at post; wife has come to Ningpo.
Ditto	Miss Jones	"	Sim-ch'ang	Left for Shanghai.
Ditto	Miss Davidge	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss Ramsten	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss McDonald	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss Bennett	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Miss Blything	"	"	Staying at Ningpo
Ditto	Rev. J. Palmer	"	"	Remains at post.
Ditto	Rev. K. McLeod	"	Ningpo	Ditto.
Ditto	Rev. A. Miller	"	"	Ditto.
Ditto	Rev. E. F. Knickerbocker and Mrs. K.	"	Fenghua	Ditto.
Ditto	Rev. W. J. Doherty	American	Ninghai	Leaving for Shanghai
Ditto	Rev. A. O. Loosley	British	T'ien-tai	At post.
Ditto	Rev. C. Fairclough	American	"	Coming in.
Ditto	Dr. and Mrs. Anderson	British	"	At post.
Ditto	Rev. A. Wilson	"	Taichow	Returned to Ningpo, August 8
Ditto	Miss Anderson	"	"	Ditto.

Mission.	Name.	Nationality.	Station.	Remarks.
China Inland	Mr. Rudland ..	British ..	T'ai-chow	Returned to Ningpo, August 8.
Ditto ..	Mr. Albertson ..	American ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. C. and Mrs. Thomson ..	British ..	Hung-yen	Returned to Ningpo, August 8. Mrs. Thomson left for home.
Ditto ..	Rev. W. and Mrs. Robertson ..	" ..	"	Returned to Ningpo, August 8.
Ditto ..	Miss Faulds ..	" ..	Lu-gyiao	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Ralston ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Richer ..	American ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Mr. and Mrs. Richardson ..	British ..	T'ai-p'ing	Remain at post.
Ditto ..	Rev. J. Kanderer ..	German ..	Sien-ku	Coming in.
Ditto ..	Rev. E. and Mrs. Hunt ..	British ..	Wenchow	Withdrawn, July 12.
Ditto ..	Rev. B. W. Upward ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Stayner ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Johnston ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Young ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Mrs. Green ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. and Mrs. Grierson ..	" ..	P'ing-yang	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. W. Grundy ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. E. C. Searie ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. R. Röhm ..	German ..	Ch'u-chou	Unknown.
Ditto ..	Rev. J. and Mrs. Bender ..	" ..	Lung-ch'üan	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Sichelshmidt ..	" ..	Tsin-yün	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Halbach ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Bäumer ..	" ..	Yün-ho	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Schüttenhassel ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Brunnenschweiler ..	" ..	Song-yang	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. H. Klein ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. E. Fröhlich ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. A. and Mrs. Wright ..	British ..	Yung-k'ang	Arrived Shanghai July 29.
Ditto ..	Rev. A. Hammond ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. J. Miller ..	" ..	Tsa-k'i	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Palmer ..	" ..	Lan-k'i	Retired to Shanghai
Ditto ..	Miss Tranter ..	" ..	Ch'ü-chou	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. D. and Mrs. Thompson ..	" ..	"	Murdered.
Ditto ..	Miss Sherwood ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Manchester ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Desmond ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Rev. and Mrs. Ward ..	" ..	Ch'ang-shan	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Thirgood ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Hopwood ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Christians	Miss L. Hopwood ..	" ..	Ningpo	At post.
Ditto ..	Miss G. Smith ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..	Miss Bettinon ..	" ..	"	Ditto.
Ditto ..		" ..	"	Left for Shanghai.



No. 355.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 18.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, September 18, 1900.*

A COPY of the Circular which Count Hatzfeldt has been instructed to communicate to your Lordship was handed to me to-day by Baron von Richthofen.

He said that it was Count von Bülow's conviction that, before entering into negotiations for peace, public opinion in Germany would require that the Government should obtain some satisfaction for the outrages committed in China. Moreover, if the ring-leaders in 1860 had been adequately punished, the present disturbances would, in his opinion, never have taken place.

No. 356.

*Mr. C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 18.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, September 18, 1900.*

I LEARN that the Russian Government have telegraphed to their Representatives in those countries, which are now engaged in China, instructing them to ascertain the opinions of the Governments on three points, which are as follows:—

Would the transfer of their Missions from Peking to Tien-tsin accord with the views of the Governments who are maintaining their troops in Peking?

Would Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching, in the character of Plenipotentiaries approved by the Chinese Government to carry on negotiations, be acceptable to those Governments; and would the Governments concerned give the necessary authority to enter on negotiations to their Representatives in China when once the latter had satisfied themselves as to the value of the guarantees put forward by the Plenipotentiaries?

I understand that the Austrian reply to the above points has been received, and is to the effect that their action will be in conformity with that of the other Governments interested.

No. 357.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 18, 1900.*

THE following telegram from Prince Ching has been communicated by the Chinese Minister:—

“The allied forces occupy Peking. The Emperor and the Mother-Empress left for the west. I am now invested with full powers to act as co-Plenipotentiary to his Excellency the Grand Secretary Li Hung-chang to open peace negotiations with foreign Powers. Please request Lord Salisbury, in taking into consideration the amicable relations existing between us, to be so good as to empower Sir C. MacDonald to negotiate with us as soon as possible so as to confer the benefits of peace upon humanity at large.”

Do you think it desirable to assent to Prince Ching's request?

No. 358.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 19.)*

My Lord,

*Tókió, August 13, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a note, which I have addressed to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, giving the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 10th instant, relative to the appointment of Field-Marshal Count Waldersee to command the international expedition to Peking.

In the absence of information as to the nature of the further instructions mentioned in your Lordship's telegram, I thought it best to omit any reference to them.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. B. WHITEHEAD.

Inclosure in No. 358.

*Mr. Whitehead to Viscount Aoki.*

M. le Ministre,

*Tókió, August 13, 1900.*

IN the course of the interview with which your Excellency honoured me on the 9th instant, you were so good as to inform me of the telegrams which had been exchanged between the German Emperor and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, on the subject of the supreme command of the allied forces in North China.

I now have the honour to state that I have received a telegram from the Marquess of Salisbury to the effect that Her Majesty's Government have accepted, so far as they are concerned, the proposal of the German Government that Field Marshal Count Waldersee shall be Commander-in-chief of the international expedition to Peking.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) J. B. WHITEHEAD.

No. 359.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Tókió, August 13, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during the interview I had with Viscount Aoki on the 9th instant, his Excellency informed me that the Chinese Minister had just been to see him, and had stated that the Peking Government were willing to send the foreign Ministers to Tien-tsin with a view to their safety, but that they refused to go. He then asked Viscount Aoki, on behalf of the Chinese Government to telegraph to Baron Nishi instructing him to leave Peking.

His Excellency replied by asking what guarantees the Peking Government could give that the foreign Ministers on leaving Peking would not be attacked and massacred by General Tung's fanatical soldiery.

The Chinese Minister had no suggestion to make in this respect. Viscount Aoki reminded him that he had repeatedly urged that Yuen Shi Kai or some other military commander of the moderate party should advance on Peking in co-operation with Japanese, British, or French troops, and should relieve the Legations. Until the Chinese had done something of this kind to prove their good faith, no foreign Government would trust them. His Excellency further pointed out that after what had occurred the Ministers naturally would not leave Peking with only a Chinese escort to depend on for safety, and that he was, therefore, unable to telegraph instructions to Baron Nishi in the sense desired.

No. 360.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 19, 1900.*

YOU will have received from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghae his telegram of the 14th instant in regard to missionaries in the Province of Shansi.

You will doubtless consider whether you can induce the Chinese Court, through the intermediary of Prince Ching or otherwise, to give orders that any missionaries still alive may be rescued and liberated.

No. 361.

*Viceroy of Nanking and Hankow to Sir Chihchen Loféngluh.—(Communicated by Sir Chihchen Loféngluh, September 20.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Nanking, September 19, 1900.

AN Imperial Edict has been issued to exterminate the Boxers.

The foreign missionaries in Paoting-fu and Chingting-fu were escorted by the order of the Acting Viceroy of Chihli and delivered to the care of the Commanders of the allied forces at Changsingtien and Lukouchiao.

It seems to us that the object of sending an expedition to Peking—first, to rescue the Representatives, and secondly, to suppress the insurrection—has been attained, and we hope that the allied Powers will soon appoint their Plenipotentiaries to open the peace negotiations with our Plenipotentiaries, and the British Government will be so good as to cease the sending of any more troops to the different ports, and to stick to the agreement for the preservation of order and peace of the Yang-tsze Valley, so as to confer the benefits of peace to humanity at large.

No. 362.

*Memorandum given to the Chinese Minister to be forwarded to the Chinese Government.*

LORD SALISBURY duly submitted to the Queen, his Sovereign, the telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China to Her Majesty, dated the 3rd July, which was forwarded by the Chinese Minister on the 11th of that month.

As Lord Salisbury informed the Chinese Minister on the 24th July, it was not possible for him to submit to Her Majesty any proposals for a reply to that message so long as the Queen was left in uncertainty as to the safety of her Envoy at Peking and communication with him was interrupted.

Now that by the efforts of the allied forces the European Legations have been rescued from the attacks of troops under the command of officers of the Emperor of China, the Chinese Minister has inquired whether a reply will not be sent to his Imperial Majesty's message.

The accounts which reach Her Majesty's Government of the treatment of British and other European missionaries in the Province of Shansi, where the Imperial Court is reported to be now residing, are of so distressing a nature that Lord Salisbury is, to his regret, still unable to submit such a message for Her Majesty's approval.

It is reported that a number of missionaries have been killed, some by the direct orders of the Governor of Shansi, and that the fate of a still larger number, including children, is still unknown.

The Queen has been deeply moved by the dreadful accounts which have reached her.

Until the Emperor has shown in some signal manner his disapproval of these shocking acts committed in the proximity of His Imperial Majesty's Court, and has issued stringent orders for the rescue of those sufferers who may still have survived, Lord Salisbury cannot advise Her Majesty to reply to the Emperor's message.

*Foreign Office, September 20, 1900.*

No. 363.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 20, 1900.

A MESSAGE from the Nanking and Hankow Viceroy was communicated to-day by the Chinese Minister, stating that an Imperial Edict had been issued ordering the extermination of the Boxers, and that the missionaries in Chengting-fu and Paoting-fu had been delivered over to the Commanders of the allied forces.

The Viceroy is of opinion that the object aimed at in the expedition to Peking



has been attained, viz., the rescue of the Legations and the suppression of the insurrection.

In these circumstances, they express the hope that Plenipotentiaries will be appointed by the Powers to carry on negotiations, and that no more troops will be sent by Her Majesty's Government to Chinese ports, and that the agreement with the Consuls in regard to the Yang-tsze Valley will be kept.

## No. 364.

*Count Hatzfeldt to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 21.)*

(Translation.)

My Lord,

*German Embassy, London, September 18, 1900.*

IN accordance with instructions received, I have the honour to make the following communication to your Excellency :—

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor consider that it should be a preliminary condition to entering upon diplomatic intercourse with the Chinese Government, that those persons who are ascertained to have been the first and real instigators of the offences against international law, committed at Peking, should be given up. The number of persons employed as instruments to carry out the criminal work is too great; an execution *en masse* would go against the civilized conscience. Circumstances will even prevent the possibility of ascertaining the names of all belonging to the group of the leaders. Those few of them, however, whose guilt is notorious, should be surrendered and punished. The Representatives of the Powers at Peking will be able to give, or to obtain, the most trustworthy evidence in this inquiry. It is not so important that a large number of persons should be punished as that the chief instigators and leaders should receive punishment. His Majesty's Government believe that they can count on the unanimity of all the Cabinets on this point, since indifference to the idea of just retribution would be equivalent to indifference to a repetition of the offence. The Government of His Majesty the Emperor therefore propose to the Cabinets concerned that they should instruct their Representatives at Peking to indicate those leading Chinese as to whose guilt in instigating or committing the crimes there is no room for doubt.

I should be much obliged if your Excellency would inform me whether Her Majesty's Government agree to this proposal in regard to the surrender of the guilty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. HATZFELDT.

## No. 365.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 21.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, September 20, 1900.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a report by Lieutenant C. G. R. Brandon, R. N., of Her Majesty's ship "Pique," on the training, &c., of the Chinese soldiers at Wuchang.

A similar letter has been sent to the War Office and India Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

## Inclosure in No. 365.

*Lieutenant Brandon to Captain Reynolds.*

Sir,

*"Pique," at Hankau, July 23, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with your orders, I accompanied the Consul-General and the Commissioner of Customs to Wuchang, and watched the exercising of the Chinese troops, all of whom have been drilled by German officers.

2. The following facts I picked up from various sources about the troops :—
3. In Chang-Chih-Tung's Viceroyalty there are 3,000 trained troops and 5,000 under training, and he intends raising 7,000 more.
4. The field guns are made in the Hankau Arsenal, which is run by Germans ; the ammunition is also obtained there.
5. There is a very large number of guns available for service ; I saw twenty-nine being exercised, 6-prs., rapid-loading breech-loading Krupp guns, with a range of 4,800 metres.
5. Twelve men form a gun's crew ; on service five horses are allowed to each gun, three carrying the gun and mounting, and two the ammunition, which is stored in boxes of ten rounds each.
6. The cavalry are armed with lances and swords, and carry a Mauser carbine slung on the back. None of the cavalry have yet finished their training.
7. The infantry carry the Mauser rifle and a short sword bayonet. The kit carried on service weighs about 35 lbs.
8. The usual company and skirmishing drills were carried out, Chinese words of command being used, and the German army step adopted.
9. The men appear to be of excellent physique ; they have all been through the gymnastic course, which is a mixture of the British, German, and Japanese. The gymnasium is large, and special attention is paid to jumping, with and without poles.
10. The officers have all been through the ranks, but the new Military School at Wuchang is expected to supply them in future.
11. All recruits have to be of decent family, and must be able to read and write. Their pay is about 8 dollars a-month.
12. The sappers and gunners are stated to be very clever at fortification, and also make excellent infantry, being trained in both branches.
13. I was informed that as long as the pay was received from the Viceroy the troops would fight his enemies, irrespective of nationality. What they would do should their pay not be forthcoming appears to be doubtful.
14. From what I saw, I am of opinion that these foreign drilled troops compare very favourably with our own men. A German officer told me that he considered them as intelligent as the average German soldier.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) CLAUDE BRANDON.

No. 366.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 22.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, September 20, 1900.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Salisbury, copy of a letter from the Commander-in-chief on the China Station, dated the 8th ultimo, reporting on the State of affairs in the Yang-tsze Valley.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 366.

*Vice-Admiral Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty.*

Sir,

*"Alacrity," at Shanghai, August 8, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that after my arrival at Shanghai on the 26th July I consulted Her Majesty's Consul-General, Mr. Pelham Warren, and some of the principal British residents on the state of affairs here. I found much disquiet and apprehension existing amongst the community, due to the fear that the two great Viceroyalties in the Yang-tsze Valley, viz., Liu Kun Yi at Nanking, and Chang Chih Tung at Wuchang (Hankau) might not be able to control their troops ; that if the troops were once out of hand there would be a general rising against foreigners throughout that region, and that the Settlement would be attacked, either by troops sent for that

purpose, or at least by hands of lawless Chinese from the Shanghae native city and surrounding country, the enormous wealth accumulated in the Settlement offering special temptation.

On the 27th July I held a meeting, at which the Chairman of the Local Defence Committee and others were present to ascertain their views. The general opinion was that 10,000 men were required to make Shanghae quite secure. The two military officers sent by General Gaselee for defence duties, Captain Davies and Captain G. D. S. Barrow, both agreed that this number was required unless they could rely on men and guns being landed from ships in the river. The number asked for was larger than I expected or myself thought at all urgently needed in all probability, and I therefore, in reporting to their Lordships, mentioned 5,000 as the number actually necessary. The meeting was strongly in favour of all British troops being sent, and, if not, that the Americans should join. This, no doubt, would be more acceptable to the Viceroy of Nanking than if foreigners of other nationalities were landed, but it was pointed out that the defence of the community was a matter in which all nations were interested, and would probably wish and insist on taking part.

A day or two later I took an opportunity of visiting the suburbs of the Settlement to see what would be the best line of defence to hold and the number of troops I thought required for it, and came to the conclusion that 3,000 troops, assisted by men and gun-fire from ships in the river might be expected to hold the Settlement against an attack in any probable force, and that 5,000 men could do so without assistance from the navy.

I would here mention that although the country about Shanghae is flat for miles, the numerous villages, trees, graves, and high reeds would enable an enemy to conceal their approach until close to the Settlement, and there are scarcely any buildings from which a good look-out can be obtained.

As soon as I arrived at Shanghae I asked Her Majesty's Consul-General to ascertain from the Consul at Nanking whether the Viceroy (Lin Kun Yi) would give me an interview, which I considered was desirable. The Viceroy replied that he was much prostrated by the heat, and would like me to defer my visit for a few days. On the 31st July I heard he could see me, and I therefore left Shanghae early on the 1st August in the "Alacrity" for Nanking. On passing the Chinese squadron just above Kiang Yin my flag was saluted and a cruiser detached to escort me up as an act of courtesy.

On the 2nd August I was received by the Viceroy in his Yamên at Nanking. I found him looking better than from previous reports I had expected, but still very frail and weak, although he conversed with animation during the interview, which he regretted must be short as he was unable to sit long (for physical reasons). He referred, with many kind expressions of regard, to our previous interview in 1898, and assured me that he entertained the same friendly feelings towards Great Britain as formerly. He spoke of the expedition towards Peking, and his pleasure at seeing me safely back. He said that the Ministers in Peking were safe and that Prince Ching was protecting them, but that the rebels were still too strong in Peking to be driven out, and that they held a great part of the city. The Empress and Emperor were, he thought, to be pitied in the present situation.

He raised no objection to the landing of troops, as I propose, at Shanghae, remarking that the protection of the Settlement was a matter left to ourselves, but he asked that the number might not be large, as he feared the excitement a numerous force might cause in these localities in the present agitated state of the people.

My visit was returned next day at the Foreign Office Yamên, lent to me for that purpose, the distance from the Viceroy's residence to the ship being too great a journey for him to undertake in his present health. At this interview the Viceroy referred to the foreign ships of war in the Yang-tsze Valley, and asked me to prevent others coming up, as in the present excited state of the people it might lead to an outbreak. He thought that one British ship at each port was sufficient to give protection to foreigners, and if other Powers sent ships the people would be afraid that they had come to divide up their country, and this they would fight to prevent. Great Britain, he knew, was friendly, and was only there to protect trade, and he remarked that if Great Britain would keep the peace on the waters of the Yang-tsze, China would do so on land. I said I would do what I could to assist him in this matter, telling him that our object was not at all the partition of China.

He assured me that on all matters referred to in our interviews both he and Chang-chih Tung (Viceroy at Wuchang) were of one mind. This he stated when I

consulted him as to the advisability of my proceeding to Hankau to interview Chang-chih Tung, which he thought was unnecessary and might perhaps disturb the people.

The opinion formed after my interviews with Liu-kung Yi is that he is quite sincere in his efforts to maintain peace in the Yang-tsze Valley, but that the people are in such an excited state of mind that it would take very little to cause a general rising against foreigners. The Viceroy, I believe, is doing his best to allay this feeling, and we should assist him as far as we can by doing nothing that may tend to further excite the people.

In making the passage between Shanghai and Nanking, I noticed that the armaments of some of the fortifications have been increased, and there were many signs of preparedness for the defence of the river. This is probably a defensive measure only, and a natural one to take in view of the large number of foreign ships of war of all nationalities now in China or being sent there. Unless this were done, it is likely that the people would rise against their Governors, believing as they do that the foreigners have intentions against the integrity of China.

Whatever differences there may be amongst the Chinese in different parts of China, there is now one bond, common to all—dislike of foreigners, and determination to resist aggression.

With reference to the 7th paragraph, I am sorry to say that since it was written the Viceroy has quite lately telegraphed down to ask that troops may not be landed here. Some having left Hong Kong, I telegraphed there to detain the rest at present. On the 11th I, with Her Majesty's Consul-General, had an interview with the Taotai of Shanghai, and we have got him to renounce his objection to troops coming, on local grounds. It still, however, remains for the Viceroy to cancel his request that they shall not land for fear of the effect created in the Valley of the Yang-tsze, and this the Consul-General and I are trying to get him to do.

The final result I cannot yet report, but while the Viceroy continues to object I shall probably feel I cannot land the troops, as our present policy is to work quite with him.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I have since heard that the Viceroy also has withdrawn his objections, but is very anxious that no other nation than Great Britain shall send troops here.

E. H. S.

No. 367.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 22.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, September 21, 1900.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 20th September, from Rear-Admiral, China, announcing the capture of the Pehtang forts.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 367.

*Rear-Admiral Bruce to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Taku, September 20, 1900, 1.10 P.M.*

PEHTANG forts captured by allies 20th September.

*United States' Acting Secretary of State to Mr. White.*—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Part 1.*—On 17th September the Chinese Minister presented copy of a Circular telegram from Prince Ching announcing appointment as Plenipotentiary, conjointly with Earl Li Hung-chang, to negotiate peace, and requesting that United States' Minister at Peking be instructed to open negotiations. The following reply has been handed to-day to Chinese Minister:—

“The Government of the United States accepts the Plenipotentiary authority of Earl Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching as *prima facie* sufficient for the preliminary negotiations, looking toward the return of the Imperial Chinese Government, and to the resumption of its authority at Peking, and toward the negotiation of a complete settlement by the duly appointed Plenipotentiaries of the Powers and of China. To these ends the United States' Minister in Peking will be authorized to enter into relations with Earl Li and Prince Ching, as the immediate Representatives of the Chinese Emperor.”

*Part 2.*—On 17th September the Russian Chargé delivered a Memorandum inquiring, first, whether the United States intends to transfer its Legation from Peking to Tien-tsin; secondly, if full powers of Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang are recognized by the United States as sufficient; and, thirdly, if the United States is prepared to charge its Representatives to enter forthwith upon preliminary negotiations with the Plenipotentiaries of the Chinese Emperor. The following Memorandum, in reply, has been sent to the Russian Chargé to-day:—

“(1.) The Government of the United States has not any present intention to withdraw its Legation from Peking; (2) the Government of the United States accepts the Plenipotentiary authority of Earl Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching as *prima facie* sufficient for the preliminary negotiations, looking toward the return of the Imperial Chinese Government, and to the resumption of its authority at Peking, and toward the negotiation of a complete settlement by the duly appointed Plenipotentiaries of the Powers and of China; (3) to these ends the United States' Minister in Peking will be authorized to enter into relations with Earl Li and Prince Ching as the immediate Representatives of the Chinese Emperor.”

*Part 3.*—On 18th September the German Chargé communicated by note the Imperial German Circular, proposing that as pre-requisite to any negotiations, the Chinese Government deliver the real responsible authors of crimes against international law, recently perpetrated in China.

To this the following note has been handed German Chargé to-day:—

“In response to your inquiry of the 18th instant as to the attitude of the Government of the United States in regard to the exemplary punishment of the notable leaders in the crimes committed in Peking against international law, I have the honour to make the following statement: the Government of the United States has from the outset proclaimed its purpose to hold to the uttermost accountability the responsible authors of any wrongs done in China to citizens of the United States and their interests, as was stated in the Government's Circular communication to the Powers of 3rd July last. These wrongs have been committed not alone in Peking, but in many parts of the Empire, and their punishment is believed to be an essential element of any effective settlement which shall prevent a recurrence of such outrages and bring about permanent safety and peace in China.

“It is thought, however, that no punitive measures can be so effective, by way of reparation for wrongs suffered and as deterrent examples for the future, as the degradation and punishment of the responsible authors by the supreme Imperial authority itself; and it seems only just to China that she should be afforded, in the first instance, an opportunity to do this, and then rehabilitate herself before the world. Believing this, and without abating in any wise its deliberate purpose to exact the fullest accountability from the responsible authors of the wrongs we have suffered in China, the Government of the United States is not disposed, as a preliminary condition to entering into diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese Government, to join in a demand that said Government surrender to the Powers such persons as, according to the determination of the Powers themselves, may be held to be the first and real perpetrators of these wrongs.

“On the other hand, this Government is disposed to hold that the punishment of

the high responsible authors of these wrongs, not only in Peking but throughout China, is essentially a condition to be embraced and provided for in the negotiations for a final settlement. It is the purpose of this Government, at the earliest practicable moment, to name its Plenipotentiaries for negotiating a settlement with China, and in the meantime to authorize its Minister in Peking to enter forthwith into Conference with the duly authorized Representatives of the Chinese Government, with a view to bringing about a preliminary Agreement, whereby the full exercise of the Imperial power for the preservation of order and the protection of foreign life and property throughout China, pending final negotiations with the Powers, shall be assured. Accept, Sir, &c."

You will communicate all foregoing to Minister for Foreign Affairs, inviting information of the replies of his Government in the three cases.

(Signed) HILL, *Acting*.

No. 369.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 22, 1900.*

FOLLOWING is a résumé of the situation up to the present time:—

The Grand Secretary Li Hung-chang has arrived in Tien-tsin; he is expected in Peking before long.

Before negotiations commence Prince Ching is waiting for Li to arrive. Meantime, he has exchanged visits with the Representatives of the foreign Powers, and has expressed his hopes for peace. It is apparently his opinion that the Court may return. If the Emperor cared for the interests of China, said his Highness to me, he must come back here.

On the 15th a separate letter was addressed by each of the foreign Representatives, except the German, urging that in the interests of a lasting peace the Court should return, as it would further the tranquillity of the country, as well as demonstrate that the influence of the Court's former advisers was at an end.

The reply made by Prince Ching was to the effect that he had already sent urging the Emperor to return, and that in support he would transmit our letters also.

The Court is, so far as is known, still at Tai Yuan-fu, the capital of Shansi Province. It is reported that the leaders of the war party are also there. The notorious Yu Hsien is Governor of Shansi.

Confidence appears to be increasing in Peking, and several minor officials are back in Peking; there are, however, it is believed, a quantity of Boxers in the city in hiding.

The foreign Representatives, all of whom are here except the Dutch and Austrian, assure me without exception that their Governments have sent them absolutely no instructions.

The railway line is in course of construction by ourselves and the Japanese between Fengtai and Huangtsun, which is the next station further south.

Work is progressing well; the villages near the line had looted a large quantity of railway material, which has now been recovered by us.

No. 370.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, September 22, 1900.*

THE Japanese answer to the German Circular is as follows:—

"In order to make it possible for the Powers to renew diplomatic relations with China, Japanese Government agree that punishment of real instigators must first take place. They are, therefore, ready to give instructions to their Representative in China to co-operate with other Representatives in order to ascertain and point out the individuals to whom the responsibility of the recent outrages is to be attributed. However, in giving practical effect to German Government's proposal to insist on their delivery, they anticipate grave difficulties. Further, an exchange of views between the Powers will be necessary on this point."

## No. 371.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tókió, September 22, 1900.*

THE following is the substance of answer to three questions of Russian Circular:—

1. The withdrawal of the Legations to Tien-tsin does not seem opportune while Prince Ching is at Peking in communication with Foreign Ministers and Li Hung-chang is on his way thither.

2. The foreign Representatives at Peking should examine the credentials of Chinese Plenipotentiaries.

3. The adequacy of the credentials should decide the question of the opening of negotiations.

## No. 372.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 23.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 23, 1900.*

LETTERS are addressed to Li Hung-chang by Prince Ch'ing as his co-negotiator. We had better, I should say, accept both above-mentioned, with an understanding that these are purely preliminary negotiations, and reference will be made to the Governments of the Powers. I am, however, inclined to suggest that the names of the two Yang-tsze Viceroy and of that of Fukien should be added to the list.

## No. 373.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 23.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, September 23, 1900.*

ACCORDING to information I have received, Prince Tuan has been appointed Member of the Grand Council, and Tung-fu Hsiang Generalissimo of the Imperial forces. An Imperial Decree, issued by the Court during its flight to Shansi, has also appointed a violently anti-foreign Taotai to Shanghai. Chang Chih Tung remains staunch in his determination to maintain order, although surrounded by anti-foreign advisers. Peace in Central China depends on the life of this aged official, and we should be prepared for eventualities.

## No. 374.

*Lord Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 24.)*

My Lord,

*Newport, Rhode Island, September 14, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a printed communication which has been furnished me by the United States' Acting Secretary of State, embodying correspondence which has passed between the United States' Government and the Chinese Minister at Washington relative to the appointment of Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching to represent China in all questions pending between that country and the allied Powers.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PAUNCEFOTE.

## Inclosure in No. 374.

CHINESE CORRESPONDENCE, SEPTEMBER 10-12, 1900.

(1.)

[Handed to Acting Secretary Hill on September 10 by the Chinese Minister, Mr. Wu Ting-fang.]

*Cablegram from Earl Li Hung-chang, dated September 7, 1900, transmitted by the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg, under date of September 9, and received by Minister Wu on the last-named date.*

I AM in receipt of an Imperial Edict of the 30th day of the 7th month (the 24th August, 1900), transmitted by way of Paoting Fu. It is as follows:—

“Li Hung-chang, Envoy Plenipotentiary, is hereby vested with full discretionary powers, and he shall promptly deal with whatever questions may require attention. From this distance we will not control his actions. Let this Edict be forwarded with extra expedition at the rate of 600 *li* per day (to Earl Li) for his information and guidance.

“Respect this.”

[Handed to the Chinese Minister, Mr. Wu, by Acting Secretary Hill, September 11, 1900.]

*Memorandum.*

The United States does not feel called upon to express any opinion at this time as to the sufficiency of Li Hung-chang's authority, but hopes it will transpire that his credentials are full and authoritative, not only for negotiation, but to enable him without further delay to give assurance that the life and property of Americans will henceforth be respected throughout the Chinese Empire.

*Department of State, Washington,  
September 11, 1900.*

(2.)

[Handed to Acting Secretary Hill on September 11 by the Chinese Minister, Mr. Wu.]

*Cablegram from Earl Li Hung-chang, dated September 9, 1900, transmitted by the Chinese Minister at London under date of September 10, and received by Minister Wu on the night of the last-named date.*

I have just received a telegram, dated the 3rd September, from Governor of Shantung, transmitting a despatch addressed to me by the Privy Council from Ta-tung Fu (Shansi) on the 30th August:—

*“The Privy Council to Li Hung-chang, Envoy Plenipotentiary, Grand Secretary of State and Viceroy of Chihli.*

“On the 3rd day of the 8th moon of Kwang-hsü, 26th year (the 27th August), the following Imperial Edict was issued:—

“We hereby command Li Hung-chang, Envoy Plenipotentiary, with full discretionary powers, and Grand Secretary of State, to proceed at once by steam-vessel to Peking, and there to associate himself with Prince Ching in discussing and dealing with all pending questions. Let there be no delay.

“Respect this.”

The above has been communicated to me in obedience to the Imperial will.

Another communication from the Privy Council states an Edict has already been



issued commanding Sir Robert Hart to confer with (the Representatives of) the foreign nations for the loan of a steam-vessel to convey Li Hung-chang without delay to Peking, where he is to associate himself with Prince Ching in dealing with all pending questions. There was also a copy of an Edict for Li Hung-chang, which the Inspector-General of Customs (Sir Robert Hart) was directed to depute an official to deliver in person (to Earl Li). The documents referred to have been dispatched by post, but on account of the roundabout method employed, and fearing a mistake or failure might arise, the Edicts are respectfully transcribed (as above). On receipt of the same the Shantung Government is requested to transmit them by telegraph to Envoy Li.

Having received Imperial orders urging my speedy departure for the North, it behoves me to make arrangements to start on my journey soon. Please inform Secretary of State, and request instructions be telegraphed to the United States' Commanders at Tien-tsin and Peking to co-operate in affording me protection if required.

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[Handed to the Chinese Minister, Mr. Wu, by Acting Secretary Hill, September 12, 1900.]

*Memorandum.*

In reply to the request of Earl Li that instructions be telegraphed to the United States' Commanders at Tien-tsin and Peking to co-operate in affording him protection, if required, on his journey to Peking, the Government of the United States, so far as its own forces are concerned, will be happy to facilitate in every proper way the journey of Earl Li to Peking, and will so instruct its Commanders.

*Department of State, Washington,  
September 12, 1900.*

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No. 375.

*Mr. C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 24.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, September 14, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy in translation of a telegram from Blagovaschensk, published in the "Novoe Vremya" of the 1:th instant, describing a thanksgiving service celebrated in honour of the relief of the town of Blagoveschensk and of the renaming of the town of Sakalin, situated on the right bank of the Amur, by the name of Ilinsky. The words of the officiating High Priest Konoploff are also given, in which he describes the town of Sakalin as having previously belonged to the Chinese and as being now a Russian possession.

At an interview which Sir Charles Scott had yesterday with Count Lamsdorff, at which I was also present, Her Majesty's Ambassador called his attention to this proceeding on the part of General Gribsky, and pointed out that it was at variance with the assurances contained in the Russian Circular recently issued giving the outlines of the policy of Russia in the Far East.

Count Lamsdorff informed Sir C. Scott in reply that his attention had only just been drawn to the newspaper account in question, and that he had immediately addressed a communication to the Minister of War pointing out that such a measure as that reported to have been taken by the military authorities at Blagoveschensk was contrary to the views of Russia, and urging that immediate orders should be sent to General Gribsky in that sense. He begged his Excellency to take no further notice of this action on the part of a Military Commander, and further confirmed the intention of the Russian Government not to make territorial acquisitions in China. He urged in explanation of the action of the military authorities that the distances were so great, and the means of communication so few, that it was not easy to keep the authorities in distant parts of the Empire in touch with the views of the Central Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

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Inclosure in No. 375.

*Extract from the "Novoe Vremya" of September 12, 1900.*

(Translation.)

*Blagovaschensk, August 25 (September 7), 1900.*

TO-DAY, on the Chinese bank of the Amur, on the burned ashes of Sakalin, a solemn thanksgiving service in memory of the relief of this place by the Russian forces, together with the ceremony of renaming the post Ilinsky, was held in the presence of the authorities, the army, the English officer Bigham, and a large crowd of people. The High Priest Konoploff said "now is the cross raised on that bank of the Amur which yesterday was Chinese. Mouravieff foretold that sooner or later this bank would be ours." In a beautiful speech General Gribsky congratulated the victorious troops.

No. 376.

*Mr. C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 24.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, September 20, 1900.*

AT Count Lamsdorff's weekly reception to-day, I inquired of his Excellency what reply had been sent to the German Circular to the Powers respecting the surrender and punishment of the principal instigators of the recent massacre of foreigners in China, and of the attacks on the foreign Legations in Peking, the substance of which had appeared in the German and foreign press.

Count Lamsdorff replied that he had so far sent no answer to the German proposal, and that, having referred the matter to the consideration of the Emperor, he was awaiting His Majesty's instructions as to the reply to be given.

His Excellency added that the German proposals appeared to him to be somewhat vague, since it was not entirely clear to him whether the prescribed persons were to be surrendered to the Ministers in Peking for punishment, or whether they were to be arrested and punished by the Chinese Government. For his part, he would prefer that the rôle of executioner, if necessary, should be undertaken by the Chinese Government, who appeared to have a special aptitude for such a task, though, in his opinion, he would prefer exile as a punishment for the guilty. His Excellency remarked that the proposal, if carried out, would serve as an excellent test as to whether a Government really existed in China of sufficient strength and solidarity to execute the stipulations to be arrived at as the outcome of the future negotiations, but that the high position of many of the leading instigators of the anti-foreign movement would present many difficulties to the satisfactory realization of this scheme.

Count Lamsdorff then informed me that he had received a telegram from M. de Giers, Russian Minister in Peking, to the effect that Prince Ching had requested the Ministers to severally address him letters urging the necessity of the return of the Emperor to Peking, which he might be able to utilize in order to put pressure on the Court to accelerate their return to Peking. This step the Ministers had complied with, and they would now wait to see its effect. He approved of this step being taken, but he doubted whether it would have the desired result so long as the allied forces remained in Peking.

I asked his Excellency whether, in the event of the Emperor's return to Peking, the Russian Legation would go to Tien-tsin, and he replied that in that case the objection to the maintenance of the Legation in a capital where there was no Court and no Government would no longer exist.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 377.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 24, 1900.*

WITH regard to the rescue of missionaries referred to in your Lordship's telegram of the 19th September, I have the honour to report that as soon as Prince Ching returned to Peking I at once impressed upon him that, in the interests of peace, the safety of all the

missionaries in the north of China must be secured. He promised that he would immediately take steps. Since then I have again represented the importance of this to his Highness.

I hope very much, therefore, that the safety of the remaining missionaries, at least in this province, will be secured.

## No. 378.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 24, 1900.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report that the Boxer movement is far from suppressed; they have only receded upon the advance of the allied troops, and remain wherever no visit is made, while they return to a place as soon as the foreign troops leave it.

It is not the case, as alleged, that the missionaries mentioned have been handed over.

## No. 379.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 24, 1900.*

OPENING of negotiations.

With reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 18th September, it is, so far as preliminary negotiations are concerned, in my opinion, desirable to do so.

## No. 380.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, September 24, 1900.*

I AM informed by Baron von Richthofen that France, Italy, and Austria have returned affirmative replies to the German Circular. In the opinion of the United States' Government, the punishment of the ringleaders should be included in the peace conditions.

The replies of Japan and Russia will, Baron Richthofen understands, be received to-day, and will be to the effect that, while the punishment of the ringleaders should precede negotiations, it would be better that the ringleaders should not be handed over to the Powers, but that the punishment should be inflicted by the Chinese Government.

The Acting Secretary of State further observed that Her Majesty's Government had as yet returned no reply.

## No. 381.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 24, 1900.*

THE German Government has made a communication to the Powers, of which the following is a summary, but to which I have not yet given any reply.

As a condition preliminary to negotiations, the German Government hold that the original and real instigators of the crimes committed in Peking must be surrendered. They consider that though it may even be impossible to discover all the ringleaders, owing to the number of criminal instruments being too great, yet those few ought to be delivered up and punished whose guilt is notorious.

The proposal, therefore, which the German Government now make is that those leading Chinese, whose guilt in instigating or in the actual perpetration of the crimes is beyond doubt, should be designated to the Powers by their Representatives at Peking, who would receive instructions in that sense.

## No. 382.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 25.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Peking, September 25, 1900.*

DEFINITE instructions have been received by the Russian Minister to proceed to Tien-tsin in order to negotiate there; he is leaving on the 29th instant.

Orders have also been sent to the Russian troops to leave immediately, except 2,200 men, *i.e.*, one battalion, two Maxims, and one half-company of sappers.

## No. 383.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 25.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Peking, September 25, 1900.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding telegram of to-day, I am informed by Russian Minister that in his Government's telegram he was told that all the Powers have agreed in principle to negotiations being carried on in Tien-tsin.

It is my strong opinion that Tien-tsin would be most objectionable for the purpose. To have negotiations there would lose to us all the advantages of staying in Peking, and give us none in exchange. Tien-tsin is capital of Li Hung-chang's Viceroyalty, and we shall, therefore, in the eyes of the Chinese, appear to be going to Li to beg for peace. This will encourage the war party, who will leave the foreign Powers to make all further advances.

If the Chinese suspect that we want to have peace more than they do themselves, no peace will be possible. Should negotiations be removed from Peking—a course which, so far as concerns preliminaries, I strongly deprecate—they should take place in Shanghai.

## No. 384.

*Consul Scott to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 25.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Canton, September 25, 1900.*

AT several places in this district Missions and converts are being attacked. His Excellency the Acting Viceroy is doing his best to repress the rioters, and has also issued a Proclamation which is extremely satisfactory, containing a denunciation of the so-called "Imperial" Edicts lately published in Canton, and laying great stress on the Throne's denunciation of the Boxers.

He also states in this Proclamation that negotiations are being opened in the north with a view to the peaceable termination of these troubles, and that those who disturb the peace will be severely dealt with.

This neighbourhood and the city itself remain quiet. There is no probability of an attack on the Concessions.

## No. 385.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.\**

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 25, 1900.*

THE replies of the United States' Government to the last Chinese, Russian, and German Circulars are briefly as follows:—

1. In anticipation of the return of the Imperial Chinese Government to Peking,

\* Also to Mr. Whitehead, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Washington.

and the subsequent negotiation of a complete settlement by Plenipotentiaries duly appointed by the Powers in China, the Government of the United States is ready to accept the credentials of Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching as sufficient for preliminary negotiations.

2. The withdrawal of the United States' Legation from Peking is not at present contemplated by the United States' Government.

3. The United States' Government, in reply to the German Circular, consider that no punitive measures can be so effective as degradation and punishment by the supreme Imperial authority itself, and it seems only just to China that she should be afforded an opportunity of doing this, although they observe that they have from the outset declared their purpose of holding responsible to the utmost the authors of wrong done to United States' subjects in China.

As soon as practicable the United States' Government intend to nominate Plenipotentiaries for the negotiation of a final settlement, and hold that the punishment of those responsible, not only in Peking, but throughout China, is a condition to be provided for in those negotiations.

In order to assure the full exercise of the Imperial power for the protection of foreign life and property pending final negotiations, the United States' Minister at Peking will be authorized to discuss a preliminary Agreement with the Representatives of the Chinese Government.

No. 386.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 25, 1900.*

I RECEIVED from the German Ambassador on the 18th instant the note,\* of which I inclose a translation herewith, proposing that the Powers should agree to demand as a preliminary to further negotiations with the Chinese Government the surrender of those who are principally responsible for the attacks on the foreign Legations in Peking, and on foreigners in other parts of the country.

I told Count Hatzfeldt and other foreign Representatives who inquired what view Her Majesty's Government took of this proposal, that in a matter of so much gravity I must ask for a few days' reflection.

I discussed the question with his Excellency during the visit he paid me this afternoon.

I said it was impossible that the proposals of the German Government with respect to the punishment of the authors of the Chinese outrages could be received by the other Powers with anything but profound sympathy with the feelings by which they were dictated.

It was felt, I believed, by every Government, and certainly by no Government more than that of Her Britannic Majesty, that the punishment of those who were guilty of the attack upon the Legations in Peking and of the murders of Europeans committed in various parts of China is not only richly deserved, but that an element of security for the future will be lost if that punishment cannot be inflicted. We should have been glad, therefore, to have given an unreserved assent to the proposal of the German Government, if it had merely pledged us to use the power given to us by our present occupation of Peking or other Chinese territory in bringing these highly-placed offenders to justice.

The proposal, however, I said, goes farther than this. If I read it rightly, it is worded so as to pledge the Governments which accede to it not to consent to any negotiations with China until the punishment of those offenders has been completed.

I hesitated, and I thought my colleagues would equally be reluctant to join in an undertaking of which it is impossible to foresee the practical effect.

We are not in possession of any evidence to enable us to judge to whom punishment is principally due or to know whether it is likely to be in our power to inflict it. Under these circumstances, I said, it appeared to us unwise to pledge ourselves to abstain from making any agreements which may be necessary for the protection of our nationals and our commerce throughout China until those who are chiefly guilty

\* No. 364.

of the recent calamities should have been adequately punished. It might be an undertaking, if the allies were to accept it, which would defer for an indefinite period the restoration of the tranquillity of China.

Count Hatzfeldt pressed me before coming to an adverse decision to consult Her Majesty's Minister at Peking on the two following points :—

First, whether he and the other foreign Representatives could with any certainty and on clear evidence designate those who were really responsible for the recent outrages.

Secondly, whether in the event of the Chinese Government refusing or delaying to surrender or punish the persons so designated, it would be practicable for the allies to find means of seizing them.

I agreed to telegraph to Sir C. MacDonald on the subject, and in the meanwhile to delay my answer.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 387.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 25, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 24th September on the subject of the German Circular addressed to the Powers, I shall be glad if you will inform me as soon as possible of the opinion of your colleagues and yourself on the following points :—

1. Whether you can designate with any certainty those persons who are really responsible for the attacks which were made upon the Legations and other recent outrages which have occurred.

2. Whether, in the event of the Chinese Government refusing to surrender or punish these persons, or returning evasive answers, it would be practicable to seize them.

No. 388.

*Mr. C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, September 26, 1900.*

THE Russian Government replied to M. de Bülow's Circular on the 24th instant, agreeing in principle with the proposal made by the German Government, but asking for fuller explanations on the subject of the surrender of the most guilty Chinese authorities, with the object of giving a more practical shape to the proposal. Count Lamsdorff desires to lend his support to the proposal of the German Government.

I am given to understand that the terms of the answer returned by the French Government are almost identical with those of the Russian reply.

No. 389.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, August 8, 1900.*

A MESSENGER sent by Captain Wingate to Peking with despatches from Sir Alfred Gaselee and myself to Sir Claude MacDonald, returned to-day.

He was unsuccessful in delivering his despatches, but has brought news which is of great interest and value. I have the honour to inclose a copy of his statement, some portions of which I have already telegraphed to your Lordship and to Her Majesty's Minister at Tôkiô.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

## Inclosure in No. 389.

*Statement of Messenger sent to Peking by Captain Wingate on 29th July.*

[THE messenger, Ma Tè Ch'un, was the servant of a resident in Peking, and had previously brought down a message from Sir C. MacDonald.]

I arrived in Peking on the 1st August; on the 2nd I went to Su Wang Yeh's Fu, opposite the British Legation; this Fu was entirely burnt, held by Tung Fu Hsiang's soldiers, who had loopholed the wall for rifle firing. Soldiers were stationed in it ready to fire on any foreigners. There was a large barricade in Legation Street, which prevented me from crossing. I then went out of the city and re-entered at another gate, proceeding to the sluice gate in the South Wall near the Legations. It was raining heavily. I was hoping to enter by this sluice gate, when a heavy rifle fire opened, apparently from the British Legation, and was answered by the Chinese. I was in Peking for three days, and but for this heard no rifle firing and no cannons. The firing was probably that of a foraging party. I could see the hats of the foreigner soldiers on the wall.

In Peking it was said that the Empress-Dowager had forbidden the troops to fire on the foreigners. On the 22nd July ten cart-loads and ten carrier-loads of provisions were sent into the Legation.

Trade was going on in the streets, the shops having opened by the Empress-Dowager's orders. She had advanced 1,000,000 taels to assist the banks.

The troops surrounding the Legations were those of Tung Fu Hsiang and Jung Lu.

I left Peking on the 4th and went through Tung Chou and Chang Chia Wan to Ho Hsi-wu. On the Tien-tsin side of the latter place, on the 6th, I met numbers of cavalry and infantry fleeing north. The Viceroy and Sung Ch'ing passed without my seeing them. Ma San Yuan was supposed to have been killed or wounded; his troops were looking for him. The troops were disheartened, and complained of lack of food—they had been living on small millet. From Ho Hsi-wu I went to Huang Hua Tien, where the troops are in great strength, and Tung Au Hsien, where are Boxers, thence to Tien-tsin.

I saw no floods on the way. I heard that Li Ping Heng had arrived in Peking with twenty camps of soldiers following behind him; he interviewed the Empress, and then left Peking. I also heard that the Empress-Dowager had made preparations for flight from Peking: news of this leaking out, Tung Fu Hsiang threatened to return to Kansu, if she fled.

Ten eunuchs were beaten to death for having divulged her intentions.

Natives in Tien-tsin city talk of the insufficiency of foreign troops, and expect to be attacked within a few days.

## No. 390.

*Consul Carles to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*Tien-tsin, August 15, 1900.*

I DO not know whether the south of China has been in such communication with Peking as to have been conversant with the contents of the "Peking Gazette" of late.

In case your Lordship has not already received from Shanghai or Canton the "Gazette" of the 13th July, I would beg to call attention to the supplementary Memorial from Yuan Shih-Kai, Governor of Shantung, which is published therein.

The document to which it is a supplement is not published, but would appear to have related to an Imperial Order to send troops to Peking.

In the supplementary Memorial the Governor compares the present state of things with that which existed during the China-Japanese war, and points out that whereas then when China was fighting against only one country, Shantung had 25,000 men, now that China is fighting against all the Powers, and therefore larger forces are needed for the protection of the province, the force is smaller than in the former war.

He states that the 7,000 men whom he took with him from Tien-tsin have been

told off to guard against any attack by German forces at Chingtao; and that twenty camps (nominally 10,000 men strong) have been sent to the south-west of the province to prevent his communications with the south of the Grand Canal being cut by the enemy.

He points out that the coast is thus practically undefended, and he is therefore enlisting four camps in the west of the province to be stationed at a point facing Taku, which he considers threatened.

He further refers to lack of funds, and reports that he has agreed with the Provincial Treasurer to use for military purposes any funds which may be available.

The main deduction to be drawn from the Memorial is that while professing to comply with Imperial Decrees, the present Governor of Shantung will as long as possible avoid obeying any order to send troops from his province northwards to meet the allied forces; but how long this attitude may continue possible probably depends upon the turn of events in this neighbourhood.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. R. CARLES.

No. 391.

*Consul Fulford to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*Newchwang, August 13, 1900.*

I HAD the honour on the 6th instant to send to your Lordship by steamer to Chefoo, and thence by telegraph, a message in cypher to the effect that as the consequence of an attack upon the foreign quarter at this port by a mob, the Russians had bombarded and taken the native city on the 4th instant. I added that the Russians had temporarily occupied this port, and had given assurances that the Treaty rights and privileges of foreigners would not be infringed; further, that the persons and property of the foreign community were safe, and that the native city had not been much injured.

Since the beginning of the present crisis in the north of China, and the isolation of Her Majesty's Minister in Peking, I have kept the British naval authorities at Taku acquainted with the course of events in Newchwang.

We were not disturbed till the 15th June, when agents of the Boxers were actively engaged in spreading their doctrines in the town and neighbourhood. Missionaries then commenced to come in from the interior, and the foreign employés of the Tien-tsin-Newchwang Railway also came to Newchwang to avoid attack. The Protestant Missions of Moukden were destroyed by a mob on the 30th June, the members of the Missions and their families having previously come to this port. The French Mission at Moukden was attacked and burnt on the 2nd July, and the Bishop and his staff were murdered. All missionaries then came away from their stations, and I am glad to be able to say that I believe every British subject escaped injury. Those north of Moukden withdrew with the Russian railway people to Harbin, and so on to Vladivostock. There is every reason to believe that all the foreigners' houses and property in the interior have been destroyed.

This port has remained chiefly under the protection of Russian gun-boats. The "Otvajny" has been anchored off our Bund since the 16th June, and the "Gremiastchy" has been at the Russian railway station since the 13th July. Most of the women and children were sent away before the end of June, and the male members of the foreign community shared in the work of guarding and patrolling the foreign quarter with sailors from the Russian gun-boat "Otvajny" and the two small Japanese gun-boats, the "Chin Chin" and "Chin Pên."

In the early part of July the Russian railway employés and guards were attacked by Chinese at several points along the railway, and gradually retreated on a place called Ta Shih Ch'iao, 15 miles due east of this on the main line from Port Arthur to the north. From Ta Shih Ch'iao a branch line runs to this port, ending on the river bank 3 miles above the town. The Russians collected reinforcements at Ta Shih Ch'iao, both by rail and by sea from Port Arthur, but for the time seemed apprehensive of an attack upon Newchwang.

The Taotai of Newchwang behaved well, and exerted himself to maintain order, in spite of instructions from the Moukden Government to take steps against the foreigners. He had under his command a force of the nominal strength of 1,000. After several



false alarms of impending attack, great excitement was caused among the natives on the 26th July by a move of the Russian Military Commander of the troops stationed at the Russian railway station. Before this the situation seemed to be greatly improving. The Russians had reinforced their troops at Ta Shih Ch'iao and the railway station, and there appeared to be no fear of a Chinese military attack upon us.

On that morning Colonel Mischenkoff moved down some 400 or 500 men from the railway, and attacked a stockade of the Taotai's troops situated close to the mud wall surrounding this town. The Chinese fled into the city, and a brisk fire was exchanged between the Russians and the Chinese on the mud wall, in the course of which Russian field-guns were freely used. This proceeding created a panic among the natives, and made the Taotai despair of keeping order. The Russian Consul disclaimed any foreknowledge of the military action, and suggested to his colleagues that the Military Commander should be asked to help in the work of guarding the foreign quarter from an attack which was now probable. Military guards were then added to our other defences.

On the 28th July the Russian Consul, hearing a rumour that a Russian captive was held in the native city, wrote to the Taotai that he must be given up immediately, or if anything happened to him the city would be bombarded. The rumour was false, but the threat gave rise to the greatest alarm on the part of the natives.

Finally, a mob attacked one of the barricades guarding the foreign quarter on the morning of the 4th instant. The attack was easily beaten off, but the Taotai and his staff now fled the town, and a desultory fire was kept up all the morning between the Russian troops, of whom large numbers came from their railway station, and Chinese, who were hidden behind mud walls in the distance. They were mostly Boxers, but some of the soldiers may have joined them.

At 3 P.M. the "Gremiastchy" steamed down to the mouth of the river below the town, and both Russian gun-boats opened fire upon the city, and continued till 7 P.M. The Chinese soldiers and mob soon ran away from the town, and many escaped to the south. The bombardment was largely directed against them, and the town was not much injured. The Russian General consented to refrain from further bombardment if the town were surrendered and all arms given up. A party of volunteers went into the town in the evening with this message, and came back accompanied by several of the Heads of guilds and leading men. This arrangement was carried out next day.

The Russian flag was hoisted on the evening of the 4th instant on the Chinese Customs flag-post. Against this action the Acting Commissioner of Customs, Mr. Bowra, protested, and I supported his protest to the Russian Consul on the grounds that the Customs property was registered in the name of Sir Robert Hart, a British subject. The Treaty Power Consuls also wrote to the Russian Consul for an explanation of the hoisting of the Russian flag. The Russian Commander-in-chief of Naval and Military Forces in the Far East, Vice-Admiral Alexeieff, arrived from Port Arthur on the 5th instant in the sloop "Zabiaka," and addressed a letter to each of the Treaty Power Consuls on the 6th August explanatory of the Russian action. The Consuls sent to his Excellency an identic note in reply to his letter, to the effect that they were reporting the matter to their Governments.

In view of the impossibility of communicating with Her Majesty's Minister, I telegraphed to your Lordship as above mentioned, and reported by letter to the naval authorities and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghai.

I inclose copies of the correspondence between the Treaty Power Consuls and the Russian authorities.

The Customs staff have consented to carry on the work as before, subject to the consent of the Acting Inspector-General. The question of the flag over the Customs is therefore in abeyance.

The Russian troops are now advancing north from Ta Shih Ch'iao along their line of railway.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) H. E. FULFORD.

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## Inclosure 1 in No. 391.

*Consuls of the Treaty Powers to M. Ostroverkhov.*

Sir,

*Newchwang, August 5, 1900.*

WE observe that the Russian flag is flying at Customs flagstaff, which appears to indicate an occupation of this town and Treaty port by Russia only.

We presume that this is a temporary measure due to the military exigencies of the situation, and that we shall soon see this town and Treaty port administered by a Civil Governor on behalf of the allied Powers.

Meantime we claim that all the rights and privileges formerly now and heretofore enjoyed by our Governments and nationals in this port and in these provinces do and shall remain in full force, subject to such temporary modifications as circumstances may necessitate, and that such modifications should be communicated by despatch or letter to the Consuls of the Treaty Powers.

We are, &amp;c.

(Signed)

K. TANAKÉ, *Japanese Consul.*J. J. F. BANDINEL, *United States'*  
*Vice-Consul.*H. E. FULFORD, *Her Britannic .*  
*Majesty's Consul.*

## Inclosure 2 in No. 391.

*Vice-Admiral Alexeieff to Consul Fulford.*

Sir,

*July 24 (August 6), 1900.*

THE hostile behaviour of the Chinese authorities, who had first encouraged the rebellion and then declared that they could not maintain order, ended in an open attack on our forces placed in this city in accordance to the wish of the Consular Body. During the said attack the Chinese authorities had fled, leaving the town to its fate.

To avoid disorder and looting by the Chinese mob and with the object of protecting the commerce of the port and the property of foreigners, the Russian military authority found it necessary to place the town under the guard of the Imperial Russian troops.

It may be added that the perfidious destruction of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the insurgents and soldiers also necessitated our placing in Yankow a force of troops to protect the same.

Nevertheless, the Imperial Government tried to avoid this extreme measure, Yankow being a Treaty port. It is to be understood that the temporary administration that is to be established, in the interests of the Russians as well as the foreigners and Chinese, will not infringe the rights and privileges which they have enjoyed previously in Yankow.

The foreign community has to note that the sole object of the provisional Russian Administration is to maintain peace and order and restore trade, and I hope in these endeavours to have the sincere support of the foreign Representatives.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

E. ALEXEIEFF.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 391.

*Consul Fulford to Vice-Admiral Alexeieff.*

Sir,

*Newchwang, August 7, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter of yesterday's date, and note that a temporary Russian Administration will be established here in the interests of the Russians as well as the foreigners and Chinese, and that the said Administration will not infringe the rights and privileges which foreigners have enjoyed previously in Yankow.

In reply I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I am reporting to my Government the contents of your note together with the facts connected with the temporary occupation of this port, and as soon as I shall hear from them I may have occasion to communicate with you again.

Meanwhile, I have the pleasure to assure you that you will have my sincere support in your endeavours to maintain peace and order and to restore trade in this port.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) H. E. FULFORD.

No. 392.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*Shanghai, August 23, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Lordship's information, on the general attitude of the provincial Viceroy and Governors during the past two months towards the missionaries resident in the interior.

On the 9th July I telegraphed to them all, calling upon them to use every endeavour in affording protection to the defenceless foreigners residing within their several jurisdictions; and I pointed out that they would be earning the gratitude of the civilized world in thus saving the lives of missionaries and their families.

I received satisfactory replies to this message from the Viceroy of Szechuan, the Viceroy of Kansu and Shên-si, the Viceroy of Yünnan and Kueichou, the Governor of Shên-si, and the Governor of Chêkiang; while the Viceroys at Nanking and Wuchang have throughout shown the greatest readiness to assist me in withdrawing missionaries from stations in the interior, by providing proper escorts and facilitating their journey to the river ports.

In the more remote provinces, the Governor of Shên-si, a Manchu named Tuan Fang, has shown great consideration to foreigners, and is spoken of in terms of the deepest appreciation by all the British missionaries who have reached this port from their stations in his province. On the 16th August I expressed to his Excellency, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, the warmest thanks for his action, and I trust that this step will meet with your Lordship's approval.

The Viceroy of Szechuan, Kuei Chün, also a Manchu, appears to have done his best to provide missionaries with escorts when they were withdrawn from that province.

The narratives of refugees from the Provinces of Honan and Shansi show what might well have occurred in the other provinces, had the attitude of all the Viceroys and Governors been as barbarously anti-foreign as that of Yü Hsien, the Governor of Shansi, and of Yü Ch'ang, the Governor of Honan. Both of these officials are Manchus, the latter being brother of Yü Lu, the late Viceroy of Chihli. The former was recently Governor of Shantung, where his violent anti-foreign proclivities led to his removal from office at the instance of the foreign Ministers.

He was, however, soon afterwards appointed to his present post, and his attitude towards foreigners in allowing such horrors, as are described in Inclosure 2, calls for the strongest retribution.

The conduct of the Governor of Chêkiang is separately reported upon in my despatch regarding the massacre at Chü Chou.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

No. 393.

*Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*Shanghai, August 23, 1900.*

ON the 28th July the Acting British Consul at Hangchow reported that a massacre of missionaries had taken place at Chü Chou, a city some 100 miles south-west of Hangchow, the provincial capital of Chêkiang.

On the 30th July the Governor telegraphed the report to me.

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On the 31st July Mr. Acting Consul King sent me more definite information, but it was not until the 5th August that the Governor of Chékiang officially admitted the occurrence, as detailed in his telegram to me of that date.

The substance of this telegram I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship in my telegram of the 6th August.

On the 18th August Mr. Acting Consul King forwarded to me translation of a letter received by him from Father Ibarruthy, which throws considerable light on the circumstances of this horrible outrage, which in less troublous times would of itself have engaged the attention of Christendom.

I further inclose copy of a letter from the Rev. J. W. Stevenson, China Director of the China Inland Mission, which summarizes the events as reported to him.

The Governor's assurances that full compensation will be paid for the lives and property lost are, of course, but poor comfort to the relatives of the deceased, but they show that he is well aware of the responsibility which devolves upon himself, and that he is prepared to make what reparation he can.

I have as yet made no reply to the Governor on this point, but am awaiting a further communication from the Rev. J. W. Stevenson before proceeding with the financial settlement of this case. The punishment of the culpable officials will be difficult to enforce until the Central Government is restored to some degree of order. The action of the Governor has, in my opinion, been so far satisfactory, and he appears to have done his best to signify his indignation at this disaster.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 393.

*Governor of Chékiang to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

July 20, 1900.

I HAVE just heard report that there has been a rising at Ch'ü Chou-fu, resulting in the murder of British missionaries and of the District Magistrate who went to their protection. If this proves to be true, besides taking energetic measures for the arrest of the ringleaders, who shall be decapitated, I will see that compensation is made for the lives lost. I trust that you will not suspect that I am in sympathy with such an act. When I have found out the truth I will telegraph to you again.

(Seal of Governor.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 393.

*Governor of Chékiang to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

August 5, 1900.

I HAVE just received report of Taoai and Prefect regarding massacre of missionaries at Ch'ü Chou. They were your nationals, five in number, and they were the victims of a sudden attack. No trace can be found of any missionaries passing through Ch'ü Chou, but I have given orders for further investigations and have instructed the authorities of Ch'ü Chou and Yen Chow to send for them and afford them protection.

The Brigadier-General, Taotai, and Prefect I have already removed from office for their negligence, and have sent deputies to take their places; these officers are instructed to use every endeavour to catch the ringleaders in the massacre, and they shall be punished with the utmost severity.

Full compensation shall be paid for the lives and property lost.

The District Magistrate of Hsi Au was killed in trying to protect the missionaries. The Brigadier, Taotai, and Prefect shall be impeached to the Throne for the severest punishment if it transpires that they had any complicity in the attack.

I have already telegraphed to the Viceroy asking him to wire to the Chinese Minister in London to communicate to Her Majesty's Government the extreme regret I feel at this occurrence, and that I am doing all I can to remedy it. I trust you will make a similar communication to the various Consuls-General at Shanghai.

(Seal of Governor.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 393.

*Acting Consul King to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

Sir,

*Hangchow, August 18, 1900.*

WITH reference to the recent massacre of foreigners at Ch'ü Chou, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of a letter in French from the Reverend Father Ibarruthy, of the Roman Catholic Mission at the above-mentioned place.

Father Ibarruthy saved his life by fleeing to the hills, and, after suffering great hardships, was ultimately rescued by the Governor's soldiers and escorted to Hangchow.

His account of the death of the foreigners differs in some particulars from the account given in a letter received from the native Evangelist, Ch'iu Lin-chung, who accompanied Mr. Ward on the journey from Ch'ang Shan to Ch'ü Chou.

According to the man Ch'iu, who says he was present, Mr. Ward was killed on the spot, and did not escape to the hills, as Father Ibarruthy states.

Again, the latter speaks of two children as having been with Mr. Ward's party from Ch'ang Shan, while the Evangelist only mentions one, namely, Mrs. Ward's baby.

On the other hand, when the man Ch'iu speaks of three unmarried ladies belonging to Mr. Thomson's Mission at Ch'ü Chou having been killed, Father Ibarruthy mentions two.

Apart from these discrepancies the main fact appears clear, that all the foreign members of the Missions at Ch'ü Chou and Ch'ang Shan, with the exception of Father Ibarruthy, were killed on the 21st and 22nd July.

I wrote some while ago to the Governor to ask that orders should be given for the bodies of the victims to be properly buried, and his Excellency replied that instructions to that effect had been issued by him.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) H. KING.

Inclosure 4 in No. 393.

*Rev. Father Ibarruthy to Acting Consul King.*

(Translation.)

Sir,

IN accordance with my promise, I send you herewith a few brief and hasty notes on what has taken place at Ch'ü Chou.

1. The trouble originated in the Sub-Prefecture of Chiang Shan, where disturbances were created by "Vegetarians" coming from the Prefecture of Kuang Hsin in Kiangsi.

2. The officials took steps to suppress them, and several were captured and put to death. Some were sent to the Prefecture of Ch'ü Chou. Wu, the Sub-Prefect of the town of Ch'ü Chou, seems to have been unwilling to punish them, and even to have had a private interview with one of the "Vegetarians," thus causing himself to be suspected of complicity with them.

3. At the same time, the people following the example of the officials of Chiang Shan attacked the "Vegetarians" and pillaged their houses. The latter, feeling themselves thus assailed on all sides, formed themselves into a body and attacked the towns of Chiang Shan and Ch'ang Shan, which being insufficiently garrisoned, fell into their power.

4. On receipt of the news, the officials issued instructions to the people of the district to band together and form a "national guard" ("t'uan lien") to oppose the "Vegetarians."

In the town of Ch'ü Chou this guard consisted of some thousands of persons recruited from the shop employes, in many cases strangers to that part of the country. Written instructions were issued to them.

5. On the 20th July (24th of 6th moon) it was reported that the "Vegetarians" were marching on Ch'ü Chou. The gates were then shut, and a state of anarchy began in the city. The civil and military authorities were powerless, and for twelve days the "national guard" ("t'uan lien") did the policing of the place.

6. The Sub-Prefect Wu was suspected of being in league with the "Vegetarians," and on the 20th July (24th of 6th moon) a paper was seized in which it was arranged

that on the 29th of the 6th moon, at mid-day, on the signal being given by lighting a fire, the rebels should enter the city without much opposition.

This was the beginning of the massacres. They hunted for the Sub-Prefect everywhere, but he had hidden himself after disguising himself by shaving off his beard. He was, however, captured and executed on the 29th.

7. This Sub-Prefect, Wu, had shown himself favourable to Europeans by the issue of Proclamations, by personally protecting them, and by punishing those who dared to make a hostile demonstration against the European Missions. This was taken as a pretext for saying that the Europeans were also in league with the rebels, and on the 25th of 6th moon (21st July) about mid-day, Mr. Thompson's house was attacked. For the time being the crowd were content to cut off one of his ears and wreck the house, the "National Guard" only carrying off money and what they pretended were bombs.

From Mr. Thompson's the crowd proceeded to the Roman Catholic Mission, which they completely destroyed, after a careful search for bombs and cannon.

8. Mr. Thompson and his family were killed at the door of the Taotai's Yamên, and their bodies dragged to the Catholic Mission and thrown on the ground there.

The corpses of the Sub-Prefect and some soldiers suspected of aiding and abetting the rebels, were also deposited at the Roman Catholic Mission.

On the 25th (21st July), in the evening, two young lady-missionaries, who had taken refuge in the house of a heathen family, were killed.

On the 22nd July, some time during the day, two ladies and two children, members of the Protestant Mission at Ch'ang Shan, were killed at the gates of the town. Mr. Ward saw the danger, and managed to escape into the hills, but was discovered on account of his white clothes, and killed there in the hills.

9. It is said that the Europeans killed at the gates of the town were placed in two coffins—one lady and one child in each. Mr. Ward was buried, it is said, about 15 *li* from the town of Ch'ü Chou.

10. A great number of persons, many of them innocent, were killed during the troubles, and order was only restored by the arrival of soldiers under the command of an officer named Li.

The above are a few notes, written in great haste. I will endeavour to complete them.

Your obedient servant,  
(Signed) L. B. IBARRUTHY.

Inclosure 5 in No 393.

*Rev. J. W. Stevenson to Acting Consul-General Warren.*

Dear Sir,

*China Inland Mission, Shanghai, August 16, 1900.*

TO-DAY I have received from the Rev. J. Meadows, of Shao Shing, who is the C.I.M. Superintendent for the Province of Chêkiang, a translation of a letter received from a native Evangelist, who has been in the employ of the C.I.M. at Ch'ang Shan Hsien.

This Evangelist was present with Mr. Ward when he and a native (Man-li-üen) were killed about 15 *li* (5 miles) from Kü Ch'ou city on the 22nd July. He was badly beaten and bruised, and reports that Mrs. Ward and infant and Miss Thirgood left Ch'ang Shan by boat with a native nurse in the afternoon of the 21st July for Kü Ch'ou, where they arrived on the 22nd July, and the boat was anchored outside the city gate. Some volunteers ("t'uan lien") came upon them, and killed Mrs. Ward and child, Miss Thirgood, and the native "awah."

The native informant desired to enter the city to acquaint Mr. Thompson of these murders, but he found that the city gates were all fast closed, and were not opened till the 6th August, when he at once entered the city. He found the report that he had heard of the massacre on the 21st July of Mr. and Mrs. Thompson and two children, Miss Manchester, Miss Sherwood, and Miss Desmond was quite true.

The bricks of the new house which Mr. Thompson had just finished had been taken and used to repair the city wall. All our property was destroyed, and the native assistants and others had all disappeared.

The above-mentioned persons were British subjects, with the exception of Miss Manchester and Miss Desmond, who were United States' citizens.

Mr. Meadows reports that he hears on good authority that Mr. Thompson was taken by the volunteers to the Taotai, but he said he would have nothing to do with him, and that they could do as they liked; and he mentioned that these "t'uan lien" got all their orders from the Taotai and Chent'ai. He also mentions that the murder of the Hsi An Magistrate, who was a friend of Mr. Thompson's, and favourable to the Reform movement, is also very significant.

Mr. Meadows considers the above a reliable report of the circumstances connected with the murder of our missionaries.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) J. W. STEVENSON,  
Deputy Director.

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No. 394.

*Mr. Herbert to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, September 23, 1900.*

IN the course of a conversation to-day, in regard to Chinese affairs, the German Ambassador informed me that, in accepting the recent German proposal, M. Delcassé had stated that he did so with much satisfaction, as it practically coincided with his own views, which he had communicated to the Chinese Minister so far back as July.

There is no doubt that the German proposal is more favourably regarded here than the Russian plan, which was not well received by the French press.

Prince Münster expressed the hope that Her Majesty's Government would accept the German proposal, as, in his opinion, it was necessary that Germany and England should act together in China, "their interests there being identical."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) MICHAEL H. HERBERT.

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No. 395.

*Mr. C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, September 27, 1900.*

I SAW Count Lamsdorff this afternoon and obtained further particulars from his Excellency as to the terms of the reply returned by the Russian Government to M. de Bülow's Circular, the substance of which I had the honour of telegraphing to your Lordship.

Count Lamsdorff informed me that he had requested the German Government to favour him with more comprehensive explanatory details on the subject of the delivery of the guilty leaders by the Chinese Government, giving his opinion that the better course would be that they should receive their punishment from the Central Imperial Authority of their own country and not be handed over to the foreign Powers; far greater effect would be produced in China by such a mode of procedure than if the leaders were delivered to the Powers for punishment. His Excellency had also expressed the opinion that the question of the punishment of these persons should form one of the guarantees which the Plenipotentiaries of the Chinese Government should be compelled to give during the course of the negotiations with the Representatives of the foreign Powers, as a security that such occurrences as had recently taken place in China should not be repeated.

The phrase "renewal of diplomatic relations," which the punishment of the guilty leaders was to precede, had seemed to him to require further explanation which he had just telegraphed to Berlin to obtain, his view being that there had never been any rupture of diplomatic relations as had been strikingly proved by the fact that a new German Minister had been appointed.

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No. 396.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 27, 1900.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 23rd September, if the powers of Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang are deemed sufficient and on clear understanding that negotiations are purely preliminaries for reference to Governments, you are authorized, in conjunction with your colleagues, to commence negotiations with them.

As regards addition to the list of Plenipotentiaries of Viceroy at Nanking, Wuchang, and Foochow, if you and your colleagues think this desirable, no objection will be raised here.

No. 397.

*Mr. C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 28.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, September 25, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the French text of an official communication published in this day's "Journal de Saint-Petersbourg," respecting the recent Imperial Order for the withdrawal of the Russian Legation, troops, and subjects from Peking to Tien-tsin.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 397.

*Extract from the "Journal de Saint-Petersbourg" of September 12 (25), 1900.*

LE "Messenger Officiel" publie aujourd'hui la communication suivante :—

"L'ordre de Sa Majesté l'Empereur concernant le départ de la Légation Impériale, du détachement de troupes Russes et des sujets Russes de Pékin à Tien-tsin, ordre qui avait été transmis par télégraphe par les Ministères compétents les 12 et 13 Août, est parvenu seulement le 23 du même mois à la Légation, et le 24 au Commandant des troupes Russes, parce que le télégraphe ne fonctionnait pas régulièrement et à cause des difficultés des communications entre Taku et la capitale Chinoise.

Le Ministre de Russie, Conseiller d'État Actuel, Giers, et le Lieutenant-Général Linévitch ont pris aussitôt toutes les mesures nécessaires pour l'exécution de l'ordre Impérial précité. Plusieurs membres de la Légation de Russie et les premiers échelons du détachement expéditionnaire se sont déjà mis en route pour Tien-tsin; le départ du restant des troupes continue graduellement, et s'achèvera dès que les conditions d'ordre local le permettront."

(Translation.)

THE "Messenger Officiel" publishes to-day the following communication :—

"The order of His Majesty the Emperor respecting the departure of the Imperial Legation, of the detachment of Russian troops and of Russian subjects from Peking to Tien-tsin, which order had been forwarded by telegraph by the Ministries concerned on the 12th and 13th August, only reached the Legation on the 23rd of that month, and the Commander of the Russian troops on the 24th, because the telegraph was not in regular working order and on account of the difficulties of communication between Taku and the Chinese capital.

"The Russian Minister, Actual Privy Councillor Giers, and Lieutenant-General Linévitch at once took all the necessary measures for the execution of the above-mentioned Imperial order. Several members of the Russian Legation and the first divisions of the expeditionary detachment have already started for Tien-tsin; the departure of the rest of the troops is being gradually carried out, and will be completed as soon as the local conditions permit."



No. 398.

*Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, September 28, 1900.

THE following are the replies given by Italy to the three Russian questions in regard to China :—

At present Italy does not accept Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang's credentials, and awaits information from the Italian Minister.

Although the Italian Minister at Peking does not favour the proposal to withdraw the Legation to Tien-tsin, yet, when others withdraw, Italy is prepared to do the same.

As to the negotiations for peace, Italy is of opinion that, in view of the German Circular, difficulties need not be anticipated in concluding it as soon as punishment has been effected.

Italy has accepted the German Circular in principle, and replied to that effect.

No. 399.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Peking, September 29, 1900.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 26th September, I have the honour to answer the two questions as follows :—

1. It is quite possible to designate the guilty with certainty, and is likely that the list of each of my colleagues would be identical with the others.

2. Prince Tuan being one of the chief offenders, and seeming to be *de facto* the Chinese Government at the present time, it will be most difficult to seize the guilty.

No. 400.

*Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Shanghai, September 29, 1900.

I AM informed by Mr. Warren that the situation on the Yang-tsze shows no change.

Taotai Sheng has communicated the following Edict of the 25th September :—

The present troubles have been occasioned against the will of the Throne. The "Boxer" brigands have been incited by Princes and Ministers, and war with friendly natives has been the result. The Court has had to flee, and although the Throne is itself to blame, the Princes and Ministers are largely culpable in various degrees. Accordingly, four Imperial Princes are deprived of office and rank. Prince Tuan is degraded from office, but given the privilege of trial by the Clansmen's Court. Kang Yi and Chao Shu Chiao are handed over to the Censorate for punishment.

From the above the Court seems to show a more tractable disposition.

No. 401.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. C. Hardinge.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 29, 1900.

I HAVE replied to the Russian Circular of the 15th September in the following manner :—

1. That the present moment did not seem to me opportune for the withdrawal to Tien-tsin of Her Majesty's Minister.

2. That I could not myself give any decided opinion in regard to the sufficiency of the full powers of Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching; in the event, however, of other Powers being satisfied, Her Majesty's Government would not, on their part, be inclined to make any objections in the matter.

3. I said that there did not appear to me to be any reason why negotiations of a merely preliminary character should not be commenced with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries immediately, if the full powers held by Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang were ascertained to be sufficient for the purpose.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. C. Hardinge.—(Substance telegraphed.)*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 29, 1900.*

THE Russian Ambassador paid me a visit on the 18th instant, and put to me the three questions stated in my telegram of to-day, which I understood to be contained in a Circular telegram from Count Lamsdorff, dated the 15th September.

His Excellency said that the Powers who were opposed to the evacuation of Peking by the international forces did not appear to object in principle to the withdrawal of their Legations from the Chinese capital, and he asked if Her Majesty's Government were prepared to transfer the British Legation to Tien-tsin.

I replied that, while reserving complete liberty of action in the future, I did not consider the present moment opportune for such a transfer, which would doubtless be erroneously interpreted by the Chinese, and might even be the cause of conflict if no arrangement had been previously concluded and signed between the Powers and China at Peking. I also thought that the question of a change of residence of the foreign Representatives in China was essentially one for the consideration of the Representatives themselves, and that they should be consulted on the subject.

M. de Staal then asked whether Her Majesty's Government considered the full powers with which Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang were furnished to be sufficient. I said that at this distance I did not feel competent to express any definite opinion, but that locally there seemed to be a disposition to question the validity of the documents in question. At the same time I had no prejudice against either of the two Chinese negotiators, and if other Powers were satisfied with the full powers with which they were furnished, Her Majesty's Government would not raise objections.

Thirdly, his Excellency inquired whether Her Majesty's Government were disposed to instruct their diplomatic Representative in China to commence preliminary negotiations at once with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries. M. de Staal laid stress on the importance, in his opinion, of losing no time in entering upon preliminary negotiations, with a view to avoiding international jealousies which would be fostered by the press, and the development of which could find no more congenial soil than that of China.

I informed his Excellency that I saw no reason why preliminary negotiations should not be opened, as soon as it was ascertained that the Chinese full powers were in proper form; but that the extremely complicated nature of the Chinese problem made it necessary to proceed with great caution.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 403.

*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 30, 1900.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 25th September, my previous telegrams will have conveyed to you the information that Her Majesty's Government have declined for the present to withdraw Her Majesty's Legation from the capital. No Government has, as far as I am aware, agreed to the Russian proposal unconditionally. Objections have been made by most of them.

No. 404.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 30, 1900.*

SO far as I am aware, no official assurances have as yet been given as regards the safety of the Empress-Dowager, but it is certainly the belief of Prince Ching that her person would be safe if she returned, although she would be excluded from power. This he gathers from his conversation with foreign Representatives. All chance of inducing the Throne to get rid of its present advisers would be, I believe, destroyed, were any threat to the contrary made.

Received *9/1/902*  
powered

## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

## EVENTS AT PEKING.

In continuation of "China No. 4 (1900)."]

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.  
April 1901.*

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## Further Correspondence respecting Events at Peking.

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[In continuation of "China No. 4 (1900)."]

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No. 1.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received January 31, 1901.)*

My Lord,

*Tókió, December 24, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to forward a Report on events in Peking from the 20th June to the 14th August.

A previous Report has dealt with affairs up to the 20th June, and the political aspects of the siege of the Legation quarter, together with the correspondence carried on between myself and the Chinese Government during the same period has been fully reported upon elsewhere.

The present Report, which deals almost entirely with the military aspect of the siege, has been somewhat delayed by the preparation of the maps which accompany it, and by the fact that my time from the 14th August until the date of my leaving Peking was very much taken up with other matters.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

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Inclosure in No. 1.

*Report of Events in Peking from the 20th June to the 14th August, 1900.*

THE record of events in Peking having been brought up to the 20th June, the following account in narrative form of what happened after that date, and mainly from a military point of view, may prove of interest.

This account is compiled from two diaries, both kept during the siege in accordance with my instructions: one by Captain Poole, my Adjutant, and one by Mr. Meyrick Hewlett, who acted as my Private Secretary, from the reports of the various Commanders of detachments given me verbally or in writing, sometimes direct and sometimes through their various Ministers, and lastly, from my own personal observation.

Before the 20th June, barricades, but not of a very substantial nature, had been erected across the road which runs between the Imperial Maritime Customs compound and the Austrian Legation, in front of the Italian Legation in Legation Street, facing east. This was composed mainly of upturned Peking carts, and was to meet any attack from the east, whilst against an enemy advancing along the street from the west, one had been put up between the Russian and American entrance gates.

The British marines held the North Bridge over the canal with a picket; the other detachments also patrolled the roads in the vicinity of their Legations and pickets were stationed at various points.

The German detachment had made a barricade in the street between their Legation and the Tartar city wall facing east, and the Americans one at the back of their Legation facing west.

Immediately the death of the German Minister became known, it was clear that we had a different foe to deal with, and preparations were made to defend the Legations in grave earnest.

A plan which had been sketched out previously by the commandants of the Legation guards was immediately put into execution; all barricades were hastily strengthened and outlying pickets withdrawn. All women and children were ordered into the British Legation. This order was pretty generally carried out, only a very few remaining at the Peking Hôtel, situated in Legation Street. More than 100 women and children came in during

the afternoon, for all of whom accommodation had to be found. This does not include some 600 to 700 Chinese Christians, servants, converts, &c., of whom more than half were women and children.

The student interpreters gave up their quarters and slept in the "tingerhs," or open reception halls; most of the staff also gave up their houses. The Second Secretary's (Mr. Dering's) was handed over to the Russian Legation and bank. The Accountant's was handed over to the members of the French Legation and their wives and families. The ladies of the American Legation occupied the doctor's quarters, and one block of the students' rooms was given over to the Imperial Maritime Customs. Fifteen ladies were accommodated in the ball-room of the Minister's house, twelve others lived in the smoking-room, two families occupied the billiard-room, whilst many missionaries slept in the corridors. The Belgian, Japanese, and Italian Ministers and their families, together with the widowed Baroness Ketteler, were also accommodated in the Minister's house. In all, 78 Europeans slept in this building, which usually accommodated a dozen; whilst nearly 900 lived within the four walls of the Legation during the eight weeks' siege, the normal number being about sixty.

The whole day was occupied in bringing in and storing provisions and making further arrangements for the defence. Punctually at 4 p.m. the Imperial troops opened fire from the north and east, mostly on the Austrian and Italian barricades, and then commenced the organized attack on the Peking Legations by the forces of the Chinese Government.

So far as the Boxers were concerned, the garrisons of the various Legations could have routed their entire force in Peking, for the *bonâ fide* Boxer believed implicitly in his supernatural powers, and disdained to use a fire-arm; but, with Mauser and Mannlicher bullets humming through the air, we knew that a different order of things had begun. Captain Strouts withdrew the picket from the North, or Yu Ho Bridge, to a barricade which we had erected at the main gate of the Legation; the enemy, from the roofs of houses, opened fire on this barricade, and the fire was at once returned. The removal of this picket was in accordance with the plan decided upon by the military authorities; it was in a very exposed position, useful against Boxers, but untenable against rifle fire. Across the canal, which runs from the Imperial city past the main gate of the Legation, is situated the Su Wang Fu, or Palace of Prince Su, a direct descendant of one of the Ironcapped Princes. This Prince had been friendly and helpful, allowing part of his Fu inclosure to be used as a shelter for the Christian refugees. I had, on this account, had some communication with him through a Mr. Huberty James, a professor at the Peking University, one of the refugees in the Legation. When the firing commenced, Mr. James informed me that Prince Su seemed very much distressed at hostilities having broken out, and asked him to convey a message to me, stating that he was convinced that if he could carry the Court an assurance that the foreign Powers had no intention of partitioning the Empire, orders would be given for a cessation of the attack. I authorized Mr. James to say that the mission of all the foreign Representatives in Peking was to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese Government and that Great Britain, and so far as I knew, none of the other Powers, had any designs whatsoever on the integrity of the Chinese Empire. Mr. James departed with my message and returned shortly afterwards saying that he had delivered it to the Prince, who had immediately mounted his horse and galloped off in the direction of the Palace. Mr. James returned to the Fu; suddenly, to the consternation of the small detachment holding our barricade at the main gate, he was seen to run out on the North Bridge, which at that time was swept by the enemy's fire and our own; instantly three Chinese cavalry soldiers charged the unfortunate man and with blows of their sabres drove him before them off the bridge; he was not actually seen to fall, but there is no doubt that he was then and there cut down. A hurried volley was fired at the cavalry, but owing to the failing light it was impossible to see with what result. Mr. James, who spoke Chinese well, had without doubt left the north gate of the Fu and proceeded on to the bridge to expostulate with the soldiery, but orders had evidently now been given to kill all foreigners at sight, orders which Tung fu Hsiang's men were only too ready to obey.

The attack now became fairly general and if pressed home must have been attended with disastrous results for, as I have stated, none of the Legations had at that time been put into a thorough state of defence. Desultory attacks took place during the night, all of which were repulsed. On the following day work was continued on the barricades and the provisioning of the British Legation was proceeded with.

June 21.—The Austrian Legation was vigorously attacked; a French marine was killed and an Austrian wounded behind the Austrian barricade; this led to the Austrians falling back on the French Legation, thereby exposing the entire east side of the large

block of Customs buildings, which up to this had been held by volunteers belonging to the Maritime Customs. Before long, immense volumes of smoke arose, and the roar of flames and crash of falling timbers were heard, denoting that the Chinese had not been slow in taking advantage of this retirement. The incendiarism continued, and during the day the Austrian and Dutch Legations were burnt, as well as the greater part of the Customs quarter and the Chinese Bank. The enemy were particularly bold in their attacks, exposing themselves freely, and suffering in proportion; it was noticed that nothing fanned their failing courage so much as a conflagration. From the French and German Legations it was reported that some troops, presumably Prince Ching's, were seen to open a heavy fire on the Boxers in the neighbourhood of the Hata Gate. Meanwhile, Tung-fu Hsiang's troops, noticeable by their uniforms—red, with black velvet facings, the cavalry having on their breast three characters denoting "the cavalry of Kansu"—were very busy in their attacks on us from the north and west. At 9 A.M. a determined onslaught was made on the Students' Mess, a two-storied building overlooking the Imperial Carriage Park; the upper story of this building, which formed the library, had been barricaded, and was held by a garrison of marines and volunteers. The enemy were driven off, leaving six of their number, making picturesque dots of colour in the long grass. German marines reported that Prince Ching's troops had entered into conversation with them on the wall; these troops said that they had orders to prevent any Boxers coming on the wall of the city, and Prince Ching had issued the strictest injunctions to shoot any Boxers doing so; they added that foreign soldiers could come up there as much as they pleased.

All day the garrison not actually engaged in repelling the attacks or the enemy were busy in assisting the organization of the defence within the British Legation; a Committee of Public Comfort was appointed, the members consisting of representatives of the various Legations, the Maritime Customs, and the various missionary bodies. Various Sub-Committees were also appointed, one of the most important being the Fortification Committee, under the Rev. F. D. Gamewell, of the American Methodist Mission; this Committee, under its intelligent and energetic Head, subsequently rendered the most invaluable services; the Food Supply Committee, to look after and regulate the stores and supply of food; the Water Committee, in charge of the five wells in the Legation, to measure each day the depth of water and regulate its consumption; the Committee on Native Labour, a most important one, very ably presided over by the Rev. W. Hobart, an American missionary; by the proper management and organization of native refugees splendid results were obtained. There was, of course, some little confusion at first, but before many days everything worked smoothly, and by applying to the proper Committee even watches could be mended and boots repaired free of charge.

June 22.—In the forenoon it was reported to me that, owing to a mistaken order, the garrisons of the various Legations were all falling back on the British Legation, and on going to the main gate I found this to be the case.

Fortunately, the Chinese were not aware of the critical state of affairs, or, at any rate, did not take advantage of it. Before it was too late the matter was rectified, and the various marine detachments marched back to their respective Legations, the Germans, however, losing two men in so doing.

While this was going on, a certain amount of confusion naturally prevailed, as a result of which the Russian, French, and Italian Ministers begged me, as having some previous military experience, to take general command of the defence of all the Legations, and I accepted the task. I subsequently saw the American and Japanese Ministers, who confirmed the above request. I would take this opportunity of stating that during the remainder of the siege I was throughout supported with the greatest loyalty and willingness by my colleagues, and also by the Commanders of the various detachments. I would also beg to acknowledge the splendid assistance given to the defence in general, and myself in particular, by the missionaries, especially the Americans, to whose powers of organization the comfort and comparative safety of the British Legation were mainly due.

The Italians, who, previous to their enforced retirement, had gallantly, by a bayonet charge, repulsed an attack of the enemy, found, on returning, that their Legation was in flames. Their Commander immediately reinforced the nearest post, which was the German, and together with their detachment held a barricade on the city wall above the German Legation, and also one in the street below. By my direction the Italians subsequently occupied, together with the Japanese, the Su Wang Fu. This Palace or Fu subsequently formed one of the principal parts of the defence; it consisted of an inclosure of some 12 to 14 acres, surrounded by walls 20 feet high. Inside were some thirty buildings of various sizes, beautiful gardens, houses, pavilions, rockeries, summer-houses, &c.

The garrison of the Fu now consisted of the Japanese detachment of one officer and twenty-three men, besides nineteen volunteers, most of whom had served in the army; the Italian detachment of one officer and twenty-eight men, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Shiba, Japanese Military Attaché; also twelve British marines and the same number of volunteers, mostly from the Maritime Customs, a small garrison to hold so extensive a post. This was the weak point of the entire defence, the garrison being altogether too few in numbers for the area defended; it was, however, under the circumstances, unavoidable, as it would have been impossible to have surrendered any single point of the defence without seriously endangering the rest.

A general glance at the position held may here be useful.

The garrison were fighting practically with their "backs against a wall," in this instance the wall being that of the Tartar city, 50 or 60 feet high, and 30 feet wide at the top.

The German and American Legations were the two which abutted on to this wall, a narrow street only dividing them from it. The line of defence on the 21st June commenced on the east at the German Legation, and, crossing Legation Street, took in the French Legation, a compound of 5 or 6 acres, containing the Minister's residence and those of his staff.

The line then followed the wall of, and included, the Su Wang Fu; from there it crossed the canal, and took in the British Legation going south. It included the Russian and American Legations, finishing again at a point on the wall some 500 yards from where it commenced.

In the defence the French Legation formed a sort of salient, open to close attack from the north and east, and also from the city wall and houses to the south-east. By the burning of the Customs quarter the Su Wang Fu, generally called the "Fu," became open to attack from the east; its north wall faced the enemy, its west side was covered by the British Legation.

On the south of the Fu were situated the Spanish and Japanese Legations, which were included inside the lines of defence and never suffered from a direct attack. The British Legation was completely open to attack from the north and west; abutting the north face were the buildings, temples, examination halls, and library, of the world-renowned Hanlin Yuan or Hanlin College, commonly called "The Hanlin." On the west was the Imperial Carriage Park, consisting of an inclosure 12 acres in extent, with handsome trees and capacious storehouses tiled with Imperial yellow, in which were stored the Imperial chairs and carriages.

This Carriage Park was held throughout the siege by the enemy; it was noticeable that the yellow-tiled roofs of the store-houses, though they commanded the British Legation at close range, were never utilized by the enemy; to the south of the Carriage Park, and abutting the west wall of the Legation, in some places actually built against this wall, were the houses which surrounded an open space some 2 acres in extent, which went by the name of the Mongol Market; as its name implied, this inclosure was used by the Mongols, who visit Peking in the winter, as a market-place for their wares.

The south of the Legation was defended from direct attack by the Russian Legation, but between these two, which are some 50 yards apart, was a large collection of Chinese and Mongol houses. These houses were a source of grave danger to both Legations, on account of the ease with which they could be set on fire. South of the British Legation was situated the Russian, the north-east half of which was protected from direct attack by the British, but the north-west formed part of the Mongol Market, and was under fire from the north and west; abutting the west of this Legation were Chinese houses, the whole of the south wall faced Legation Street, on the opposite side of which was the American Legation, which was separated from the Tartar city wall by a narrow street. It was commanded at close range from the wall. The position is clearly shown in the inclosed excellent map, compiled after the siege by Lieutenant Fergusson, of the United States' Engineers.

At the commencement of the siege the west of the American Legation was protected by the Russian Bank, which for some few days was held by Russian and American marines and volunteers. It was evident from the commencement that to the general defence the most important points were the Tartar city wall and the Fu, the former because an enemy holding it commanded easily the entire circle of defence, and the Fu, because its loss would render the British Legation almost untenable, and here were assembled, by the decision of the Military Commandants, the women and children, spare ammunition and provisions, also; an enemy holding the Fu would menace the retreat of the German and French Legations. The wisdom of the above-mentioned decision on the part of the Commandants was amply borne out by subsequent events.



Late in the afternoon the enemy developed their attack from the west, opening fire from the Mongol Market, the houses surrounding which had been loopholed. A private of the marines was shot dead on the west wall of the Legation whilst returning the enemy's fire. Two 9-pr. Krupps also opened fire from the Chien Gate of the city, doing damage to the Russian Bank and American Legation.

The buildings in the Hanlin College were, from a military point of view, a source of great danger to the British Legation, owing to the possibility of their being set on fire, and it was proposed to destroy them. As the buildings were, however, of a very substantial nature, it would have been difficult to do this without explosives, of which we had none; to set them on fire would have been the best course, but one attended with very great danger to ourselves. One could only hope, therefore, that the Chinese, a nation of *literati*, would hesitate to commit this act of vandalism and destroy their national library. By way of precaution, however, a hole was made through the wall which separated us from the Hanlin inclosure, and a search party sent out under Captain Poole, the various buildings were found unoccupied by the enemy, neither were any signs of preparation for setting them on fire visible.

June 23.—Communication with the Russian Legation was established through a hole in the South Wall, and the work of destroying the shops and small buildings situated between the two Legations was commenced; this was a most important necessity in order to establish safe communication between the two Legations, and to ward off all danger from incendiarism; the enemy kept up a heavy rifle fire on the working party, some of whom were wounded, including Mr. Peachy, a student interpreter, but considerable progress was made.

A brisk fire was now commenced and kept up by the enemy from some high roofs belonging to the recently established Electric Light Company, as also from the adjoining premises of the Chinese Colonial Office; these buildings lie some 300 yards to the north-east of the British Legation; the Italian quick-firing 1-inch gun was brought up and together with our sharpshooters from the north stable picket returned the fire with telling effect. This Italian quickfirer was by far the most useful of the machine-guns brought by the various detachments. The others were an Austrian Maxim, a British five-barrelled Nordenfelt, very old pattern, and an American Colt automatic. Unfortunately, there were only 150 rounds brought up with the Italian gun. In the course of the siege the entire gun detachment of this quickfirer, consisting of five men, were either killed or wounded.

At 11.15 A.M. a determined attack was made on the Hanlin inclosure. It was preceded by a sharp infantry fire from the Imperial Carriage Park; the greater part of the Hanlin was then set on fire by the enemy; the fire bell rang and all hands were soon at work endeavouring to extinguish the flames; the Chinese had carefully selected their day and had evidently no qualms whatever as to the vandalism they were committing; a fresh north wind was blowing and the flames were carried nearer and nearer to the Legation buildings; a stubborn fight was maintained until late in the afternoon when the flames were got under, but not before more than three-quarters of the temples, examination halls, and libraries, forming the Hanlin College, had been destroyed. There remained only one building entirely intact, the heavy wooden eaves of which overshadowed and almost touched the students' quarters in the Legation; had these caught fire, the Legation would most probably have been doomed, but owing to the splendid efforts of the garrison, men, women, and even children, joining in the work of passing water to the engines, as well as to a providential change of the wind to another quarter, the danger was averted. Orders were given to save as many of the valuable books in the Hanlin as possible; the greater part had, however, been destroyed either by fire or water; a good many were taken away as mementoes by members of the garrison.

The enemy pursued these incendiary tactics at other parts of the defence, and at 3 P.M. a fire was reported from the Russian Legation, but M. de Giers reported that he thought he could cope with it with the resources at his command. Late in the afternoon the American detachment reported a determined attempt to set fire to their Legation buildings. I sent over immediately a reinforcement of twenty-five men and some members of the fire brigade. The Russo-Chinese Bank next to the American Legation was on fire, and partially burnt down, but the Legation escaped. For the next five days the enemy endeavoured to burn out the garrison, and a daily and hourly fight took place, resulting in a complete victory for the defenders.

The practice from the enemy's Krupp 9-pr. battery on the Chien Gate now became very accurate, and for a time they paid particular attention to the national standards flying over the entrance gates of the Russian and American Legations. The American flag-staff was shot away,\* and a considerable hole made in the gate-way. The Russian

\* N.B.—Sir C. MacDonald telegraphed on the 29th January, 1901, to the effect that this incident took place not on the 23rd June, but later, on the 6th July.

flag had also some narrow escapes, and they were both eventually removed to places where they could not be seen from the wall. This battery also shelled the barricade on the wall at the back of the American Legation, bursting two shells in the barricade itself, the range being about 800 yards. Unfortunately we had no artillery heavy enough to silence these guns, and our riflemen were so scattered it was all we could do to keep in check those of the enemy. The 9-pr. which was to have accompanied the Russian detachment had most unfortunately been left behind on the platform of the railway station at Tien-tsin, though the ammunition had been brought.

*June 24.*—Early on this morning an attack was made on the American and Russian Legations, resulting in some casualties on our side. A determined attack was also made on the Fu, the Chinese trying to breach the high wall on the north-east corner, but were driven off with loss. They also effected a lodgment on the Tartar city wall immediately behind the American Legation, where they displayed their banners, and seemed to be waiting for orders to fire. A brilliant charge along the top of the wall by a small force of Germans and Americans, led by the intrepid Lieutenant von Soden, put the enemy to flight, and the pursuit was kept up almost to the Chien Gate. Here the pursuing party had to retire, finding themselves face to face with a Chinese barricade. In this gallant affair the enemy lost from eight to ten killed and three banners. While this was going on the British Legation was attacked in a determined manner from the Mongol Market, the attack being directed against the south stable quarters, the enemy working their way through the Chinese houses up to the wall of the Legation. They then set fire to a part of the stables, and threw stones and other missiles into the stable-yard. A sortie was instantly decided upon, a hole was made in the wall, and a party of marines headed by Captain Halliday dashed into the burning buildings, and cleared them at the point of the bayonet. Unfortunately Captain Halliday was almost immediately wounded very severely by a rifle-shot through the shoulder and lung, and had to give up the command. Notwithstanding the severe nature of his wound, Captain Halliday shot three of his assailants, and, refusing all aid, walked to the hospital, a distance of some 200 yards. I regret to say, owing to the severity of the wound, the services of this excellent officer were lost to the defence for the rest of the siege. Captain Strouts now took command of the sortie, and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy, killing thirty-four in one house. One marine was mortally wounded, and others slightly in this affair, which had a most excellent effect, as it destroyed some 200 yards of cover which the enemy possessed, and drove them back to their barricades situated at the same distance from the Legation wall. During the morning an equally brilliant sortie was made by Colonel Shiba from the north-east corner of the Fu at the head of ten French, ten Italians, and ten Japanese marines, and some British and Japanese volunteers, driving the enemy out of and past the Customs buildings. In the meanwhile the American detachment under Captain Myers had effected a lodgment on the Tartar wall, and a barricade had been commenced, a special gang of coolies to work on it being told off under an American missionary. By the following morning this barricade was completed. Unfortunately it was constructed at the head of the east ramp leading up to a bastion, thus leaving the bastion and the west ramp to be taken possession of by the enemy should they be so minded. The ramp leading up to the barricade was under fire from the Hata Gate, and many casualties occurred in going up to it. I myself saw three "converts" shot on the ramp in the space of five minutes. The enemy maintained a smart fire on this position, as also on the barricades across the street below. The fire on the wall was so severe that any casualties which occurred could not be attended to until nightfall, and the dead had to remain where they fell. The French and German Legations had meanwhile been keeping up a stubborn defence. The Germans held a barricade facing the Hata Gate, on the wall, and also on the road between the Legation and the foot of the ramp, and the French a barricade across Legation Street looking east. As evening closed in a British marine was dangerously wounded whilst walking inside our Legation compound. At the time he was shot down several ladies and children were within a few yards. It is a noticeable fact that during the entire siege only three casualties took place in the actual grounds as distinguished from the defences of the Legation. A marine was shot dead coming out of the guard-room by a bullet which skimmed the roof of the constables' quarters; the third casualty was a lady seriously wounded on the tennis lawn a few minutes after the relieving force entered the Legation.

*June 25.*—During the night and early morning the barricades on the wall and in the street at the back of the American Legation were badly damaged by shell fire from the Chien Gate; ten Germans and ten British marines were sent to reinforce, two British marines were almost immediately wounded by shell fire, one of whom subsequently died.

French reinforcements, together with Customs and Legation volunteers, under Captain Poole, were sent to the Fu, which was hard pressed; in this attack one French marine and two Japanese were killed and two Italians wounded.

Shortly after 4 P.M. great excitement was caused in the British Legation by the appearance of a small group of men carrying a board on the North Bridge, and word was passed to the northern defences and to the Fu to cease fire. By means of glasses from the north stable the board was made out to be an Imperial Decree stating that the Chinese troops were sent to protect the Legations and stop the firing, and adding that a despatch would be handed to the Legations on the North Bridge. One of the garrison, a Chinaman, volunteered to go out and receive the despatch; he was furnished with a notice board with black characters painted thereon, to the effect that the Imperial Decree had been understood, and that the despatch would be received; wearing an official hat the messenger sallied out watched by an expectant garrison; on arrival at the bridge he was received with cries of "Lai, la" ("He has come"), whereupon his courage seemed to fail him, and dropping the board he retreated hurriedly back to the Legation, arriving unhurt. Two Mandarins accompanied by soldiers appeared round the corner of the bridge and everybody hoped that communications with the enemy were about to be opened, but some dropping shots were heard and the Mandarins and soldiers quickly disappeared. It was thought at the time that some too zealous sentries in the Fu had been unable to resist the temptation of shooting a Mandarin, and had disobeyed orders; but I have subsequently ascertained that the shots were fired by Tung fu Hsiang's soldiers at the party bearing the Imperial Decree, and that one of the bearers was actually shot dead, the rest taking to flight. The board with the Imperial Decree inscribed thereon remained for many days on the bridge a curious commentary on the thousands of bullets which swept over it and pattered on the roofs and defences of the Legations.

The immediate effect, however, of this notice was a sounding of horns in the Imperial city, which was taken up all round the defences and the firing immediately ceased, thus showing very clearly the complete command the *de facto* Government, whether Dowager-Empress, Prince Tuan, or both had over the troops. The lull in the firing was the signal for increased activity in the British Legation on the part of Mr. Gamewell and his Fortification Committee, and soon some hundred of converts were busily at work strengthening weak places and adding to the defences. Our advanced posts in the Hanlin entered into conversation with the Chinese soldiers; from the latter it was gathered that Yung Lu had ordered the "cease fire," and that a communication was coming from him to us, but it never came.

Previous to the appearance of the board, the Germans and Americans had been hotly engaged, and the Italian gun had been sent to the wall barricade to endeavour to keep down the shell fire from the Chien Gate, but had itself been put out of action, both gunners having been seriously wounded and carried to the International Hospital. By 8 P.M. the firing had altogether ceased; shortly after a few shots were exchanged between the French in their Legation and the opposing barricades; a few desultory shots were also fired on the wall. On this day the Chinese took to building barricades of a more substantial nature and scientific design; up till now they had fired from barricades hastily constructed, from roofs of houses, and from behind ruined walls, and must have suffered severely.

About midnight, Prince Tuan and the war party having presumably again got the upper hand a tremendous fusillade was opened from all sides, but principally from north and north-west. This was the heaviest fire to which we had yet been subjected, and the bullets struck and ricocheted off the roofs of the various buildings like hailstones; this fire was kept up all through the night, and very few of the garrison obtained any sleep. The Americans were badly pressed in the barricade below the wall and reinforcements were called for from the French Legation, but Captain d'Arcy was unable to send them, his own post being hotly attacked; ten British marines were accordingly sent as soon as they could be spared.

June 26.—In the morning the enemy, exhausted evidently by their efforts of the previous night, kept fairly quiet, allowing the worn-out garrison to snatch a few hours sleep. At 9.30 desultory sniping took place all round the defences.

Mr. Cockburn, Chinese Secretary, and Mr. Ker, Assistant Chinese Secretary, remained with the picket in the north stables the whole day, in case any message should come from the Imperial city, but in vain, and it was now evident that the war party was in the ascendant, and that a policy of extermination of the Legations had been decided on. The enforced retreat of Admiral Seymour and the successful blockade and bombardment of Tien-tsin, of which we were, of course, unaware, would be sufficient to account for this decision.

To-day was organized the last reserve, and the following order was posted on the Bell Tower:—

“In case of heavy firing, all men with guns of any description who are not on special duty at the time are to assemble at once at the Bell Tower and there await the orders of Captain Strouts.”

Subsequent instructions were given that the assembly should only take place at the ringing of the “general attack bell.”

The French Legation was severely attacked towards evening, and heavy volleys were fired into it from the enemy's barricades.

June 27.—This promised to be a lively day. The firing became very heavy all round as early as 2 A.M. At 8 A.M. the firing slackened somewhat; but a smart attack was made on the Fu, and Colonel Shiba sent for the Italian gun. Fresh gunners having been procured, the gun was sent to him.

At 2:30 the American Legation called for reinforcements, and a reserve of five British marines, which were now always kept ready at the main gate, were immediately dispatched with a promise of ten more, if necessary. Ten British marines were already in the American barricade; this made twenty-one British marines, rather more than one-third of the available force, on duty outside the British Legation.

At 4 P.M. a heavy fusilade commenced on all sides, and the bugle sounded to general quarters. There was also heavy firing from the north-east corner of the Fu, and a Japanese orderly came hurriedly over with a note for me from Colonel Shiba. It ran thus:—

“Dear Sir,—They are nearing to break down the Fu's wall. I want to crush them when they come in. Will you please send some more reinforcements to me with the bearer.”

Five marines and five volunteers were immediately sent. Shortly afterwards Colonel Shiba came over and reported that the enemy having breached a hole in the north-east corner of the wall, had poured through into the Fu. He was, however, prepared for this incursion, and opened a murderous fire on them from surrounding loop-holes. The enemy fled in panic, trampling each other down in their efforts to escape through the hole by which they had entered, and leaving over twenty of their dead in the inclosure.

To cover their retreat they set fire to a temple at the corner of the Fu, and for the rest of the afternoon occupied themselves in dragging their dead through the hole in the wall by means of long poles with hooks attached to the ends.

At 8 P.M. the American detachment reported that 200 Boxers, compelled by Chinese soldiers to advance, had attacked the street barricade, but had been forced to retire with a loss of fifty killed. This number is, I think, somewhat excessive.

At 10:30 the “general attack” bell was sounded. The reserves turned out smartly and in very creditable numbers. The firing ceased shortly after 11, and a fairly quiet night ensued.

June 28.—The enemy had evidently constructed gun platforms during the night for their two Krupp guns in the Fu, and with these they devoted themselves to bombarding the north wall at close range (about 10 yards) in order to breach the wall further. They also turned their attention to the “Hôtel de Pékin.” The upper story of this building was struck twenty-six times by shell, without, however, doing any harm to the occupants, who were in the lower story. The ruins of the Russo-Chinese Bank were occupied this day by the enemy.

At 6:30 P.M. the “general attack” bell was again sounded. The enemy had manned their loophole in the Mongol Market, and opened a heavy musketry fire against the stable quarters. Suddenly a gate at the north-west corner of the market flew open, and two Krupp guns opened fire at the top story of the stable quarters at a range of about 200 yards. Shell after shell crashed into the building, completely wrecking one window, shattering the barricades of the next, and driving the defenders out of the two upper rooms down below into the stable yard. Our men were not slow to return the fire, but having been driven out of the top story of the building we could only bring a few rifles to bear. These, however, delivered an effective fire into the gateway, where, through the smoke, we could see the gunners at work. These, however, stuck to their guns, and it was only when it seemed as if the upper story of the house must come down, that the fire suddenly ceased.

Experts say that two or three more rounds and the supporting walls would have given way, sending the heavy Chinese roof crashing into the story below. The Chinese gunners must have suffered severely, for they were considerably exposed, and they never again attempted an artillery attack upon the Mongol Market.

The food supply suffered considerably during this bombardment, two mules and a pony having been killed by exploding shells. Several of the men had narrow escapes, but only two were wounded.

The wall behind the American Legation and the Legation itself were hotly attacked during the day. Mr. Conger, writing from his Legation, says:—

“Besides the attack of last evening our people on the wall and in the street below had two heavy attacks during the night. This morning they can be seen in largely increased numbers; they have occupied the inclined ramp opposite ours, and have planted a banner near the top, within 100 yards of our position, but we cannot touch them. If they attack, Captain Myers can repulse them, if not in great numbers. I have instructed him to hold on to the last minute, and am sure he will.”

The enemy did not leave their barricade, but contented themselves with a continuous fusillade from their loopholes.

June 21.—Two sorties had been arranged for this morning: one under Captain Wray and one under Captain Poole. The former consisted of 26 British, 10 Russians, 5 French, and 5 Italians, and the latter, of 5 marines and 10 volunteers. Captain Wray's party attacked the Mongol Market with a view, if possible, of capturing the two Krupp guns which had done such damage the day before; the guns had, however, been removed, and the sortie retired, setting fire to some houses; there were no casualties.

This sortie would have effected more, but so many nationalities were represented on one spot that orders given were not understood and some confusion resulted. Captain Poole's party penetrated into the Carriage Park, but were brought up by a high barricade; when near the same they came under a heavy cross-fire at close range, and had to retreat, fortunately without any casualties, though the fire was very hot, the bullets pattering like hail all round the hole in the wall through which the retreat had to be effected.

During the forenoon the enemy's artillery at the north-east corner of the Fu was particularly energetic; the gunnery, however, was erratic, several of the shells coming over the Legation, and finding a home in the Chinese city south of the Tartar wall. Reinforcements were sent into the Fu, 5 marines and 5 volunteers. Shortly after 10 the Chinese set fire to a large pavilion at the north-east corner of the Fu, and effected a lodgment in the grounds. They crept up under cover of ruins, &c., with long poles, at the end of which tow dipped in kerosene was tied. With these they set fire to the heavy overhanging wooden eaves of the Chinese buildings, which were very old, and burnt like tinder. It was only by being burnt out that the plucky defenders were forced to fall back.

Dr. Lippett, surgeon of the American detachment, was dangerously wounded whilst talking to his Minister. The wound was a very serious one, and he was still in hospital when the relieving troops entered.

Captain D'Arcy, the gallant defender of the French Legation, was severely attacked and sent for reinforcements: 5 British marines, 5 volunteers, and 10 Japanese were immediately sent and assisted in repelling this attack. The British detachment was cheered by their French comrades when leaving the Legation.

Lieutenant Herbert, second in command of the French detachment, was killed whilst directing the defence, and two French marines were brought in wounded to the International Hospital, which had been established in this Legation under Drs. Poole and Velde, surgeons of the British and German Legations respectively.

This had been a bad day for the defence: every single nationality had to deplore the loss of some of its members, and the French and Japanese, after hard fighting, had lost ground.

It had always been supposed that heavy rain would have the effect of driving the Chinese under shelter, and that a rainstorm while it lasted would result in quiet times for us. At 10 P.M. heavy rain commenced, and was the immediate signal for a most tremendous fusillade that quite surpassed anything that had ever taken place before. There was little or no artillery fire, but the roar, for it can be called by no other name, of musketry continued without intermission until daylight. There was no necessity to ring the alarm bell, for the entire garrison stood to arms during the whole night, thinking that this waste of ammunition must be the precursor of something more serious. Nothing, however, happened, and the damage done, except to trees and roofs, which were badly cut about, was practically nil. To maintain so continuous a fire I am of opinion that the Imperial regiments must have relieved each other in the firing line. The vast majority of the hail of bullets were going very high, and again the Chinese city must

have suffered seriously. At a low computation 200,000 rounds must have been fired by the Chinese during the night.

*June 30.*—Up till 9 A.M. the enemy remained quiet, having without doubt passed a sleepless night, but shortly after 9 they showed in large numbers opposite the German posts and, in reply to a communication from the German Chargé d'Affaires, a reinforcement of ten British marines was sent to assist in repelling the attack; two of this reinforcement were soon carried back severely wounded by splinters from shells; one has since died. Fighting had now become severe, and three German marines were killed and two wounded, but the enemy were repulsed having suffered heavily; the French, also, though attacked and hard pressed, drove off their assailants with loss.

At 11 P.M. the picket in the south stable reported what looked like a search-light far away on the southern horizon. I watched the light in question for some time; it certainly had the appearance of a search-light, or rather lighthouse, low down on the horizon; its resemblance to a search-light, however, was not sufficiently pronounced to warrant a notice being put up on the Bell Tower, where all events of interest were posted.

*July 1.*—This morning began quietly, but at 9 A.M. the enemy, notwithstanding their lessons of the previous day, showed in force towards the Hata Gate, and creeping up in the ramps surprised the German guard of ten men, under a non-commissioned officer, who retired down the reverse ramp, thereby exposing the rear of the American barricade some 450 yards distant; the latter coming under a reverse fire also left the wall, and the situation for a time was very critical; the Chinese, however, did not realize or at any rate did not avail themselves of the advantage they had gained: Russian reinforcements were at once sent to the Americans, and shortly afterwards they reoccupied their barricades, but the German barricades on the wall remained in the hands of the enemy until the end of the siege. At 10:30 a further reinforcement consisting of ten marines, under Captain Wray, was sent to relieve Captain Myers on the wall; seven marines also went to the German Legation; whilst this was going on a fierce attack was made on the French Legation; Mr. Wagner, one of the Customs volunteers, was shot dead and the garrison momentarily fell back to their last line of defence, leaving the German Legation in a somewhat exposed and critical position. M. von Below, German Chargé d'Affaires, sent word to me informing me of the state of affairs and asking for reinforcements; though the Kansu troops were busy attacking our north and north-west defences, Captain Strouts was able to detach six men and a corporal to the relief; the French had in the meanwhile advanced and reoccupied their Legation. The enemy had during the night built formidable barricades in the north of the Carriage Park; to cope with this the Italian quickfirer was with some difficulty hauled up into the Students' Library, a large upper story room, and opened with deadly effect on the said barricade, completely silencing its fire. At 2 P.M. Captain Wray who, it will be remembered, had been sent to Captain Myers' assistance on the wall, was brought in with a Mauser bullet through the shoulder. I had given this officer orders whilst on the wall to commence a barricade some 200 yards east of the American one in order to hold the enemy in check from the Hata Gate side and to cover the rear of the Russo-American position. On advancing towards the spot indicated he and his party were met by a severe cross-fire from both the Hata Gate and Chien Gate, the Mauser bullets from the latter just clearing the top of the American barricade in rear of the little party, and ricocheting along the wall, they nevertheless continued to construct the work. Captain Wray, whilst directing his men, was wounded soon after; one of his party was also shot down. The fire now became so hot that it was quite impossible to continue the work; Captain Wray, therefore, ordered a retreat, which was carried out with most exemplary coolness under a severe fire.

At 3:15, Lieutenant Paolini, the officer commanding the Italian detachment in the Fu, reported that the Krupp gun, which had been firing all day, had been moved nearer, and he thought, by making a sortie, he might be able to take it; he asked for assistance, and also for permission to make the attempt. Thinking the proposition rather risky, I consulted Colonel Shiba, in whose judgment of affairs in the Fu I had the fullest confidence.

Colonel Shiba replied that he thought the capture of the gun practicable, and that the sortie should be made. I accordingly gave orders that the desired reinforcements should be sent to Lieutenant Paolini, and that he might proceed. There was no time to discuss the details of the sortie, as the position taken up by this gun was evidently only temporary, but the general idea was for Lieutenant Paolini's party to attack from the west, while Colonel Shiba attacked from the east. The reinforcements detached by Captain

Strouts consisted of seven British marines and five volunteers, the latter all student interpreters in the Consular service. I ordered all firing to cease from the north stable picket and main gate, and waited results. The attacking party sallied out of the gate of the Fu, and going along the wall, disappeared round the corner, up a lane which forms the north boundary of the Fu. A heavy fusillade was heard, and a marine was seen staggering back, waving his hand as if to attract attention; he had not gone very far when he fell. Three of the garrison instantly dashed out and brought him in. No man of the attacking party returned, and it was hoped that the attack had proved successful; this, however, proved subsequently not to be the case. Lieutenant Paolini was severely wounded, two Italian marines killed, and seven marines wounded, two of the latter being British. Mr. Townsend, one of the student interpreters, was also severely wounded. It appeared that when the party turned into the lane they were met by a severe fire from a barricade some forty yards in front, as well as from the left wall of the lane, which was only some 18 to 20 feet broad. Lieutenant Paolini was shot almost immediately, whilst gallantly leading the party; two Italian marines also fell, one shot dead, the other mortally wounded (he died almost at once). The barricade in front, some 8 feet high, was a blaze of fire, as well as the side wall. The little party, finding themselves in a death trap, sought to escape through a hole or breach in the wall of the Fu, which was, however, only large enough to allow of two passing through at a time; it was whilst getting through this breach that two other men were wounded. Mr. Russell, a young student interpreter, with great presence of mind, ordered his party of four volunteers to take cover behind a small heap of earth and bricks, and wait till the regulars had got through the hole. As soon as all had passed through, the students dashed across the lane one at a time; it was in doing this that Mr. Townsend was shot in the shoulder and thigh, and fell. He was, however, pulled through the hole, still retaining possession of his rifle. Mr. Bristow, another of the party, with great coolness and presence of mind, picked up and brought in the rifle belonging to the Italian marine, whose dead body was lying in the lane. But for Mr. Russell's cool action, the confusion and consequent loss amongst the attacking party would most certainly have been greater. A fight now took place over the dead body of the marine, but the fire was so deadly in the lane it was found impossible to recover it; three of the enemy, tempted, doubtless, by the reward offered by the Chinese Government for the head of a foreigner, came out from behind their defences, but were instantly shot down by the north stable picket from an advanced post on the other side of the canal.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shiba came over to me at once and reported the ill-success of the sortie, for which he very generously took the entire blame.

It was impossible to reconnoitre the ground outside our defences, so that sorties were at all times very risky, and, with so small a garrison, only to be undertaken under very special circumstances. Colonel Shiba's party had also encountered an unexpected barricade, and been forced to retire. Had we been able to capture the enemy's gun and its ammunition, the loss we suffered would have been small in comparison to the addition to our strength in the shape of even one piece of artillery. Lieutenant Paolini's wound was found to be severe, and he was detained in hospital; his place was immediately taken by M. Caetani, Secretary of the Italian Legation, an ex-officer of Italian cavalry.

The evening passed fairly quietly. At 10.30 the light I have alluded to was again reported. I went, together with the signalman of Her Majesty's ship "Orlando," to the upper story of the First Secretary's house, and the light was plainly visible; the signalman said it was evidently a flash-light. As it might possibly belong to the force which was on its way (we hoped) to relieve us, and by way of cheering up the spirits of the garrison, the following Notice was posted up the next day on the Bell Tower:—

"Last night, between 10 P.M. and 2 A.M., an electric flash-light was seen on the south-eastern horizon; its approximate distance from Peking, 25 miles. The flashes were regular, and occurred at intervals of almost a second, with a pause of between five to ten seconds between forty or fifty flashes."

*July 2.*—Gangs of coolies were at work all night on the American barricades on the Tartar city wall, and some excellent work was put in, the barricades being very considerably strengthened. Spies coming in to Colonel Shiba stated that troops were being withdrawn from Peking towards the south. These statements were received with caution.

Up till 10 o'clock, however, very little firing took place, and it seemed as if the enemy were either withdrawing part of their force or engaged in making fresh plans for attack. At 10.30 the Krupp guns opened fire on the Fu, and an occasional shot took effect on the defences; the majority, however, were going high. During the forenoon the enemy commenced to construct a large barricade in front of the main gate of the Hanlin, about 60 yards from our northern barricades. A few well-placed shells from the

invaluable Italian quickfirer, which had again been hauled up to the Students' Library, demoralized their working party, and they did not continue.

Various important defences were commenced to-day in the British Legation. It was evident that the enemy were concentrating their attack on the Fu, either because they knew how important a point it was in the defence, or because they were aware from their spies that the buildings immediately to the south of it had been allocated to the converts, and it was against these latter that the Chinese seemed especially incensed. Should the Fu fall into the hands of the enemy, the British Legation would be completely commanded by its west wall, and the enemy would be able to bring up their Krupp guns to within 40 yards of the east wall of the British Legation and batter it down, in the same way as they had done to the north wall of the Fu. By my orders the Fortification Committee, under Mr. Gamewell, commenced to strengthen the east defences; the wall itself was furnished with a doubled row of loopholes and thickened to a breadth of 10 feet, so as to render it proof against artillery, and traverses were erected to protect the western defences from reverse fire.

At 9 P.M. the American Minister and Mr. Squiers, his Secretary of Legation, both of whom had seen military service, and whose experience was invaluable to the defence, came over to report that the Chinese had advanced across the bastion in front of the Russo-American barricade on the wall under cover of a species of sap or stone wall, and had erected a tower at the end of the sap, from which they could actually throw stones at the defenders of our barricade, from which the tower was only distant some 25 feet. They pointed out that it was absolutely necessary to take this tower and the Chinese barricade by assault, to prevent the enemy rushing our position on the wall, which was in imminent danger.

I immediately fell in with their views, and promised a reinforcement of fifteen men, which, with the ten marines already on duty, made up a total of twenty-five; with them went Mr. Nigel Oliphant, who volunteered for the sortie. The attacking party, under Captain Myers, United States' Army, collected behind the wall barricade at 1:30 A.M. on the 3rd July; the party consisted of Captain Myers and fourteen American marines, a Russian officer, Captain Vroubleffsky, and fifteen Russian marines, Mr. Nigel Oliphant and twenty-five British marines. No marine officer was available, two, Captains Haliday and Wray, being in hospital wounded, and Captain Strouts could not be spared from the British defences. Captain Myers addressed the men in a short speech, pointing out clearly the plan of attack: the Anglo-American detachment, under his immediate command, was to attack the tower, follow along the sap, and then assault the barricade on its left or southern side; the Russian detachment was to attack the Chinese barricade on the right or northern end, where it abutted on to the top of the ramp.

At a given signal the whole party swarmed over the American barricade; the night was very dark and threatening rain. The English and Americans, with Captain Myers at their head, entered the tower, which they found unoccupied. They followed along the sap. Here Captain Myers received a severe spear wound in the knee and was disabled. At the south end of their barricade the Chinese had left a small lane or opening to connect with the sap. Through this the Anglo-American party streamed and engaged the enemy hand to hand, Mr. Oliphant shooting two with his revolver. A small encampment of tents was found behind their barricade. The enemy was cleared out of these, and driven down the ramp, leaving twenty-five of their dead on the wall.

The Russians, gallantly led by Captain Vroubleffsky, had in the meanwhile climbed over the right of the barricade and joined in the combat.

The enemy's position, including the whole bastion, was now in our hands, and work was commenced to strengthen what we had taken. A tremendous musketry fire was opened on the working party from a second barricade some 60 yards further along the wall, severely wounding a non-commissioned officer of marines. Just before dawn heavy rain came on which lasted several hours and caused great discomfort to the men. Our losses were two American marines killed and Captain Myers wounded; one Russian killed and two wounded, and three British marines wounded, all severely.

The above was one of the most successful operations of the siege, as it rendered our position on the wall, which had been precarious, comparatively strong. Work was continued day and night, and every opportunity taken to improve the advantage gained. At dawn the Krupp guns again began pounding away at the Fu defences, which were severely knocked about, and several casualties took place. The rain which had set in at dawn continued until sunset; the canal which separated the British, American, and Russian Legations from the remainder of the defence came down in flood, and threatened



to carry away the covered way and barricade which had been constructed across it; as soon as the water subsided, which it fortunately did next morning, work was started on this, and a culvert to carry off the water was constructed. The heavy rain had an excellent effect from a sanitary point of view, as it helped to clear out the canal, which from the number of decaying bodies of horses, mules, and dogs, which had been killed in or near the same by the wild fire of the enemy, had become very offensive and insanitary; but it played havoc with the earthworks and defences generally, and the fortification gangs were hard at work repairing damages. The enemy's works were also much impaired, and they lost heavily when repairing them.

During the afternoon the halyard of the Union Jack flying over the British Legation gatehouse was cut by a bullet and the flag came down with a run. Attempts were made to rehoist it by the signalmen and armourer of Her Majesty's ship "Orlando," but the fire on the top of the gate-house was too hot; the flagstaff was let down to the ground through the tower, the flag nailed to the staff and then rehoisted into its old place. Amongst the small crowd of bystanders who helped with a will to hoist the heavy staff were the Representatives of three of the Great Powers.

At 9 P.M. heavy firing began against the Russian Legation, and our new position on the wall resulting in a few casualties. One of the enemy crept up in the dark to the Russian barricade and thrust a spear through one of the loopholes, narrowly missing a Russian sailor. The owner of the spear was instantly fired at from the neighbouring loopholes, but owing to the darkness it was impossible to see with what result. The flash-light was again seen, but clearer and with more movement. It was particularly bright at 2 A.M.

At my request a Return was furnished to me this day by the various officers commanding the detachments of the number of casualties which had taken place since the 20th June. They were as follows:—

British marines, 2 killed, 15 wounded, including 2 officers.

Bluejackets, Italian, 5 killed, 7 wounded, 1 officer.

Bluejackets, Russian, 3 killed, 11 wounded.

Bluejackets, Japanese, 5 killed, 11 wounded.

German marines, 8 killed, 7 wounded.

Bluejackets, French, 6 killed, including 1 officer, 5 wounded.

Bluejackets, Austrians, 3 killed, 3 wounded.

American marines, 6 killed, 6 wounded, 1 officer.

All the wounds were severe and necessitated removal to hospital. Total, thirty-eight killed and fifty-five wounded.

July 4.—This being the anniversary of American Independence the Anglo-Saxon community amongst the besieged had decided that the relieving force would appear to-day, knowing the difficulties of transport I did not share in their anticipations, though when appealed to, I did my best to encourage their hopes. Several attempts had been made through the converts to communicate with the outside world, from whom we had received no news whatever since the commencement of the siege. Our messengers were at first let down over the Tartar city wall or went through the canal sluice gate under the same. None had succeeded, so far as we knew, in piercing the strict cordon drawn round us; some had returned baffled in their efforts; and some we feared had been killed. To-day a Shantung lad of about 14, well known to the American missionaries, volunteered to go; he took a letter from me to the British Consul sewed up in a piece of oil-cloth; the package was flat, just an inch long and half-an-inch broad; instead of concealing it in the thick sole of his shoe or sewing it into his clothes, hiding places with which the enemy had become well acquainted, he concealed it in a bowl of rice which he carried with him, after the fashion of some Chinese mendicants. As this was the first of our messengers who got through, his adventures are worth recounting. He left the water gate at night, and after having narrowly escaped capture reached the south gate of the Chinese city; watching his opportunity he slipped through with some mendicants and gained the open country, working his way with great caution from village to village. As he was not certain of the road to Tien-tsin, and fearing to excite suspicion by making inquiries, he used, on arrival at a village, to join the children at play and from them ascertain by degrees the general lie of the country, the names of adjoining villages, and the direction of Tien-tsin. The country was overrun with Boxers, and the villages were full of wounded, the result of the fighting with Admiral Seymour. When within sight of Tien-tsin he was commandeered by the enemy and made to work for them for over a week; at last he managed to escape and slipping through the allied sentries, which was undoubtedly the

most risky part of the journey, he arrived at Tien-tsin on the 19th, five days after the taking of the Chinese city by the allies. He wandered about for a couple of days before he met any European who could talk Chinese, but at last he was fortunate enough to do so and was at once taken to the British Consul, where he delivered his letter on the 21st instant, which, though dated the 4th, was the latest news received from Peking. He started back on the 22nd and made the return journey in six days. The lad stated that when he arrived in the vicinity of Tien-tsin the enemy were in the greatest state of demoralization, flying in every direction and leaving their artillery in ditches and hidden in the millet fields. On the return journey he noticed that finding they were not pursued they had recovered most of their guns and were entrenching themselves at Peitsang and other places. All the above we ascertained on the 28th instant, when the lad returned.

The letter which was received on the 21st by the British Consul was the *facsimile* of several others I had sent on previous occasions, the number of casualties only being altered from day to day. On this day, the 4th July, we had forty-six killed, including civilians, and about double that number severely wounded; of these eight civilians had been killed and eleven wounded. The slightly wounded were not entered in the Returns and only went to hospital to have their wounds dressed and then returned to duty. The letter gave the relieving force, for of course we always counted on a relieving force, all needful information with regard to the position we held, and also pointed out that the water or sluice gate through the Tartar city wall afforded the easiest means of entering the Legation quarter. It was by this way that the troops eventually entered.

July 5.—At a European shop within our lines were found some Japanese fireworks. The light-hearted Japanese garrison amused themselves at night by a pyrotechnic display, but one of their number discovered that a very effective missile might be constructed by opening these fireworks and filling them with nails, scrap iron, &c.; this was accordingly done and used against the Chinese with considerable effect.

The upper story of the "Hôtel de Pékin" was again severely knocked about by the enemy's shells from the Chien Gate; the Secretary's quarters in the German Legation were rendered untenable from the same cause. The enemy were during the morning very active in the Hanlin. A party under Captain Poole were out clearing the ruins, the fire became very severe and a retreat was ordered. Mr. David Oliphant, of my Consular staff, was busy cutting down a tree in company with the signalman of the "Orlando," and before he had time to obey the order, was shot through the body and fell; the signalman stayed behind him under a shower of bullets until a stretcher was brought. The wound was mortal and the poor young fellow died and was buried the same afternoon; his loss was deeply felt by the whole British community, with whom he was an immense favourite; owing to his coolness under fire, and his knack of commanding men, I had appointed him in charge of the eastern defences of the Legation and I felt his loss very keenly.

At midday the sentries in the upper story of the Students' Library and quarters reported the enemy at work amongst the yellow tiles on the top of the Imperial city wall, which is distant some 200 yards from the north wall of the Legation. At first it seemed as if they were loopholing it for musketry, but by means of field-glasses through the foliage of the trees two guns could plainly be made out. How the enemy had succeeded in getting them up to their position it was difficult to ascertain, for the wall was over 20 feet high and only some 3 feet thick. Fire was instantly opened upon the battery by our riflemen. The position, owing to the foliage and the very small part of the wall disturbed was not easy to locate with the naked eye, but with glasses the gunners could clearly be seen getting their guns into position.

We were not long left in doubt as to the enemy's intentions, for the first missile, a 7-lb round shot, came crashing into the students' quarter, where a group of riflemen were endeavouring to pick off the gunners. The bricks were sent flying in every direction but no harm was done. This was the introduction to several more, all of which took effect on the buildings in the Legation, the Minister's house and upper students' quarters being particularly favoured.

The round shot were of two sizes, one weighing 7 lbs. and the other 14 lbs. The bombardment continued with intervals day and night for the next ten days, and over 150 rounds of shot were fired into the Legation and the Hanlin buildings alone. Curiously enough, the only casualty resulting from this fire was an old Chinese woman, whose leg was broken by a round shot, from the effects of which she died. Some people were hurt by falling bricks, displaced by the shot, but no one seriously.

There were, of course, some narrow escapes. The British Nordenfolt, which was temporarily in action on the balcony of the nursery in the Minister's house, was struck by a round shot, which came through the wall and broke the wheel; the seaman who was working the gun escaped uninjured. Another struck a chimney high up, fell down the

same and rolled out of the grate on to the floor occupied by three young ladies of the garrison. One crashed through the smoking-room of the Minister's house and fell amongst the occupants, all ladies, but without touching any of them. Another, after carrying away part of the coping of one of the bed-rooms in the Minister's house, smashed its way through a thick wall in the escort quarters occupied by the Maritime Customs and fell between two ladies without touching either. And lastly, one entered the big dining-room through the north wall, and passing behind a large picture of the Queen without in any way injuring it, pierced the south wall of the dining-room and fell into the little central garden, where the children were playing at Boxers, and barricades, sorties, and mimic warfare generally.

Though the enemy's fire from these two batteries—for very shortly a second appeared some 30 yards to the right of the first, also furnished with two smooth bores—was ineffective, the same cannot be said of our return fire, which seemed to annoy the enemy considerably. The invaluable Italian gun was got into position and the second shell exploded in the westernmost battery, completely silencing one gun for the rest of the siege; the others continued to fire at intervals. Our rifle fire was so searching, however, that the gunners were unable to take aim; on the other hand, at that short range they could not help hitting some part of the Legation. The rifle practice, nevertheless, prevented the enemy from concentrating their fire on any one part of our defences and thus making a breach. Very shortly, owing doubtless to their losses at the guns, each embrasure was provided with an iron door, which opened at intervals; the muzzle of the gun was hastily protruded and the gun fired. The opening of these doors was a signal for a volley from our people, who had the range to a nicety. These volleys must have rendered the firing of the gun a somewhat unhealthy occupation.

After the siege was over these batteries were found to consist of very elaborate gun platforms, 20 feet by 16 feet, made of scaffolding strong enough to hold guns of a much heavier calibre than those actually used. They could accommodate from thirty to forty men, and were made of timbers 9 inches in diameter, some 700 to 800 being employed to make each battery. The constructing of the platforms must have taken from a week to ten days, and occupied from thirty to forty workmen a-piece. Ramps 12 feet broad led up to the platforms. A small gallery supported by scaffolding ran along to right and left of the batteries just below the yellow-tiled coping on top of the wall. This gallery was loopholed for musketry. The place where the guns stood was roofed over as a protection from sun and rain. The iron doors mentioned were found in the battery after the relieving force arrived. They consisted of folding doors on hinges of wrought iron half-an-inch thick, but had been pierced over and over again by our rifle fire, and the left battery had a hole through its door as if made with a punch. This was the work of the Italian gun. Towards evening the sound of big guns was heard to the west of the city. This was not the bombardment of the Roman Catholic missionary establishment known as the Peitang. The sound came from further off, and was almost due west of the Legation.

July 6.—The morning commenced by a severe shell fire against the Fu. The Chinese, emboldened by the failure of our last sortie in this direction, moved one of their Krupp guns up to within a few yards of the wall of the Fu, through which they had made a breach. Colonel Shiba seized the opportunity to make a sortie to capture the gun. Previous to so doing he came to me for orders, and to explain the situation. The gun was located some 10 yards in a lane to the right of the breach above mentioned, and the idea was to dash through the breach and seize the gun and limber. Several Chinese converts provided with ropes for dragging the gun away were to follow the attacking party, which was composed entirely of Japanese marines and volunteers, headed by an ex-officer of the Japanese army serving as a volunteer. A feint attack was to be made from the west by the Italian detachment, reinforced by a corporal and ten British marines. The Japanese detachment charged through the breach. Unfortunately their leader was almost immediately shot through the throat and fell, but the men pressed on, and actually seized the gun, the Chinese gunners taking to flight. The converts were, however, panic-stricken and refused to advance. The enemy, taking advantage of their hesitation, rushed back to their loopholes, and a terrific fire was opened upon the attacking party, causing them to retire through the breach with three more of their number *hors de combat*. The gun and limber were now standing disconsolately in the lane, which formed a *cul de sac*. To venture into the lane was certain death, as every wall and building which commanded it was loopholed, and at every loophole stood one of Tung-fu Hsiang's men with a magazine rifle. On the other hand, any of the enemy who attempted to pass the breach in the wall to get at the gun was shot down by the Japanese. This state of affairs lasted till dark, when the Chinese from their side of the wall threw bricks and stones in

front of the breach, gradually filling it up, and during the night they withdrew the gun. The Russian and French Legations were severely shelled from the Chien Gate, the fire being mainly directed against the American flag, which could be seen from the enemy's battery. At the fourth or fifth shot the flagstaff was struck at the base by a shell, which exploded and shot away a large portion of the roof of the gate-house, bringing down the staff, flag and all. It was rehoisted in a neighbouring tree, the roof of the gate-house being too damaged to allow of it being rehoisted there. The Russian flag was also attracting the fire of this battery, the shooting from which was very true. The flag was therefore removed to another building. It is to be noted that the flags of such Legations as remained unburnt were kept displayed throughout the siege. These were the flags of America, Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Spain, the Chinese gunners distributing their favours amongst them with absolute impartiality. A Russian Consular student, whose mind, it appeared, had been somewhat affected by the strain of the siege, suddenly left the French barricade in Legation Street, and, before he could be stopped, advanced alone and unarmed towards the Chinese barricade some 60 yards distant. The enemy allowed him to approach to within 10 yards, and then shot him down. Instantly several Chinese soldiers rushed forward to seize the dead body, but the French sharpshooters were on the alert, and man after man of the enemy dropped, until eleven had paid the penalty of their temerity with their lives. During the night his body was removed by the Chinese. Since the commencement of the siege this was the third and last European whose dead body fell into Chinese hands. The gallant garrison of the Fu were this day burnt out of some more of the buildings held by them. Since the fighting began they had lost by this means about one quarter of the Fu.

*July 7.*—A quiet morning, but matters became lively as the day advanced. At 9·15 a sharp attack was made against the Fu defences, but repulsed. At 9·30 the French Legation was bombarded by the guns north of the Fu, and also from the Hata Gate. Firing of heavy ordnance was heard to the south and south-west of the city in the direction of the railway terminus. This firing had been distinctly heard throughout the night, and had been reported to me by the officers commanding the French, Austrian, and German detachments, and a notice to this effect was posted on the Bell Tower, and greatly cheered the garrison. The enemy started a fresh barricade near the North Bridge at the end of the road known as "Dusty Lane," but one or two well-placed shells from the Italian gun, which had been brought to the main gate of the Legation, made them desist. The ammunition for this gun was unfortunately getting very low. The cannonading from the Imperial city wall became very brisk; a round shot came through the north corridor of the Minister's house, and fell on the roof of the cellar, which had been converted into a magazine; as this contained some 20,000 rounds of Lee-Metford and Mannlicher ammunition, as well as ninety rounds of shell, common and shrapnel, for the Russian field gun, it was considered advisable to have the cellar further protected by a roofing of sandbags.

There were now only fourteen shells remaining for the Italian quickfirer, so this gun was only used when the case was urgent. The armourer of Her Majesty's ship "Orlando," with considerable ingenuity, devised a new cartridge for the same; taking one of the empty copper cases, most of which had been converted into playthings by the children, but which were now collected, he cast some conical solid shot made from pewter vessels, tea-pots, candlesticks, &c., which had been found in the neighbouring houses; the charge consisted of pebble powder taken from the Russian shells. The difficulty was the percussion cap; this was surmounted by removing the cap of a .45-inch revolver cartridge, which exactly fitted the hole made in the copper case by the removal of the original percussion cap. One of these projectiles was used experimentally in the Italian gun, and answered admirably; the shot being solid pewter, and weighing more than the old shell, the shooting was not so accurate, neither was the effect of the solid shot so good as the explosive shell, but as a makeshift it was excellent. As soon as the shells were finished, these projectiles were taken into use, and continued until the end of the siege; so far as I know, though upwards of seventy were utilized, not one missed fire.

Towards evening much shouting and firing could be heard in the Chinese city; it seemed as if the Boxers and Chinese troops, or different factions of the latter, had fallen out and were settling their differences. Our guards on the wall reported skirmishing between what seemed to be Boxers and Imperial troops, and several of the former were seen to fall.

*July 8.*—At 2 A.M. a very heavy fusillade took place, but lasted only fifteen minutes; it was so severe that the "general attack" bell was rung, and the garrison stood to their arms; the smooth bores on the Imperial city wall joined in the chorus, and the din was deafening.

The morning passed quietly until shortly after 10, when the rattle of musketry burst out all round the north and east of the Fu, accompanied by the fire of the two Krupp guns, which were so close that they made the windows of the British Legation rattle again. At 10.15 the following note was brought to me by a Japanese volunteer :—

“Pressed hard ; please send a strong reinforcement.—SHIBA.”

Warned by the musketry fire, a reinforcement was in readiness ; a non-commissioned officer and six marines, also six volunteers, were at once hurried over. I also wrote to the Russian Legation, and they sent ten sailors ; the attack had, however, in the meanwhile, been repulsed, and their services were not required. The French Legation, to whom Colonel Shiba had also applied, had not been able to help, as they were themselves hard pressed, being subjected to a severe shell and rifle fire from the Hata Gate. Captain Thoman, of the Austrian frigate “Zenta,” who had come up to Peking as a visitor, and had been unable to return to his ship, was killed on this occasion in the French Legation by a fragment of shell ; he was a courteous and gallant officer, and his loss was much felt by those who knew him.

On the previous day one of the gangs of Chinese converts at work under the supervision of Dr. Dudgeon, discovered at an old foundry within our lines what appeared to be an old piece of iron but proved on closer examination to be a small cannon. The trunnions had been knocked off, and it was one mass of rust and dirt ; it was handed over to Mr. Mitchell, the master gunner of the American detachment, and after much hard work, scraping and cleaning, it presented quite a creditable appearance. It was at first lashed to a heavy spar ; when this was found unsatisfactory, it was mounted on a spare set of wheels belonging to the Italian gun ; the shell of the Russian gun, when removed from its projectile fitted, with some coaxing, the bore of this new gun, which was found on closer examination to be rifled and apparently either made of steel or fitted with a steel lining, and probably dated back to 1860, when the Anglo-French forces were in Peking. As the gun was found by Chinese converts in charge of a British subject, and was probably of either British or French manufacture, as it fired Russian ammunition, was mounted on an Italian carriage and further was put together and fired by an American, it was with much truth christened the “International” gun, though our marines more often called it the “Dowager-Empress,” or “Betsy.” The performances of this piece of ordnance were erratic, but owing to the close quarters at which the fighting was carried on, eminently satisfactory. The first shot was aimed at the corner battery on the Imperial city wall, about 240 yards distant (as there were no sights, the aiming consisted of pointing the gun generally in the direction of the object aimed at), the projectile went screaming over the battery into the Imperial city ; the result was received with great cheering by the onlookers in the Legation, who, truth to say, had not much confidence in their new acquisition, and by an astonished silence on the part of the enemy, who were apparently startled to find that after so many days we had at length opened fire with comparatively heavy ordnance. The second shot went woefully short, but the third landed in the battery. This woke the enemy up from their astonishment, and the Mauser bullets began to whistle all round in uncomfortably close proximity ; the “International” was therefore temporarily withdrawn, and transported, not without considerable difficulty, over to the Fu, where it was twice fired under Colonel Shiba’s orders with telling effect at a barricade some thirty yards distant. The first shot carried away one of the enemy’s standards, and the second discharge, which consisted of old nails and bits of scrap iron, was fired into the barricade, and judging from the yells which followed did considerable damage. One drawback to this gun was that immediately the enemy located its whereabouts (which was not at all difficult to do, as the noise and smoke created by it were out of all proportion to its size), they opened a heavy rifle fire on the spot and the gun could not be used for more than three or four shots in succession from the same place. From this evening on, a corporal and five British marines and five volunteers were permanently stationed in the Fu, as affairs were very critical there ; the Japanese detachment having been reduced by casualties from one officer and twenty-five men to one officer and seven men, and the Italian detachment had suffered in like manner.

The British marines also supplied a permanent guard of ten men to the American and Russian barricades on the Tartar city wall ; this had been the case since the 1st July and lasted till the 17th July ; this guard was changed every twenty-four hours. During the afternoon the enemy had been very persistent in their attacks from the Mongol Market and Carriage Park side, they brought up a 1-inch quickfirer and shelled the British Legation ; in the space of fifteen minutes three shells exploded inside the roof of the Chinese

Secretary's house, the fragments coming through the ceiling in a very unpleasant manner; several of these shells exploded in the trees round the tennis ground, some struck the hospital, which fortunately was well barricaded, and one exploded in front of the Second Secretary's house, then occupied by the Russian Minister's family; the fragments entered a room full of children and buried themselves in the wall and furniture, but happily touched no one. It was impossible to locate this gun as it was skilfully concealed amongst the ruins of the Mongol Market houses and was using smokeless powder; fortunately it never returned to this particular position.

*July 9.*—The "International" gun again changed position. This time it was unlashd from its carriage and hauled up into the Students' Library and fired at a barricade which the enemy had erected in the Carriage Park. Considerable damage was done to the enemy, but nearly every pane of glass was smashed in the library, although the windows were open, and the wall of the mess-room below was cracked. The whole of this day the firing all round was incessant, but nothing of particular interest in the fighting-line occurred. All our positions were maintained; constant work was kept up on the fortifications, repairing the old and making new.

A Christian convert volunteered to go into the city and, if possible, obtain news of what was going on. The American missionaries stated that the man in question was reliable. Towards the evening he returned, having had many narrow escapes. He said that the soldiers that surrounded us were Yung-lu's and Tung-fu Hsiang's men. In the north of the city business was proceeding as usual, the hucksters crying their goods in the streets. He had himself bought some small articles, which he brought back with him. The Emperor and Empress were both at the Palace, only a few hundred yards from us. The "Peking Gazette" was published as usual. The Chinese troops had lost heavily, and were afraid of the foreigners in the Legations. He could hear nothing of any foreign troops coming to our rescue.

*July 10.*—The forenoon was quiet after a night of incessant fusillade. It was evident that the Chinese troops indulged in a siesta between the hours of 11 and 1. During the night they never seemed to sleep; the above hours were, therefore, in future, reserved for demonstrations on our part.

Shortly after 2 a fierce fusillade commenced against the Fu, and the enemy seemed to be concentrating all their efforts on this part of the defence. Twenty marines under Captain Poole were sent over; also ten Russian marines. One of the Krupp guns suddenly turned its attention from the Fu to the Union Jack over the Legation gateway, Three shells in quick succession struck the gateway, and several exploded on the tennis lawn, just missing the staff.

As the latter was apparently drawing the enemy's fire and thereby endangering the women and children's lives, the question of hauling the flag down, or at any rate, moving it to another position, was mooted to me by the missionaries. Captain Strouts, whom I consulted, was of opinion that this would only encourage the enemy to further efforts, and would lead to great discontent on the part of the British marine guard.

Fortunately the enemy settled the difficulty by turning their attention to other parts of the defence, and never again made a deliberate target of the flag.

*July 11.*—A message carried by one of the Christian refugees was sent out through the water gate. He was received with a volley from a loopholed house opposite, and beat a hasty retreat. The enemy had evidently discovered this means of exit from our lines and were prepared.

During this afternoon Baron von Rahden reported to me that Chinese soldiers had been seen leaving their defences carrying away their bedding, and that heavy firing had been heard south of the Chinese city.

No satisfactory reason for this heavy cannonading to the south and west of the city has ever been given. Rumour said that Prince Ching's troops had fought with Tung-fu Hsiang's and been defeated, but no corroboration of this came to hand.

Mr. Nigel Oliphant, who, as already mentioned, had been with the sortie on the Tartar city wall, was brought in from the Fu this afternoon shot through the leg. The day's casualties in the Fu alone amounted to 1 Japanese marine killed and 2 wounded, 2 British marines and 2 volunteers wounded.

The temperature to-day registered 102° in the shade; it had not fallen below 90° for some days. The heat and a perfect plague of flies, together with the stench from dead bodies of men and animals, was very trying, especially for the wounded. The poor living—pony and mule broth—was beginning to tell on the children.

*July 12.*—During the night, which was as noisy as usual, the Chinese built a new barricade in the Imperial Carriage Park inclosure, close to the high west wall of the Hanlin, and also established a sandbag battery on top of it. Behind this they placed a

large black silk flag with the Chinese character for "artillery" inscribed thereon. This battery abutted on to our advanced post in the Hanlin. Mr. Mitchell, the American gunner, and Sergeant Preston, of the Marine Guard, in the Hanlin, made a dash for the flag, and jumping up seized it. Instantly a volley of rifle shots went whizzing in all directions: one struck a stone sending the fragments into Sergeant Preston's face; stunned by the blow he let go his hold and fell. Mitchell, however, retained his hold of the flag, and a species of see-saw ensued, with the wall as a fulcrum; several marines and volunteers dashed forward and seized hold of Mitchell. The added weight broke the staff and the flag and part of the staff was triumphantly retained on our side of the wall. This plucky act was the signal for a tremendous outburst of firing from all the enemy's positions which commanded the Hanlin, but our men keeping well under cover no damage was done. The French garrison the same afternoon made a gallant sortie and captured a large silk flag with scarlet characters on a white ground, setting forth that the flag was presented by the Dowager-Empress to General Ma, commanding the left wing of Yung-lu's army. Dashing forward the French sailors deliberately lassoed the flag and hauled it over to their side of the barricade. A tremendous outburst of rifle-fire was the result, by which, unfortunately, four marines were wounded.

July 13, and a Friday.—This was the most harassing day for the defence during the whole course of the siege. During the night Tung-fu Hsiang's men had been particularly active in the Hanlin. Shortly after daylight the Fu was heavily shelled by four guns with shrapnel; the defenders could do nothing with such a hail of shot except keep close under cover. The attack became so severe that notwithstanding reinforcements and a most stubborn resistance on the part of the Japanese, Italian, and British, they were compelled to fall back to the last position but one.

Colonel Shiba had originally planned nine lines of defence, one behind the other. The seventh had been held since the 9th instant but had now to be abandoned, as most of its buildings were in flames, and the enemy's Krupp guns were riddling them with common shell and shrapnel shell at a range of 150 yards.

About 4 a tremendous fusillade broke out on all sides. The "general attack" bell sounded, and as many men as could be spared were fallen in ready to reinforce any part of the defences, which were more than usually hard pressed. The firing in the Fu was heavier and more continuous than I have ever heard it before, and accompanied with yells of "Kill, kill," which could be distinctly heard in the Legation; the sound of the firing seemed as if the defenders were being gradually driven back, and I expected every minute to see our people coming out of the Fu gate, crossing the canal, and falling back on to the Legation. I had sent over every man that could be spared, for on all sides we, too, were being attacked.

I wrote to the Russian Legation for reinforcements and very soon ten marines came over at the double. As soon as they had got their breath I sent them over in charge of M. Barbier, a Russian volunteer, who did good service throughout, and who knew the geography of the Fu well. They had hardly disappeared through the gate of the latter when a welcome messenger came from Colonel Shiba to say that he was holding his own and had driven off the enemy, and for the moment required no further men. I was about to recall the Russians when Herr von Bergen, Second Secretary of the German Legation, came running across the lawn with an urgent written message from the German Chargé d'Affaires, saying that he was very hard pressed and begging for immediate help. The ten Russian marines no longer required at the Fu were at once sent to his aid, and arrived in the nick of time. The enemy, after a smart fusillade, had left their defences and charged into the open with waving banners and loud shouts. They were met by a volley which accounted for six or seven of their number; the rest wavered. The Russians coming up at that moment, the united forces under Lieutenant von Soden charged with fixed bayonets and pursued the enemy capturing one of their standards.

In the meanwhile the French Legation was being vigorously attacked, and shortly after 7 the Chinese exploded two mines underneath the Second Secretary's house and the east side of the Minister's; the explosion completely destroyed these buildings and set fire to those adjacent; two French sailors were killed and buried under the ruins. Captain D'Arcy, the Commandant, was also partially buried and badly cut about the head by falling stones; his wounds were fortunately not serious. The enemy not having properly judged the force of the explosion, suffered severely, and the spy stated that carts next day carried away thirty of their dead from the vicinity of the crater formed by the explosion. The command of the French detachment for the moment devolved upon Captain Labrousse, an officer of Marine Infantry, a visitor to Peking. When he had satisfied himself that it was impossible to recover the bodies of the buried men, he ordered a retreat to the next line of defence. After the explosion the Chinese, notwithstanding

their losses, seemed to be greatly elated at the success of their mining venture and opened a sharp fusillade, but did not leave their defences. The French and Austrians now occupied a trench which they had prepared, and also the Legation chapel, which was loopholed, and held the enemy at bay. In spite of their severe repulse by the Russian and German detachments the Chinese attempted another attack along the road leading at the back of the German Legation under the city wall. The Americans were at this moment changing guard at this post; in the half light they detected the attempt, and the double guard opened a withering fire on the advancing enemy, who retired in confusion, leaving twenty dead on the road.

While all this fighting had been going on in the east and north-east, the enemy had also made demonstrations against the Hanlin, but had been kept in check by the fire from the loopholed defences and the upper windows of the students' quarters; just in front of the west corner of the Hanlin defences against the Carriage Park wall there had been a temple; this had been burnt by the enemy on the 23rd June, and only the four walls remained standing. Captain Strouts saw it was important to occupy this inclosure, as the enemy had pushed their attack to within a few yards of it; a hole was made through the wall, and a party under Captain Poole dashed in and occupied the place; a heavy fusillade was opened, but by keeping close to the west wall no one was hit; here two sentry posts were established, so close to the enemy's sandbag entrenchment on the Carriage Park wall, that amenities in the shape of bricks, stones, and water-melon rinds were freely exchanged between the besiegers and besieged, and our sentries could hear the enemy quarrelling over their rice rations and discussing matters generally. The net result of this day was that the enemy had undoubtedly lost heavily and had been severely handled, and our defences had been pushed forward in the Hanlin, as shown above, but we had lost ground both in the French Legation and in the Fu; our losses amongst the fast diminishing garrison were very serious, amounting to five killed and about double that number wounded.

That evening, together with Colonel Shiba, I inspected the new position in the Fu, to which we had been driven back; the left of the line was pretty strong, consisting of two buildings defended by a high parapet with a species of small fort built against the wall; the ground in front of this was clear, but the enemy had crept up and made a high barricade, its right resting against the wall some 15 yards from the little fort; the parapet was now extended to the right, but unfortunately it was impossible owing to the nature of the ground, to construct it parallel to the enemy's attack, but it fell back considerably, taking in a little artificial mound whereon a redoubt had been constructed. The fort and buildings above mentioned were held by an Italian guard under M. Caetani, Lieutenant Paolini being still incapacitated by his wound. The little hill redoubt was held by Austrians and Italians. The line then proceeded east some 30 yards, where a building half in ruins was arrived at; this was held by Japanese sailors and volunteers. Looking through the loopholes one could see the enemy's positions amongst the still smoking ruins some 50 yards off; the parapet was carried south-east again till it met a high wall which divided the Su Wang Fu into two portions, the official buildings being on the right and the private dwelling-houses on the left; the defence line followed this till it came to a hole made by the Japanese; here it went due east inclosing two buildings east and west of the big centre gateway to the Prince's official residence. In front of this entrance was a large courtyard with gates east and west; in this courtyard the Christian converts had originally taken refuge, but had been obliged to abandon it owing to shrapnel and rifle fire; this courtyard formed the right of the line of the Fu defences; it was 200 metres south of the fort held by the Italians, and 220 metres east. The two gates of the courtyard were held by the Japanese marines and British marines and volunteers, the advance sentries being posted by Colonel Shiba and myself at loopholes in the two buildings above mentioned. Looking through these loopholes manned by a British and Japanese sentry side by side the flames from the burning buildings in front actually touched the muzzles of their rifles. Fortunately, what little wind there was came from the south, increasing in strength as the night advanced; it blew the fire back towards the enemy; but for this the buildings must have caught, the main gate would have followed, and the enemy entering here the whole position would have been taken in reverse. When this fire had burnt itself out our position was strengthened, for it had cleared a space in front of the advanced sentries.

During the night it rained heavily, and the enemy, in consequence, kept up a brisk fusillade; the forenoon was quiet. In the afternoon matters livened up somewhat, and an attack was made on the Russian Legation, the Minister's house being shelled, and his study riddled with shrapnel. The Italian gun was sent over, and assisted in repelling the attack. The "International" went to the French Legation, where, under the able direction of the American gunner, it did excellent work, bursting a shell in a Chinese barricade



and scattering the enemy. On this day a Chinese convert, late gatekeeper at the Roman Catholic Cathedral, called the Nan Tang, who had volunteered to take a message to Tientsin, came with a letter addressed to me, signed "Prince Ching and others." A full account of the correspondence which ensued, and which lasted up to the last day of the siege, is given in a previous despatch. The messenger bore evidence of having been badly beaten, and he told a sad tale of his experiences. He had been caught attempting to leave the Chinese city, and compelled to give up his letter, which the enemy read. After beating him, they took him to Yung Lu, who ordered that his life should be spared, and handed him this letter. The Roman Catholic missionaries gave the man an indifferent character, so he was kept apart from the rest of the converts, and not allowed to roam about the defences. On the following day he quite willingly took back an answer to Yung Lu.

The enemy having been successful with their mining operations in the French Legation, were evidently bent on trying this means of attack at other points. Sounds of picking were distinctly heard by placing one's ear at the back of our foremost barricade in the Hanlin, close to the Carriage Park wall. Mr. Wintour, of the Imperial Maritime Customs, obtained leave and commenced a countermine just at the back of the barricade, and worked in the direction of the sound; three of the Chinese converts, who had proved themselves expert diggers, were told off and put under his orders.

*July 15.*—A quiet night. Chinese, judging by the sound, were very busy in the early morning in the Carriage Park with pick and shovel, though no signs of what they were at, or exactly where they were, could be detected. One of our marines was brought in dangerously wounded from the Fu. During the afternoon the Russians made a successful sortie, and pulled down some houses outside their defences, which had been giving cover to the enemy.

At 6:30, Mr. Warren, student interpreter, was brought in from the Fu mortally wounded by a splinter of a shell in the face; he died within a few hours without recovering consciousness; he had only been in Peking a few months, and was much liked by his fellow-students.

Heavy firing in the direction of the Peitang, the celebrated Roman Catholic Mission, presided over by Mgr. Favier. We were aware that several thousand refugees, as well as a number of foreign priests and Sisters, were besieged within its walls. When the Legation guards had first come up, a French officer and thirty men, and an Italian officer and eleven men, had been sent to assist in the defence of this important Mission. Though several attempts were made, we never succeeded in establishing communication with this place, which lay only some 4 miles off, but through streets packed with the enemy.

Colonel Shiba reported to me that the men of his detachment, sailors and volunteers, were quite exhausted; they had all been up on duty night and day since the commencement of the siege, and had none of them even changed their clothes since the 20th June, nor had they had more than three or four hours of consecutive sleep during that time; he begged that, if possible, half might be taken off duty for a clear twenty-four hours, and replaced by British marines and volunteers, after which the second half might be relieved in a similar manner. I consulted with Captain Strouts, and it was arranged that, although our people were in the same plight, an effort should be made to carry out Colonel Shiba's wishes. The marines and volunteers responded with alacrity to this call made upon them, for they knew what splendid work the Japanese had done and were doing. It was decided that the Japanese sentries should be relieved by ours at 7 o'clock on the following morning.

*July 16.*—At 7 A.M. Captain Strouts took over the relief party; he was accompanied by Dr. Morrison, "Times" correspondent. After having posted the last sentry, they were returning, and had just left the Italian post, when a shower of bullets came over the barricade, and Captain Strouts fell mortally wounded by a bullet through the groin, which shattered the upper part of the thigh-bone. Dr. Morrison was shot almost at the same time by a bullet through the thigh, but which, fortunately, did not strike the bone. Colonel Shiba, who was coming towards them at the time, seeing Captain Strouts and Dr. Morrison fall, ran forward to help them; stretchers were procured, and both wounded men were brought into hospital; this was done under heavy fire, a bullet passing through Colonel Shiba's coat. From the first there was no hope for Captain Strouts, and he died within three hours of his entry into hospital. He was a first-rate officer, cool, calm, and fearless, and his death was a great blow to me and to the entire defence. He was buried at 6 P.M. in the same grave with young Warren, who had been killed the day before. The funeral was attended by all the foreign Representatives, the officers commanding detachments, and as many of the garrison as could be spared from their defence duties. While the mournful procession was proceeding through the Legation grounds to the little

cemetery close by the First Secretary's house, the old Chinese messenger who had taken a letter to "Prince Ching and others," bearing a large white flag aloft in one hand, and holding in the other what proved afterwards to be a sufficiently friendly reply to our letter, was marching solemnly along the side of the canal from the North Bridge towards the Legation. The enemy—whether they had in the meantime relented of the friendly tone of the letter he carried, or whether they wished to accelerate their messenger's movements—definitely exploded a shell over his head, fortunately without doing him any harm; the next two shells followed in the same line, exploding in the trees just above the funeral party, but the fragments were carried into the ruins of some neighbouring houses, and did no damage.

The document from "Prince Ching and others," which was an answer to my letter of the previous day, practically initiated a species of armed truce, which lasted until ten or twelve days before the entry of the relieving force.

For the first day or two the enemy were embarrassingly demonstrative in their endeavours to be friendly, and came out unarmed from behind their barricades in considerable numbers, and advanced towards ours. They had repeatedly to be warned back, for we were afraid of treachery; neither did we wish them to see how few were the defenders behind barricades which otherwise looked formidable to them.

As time wore on this friendliness became less and less apparent, and by the end of the month matters had become almost normal, and the attacks and counter-attacks were as brisk and determined as ever. The precious days of comparative peace which followed the 16th were utilized by us in working with increased energy at our defences. At no time, however, after the 20th of the month was it safe to show for one second outside the defences. The slightest exposure was a signal for a hail of bullets. The old Chinese messenger, besides the official despatch from Prince Ching, brought a cypher telegram for Mr. Conger from the State Department at Washington. This the messenger said he had received from the Tsung-li Yamên.

The arrival of this telegram created great excitement amongst the besieged, as it was the first news we had had from the outside world since the 18th June. There could be no question of the genuineness of the message, as it was in a cypher possessed only by Mr. Conger and the State Department. Mr. Conger replied in the same cypher. This message was duly forwarded by the Yamên and duly arrived at Washington, but the public were unwilling to credit it, having apparently quite made up their mind that the Legations had been destroyed, and the besieged massacred.

*July 17.*—At the east barricade in the Fu, the Chinese came from behind their defences in considerable numbers and advanced up to Colonel Shiba's post. Six of them were forthwith made prisoners, the rest beat a hasty retreat. Colonel Shiba reported the matter to me and I ordered the men to be released with a message to their commander to the effect that if more than two left their barricades together they would be fired on.

The same afternoon I was on the Tartar city wall, inspecting the defences, together with Mr. Squiers, whom I had appointed Chief of the Staff. The Colonel commanding Tung-fu Hsiang's troops in the opposing barricade, some sixty yards off, had shouted a message across for permission to bury his dead which were lying at the foot of our barricade, the result of the sortie of the 3rd instant. This permission, as may be imagined, was readily granted.

The Chinese barricade was swarming with men, at least 250 being crowded on it and the adjacent walls; their arms were all out of sight. They were dressed in a variety of uniforms, scarlet and black of Tung-fu Hsiang's men predominating. Six of the Chinese soldiery descended with spades and large pieces of matting, on which they proceeded to carry away the rotting corpses. Through Mr. Spingard, our interpreter, I requested the Colonel to come and have a talk with me. After some demur he consented. I offered him a cigar, which he gladly accepted, and we sat on the outside of our barricade and chatted until our cigars were finished. He told me that he belonged to the Kansu troops, but was at present under the immediate orders of Yung Lu, who was desirous of stopping the fighting. I remarked that the fighting was none of our doing, but we were quite prepared to defend ourselves whenever attacked. I said that, to prevent misunderstandings it would be better if not more than two men left their barricades at a time. If more than that number did so I should be compelled to open fire. He said he thought it would be a good thing if some such understanding were arrived at, and suggested my writing a letter to Yung Lu to this effect. He assured me that any letter handed to him for Yung Lu would most certainly reach its destination. On my return from my interview, whilst standing on the top of our barricade, I could see the enemy's positions stretching away to the north until they disappeared in the direction of the Carriage Park.

There were barricades in the streets below the wall. A large temple was loopholed and put into a state of defence and full of men. More men were amongst the ruins west of the Russian Legation, and a species of mound which commanded this Legation and the Mongol Market was gay with the uniforms of hundreds of Imperial infantry. Following the line west of the Mongol Market the tops of the houses carried nests of these brightly-coated soldiery. Altogether from my position I saw some 1,500 to 2,000 men, and many more must have been hidden behind the walls and ruined houses. From where I stood I noticed that the men in the opposing barricade could overlook certain portions of our position on the wall, and would probably remark the very small garrison we were able to maintain. I therefore requested the American and Russian Commandants to send up as many of their reserve men as could be spared, with orders to show themselves as much as possible on the barricades. This order was promptly and quietly carried out, and very shortly our position was occupied by a goodly number of Russian and American sailors, as well as by some twenty of our marines.

On my return to the Legation I wrote a despatch to Yung Lu, and stated that in view of the negotiations which had commenced with the Tsung-li Yamên the defenders of the Legation would not fire unless they were fired at, but to prevent misunderstandings it would be better if not more than two soldiers left their barricades, and these must be unarmed. Any armed soldier leaving his barricade would at once be fired at. I also added that if the enemy were seen making new barricades in advance of those already existing fire would be opened on the working parties, even if they were unarmed. This letter was delivered into the hands of my friend the Colonel, who promised to deliver it to Yung Lu.

The Commanders of all portions of the defence reported that the enemy had ceased firing, and showed a friendly disposition and a desire to enter into conversation with the besieged. This was much less the case in the north and west, where they were decidedly treacherous and unfriendly, though they had evidently received the same orders as their comrades. From information picked up by the Japanese at their barricade it was evident that the cause of this sudden change in the demeanour of our assailants was due to the news which the high authorities, whoever they may have been at that time, had received of the capture of the native city of Tien-tsin by the allies, and the rout of the Chinese army. By some friendly soldiers we were warned against mines which were especially to be directed against the British Legation. In addition to the counter-mine begun by Mr. Wintour on the 14th, and which by now had been sunk to a depth of some 9 feet, and then for a short distance carried under the Carriage Park wall, a system of counter-mines had been organized in the north and west of the Legation, and carried out most efficiently under Mr. Gamewell's direction. They consisted of trenches some 11 or 12 feet deep close up against our advanced lines, and it would have been impossible for the enemy to pass these trenches without being immediately detected.

On the 18th July a messenger who had been sent out by Colonel Shiba returned from Tien-tsin with a letter from the Japanese head-quarters staff at that place. It contained the news that the native city had been taken by the allies, and that a relief force was being organized consisting of 24,000 Japanese, 4,000 Russians, 2,000 British, 1,500 Americans, and 1,500 French, and would leave on or about the 20th July and advance on Peking. This notice was posted on the Bell Tower. It was the first news we had had from Tien-tsin, and was joyfully welcomed by the besieged, though many were disappointed that the force was not already well on its way. As a matter of fact the message was far less hopeful. It mentioned the heavy losses sustained by the allies, and also spoke of the absolute absence of transport. To keep up the spirits of the besieged, however, the message as posted was made as cheerful as possible.

As an instance of the curious state of affairs which existed at this time between the besiegers and besieged, especially on the east side where the Japanese and French were in contact with the enemy, a young Frenchman, by name Pellet, wandered over to the opposing barricade and entered into conversation with the Chinese soldiery; without thinking he stepped inside their barricade and was instantly made prisoner; he was not roughly treated but taken to a Yamên at some distance where he was brought before some high Mandarins who courteously asked him several questions regarding our strength, losses, &c., all of which he answered in an evasive manner; eventually he was conducted under an escort of Yung Lu's men through streets full of Boxers and soldiery, back to the barricade, and set at liberty.

The Japanese started a small market for eggs which the Chinese soldiers brought over hidden in their capacious sleeves and sold to our people; the eggs were mostly distributed by the Food Supply Committee to the hospital, and amongst the women and children. The weather was very hot and the latter began to feel the want of proper food;

between now and the arrival of the relieving force six of the younger ones died in the Legation.

On the 20th it was reported to me that the Chinese were heard mining in close proximity to the Hanlin. I went down Mr. Wintour's countermine and heard them distinctly at work; they seemed quite close but somewhat above my level; a pick was handed down and at the first few blows the enemy stopped working. From that time a strict watch was kept at this countermine, but the enemy had either abandoned their mine or had changed the direction, for the sounds gradually died away and then stopped altogether. After the entry of the relieving force the mine was thoroughly examined by the Royal Engineers; it was found to commence in one of the large buildings in the Carriage Park inclosure and to proceed straight for our barricade in the Hanlin. It arrived within a few feet of Mr. Wintour's countermine and then suddenly changed direction to the south and followed parallel to the dividing wall for some 40 feet, till it arrived opposite the centre of the building, forming the students' library and mess-room when, instead of turning east under this building, it turned west, described a curve and ended at a point some 30 yards due south of where it started. There is no doubt that Mr. Wintour's countermine checked the enemy's advance underground and headed them south, but why, when they got to a convenient striking point, they went away from their objective, it is impossible to say.

During this spell of comparative quiet the enemy were very busy working at their barricades, and besides the one I have mentioned, mines were started by them on the top of the Tartar city wall endeavouring to get under the Russo-American barricade, also in Legation Street working towards the Russian barricade; similar mines were commenced against the French and Japanese defences on the east, we, in the meanwhile, were equally busy working at our defences and countermines. After the arrival of the relieving force, amongst some documents seized by the German troops was found a letter addressed to the General Commanding at the Hata Men, on the subject of mines. The writer had been a teacher at the British Legation in the employ of Her Majesty's Government for four years and was well known to the student interpreters; together with all the other teachers he disappeared about the middle of June. The letter was dated the beginning of July and pointed out that the General's methods of attacking the Legation were faulty and were bound to lead to considerable loss in the future as they had done in the past. The proper method of attack, the writer said, was by mining; to assist the General in his attack he inclosed a correct plan of the British Legation, with which he was well acquainted, and marked on the plan the most suitable place for the mine to be driven. Eager inquiries have been made since the siege was raised for the writer of the letter but as yet he has not been found.

On the 18th July one of Yung Lu's men advanced with a flag of truce along the city wall, and came down to the German defences with a letter for me from Yung Lu, accepting the arrangement suggested with regard to terms of a truce. This man was very intelligent and friendly; he had been specially selected to come, as he had had to do with foreigners, having been a policeman on the Peking-Tien-tsin Railway. He was recognized by one or two Europeans in the Legation. The same afternoon another soldier came in with his ear partially severed; he had been in the employ of Sir Robert Hart, and was bugler to the regiment at the Hata Gate. He came in, he said, to have his ear seen to, as he knew that foreign surgeons were good and humane men. His officer had wounded him with a blow of his sword for not being sufficiently proficient on his bugle. He informed us, further, that the men were very discontented, and were sick of fighting the foreigners. The same story was told by three soldiers who strolled along the wall from the direction of the Hata Gate to the American barricade.

It was very evident throughout the siege that the enemy on the east were much more friendly, and had not the same stomach for fighting as our friends in the north and west; from this direction not a single man ever came in, neither did any of our messengers ever succeed in getting out. My conversation with the Colonel on the city wall was the only instance of a friendly act on that side.

Even when the truce was at its height, from the 17th to the 20th, it was unsafe to show oneself for an instant at the barricades in the Hanlin. On the 19th some of the enemy held out a water melon at the end of a pole on one of the Hanlin barricades; a volunteer of ours advanced to take it, and was instantly fired at, the bullet passing within an inch of his head. On the 20th and subsequent days several of our people, mostly Chinese converts, were hit whilst working at the defences; this was, of course, in accordance with the terms of truce, and we returned the compliment.

On the 24th the supply of eggs began to dwindle down, and the men who brought them reported to the Japanese that their officers had threatened to execute anybody found

bringing in anything to the besieged. On the 23rd two men were beheaded for this reason within sight of the Japanese.

On the 28th July the boy messenger, who had been sent out on the 4th July, returned from Tien-tsin. His arrival caused great excitement; he brought, sowed in the collar of his coat, the British Consul's letter in answer to mine. The news ran like wild-fire through the Legation, and eager crowds surrounded the Bell Tower, waiting to hear what was posted on the notice board. This was the message:—

“Yours of the 4th July. 24,000 troops have now landed, and 19,000 here. General Gaselee expected Taku to-morrow. Russians hold Pei Tsan. Tien-tsin city under foreign Government, and Boxer power has exploded. Plenty of troops are on the way if you can hold out with food. Almost all ladies have left Tien-tsin.”

This letter caused great disappointment amongst the garrison, as the general opinion was that ample time had elapsed between the 20th June and the 21st July to organize and start a relief expedition.

In justice to Mr. Carles, who has been blamed for not sending more information, it is right to state that, had he written the true state of affairs which then existed in Tien-tsin, the effect on the beleaguered garrison would have been crushing; he consequently made the note as cheerful as he could under the circumstances. Had not the arrival of the messenger been witnessed by numbers of people, it is more than probable no notice of the contents of the letter would have been posted on the Bell Tower.

During the early days of the armistice from their barricades on the east of the Fu, the Chinese adopted a novel way of communicating with the Japanese defenders. One day a large dog trotted into the Japanese barricade with a note tied round its neck. This was from the Chinese General commanding in that quarter, pointing out the futility of further defence, and recommending unconditional surrender. A reply, declining the suggestion in somewhat forcible terms, was tied on the dog's neck, with which it trotted back.

This was repeated several times, the advisability of surrender being urged with greater insistence each time. The answers varied only in the strength of their language. Letters demanding and suggesting surrender were also tied to arrows and shot into the Japanese lines. A remarkable instance which took place at this time of filial obedience and good faith on the part of a Chinese soldier, was recounted to me by Colonel Shiba.

Amongst the men who brought eggs for sale was one who belonged to Yung Lu's force, who was distinguished from his fellows by the hard bargains which he drove for his wares. Noticing this, Colonel Shiba thought the man might be induced for a price to carry a letter to Tien-tsin and bring back an answer. He was accordingly approached on the subject, and after considerable discussion about the amount, he agreed to go for the sum of 250 dollars, the money to be paid over on his return with the answer. The man left on the 22nd and returned on the 1st August, bringing with him a reply from the Chief of staff of the Japanese division. It ran as follows:—

“Your letter of 22nd received. Departure of troops from Tien-tsin delayed by difficulties of transport, but advance will be made in two or three days. Will write again as soon as estimated date of arrival at Peking is fixed.”

The letter was dated the 26th July. The bearer refused to accept the 250 dollars, and no amount of persuasion could induce him to do so. Thinking that perhaps he was unwilling to be discovered in possession of so large a sum, he was offered a letter to the Consul at Tien-tsin in the form of a promissory note, but he declined everything. On being asked why he refused now, when he had been previously so keen to acquire the money, he told Colonel Shiba that on arrival at Tien-tsin, after delivery of the letter and receiving the answer, he went to his own home; his mother did all she could to prevent his returning to Peking, but he said he had promised the foreign officer to return, and return he must. “Then,” said she, “you must accept no money, for what you are doing is for the good of your country.” He, therefore, in obedience to his mother's wishes, steadfastly refused any money whatever. He offered to take a letter back to Tien-tsin if it was written at once, but he could not, he said, bring back an answer. Seeing that it was impossible to shake the man's resolution, Colonel Shiba wrote another letter which the messenger duly delivered at the Consulate at Tien-tsin, but again refused all offers of money.

On the afternoon of the 29th July the Chinese began to throw out heaps of bricks and stones at the corner of some ruined houses at the east end of the north bridge. This bridge was commanded by the north stable picket, and by a caponier which had been constructed in front of the main gate of the Legation, called by the marines “Fort Halliday.” The road across it is one of the main arteries of the city from east to west,

and to avoid the bridge the Chinese had to make a considerable detour through the Imperial city. It had always been a source of surprise to us that no barricade had been constructed across the bridge, because in addition to allowing passage across, the fire from it, the barricade, would command the whole length of the canal with the roads on either side, and would sweep the south bridge, which was one of our means of communication (the only one for carts), between the east and west defences. During the night-time the bridge was undoubtedly used by the enemy; but in the daylight the fire of our pickets was so deadly, that after losing several men, they gave up all attempts at crossing it.

It soon became evident that the heap of bricks and stones was the commencement of the long-expected barricade; immediately a lively fusillade was opened on the inoffensive-looking heap, and bricks and stones were sent flying, but so soon as they were shot away others appeared in their place. Very shortly wooden cases, evidently filled with bricks and stones, were pushed forward from behind the heap and the barricade stealthily crept forward.

The enemy's sharpshooters in the ruins on the other side of the canal were in the meanwhile very busy, and some very pretty shooting took place. They had the most modern rifle with smokeless powder, and the men in the north stable picket had some very narrow escapes, bullets pattering round their loopholes and in some instances coming through.

The "International" gun was at that time doing good service in the French Legation so could not be used, but the Italian 1-pr. with its solid pewter bullet was hauled up on to a sandbag battery on the roof of the cow-house which formed part of the north stable picket, and opened fire. The enemy were not slow to return the compliment, and the Mauser bullets soon began to knock the sandbags about, at the close range of 60 yards, cutting them into shreds.

The Italian gunner behaved with great coolness. Unfortunately, as he was laying the gun for the third round his hand was smashed by a Mauser bullet, and he was taken to hospital. The serjeant commanding the marine detachment went up and fired the round, but the enemy's fire now became so hot, pieces of silk damask and sand being scattered in every direction by the hail of bullets. It was found impossible to continue the gun in action; it was also impossible to remove it. This was eventually done under cover of darkness.

On the following morning it was found that the enemy had succeeded in building a barricade 6 foot high the whole length of the north bridge, a distance of 30 to 40 yards.

In the correspondence which was at this time proceeding between the Diplomatic Body and the Chinese Government as represented by "Prince Ching and others," expostulations had been made respecting the strengthening of our defences. Attention was, therefore, drawn to the building of this formidable barricade by the Chinese Imperial troops. The reply received was that "we must not be alarmed as the troops of Tung-fu Hsiang were only engaged in mending the road!"

Fire was immediately opened from this barricade, and the road along the canal became very dangerous. To obviate this a large traverse was run across the road at the smaller gate of the Legation and a barricade constructed across the south bridge.

On the 2nd August the fortifications having been thoroughly strengthened on the north and east, it was determined to improve our western defences. Consequently, a small party of British marines and volunteers of various nationalities, mostly belonging to the Imperial Maritime Customs, under M. von Strauch, an ex-officer of the German army, were directed to cut a hole through the west wall of the stable quarters and occupy some buildings forming the east side of the Mongol Market. The hour chosen was that of the Chinese siesta, shortly before noon. The houses were successfully occupied without the enemy becoming aware of our intentions. They were found to be in a good state of preservation, and a party of Christian converts under Mr. Gamewell's orders were at once set to work to loophole the walls and make barricades where necessary. Three Chinese soldiers were found dead in the houses, where they had evidently dragged themselves to die.

In a few days this position, which was one of considerable importance, was greatly strengthened. Thus on the north and west the British Legation defences had been pushed forward in the direction of the enemy. The latter very soon discovered this new occupation, and the whole of the Mongol Market barricades blazed out on our working parties. These, however, kept well under cover, and only a few casualties took place.

For the remaining few days of the siege this position was the scene of constant attack. The enemy, whose barricades by the Carriage Park wall were within stone-throwing distance, kept up a constant fire, also hurling bricks and stones over the ruined walls. One of our marines was badly cut on the head by one of these missiles.

On this day a messenger arrived from Tien-tsin bearing many letters. The following were posted on the Bell Tower:—

“From the American Consul, Tien-tsin, to American Minister, dated the 28th July.

“Had lost all hope of seeing you again. Prospect now brighter. We had thirty days shelling here, nine days siege, thought that bad enough. Scarcely a house escaped damage. Excitement at home is intense; of course, our prayers and hopes are for your safety and speedy rescue. Advance of troops to-morrow probable.”

Another from Lieutenant-Colonel Mallory, United States' Army, dated the 30th July:—

“A relief column of 10,000 is on the point of starting for Peking; more to follow. God grant they may be in time.”

The one which contained the most news was written by Mr. Lowry, of the American Legation, who was in Tien-tsin when the railway was cut. The letter was to his wife, one of the besieged. It was as follows:—

“The bearer arrived last Friday with news from Peking. The 9th, 14th United States' Regiments already at Tien-tsin. 6th Cavalry at Taku on its way up. An advance guard of several regiments has already started. There was fighting this morning at Pei Tsang. Everything is quiet here now. Word came to-day Boxers killing Christians at Tsun Hua and many other places. Tien-tsin full of foreign troops and more coming all the time. Railway open between here and Tangku. Many ladies and children went back to United States on transport ‘Logan.’ All property at Pei-tai Hoa destroyed.”

This letter was dated the 30th July.

This news greatly cheered the spirits of the garrison.

On the 7th August “Prince Ching and others” sent condolences on the death of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha and the firing was heavier than usual. The enemy seemed now to be concentrating their attention on the British Legation, the fire from the Mongol Market being particularly severe; the bullets were also coming lower. Mr. Game-well reported that our fortifications in this quarter were being damaged by rifle fire to an extent which had not before occurred. We ascertained afterwards through spies that a new division of troops had come from Shansi under a Brigadier-General, who had sworn to take the Legation in five days. This division was stationed in the Mongol Market.

Orders were posted on the Bell Tower that women and children were not to walk about the grounds while firing was going on, several very narrow escapes having taken place. To meet the attacks from the west the Nordenfelt was mounted on a platform on the top of the wall at the back of the Chinese Secretary's house and did excellent work. A platform was also made in our new defences in the Mongol Market for the “International” gun, which was still in charge of the indefatigable American gunner, Mitchell.

On the 9th August the Fu, which had enjoyed a spell of comparative quiet, was again attacked, and fresh flags were planted behind the enemy's barricades. The attack was evidently now closing in. We had, however, worked so hard on the defences that our casualties were very few.

August 10.—At 3 in the afternoon a tremendous fusillade took place against the Fu and all our defences, Hanlin, Carriage Park, and Mongol Market. The big gun fire had entirely ceased since the commencement of the armistice, but the rifle fire was very heavy, and cut our fortifications about considerably.

On this day a messenger, who had been sent out on the 6th to the advancing forces, returned with the following letter from General Gaselee, dated the 8th August, Tsai Tsung:—

“Strong force of allies advancing. Twice defeated enemy. Keep up your spirits.”

Colonel Shiba also received a letter from General Fukushima, dated Camp at Chong Chiang, 2 P.M., north of Nan Tsai Tsung, the 8th August:—

“Japanese and American troops defeated enemy on 5th instant near Pei-tsang and occupied Yang-tsun. The allied force, consisting of Americans, British, and Russians, left Yang-tsun this morning, and while marching north I received your letter at 8 P.M. at a village called Nan Tsai Tsung. It is very gratifying to know that the foreign community at Peking are holding on, and believe me it is the earnest and unanimous desire of the Lieutenant-General and all of us to arrive at Peking as soon as possible, and relieve you from your perilous position. Unless some unforeseen event takes place the allied

force will be at Ho Si Wu on the 9th, Matou, 10th, Chang Chia-wan, 11th, Tung Chou, 12th, and arrive Peking 13th or 14th."

On the 6th Mr. Squiers, my Chief of the staff, had drawn up a plan of the city, showing the sluice gate through the Tartar city wall, and our position on the wall, which was marked by three flags, a Russian on the western extremity, a British flag in the centre, and an American on the east. Directions were given in this letter in English and American cypher as to the best means of entrance. The letter was addressed to the American and English Generals, and was duly delivered to them on the 8th instant.

*August 12.*—From the various quarters of the defence reports came in that the enemy were very active, and it became evident that the relief force was nearing. From the Russo-American position on the Tartar city wall numerous bodies of troops were reported leaving the Cheng Meng. From the north stable picket bodies of cavalry were seen to advance up to the bridge, dismount, and lead their horses across under cover of the barricade; their movements were considerably accelerated by our riflemen from that post and the Main Gate caponier; the Krupp gun by the Hata Gate, which had been silent for several days, again opened fire. Nickel-plated bullets, fired at a range of 20 yards, pierced our defences in the Mongol Market and elsewhere. In their eagerness to press forward, the enemy overthrew one of their own barricades. Instantly our sharpshooters opened a deadly fire, and the Nordenfelt was brought to bear. Before they could escape this hail of bullets twenty-seven, including their leader, fell in a riddled heap. The next day "Prince Ching and others" wrote an indignant protest, saying that the "converts" had again opened fire on the Imperial troops, killing an officer and twenty-six men. We subsequently heard that the officer was none other than the General of Division whose rash oath has been recorded.

When the evening closed in the enemy had made no advance in any direction and had lost severely. Our casualties were few, but they included Captain Labrousse, of the French Staff, an officer who had done excellent service both in the French Legation and on the Tartar city wall; in this capacity he came particularly under my notice, his reports being very lucid and of great service to the defence. In him the French army lost a smart and capable officer.

The morning of the 13th commenced with sharp firing in every direction, which lasted with scarcely an interval throughout the day. Towards evening it was reported to me that the enemy were at work in the battery on the Imperial city wall. I immediately proceeded to the north stable picket, and, in the failing light, through glasses, saw that work of some kind was being carried on. The sergeant of the picket reported that previous to my arrival he had seen what he thought was a modern piece of artillery owing to the light catching on brass mountings. As the enemy had not fired from this battery since the 16th July, I thought that it would be advisable to let sleeping dogs lie and not to draw the fire unnecessarily, especially as the relief force was so close; but, to be on the safe side, before the light died away altogether the Austrian Maxim was brought into the north stable and careful aim taken at the battery. The American gunner in charge of the automatic Colt, in the Main Gate caponier, was instructed also to lay his gun on the embrasure. Both had orders that immediately fire was opened from it the two machine-guns were to return the fire. The ranges were 200 and 350 yards. Shortly before 8 a tremendous rifle fire opened all round, and instantly the above-mentioned battery joined in. The sergeant had been right in his surmise, for, instead of our old friend the smooth bore, it was a 2-inch quick-firing Krupp which opened on us with segment and common shell. Hardly had the crash of the first exploding shell taken place when the Austrian Maxim and the American Colt rattled out their reply. At the seventh round this gun was silenced, but not before it had done considerable damage; three shots struck Fort Halliday, stunning the inmates, though hurting nobody; one carried away a tall chimney in the Minister's house, another struck a brick pillar in the upstairs balcony of the north-east corner of said house (a post commonly known as Rosamond's Bower), completely demolishing the pillar and part of balcony, and one pierced the roof and exploded in my dressing-room, creating very considerable havoc; fortunately, not a single casualty resulted from all this cannonade. Four times between sunset and sunrise the "general attack" bell was sounded, when all reserves turned out and stood ready for emergencies. The enemy seemed particularly active in the Mongol Market; reinforcements were urgently requested from this quarter, and were promptly sent. The Chinese officers were heard inciting the men to charge, laying stress on the fact that they far outnumbered us and the distance was very short. The firing ceased, and an ominous silence followed, as if they were in reality gathering for the attack. It was then that our Commandant sent for reinforcements; before they arrived the enemy had evidently thought better of their intention to attack with the bayonet, and had



recommenced firing and throwing bricks. The din of rifle fire, the rattle of bullets on the roofs, and the scream and crash of large ordnance was deafening.

At about 2 A.M. there was a pause, when very distinctly the delighted garrison heard the boom of heavier guns away to the east, and the sound of many Maxim's evidently outside the city walls. The scene in the Legation was indescribable. Those who, tired out, had fallen asleep were wakened by these unwonted sounds, and there was much cheering and shaking of hands. The enemy, too, had heard it. For a moment there was silence; then the rifle fire broke out more angry and deafening than before, instantly responded to by the rattle of our sharpshooters and the grunt of the five-barrelled Nordenfelt, which, under the able management of the "Orlando's" armourer and Sergeant Murphy of the marines, refused to jam, but hailed volleys of bullets into the Mongol Market barricades. The "International" was also particularly active, and fired at point blank range into the said barricade until the gallant gunner Mitchell had his arm badly broken by a Mauser bullet, and was taken to hospital. After the relieving force entered, the little garrison of the Mongol Market defences found that the "International" was loaded, but owing to the accident to the gunner had not been fired. As it was impossible to draw the charge, the muzzle was elevated, and the last shot fired from this unique gun descended amongst the yellow-tiled pavilions of the Pink or Forbidden City.

With daylight the firing died down, and there was a period of calm. A sharp look-out was kept from all the posts, especially the Tartar city wall, for any possible appearance of the relieving force. Mr. Squiers, my energetic Chief of the staff, reported from the American Legation shortly after daybreak: "On the wall there has been no sign of the approach of our troops beyond the firing of the machine-guns. The direction of the firing seemed to be the Chinese wall just to the right of the part where it joins the Tartar city wall. There is no commotion in the Chinese city or at either of the gates. Your flag-staff was shot away during the night, the flag falling over the wall. Fortunately it was secured, and pulled back before the Chinese had a chance to capture it. If you will send a carpenter I will attend to repairs." The armourer and signalmen of the "Orlando" were sent, the staff was mended, and the flag rehoisted.

At 6 A.M. Mr. Squiers again reported: "The Chinese have three guns mounted at the Hata Men, which they have been firing in an easterly direction. All the musketry fire seemed to be on the wall between the Hata Men and the tower at the corner. No excitement in the Chinese city. The Chien Men is still open, but few passing in or out." Again, at 7 A.M.: "Heavy firing at the Chi-hua Men; also further machine-gun fire beyond the Hata Men. No movement in the Chinese city." This was the Japanese, Russian, and American attack developing along the east side of the Tartar city. As can be seen, Mr. Squiers is careful to report any movement in the Chinese city, for in accordance with the plan sent out it was in this direction the relief was expected. At 9.15 he reports: "For the past half-hour Chinese soldiers have been pouring out of the Chien Men, going in the direction of the south gate; cavalry, infantry, and two pieces of artillery. In the direction of the Hata Men there is heavy cannon fire, and a large shell has just exploded in the roof of the tower in the south-east angle of the Tartar city."

At 11 the report came: "Large numbers of Chinese soldiers are passing through the Chien Men into the Imperial city." The defending troops were evidently being withdrawn from the Chinese city to meet the Japanese attack on the east gate of the Tartar city.

Shortly before 3 P.M. a breathless messenger from the Tartar city wall arrived to say that foreign troops were under the city wall opposite the water gate. I immediately followed him, and arrived in time to receive General Gaselee and his staff as they came through the said gate and stood on the canal road. From there I led them through the Russian Legation to the British, where they were welcomed by the rest of the besieged garrison. The regiment which first entered the Legation quarter was the 7th Rajpoots under Major Vaughan. With them was Major Scott, of the 3rd Sikhs, attached to the 1st Sikhs, with a few men of this regiment. This officer with several men ran along the canal road from the south bridge to the gateway opposite the First Secretary's house, and were the first to enter the British Legation. This portion of the canal road was under the enemy's fire from the north bridge barricade, and three casualties occurred here later in the afternoon.

On arriving in the Legation, which was still being hotly attacked by the enemy from the Hanlin and Mongol Market, a small detachment of the 7th was sent into the Main Gate caponier to assist in repelling the attack. A man of this regiment was almost immediately seriously wounded; one of the ladies of the garrison was also wounded on the lawn. In the meanwhile, Mr. Squiers with a small party of Russian and American marines, under Captain Vroubleffsky and Captain Perry Smith, had proceeded along Legation Street to the Chien Gate, which they opened, allowing the 1st Sikhs, under

Colonel Pollock and the Hong Kong artillery to enter, the Chinese making a stand here and charging up to the Maxims of the artillery. The American troops under General Chaffey, and Russians under General Linievitch had, with considerable loss, forced the north-east gate of the Chinese city, and proceeding underneath the wall, had entered, some by the water gate and some by the Chien Gate. Two guns of Major Johnson's Battery Royal Artillery had also been got through the water gate and up an improvised ramp on to the canal road. One of these guns was brought on to the south bridge, and effectively shelled the north bridge barricade, and the battery on the Imperial city wall. The besieged lost no time in taking the offensive. As has been seen, the American and Russian Legations were instrumental in opening the Chien Gate; Lieutenant von Soden with a detachment of his men attacked the enemy and drove them to the Hata Gate, capturing their guns and banners; the Italian and Japanese detachment in the Fu drove the enemy from their positions and reoccupied the entire Fu.

A detachment of British marines and volunteers under Captain Poole cut a hole through the Carriage Park wall and occupied the whole of this inclosure, killing three of the enemy.

Two days later a detachment of French, Russian, and English troops relieved our gallant fellow prisoners in the Peh-tang, whose sufferings had been worse than ours, and the siege of Peking came to an end.

During the siege the following number of cases passed through the International Hospital: 126 wounded, all severely, of whom 17 died; 40 cases of sickness, mostly enteric and dysentery, of whom 2 died. Of the 166 cases treated 142 were soldiers or sailors, the rest civilians; 165 were men; 1 woman was wounded. Of the above cases 21 were Germans; Americans, 17; English, 55; French, 17; Dutch, 1; Japanese, 14; Italians, 17; Austrians, 6; and Russians, 18.

The slightly wounded are not mentioned in this Return; many of these were treated on the spot by the excellent French and Japanese military surgeons, who remained with their detachments in the French Legation and Fu.

The latter post has frequently been mentioned as the scene of severe fighting. The following Return of the numbers killed and wounded therein will be of interest:—

						Killed.	Wounded.
English	..	..	..	..	..	2	11
French	..	..	..	..	..	1	2
Russians	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Austrians	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Italians	..	..	..	..	..	7	11
Japanese	..	..	..	..	..	9	21
Chinese	..	..	..	..	..	18	85
Total	..	..	..	..	..	38	133

The Chinese were mostly employed working in the defences, though Colonel Shiba had organized a force of some twenty Chinese armed with swords and spears who were very useful in keeping watch.

A Return of the officers killed and wounded of the various marine detachments will be of interest:—

					Officers arrived.	Killed.	Wounded.
British	..	..	..	..	3	1	2
Italians	..	..	..	..	2	..	2
Russians	..	..	..	..	2	..	..
Japanese	..	..	..	..	2	1	1
German	..	..	..	..	1	..	..
French	..	..	..	..	3	2	1
Austrians	..	..	..	..	4	1	2
Americans	..	..	..	..	2	..	1
Total	..	..	..	..	19	5	9

The total number of foreigners killed during the siege from the 20th June to the 14th July inclusive, was sixty-six.

I inclose two maps : one, of the defences of the Su Wang Fu, and the other, of the French Legation, both drawn to the same scale.

A careful examination of these maps will show that from the 20th June to the 13th July the garrisons of both these important posts were driven back step by step, disputing every inch of the ground, yielding only to superior numbers and having to cope with shell fire, incendiarism, and in the case of the French Legation, subterranean mines, until, after twenty-three days' fighting, three quarters of each of these two positions was in the hands of the enemy. Had the latter pressed on after the 13th July with the same persistence they showed up to that date, and also having an attenuated and worn-out garrison to deal with, they would have captured both positions by the 20th July at latest. Fortunately, on the 14th instant, Tien-tsin was taken by the allies; this produced a marked effect on the besiegers, and the besieged received nearly twenty days' respite, which enabled them to materially strengthen their defences and recuperate generally, so that the final attacks of the enemy were repulsed with ease.

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[Three Plans annexed.\*]

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No. 2.

*Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received February 2, 1901.)*

My Lord,

Tókió, December 26, 1900.

IN my Report dated the 20th September last, I had the honour to recommend certain officers and civilians who performed exceptionally good service during the siege of Peking.

To the names then mentioned, it gives me great pleasure to add the names of the following gentlemen volunteers, members of the Imperial Maritime Customs, whose services have been specially brought to my notice by Captain Poole, who was in charge of volunteers.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

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Inclosure in No. 2.

*List of Members of the Imperial Maritime Customs recommended by Sir C. MacDonald.*

MR. MACOUN was for some time in charge of the Customs contingent of volunteers, arranged their roster, and was himself unceasingly on duty in either the dangerous Prince Su's Park or West Hanlin. He was an indefatigable worker. He was wounded in the thigh by a bullet in Prince Su's Park on the 12th July, and, though lame from the effects, cheerfully resumed his duties after a week's rest. I understand that he is not even now fully recovered.

Mr. de Courcy was also conspicuous by his hard work, and cheerfully resumed his dangerous duty in the park and elsewhere before his health really rendered it advisable for him to do so. After the siege his health completely broke down, and he died at Tien-tsin on the 29th September. He was also slightly wounded in the Legation compound.

Mr. Smythe, too ill at the commencement for work, took his duty at the very earliest opportunity, and was always only too eager to supplement his own watches by relieving those who were worn out by the extreme length of the watches towards the end of the siege. His health suffered severely under the strain of his self-denying good nature, resulting in an attack of typhoid after the relief.

Mr. Bethell's extreme youth made the work done by him as a volunteer the more specially noticeable. The strain and hardship brought on a sickness which necessitated his going to hospital for a short time during the siege, yet, in spite of this, he resumed his duty at the earliest chance.

\* Not printed.

Mr. Russell's arduous, willing, and self-denying services in the commissariat, where he had charge of and dealt out daily the rations of the plainer foodstuff to foreigners and natives, excited general admiration, and they were always rendered with the greatest cheerfulness. The important and difficult work of milling the grain, in obtaining which he was also largely instrumental, was also intrusted to him.

No. 3.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 10, 1901.*

I HAVE received and laid before the King your despatch of the 24th December, inclosing a report, in continuation of those already received, with accompanying maps, on events at Peking from the 20th June to the 14th August regarded from the military aspect.

As the present report completes your account of the siege and relief of the Legations, I desire to take this opportunity of stating how highly His Majesty's Government value these admirable and exhaustive records of an episode of the deepest historic interest.

The gallantry with which the defence was maintained by all the foreign forces engaged, more especially after the failure of the first relief expedition, and the consequent disappointment to the besieged, coupled with the energy and courage with which the efforts of the regular forces were seconded by the Legation staffs and other civilians, has commanded the admiration of the whole civilized world.

His Majesty's Government desire also to place on record their appreciation of the important part borne by yourself throughout this crisis. On the 22nd June, at the request of your colleagues, you took charge of the defence, a position for which, from your military training, you possessed exceptional qualifications; and from that date you continued to direct the operations of the garrison until the relief took place on the 14th August.

Information has reached His Majesty's Government from various sources that the success of the defence was largely due to your personal efforts, and more particularly to the unity and cohesion which you found means of establishing and maintaining among the forces of so many different nationalities operating over an extended area. Competent eye-witnesses have expressed the opinion that if it can be said that the European community owe their lives to any one man more than to another, where so many distinguished themselves, it is to you they are indebted for their safety.

I cannot conclude this despatch without asking you to convey to Lady MacDonald the thanks of His Majesty's Government for her unceasing and devoted attention to the comfort and welfare of the sick and wounded. Her work, and that of the ladies who assisted her, have earned the lasting gratitude not only of those who benefited by her ministrations, but also of their relatives in Europe who were kept for so many weeks in a condition of the most painful anxiety and suspense.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.



FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE respecting Events at  
Peking.

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[In continuation of "China No. 4 (1900)."]

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-  
mand of His Majesty. April 1901.*

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LONDON:

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

## CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

## CHINESE LOAN NEGOTIATIONS.

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.  
October 1912.*

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27	Sir J. Jordan	.. Telegraphic	8,	Refers to Nos. 23 and 25. The Minister of Finance has learnt that a loan for 10,000,000L. was concluded by the late Minister of Finance without his know- ledge. He has telegraphed to the Chinese Minister in London not to sign the agree- ment .. .. .	14
28	To Sir J. Jordan	.. Telegraphic	9,	Is considering views expressed in No. 25. It is necessary that the groups should agree on the conditions on which they will accept the new Chinese proposal. The Crisp loan has been concluded. The Chinese Engineering and Mining Company have postponed conclusion of a similar loan pending the approval of His Ma- jesty's Government .. .. .	14
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## Correspondence respecting Chinese Loan Negotiations.

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No. 1.

*Eastern Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received January 26.)*

Sir,

4, Crosby Square, London, January 24, 1912.

WE take the liberty of informing you that, in conjunction with Messrs. J. Henry Schröder and Company and Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Company, we are members of an international syndicate formed for the purpose of financing loans for the Chinese Government. The syndicate is composed of Russian, French, Belgian, and English groups, and we should esteem it a favour if you would be good enough to note our participation, so that, in the event of any loan being arranged and divided up between the various countries, we, as representing the English group, may not be overlooked.

Faithfully yours,

BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH,

*Chairman.*

---

No. 2.

*Foreign Office to Eastern Bank.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 3, 1912.*

IN reply to your letter of the 24th January last, in which you state the desire of the Eastern Bank, Limited, as a member of an international syndicate composed of Russian, French, Belgian, and British groups, to participate in financing loans for the Chinese Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a copy of your letter will be forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, who will be directed to furnish your local representative with such assistance as he properly can. In issuing these instructions to Sir J. Jordan, Sir E. Grey would be glad to be in a position to give the names of the foreign firms with whom your bank is associated, and I am to request that this information may be supplied.

Sir E. Grey desires me to point out, however, that applications for loans are not usually made by the Chinese Government to His Majesty's Legation but direct to the resident representatives of foreign financial establishments, and I am to add that it is probable that the Chinese Government would apply for any assistance they might require in the first instance to the four international banking groups who have lately divided important loan business in China.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

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No. 3.

*Eastern Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received February 9.)*

Sir,

4, Crosby Square, London, February 8, 1912.

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, and note with many thanks that Secretary Sir E. Grey will request His Majesty's Minister at Peking to furnish our local representative with such assistance as he properly can.

In reply to your enquiry, I beg to say that our syndicate is composed as follows :—

*The Russo-Asiatic Bank*, who are represented by their manager in Peking, M. de Hoyer.

*French Group.*—Messrs. A. Spitzer and Co., of Paris, and their friends, represented in Peking by M. Bouillard.

*Belgian Group.*—La Société générale de Belgique, represented by La Banque sino-belge and La Société belge de Chemins de Fer en Chine, whose agent in Peking is M. Devos.

*British Group.*—Messrs. J. H. Schröder and Co. and the Eastern Bank (Limited), represented in Shanghai by Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co.

I, of course, quite understand that applications for loans are usually made direct to the resident representatives of foreign financial establishments by the Chinese Government, and not to His Majesty's Legation. Our representatives are ready to compete for such loans in the ordinary way. If, however, any international loan is made by the Powers to be divided between the groups of different nationalities, I venture to express the hope that His Majesty's Government will bear us in mind, in order that we may participate.

Yours faithfully,  
BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH,  
*Chairman.*

No. 4.

*Eastern Bank to Foreign Office.*—(Received February 29.)

Sir,

4, Crosby Square, London, February 29, 1912.

WITH reference to our chairman's letters of the 24th ultimo and 8th instant on the subject of loans to the Chinese Government, I am directed to inform you that we have received advices from China to the effect that future loans are to be made international—that is to say, they will be divisible amongst seven Powers, namely, England, France, Germany, Russia, Belgium, America, and Japan, each to have one-seventh part of any loan which may be arranged.

We venture to take the liberty of stating that, in our opinion, it is not in the interest of Great Britain to agree to an arrangement on these lines. Great Britain for many years has been in the field, and has rendered very valuable services to China. The proposal now made will place us in no better position than certain of the above-mentioned Powers, who are not even able to float their portion of any loan in their own country. They simply obtain a participation with a view to re-selling it at a profit, the loan being ultimately floated in London. There will also be difficulty in dividing the English participation between the syndicates now negotiating for these loans in China.

We may mention that our syndicate have practically arranged a loan with the Chinese Government, but the matter is in abeyance pending the settlement of the above question or a definite arrangement as to future loans.

As there are practically only two syndicates now working in China, namely, our own (of which particulars were furnished to you by our chairman, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, in his letter to you dated the 8th instant) and that of the Hong Kong Bank and their continental and American friends, we venture to suggest that the better and more equitable arrangement would be for each syndicate to be allotted half of any loan.

We trust that our claim and that of our co-partners, Messrs. J. Henry Schröder and Co., as representing the English group in our syndicate, may be kept before His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

F. H. SUTTON, *Manager.*

No. 5.

*Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to Foreign Office.*—(Received March 6.)

Sir,

*Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,*

31, Lombard Street, London, March 6, 1912.

WITH reference to our conversations of yesterday and to-day, I should like to make it clear what the contention of the British group is.

It has, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, entered upon negotiations, in conjunction with the French, German, and American groups, for supplying the immediate financial requirements of Yuan Shih-kai, as president of the Chinese Provisional Government, against the issue of unsecured Chinese Treasury notes, repayment of which is to be provided at a later stage by a reorganisation loan for a

large amount. The British group therefore feels that it is entitled to claim that, during the course of these negotiations and until they have been brought to a conclusion by the issue of the reorganisation loan, His Majesty's Government will not support any other group in making loans or advances to China, but will confine their exclusive support to the British group as signatories of the intergroup agreement.

I trust this will not be considered an unreasonable contention in view of the obligations entered into by the British group, at the instance of His Majesty's Government, *vis-à-vis* the French, German, and American groups. I submit that a distinction must be drawn between a general monopoly and a particular monopoly of support, as applied to a specific negotiation entered upon with the approval of His Majesty's Government. It is certain that our continental friends would regard it as a breach of faith if, under cover of negotiations recognised by the four Powers, support were given to any group which is not a party to the intergroup agreement.

An embarrassing and even dangerous situation would be created, and great difficulty might be experienced in maintaining the agreement between the groups.

I am, &c.

C. S. ADDIS.

No. 6.

*Foreign Office to Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 14, 1912.*

AS you already know, I submitted to Sir E. Grey your letter of the 6th instant, in which you set forth the contention of your bank that it is entitled to claim that, during the course of the present loan negotiations and until they have been brought to a conclusion by the issue of the reorganisation loan, His Majesty's Government will not support any other group in making loans or advances to China, but will confine their exclusive support to the British group as signatory of the inter-group agreement.

Sir E. Grey has already explained to you at the interview which you had with him on the 9th instant his view in regard to the point raised in your letter, and he now directs me to inform you in writing that, while disclaiming any intention of giving a monopoly of support to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in regard to loans in China, His Majesty's Government will not for the moment support negotiations for a loan which might interfere with the temporary arrangements made for financing the Chinese Provisional Government, or which might conflict with the terms or weaken the security of the large loan for reorganisation purposes which your bank and the allied French, German, and American groups are negotiating, with the full knowledge of their Governments, and in regard to which advances have already been made to the Chinese Government with the approval of the four Governments. In view of the fact that these advances, made without proper security, have been authorised by the four Governments, under the conviction that the moment had come when it was politically expedient to strengthen the hands of the *de facto* administration in China against the forces of anarchy, His Majesty's Government recognise that they are under obligation not only to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, but also to the Governments and groups concerned in these advances, not to give their support to any other group in negotiating with the Chinese Government any loan as described above until the large loan out of which these advances and the expenses of reorganisation are to be covered has been successfully negotiated, and, above all, until the security on which it is to be issued has been definitely settled.

At the same time, I am to confirm what Sir E. Grey said to you on Saturday, that, in his opinion, the best method of obviating the difficulties in regard to your future business in China likely to arise out of the competition of other British firms and the obvious impossibility of granting exclusive Government support to one British bank is the formation of a British group somewhat on the lines of the French and German groups, and further, to remind you that Sir E. Grey expects that, in view of the assurance now given to you, your bank will be able to arrange for the participation of competing British houses in the issue of the large loan, provided that such participation would really fall to British capital.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

## No. 7.

*Foreign Office to Lord Balfour of Burleigh.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 14, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of the letter signed by the manager of the Eastern Bank and dated the 29th ultimo on the subject of loans to be made to the Chinese Government.

In regard to the first point raised in that letter, viz., the question of the advisability of internationalising loans in China, I am to inform your Lordship that Sir E. Grey is unable to concur in the statement that it is not in the interests of Great Britain to agree to such an arrangement. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government and the other Governments concerned have, from the experience of past years, come to the unanimous conclusion that, both in the interests of their own financiers and investing public, and also as a safeguard of China's credit, it is incumbent on them to prevent, as far as lies in their power, all possibility of a return to the former dangerous policy of unprofitable international competition in China, which only enabled the Chinese Government to obtain money without adequate guarantees, and rendered it impossible for the Governments interested to exercise the necessary control over the terms of any loans. There can be no doubt that the internationalisation of future loans would go far to secure this desirable end.

In regard to your suggestion that of any loan negotiated by the Chinese Government one-half should be allotted to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and their foreign associates and the other half to the international syndicate to which your bank belongs, I am to point out that this suggestion appears to conflict with your protest against the internationalisation of loans to China. In any case, however, it would be an unjustifiable intervention on the part of His Majesty's Government and wholly outside their competence to take any action in the direction of indicating the proportion in which any particular loan under negotiation should be divided between two competing syndicates. If the Eastern Bank desire to participate in any loan negotiated by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, it is for them, and not for this department, to approach the latter institution, and Sir E. Grey is of opinion that it would be advisable for your Lordship to follow the course thus indicated. Sir E. Grey has been in correspondence with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank on the subject of the participation of other British financial institutions in the loan to the Chinese Government, which is a present being negotiated by them, and he is fully in agreement with them that a *sine quâ non* for the granting of such participation must be that the other financial houses should be in the position to prove that British capital would profit by such participation.

In regard to the loan which your syndicate is stated to have practically arranged with the Chinese Government, I am to state that this department has as yet heard nothing on the subject from Sir John Jordan, and this is probably accounted for by the fact, as stated by your Lordship to Mr. Max Müller on the 7th instant, that the negotiations were being conducted by the representatives of the Russo-Asiatic Bank.

At the same time, Sir E. Grey directs me to inform you that, while disclaiming any intention of giving a monopoly of support to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in regard to loans in China, it is impossible for the moment for His Majesty's Government to support negotiations for a loan which might conflict with the terms or weaken the security of the large loan for reorganisation purposes, which is at present being negotiated in Peking by the four-Power combine, with the full knowledge of their respective Governments, and in regard to which advances have already been made to the Chinese Government by the banks interested, with the full approval of their Governments. Such advances, made without any proper security, have been authorised by His Majesty's Government and the other Governments concerned, under the conviction that the moment had come when it was politically expedient to strengthen the hands of the *de facto* administration in China against the forces of anarchy, and His Majesty's Government feel therefore that they are under obligations not only to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, but also to the Governments and financial groups concerned in these advances, not to give their support to any other group in negotiating with the Chinese Government any loan as described above until the large loan, out of which these advances and the expenses of reorganisation are to be covered, has been successfully negotiated, and, above all, until the security on which it is to be issued has been definitely settled.



I am to add that, as a matter of principle, His Majesty's Government would not feel justified in ordinary circumstances in giving their support to any loan which did not, in their opinion and in the opinion of the other Governments concerned, offer adequate guarantees for the proper and useful expenditure of the proceeds, and satisfactory security for the payment of principal and interest.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

No. 8.

*Eastern Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received March 16.)*

Sir,

4, Crosby Square, London, March 15, 1912.

WITH reference to my letter of the 29th ultimo, I am instructed by my board to inform you that the Peking agents of the Eastern Bank (Limited), and of Messrs. J. Henry Schröder and Co., Mr. H. Lawson, and Major Menzies have, in conjunction with our Belgian and French associates, arranged a loan for 1,000,000*l.* in one year Treasury bills at 5 per cent. at 97 to the Chinese Government against the security of the Peking-Kalgan Railway. The object of this loan is to render a temporary advance to the Chinese Government, pending the negotiation of a larger loan which the Chinese Government have undertaken to offer us upon equal terms to those of any other groups.

The contract has been signed by the President of China and the Finance Minister, and I venture to ask you to instruct Sir J. Jordan to receive the customary notification of the Chinese Government.

I have, &c.

F. H. SUTTON.

No. 9.

*Eastern Bank, Messrs. J. H. Schröder and Co., Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co., and Messrs. Brown, Shipley, and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received March 19.)*

Sir,

4, Crosby Square, London, March 18, 1912.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Foreign Office letter of the 14th instant, addressed to Lord Balfour of Burleigh, as chairman of the Eastern Bank.

The letter of the 15th instant from the manager of that bank had been written before the receipt of the Foreign Office letter now under reply. We have now had an opportunity of considering your letter of the 14th instant, and we are writing to express our regret at the attitude now adopted, and to say that it does not seem wholly consistent with the position taken up in the earlier letters of the Foreign Office.

We venture to remind you that, in the letter of the Eastern Bank of the 24th January last, the Foreign Office were advised that a syndicate had been formed for the purpose of financing loans to the Chinese Government, and the Foreign Office were invited to be good enough to note this fact.

The Foreign Office replied on the 3rd February that a copy of the letter referred to would be forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, who would be directed to furnish our representative with such assistance as he could properly give. At the same time the probability was pointed out that the Chinese Government would apply in the first instance for any assistance they might require to the four international banking groups.

In reply it was stated that our syndicate were quite ready to compete for such loans in the ordinary way, and having regard to the intimation which had been received from the Foreign Office in their letter of the 3rd February, we proceeded with our negotiations with the Chinese Government, which, as we advised the Foreign Office on the 15th instant, have now resulted in a loan being arranged on the terms there stated.

In the letter of the 14th instant, the Foreign Office for the first time take exception to the policy of competition for these loans. It was also stated that His Majesty's Government feel that they are under obligations to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank not to give their support to any other group in negotiating loans with the Chinese Government until the four international banking groups, of which the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank forms one, have completed their negotiations for the large loan, in anticipation of which they have already, without any definite security, made advances to the Chinese Government.

We respectfully suggest that having regard to the views expressed in your earlier letters, the support thus given to the four international banking groups is in effect the giving of a monopoly of the support of His Majesty's Government to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and their associates, notwithstanding the disclaimer contained in the Foreign Office letter of the 14th.

With regard to the condition laid down by the Foreign Office that participation in any loan should result in profit to British capital, we desire to express our belief that the profit arising from the participation of British capital in a loan granted to our syndicate would be equal to, if not greater than, that derived from participation in a loan placed with the other international syndicate. Our syndicate is a very comprehensive one, comprising as it does many English interests; for besides the Eastern Bank, Messrs. J. Henry Schröder and Co., and Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co., the firms of Messrs. Brown, Shipley and Co., Messrs. W. Greenwell and Co., and also Sir Marcus Samuel are interested in our Chinese negotiations.

We desire to add that the loan of which the Foreign Office were advised in the letter of the 15th instant was negotiated through the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the Bank Sino-Belge, with the co-operation of Major Menzies and Mr. Lawson, who travelled from this country to China specially for the purpose of furthering British interests in conjunction with these institutions.

Having incurred heavy expenses in negotiating this loan, which had, as we believed the full concurrence of His Majesty's Government, we venture to express our earnest hope that the necessary instructions may be sent to Sir J. Jordan to receive the customary notification from the Chinese Government.

We much regret we are unable to agree that the policy suggested by us is in any way in conflict with that of the internationalisation of loans in China; our first letter laid stress on the fact that we are members of an international syndicate, and our status as such appeared to us to have been recognised in your letter of the 3rd February.

We are most anxious to avoid any appearance of embarrassing His Majesty's Government, and in view of the remarks contained in the Foreign Office letter of the 14th, we are prepared upon invitation to meet the representatives of the alternate British group in friendly discussion in order to arrive at a basis of co-operation in future.

We have, &c.

BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH.  
J. HENRY SCHRÖDER AND Co.  
E. D. SASSOON AND Co.  
BROWN, SHIPLEY, AND Co.

No. 10.

*Foreign Office to Eastern Bank.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 19, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, informing him of the arrangement made by your Peking agents, in conjunction with your Belgian and French associates, to issue a loan of 1,000,000*l.* to the Chinese Government, and requesting that His Majesty's Minister at Peking may be instructed to receive the customary notification of the Government.

I reply, I am to state that the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the question of loans to China was fully defined in the letter addressed from this Office to Lord Balfour of Burleigh on the 14th instant, and I am to inform you that, for the reasons set forth in that letter, Sir E. Grey regrets that he is unable to support the loan which you have arranged or to instruct Sir J. Jordan in the sense which you desire.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

No. 11.

*Eastern Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received March 22.)*

Sir,

*4, Crosby Square, London, March 22, 1912.*

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, and observe with regret the attitude now taken up by His Majesty's Government.

In view of our chairman's letter of the 24th January last, bringing our syndicate to your notice, and your reply of the 3rd February, in which you wrote:—

“I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a copy of your letter will be forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, who will be directed to furnish your local representative with such assistance as he properly can. In issuing these instructions to Sir J. Jordan, Sir E. Grey would be glad to be in a position to give the names of the foreign firms with whom your bank is associated, and I am to request that this information may be supplied”:

we think we were not unreasonable in considering that we had the concurrence and support of His Majesty's Government, and we had no hesitation in concluding the loan, of which we advised you in our letter of the 15th instant.

The contract has been ratified by the National Assembly, and we venture to hope that, after consideration of the facts set forth in our syndicate's letter of the 18th instant, our request may meet with a more favourable response from His Majesty's Government, and that the necessary instructions may be sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

I have, &c.

F. H. SUTTON, *Manager.*

No. 12.

*Foreign Office to Eastern Bank, Messrs. J. H. Schröder and Co., Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co., and Messrs. Brown, Shipley, and Co.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 22, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, replying to the views of Sir E. Grey as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards financial groups making loans to China, as set forth in the letter to you from this Office of the 14th.

You state that the attitude now adopted does not seem wholly consistent with the position taken up in the earlier letters of the Foreign Office.

In reply to this statement, I am to refer you to the Foreign Office letter of the 3rd ultimo, in which, as you observe in your letter now under consideration, you were warned that the Chinese Government would probably, in the first instance, apply for financial assistance to the groups of the four-nation combine. This is the course which in the event the Chinese Government actually adopted, and when you applied to Sir E. Grey in regard to the Anglo-Belgian loan he was already pledged to support another loan, with the conditions of which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government and the other Governments interested, the Anglo-Belgian loan was in conflict.

It appears to Sir E. Grey that you are under a misapprehension in attributing to him a statement that the policy suggested by you was in conflict with that of the internationalisation of loans in China. You were informed that your request appeared to conflict with your protest against the internationalisation of loans in China, which is obviously a quite different statement to that now attributed by you to Sir E. Grey.

I am further to point out to you that His Majesty's Government are acting in accord with both the German and French Governments in this matter. The German market has been closed to this loan, and the French Government refuse to support it. Moreover, the conditions of the loan are unknown to His Majesty's Government, and it is very doubtful whether the four Governments interested would find that it offered what they would consider “adequate guarantees for the proper and useful expenditure of the proceeds and satisfactory security for the payment of principal and interest.”

Sir E. Grey notes with pleasure that you have no desire to embarrass His Majesty's Government, and are prepared to discuss matters with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank; but I am to point out that it is for you to approach that bank, as suggested in the previous letter from this Office.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

No. 13.

*Foreign Office to Eastern Bank.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 27, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, requesting that he may reconsider his decision, conveyed to you on the 19th instant, as to instructing His Majesty's Minister at Peking to receive the notification of your loan from the Chinese Government.

Sir E. Grey assumes that your letter crossed the letter from this Office of the 22nd, which was sent in reply to your communication of the 15th, and which amplified the reasons previously transmitted to you for the attitude taken up by His Majesty's Government towards financial groups making loans to China.

The matter has now been fully considered in all its aspects by Sir E. Grey, and he regrets that he is not in a position to do otherwise than adhere to his original decision.

I am, &amp;c.

W. LANGLEY.

No. 14.

*Eastern Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received March 29.)*

Sir,

*4, Crosby Square, London, March 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, which has been submitted to my board and to the syndicate, and I am directed to say that, after what passed in the earlier steps of the correspondence, they are unable to understand the position now taken up by His Majesty's Government.

My board and those interested in the syndicate have again carefully studied the contents of your letter of the 3rd February to which you refer them. It is no doubt the case that you mentioned therein the probability of the Chinese Government applying in the first instance to the four international banking groups, but there was no suggestion in the letter that Sir E. Grey was already pledged to support them to the exclusion of all others. On the contrary, the Foreign Office wrote as follows :—

“I am instructed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a copy of your letter will be forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, who will be instructed to furnish your local representative with such assistance as he properly can. In issuing these instructions to Sir J. Jordan, Sir E. Grey would be glad to be in a position to give the names of the foreign firms with whom your bank is associated, and I am to request that this information may be supplied.

On the 8th February we furnished you with the particulars asked for, and on the 15th instant gave details of the 1,000,000*l.* loan arranged by our representatives for one year on the security of the Peking-Kalgan Railway, and payments have already been made to China in respect thereof.

It is the case, as stated in our letter of the 8th February, that German banks are not yet officially interested in our syndicate. French bankers, however, are interested, and so also is the Russo-Asiatic Bank with the full knowledge of the Russian Government. We have had many applications from English, German, American, and French bankers to join us, but at the present moment we have no desire to enlarge our syndicate.

The loan which we have arranged was not made until after we had informed the Foreign Office of our intention, and in view of the fact that during the negotiations there was nothing to indicate that His Majesty's Minister at Peking would not be authorised to receive the customary notification of the Chinese Government, we proceeded in fact on the promise of support contained in your letter of the 3rd February, and it is difficult for us to understand why His Majesty's Government should now shut the door against us.

As regards the larger loans to follow, we are willing and ready to submit to the Foreign Office all details, and to co-operate with other groups, but as the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Syndicate are aware that His Majesty's Government is pledged

to support them, it would be manifestly useless for us to act on your suggestion that we should approach that bank on the matter, unless the Foreign Office is willing to give us the same support as is granted to them, thereby placing us upon an equal footing.

Telegrams from Peking appearing in the press indicate that His Majesty's Minister is joining the Ministers of Germany, France, and America in protesting to the Chinese Government against the loan arranged by our syndicate. If this is accurate we are obliged most respectfully to say that we cannot understand the justice of the action taken in respect that before opening negotiations with China we informed the Foreign Office (on the 24th January) of the formation and intentions of our syndicate, and received Sir E. Grey's promise that His Majesty's Minister at Peking would afford us such assistance as he properly could. It was only on the 14th March, after the loan had been arranged, that you informed us that Sir E. Grey could not support us.

It seems that, in spite of the promise of the 3rd February, His Majesty's Government not only refuses to support us, but has joined in a protest against our loan. This change of attitude after the loan has become an accomplished fact and payments have been made to China in respect thereof seems to us less than fair, and I am directed to urge that His Majesty's Government will, under the circumstances, grant our syndicate the support to which, in view of the foregoing, we feel we are entitled.

I have, &c.

F. H. SUTTON, *Manager*.

No. 15.

*Foreign Office to Eastern Bank.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 6, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, stating that your directors are unable, in view of the earlier correspondence with this department, to understand the attitude assumed by His Majesty's Government towards the recently negotiated loan of 1,000,000*l.* to the Chinese Government in which your bank is interested.

I am to point out to you that at the time when the letter from this department of the 3rd February last was written, His Majesty's Government were not pledged to support the loan negotiations of the four-nation combine to the exclusion of all conflicting loans. When, however, the Eastern Bank applied to this department in regard to the so-called Anglo-Belgian loan, His Majesty's Government were, as already stated, pledged to support another loan with the conditions of which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government and the other Governments concerned, the Anglo-Belgian loan was in conflict.

As far as Sir E. Grey is aware, His Majesty's Minister at Peking was left in complete ignorance of the negotiations for the Anglo-Belgian loan. If he had been applied to by the representative of your syndicate, Sir J. Jordan would no doubt have explained that, in the circumstances which had arisen, he could not properly afford your representative assistance in his negotiations.

Apart from their obligations towards the other Governments and financial groups interested in the reorganisation loan at present under negotiation, His Majesty's Government have, as the Eastern Bank has already been informed, agreed not to support any loan to China which does not offer adequate guarantees for the proper and useful expenditure of the proceeds and satisfactory security for the payment of principal and interest.

Sir E. Grey regrets therefore that, for the reasons stated in this and previous letters from this department, he is unable to give your syndicate the support for which you ask.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

No. 16.

*Eastern Bank, Messrs. J. H. Schröder and Co., and Messrs. Brown, Shipley, and Co.  
to Foreign Office.—(Received May 4.)*

Sir,

4, Crosby Square, London, May 3, 1912.

WE have the honour to inform you that Mr. Lawson, the British representative of the Anglo-Belgian syndicate in China, has communicated to us by cable that he has been advised by the British Minister at Peking of the intention of the Chinese Government to cancel clause 15 of the loan agreement, such clause relating to privileges granted to the syndicate in respect of a contemplated loan of 10,000,000*l.*

Having regard to the previous correspondence which has passed between the Foreign Office and ourselves, we are reluctant to again approach you, but we feel compelled to advise you of the breach of the agreement referred to, under which the interests of British subjects must suffer.

If the cablegrams appearing in the public press are authentic, the breach of the agreement referred to has been agreed upon with the concurrence of the four Powers. We must beg you to believe that our syndicate effected the loan of 1,250,000*l.* to the Chinese Government upon the honest conviction that the terms conveyed in your letter of the 3rd February pointed to our having the support of the British Minister. Whilst this has unfortunately not proved to be the case, we venture to submit that we are entitled to the support usually given for the protection of British interests, and we observe with the utmost regret that, instead of this being so, our own Government has apparently done nothing to prevent the other Governments from supporting other parties in an attempt to bring about a direct breach of the agreement entered into between ourselves and the Chinese Government.

We beg you most respectfully to take note of our protest, and we still hope that we may in some manner receive your support, having regard to the circumstances of the case.

We understand that the Belgian Government is addressing a formal protest to the Chinese Government, and possibly to the four Powers.

We are, &amp;c.

BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH

*(per Eastern Bank).*

J. HY. SCHRÖDER AND Co.

BROWN, SHIPLEY, AND Co.

No. 17.

*Foreign Office to Eastern Bank, Messrs. J. H. Schröder and Co., and Messrs. Brown, Shipley, and Co.*

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, May 10, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant relative to the intention of the Chinese Government to cancel clause 15 of the Anglo-Belgian loan, which clause conferred on your syndicate certain privileges in regard to a further loan of 10,000,000*l.*

In that letter, you state that you understand from telegrams published in the press that the cancellation of this clause by the Chinese Government has the approval of the Governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States of America. Sir E. Grey desires me to state that you are correct in this surmise, and to remind you that from the moment you first approached him in regard to this special loan, he has never concealed from you the fact that its terms conflicted with those of another loan which His Majesty's Government and the other three Governments concerned were, for reasons already explained to you, pledged to support, and that he was therefore unable to afford you any assistance in your negotiations. On the contrary, as you are aware, His Majesty's Minister in Peking was instructed to join with the French, German, and American Ministers in protesting against the Anglo-Belgian loan, on the ground that it violated the terms of the agreement on which the four-Power combine had, with the approval of their Governments, consented to make certain advances to the Chinese Government.

Sir E. Grey readily accepts your statement that your syndicate was acting in good faith in effecting the first loan of 1,000,000*l.* to the Chinese Government, but he cannot

help feeling that your representatives in China should have communicated with His Majesty's Minister at an earlier stage of the negotiations.

In the circumstances, it is obviously impossible for Sir E. Grey to give any support to your protest against the cancellation of clause 15 of the Anglo-Belgian Loan Agreement.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

No. 18.

*Eastern Bank, Messrs. J. H. Schröder and Co., Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co., and Messrs. Brown, Shipley, and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received May 16.)*

Sir,

4, Crosby Square, London, May 15, 1912.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the letter addressed to us by the Foreign Office on the 10th instant, and although we might labour the point to which we have often referred, viz., the fact that the letter of the Foreign Office of the 3rd February led us to suppose that we were free to make loans to China without, to say the least, encountering the opposition of our own Government, we do not wish to embarrass His Majesty's Government in these delicate negotiations.

We would, however, ask the Foreign Office to endeavour to realise the position in which we have been placed through no fault of ours, and in justice to our interests to support us in our continued endeavour to carry out the wishes of the Foreign Office, expressed in their letter of the 14th March last, in coming to an understanding with the group which is at present receiving the support of the Foreign Office.

Our group, commonly known as the Anglo-Belgian syndicate, is already associated with the Russo-Asiatic Bank, which has the support of the Russian Government, and is interested in the one-sixth share offered to Russia, and we have endeavoured to come to an amicable arrangement with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to settle the Belgian interest.

We have asked that bank to cede to Belgium a small percentage in the reorganisation loan, and also to consent to a joint issue in London; and this latter point appears to us to be the stumbling-block to a settlement of all our interests.

Inasmuch as the issues of Chinese loans on all the continental markets are conducted by many banks on each market, we cannot understand why the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank is so unwilling to meet the very reasonable demands of our group as to the question of the issues, and we still hope that a solution may be arrived at along the lines we have mentioned.

May we therefore hope that the Foreign Office will understand and comply with our request to use its influence with the Hong Kong Bank on our behalf, and request them to meet us in our endeavour to carry out the advice given us by the Foreign Office to come to a fair understanding regarding Chinese finance.

We have, &c.

BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH

(For Eastern Bank).

J. HY. SCHRÖDER AND Co.

E. D. SASSOON AND Co.

BROWN, SHIPLEY, AND Co.

No. 19.

*Foreign Office to Eastern Bank, Messrs. J. H. Schröder and Co., Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co., and Messrs. Brown, Shipley, and Co.*

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, in which you request that the influence of the Foreign Office may be used to induce the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to meet your wishes as to the question of the issue of the reorganisation loan to China.

In reply, I am to remind you that Sir E. Grey feels bound to give due weight to the special position acquired by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank by the fact that it was first in the field in regard to the present loan, and also that it was to a large extent instrumental in bringing about the present international combine which, it is hoped,

will render effective the aim of His Majesty's Government to prevent any return to the former unprofitable policy of international competition in Chinese loans.

Under these circumstances, Sir E. Grey feels that the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank can hardly be expected to give up the position of sole issuing bank in England for the present loan, and, though he would be glad to see you secure financial participation in the loan, he cannot urge the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to share the issue in London with you or other banks.

With regard to the penultimate paragraph of your letter, I am to state that, as far as this department is aware, the sole issuing banks for the loan in Paris and Berlin will be the Banque de l'Indo-Chine and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank respectively.

Finally, I am to add that it would be impossible for Sir E. Grey to suggest to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank that they should give a percentage of their share of the loan to the Belgian group, and that the most reasonable course for the latter to adopt would appear to be that they should in the first place approach their Russian partners for this purpose.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

No. 20.

*Eastern Bank, Messrs. J. H. Schröder and Co., Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co., and Messrs. Brown, Shipley, and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received May 31.)*

Sir,

4, Crosby Square, London, May 30, 1912.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, and although it is with the greatest reluctance that we are again approaching you on this matter, we feel that, in justice to ourselves, we should point out to you that, as regards the issue in Paris and Berlin, your department must have been misinformed, as the issues will not be made by the Banque de l'Indo-Chine and by the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank alone, but all large banks in France (the Crédit Lyonnais, Société générale, Comptoir national, Banque de Paris, Banque de l'Union parisienne, Crédit industriel, &c.) and Germany (Deutsche Bank, Disconto-Gesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, Darmstädter Bank, Messrs. Bleichröder, Messrs. Mendelsohn, &c.) will also appear in the prospectus as issuing houses.

It is for this reason that we ask that the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank should in fairness, be induced to co-issue with our group in London.

We are, &c.

J. S. HASKELL, *Director*

(For the Eastern Bank).

BROWN, SHIPLEY, AND CO.

E. D. SASSOON AND CO.

J. HY. SCHRÖDER AND CO.

No. 21.

*Foreign Office to Eastern Bank, Messrs. J. H. Schröder and Co., Messrs. E. D. Sassoon and Co., and Messrs. Brown, Shipley, and Co.*

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, June 21, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, in which you state that the issues of the Chinese reorganisation loan will be made in Paris and Berlin by all the large banks in France and Germany.

In reply I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey is aware that, in a certain sense, both the Banque de l'Indo-Chine and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank share the right of issue with the other banks which form the French and German groups, but the methods of negotiating and issuing foreign loans in France and Germany are different from those in force in England, and in consequence the position of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine and of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank is in this sense, but in this sense only, not on the same footing as that of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.

In France and Germany any large issue, in order to be successfully dealt with, must be, and is, placed through the important French and German financial houses, and their innumerable branches all over the country. In London it is customary for individual houses to negotiate and issue, only interesting the leading houses in the city



by participation in the underwriting which is generally given after the conclusion of the business.

Apart from this point, which is dependent on the difference of the systems of the markets, Sir E. Grey understands that, broadly speaking, in all that constitutes the essential attributes of a bank of issue, such as the conduct of negotiations, signature of agreement, counter-signature of bonds, service of the loan, and custody of the funds, the position of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine in Paris and of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in Berlin does not differ from that of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in London.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

No. 22.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 23, 1912.*

MR. C. BIRCH CRISP, a member of the London Stock Exchange, called at this department to-day, and stated that a syndicate which he claimed to represent was negotiating a loan of 10,000,000*l.* with the Chinese Government. The syndicate was, he said, composed of Lloyd's Bank, the London County and Westminster Bank, and the Capital and Counties Bank, and the negotiations were being conducted with the representative of the Chinese Republic in London, Mr. Lew Yuk-Lin.

The present position of His Majesty's Government in the matter of loans to China, and their obligations towards the other Governments and the six-Power consortium, were explained to Mr. Crisp, and he was informed that His Majesty's Government did not consider that China was free to borrow outside the consortium until the repayment of the advances made by the latter had been duly provided for. It was also explained to Mr. Crisp that, as a matter of general principle, His Majesty's Government would never support a loan concluded without adequate guarantees for the control of the expenditure of the proceeds and without proper security. The fact that the six-Power consortium, with the full support of the respective Governments, had so far been unable to obtain satisfactory terms in these respects from the Chinese Government rendered it very improbable that a syndicate without the same experience and unsupported by any foreign Government could meet with a greater measure of success.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 23.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 23, 1912.*

IT appears that negotiations are proceeding between the Chinese Minister here and a new syndicate for a loan of 10,000,000*l.* to China. Representative of syndicate, Mr. C. B. Crisp, informed that I should regard with disapproval any proposal for a loan by firms not connected with the groups until the repayment of advances has been provided for, since Chinese Government are not, in my opinion, free to negotiate such loans until this has been done.

No. 24.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 30, 1912.*

I LEARN that a loan to China of 10,000,000*l.* is being negotiated by the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company. Company is being informed in the same sense as Mr. Crisp (see my telegram of the 23rd August).

No. 25.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)*

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Peking, September 3, 1912.*

CHINESE have made fresh overtures to the six groups for loan of 20,000,000*l.*, stipulating that terms must not be such as to impair their administrative authority or to excite popular alarm. This is understood to imply some modified control of gabelle. Chinese are, in my opinion, more likely to accept proper conditions of security and control at the hands of the six groups than from any individual group of lenders, and latter's only chance of success seems to lie in their agreeing to relax terms. Given equal terms, the six groups would be preferred, because they have command of the market, and, salt being practically the only available security, its reorganisation must, on account of indemnity claims, be an international one.

No. 26.

*Mr. Lew Yuk-Lin to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

Your Excellency,

*Chinese Legation, September 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that under instructions from my Government, and in fulfilment of a preliminary agreement signed at Peking on the 12th July last, I have signed a definitive agreement with a financial group, represented by Messrs. C. B. Crisp and Co., for a loan of 10,000,000*l.*, secured upon the unhypothecated portion of the Chinese salt gabelle.

The agreement was signed on the 30th ultimo.

As my Government is in urgent need of funds, pending the realisation of the loan sums in advance will be received against the issue of Treasury bills.

I have, &amp;c.

LEW YUK-LIN.

No. 27.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)*

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Peking, September 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 23rd August and my telegram of 3rd September.

Minister of Finance informed the representative of one of the groups yesterday that he had just learnt that late Minister of Finance had without his knowledge concluded negotiations with London bank through Chinese Minister in London for loan of 10,000,000*l.*; he was accordingly telegraphing to Chinese Minister warning latter not to sign agreement.

No. 28.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

THE views expressed in your telegram of 3rd September are receiving my careful consideration. Meanwhile I consider it most necessary that an agreement should be reached by the groups as to the conditions on which they will accept the new proposal of the Chinese, and the necessary communication made with the least possible delay.

The 10,000,000*l.* loan with the Crisp Syndicate has been definitely concluded, and a similar loan would have been concluded with the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company if latter had not, by our request, postponed decision pending our approval.

No. 29.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, September 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of yesterday.

Official note from Chinese Minister here informs me of signature of an agreement with the Crisp Syndicate for loan of 10,000,000*l.* I am in communication with them with the view of stopping execution of agreement if possible. Should I fail in this, it will become necessary to deal with the matter by direct communication with Chinese Government.

No. 30.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 10, 1912.*

MR. C. BIRCH CRISP called to-day by appointment at this Office in connection with the proposed loan of 10,000,000*l.* to the Chinese Government, referred to in my despatch of the 23rd ultimo.

Mr. Crisp was received by Mr. Gregory, of the Far Eastern Department, and confirmed the statement contained in Mr. Lew Yuk-Lin's note of the 4th instant, referred to in my telegram of 9th September, that the loan in question had been definitely concluded.

Mr. Gregory pointed out that Mr. Crisp had acted in defiance of the declared policy of His Majesty's Government, which had been made perfectly clear to him on his previous visit to the Foreign Office. Mr. Crisp admitted that this was so, but said that he knew that the public was prepared to take up the loan, and that he did not see how His Majesty's Government could prevent the transaction being carried through.

Mr. Gregory replied that His Majesty's Government were not of course in a position to put pressure on the syndicate interested in the loan, but they could put considerable pressure on the Chinese Government, and would not hesitate to do so at once.

Mr. Gregory enquired whether Mr. Crisp would prefer to see the whole influence of the six Governments thrown against the loan, or whether he would be prepared himself to cancel the agreement and prevent an open conflict. After consideration, Mr. Crisp admitted that it would be foolish to proceed with the loan in the face of the active hostility of the six Governments, and he therefore proposed the following procedure, which Mr. Gregory promised to submit to me: He would postpone the issue of the loan and would undertake not to proceed further with it without previous notification to the Foreign Office; he would issue no prospectus; he would cause no reference to be made to the agreement in the press, and would refuse any information as to its existence if applied to.

Mr. Gregory could not say whether I should be satisfied with this solution, or whether I should demand that the Chinese Government should cancel the agreement. He would, however, submit the proposal to me as it had been made.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

No. 31.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, September 11, 1912.*

MY telegram of 9th September.

Loan by London syndicate.

Representative of the Crisp Syndicate has been pressed to postpone issue and has consented not to take further steps without informing us. He confirms statement that agreement for loan was definitely signed on the 30th ultimo.

You should endeavour to persuade Chinese Government to disavow the action of their agents in this transaction, which, in view of the formal engagements into which

Chinese Government have entered with the groups, I cannot believe was conducted by their authority. If they refuse, you should enquire how they can maintain their attitude to be consistent with those engagements.

We wish, in any case, to be placed in possession of full details of the recent agreement at the earliest possible date.

## No. 32.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)*

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Peking, September 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 11th September.

Following information furnished to me by Kirton, who originated transaction here:—

A preliminary agreement was signed by him on 12th July last providing for negotiations in London. This was on behalf of International Finance Syndicate, of which Crisp is representative. Morrison was instructed to examine proposals, and was understood to have reported favourably.

Price is 95 at 5 per cent., and term of loan forty years. Security, balance of salt revenue and property transfer tax. Loan is to be followed by the establishment in China of an associated commercial bank with a capital of 2,000,000*l.*, half foreign and half Chinese.

I told Kirton that transaction seemed to me impracticable, and that I was bound to oppose it. Salt revenue, as at present administered, was insufficient to meet even the indemnity, and its reorganisation was essentially an international matter. As security for a foreign loan the property transfer tax had no value except for advertising purposes.

## No. 33.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Peking, September 13, 1912.*

I TO-DAY made a representation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your telegram of the 11th instant.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs will submit the representation which I made to him to Yuan Shih-kai.

## No. 34.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1912.*

A REPRESENTATIVE of Messrs. C. Birch Crisp and Co. called at this department to-day, and stated that the prospectus of the first part of the loan of 10,000,000*l.* to the Chinese Government was about to be issued to the public.

Messrs. Crisp's representative said that this notification was made in pursuance of the undertaking given by Mr. C. B. Crisp that he would not issue the prospectus without giving previous notice to the Foreign Office.

The undertaking in question would appear to be that referred to in my despatch of the 10th instant. Mr. Crisp, however, then engaged not merely to issue no prospectus but to proceed no further in the matter of the loan without previous notice to this department. The present notification seems to indicate that Mr. Crisp has in the meanwhile made the necessary arrangements for underwriting, and has completed all other preparations for the issue of the loan; it can therefore scarcely be regarded as fulfilling the undertaking which he was understood to have given. It must indeed have been clear to Mr. Crisp that that undertaking, if it was to have any value for

this department, must necessarily provide for the notice being given in sufficient time to enable His Majesty's Government further to consider the position, and to take such action as they considered necessary before the definite issue of the loan rendered any further steps futile.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

No. 35.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 23, 1912.*

MESSRS. CRISP have just informed me that they propose forthwith to issue prospectus of 10,000,000*l.* loan and proceed with issue. If this is done with sanction of Chinese Government, His Majesty's Government will be obliged to take the most serious view of such proceedings. You are aware that we are disposed to show every consideration to Chinese Government in facilitating their negotiations with the groups. But our attitude will have to be entirely reconsidered if Chinese Government on their part defy us in a matter in which they well know that we are pledged to act with the five other Powers.

You should accordingly warn the Chinese Government in the most serious manner of the un wisdom of their persisting with this loan at this juncture, and use your best efforts to get them to order the suspension, at least provisionally, of the issue.

No. 36.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)*

(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, October 9, 1912.*

WAI-CHIAO PU have communicated to me, in accordance with article 17, copy of Crisp loan agreement, and have asked that it should be placed on record.

As similar notification has under the above article to be made to you by Chinese Minister at London, I request instructions as to what reply I should return.

No. 37.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 9th October.

You should decline to place the Crisp loan on record.

CHINA. No. 2 (1912).

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CORRESPONDENCE respecting Chinese Loan  
Negotiations.

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command  
of His Majesty. October 1912.*

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LONDON :

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## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

# AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[In continuation of "China, No. 1 (1912)": Cd. 6148.]

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.  
November 1912.*

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## Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of China.

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[In continuation of "China, No. 1 (1912)": Cd. 6148.]

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No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 5, 1911.*

IN my despatch of the 23rd ultimo\* on the subject of the Imperial Maritime Customs revenue and the charges thereon for the service of the foreign debt, I reported that an identic telegram was sent by the foreign representatives at Peking to the foreign bankers in Shanghai, asking them to arrange in consultation for the formation of a bankers' commission to receive and dispose of the customs revenues in accordance with the obligations for which they were hypothecated.

I have now the honour to forward a copy of the resolutions adopted by the bankers in consequence of this invitation. It will be noted that the objections to reviving the Indemnity Commission of Bankers, which I had pointed out to my colleagues, are completely obviated by the agreement that the custody of the customs funds is to be entrusted only to the banks which have the first charge thereon.

The foreign representatives, to whom the proposals of the bankers were circulated as soon as received by telegraph, have now agreed to submit them to their respective Governments for approval.

I have also the honour to enclose herewith copy in translation of a memorandum from the Wai-wu Pu in reply to the memorandum which, as reported in my despatch above quoted, I addressed to them on the 21st ultimo, on the subject of the default in meeting the service of the Chinese Imperial Government 5 per Cent. Gold Loan of 1896. The Wai-wu Pu here state officially that the customs revenue at all ports has now been placed entirely under the control of the inspector-general of customs for the purpose of paying off foreign loans and the indemnity; and in a further communication, copy also enclosed herewith, they inform me of the arrangements which have been made, at the suggestion of the inspector-general, for carrying this policy into effect. I have circulated copies of both of these communications amongst the other foreign representatives.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

### *Resolutions adopted by the Bankers.*

AT a meeting of the managers of the foreign banks at the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China on Thursday, the 23rd November, at 4.30 P.M., to consider the question referred to them by their respective consuls, viz., a telegram from the diplomatic body in Peking, recommending the formation of an international commission during the present troubles in China to supervise the custody and distribution of the customs revenue, pledged primarily to meet the service of foreign loans contracted previous to 1900; and, secondly, the indemnity payment provided for in the final protocol, it was resolved as follows:—

1. To recommend to the diplomatic body, through their respective consuls, that the international commission should consist of the managers of the banks interested

\* See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 121.

in the service of all outstanding loans secured by the customs revenue, contracted previous to 1900, and (or) the indemnity payments.

2. That the banks chiefly interested, viz., the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the Russo-Asiatic Bank should be the custodians of the customs funds.

3. That the inspector-general of customs be asked to give an undertaking that he will account to the commission appointed for the net customs revenue until such time as the Chinese Government are in a position to resume payment of loans and indemnity.

4. That the inspector-general of customs arrange for weekly remittances of net revenue from all collecting points to Shanghai.

5. That the inspector-general of customs arrange that the net revenue accumulated in Shanghai be divided weekly in as nearly as possible equal amounts between the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and Russo-Asiatic Bank, for account of the loans concerned and indemnity payments, and that the commissioner of customs be authorised to draw upon these accounts for loan payments as they fall due, according to the priority of such loans.

6. That if normal conditions are not restored by the end of 1912, then at that time an account be taken of the surplus available for the indemnity, and that such account be sent to the diplomatic body for their decision as to its disposal.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

*Memorandum communicated to Sir J. Jordan by the Wai-wu Pu.*

(Translation.)

WITH reference to His Majesty's Minister's memorandum on the subject of the delay in payment of the monthly instalment of interest and sinking fund on the 5 per Cent. Gold Loan of 1896 [gives précis of memorandum], the Wai-wu Pu have the honour to point out that the customs revenue at all ports has now been placed entirely under the control of the inspector-general of customs for the purpose of paying off foreign loans and the indemnity. The Wai-wu Pu has therefore addressed the Revenue Council, asking them to instruct the inspector-general of customs to take at once the necessary steps for the repayment of the above instalment.

*Wai-wu Pu, November 27, 1911.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

*Wai-wu Pu to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*December 2, 1911.*

OWING to the failure to meet at the due date the instalments due for foreign loans and the indemnity, your Excellency has frequently made representations to the effect that, in view of the present state of affairs in China, the Central Government should take steps to place the customs revenue at all the ports throughout the Empire under the control of the inspector-general of customs, to be devoted towards the payment of the various foreign loans and the indemnity.

My Ministry accordingly consulted the Ministry of Finance, and have now received their reply as follows:—

“The Revenue Council have forwarded to us a scheme in four articles, prepared by the inspector-general under their instructions. We consider that this scheme is quite practical and that it should be carried out temporarily. We enclose a copy thereof for your information and guidance.”

I have the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of the scheme in four articles prepared by the inspector-general of customs, and I beg that you will communicate it to your honourable colleagues, so that a decision may be taken and a reply sent me.

I have, &c.

HU WEI-TÊ.

## Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

*Scheme prepared by the Inspector-General of Customs.*

THE inspector-general suggests :—

1. That the superintendents of customs, at all ports where the receiving of duties is not under the inspector-general's control—*c.g.*, Harbin, Hunchun, Newchwang, Antung, Tatungkow—be instructed to hand over forthwith the duty balances in hand to the local commissioners of customs, in order that they may be remitted to the inspector-general's revenue account with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Shanghai, for the purpose of meeting foreign loan obligations; that, in future, the receiving of duties in the ports enumerated above be placed under the control of the commissioners of customs, in the same way as has been done at disturbed open ports; that the Kiaochow and Dairen customs revenue be similarly remitted to Shanghai by the inspector-general to meet foreign loan obligations, with the exception of the allowance due from the Kiaochow revenue to the Tsingtau Government.

2. That the revenues of the Kowloon and Lappa customs, which have hitherto been remitted to the Canton Viceroy, be similarly remitted to Shanghai by the inspector-general, beginning with the month of October, 1911, in order to meet foreign loan obligations.

3. That the diplomatic body be requested to nominate a commission of foreign bankers to decide questions of priority of claim between foreign loan payments; to draw up a schedule of the various payments to be made in this connection, and, in accordance with this schedule, to receive from the inspector-general, as these payments fall due, the amounts of revenue needed to meet them.

4. That the commission of bankers be requested to arrange for the temporary suspension of repayment of principal due on the loans, leaving for the time being, and until sufficient revenue accumulates, only the interest to be paid on the dates due.

December 2, 1911.

## No. 2.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 12, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 1st instant,\* I have the honour to transmit herewith a series of reports, since received from His Majesty's consul at Nanking, which graphically describe the course of events which culminated in the capitulation of that city to the revolutionary forces on the 2nd December. This success to their arms, which sets off the reverse recently sustained at Hanyang, has unquestionably put fresh heart into the revolutionaries, and to its influence may be traced the uncompromising attitude now adopted by their leaders as regards the retention of the Manchu dynasty, even as a figure-head of the State.

Although Nanking has since remained quiet, the escape of General Chang Hsün with a body of men, estimated at 1,500 to 2,000, to the north bank of the Yangtse, has created a situation that has caused some anxiety.

On the 1st December information reached me which pointed to an intention on the part of the Central Government to attempt the relief of Nanking. The Imperial railways of North China had received instructions to rail 7,000 troops from Lanchow to Tsinanfu, and the surmise that Nanking was their ultimate destination seemed justified seeing that the retrocession of Shantung to the Imperial authority presumably disposed of any necessity to augment the forces in the provincial capital. I enquired, however, of His Majesty's consul at Tsinanfu whether any of the troops of the Vth Division, which is stationed there, had entrained for the south. On the 2nd December Mr. Tebbitt replied in the negative, but on the 5th telegraphed that some 2,000 Imperialist troops had arrived from Nanking at the southern border of Shantung, and that their further progress had been arrested by orders from Peking; also that 1,000 men of the Vth Division had been sent to Tsao Chou Fu in the south-west of the province to suppress robbery.

\*“ See China, No. 1 (1912),” No. 31.

On the 6th December His Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai repeated to me a telegram from Nanking: fighting between General Chang and the revolutionaries was reported some 100 miles to the north, but telegraphic communication was broken and no confirmation obtainable. The revolutionary commander at Nanking claimed that the whole railway from Pukow was under the control of his party, and threatened its destruction in the event of its being used to transport troops from the north. He wished the line to be worked as usual, but being cut off from funds the chief engineer foresaw the possibility of being compelled to abandon it.

At a moment when there seemed to be a fair prospect of bringing about a meeting between the representatives of the conflicting parties with a view to negotiate, I felt most strongly that in addition to the question of a further and useless effusion of blood, for the Imperial Government to embark on so hazardous an undertaking as the recapture of Nanking, might irretrievably compromise the cause of a peaceful settlement, which the interests of all concerned so urgently demanded. I accordingly caused my views on the situation to be represented to Yuan Shih-kai with a view to the issue of instructions to General Chang to suspend further hostilities. In informing His Majesty's consul at Nanking on the 7th December of my action I authorised him to assure the revolutionary leaders from me that the railway would not be used to transport troops from the north, and pointed out how vitally important it was in the interest of the integrity and independence of China that a peaceful settlement should intervene without delay. I am not aware whether instructions in the sense indicated were actually sent, but in view of the fact that military operations in this district fell within the scope of the general armistice agreed to on the evening of the 9th instant, I did not deem it necessary to press the point. I to-day received telegraphic information from His Majesty's consul at Tsinanfu that 1,000 men of the Vth Division have gone to Han Chuang station on the southern frontier of Shantung. There appears, however, to be little doubt that this movement was effected before the conclusion of the armistice.

A further despatch has to-day been received from His Majesty's consul at Nanking concerning the difficult situation which has arisen in respect of the Tientsin-Pukow railway, and requesting instructions as to his attitude towards the new revolutionary authorities. I have the honour to enclose copy of this despatch, as also of my reply. As regards the latter point I have given Mr. Wilkinson instructions similar to those furnished to His Majesty's consul-general at Hankow, the circumstances being closely analagous. As regards the railway I have recommended a policy on the lines of that followed in the case of the Shanghai-Nanking line, pointing out, however, that in a situation already ill-defined and liable to sudden modification, the exercise of a wise opportunism is the only possible course.

I venture to think that Mr. Wilkinson's actions, as shown in the accompanying reports, are deserving of commendation, and I have expressed to him my warm approval of his proceedings generally throughout a difficult and trying period, and of his determination and courage in remaining at his post until his presence there was no longer possible or expedient. Copy of my despatch to him is enclosed.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, November 23, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report as follows:—

I received a telephone message yesterday evening from Commander Veale of His Majesty's ship "Clio," the British senior naval officer at this port, informing me that he was in receipt of a wireless telegram from His Britannic Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai stating that an attack on Nanking was imminent, and advising all British subjects to leave the city. I at once circulated the news amongst the four British residents who still remain here, warning them once more that no protection could be afforded them.

This morning I accompanied Captain Veale on a ceremonial visit to the Viceroy and General Chang, whom I had occasion to see regarding certain questions which have arisen here. The Viceroy received us alone, the staff of taotais who assist him on such occasions to entertain visitors having every one of them disappeared. His Excellency

seemed to me very depressed. All these troubles, he said, had come on him unexpectedly, and they had told heavily on his health. Matters had reached a stage now at which compromise in his opinion was no longer possible. While he was convinced that the present rebel attack on Nanking would fail, their defeat would not, unfortunately, be the end of the business. His most immediate grievance appeared to be that he was unable to send telegrams to Peking, although the line was now in working order. All official messages were turned down, he said, at Shanghai. According to his Excellency, though he is undoubtedly mistaken in his belief, it was the revolutionaries who had destroyed the wireless station here, which, as I reminded him, would have come in very useful at this crisis.

General Chang, upon whom we next called, received us cordially, but with very little ceremony. He was dressed shabbily in ordinary Chinese clothes. His *yamên* and its surroundings were in keeping with his appearance, and, as is usual amongst old-style officials, a disreputable-looking crowd of soldiers and coolies hung round the doors and windows listening to our conversation. I learnt subsequently that the general had an impression that, like Dr. Reid, we were calling on him as peace negotiators, and possibly for this reason and for the benefit of his other auditors he commenced the conversation by talking in a very contemptuous manner of the rebels, whom he was longing, he told us, to meet, and of whom he proposed to make very short work. The general result of our conversation was unsatisfactory, as we learned nothing of his intentions, which are alleged to be that, if he sustains a reverse, he will make his way across the river to Pukow and march along the railway into Shantung. He mentioned, however, that he intended to give battle outside the city, and that foreigners inside had not the least cause for alarm, as he was well able to protect them. He also promptly agreed to the small requests I had to make of him, one being that the west gate should be specially opened to allow certain goods belonging to the British-American Tobacco Company to be conveyed out of the city. To support this latter application I presented him with a despatch from His Britannic Majesty's consul-general, Shanghai, on the same subject, and, from his embarrassment, it was only too obvious he was unable to read it. On the whole I was not unfavourably impressed with General Chang, who is unquestionably a man of energy with a practical knowledge of his profession.

The situation in the city remains to all appearances unchanged. It is reported that a revolutionary army is already within 7 miles of the walls, but, if the information is correct, the population of Nanking must be unaware of the fact, for the exodus from the city is diminishing. According to General Chang their main body had not reached Lungtan this morning, but he evidently expects them soon, as he has already sent some 5,000 men out of the east gate to await them at the foot of Purple Mountain, where, apparently, the first big battle will be fought. The men sent out include the majority of the recruits and three or four battalions of provincial troops. The Yang-tsze defence army, the general's own particular force, remains within the city wall, so that he evidently intends to let his inferior troops bear the first brunt of the attack. It is probable, however, that the revolutionaries, before attempting to attack the city, will try and capture the forts on the river bank, of which there are at least three between here and Chinkiang. From the last fort, which is situated on the south bank about 2 miles below Hsiakuan, the breech-blocks of the big guns have been removed, it is said to prevent them, if the fort is captured by the revolutionaries, from being turned on his troops when crossing over to Pukow. It is also possible, of course, that he doubts the loyalty of the garrison. In any case the removal of these breech-blocks, and the fact that the general has just sent away to Shanghai his favourite concubine, show that he is not quite as confident of success as he professes to be.

As I am still of opinion that the situation in the city has not as yet become dangerous to foreigners, I propose to remain at the consulate at any rate until the attack on the city begins. If necessary I can take refuge at the Japanese consulate. Should I be shut in here, the senior naval officer will take our interests at Hsiakuan under his charge.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

Nanking, November 27, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 23rd instant on the situation at Nanking, I have the honour to report as follows:—

On Saturday, the 25th instant, the gates of the city remained closed to the public throughout the whole of the day, although inside everything apparently was quite peaceful. Owing to the high wind and dust prevailing it was impossible to discover what was happening outside the city, but from the number of troops moving about it was evident that hostilities had either already commenced or were on the point of doing so. At about 4:30 P.M. a letter from Mr. Pitzipios at Chinkiang, which had been passed over the wall in a basket, was delivered to me conveying a message from General Hsü strongly recommending me to leave the city at once. Almost immediately after the receipt of this letter I was called up on the telephone by the German consul, who has taken up his quarters in one of his national's houses at Hsiakuan, by whom I was informed that Tiger Hill fort, referred to in my despatch as one situated just below Nanking from the guns of which the breech-blocks had been removed, had been captured by or gone over to the revolutionaries, and that the general in command also wished me to be urgently advised to leave the city, which he intended to bombard the next day.

These messages, and the news brought to me about the same time by Dr. Macklin, the consulate physician, who is remaining in the city to attend to the wounded in his hospital, that a force of Imperial troops had been surprised by the revolutionaries outside the walls and almost cut to pieces, among the killed being General Wang, General Chang's second in command, convinced me that it was time to move my office out of the city unless I wished to be shut in altogether and endure a siege. After considerable trouble I was able to obtain from General Chang a permit allowing the Hsiakuan gate to be specially opened that night to let me out, and at 8 P.M. I quitted the consulate, accompanied by my constable and the agent at this port of the British-American Tobacco Company, who had been staying with me while making arrangements for the removal of his stock from the city. Behind me I have left three British subjects, Dr. Macklin and Mr. Drummond, who are both engaged in Red Cross work, and an Indian with whom I was unable to communicate. I have placed the consulate during my absence in charge of the writer and three other members of my staff who have not deserted me. They will live on the premises and do their best to protect them from thieves or fire if hit by shells. The cash and the more important archives I have, of course, brought away with me. I also notified both the Viceroy and General Chang of my intended departure, and asked for a special guard for the protection of the consulate.

While I am still of opinion that I might have continued to reside at the consulate without serious risk, the repeated warnings of the revolutionary leaders have satisfied me that, apart from other reasons, it would not have been politic on my part to delay my departure any longer. I venture, therefore, to hope that, in view of the circumstances, you will regard my action in leaving when I did as justified, and that it will meet with your approval. Yesterday there was only one means for foreigners and Chinese alike of getting out of the city, and that was secretly by a rope over the wall. My new quarters are on Messrs. Butterfield and Swire's hulk, the agent of that firm, Mr. Wells, having very kindly, and at considerable personal inconvenience, accommodated both me and my constable.

The fighting, which commenced with the attack on General Wang's force, has continued ever since almost without intermission. From what I can learn, it would appear that the revolutionaries have been uniformly successful, which is not perhaps surprising, seeing that none, or at any rate very few, of General Chang's best troops have been engaged. These he has kept with him in the city, as the only ones on whose loyalty he can absolutely rely. The general result of the fighting so far has been that the Imperial troops have abandoned almost every point of vantage held by them outside the city, and are now practically besieged inside it. So far the fiercest fighting has been east of the city, round Purple Mountain, which was held in considerable force by the Imperialists. A foreign eyewitness, who saw the troops, mostly recruits, engaged in the struggle there return to the city, tells me that they rushed in through the gates in the utmost disorder, and never stopped running

until they reached their quarters in the exhibition grounds, some 3 miles away. There are no figures available to show even approximately what the losses on either side have been up to date.

My own view of the fighting has been confined so far to watching an exchange of shots throughout yesterday morning and for about half-an-hour this afternoon between the captured fort on Tiger Hill and Lion Hill, the fort in the city overlooking Hsiakuan. The shooting on both sides was a good deal better than was expected, for although no guns in either fort were dismantled, very few shots missed their mark altogether. One shell, however, struck a foreign house in Hsiakuan, fortunately vacated the previous day by its inmates, and another fell quite close to the temporary German consulate, killing and wounding several Chinese. The best shot of the day was one fired from Tiger Hill at Pei Chi Ko, the hill in the city on the top of which the Viceroy, Tartar General, and General Chang had taken up their quarters. Though the distance between the two hills is over 5 miles, the shell actually burst in the temple in which the three of them were lodging, dismantled two small guns, and struck such terror into the high authorities themselves that they fled in the utmost panic to the Japanese consulate, which is close by, for refuge. General Chang soon recovered his nerve and returned to his duties, but the Viceroy and Tartar General were still there yesterday evening. The bombardment this afternoon was harmless, but an attack on Lion Hill fort by Tiger Hill fort and the revolutionary fleet combined is announced for to-morrow, and as Hsiakuan will be in the line of fire, at the request of the revolutionary general in command at Tiger Hill, the foreign hulks are being removed to-day some 7 miles up-river. The risk from the bombardment to foreign property in Hsiakuan, and possibly to the consulate, is, of course, considerable, but, in the opinion of the naval commanders here, it is impossible, under the circumstances, to do anything to protect foreign interests in the threatened area. Some six vessels belonging to the fleet put in an appearance, I should mention, this morning at 10 o'clock, without, however, taking any part in the firing. Their guns are probably too small to be of much use against the heavy armament on Lion Hill fort.

The revolutionary general to whom I have referred as being in command at Tiger Hill is a Yunnanese of the name of Li Tien Tsai. He has with him, in addition to the garrison of the fort, a mixed force of Southern Chinese about 1,500 strong. Several foreigners here have been to see him, and have been courteously received. Both he and his troops impressed them favourably. According to General Li his particular duty is to prevent General Chang from escaping either alone or with his troops across the river. In his opinion the revolutionaries will soon effect an entrance into the city through one of the southern or eastern gates, which will be opened to them by the guards defending it. In that case General Chang will attempt to make his way to Pukow, where he has some 1,500 of his best troops, and march north. It is for this reason that General Li wants a clear river, so that there may be nothing in the way to prevent him from firing on the Imperialists should they try and cross it.

How long it will be before Nanking falls it is, of course, impossible to say; but it would still seem as though the revolutionaries were relying as much on treachery in the Imperialists' ranks as on their efforts to capture the city. The issue, therefore, appears to depend largely upon whether General Chang's troops remain faithful to him or not.

In the absence of telegraphic communication with other ports, I am continuing my former practice of collecting all the news I can get and giving it to the senior naval officer to send what he chooses to Shanghai by wireless. All such messages, I understand, are communicated to His Britannic Majesty's consul-general and by him to you.

To-night from the flashes that can be seen it is evident that the city is being bombarded from the south, no doubt by field guns. The naval bombardment is fixed for 4 P.M. to-morrow.

The British men-of-war now at Nanking are His Majesty's ship "Clio" and two destroyers.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, November 29, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 27th instant, I have the honour to report as follows:—

The general bombardment of Nanking announced by General Li to take place yesterday commenced just after dark, and continued with varying severity during the greater part of the night. During the early hours of the morning the firing was very heavy, and it seemed as if the city was being attacked on every side, though it was round Hsiakuan and the south gate that the din was greatest. This morning I visited Hsiakuan, which appeared none the worse for the experience. A few houses close to the city wall had been struck by shells, but none of them was seriously damaged. The private telephone from the customs to the commissioner's house, which is next door to the consulate, was still in working order, and I was able to talk over it to my writer, who informed me that the consulate and other foreign buildings in the neighbourhood were intact, and that, as far as he knew, no foreigner in the city had been hurt. He was unable, unfortunately, to tell me, nor could I find out from any other source, what the result of the fighting outside the south gate had been. Inside the city everything was quiet.

In Hsiakuan I met the correspondent with the revolutionary army of the "New York Herald," who had just arrived there from Yaohuamen station, where he had spent the previous night. He knew nothing of the result of last night's fighting, but was able to confirm Dr. Macklin's report of the revolutionary success on Saturday, the scene of which he had visited the next day. The Imperialist force which had been so badly cut up, though composed mainly of recruits, had a strong leavening in it of old soldiers, who were unable, however, to stem the panic. The correspondent saw several heaps of their dead, in the largest of which he counted over one hundred corpses, so that their losses must have been very heavy. He had nothing but admiration for what he had seen of the fighting of the revolutionaries, but thought very little of the generalship of their leaders, of whom the chief of the staff, General Ku, was the only one who had impressed him in any way. Generals Hsü and Lin were so jealous of one another that their rivalry was seriously handicapping the operations. Though successful in the fighting round the foot of Purple Mountain, the revolutionaries had failed to dislodge a force of about 200 Imperialists stationed on the summit of the hill, who were still there this morning.

It would seem from the total failure of the revolutionary attack on Hsiakuan yesterday, though it may, of course, have been a feint to draw the Imperialists from the south gate, that until Lion Hill fort can be silenced they have no chance whatever of effecting an entrance into the city from its northern end. To break open the gate or breach the wall here the assistance of the fleet will be required, and their ships cannot approach Hsiakuan as long as they are exposed to the fire of the heavy guns on the fort. Under cover of the darkness one or two of the gun-boats are believed to have joined in the bombardment last night, but at so great a distance as to be practically useless. To silence Lion Hill it must be bombarded, it appears to me, from up-river, in which direction only one or two of its smaller guns point. This could be done by the cruisers now at Hankow, but so far none of them have put in an appearance. The guns on Tiger Hill pointing towards the city are only 4·7-inch, whereas on Lion Hill there are 6- and 8-inch guns. In my last despatch I omitted to mention that the breech-blocks of the guns on Tiger Hill, which were removed by General Chang, were placed by him for safe keeping on one of the gun-boats, which subsequently went over to the revolutionaries, who took them back, of course, to the fort when it fell into their hands.

Messrs. Butterfield and Swire's hulk, on to which I have moved my office, is now moored 9 miles above Hsiakuan. To find out what is going on, I have obtained from the superintendent of stores of the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway the loan of one of his launches to convey me every day to Hsiakuan. Though the firing can easily be heard from here—we are only 7 miles as the crow flies from the south gate—it is impossible to obtain any information. Yesterday, however, we saw at a distance of about 2 miles from the hulk a body of about three or four hundred Imperialists being pursued in a westerly direction by the revolutionaries.

I have, &amp;c.

F. E. WILKINSON.



## Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, December 1, 1911.*

SINCE I addressed you on the 29th ultimo there has been no cessation in the fighting around Nanking, though, to judge by the amount of firing, it has been considerably heavier at night than during the day. During my visit to Hsiakuan yesterday the big guns on Tiger and Lion Hills were again exchanging shots, and while I was telephoning to the consulate in the city, the building which I was in was very badly shaken by the explosion, probably by a shot from Lion Hill, of the magazine of the torpedo depôt, some 2 miles farther down the river. The depôt, of which nothing was left, was in the possession of the revolutionaries, but whether they were making any use of it or not I am unable to say. Later on in the day and during the whole of last night and this morning there was also heavy firing from the direction of Pukow, which is being attacked by revolutionaries from Yangchow and Chinkiangpu. The strength of the garrison is about 2,000 men, of whom 500 have recently been sent up to Linhuaikuan, but the position is such a strong one that it will need a lot of taking.

The object of the attack on Pukow, like that on Lion Hill fort, would seem to be to cut off the only means of escape for General Chang and his troops should the revolutionaries effect an entrance into the city. It is undoubtedly on the south and east of the city that the revolutionaries are directing their main attack, and they are pressing it with such vigour that their efforts should soon be crowned with success. The only Imperialists who have not yet been driven inside the walls are those referred to in my last despatch as being on the summit of Purple Mountain. The Yühuatai fort, outside the south gate, has been taken and its guns turned on the city. Even General Chang himself must be losing heart, for, according to the missionaries now in the city, he has enquired of them whether, in the event of the place being taken, he might take refuge with them. These missionaries, I should mention, expect Nanking to fall within the next two or three days.

The reports sent to me regarding the situation inside the city continue to be very reassuring. All foreigners are well, and, as far as is known, no foreign houses have been looted or burnt. The fires, of which there have been several, have all been in the Chinese quarter.

I have, &amp;c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

## Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, December 2, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that Nanking surrendered to the revolutionaries this morning.

The first intimation I had of the surrender was the sight of the white flag flying on Lion Hill fort, which I noticed when approaching Hsiakuan this forenoon in quest of information regarding the progress of the siege. I at once landed from my launch and made my way through the city gate, which, though strongly guarded, was open, to the consulate, the number of white flags about and the smiling faces of the people making it very apparent that the fall of Nanking was an accomplished fact. From the quietude prevailing and the obviously friendly relations between the soldiers of the old garrison, many of whom, all with white bands on their arms, were about, and the revolutionary troops, who were flocking into the city in batches of two and three, it was also evident that the surrender had been accomplished amicably and without fighting, at any rate in the northern section of the city. From the consulate, which was intact—no foreigner or foreign building has suffered injury during the siege—I made my way to the missionary quarter in the centre of the city, where I saw Dr. Mackliu, who was busily engaged in attending to the wounded, of whom there were about 150, in his hospital. From him I learnt that the surrender had been practically decided upon the previous afternoon, the capture of the summit of Purple Mountain and the bombardment thence of the city having utterly disheartened the defenders, who, with the exception of General Chang's own men, less than a third of the total garrison, had all become disaffected.

As far as I can gather, the surrender was arranged by a man called Tsou, an emissary of the revolutionaries but also a personal friend of General Chang, who has been in the city for some time trying to negotiate a settlement. Accompanied by some missionaries, he visited General Lin, the commander of the revolutionary forces outside, yesterday morning and obtained from him very satisfactory conditions in the event of a surrender. These conditions were submitted by Mr. Tsou to General Chang, and, though refused by him, were apparently so acceptable to the majority of his officers and men that the general decided, it is supposed, that the time had come to throw up the sponge. In any case, accompanied, it is believed, by the Viceroy and Tartar General, he left the city either last night or this morning and crossed over to Pukow, whither a large number of his troops subsequently followed him, escaping through the west gate and crossing the Yang-tsze about 12 miles above Hsiakuan. As soon as it was known that he had fled the gates were at once opened to the revolutionaries.

The collapse of the defence of Nanking has been so sudden and unexpected that it is difficult to resist the suspicion that General Chang has been bought off and that his rejection of General Lin's terms was merely a blind to deceive outsiders and possibly his own men. Notwithstanding the heavy bombardment to which parts of the city have been subjected, the damage done to its defences is insignificant. Many of the guns inside have been silenced, but the wall itself has not been breached, and the only gate, I am told, that has been badly knocked about is the Taiping gate. Unless it is that the general distrusted his own men or that his provisions were running short, there is no reason why he should have turned tail as he has done. It is also rather remarkable that no serious attempt was made by the revolutionaries to oppose his passage across the river and that the troops which only yesterday morning were attacking Pukow and had practically invested it were all withdrawn in the afternoon.

It is not known yet how many of General Chang's troops accompanied their leader in his flight, but together with his army at Pukow he must have a force of at least 2,500 men under his command.

The city when I visited it this morning was quiet, but a good deal of looting had been going on during the night, and, as any man found with what might be assumed to be stolen goods in his possession was being summarily executed, I was the unwilling witness of many gruesome incidents. At the city gate a head was hanging, and as I arrived at the consulate, I saw a man shot who proved to be one of General Chang's officers, on whose person 200 dollars in cash had been found. Unfortunately the bullet which killed him ricocheted and shot a small boy who was standing by, passing through his neck. As he was still alive, I took him with me to the hospital, where he was treated. I also saw a fight, due to a misunderstanding between a patrol of revolutionary soldiers and some old troops who had surrendered, in which there were several casualties before the mistake was explained. The most unpleasant sight, however, was the headless corpses, obviously of loafers, lying along the road. There could be no doubt that the revolutionaries were enforcing order. I understand that General Lin is the senior officer in command in the city.

I propose to move back to the consulate to-morrow. General Lin has sent me word that he would have an escort for me at the jetty at 1 o'clock, an unnecessary honour.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, December 5, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that Mr. Tuckey, the engineer-in-chief of the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway, called upon me this morning to inform me that he had been notified by the general in command of the revolutionary forces now occupying Pukow that, as the revolutionaries had the whole of the southern section of the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway under their control, the line was not to be used for the transport of Imperial troops, of whom it was reported that a large force was being sent down from the north. The general added that, if the railway was used for the purpose, he would have no option but to destroy it, but, in the meanwhile, he would be very glad if the line could be worked as usual.

Communication by telegraph along the line has been broken off as the result of the fighting which is taking place between General Chang's retreating army and the

revolutionary forces at Chüchow, Linhuaikuan, and Pengpu. Yesterday morning some 2,500 of Chang's troops were at Chüchow, but the general himself left that station by train in advance of his army on Sunday night (the 3rd instant). As the revolutionaries have a force of nearly 3,000 men between Linhuaikuan and Pengpu, it is very doubtful whether he succeeds in getting through these places. The fact, however, that there must be at least 3,000 of General Chang's best troops in practical possession of at least half the line between Pukow and Pengpu throws some doubt on the Pukow general's contention that the revolutionaries control the whole of the line. A missionary, I should mention, who met General Chang at Chüchow was informed by him that he had abandoned Nanking only because he had been instructed to do so by the Peking Government, who wished him to join forces with an army which was coming down from the north. Whether the Viceroy and the Tartar General are with General Chang is not yet known.

The taking over of Nanking city by the revolutionaries has now been completed, and though there have been a considerable number of unnecessary executions and some wanton destruction of property, on the whole the revolutionists have reason to pride themselves on the moderation they have shown. Stories have been brought to me of the massacre of Manchu men, women, and children, but on investigation they have almost all of them proved to be unfounded, although there have been a few decidedly unpleasant incidents. Such destruction of property as has occurred has all been in the Manchu quarter.

Everything at present is quite peaceful and the city is rapidly resuming its normal aspect. The only disturbing element in the situation is the rivalry between Generals Hsü and Lin and their respective troops. General Lin, having got into the city first, promptly occupied the Viceroy's yamên, nominated himself military governor, and notified the consular body of the fact before General Hsü, who is nominally his superior, had time to enter the place. The latter has had to content himself, consequently, with the Provincial Assembly building. It is understood that Governor Ch'en, of Soochow, will be here in a day or two, and will be nominated Viceroy, and that Generals Hsü and Lin will then be given separate commands—one of them of the army destined for Hankow and the other of the northern army.

In addition to General Lin, General Hsü and a Mr. Su, the local representative of the Hupei Revolutionary Government, have notified me of their arrival and of their anxiety to protect foreign interests. None of them have as yet called on me, but General Lin has visited the captains of the foreign men-of-war at Nanking.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

P.S.—Mr. Tuckey has just sent me a message to say that the telegraph lines on the railway were cut by the revolutionaries, who have also broken a bridge. The lines are being repaired.

F. E. W.

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Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

*Sir J. Jordan to Consul Wilkinson.*

Sir,

*Peking, December 12, 1911.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of the 23rd, 27th, and 29th November and the 1st and 2nd December, reporting on the events which culminated in the capture of Nanking by the revolutionary forces. Copies of these despatches, which have been read with great interest, are being forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and while conveying my thanks for the admirable manner in which you have kept His Majesty's Legation informed of a difficult and trying situation, I desire to express to you my warm approval of your proceedings generally, as therein reported, of your action in the circumstances stated in leaving the consulate, and of the determination and courage you displayed in remaining at your post until the moment came when it was no longer possible nor desirable that you should do so.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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## Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

*Sir J. Jordan to Consul Wilkinson.*

Sir,

Peking, December 12, 1911.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 5th instant.

As regards the Tient-tsin-Pukow Railway, the situation is liable to such sudden changes that it is not easy to give you definite instructions. You should, however, act as far as possible on the principle which we have endeavoured to enforce in the case of the Shanghai-Nanking line. The object should be to keep the railway running as a commercial enterprise free from interference from either side, but you will have to exercise your own judgment for the rest. So long as the present armistice continues—*i.e.*, until the 24th December—there is, as far as I can judge, unlikely to be any movement of troops from the north, and presumably the southern army will also remain quiescent. After that, unless the armistice is renewed, there is no guarantee as to what may happen. In the last resort you should advise Mr. Tuckey, if he consults you, to yield to *force majeure*. We cannot hope to preserve the neutral and commercial character of the railway if the military forces on either side are determined to use it for military purposes.

The general instructions which have been issued to His Majesty's consular officers as necessity arose direct them to confine their relations with the rebel Governments as far as possible to urgent questions affecting the safety of British lives and property. The consular body at Hankow were told that if circumstances arose which, in their opinion, obliged them to enter into actual relations with the rebels, the diplomatic body would not be able to disapprove of such a course. This has to a large extent become inevitable. If Nanking is made the head-quarters of the Military Government, I do not see how it will be possible for the consular body to maintain the attitude of aloofness which a strict interpretation of international law would dictate without impairing their utility in the settlement of the various questions which are sure to arise involving foreign interests.

I am, &amp;c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 3.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)*

Sir,

Peking, December 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith in translation the text of the "Articles of Confederation for the Provisional Government of the Republic of China," which General Li Yuan-Hang has sent officially to the acting British consul-general at Hankow.

I have, &amp;c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 3.

*Articles of Confederation for the Provisional Government of the Republic of China.*

## ARTICLE 1.

*The Provisional President.*

SECTION 1. The Provisional President shall be elected by the delegates appointed by the governors-general of those provinces which have declared their independence. A two-thirds vote shall be necessary for his election. Each province shall be entitled to one vote.

Sec. 2. The Provisional President shall be vested with full power to administer the affairs of the Republic of China.

Sec. 3. The Provisional President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the Republic of China.

Sec. 4. The Provisional President shall have power, with the concurrence of the Assembly, to declare war and peace and to make treaties.

Sec. 5. The Provisional President shall have power, with the concurrence of the Assembly, to appoint the Ministers of the executive boards of the provisional government and special diplomatic circles.

Sec. 6. The Provisional President shall have power, with the concurrence of the Assembly, to establish a system of national courts of justice.

## ARTICLE 2.

### *The Assembly.*

Sec. 1. The Assembly shall be composed of representatives appointed by the provincial governments.

Sec. 2. Each province shall be limited to three representatives in the Assembly, the method of appointing such representatives to be determined by the government of the province from which they come.

Sec. 3. Each representative shall be entitled to one vote in the Assembly.

Sec. 4. The duties and powers of the Assembly shall be as follows :—

(a.) To determine the matters referred to in article 1, sections 4 and 6.

(b.) To approve the action of the Provisional President in matters referred to in article 1, section 5.

(c.) To determine the budget of the provisional government.

(d.) To supervise the accounts of the provisional government.

(e.) To determine all matters concerning the taxation, currency, and public debt of the republic.

(f.) To make laws for the republic during the provisional government.

(g.) To determine all matters referred to the Assembly by the Provisional President.

(h.) To answer questions put to the Assembly by the Provisional President.

Sec. 5. No measure shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of the representatives present in the Assembly.

Matters referred to in article 1, section 4, must have the concurrence of two-thirds of the representatives present in the Assembly.

Sec. 6. Every measure which shall have passed the Assembly shall, before it becomes a law, be presented by the Speaker of the Assembly to the Provisional President for confirmation. If he approves, he shall sign and seal it, and instruct the executive officers concerned to act accordingly.

Sec. 7. If the Provisional President disapproves of any measure, he shall return it to the Assembly, with his objections, for reconsideration by them, within ten days from the time it was first presented to him. If the Assembly after reconsideration shall, by two-thirds vote, agree to pass the measure, it shall become a law and be put in force according to the preceding section.

Sec. 8. The Assembly shall elect its speaker from among its own members by ballot, and a majority vote shall determine the election.

Sec. 9. The Assembly shall determine its own rule of procedure.

Sec. 10. Before the Assembly is organised, the delegates appointed by the various provincial governments shall temporarily perform the duties of the Assembly, but the delegates from each province shall cast only one vote for that province.

## ARTICLE 3.

### *The Executive Boards.*

Sec. 1. The executive boards shall be as follows :—

(a.) Board of Foreign Affairs.

(b.) „ „ Civil Affairs.

(c.) „ „ Finance.

(d.) „ „ War.

(e.) „ „ Communications.

Sec. 2. There shall be a Minister for each board, who shall have charge of the affairs of that board.

Sec. 3. Rules governing and defining the powers and duties of the officers of each board shall be drawn up by the Minister of that board and be approved by the Provisional President before being put in force.

ARTICLE 4.

*Bye-laws.*

Sec. 1. Within six months after the establishment of the provisional government the Provisional President shall call a convention of the people. The Assembly shall draw up rules to govern the calling of this convention.

Sec. 2. The articles of confederation for the provisional government of the Republic of China shall become void from the day when the constitution of the Republic of China comes into full force.

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The above articles of confederation were drawn up and passed by the delegates in session on the 13th day, 10th moon, and 4,609th year of Huang Ti (3rd December, 1911). Delegates from the following provinces were present :—

Anhui	...	represented by 3 delegates.
Chekiang	...	4 "
Fukien	...	1 "
Hunan	...	2 "
Hupei	...	4 "
Kiangsu	...	4 "
Kwangsi	...	1 "
Shantung	...	2 "

The following provinces were represented by proxy :—

Kiangsi.  
Kwangtung.  
Kweichow.

Chihli and Honan each sent one delegate, but, as these two provinces have not yet declared independence, their delegates were given the privilege to speak but without the power to vote.

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No. 4.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 14, 1911.*

THE acting British consul-general at Hankow has forwarded to me three statements regarding events in Sianfu. The one to which I attach most weight is contained in a letter from Mr. Shorrocks, of the English Baptist Mission, the principal contents of which have already been communicated to you by telegraph. It confirms the news of the death at the hands of a mob on the first night of the rising of Mrs. Beckman, Mr. Watne, and six children; but states that the authorities were friendly, and that order has been restored in the city itself. Mr. Shorrocks also refers to the dangers of travelling, and I may add that in a private letter received by a Peking resident on the 8th December from a missionary in Suitechow, in the north-east of Shensi, dated the 8th November, the writer says: "The Ko Lao Hui in Shensi is just a huge society of robbers, and they have held up the road between here and Sianfu, so that it is courting almost certain death to attempt to travel."

Two other letters from Sianfu were communicated to me on the 8th instant. One is an unsealed letter, probably from a Roman Catholic priest, Father Hugh Scallan, to a relative in England, and the other is from an American missionary to the American Minister. These letters are dated the 25th and 26th November respectively, and give a much less favourable view of the situation than the earlier letter of Mr. Shorrocks. There is some reason to fear that the disorderly elements in the city may again gain the upper hand, and the difficulty of communication increases the anxiety.

In view of these apprehensions, the representatives of Japan, America, France,

Germany, and Great Britain, all of whom were interested in foreigners resident in the Province of Shensi, held a meeting on the 9th instant to consider what steps could be taken to get into communication with our isolated fellow-nationals. The result was that I arranged for an interview the next day with the Premier, Yuan Shih-kai, at which my colleagues and I explained our anxiety in regard to the situation of the foreigners in Sianfu, and said we had called to ascertain what could be done to communicate with them. The Premier, in reply, expressed the great regret felt by the Chinese Government at the ill-treatment of foreigners there, and referred to the recent Imperial decree on the subject, which had ordered the Viceroy of Shen-Kan and the new Governor of Shensi to proceed thither with troops to quell the disturbances. He admitted, however, that the Imperialist forces were not able at present to advance beyond Tung Kwan, on the border of Shensi, and that telegraphic communication with Sianfu was entirely cut off. A discussion ensued as to the question of a safe conduct for any party that might be sent, and Yuan Kung Pao promised to telegraph to the military authorities at Tungkwan to ascertain whether it were possible to arrange with the rebels for the escort of such a party from Tungkwan to Sianfu.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 5.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 15, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of an identic memorandum (*mutatis mutandis*) which has been addressed to the Wai-wu Pu by the French and German Ministers and myself at the request of the three banks, notifying the default of the Nanking Provincial Treasury to pay the amount due on the 11th instant for account of interest and principal of the loan for Shanghai, 3,000,000 taels, contracted by the Nanking Viceroy on the 11th December, 1910, and requesting the Imperial Government to arrange for immediate payment, under the guarantee in the loan agreement.

The communication therein referred to, from the Nanking Provincial Treasury to the banks, was received by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank on the 4th instant, and stated that the money had been used for military purposes, adding that salt *li-kin* is not forthcoming on account of the revolution.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 5.

*Identic Memorandum communicated to the Wai-wu Pu.*

HIS Majesty's Minister has the honour to refer to a communication, received from the Wai-wu Pu on the 10th November, 1910, in which he was informed that the Imperial sanction had been given to a loan of 3,000,000 taels, contracted by the Viceroy of Liangkiang from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the Banque de l'Indo-Chine.

By the terms of the loan agreement, interest at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum is payable half-yearly, on the 11th June and the 11th December in each year, and the principal is repayable by yearly instalments of 500,000 taels, commencing on the 11th December, 1911; the amount due to the three banks on the 11th instant is therefore 605,000 taels Shanghai sycee.

Article 8 of the agreement further provides that the Viceroy, on behalf of the Imperial Government, guarantees the due payment of the principal and interest of this loan.

In view of the fact that the Nanking Provincial Treasury had addressed a communication to the Shanghai office of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank requesting the postponement of the payment of interest for twelve months, Sir John Jordan has the honour to request the Imperial Government to arrange for the payment forthwith to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank of its share of the sum due, in accordance with the terms of the guarantee above referred to.

*Peking, December 14, 1911.*

## No. 6.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 1, 1912.*

I CALLED this afternoon on Yuan Shih-kai, who appeared to be unwell and very depressed.

It was only right, he said, that he should admit frankly to me that he had now lost control of the situation. All his efforts to effect a peaceful settlement had been exhausted in vain. Tong Shao-yi had resigned and the revolutionary party at Shanghai throughout the negotiations had been most uncompromising.

On the other hand, the generals had called upon the Manchu princes and nobles to produce money to continue the war; the northern provinces and the army reproached him for the concessions he had made to secure peace and would not allow him to go further in this direction; and a renewal of hostilities seemed imminent. He could no longer guarantee the peace of the north, which now became the chief consideration. He accordingly proposed to hand in his resignation to-morrow.

## No. 7.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 2, 1912.*

REBEL general at Hankow has proposed to His Majesty's consul-general that all ships should be searched at Kiukiang, and His Majesty's consul-general states that if this is agreed there will be no more firing.

I have replied that His Majesty's Government and other Powers have not recognised belligerent status of revolutionaries; that, in my opinion, present moment is very inopportune for such recognition; and that he should allow ships to be searched only when British lives or property would be endangered by opposing it.

## No. 8.

*British Residents, Ichang, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, January 2, 1912.*

PROTEST absence British gun-boat. Beg adequate protection.—BRITISH RESIDENTS, ICHANG.

## No. 9.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, January 2, 1912.*

REINFORCEMENTS will be sent to Canton from Hong Kong.

War Office would be glad to know if you consider that 500 troops now available in North China for emergency elsewhere could be raised to 1,000, otherwise it will probably be necessary to reinforce Hong Kong.

## No. 10.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, January 2, 1912.*

BRITISH residents, Ichang, protest against absence of British gun-boat, and beg adequate protection.

Please concert with admiral as to what, if any, steps should be taken.



No. 11.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3, 1912.)*

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 29, 1911.*

THE "Official Messenger" of to-day's date publishes a communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denying the truth of a statement which is alleged to have been published in the Peking "Official Gazette," to the effect that M. Sazonof has declared to the Chinese Minister here that the Russian troops sent to Mongolia have no intention of occupying that province, but are only sent to protect the interests of Russian subjects there. The communiqué states shortly that M. Sazonof has had no detailed conversation with the Chinese Minister, and that no Russian troops have entered Mongolia.

At the same time, the St. Petersburg press is showing considerable interest in the future of Mongolia and, incidentally, in that of Thibet.

The "Novoe Vremya" of to-day represents Chinese rule in Mongolia as a tyranny which has enslaved the Mongols and enabled privileged Chinese companies to acquire a monopoly of the whole trade of the country. Russia, on the other hand, is interested in the economic development of Mongolia, and should welcome the effort of the Mongol princes to free their land. The writer urges the Russian Government to recognise immediately the autonomy of Mongolia. Should the Mongol princes succeed in establishing their autonomy, they will then be in a position to conclude commercial treaties with Russia.

The same paper publishes an article on Thibet, and hails the prospect of the early return to Lhasa of the Dalai Lama. The Lama, it says, will henceforth be practical ruler as well as spiritual head of the country, a result which it attributes in large measure to the energy of the Russian Buriat Dorjief, who has worked incessantly for his master.

In discussing the Mongolian question, the "Bourse Gazette" is even more outspoken than the "Novoe Vremya." It urges the utility to Russia of the creation between her and China of a buffer State, which would, while recognising the suzerainty of China, be independent of that Power and under the influence of Russia. "For various reasons," says the article, "Mongolia has always been favourably disposed towards Russia, and an increase of Russian influence would be the natural result of the creation of an independent Mongolia. Mongolia, in becoming independent, must draw closer to Russia. There is no other course open to her. Whether the declaration of her independence by Mongolia induces Thibet to follow her example or causes Japan to take action can make no difference to the actual facts. Mongolia will turn towards Russia, and Russia cannot renounce the rôle which is thus thrust upon her." The article closes with a note of warning, to the effect that Russia must not interfere actively in the internal affairs of Mongolia, but must, in order to preserve the harmony of her Far Eastern policy, content herself with offering good advice.

I have, &amp;c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 12.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 3.)*

THE Secretary, War Office, presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by command of the Army Council, transmits herewith copies of certain papers relating to the reinforcement of the detachment of British infantry at Canton.

*Whitehall, January 2, 1912.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

*War Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Whitehall, January 2, 1912.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to inform you that a cablegram has been received from the General Officer Commanding the Troops, Hong Kong, in which

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he recommends the reinforcement of the detachment of British infantry at Canton by 150 native infantry, two 15-pounder and four Maxim guns, and that the Admiralty, on the representation of the Senior Naval Officer at Hong Kong, endorses this recommendation.

I am to request, therefore, that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, instructions may be sent to the Governor and Commander-in-chief at Hong Kong to authorise the dispatch of these reinforcements by the General Officer Commanding the Troops.

Instructions are being sent to General Anderson to arrange for their immediate dispatch, in conjunction with the Naval authorities, subject to the approval of Sir Frederick Lugard.

I am, &c.  
R. H. BRADE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

*Secretary of State for War to General Officer Commanding, South China, Hong Kong.*

(Telegraphic.)

*January 2, 1912.*

DISPATCH 150 native infantry, two 15-pounders, and four Maxim guns to Canton, in conjunction with Navy, subject to the approval of Governor, Hong Kong.

The Commander-in-chief has been informed by the Admiralty that detachments Hankow and Canton are under his orders, and that responsibility for their support or withdrawal in case of necessity rests with him.

No. 13.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 4, 1912.*

ONE thousand troops at Lanchow have declared for republic and 2,400 at Tangho will probably follow suit. In view of the possibility of the Imperialists resorting to the expedient of cutting the railway and the uncertainty of important developments, the generals at Tien-tsin have unanimously recommended the immediate occupation of the important points on the line as a precautionary measure.

I have concurred.

No. 14.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 2nd January.

After consulting with general officer commanding I am of opinion that not more than 500 troops could safely be spared at present. In about a fortnight, when American troops arrive to take their share in guarding railway, we might spare another 300 men if no further complications arise, but situation looks more serious.

No. 15.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, January 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 2nd January.

I approve instructions sent to consul-general, who should, so far as is possible, act in concert with his colleagues in the matter of search of ships.

## No. 16.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 5.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, January 4, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you a copy of a telegram to the governor of Hong Kong on the subject of the dispatch of troops from Hong Kong to Canton.

I am, &c.

JOHN ANDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 16.

*Mr. Harcourt to Governor Sir F. Lugard.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Downing Street, January 3, 1912.*

WAR OFFICE and Admiralty wish to send 150 native infantry, two 15-pounders, and four Maxim guns to reinforce troops at Canton. Please arrange accordingly with general officer commanding, who has received instructions from War Office, if you are satisfied that the troops remaining are sufficient to ensure the preservation of order in any circumstances likely to arise.

## No. 17.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 5, 1912.*

ICHANG despatch says that all foreigners, including consuls, left Chengtu by river 13th December, and that it is reported that evacuation of Chungking by all foreigners is contemplated.

## No. 18.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 5, 1912.*

WU T'ING-FANG has addressed to consuls at Shanghai, who made identic representation 20th December, a note in which he held Manchu Government responsible for all the consequences likely to follow from T'ang Shao-yi's recall and repudiation of his acts.\*

## No. 19.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 5, 1912.*

MY telegram of 4th January.

Identic instructions are being sent to-day to British, French, German, Japanese, Russian generals commanding at Tien-tsin to take steps at once for maintaining free communication between Peking and sea, in accordance with terms of protocol 1901. British troops will protect American section pending arrival of American troops.

\* See No. 63.

No. 20.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 5, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Army Council, copies of two telegrams from Sir J. Jordan which were received yesterday on the subject of the military situation in China.\*

It will be observed from these telegrams that it has been found necessary to employ British troops in guarding the railway communications between Peking and the sea, and that no further troops could at present be spared from North China in case of an emergency arising elsewhere beyond the 500 which are now held in readiness.

Under these circumstances, and in view of the opinion expressed by Sir J. Jordan that the situation looks more serious, I am to suggest that the Army Council should consider the desirability of immediately reinforcing the garrison at Hong Kong.

I am, &amp;c.

W. LANGLEY.

No. 21.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 17, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report briefly upon the course of the negotiations which have led to the conclusion of the present armistice between the Imperialist and Revolutionary parties in China.

At an interview which I had with Yuan Shih-kai on the 26th November I impressed upon him the anxiety and danger to which the British community at Hankow were exposed by the continuance of hostilities, and in reply he assured me that he would gladly order a suspension of hostilities if an armistice could be arranged on mutually satisfactory terms. With the approval then of Yuan Shih-kai I instructed the acting British consul-general at Hankow to convey unofficially to General Li an intimation to that effect.

Mr. Goffe replied on the 27th November, forwarding the terms suggested by General Li, which Yuan Shih-kai considered quite acceptable, but stated that he could not accept them finally until he was better informed as to the extent of General Li's authority. Yuan added that since the fall of Hanyang it was rumoured that General Li's position was much shaken. I took occasion at this juncture to point out to the premier that an advance by the Imperialist army on Wuchang would throw upon him the responsibility of further bloodshed, and this warning was not without its effect, for on the 1st December Yuan telegraphed to General Fêng to stop the Imperial troops crossing to Wuchang. Taotai Huang was at the same time instructed to consult with Mr. Goffe for a preliminary truce of three days.

Negotiations then proceeded between the two sides with Mr. Goffe acting as an intermediary, and, as reported in my telegram of the 3rd instant,† a three days' truce, expiring at 8 A.M. on the 6th December, was agreed upon by both sides. Yuan Shih-kai being anxious in the meantime to arrange for a meeting of provincial representatives at Wuchang to discuss terms, I instructed the acting British consul-general to use his good offices for this object.

Yuan lost no time in trying to arrange for an extended armistice, and on the 4th December telegraphed certain terms to General Fêng which had been drawn up in consultation with T'ang Shao-yi and myself. These terms included an extension of the existing armistice for fifteen days and the appointment of T'ang Shao-yi as representative of the Prime Minister to discuss the situation with General Li.

On the 9th December the acting British consul-general at Hankow telegraphed that an extended armistice had been signed that morning, copy of the terms of which I have the honour to enclose. General Li, at Wuchang, had, it appears, practically adopted the terms suggested by Yuan Shih-kai.

The question of which place should be chosen as the venue for the peace negotiations has given rise to no little difficulty. T'ang Shao-yi, who left Peking

\* Nos. 13 and 14.

† See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 98.

on the 9th instant by special train and reached Hankow on the 11th, found on his arrival that the revolutionary party were insisting on Shanghai as the meeting-place. Upon his advice, Yuan, who had always preferred Hankow, yielded, and T'ang accordingly left for Shanghai per the British steam-ship "Tungting." He is due to arrive to-day and the peace negotiations are expected to open to-morrow.

Wu T'ing-fang, who is charged with the foreign affairs of the Revolutionary party, has been appointed their representative at the peace negotiations and it was he who insisted on the conference taking place at Shanghai.

Since the conclusion of the present fifteen days' armistice each side has charged the other with breaches of the terms of the convention especially in regard to movements of troops. For instance, the Revolutionary party have shipped 3,000 troops from Canton to Shanghai. Yuan also complains that, according to a telegram received by him from Shanghai, 5,000 troops are being moved from Nanking to Hankow in China Merchants Steam Navigation Company's steamers. Further, that the rebels are advancing northwards from Pukow and have mounted guns at Lin Hai Kuan. The Imperialists, on the other hand, are accused of having occupied Tai Ho Hsien in Honan and they have refuted this charge by claiming that an uprising of brigands having occurred in that region they were compelled to dispatch armed expeditions to suppress them. Again, the Imperialists are accused of having advanced against the Shansi rebels after the signing of the armistice. What happened was that the rebels made the first move and were then driven back by the Imperialists who recaptured Niangtze Kuan, the rebel stronghold on the Shansi frontier. Since these incidents have occurred, however, the Premier has issued strict orders to the various generals to cease hostilities. The above alleged breaches illustrate only too well the difficulties which have arisen in regard to the armistice.

As matters now stand the peace negotiations between Wu T'ing-fang and T'ang Shao-yi are due to commence to-morrow, and I have instructed His Majesty's consul-general to keep in as close touch with T'ang as possible. I have also pointed out to Mr. Fraser that it is our anxious desire, in co-operation with other Powers, to promote a speedy settlement and that he should use his best endeavours to assist both parties in coming to an agreement.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure in No. 21.

*Terms of the Armistice.*

THE armistice of fifteen days shall commence at 8 A.M. on the 9th December and terminate at 8 A.M. on the 24th December. During this period—excluding the provinces of Shensi, Shansi, and Szechuan, which are dealt with in a separate article—both armies in every province shall refrain from all movement of troops in the places at present occupied by their respective forces.

2. The Premier, his Excellency Yuan, shall appoint the former president of a board T'ang Shao-yi as his representative to negotiate a general settlement with the military governor, Li, or his representative.

3. Telegraphic communication with Shensi, Shansi, and Szechuan being interrupted, it may not be practicable to suspend hostilities immediately, and the above articles shall therefore not apply to these three provinces, but during the period of the armistice neither army in these provinces shall receive reinforcements either in men or munitions.

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No. 22.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 15th November last,\* I have the honour to report as follows on the subject of the transfer to the senior consul of securities formerly in the official custody of the Shanghai Taotai, which are for the most part ear-marked for foreign obligations.

On the 8th November His Majesty's consul-general informed me by telegraph that his advice had been sought by the taotai in respect of a demand to hand over

\* See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 99.

these securities, together with other official assets, which he understood would shortly be made by Li Ping Hsü, a gentleman who had recently accepted office under the revolutionary Government as civil governor of Chekiang and Kiangsu. Mr. Fraser suggested that Li Ping Hsü should be informed of the purposes to which the securities were hypothecated, and that they could not be handed over to the new Government until it had secured the recognition of the foreign Powers; the taotai could deposit the various articles in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to the order of the senior consul, and give Li Ping Hsü a list of them. I approved Mr. Fraser's reply and stated that until the Imperial Government reasserted its authority or a new Government was recognised by the Powers, no claim for the surrender of persons or property in the international settlement could be entertained.

On the 10th November the revolutionary general sent the taotai a written demand for the securities, under pain of treatment by martial law, but His Majesty's consul-general had taken steps to let his attitude become known indirectly to Wu T'ing-fang, from whom he received a verbal assurance on the 13th that the revolutionary party would rest satisfied with the communication of a list of the securities, reserving to themselves to discuss with the trustee their right to any of the items which they considered themselves entitled to claim.

On the 20th November I telegraphed to His Majesty's consul-general that in my view the senior consul was fully justified in taking charge of the securities in the circumstances, and that a grave responsibility would rest on the consular body if they allowed funds intended to meet foreign obligations to pass into the hands of the revolutionaries. I added that the Chinese Government were being prevented from using any portion of the customs revenue, because it was pledged to foreign bondholders, and that similarly the revolutionaries must abstain from interference with all funds earmarked for foreign obligations.

The senior consul at Shanghai has since communicated to me a list of the securities handed over, the checking and translation of which has entailed considerable labour. They consist in the main of advances to native banks on collateral security which is at present unrealisable, and Mr. Fraser considers it very doubtful whether the banks in question, even if they are able to repay the advances, will not be terrorised into withholding payment by the *de facto* rulers.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 23.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 19, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose for your information, and for favour of transmission to the War Office, copy of a report, of to-day's date, which has been addressed to me by the military attaché to His Majesty's legation.

Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby's report describes the military forces of the foreign Powers in the province of Chih-li, and the arrangements made in case of necessity for guarding the railway from Peking to Shan-hai-kuan.

He also furnishes some interesting information respecting the protection of the foreign concessions at Hankow, which had not been previously brought to my notice in detail.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

• Enclosure in No. 23.

*Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby respecting Strength and Distribution of Foreign Troops in Chih-li Province, Legation Guards, and arrangements for protecting Railway communication between Peking and the sea. Also some general remarks regarding the protection of Hankow.*

THE attached tables show—

- (A.) The strength and distribution of the foreign contingents in Chih-li;
- (B.) The legation guards at Peking; and
- (C.) The arrangements for the protection of the Peking-Mukden railway line from Peking to Shan-hai-kuan.

As regards (A), it will be noticed that the total of foreign troops of all ranks now in Chih-li amounts to the considerable figure of 7,021, the bulk being stationed at Tien-tsin, and, I think, it cannot be doubted that their presence there has had a steadying effect on the situation, and has possibly saved Tien-tsin, so far, from civil strife.

The fortuitous circumstance of the outbreak of the revolutionary movement synchronising with the reliefs of the British garrison of North China luckily gave the opportunity for adding an extra battalion thereto, and the British force at present in Chih-li, viz., 2,840 officers and men, largely outnumbers that of any other foreign contingent.

These foreign contingents have, all told, 45 field-guns and 60 machine-guns. Of these, at Tien-tsin the British and French have 2 and 10 field-guns respectively, and the British, Austrians, Germans, Japanese, and Russians 2, 7, 4, 8, and 2 machine-guns respectively. The details of the guns at Peking, with the legation guards, is shown on table (B).

Reinforcements for the above contingents could be most readily obtained from the Russian, Japanese, and German forces in North Manchuria, South Manchuria, and Tsing-tau respectively. Japan, for instance, could land troops at Ch'in-wang-tao within twenty-four hours, from Port Arthur.

The next sources of reinforcement would be Siberia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and India. (In 1900, I may mention, the first troops for the "Boxer" expedition left Calcutta on the 25th June and arrived at Taku on the 17th July, and the head-quarter staff, which left Calcutta on the 3rd July, arrived at Taku on the 25th July.)

As regards (C). Early in November, when the XXth Division of the Chinese regular army, then in camp in the neighbourhood of Lan-chou (on the railway between Tien-tsin and Shan-hai-kuan) declined to entrain for Hupei, and showed unmistakable disinclination to act against the revolutionary forces, the question of the safety of the railway line became a matter of urgency (as either side might cut the line to impede the movements of the other), and, at the instance of their Ministers in Peking, the commanders of the foreign contingents in Tien-tsin drew up a scheme for the protection of the railway between Peking and Tien-tsin, as shown in (C) (1), but they were explicitly directed not to bring it into operation until "any overt attempt to cut the line" came to their notice.

The approach of winter and the prospect of the closing of the Hai-ho to navigation by ice necessitated the extension of the railway protection scheme to the winter port (almost ice-free) of Ch'in-wang-tao, in fact, it was carried a few miles further to the Great Wall at Shan-hai-kuan. The details of this more extended scheme are shown on (C) (2).

A few remarks as regards the defensive arrangements of Hankow may, perhaps, be not out of place in this report.

At the end of October, when Hankow and its vicinity became the theatre of military operations, the work of protecting the neutrality of the foreign concessions at this important trade centre devolved upon the naval forces of the various Powers, assisted by the local volunteers and police.

On the 12th October the combined defence arrangements were, by common consent, put under the command of Rear-Admiral Kawashima, the senior naval officer, and so remained till the arrival of Vice-Admiral Sir A. Winsloe on the 17th October.

The strength of the naval shore parties fluctuated according to the number and size of the men-of-war in port. When I arrived in Hankow, at the end of October, the possible available numbers for the defence of the concessions was 890 from naval contingents and 260 volunteers. Actually there were on duty 250 from the ships and 120 volunteers. Each concession arranged its own defence, but assistance was mutually afforded, as the exigencies of the time might demand, *e.g.*, at first the danger points were at the north end, viz., the Japanese and German concessions, while the fighting was going on about Kilometre Ten Station and the Racecourse, and the Japanese posts at their barricades at the northern exits of their concession were reinforced by other nationalities to stem the tide of rebel fugitives and the entry of pursuing Imperialist troops. After the latter had got possession of Ta-chih-mém railway station and the Sin-sêng road, however, the British concession, being the one adjoining the native city, became the most dangerous part of the foreign concessions, and a few days later the co-operation there of the sailors and volunteers of other nationalities was admitted.

On the landward side barricades (which varied greatly in character and strength—some of the most effective were made of bags of sesamum seed) were constructed at the

exits of the concessions, and naval detachments or volunteers were posted at them. Volunteer day and night patrols and a cyclist orderly service were arranged, and signal stations placed at suitable points of vantage. The defence head-quarters of the British concession were at the Hankow Club, a good central position, close by the municipal buildings, where the alarm bell was rung. "Alarm" practice was carried out from time to time, and various improvements in detail introduced.

The British volunteers did well, cheerfully performing for many weeks wearisome day and night duties at the barricades, and patrolling the streets.

Considering the number of shells from the rebel batteries that fell in the streets and houses of the British concession, and the frequent stray bullets that were flying about, whereby a considerable number of Chinese were killed and wounded in the concessions (I, myself, saw several), the comparative immunity of foreigners was really remarkable. On duty in the concessions, as far as I know, only one British marine and one German bluejacket were wounded, and, all told, not more than four or five foreigners appear to have been hit, of whom only one was killed (a Japanese).

As regards the British municipal police, the whole of the Chinese police left Hankow when foreign employés were given the option of leaving with the hulks, which were moved down-river to Yang-lo when Admiral Sa announced his intention of bombarding Wu-ch'ang. The Indian portion of the police only (thirty-five Sikhs) were left, and they continued at duty throughout, as did also in the French concession the alien (Annamite) section of their police, numbering thirty. Most of the Chinese police returned when the hulks came up again a few days later.

Towards the middle of November the Hankow community (both British and French) strongly urged that a military garrison might be sent to the port. The British naval commander-in-chief had also urged the desirability of relieving his naval detachments, who had been many weeks on shore duty, by a military force.

On the 5th December, accordingly, a small detachment of 160 officers and men, with two guns, was dispatched from the Hong Kong garrison to Hankow. A Russian detachment of one company, with two machine-guns, from the 6th Siberian Rifle Regiment, numbering about four officers and 270 men, has been also sent to Hankow.

The Italians have had a consulate guard of one officer and thirty sailors (detached from the Italian Legation guard at Peking) at Hankow since October, and the Germans have recently sent thither a small concession guard of fifty men.

M. E. WILLOUGHBY,  
*Military Attaché.*

*Peking, December 15, 1911.*

(A).

STRENGTH and Distribution of Foreign Troops in Chih-li.

(Corrected to December 14, 1911.)

Nationality.	Peking.	Tien-tsin.	Tang-ku.	Tang-shan.	Ch'in-wang-tao.	Shan-hai-kuan.	Total.
American—							
Officers .. ..	11	..	..	..	..	..	11
Other ranks.. ..	310	..	..	..	..	..	310
Austrian—							
Officers .. ..	4	1	..	..	..	..	5
Other ranks.. ..	82	36	2	..	..	..	120
Belgian—							
Officers .. ..	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Other ranks.. ..	20	..	..	..	..	..	20
British—							
Officers (British) ..	10	74	..	3	1	..	88
" (Indian) .. ..	..	12	..	2	1	1	16
Other ranks (British)..	320	1,568	..	..	..	..	1,888
" (Indian).. ..	2	678	..	111	33	24	848
French—							
Officers .. ..	6	34	..	..	1	2	43
Other ranks.. ..	295	865	28	..	28	56	1,272
German—							
Officers .. ..	6	7	..	..	..	..	13
Other ranks.. ..	115	226*	2	..	..	..	343

\* 2 detached to Pei-tai-ho.



Nationality.	Peking.	Tien-tsin.	Tang-ku.	Tang-shan.	Ch'in-wang-tao.	Shan-hai-kuan.	Total.
Italian—							
Officers .. ..	7	..	..	..	..	..	7
Other ranks.. ..	170	10	3	..	..	4	187
Japanese—							
Officers .. ..	12	50	..	..	..	1	63
Other ranks.. ..	280	806	5	..	14	48	1,153
Dutch—							
Officers .. ..	3	..	..	..	..	..	3
Other ranks.. ..	45	..	..	..	..	..	45
Russian—							
Officers .. ..	6	4	..	..	..	..	10
Other ranks.. ..	393	182	..	..	..	..	575
Total .. ..	2,098	4,553	40	116	78	136	7,021

M. E. WILLOUGHBY,  
*Military Attaché.*

## (B.)

## LEGATION Guards at Peking.

Nationality.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Field-guns.	Machine-guns.
American (naval marines) ..	11	310	2—3-in. naval .. .. 2—2·95-in. Vickers-Maxim	2—300-in. Gatling. 6—300-in. Colt.
Austro-Hungarian (naval) ..	4	82	4—7-cm. Q.F. .. ..	6—8-mm.
Belgian .. ..	1	20	.. ..	.. ..
British .. ..	10	322	2—5-in. B.L. howitzers ..	6—303-in. Maxim.
French .. ..	6	295	2—80-mtn. mountain .. 2—37-mm. Q.F.	.. ..
German .. ..	6	115	3—15-cm. howitzers ..	10
Italians (naval) .. ..	7	170	3—7·7-cm. field 3—37-mm. Q.F. .. ..	5 Gardner-Montigny.
Japanese .. ..	12	280	4—75-mm. field	.. ..
Dutch .. ..	3	45	4—57-mm. field .. ..	.. ..
Russian .. ..	6	393	2—12-cm. howitzers ..	2 Maxims.
Total .. ..	66	2,032	33	37

M. E. WILLOUGHBY,  
*Military Attaché.*

## (C.)

*Arrangements for protection of the Peking-Mukden Railway Line from Peking to Shan-hai-kuan.*

## (1.)

*Peking to Tien-tsin (until Hai-ho River closed by ice).*

(Scheme dated the 7th November.)

BRITISH troops to guard the line from Peking to 6 kilom. south of Wan-chuang (71 kilom.), maintaining posts at Feng-t'ai (200 men), Huang-tsun (30), Anting (30) Wan-chuang (30), with a detachment of about 120 men also sent to Tang-shan.

Japanese troops: from 5 kilom. north of Lang-fang to 5 kilom. south of Chang-chuang (total, 35 kilom.). Posts at Lang-fang, Lo-fa, and Chang-chuang.

French troops: from 6 kilom. north of Yang-tsun to Tien-tsin (east), total, 35 kilom. Posts at Yang-tsun and Tang-ku.

Each nation to arrange that its section is properly patrolled and bridges protected.

(2.)

*Peking to Shan-hai-kuan (after closing of the Hai-ho).*

(Scheme dated the 25th November.)

The line from Peking to Shan-hai-kuan (262 miles) to be divided into sections for protection by troops of Great Britain, France, Germany, America, and Japan. Russia was unable to participate in this scheme owing to paucity of troops at the time this scheme was made.

Each nation to make its own arrangements for protecting the line in the section allotted to it, viz. :—

Great Britain—					Miles.
	Peking to (west end) Yang-tsun railway bridge	..	..	..	68·5
France—					
	Thence to (north end) Ching-lung-wang-ho railway bridge, 1 miles north of Pei-tang station	..	..	..	57·5
Germany—					
	Thence to Tang-shan station (west distant signal)	..	..	..	41·5
America—					
	Thence to Lanchow station (west distant signal)	..	..	..	33·5
Japan—					
	Thence to Great Wall, east of Shan-hai-kuan station	..	..	..	61·0
	Total	..	..	..	262·0

M. E. WILLOUGHBY,  
*Military Attaché.*

No. 24.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 6.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, January 5, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, with reference to the letter from this department of the 20th December, 1911,\* copy of despatches from the Commissioner of Wei-hai Wei on the subject of the revolutionary movement in China.

I am, &amp;c.

JOHN ANDERSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

*Commissioner Sir J. H. S. Lockhart to Mr. Harcourt.*

Sir,

*Wei-hai Wei, November 24, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a second despatch which I have received from his Excellency Sun Pao-chi.

2. In this despatch it will be observed that his Excellency describes himself as "the Commander-in-chief of the Commandery of the Republic of China in the province of Shantung," and states that he has been publicly and unanimously elected to that position by the people of that province because "it is impossible for the orders of the Peking Government to have any effect at a distance."

3. In view of the instructions contained in your telegram of the 20th instant,† I am not sending any acknowledgment of this despatch.

I have, &amp;c.

J. H. STEWART LOCKHART.

\* See "China No. 1 (1912)," No. 134.

† See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 68.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

*Sun Pao-chi to Commissioner Sir J. H. S. Lockhart.*

(Translation.)

THE outbreak at Wuchang, and the response with which it has met in other provinces, have rendered it impossible for the orders of the Peking Government to have any effect at a distance. The inhabitants of the whole province of Shantung, including its officials, gentry, and the civil and military population generally, being, therefore, afraid that unforeseen difficulties might arise, which might result in reducing the province to a condition of chaos, have publicly and unanimously established a commandery, and elected me, the governor, to be its commander-in-chief, and Chia Pin-ch'ing, second in command of the Fifth Brigade, to be assistant commander-in-chief, so that the general control may rest with us.

All the consulates of the consuls stationed at Chinan will be specially guarded by police, and all foreign merchants and missionaries residing in the province will be carefully protected, whilst every effort will be made to preserve peace and good order generally.

In addition to issuing general instructions to the various officers under my command, I have deemed it right to address this despatch to you, which it is requested you will note and communicate to those under your authority.

Dated the 25th day of the 9th month of the Hsin Hai year (15th November, 1911).

(Sealed Commander-in-chief of the Commandery of the Republic of China in the Province of Shantung.)

## Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

*Commissioner Sir J. H. S. Lockhart to Mr. Harcourt.*

Sir,

*Wei-hai Wei, December 7, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of a third despatch which I have received from his Excellency Sun Pao-chi, Governor of Shantung, informing me that "the temporary Government and the declaration of the independence of the province of Shantung are cancelled."

2. Notwithstanding this information contained in the despatch from the governor, the revolutionary administration of affairs at Chefoo still continues, and the acting British consul at that port was informed unofficially a day or two ago by the head of that administration that the revolutionary party at Chefoo has no intention of abandoning the present revolutionary form of government until it is forced to do so.

3. The magistrate of the city of Wei-hai Wei also continues, so far as I am aware, to be subject to the orders of the revolutionary Government at Chefoo.

4. This territory continues to be quite peaceful, and, though rumours of all kinds are rife, there seems no reason at present to anticipate any local trouble.

I have, &amp;c.

J. H. STEWART LOCKHART.

## Enclosure 4 in No. 24.

*Sun Pao-chi to Commissioner Sir J. H. S. Lockhart.*

(Translation.)

WITH reference to my previous despatch, I have the honour to inform you that the revolutionary outbreak at Wuchang caused much anxiety among the people, and the gentry and student class of this province showed at that time a turbulent restlessness. They came to me with a great many demands, and obliged me to give sanction to the establishment of a temporary Government. As soon as a united protection society had been established they demanded that the province should declare its independence, and at a public meeting they elected me as president and Chia Pin-ch'ing, lieutenant-general of the Fifth Brigade, as vice-president.

All this was duly reported to His Majesty the Emperor of China, and notifications of what had taken place were also dispatched to the various authorities concerned.

My chief duty as governor is to protect the province under my charge and to preserve peace among the people. In taking the steps already narrated I did so

regardless of my personal reputation, and yielded to the pressure of circumstances solely on account of temporary exigencies and in order to maintain public tranquillity.

Now, however, affairs are gradually resuming their normal condition, the united protection society is being disbanded, and the temporary Government and the declaration of independence are cancelled. I have issued instructions to my subordinates to ensure that all strangers in Shantung, including merchants, missionaries, and others, will be afforded protection as heretofore in accordance with the regulations.

I have reported these circumstances to the Throne, and have also communicated them to the officials and gentry and the civil and military population of the province. It is also my duty to inform your Honour of what has taken place, and I have therefore set forth the facts in this despatch.

Dated the 1st December, 1911.

(Sealed with the seal of the Governor of Shantung.)

No. 25.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 6, 1912.*

MY telegram of the 5th January.

Later report states that consuls still remain at Chengtu.

No trouble anticipated at Chungking for the present.

No. 26.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, November 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you copies of a despatch and its enclosure which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister in Peking.

I have, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, November 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you a report on recent events in this district in connection with the revolutionary rising.

I have, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 26.

*Report on the Revolutionary Rising in Tengyueh.*

IT has been the custom since a consulate was permanently established in Tengyueh for the consul, when not prevented by the pressure of his duties at his post, to make annual and other occasional visits to Burmah in order to keep in personal touch with the Government of that country, whose frontier interests are his chief concern. When proceeding to my post in April of this year I came straight through Burmah without turning aside to visit Maymyo, where the Government of Burmah then was, preferring to put off my first visit till I should be better acquainted with the special work attaching to this frontier post, and afterwards to take the first convenient opportunity of visiting Burmah to repair the omission.

The pressure of business made it impossible to leave Tengyueh as early as I had intended, and it was not till the middle of October that I was at liberty, and it was thus during my absence that the events to be related took place. My departure, which, as I telegraphed to you, was intended for the 16th, did not actually take place till the

18th, owing to belated rains. My route was to have been viâ Sima to Myitkyina, thence to Maymyo, and back to Tengyueh viâ Bhamo. Heavy rains, which fell from the 20th to the 23rd October, however, made the Sima road impassable, and I was compelled to go to Myitkyina viâ Bhamo, losing two days. My stay at Myitkyina was therefore made as short as possible, and I arrived at Maymyo on the 31st October.

I had left Tengyueh in its normal condition of tranquillity; not a shadow of unrest was to be seen. True, there was known to exist a society called the "Te Hua She,"—technically, "secret," and therefore illegal—but its technical secrecy did not prevent its composition and purposes being within the knowledge of the local authorities, and the ting assured me a few days before my departure that all information relating to it was in his possession. Its main purpose seemed to be the collection of funds from its members to be expended on feasts for its leaders, and though aware of its revolutionary sympathies, the local authorities did not attach much importance to it. If this was a cloud on the horizon, it was no bigger than a man's hand. In all other respects public tranquillity was more profound than at any time since my arrival, the departure of Taotai Keng having been a relief, not to me alone, but to all persons of any prominence.

The general course of the rebellion in Szechuan was known to me through the newspapers and through the information received by the Chinese authorities in Tengyueh, but when I started for Burmah it was still confined to Szechuan; and though its extension to Wuchang came to my knowledge on reaching Bhamo, there was no reason to suppose it had penetrated into Yunnan, more especially as its progress seemed to be along the Yang-tsze.

The news that Tengyueh was in the hands of the rebels, which I received on alighting from the train at Maymyo, was therefore utterly unexpected. The information was derived from two telegrams to the Government of Burmah, one sent from Tengyueh by the Commissioner of Customs at the request of the revolutionary leader Chang Wen-kuang, stating that Tengyueh was in the hands of the revolutionaries, that protection was promised to foreign life, property, and trade, and that no further disturbances were then expected; the other from His Majesty's consul-general at Yunnan-fu stating the bare fact for my information if still in Burmah.

The following day I despatched to you a telegram informing you of the fact and announcing my immediate return. I also telegraphed to Mr. O'Brien-Butler that I was returning to Tengyueh at once, but a telegram for Mr. Howell, the Commissioner of Customs at Tengyueh, could not be transmitted owing to the interruption of the line.

I left Maymyo on the morning of the 2nd November, and on the 4th November reached Bhamo, where I stayed till the following day collecting what information could be obtained from the Chinese residents there as to the situation in Tengyueh. Rumours were numerous and copious, and not very reassuring. It was stated that the taotai, the chentai, and the colonel of the new troops had been killed, the ting had escaped and been recaptured, that three of the seven foreigners had fled a day's journey towards Bhamo, but had returned; that the ting's yamen had been burned and all the yamens looted; that panic prevailed and numbers of refugees were making for Burmah; that the Kanai Sawbwa had joined the revolutionaries with a large number of rifles, and the Nantien Sawbwa favoured them less decisively. The most comforting rumour was that, on the day after the outbreak, a man had been found looting and summarily executed. There was no reason to believe that the foreigners were not safe, the statement in Mr. Howell's telegram that they were protected being confirmed by the statements in Reuter's telegrams of the attitude of the revolutionaries everywhere. There were, however, disquieting rumours of dissensions among the revolutionaries which might lead to further disorder.

I started from Bhamo on the 5th November, accompanied by an agent of the contractor who is supplying mules for the Myitkyina district this season. On the following morning, before starting on the second stage of my journey, I was overtaken by a messenger from Bhamo, who informed me that the taotai had actually arrived the previous night, almost unattended and in a state of unrestrained terror. Much as I should have wished to hear the taotai's account of events, I did not think it desirable to return, more especially as he was said to be incoherent with fright. I therefore contented myself with writing a hasty note to the deputy commissioner, asking him to do anything in his power to assist the taotai, and offering to do what I could to assist his family if still in Tengyueh, for he was stated to have come away without them, though I have since learned that they escaped separately.

On completing the long stage to Kulonghka, on the 6th, I was informed that three

foreigners from Tengyueh were on the road, and shortly afterwards Mr. Groves, of the Office of Works, who was visiting Tengyueh to make preliminary enquiries and arrangements towards the building of a consulate, Mr. Craig, of the outdoor staff of the Tengyueh Customs, and his wife, the only foreign woman in Tengyueh, arrived at the bungalow. From them I obtained the first consecutive account of what had happened. They stated that things were now quiet in Tengyueh, but that it had not been considered advisable for Mrs. Craig to remain. Mr. Groves proposed that he should return with me, and as I thought that if he were able, as seemed likely, to carry out the objects for which he had come, the fact of business being carried on under the auspices of this consulate would tend to promote tranquillity and public confidence, I consented to his returning with me. At the next stage, however, I received a note from Mr. Howell, informing me that the remaining foreign residents of Tengyueh were coming away and had arrived at Manhsien, the last stage on the Chinese side of the frontier. The next day, therefore, the 8th November, I advanced as far as to meet Mr. Howell, and returned with him to the place where I had spent the previous night.

Mr. Howell reported that Tengyueh was in a state of anarchy, money was not to be had, all sorts of riff-raff were being enlisted as soldiers on a promise, which there seemed no means of fulfilling, of 8 taels a-month, the leaders of the revolutionaries were apparently incapable, and looting had begun. The man I had heard of as having been executed for looting was the only person so treated, and that probably was because the bank he robbed was regarded as treasure trove by the revolutionary leaders themselves.

This account of the state of affairs raised the question whether there was any object in continuing my journey. So long as the foreign residents were in Tengyueh there was no doubt of my course, but now they had left and there seemed a reasonable prospect that the consulate and other foreign houses had been looted it was not so certain that my return to Tengyueh would be either useful or even safe. I decided finally to proceed at all events as far as Manhsien and get what further news I could. At Manhsien I should also be able to arrange with Mo Kuantai, late commandant of the Pao Shang Ying, for all authentic information to be sent to me if necessary in Bhamo, and for means of communication if necessary with Tengyueh. Mr. Howell kindly undertook to despatch from the telegraph office at Tunhong, which he would pass on his next stage, telegrams to the revolutionary leaders in Tengyueh (if the line were yet restored) informing them that I should hold them responsible for the safety of the missionaries at Talifu, and of all foreign property in Tengyueh. I also sent back Mr. Groves, as the prospect of doing any business had dwindled to unappreciable proportions.

I reached Manhsien on the 9th November. On the road I passed several Chinese of my acquaintance, who were taking refuge in Burmah, and from the accounts they gave me, as well as from what was told me at Manhsien by Mo Kuantai, I came to the conclusion that matters in Tengyueh might not be so bad as I had been led to suppose. There were several reasons why I should go on to Tengyueh if it were safe to do so. I was most anxious for news of the missionaries at Talifu, and as the telegraph lines to Yünnan-fu were all interrupted, it was only from Tengyueh that I could hope for information. The safety of foreign property would probably receive much more careful attention if I were in Tengyueh than otherwise, and even if on arriving I should find it unsafe to remain, I might at least be able to secure the consulate archives. From these considerations I decided to go forward.

At Manhsien there was not the smallest sign of trouble, and I was assured by Mo Kuantai that the roads were safe, the Kachins quiet, and there was no rioting at Tengyueh. The only indication of the recent events which was discernible at Manhsien was a proclamation issued by the Kanai Sawbwa, under his assumed title of Commander-in-chief of the Yünnan forces. The proclamation was posted in Chinese with a translation into English "as she is spoke," and informed all and sundry that the revolutionary Government, which had occupied the principal cities of Yünnan, was going to destroy the Manchurian Government, and that in this province order was quite recovered, people were now in the peaceful condition, and the foreigners would be most kindly protected.

I telegraphed to Burmah that I was going on, and to Tengyueh that I was coming, and that foreign property must be safeguarded.

At Chincheng, which I reached on the 11th November, enlistment of troops was going on apace. Nearly every man in the place was armed with a dah, but there was no unfriendliness displayed. A long proclamation was posted in the town, setting

forth the general intentions of the revolutionaries. There was not time to get this copied, but it was to the general effect that China having suffered the oppression of the Manchus for 260 years, and been plunged into disaster and discredit by them, the Ko Ming Tang had now risen against them and formed a military government with a view to the ultimate establishment of liberty, equality and fraternity, under a president and elected assemblies. There was to be no distinction of high and low, rich and poor. The price of land was to be fixed (I presume as a basis of taxation; they can hardly expect to be able to fix it for marketable purposes), opium, foot-binding and fêng-shui, which were indiscriminately attributed to Manchu oppression, were to be abolished within two years, and in six a full-blown republican constitution was to be in operation.

The long final stage from Chetao to Tengyueh I divided into two, stopping at a village some ten miles from Tengyueh, as I did not think it advisable to travel in the dark. I did not, therefore, reach Tengyueh till the morning of the 14th November. I found my house sealed by slips of paper fastened across the doors and windows. The same precautions had been taken with the houses of the commissioner of customs and his assistant, Mr. Joly. The slips bore the date of the 7th November, the day before my telegram from Tunhong would have been despatched. An inconsiderable amount of theft has taken place from my own house, from the quarters of the customs outdoor staff, and from the mission house.

The incidents of the revolution in Tengyueh, as I have pieced them out from the narratives of the foreign residents and of the numerous Chinese whom I have questioned, were as follows:—

On the night of the 27th October, at about 8:30 P.M., the Hsün-fang Tui, or provincial troops, mutinied and murdered their commandant. Of the origin of the mutiny I can only learn that it is believed to have been instigated by the Kanai Sawbwa, who has imbibed revolutionary sentiments during a residence in Japan, and has no doubt kept in touch with the revolutionary leaders ever since. He has been accused by the Chinese in past times of smuggling arms into his state through Burmah, and, judging by some of the rifles I have seen in possession of the troops here, has probably had them manufactured locally, at all events as far as the wooden parts are concerned, the metal parts having most likely been imported in sections.

The new troops immediately followed the example of the old ones, with the not very important difference, that they first called upon their commandant to lead them, and only murdered him on his refusing to do so, and exhorting them to keep the peace.

An immediate move was made on the yamens of the taotai and the ting, chiefly, I understand, by the Hsün-fang Tui. These officials, however, had been warned in time, and had made their escape. The ting was afterwards captured, but again released by the Cantonese among the new troops, who sympathised with a fellow-provincial. Indeed, there seems ground for supposing that there was no intention of killing the civil officials, though it is perhaps as well that they they were not found during the excitement of the first few hours of revolt.

The brigadier-general was not so fortunate. In Bhamo and on the road, I had been informed that he had taken poison, but since my arrival in Tengyueh I heard on the best possible authority that he was shot by the troops.

The yamens were looted by the soldiery, and some tens of thousands of taels lost—a loss very inconvenient to the revolutionary leaders. The prisoners in the ting's gaol were liberated, and the gaol itself set on fire.

The next morning everything was again quiet. Shots, which had slackened from 2 o'clock in the morning, ceased altogether about nine. The foreigners who remained in Tengyueh, namely, the customs outdoor staff, were able to walk in safety through the city, and proclamations in the interest of their safety were posted up. They were even invited to the funeral of the late commandant of the new troops, which took place in the forenoon of the 28th.

The foreign residents normally number seven, and this was at the time their actual number, my absence being compensated for by the arrival of Mr. Groves. The indoor staff, consisting of Mr. Howell and Mr. Joly, occupy two houses outside the east gate, close to the consulate, and the medical officer occupies a house not far up a street leading southwards from the consulate. The outdoor staff live in the custom-house compound, a large enclosure at the end of a long street leading southward from the south gate. It consists of Mr. Nisbet and Mr. Craig, the latter of whom is married. The only other resident is Mr. Fraser, a member of the China Inland Mission, who occupies a compound situated in a street branching westward from the street leading from the

south gate. In a community so small and so far separated from each other, mutual assistance in case of an anti-foreign outbreak would be impossible, and it is fortunate that the present outbreak was not anti-foreign.

It was, nevertheless, sufficiently alarming.

Mr. Groves had arrived in Tengyueh on the evening of the 27th October, and was staying, pending my return, with Mr. Howell. Mr. Groves has an unusually large experience of riots in China. He was in Chungking at the time of the Boxer rising, and in Changsha during the riots there. Scarcely more than an hour after his arrival at Tengyueh, he and Mr. Howell having just finished dinner, Mr. Joly came in with the news that the soldiers had murdered their commandant and were in open revolt. Mr. Howell was at first incredulous, but the report was confirmed by enquiry, and he sent a hurried note to the outdoor staff to be ready to leave at once if necessary, as it was feared there might be serious trouble in the city.

Volleys of musketry, which seemed to be approaching, alternating with yells and screams, left no doubt that a serious riot was in progress, and the party decided to make for the Bhamo road at once. A further note, which, however, did not reach its destination, was sent to the outdoor staff, and Messrs. Howell, Joly, and Groves accompanied by several Chinese servants left by the back entrance of Mr. Howell's house and proceeded to the open downs south of the city till they reached a spot where the Bhamo road approaches most closely to the custom-house. From this place a messenger was sent to the custom-house to summon the outdoor staff, but he was unable to reach them. The party waited over an hour for the return of their messenger, till eventually the glare of a conflagration showed, as they believed, that the customs buildings, which, like all others in Tengyueh, are of wood, were in flames. As a matter of fact, it was the prison and not the custom-house that was on fire, but the direction being nearly the same the mistake was an easy one to fall into.

To make further attempts to reach the custom-house seemed useless, and the party could only hope that the outdoor staff had escaped by the other road towards Nantien. They themselves continued their way by the road they had taken, and after a night in the open reached Je-shui-t'ang, a village rather more than half way to Nantien, the next day.

Meanwhile, the outdoor staff had remained in their quarters at the custom-house. About half-past ten, an hour after the firing began, they had received Mr. Howell's note, and had sent a reply (which never arrived) that all was ready. Their position was an alarming one, as the outbreak began in a temple not much over 100 yards from the custom-house. About half-past three in the morning they learned that the commissioner, in company with Messrs. Joly and Groves, had left, but firing had slackened for the past two hours, the revolted troops were occupied in the city, daylight was due in a few hours, and they decided to await events.

Desultory firing continued till 9 A.M. At 8:30 the customs writer brought in a letter from the revolutionary leader for the commissioner, assuring him of safety and inviting him to return. It was forwarded to him by the hand of mounted tingchais, and overtook him at Je-shui-t'ang.

During the morning of the 28th everything was quiet. A member of the outdoor staff walked through the city, and observed proclamations posted up assuring foreigners of protection both in person and property.

In the evening a guard of sixteen soldiers was posted to secure the protection of the customs premises, and remained till 7 A.M. the following morning, the night having passed without disturbance. Mr. Howell and his companions arrived in Tengyueh early in the afternoon of the same day, the 29th October.

Though the overthrow of the Imperial authorities was complete, and there was no further rioting, yet, as may be supposed, public confidence had received a severe shock. Money was not to be had, and the revolutionists proposed to remedy this by the issue of a paper currency. Petty thefts were common. The revolutionary leader, Chang Wen-kuang seemed hopelessly incompetent. The worst elements of the population were being enlisted, and credit being at a standstill there seemed no likelihood of these persons being paid, and therefore much likelihood of their proving dangerous. The greater part of the 500 Lu-chün troops stationed in Tengyueh had left to assist in bringing pressure to bear on Yungchang-fu, where the trained bands were under arms to oppose the forces of the revolutionists. Communication with the outside world was cut off, and on the whole things seem likely to go from bad to worse. It was thought advisable that Mrs. Craig at least should leave, and on the 1st November, having obtained a passport from the revolutionary authorities, she started for Bhamo, escorted by her husband and Mr. Groves, who, being unable to carry out the object of his visit,



had no reason for remaining. The other foreign residents remained three days longer in the hope of an improvement in the situation, but no change for the better being apparent, they followed on the 4th November.

On their way down they passed the Kanai Sawbwa coming up. I suspect that it may have been partly the arrival of this person, who, unlike his colleague Chang Wen-kuang, has had some administrative experience, that has been responsible for the difference between the state of affairs described to me by Mr. Howell, and that which I found on reaching Tengyueh ten days after the latter's departure. Except for the frequent spectacle of men drilling, there is very little to distinguish the existing conditions from those obtaining when I started for Burmah. There has been, of course, a very considerable rise in prices, but local business goes on much as usual, and I find it no more difficult to get money from my Chinese bank than before.

The chief persons in authority are Chang Wen-kuang, Tao An-jen, the Kanai Sawbwa, and a military officer named Li Hanhsing. The frontier deputy Choa has also been prevailed upon to undertake the duties of magistrate, and I entertain no doubt that it is owing chiefly to him that general tranquillity has been so successfully restored. These officials, especially Messrs. Chang and Tao, have done their best to impress me with the excellence of their intentions in all matters where foreigners are concerned, and with their earnest wish to be on good terms with the Government of Burmah.

The progress of the rebellion in my district can be described very briefly. The whole district is now in the hands of the revolutionists. Yungchang-fu accepted their dominion early in November—I cannot get the exact date—and Tali-fu not long afterwards. Telegraphic communication with these places is not yet restored, but I am informed that repairs are being effected. A certain amount of disorder still prevails in the country districts near Tali-fu and in the neighbourhood of Lungling.

Further north there is no news, but the occupation of Tali settles the fate of the whole of the western circuit, without any necessity for military operations on any scale. Of Yünnan-fu no information has reached me.

The present disposition of troops in this part of the province is not easy to ascertain. In Tengyueh itself there remain only some 50 of the 500 "new" troops formerly stationed here, and these are employed in drilling the new recruits. The number of Hsün-fang Tui, I believe, is about 1,800, including new recruits. Three hundred have recently been sent to Lungling to suppress disorders which have arisen there. There is no doubt a garrison at Yungchang, and probably a considerable force at Tali-fu, unless it has been required for operations further east. Before the outbreak there were about a thousand Lu-chün troops at Tali-fu. At present the reticence of some of the authorities and the ignorance of others make it impossible to get information that can be depended upon, and the reports circulated serve only to illustrate the maxim of Laotzu, that those who know do not tell and those who tell do not know.

The departure of the commissioner of customs, accompanied by all foreign customs employés and the greater part of the Chinese staff, in addition to the closing of the custom-house, involved the disorganisation of the post-office, which, though recently separated from the customs, had not grown accustomed to its independence and still looked upon the commissioner as its chief, especially in the case of the minor employés. The letter-carriers, unable to get their pay, left in a body, and I met most of them, as well as the greater part of the permanent Tengyueh staff, on the road. The consequence is that mail service has been suspended since the beginning of the month; and though at the time of my arrival the post-office professed to be working and has accepted letters for transmission, none have been delivered to me except those which were awaiting my arrival. The custom-house remains closed, though a Chinese has been instructed to collect duties.

Besides the residents in Tengyueh itself the only British subjects known to be in my district are the members of the China Inland Mission at Tali-fu and Mr. Kingdon Ward, a botanist who has been collecting plants in the neighbourhood of A-tuntze. Of these I have so far no information whatever. The Tali mission station consists of the Rev. and Mrs. Embury and two children (they, however, may have previously left, as they were to go on furlough some time in October, viâ Yünnan-fu), the Rev. A. H. Sanders, Miss Simpson, Miss Morgan, and Miss Kratzer. When I arrived in Tengyueh it was reported that Tali-fu still held out against the revolutionists, and as there seemed a prospect of fighting I telegraphed to you for permission to go there and bring them away, thinking that I could probably manage this without serious danger, both parties being anxious not to imperil the lives of foreigners, but that as accidents might happen where fighting was going on it was most undesirable that they should stay

there. A day or two later, however, I learned on satisfactory authority that Tali-fu had surrendered without fighting; and though the telegraph lines are not yet connected and I cannot get into communication with them I have every hope of their safety.

Mr. Ward was to have left A-tuntze about the 20th October on his way home. By what road he intended to come is not known. The main road would be by way of Tali-fu, but it does not appear to have been his intention to follow this route. It is therefore impossible for me to guess his whereabouts. At the time of the outbreak in Tengyueh he can hardly have got beyond Wei-hsi Ting, if he started at the date given.

Besides the above British subjects, there is a French merchant in the north-west of the provinces with headquarters at A-tuntze, and a French missionary at Wei-hsi.

So far as can be observed in Tengyueh, public opinion is indifferent to the revolution. There is no enthusiasm whatever, though the leaders have tried to persuade me that their *coup d'état* was hailed with joy. The cutting off of the queue, that symbol of Manchu subjection, is so far from being general, that the sight of a cropped head in the streets is very rare. Of course, the practice of wearing a turban, common among the lower classes, makes it impossible to see in many cases whether the queue is retained or not, but the lower classes are precisely the ones whom one would expect to adhere to customs with which they are familiar, and it is highly improbable that they should have abandoned the queue while it is still retained in the great majority of cases by respectable people. The readiness of the coolie class to enlist is no more than a readiness to receive the 6 taels a-month which is, I fear fallaciously, promised to them. The fact is, that a change of governors means nothing whatever to the great majority of the people, and for the great majority the change from monarchy to republic can mean nothing but a change of governors. The common people know nothing of emperors and parliaments except as names. The part of the machinery of government with which they are chiefly familiar is the yamen runners, and the prospect of radical reform in this department is not implied in anything that has yet befallen. The effect of recent events which will be most apparent to them is the sharp rise in the prices of all necessaries.

At the same time it must be admitted that among the well-to-do classes there has long been a considerable degree of sympathy with the schemes of the revolutionary party, and indeed without this the late *coup d'état* would have been impossible. The Chinese in Rangoon and Mandalay are commonly believed to be opponents of the Manchu dynasty; and the populous village of Ho Shun Hsiang, situated a few miles from Tengyueh, is largely inhabited by Chinese who have lived in Burmah and acquired advanced ideas.

What may be the effect of recent events on the semi-independent Shan Sawbwas of the frontier, it is not yet possible for me to judge. The revolutionary leaders have assumed that the position in relation to the Sawbwas of the late Imperial authorities has now been transferred to them, but I do not yet know how far the Sawbwas respond to this assumption. I propose as soon as possible to make a tour of the frontier, and besides doing what is possible to settle outstanding frontier cases, impressing upon the Sawbwas that, pending the establishment of authorities recognised by the British Government, they will themselves be held responsible for the maintenance of order on the frontier and the settlement of frontier cases.

No. 27.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, November 30, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of the revolutionary rising at Tengyueh.

I have, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

## Enclosure in No. 27.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, November 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report the further developments which have taken place since that date.

The information which reached me a few days after the despatch of my telegram reporting the peaceful surrender of Talifu greatly relieved my anxiety about the missionaries resident there. Your telegram of the 15th November, authorising me to go to Talifu if I really thought it necessary and safe, did not reach me till the 24th November, and as I had already, on receipt of the news from Talifu, decided that the journey I had contemplated was now unnecessary, I did not take advantage of your permission. Nevertheless, I thought it most inadvisable that any British subjects should continue for the present to reside in the remote interior, and as soon as the telegraph line to Talifu was restored I requested the missionaries there to withdraw as soon as possible either to Tengyueh or to Yünnan-fu, as they might prefer, the distances being nearly equal, and neither road offering any preference in point of safety. As I expected, they elected to go to Yünnan-fu, that being much the easier road, and on the 25th November they telegraphed to me that they were leaving Talifu that day, and I telegraphed the information to His Majesty's consul-general.

While I regarded it on general grounds as undesirable that they should remain at Talifu, an additional reason was afforded me for requesting their withdrawal in the shape of a telegram received by Burmah from Yünnan-fu, and repeated by the former to me. This telegram, though a good deal mutilated, was sufficiently intelligible to make it plain that His Majesty's consul-general had reason to fear that the state of anarchy subsisting in Szechuan, where the Lolos had risen against the Chinese, might spread into Yünnan.

In Tengyueh the situation remains outwardly unchanged. There is, however, a strong feeling of insecurity in the city, owing to the incompetence of Chang Wen-kuang, and the dissension which has arisen between him and Tao An-jen. The latter of these came from Kanai to supersede Chang in his government of the district. The respectable people of Tengyueh and the neighbourhood, however, were not prepared to submit to the rule of a native, Sawbwa, and Chang was therefore suffered to remain, Tao being instructed to return to Kanai. It was now Tao's turn to object, and he refused absolutely to give way to Chang. The result was a quarrel, which might have had serious results if it had not been smoothed over by the mediation of the old brigadier-general, who, while declining to take any active part in political affairs, has no objection to use the influence of his years and position to preserve the peace.

The revolutionary authorities at Yünnan-fu seem to have awakened to the necessity of making more satisfactory arrangements for the government of Western Yünnan, and I am to-day informed that both Chang and Tao are to be superseded, their places being taken by one Chao Fan, formerly provincial treasurer of Kansu, but recently living in retirement at Chien-ch'uan Chou, to the north of Talifu. He is not expected to arrive here for some three weeks more, as he is to wait at Talifu for Li Ken-yuan (the "Superintendent Li" of the silver tokens given to the Maru headmen in the N'mai Hka Valley by the Chinese expedition of last summer), who is now coming from Yünnan-fu to Tengyueh. Tao is to resume his position as Kanai Sawbwa, and Chang the private station he occupied before the revolt.

The number of recruits enlisted in the past month is stated to be about 3,000, of whom about 1,000 remain in Tengyueh. A number of troops have been sent to Manwyne, Lungling, Mingkuang, and Kuyung, and I am informed that all frontier posts have been strengthened. People who have arrived from Bhamo report that considerable numbers of troops are moving down the road towards the frontier, and it is stated that 250 men are to be posted at Kulihka on the frontier itself. Whether the troops sent are these new levies or not, I have no definite information; if so, very little importance need be attached to them. The numbers given me as having been dispatched to Lungling and Mingkuang were each 300, and, if these numbers are correct, they certainly cannot consist of Lu-chun troops.

There is said to have been fighting at Lungling with local brigands, but no details have reached me. From Myitkyina I have heard that a party has gone to Pien-ma and murdered the headman.

For the pay of the troops, a usually well-informed Chinese acquaintance tells me, a sum of 300,000 taels or 400,000 taels has been received from the revolutionary

head-quarters, but this has not yet been drawn upon, the local leaders preferring to use first what they can obtain by nominally voluntary contributions from the neighbourhood and loans from the local banks.

The collection of customs duties has been entrusted to the firm of Chun Yen Chi. Only the back compound of the custom-house enclosure, in which the examination shed is situated, is in use, the offices of the foreign staff being left unoccupied. Trade continues to move to a certain extent, though very much reduced in volume.

The post office has resumed work, but mails are transmitted and delivered only twice a-week instead of three times, as was the rule during the past five months. The first mail that came in since my arrival reached me on the 27th, an interval of three weeks since the previous inward mail.

I have, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

No. 28.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 20, 1911.*

THE edict issued on the 6th instant by the Empress-Dowager announcing the formal abdication of the Prince Regent, translation of which I had the honour to enclose in my despatch of the 8th instant,\* was not immediately accepted by public opinion at its face value as being the notification of a further step taken by the dynasty in the interests of constitutional government, but, on the contrary, it gave rise to a certain amount of suspicion that it really indicated the victory of the Empress-Dowager's party over that of the Regent, and portended an attempt by the former to return to the system of the last reign under which the late Empress-Dowager controlled both Palace and people for so many years.

These suspicions were voiced in the columns of the native press, and even the "Peking Daily News," the semi-official organ of the Wai-wu Pu, in concluding its leading article on the edict, thought it necessary to add as follows:—

"There is perhaps the unnecessary fear that Prince Ch'un's party may create trouble in the capital on the downfall of their chief. Whether there are dissensions within Court circles we do not pretend to know, but the decree urged the loyalty and good sense of the Princes, and we believe that the partisans of the late Regency will accept the inevitable without resorting to any measure to further entangle their own cause and that of the country."

The same paper returned to the subject in its leading article of the 9th instant, and propounded the following three questions:—

1. Is there any Regent under the present arrangement?
2. If so, who is the Regent?
3. Has the Regent any real power?

Having answered the first in the affirmative, it pointed out that the Empress-Dowager must be considered the legal Regent, but with no real power, inasmuch as she can only exercise the extremely limited functions reserved to the Emperor under the nineteen articles of the new constitution.

There were rumours for a day or two after the abdication of possible trouble with the Imperial Guard, but this had already been guarded against to some extent by the appointment by Imperial edict on the 2nd December of Hsü Shih-chang—soon to be the Chinese grand guardian of the Emperor—to the command of the training department of the Imperial Guard, a position formerly held by Prince Tsai T'ao. This step was followed on the 9th instant by the absorption of this training department into the general military organisation and the conversion of the two brigades of guards into an ordinary army unit under the command of General Feng Kuo-chang, a Chinese director of the general staff, and known partisan of the Premier.

It was not long before this misapprehension of the motives for the Regent's abdication found official expression through the medium of a telegraphic memorial addressed to the Throne by the governor and provincial officials of Kirin. This document was

\* See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 139.

not published in the "Official Gazette," and the translation, which I have the honour to enclose, was made from the text of the memorial as reproduced in the native press. The memorial called forth the edict of the 10th instant, translation of which is also enclosed herewith, in which an indignant denial is given by the Empress-Dowager to the suggestion of the memorialists, that the abdication inferred either a premature desire for change on the part of the Throne, a confusion of the powers of Government, or a want of harmony in the Palace.

Even apart from the issue of this edict, it is doubtful whether the abdication would have continued to interest the nation at large, but the Empress-Dowager's denial closed the discussion of an incident which is now entirely overshadowed by the greater issues of peace and war with which the country is at present confronted. Whatever happens, there is no possibility of the retention of the Empress-Dowager in her present position.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

*Memorial by Ch'en Chao-ch'ang, Governor of Kirin, and others, advocating the retention of the Prince Regent.*

(Translation.)

To the Prime Minister,

THE Empress-Dowager's instructions, which we have seen to-day, accepting and making known throughout the Empire the resignation of the Regent, have filled us with the deepest alarm. The Prince has since the time he took up the Regency shown himself indefatigable in the service of the State, and has earned the respect and admiration of all, both Ministers and people. The disturbances in Szechuan and Hupei are directly due to the responsible officials of those provinces, and the fact that he takes on himself the whole of the blame arises solely from the Regent's natural humility. Moreover, it is obviously impracticable thus lightly to change the supreme control of the Empire in a critical moment like the present. Even granted that the south and east are utterly lost, all the country north of the Yellow River is still quiet and the people still loyal. But the confidence of the people is placed entirely in the Throne, and if the Palace is seen to evince a premature desire for change, those places already in revolt will take the confusion of the powers of government as another argument in their favour, while those till now loyal may be led to waver by the want of harmony in the Palace. The Emperor is still but a baby, while the Empress has had no previous experience in the task of government. However gifted and intelligent she may be, how can she, buried away in the Palace, have acquired as great a knowledge of the world as the Regent? I know only too well that, though the Cabinet may bear the whole responsibility, the powers of government remain with the Emperor. Surely it cannot be that in a crisis of the present dimensions the interests of the Empire are to be thus lightly abandoned.

Manchuria, the home of the dynasty, is being threatened by her powerful neighbours, and for the space of a month all sorts of lying reports have been spread abroad. The soldier and student classes have from the first advanced the cry of independence, advocating a republican Government. In an intensely critical situation, however, happily we found the dread majesty of the Throne effective in pacifying and appeasing the people, and we succeeded in restoring temporarily some semblance of order. But since the issue to-day of the edict about the Regent's retirement the popular clamour has arisen louder than ever, saying that this one act stultifies in the eyes of the Empire the nineteen articles sworn to in the ancestral temple. If this district seizes this pretext for revolt, the province will be reduced to such a condition that it will fall an easy prey into the clutch of its watchful foes. When Manchuria is in turmoil and the Court in danger, how will it help the country if we are then punished for failure to perform our duty? In our blundering, ignorant way, therefore, we would speak quite plainly, praying that the edict be withdrawn, so as to strengthen the authority of the Emperor and satisfy the people. Otherwise, your servants are powerless to deal with the crisis in Kirin, and they have no alternative but to request that they be dismissed from office, and other and capable men appointed in their place, who may, perhaps, be able to restore order in the country. Unless our prayer is granted danger is very close to Manchuria, and we with our small powers are unequal

to our heavy task. We therefore pluck up our courage and present this appeal, awaiting with impatience the further commands of the Throne.

CH'EN CHAO-CH'ANG,\*  
*Governor of Kirin.*

HAN KUO-CHÜN,  
*Acting Commissioner for Interior.*

KUO TSUNG-HSI,  
*Acting Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.*

WU TAO,  
*Commissioner for Justice.*

TS'AO KUANG-CHEN,  
*Commissioner of Education.*

HSÜ TING-K'ANG,  
*Commissioner of Finance.*

HUANG YÜ-YU,  
*Industrial Taotai.*

CH'ING SHAN,  
*Manager of Banner Affairs.*

MENG EN-YÜAN,  
*Commander of 23rd Division.*

WANG KENG,  
*Military Adviser.*

KAO FENG-CH'ENG,  
*Commander of 45th Brigade.*

P'EI CHI-HSÜN,  
*Commander of 46th Brigade.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

*Edict of December 10, 1911.*

*Explanation of Regent's Abdication.*

(Translation.)

WE have received the following edict from the Empress-Dowager:—

We have perused the telegraphic memorial of Ch'en Chao-ch'ang and others submitted through the Cabinet.

Our action in granting the request of Prince Ch'un to be relieved of the regency was in accordance with the main principle of constitutional government, and the placing on the Premier and Ministers of State the responsibility for the employment of officials and conduct of Government, the using of the Imperial seal on edicts, the associating of ourselves with the Emperor in the ceremony of audiences, all have nothing in common with the system of regency of the late Empress-Dowager, but are in reality the giving of effect to a reform of the Government, and a witness to the fact that we are not monopolising the prerogative of rule, but are making a fresh departure in conjunction with our people.

Nevertheless, the said governor rashly assumed that our action inferred a premature desire for change on the part of the Throne, a confusion of the powers of Government, a want of harmony in the Palace, and failed to realise that our object was to act in accordance with the requirements of the times in the public and not in our private interest.

Ch'en Chao-ch'ang and others are verily ignorant of the circumstances and do not understand the issues; let them be reprimanded by special decree.

The present crisis is full of imminent danger; men's minds are disturbed and rumours rife. The said governor and others should with united effort strive to protect and maintain the public peace and check the spread of disturbance.

\* A Cantonese.

No. 29.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.*

I HAVE received your despatch of the 12th ultimo enclosing a number of reports from His Majesty's consul at Nanking describing the course of events leading up to the capitulation of that city to the revolutionary forces.

Mr. Wilkinson's despatches have been read with much interest, and I concur in your appreciation of his conduct.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

No. 30.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 9, 1912.*

MY telegram of 30th December.\*

Armistice has been further extended to 15th January.

No. 31.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 10.)*

Sir,

*Whitehall, January 9, 1912.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Office letter of the 5th January, in which was suggested the desirability of immediately reinforcing the garrison of Hong Kong.

2. The council have had this question under consideration, and, after informal consultation with the India Office, and after communicating with general officer commanding South China, propose asking the Government of India to dispatch to Hong Kong the following troops :—

2 battalions Indian infantry,  
1 Indian mountain battery.

3. I am to enquire whether, in the opinion of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, these reinforcements, together with the troops now available for detachment from the North and South China commands (in round numbers, 800 infantry and a detachment of Royal Engineers), will be sufficient to meet all probable requirements in the near future for the protection of British interests in China.

I am, &amp;c.

R. H. BRADE,

No. 32.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, January 10, 1912.*

WAR Office propose asking Government of India to dispatch two battalions Indian infantry and one Indian mountain battery to Hong Kong.

They enquire whether these reinforcements, together with troops now available for detachment from North and South China commands, will be sufficient to meet all probable requirements in near future for protection of British interests in China.

What is your view ?

\* See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 142.

## No. 33.

*Mr. Bryce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, January 10, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from United States Government semi-officially to-day :—

“Having been informed by its Peking Legation that representatives of Great Powers there deemed it expedient that United States should send, in connection with keeping open railway, a regiment of some 1,200 men, and that this was acquiesced in by Chinese Government, United States Government was prepared to take necessary steps in accordance with this agreement.

“However, being now informed by legation that situation on railway is less acute, and that Chinese Government expects to keep it open, United States Government understands that to send only 500 troops will be satisfactory for the present, and orders have accordingly been issued.”

I am informed that troops will be sent from Manila.

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## No. 34.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, January 11, 1912.*

RUSSIA and Mongolia.

Following is a summary of an official communiqué published to-day :—

The Mongolians, having declared independence, appealed to Russia for support. Russian Government advised them to show moderation, and to endeavour to find basis of agreement with China. Subsequently Chinese plenipotentiary, appointed negotiator with Mongolians, asked for friendly mediation of Russian consul at Urga, and Mongolians simultaneously asked for mediation. Russian Government considered it possible to accede to this request, but held that Mongolians must be guaranteed in their autonomous régime, and so for that purpose the following should be basis of negotiations :—

No Chinese administration to be established in Mongolia, no Chinese troops to be formed, and no Chinese to be settled in Mongolian territory.

At the same time, Russian Government recognised that permanent tranquillity could prevail in Mongolia only if Mongolians realised that measures taken for development of their country were approved both by Russia and China. Russian Government accordingly expressed readiness to give their friendly co-operation in bringing into existence in Mongolia all necessary measures, administrative, economic, and cultural. In informing Chinese Government of the above, Russian Government added that they would endeavour to induce Mongolians not to sever their connection with China, and to fulfil their obligations.

It depended on good-will of China whether mediation on these terms is accepted or rejected. Not wishing to intervene in struggle proceeding in China, and harbouring no aggressive designs on Mongolia, Russia cannot, nevertheless, but interest herself in establishment of lasting order in this province adjacent to Siberia where she has large commercial interests.

If Mongolia severs her connection with China, Russia will be compelled by force of circumstances to enter into business relations with Mongolian Government.

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## No. 35.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, January 11, 1912.*

EUROPEANS in the interior.

Your telegram of the 5th instant.

Are the missionaries from outlying stations in the province to leave with the other Europeans ?

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## No. 36.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 12.)*

Sir,

*War Office, January 11, 1912.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter, dated 10th January, 1912, addressed to the India Office, on the question of reinforcements for the garrison of the South China command.

I am, &c.

R. H. BRADE.

Enclosure in No. 36.

*War Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Whitehall, January 10, 1912.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to address you in regard to certain movements and dispositions of troops in China, which have been rendered necessary by the unsettled condition of that country.

2. In a letter recently received from the Foreign Office, the Secretary of State has expressed a recommendation that, having in view the small number of troops in the North and South China commands available to meet further possible demands for the protection of British interests in China, it is advisable to reinforce immediately the garrison of South China.

3. I am therefore to request that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for India, the Indian Government may be asked by cable if they can spare temporarily the services of the undermentioned troops to reinforce the garrison at Hong Kong, and, if they approve, to dispatch them forthwith:—

Two battalions Indian infantry.

One Indian mountain battery.

4. I am to suggest that, since it will be impossible to accommodate the majority of these troops in barracks, they should be provided with a full scale of baggage and tentage to enable them to form a standing camp.

I am, &c.

R. H. BRADE.

## No. 37.

*Wang Chung Hui, Revolutionary Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received January 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nanking, January 11, 1912.*

I HAVE honour inform you National Congress, representing seventeen provinces, assembled Nanking, elected: Sun Yat Sen, President *pro tem.*; Liyuanhung, Vice-President, Republic China. Cabinet formed: Minister Foreign Affairs, Wangchunghui; War, Huanghsin; Navy, Huangchungying; Justice, Wutingfang; Finance, Chenchintao; Home Affairs, Chengtehchuan; Education, Tsaiyuanpei; Commerce and Industry, Changchien; Communication, Tangshouchien.

In provinces Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechuan, Hunan, Hupeh, Anhui, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, Shensi, Shansi, civil military governors appointed, with other necessary officers. Republican Government controls all treaty ports except Tien-tsin, Newchwang. Law order now secured in these provinces, Central Government holding itself responsible for continued quietude, observing with utmost solicitude those rules regulations that govern nations. Trust it will be accorded same rights, immunities, privileges they accord one another.

No. 38.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 12, 1912.*

THE situation is increasing in tension. Yesterday a close friend of Yuan Shih-kai called to consult me privately.

All parties were now agreed, he said, that no settlement was possible unless preceded by the abdication of the Emperor and the retirement of the Court. The difficulty which confronted them was to decide upon the form of Government to be substituted for the Manchu dynasty.

The question was whether the Powers would recognise Yuan Shih-kai if the Court were willing to abdicate in his favour or were to authorise him to establish a Provisional Government. There was, moreover, the danger of a division of the country if the revolutionaries, having established a Government at Nanking, should refuse to enter into a coalition with the north.

While making it clear that the question was one in which I must necessarily maintain an attitude of reserve, I pointed out that Yuan Shih-kai commanded the confidence of the Powers, and that, the quarrel being a domestic one, he and the southern leaders should be able to come to terms amongst themselves.

No. 39.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 11th January.

On 17th December His Majesty's consul at Chungking warned all British subjects in interior of Szechuan to withdraw. There is no means of communication with Chengtu, where from all accounts the situation is grave.

No. 40.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 13, 1912.*

MY telegram of 4th January and your telegram of 10th January.

I have had personal conference with general officer commanding at Tien-tsin. In view of the more serious outlook in the north, and the fact that American contingent will number 500 instead of 1,200, we are doubtful whether any troops can be spared from the North China command, but we think that reinforcements which it is proposed to send to Hong Kong will be sufficient to meet future requirements in China.

No. 41.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, January 14, 1912.*

MONGOLIA. Please refer to my telegram of the 11th January.

I touched on this subject in conversation with M. Sazonof yesterday, and he informed me that he had been asked by the Chinese Minister here whether the meaning of the communiqué issued by the Russian Government was that an annexation of Mongolia was contemplated. To this M. Sazonof had replied that for Russia the idea of annexing a territory of such vast extent would be positively insane. Both the Mongols and the Chinese of Mongolia had approached the Russian Government, and in reply they had offered to mediate between the two parties with the object of preventing a declaration of Mongolian independence and of securing that autonomy was granted to Mongolia by China in such a form as would enable Mongolia to administer her internal affairs herself.

On my enquiring whether a protectorate would be established by Russia over

Mongolia, M. Sazonof replied that such was not Russia's intention, as she had no desire to take over administrative duties. As regards Russia's declaration that she was ready to give friendly support, his Excellency explained to me that the Mongols had suggested that instructors might be supplied by Russia for the army which they wished to organise. At present, however, it did not appear that any nucleus existed round which an army could be created; but if a request were made for Russian military instructors later on, the Russian Government would probably send them. A Chinese resident would be established at some town where a Russian consular officer was stationed, possibly Urga. He doubted, however, whether the suzerainty of China would still be recognised by the Mongols if the Central Government at Peking were to assume a republican form; and Russia would have to recognise Mongolian independence if it were declared.

As regards Kuldja, his Excellency, in reply to a question from me, said that the district was in complete anarchy and that the Manchus there were being killed. Many Russian subjects lived there, but hitherto no harm had been done to them, and so long as this was the case no Russian intervention would take place.

## No. 42.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 14, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs brought me yesterday a telegram which the committee of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, a body of foreign merchants, had addressed to ex-Prince Regent, Prince Ch'ing, and Yuan Shih-kai, virtually suggesting that Throne should abdicate as a preliminary to a peaceful settlement, and adding that they would appeal to leaders of the republican party to meet any proposals made to them in a conciliatory spirit.

## No. 43.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Chengtú, November 29, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking reporting on the declaration of independence by the province of Szechuan.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure I in No. 43.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtú, November 29, 1911.*

SZECHUAN, where the revolution in China had its beginning, has been, it would seem, the last to revolt. This apparent hesitation to follow the example of the other provinces, and to declare its independence, was evidently causing umbrage to the leaders elsewhere of the revolutionary party. From Kueichou, a poor and comparatively small province, partly supported by subsidies from Szechuan, came a contemptuous offer of assistance. From Ichang on the 22nd November was sent a telegram, in the name of General Li Yuan-hung, threatening that if the Szechuanese did not fall into line they would be treated as Manchus are being treated.

The difficulties in the way of formal renunciation of the Ta Ch'ing Government were greater at Chengtú than they must have proved even at Canton or Nanking. For one thing, the Governor-General here was a Han-chün, a descendant of the Chinese who sided with the Manchus of the Conquest, and scarcely distinguishable therefore from a Manchu. He was, moreover, a man of tried courage and marked ability. He had gathered round him some hundreds of the mercenaries whom he has so often led to victory in the Marches. At his elbow was the Tartar general, with 1,000 trained Manchu troops, well armed and desperate. The commander of the modern forces,

General Chu Ch'ing-lan, was a protégé of his brother, and had proved that his influence over his men was sufficiently great to induce them to continue to fight against their fellow-provincials.

If, then, no arrangement could be come to between the lately-released leaders of the Railway Guild and his Excellency Chao Erh-feng for a pacific revolution, Chengtu might presently have to stand a siege from the allied forces of the provincial malcontents and the Ko-ming Tang (revolutionary party). An emissary of these last, one, Tai T'ien-ch'ou, a Han Chou man in Chengtu Prefecture, was on his way from Wuchang to direct operations in Szechuan. At Kuan Hsien and elsewhere west and south of the provincial capital were bands of brigands, leaguers, and aborigines threatening a descent on the city. Nothing was to be hoped for from Tuan-fang who could place little reliance on the fidelity of the Hupei troops he had brought with him, and who was even then in desperate case at Tzu Chou, four days away. If Chao Erh-feng were, as he had threatened, to commit suicide, the hsün-fang tui (the mercenaries aforesaid), being left without a head, would most probably start in to sack the city.

If Chao Erh-feng, on the other hand, led them back to Tachienlu, Chu Ch'ing-lan might throw in his fortunes with his patron's brother; the Manchu military colony and the sleek citizens of the Chinese quarter would be left a prey to the bandits and to the leaguers outside, who have so often complained that, while they themselves were suffering every hardship, the people of Chengtu were living in luxury.

Under these circumstances, P'u Tien-chün, Lo Lun, and the other ringleaders, came to an understanding with Chao Erh-feng, the details of which were subsequently published in the form of nineteen stipulations and eleven concessions. A translation of these documents is appended.

Put briefly, Chao Chih-t'ai (henceforth styled Chao-shuai, or Marshal Chao) hands over the Government of Szechuan to P'u Tien-chün, as President of the Provincial Assembly (Tzu-i-chü). He himself takes up the post of warden of the Marches, to which he was reappointed by the last decree of the Ta Ch'ing Government known to us. He is to be provided with 1,200,000 taels and with eight new battalions, in addition to his old border troops. All other forces in Szechuan are to be amalgamated and placed under the command of Chu Ch'ing-lan. Complete amnesty is promised on all sides; Manchus, Mongols, Mahommedans, and Chinese are to be treated alike. The Tartar general, the provincial commander-in-chief, and the Manchu lieutenant-general vacate their posts, but may remain at Chengtu as respected citizens or go elsewhere at the expense of Szechuan. Foreigners and missions are to be protected.

Chao Erh-feng, in pursuance of this concordat, issued on the morning of the 27th November a valedictory notification informing the people of Szechuan that, by the unanimous advice of the Provincial Government and the gentry of Chengtu, "the affairs of the whole province of Szechuan have been provisionally made over to P'u Tien-chün, President of the Provincial Assembly, who will take steps towards self-government, seeking first a means of urgent safety and the settlement of disturbance, then gradually planning a good and stable Government in which all can unite." He himself is, he says, preparing for his military duties, and when all is ready, he will, in obedience to decree proceed to the Marches.

The phraseology of this notification is stilted, but there is in it a note of pathos that has appealed to the people of Chengtu, who are now, I think, coming to feel that they have misjudged Chao Erh-feng. There is also, for those who can catch it, a note of irony: do these amateurs hope to better the work of a man who has seen service in seventeen provinces? The added note of warning should be clear enough: Szechuan will have to be on her guard against dictation from without. "Outside pressure" is to be feared; insults may come "from outside"; State rights, as an American Confederate of the early sixties would have said, may be endangered.

Meanwhile, on the evening of the 26th each of the four consular representatives at Chengtu had received from the Provincial Assembly a note informing us that Szechuan, "constrained by the present condition of the country"—that is, of China—had decided to proclaim its independence on the morrow. A delegate from the Assembly would call in the forenoon of that day and a formal communication would be made to us later.

To this note I replied stating that I should be happy to receive the delegate at the hour named. At that hour—10 A.M. of the 27th—a young man named Shen Tsung-yuan called. He knows some English and has spent a few years in Peking, but he evidently preferred to speak in the Szechuan dialect of "mandarin." He began with what was clearly a prepared oration, in the course of which he dwelt on the desire of

the coming Government to conform in all its acts to the spirit of modern civilisation. After hearing him out I said that changes in the form of government, provided they did not prejudice the rights of foreigners, were a matter for the people to decide. As regards formal recognition, however, of those changes, a consul had no authority of himself to act; he must report to his Government and await instructions. Now, as soon as, the day before, I had learnt of the concordat or protocol, or whatever it should be styled, entered into between the gentry and Chao ta-shuai, I had endeavoured to telegraph to my superiors, by means of the telegram *en clair* copy of which I now handed to him for perusal. As he would see, the telegraph office had refused to forward it, alleging that the wire between Tzu Chou and Lu Chou is broken and the road to Chungking blocked. I was therefore placed in a position of some difficulty. Until I could receive instructions from my own Government there would be inconveniences in communicating direct with the new Government of Szechuan. Had Chao ta-shuai formally notified to me that he had handed over charge to P'u ta-jen matters would have been easier. Could not this be arranged?

Shen hsien-sheng said that he would report to the Assembly, but could not be certain that Chao ta-shuai would be willing to write. (His Excellency's valedictory notification had not then been published.) If that proved to be the case, I replied, then the only solution that occurred to me was that I should correspond for the present, and until the instructions of my superiors reached me, with P'u ta-jen, not as head of the new Government, but as President of the Provincial Assembly. P'u ta-jen would understand that I suggested this compromise not as intending to throw any difficulties in his way, but because it was the view of our duty which is taken by all the consular representatives here. Shen hsien-sheng then left.

A little before noon the ceremony of proclaiming the new Government took place inside what is known as the Huang Ch'eng ("Imperial City"), a walled enclosure in the heart of Chengtu erected for a Prince of the Ming Dynasty.

Some highly coloured accounts of the ceremony have been published in the native papers, which daily multiply. The proceedings, however, appear to have been brief and simple. The new State was proclaimed under the style of Ta Han Szechuan chün-cheng-fu. Han was the title of a great native dynasty that ruled from B.C. 206 to A.D. 220. Chinese constantly call themselves Han-jen or "men of Han," and "Han," "Chinese," is the common antithesis to Man, "Manchu." Cheng-fu is "government," but precisely what is the force of "chün," properly "military," is not yet clear—possibly even to the Szechuanese themselves. The idea would seem to be not so much of a military dictatorship, as of a governing body that, as distinct from a mere municipality, has the right of employing armies. Meanwhile chün-cheng-fu is a convenient term to distinguish the new from the old (Ta ch'ing) Government.

The proclamation was followed by the hoisting of the new flag, which (as I presume is the case elsewhere now in China), is of white, bearing the character (Han) in red, surrounded by a black ring encircled by eighteen stars, shaped like suns, but coloured black. The newly elected tu-tu, or president, P'u Tien-chün, made a short speech, as did also certain other members of the new Government. All the speakers had cut off their queues; in fact, an extra to the "Shang-pao" of the day before had announced that persons attending the ceremony were to be queueless, and in military costume, or if they did not possess such costume, then in short jacket, peaked cap and boots.

In the course of that day, 27th November, the new Government issued three notifications. The first simply states that all official documents emanating from the Government would bear a seal impressed with the characters "Ta Han Szechuan chün-cheng-fu chih Kuanfang." This seal, I may here say, is of the same size and shape as that of a Governor-General under the old régime, and, like it, is impressed in purple ink. The second begins with a list of offences forbidden, three of which are punishable by death. Officials, foreigners, bannermen, and public buildings are alike to be protected; murder, arson, robbery, and rape will be treated as capital crimes. Then follows an announcement of the change of Government, in the course of which the promise of protection to foreigners and missions, to the executive officials of the province, and to the Manchu garrison, is renewed. The railway league, having now attained its object, is called on to dissolve, and an undertaking is given to reduce or abolish "the harsh imposts of the bad old Government," and to compensate sufferers from the disturbance.

The third is a circular to the departments and districts, informing the various incumbents, from intendant of circuit (taotai) downwards, that they are at liberty for the present to carry on, or, after they have given notice and been relieved, to depart. *Li-kin* stations everywhere are to be abolished; the 4 cash a catty added to the price of

government salt is no longer to be collected. Fees in lawsuits are to be halved. The laws, ordinances and procedure of the Ch'ing dynasty, not definitely abrogated or amended by the present Government are to be observed; but all political prisoners are to be released. The incumbent is made responsible for the care of all Government property, and for due payment of the land-tax wherever exemption has not been expressly allowed. To ascertain the validity of claims for such exemption the officials are to consult with the "t'uan-t'i," or "vestry" as it may conveniently be styled, of each township. These last must also be consulted as to all local matters that call for suppression or encouragement.

The stipulations and concessions (enclosures Nos. 2 and 3) provided for the safety of the Manchus who, as I have reported, number at Chengtu some 10,000 persons. In the same spirit P'u Tien-chün, as president of the new State, issued a notification to the banner-men (Manchus, Mongols and Hanchün) promising them protection and a continuation for the present of their rice allowance. A translation of this document was published in the "Shang-pao" of the 28th. It affirms that the banner-men will themselves be profited by the change of Government, seeing that they will no longer be confined within the walls of the inner city, nor restricted in their choice of a calling.

The reference in the opening paragraph to "the will of God" (for "shangti" can hardly be translated otherwise) may be significant, as it would seem to point to some Christian element in the revolutionary body. As a matter of fact Yang Shao-ch'uan, the president of the Young Men's Christian Association of Chengtu, is on very friendly terms with P'u Tien-chün, if he is not himself actually a member of his Government.

Another expression worthy of note is the description of the newly established State as a "federal republic" (ho-chung min-kuo). In the communication of this same day's date, 28th November, addressed to me as "British Consul" by "the president of the Szechuan Government of the Ta Han" it is said:—

"As regards the treaties made by the Ta Ch'ing Government with various countries, those that relate to our country as a whole must await discussion by the confederated States; those that relate to Szechuan this Government is prepared to recognise."

Here the new system that is to prevail in China is described as one of "confederated States" (lien pang); and Shen hsien-sheng, in his interview with me, explained that the model to be taken is not the United States of America, but the German confederation.

In one of the three annexes to this communication "Szechuan's Declaration of Independence," it is said:—

"We are weaving a united constitution, to strengthen and make firm the Empire (ti kuo) of the confederate States (lien pang) of the Han."

Such a pronouncement seems to bear out Shen hsien-sheng's assertion, and to adumbrate the election of a War Lord for the Chinese confederation.

The circumstance that the number of "stars" on the flag is eighteen, and not twenty-one or twenty-three, would point to the exclusion from the confederation of Manchuria, Mongolia, and the new dominion (Kashgar). That Thibet is to be retained would appear from article 19 of the Stipulations and article 4 of the Concessions.

On receipt of the communication from the president above referred to, I consulted with my colleagues, and it was arranged that we should each reply, *mutatis mutandis*, in the sense of the memorandum, copy of which I append (enclosure 4). The telegram which I endeavoured to send on the 26th November to the acting British consul at Chungking, for transmission to you, was, as I have reported, refused by the telegraph office on that date, but accepted the following afternoon. It could only, as Shen hsien-sheng explained, be wired as far as Tzu Chou (about half way to Chungking), where Tuan-fang was subjecting all messages to censorship. If it passed that test, it could be forwarded by post or special courier.

It is now reported that Tuan-fang is dead, whether by his own hand or by violence does not appear. In view of his generous protection of foreigners in 1900, when he was Governor of Shensi, I most sincerely trust that this report is untrue. I ventured, during my interview with Shen hsien-sheng, to express a strong hope that no harm would befall him, and I was assured in reply that none was intended. Tuan-fang could, the delegate said, take up his abode here with the *ci-devant* Tartar general, or if they preferred to leave Szechuan they would both be escorted out of the province with all respect and in all security.

I will reserve for a later despatch an account of the new offices, and a list of office-

holders, contenting myself here with reporting that General Chu Ch'ing-lan has accepted the post of vice-president ("fu tu-tu").

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

*Terms proposed by the Officials and assented to by the Gentry.*

(From the "Shang Hui Kung Pao" of November 27, 1911.)

1. NO Manchus to be boycotted.

2. Peaceful arrangements for the livelihood of bannermen.

(*Note in paper.*—Bannermen who have been naturalised and are serving as soldiers—in the Chinese army—will, of course, draw food or pay. For the rest, scattered about and without regular means, their livelihood must be planned, lest they become destitute and at a loss for employment. This, too, is a way of ensuring peace and order.)

3. All men must be treated alike, whether from Szechuan or from other provinces.

4. No grudge must be allowed against the officials, nor must they be in other respects insulted.

5. Foreigners must be protected.

(*Note in paper.*—Consuls and missionaries, and those who are neither consuls nor missionaries.)

6. The trading classes must be protected.

(*Note in paper.*—Whether his trade is great or small, it is the livelihood of the trader, and no matter who he is he ought not to be encroached on to his loss.)

7. None shall be allowed to take vengeance.

(*Note in paper.*—Strife and battle have now lasted long. The Government troops, the people, and the bandits have been wounded and slain. But hereafter no one, no matter who, may take vengeance one on another.)

8. None shall be allowed to slay for a feud.

(*Note in paper.*—This has no connection with the war, but refers to people who have a private feud.)

9. None shall be allowed to break open prisons.

10. None shall be allowed to maraud.

11. None shall be allowed to burn or slay. All who offend against the above shall be severely dealt with.

12. The multitude with one mind shall help the common weal.

(*Note by editor.*—This article is the keynote of independence; my brethren will haply keep it in mind.)

13. Sedulously preserve decorum, and genuinely act up to civilisation.

(*Note by editor.*—This article is a footnote to the one which precedes; if my brethren keep in mind what precedes, they will then be decorous and calm, like the water in a well.)

14. The banner troops, now three battalions of drilled men, will pass under the command of the general of the modern army (Luchün).

15. The whole of the forces except those chosen to join the border army will join the 17th division, and be attached to the command of General Chu.

16. The yearly cost of the administration of the marches, together with the pay of the troops, in all 1,200,000 taels, shall be borne by Szechuan.

17. If military preparations in the marches have to be extended, then pay, weapons, and cartridges shall be augmented from Szechuan.

18. The army (in the marches) shall be increased, in addition to the border troops, by eight battalions.

19. A grant in aid for Thibetan expenses shall be made as heretofore.

Enclosure 3 in No. 43.

*Protocol said to have been accepted by Chao Erh-feng, November 25, 1911.*

(Translation.)

IN view of the present urgency, his Excellency (shuai, "commander-in-chief") is requested to issue a notification informing the people that all the functions of

government will be transferred to the management of the Szechuanese themselves, being temporarily entrusted to the direction of P'u Tien-chün, delegate of the Provincial Assembly.

2. After the Governor-General's seal has been deposited in the treasury of the financial commissioner, the Szechuanese shall choose a day on which to declare their independence.

3. Previous to the transfer, his Excellency is requested to arrange for the amalgamation of all military forces, stress being laid on their unification.

4. As Thibet serves as a fence for Szechuan, it is trusted that his Excellency will extend his regard for the security of Szechuan, and will still proceed to the border in accordance with the mandate of the court, to manage the affairs of the marches. All the pay of his troops and all expenses of administration will be borne by the Szechuanese.

5. After the proclamation, his Excellency is requested still to postpone his departure for the border, in order that, should things occur, recourse may be had to him, his assistance given, and his advice indicated.

6. The Tartar general, the provincial commander-in-chief, and the Manchu lieutenant-general, shall be personally approached by the gentry, and if, later on, they wish to remain in Szechuan, they shall continue to be treated with fitting courtesy. If they wish to return to their homes, the needful travelling expenses will be provided by the Szechuanese on a liberal scale.

7. The allowance to the (Manchu) garrison will be issued as usual; later on further plans will be made for their livelihood.

8. It is trusted that all executive and judicial officers will continue to exercise their functions as usual. Should they be unwilling to stay, their wishes will be respected.

9. All officials in the province, civil or military, shall be strenuously protected, and no encroachments shall be allowed on their liberty, nor shall people be suffered to wreak vengeance upon them.

10. His Excellency shall be asked to instruct the police office that it is unnecessary to concern themselves with the editorials in the newspapers, in order that past events may be discussed, and apprehension allayed as it may occur.

11. After the matter is settled, all, whether Manchu, Mongol, Mahommedan, or Chinese, shall be treated alike, and no distinctions shall be drawn.

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Enclosure 4 in No. 43.

*Memorandum.*

HIS MAJESTY'S consul-general is in receipt of a despatch, dated the 8th day of the 10th moon of the 4609th year since the accession of Huang Ti, being the 28th November, 1911, informing him that the Szechuanese Government of the Ta Han having been established and the independence of Szechuan proclaimed, the authority of the Ta Ch'ing dynasty is now extinct; that such of the treaties with foreign Powers as relate to China as a whole must be discussed at a conference of the confederate States, but that the present Government of Szechuan is prepared to recognise those that relate to Szechuan, and to continue the considerate treatment of the consuls and their nationals resident in the province, for whose safety they will hold themselves responsible.

Neither envoys nor consuls-general nor consuls have authority to give formal recognition to a change of Government. In the course of his conversation on the 27th November with Mr. Shen, who called to see him on behalf of the Provincial Assembly, Mr. Wilkinson verbally explained the difficulties which arise from this limitation of a consul's powers, and stated that he must telegraph to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and await the instructions that would be issued for his guidance.

The reasons that preclude him from independent action are based on rules of universal application, and do not spring from any desire on the consul-general's part to raise difficulties, as the Assembly will understand. At the present time, however, telegraphic communication is interrupted, and it is impossible to ensure the speedy transmission of messages. Mr. Wilkinson would therefore suggest that, in harmony with his Excellency Chao's notification of the 27th November, his correspondence should be conducted with the president of the Provincial Assembly, Mr. P'u Tien-chün,



until such time as he shall have received instructions from the Secretary of State. This is a provisional and temporary expedient, which the consul-general trusts will prove acceptable.

*Chengtü, November 29, 1911.*

No. 44.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Chengtü, December 5, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting on affairs in the province of Shensi.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure in No. 44.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtü, December 5, 1911.*

I HAVE just received a letter, dated Paoning, 29th November, from Bishop Cassels, covering extracts from a letter written to him by the Rev. G. F. Easton, at Hanchung Fu, Shensi Province, on 20th November, from which it appears that the post office at Singan-fu has been burnt and the German postmaster murdered.

For some days the story has been current here of the killing of foreigners (or a foreigner) in Shensi. The Shang Pao has referred to it with reprobation, expressing a hope that Szechuan would show itself less barbarous. Herr Henne, the victim of this outrage, leaves a wife and children at Si-ngan, unless he had sent them away into safety.

There seems to be no doubt that Wang Jen-wen, late acting Governor-General *ad interim* of Szechuan, is on his way from Shensi back to Chengtü, for yesterday's press announced that a guard of 400 men had been sent from this city to welcome him. Whether he will remain here, and what part he will play in the complicated politics of Republican Szechuan, has not been stated. It is possible that he is only re-visiting Chengtü on his road to his native province of Yünnan.

A Chinese enclosure to Bishop Cassels' letter states that the revolution at Si-ngan was fomented by a general in the lu-chün (modern army), named Chang Feng-cho, with the aid of two of his staff. The Manchu city was attacked, and nearly all the Manchus massacred, including all but six of their compatriots serving in a Szechuan contingent of the lu-chün. The revolted soldiery (whom the correspondent describes as *hsin-chün*, literally "new forces") pursued the Acting Governor Ch'ien to Hsienyang and called on him to resume his duty. His Excellency refused and attempted to shoot himself. The wound did not prove mortal, and the soldiery, mindful of past kindnesses received at his hands, placed him under the care of a foreign surgeon.

The intendant of police, the home magistrate, and the magistrate of Hsienyang (a town a little to the west of the capital), went over to the insurgents and continue to discharge their respective functions. No Chinese have been wantonly slain, but the home prefect, a Chekiang man, named Hu Wei-yuan, was killed, as he refused to submit. The *hsin-chün* have divided their forces into three bodies; one that has gone north to guard against the Mongols, one that is occupying the southern hills for some undefined purpose, and a third that has proceeded towards Hupeh to get into touch with the Wuchang revolutionaries.

The taotai at Hanchung is, like Chao Erh-feng, a Han-chün Bannerman, and Hanchung is to be garrisoned by a battalion of the insurgents. Feng-hsiang Fu was retaken by the insurgents, apparently on the 26th October, and towns innumerable, among them Wu Kung, Feng Hsien, Sanyuan, and Chingyang, have submitted. Eight or nine tenths of the province is in the hands of the rebels, but bands of robbers are marauding everywhere.

The correspondent hears that the revolutionary forces (*ko-chün*) have sent forward a reconnoitring party into Szechuan, which will be presently followed by the main body.

On the other hand, there are rumours at Chengtu that a son of the late notorious boxer-leader, Tung Fu-hsiang, at the head of a large body of Mahommedans in Kansu, has proclaimed P'u-chün, the disgraced Crown Prince (Ta A-Ko) of 1900, as Emperor, and is preparing to invade both Shensi and Szechuan.

A letter from the sub-district postmaster at Lanchow, Mr. Ross, to Mr. Ritchie dated 15th November, says:—

“Si-ngan Fu has been in the hands of the reformers since the first of the moon, and it is reported here that our office there has been burnt, and that Mr. Henne has been injured. The line from Tsinchow to Si-ngan Fu has been abolished as the route is infested by rebels and bad characters. I am sending all our mails at present via Tihua Fu and Russia.”

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

No. 45.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 25, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith five further reports from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu dealing with the situation in Szechuan.

From these it will be seen that, as the result of a protracted and, as it would appear, not very connected series of military operations, the Government troops have regained control to the south and south-west of the provincial capital. It is satisfactory to learn that foreign residents in the towns where the fighting has been heavy have suffered nothing worse than some personal inconvenience and anxiety, and the attitude of both parties to the struggle towards them seems to have been unexceptionable.

With his hands strengthened by these victories over the insurgents and his popularity somewhat redeemed in the eyes of the Szechuanese patriots by the release of the ringleaders of the railway agitation whom he had arrested in September last, Governor-General Chao Erh-feng has been able to make his peace with the Railway League, though apparently more on the latter's terms than on his own. Ostensibly, at least, the authority of the Provincial Government is in a fair way to effective reassertion, but the sweeping nature of the reforms inaugurated by the Governor-General in Council (see Mr. Wilkinson's second despatch of the 25th November) rather indicates the subordination of his Excellency's administration to the irresponsible dictates of the local gentry.

During the last week it has been circumstantially reported in the local press that Tuanfang has been assassinated at Tze Chow by his own troops, but I have been unable to obtain confirmation of the statement. Mr. Wilkinson's allusion to a rumour that Tuanfang was shut up in Tze Chow, however, rather points to some difficulty having arisen.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 45.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtu, November 14, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a letter from Mr. Openshaw, the resident American missionary at Yachou, which is the first communication I have had from that city since the commencement of the rebellion. Yachou, which has for long been besieged by the insurgent bands and vigorously defended by a small force of “hsünfang,” was eventually relieved by Government troops dispatched from Ch'ung Chou after the recapture of that city. Other towns in the neighbourhood, such as Ta-yi Hsien and Ch'ung-ch'ing Chou, have also been cleared of insurgents, and general success appears to have attended the recent military operations of the Imperialists in the south-west.

The relief of Yachou has at length cleared the road for five “ying” (battalions) of “hsünfang,” which had been recalled from the garrisons in the Marches, and had been

waiting till they could get through to Chengtu. I now understand that the Governor-General intends gradually concentrating these troops, on whose loyalty he can implicitly rely, in the capital, in order that, in the event of the Hupei and Szechuan "luchün" revolting, he may yet be in a position to hold his ground. Of these five "ying," one is already at Hsinching, within a day's march of Chengtu, and two more are said to have marched towards Chiating, which city has long been in the peaceful occupation of the insurgents.

In spite of the fact that the road from Yachou to Ch'ung Chou, and thence via Hsinching to Chengtu, may now be considered, at any rate temporarily, open, no word has been received from my French colleague, M. Bons d'Anty, who has been held up at Tachienlu for more than two months.

T'ang Ssu-yeh, the Governor-General's Foreign Secretary, informed me yesterday that a telegram had been sent, some three weeks ago, to Fu Sung-ma, the acting warden of the Marches at Bat'ang, ordering two "ying" of the border troops, then at Derge, to proceed via Tachienlu to clear the rebels out from the neighbourhood of Ch'ing Ch'i Hsien. The telegram was sent to Lichiang, in Yünnan, whence it would be forwarded by courier. Allowing nine days for such transmission, and at least twenty for the passage of the troops, another week must elapse before these last can arrive at Tachienlu, and act perhaps as escort for my colleague.

On the 8th instant, Captain Noiret, a French army officer and a member of the Legendre Scientific Mission, arrived in Chengtu, having travelled through the most disturbed regions without meeting with any trouble beyond the difficulty of procuring chair-bearers and porters. Captain Noiret left Ningyuan Fu, in the Chien-Ch'ang valley, on the 23rd September, on which date no news of the insurrection had yet reached that secluded neighbourhood. It was not till he reached Fulin, a small town on the T'ung River, some days west of Chiating, that he found the roads blocked and the country disturbed. After being delayed near that place for some days, owing to transport difficulties, he managed to reach Chiating. At Chiating he received a "lu-p'iao," or road-pass, from the insurgents, and eventually reached Chengtu after being seven weeks *en route*. Captain Noiret now informs me that he is proceeding shortly to Paoning Fu with the intention of carrying on his scientific observations, nor does he appear in any way deterred by the disturbed state of the province and its uncertain future.

As regards other parts of Szechuan, there has been little change in the situation in the districts north of the capital, where the insurgent bands continue to roam at will. But there seems to be little co-operation or organisation amongst them, and a garrison of a few regulars appears to be sufficient to save a city from attack.

In the south, Wei-yuan Hsien has fallen into the hands of the rebels and the magistrate has been brutally murdered. The mutinous luchün, who proceeded from Lung-ch'uan Yi through Chien Chou to Lo-chih Hsien, are said to have been defeated and dispersed near the latter town by troops sent in pursuit.

Disturbing news has recently reached me from the east of the province, which has hitherto remained quiet. It appears that an outbreak occurred at Tien-chiang-Hsien, on the overland road from Wan Hsien to Chungking, where the yaméns and public offices were destroyed and the telegraph wire cut. From there the trouble was expected to spread to Ta Chu, on the Wan Hsien-Chengtu road, but I have as yet received no confirmation of this. The affair at Tien-chiang appears to have been a local outbreak merely, and to have no proper connection with the real revolutionary movement, which seems to be unaccountably slow in spreading up the Yang-tsze from Ichang. Recent letters show that Wushan and K'uei-fu, towns on the river below Wan Hsien, were still in the hands of the existing Government on the 8th instant, though Li-ch'uan, west of Shihnan-fu, in the extreme corner of Hupeh, was reported to be in the hands of the revolutionaries. If this is true, then it would appear that the Hupeh insurgents are advancing along the land route to Chung Chou, rather than ascending the river to Wan Hsien.

Very little news of the state of affairs in the rest of China filters through here. It appears to be fairly generally known that many of the Yang-tsze provinces, together with Yünnan and Kueichow, are in the hands of the anti-dynastic revolutionaries, in spite of the efforts of the local press, which exhorts the people not to listen to vague reports without foundation. The absence of all news from Peking is, however, seriously alarming officials and gentry and leading to the wildest rumours. But the 300,000 inhabitants of this great city appear to show a strange apathy in the face of what must be considered so critical a situation.

Tuan-fang is now somewhere on the road between Tzuchou and Chengtu, and

should be here very shortly. The rumours which credit him with the intention of trying to escape to the north without coming to the capital would seem to be without foundation. The Ping-pei Ch'u (office of the General Staff), next door to the Governor-General's yamên, has been prepared for his Excellency's reception, and quarters for his Hupeh troops are being made ready at the Wu-hou Tzu Temple, outside the south gate.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 45.

*Extract from Letter from Mr. Openshaw, Missionary, Ya Chou, November 4, 1911.*

LIU TUNG-LIN, the military official out from Thibet, who saved the day for us here, is going to try and get a letter through, so I will write a brief word. Ya Chou has had a terrible time of it; we have been besieged for weeks; the suburbs and surrounding farm-houses are in ruins. In two skirmishes and in two real battles, and in dozens of night attacks, the soldiers were victorious, and the rebels were slain by hundreds. The biggest battle was on the 15th of the 8th moon, when the soldiers suddenly rushed through the south gate, caught the rebels by surprise and slaughtered them, capturing all kinds of fire-arms, and some big home-made cannon right up at the city wall, besides dozens of ladders. There were about fifty heads in front of the various camps and yamêns. Lots of people fled from the city, and had a hard time of it in the country. It looked stiff for the safety of the city for the first few days, but the timely arrival of the Thibetan troops, hardened to warfare, saved the day. The soldiers lost all told about ten or a dozen, and one or two local braves were killed. Lots of wounded and accidents. I had to turn to and do the best I could, and have gained a great reputation. . . . Roads on all three sides, four sides are now open. It was marvellous. Up to Sunday last we were tightly surrounded by thousands, and surely expected a hard battle to settle things up, when, lo and behold! Monday morning last the rebels had completely disappeared. . . . Only the east gate is open yet, and that only for a time. . . .

Enclosure 3 in No. 45.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtzu, November 18, 1911.*

OF the eleven ringleaders, whose arrest on the 7th September was the signal for the present rising in Szechuan, three (Yeh Ping-ch'eng, Hu Jung, and P'eng Lan-fen) were quietly released towards the close of last month, and two others (Meng Ts'ai-ch'eng and Wang Yu-hsin) on the 7th and 11th November respectively. The remaining six—the notorious Lo Lun, P'u Tien-chün (president of the provincial assembly), Yen K'ai, Teng Hsiao-k'o, Chang Lan, and Chiang San-ch'eng—were “ceremoniously requested to come out” on the evening of the 14th instant. In the “Shang Hui Kung-pao” of the 16th appears a circular letter to the people of Szechuan, professing to be written by the octogenarian, Hanlin Wu Chao-ling, and others of the gentry at Chengtzu, explaining that the Governor-General had released these notables, trusting with their co-operation to restore peace to this distracted province.

It would seem that Chao Erh-feng had come to the conclusion that Tuanfang would on his arrival at Chengtzu—and he is expected here to-morrow—insist on the release of the imprisoned ringleaders, and that he therefore, to save his own dignity, came to a previous understanding with them, and asked them to leave their quarters in the viceregal gaol. He has done more; he entertained them to dinner the following day.

Efforts are being made to show (what is indeed the truth) that the arrest of these men was forced on Chao Erh-feng by the imperative orders of the Peking Government, and that he himself was averse to measures of severity. It is generally believed that his Excellency has been impeached by Tuanfang in a memorial dated from Chungking. There seems little doubt that four of his subordinates have been denounced, Chou Shanp'ei, Wang T'an, T'ien Cheng-kuei, directors respectively of the Ping-pei, and the Ting-wu Ch'u, and Jao Feng-tsaio one of the Governor-General's secretaries.

Chou Shanp'ei, as acting intendant of commerce (for some reason he was never given the substantive rank), took a conspicuous part in what may be styled the domestic

and foreign policy of the Szechuan Government. For the last few months he has been acting as judicial commissioner. What he and the other three officials have done to incur the anger of the leaguers is not altogether clear, but the insurgents were offering last month a price for their heads, as well as for the head of Governor-General Chao Erh-feng. Even his bitterest enemies admit the ability of Chou Shanp'ei, though they prefer to describe it as cunning.

When he learnt that the Imperial commissioner had denounced him for, among other things, deceitfulness and self-seeking, he at once wrote to the Governor-General, requesting his Excellency to say whether he, Chou Shanp'ei, had, as was alleged, plotted the arrest of Lo Lun and his fellows on the 7th September, or whether it was not the fact that he had never been consulted in the matter. When Chao chih'ai replied that he himself was solely responsible for that proceeding, Chou Shanp'ei addressed to Tuan ta-ch'en a voluminous *apologia*, and, what is more, printed and distributed broadcast copies of this document, in which he rebuts on to Tuanfang himself the charge of driving the Szechuanese into rebellion, and affects to find the root of the trouble in a telegram from Tuanfang and Sheng Hsuan-huai dated Peking the 1st June, informing Wang Jen-wen, then governor-general *ad interim*, that railway scrip would be given (instead of money) for both the cash balance of the railway company and the amount which that company had actually expended. His main contention is that he, Chou Shanp'ei, had been a consistent advocate of pacific measures, whereas Tuanfang was at first all for stern measures, and has only now changed his note because he finds that severity will not pay.

The *apologia* was followed up by a formal tender to the Governor-General of his resignation of the post of judicial commissioner. This was accepted, and the text of both petition and minute was published in the "Shang Hui Kung-pao" of the 15th. The excuse given is that he, Chou Shanp'ei, had, in common with the rest of the executive council, announced to the public that he would resign should no satisfaction be given by the Central Government in the railway controversy. Tuan ta-ch'en has confined his efforts to the release of the prisoners and the denunciation of officials; he has made no public pronouncement as to how the demands of the Szechuanese are to be met. Recklessly slandered by the Imperial commissioner, and unable to inspire confidence in the people, Chou has, he says, no option but to resign. The fact, however, that he has resigned, and at the same time has not scrupled to assail an Imperial commissioner with invective, shows that in the opinion of the astute time-server, who has spent all his life among them, the Szechuanese are ripe for revolt.

Tuanfang should be at Chengtu to-morrow, unless he again changes his mind, and we ought presently to be in a position to form a clearer estimate of what course events will take in this province. At present it looks as though the Imperialists, headed by the governor-general, have made a concordat with the league, to maintain order against brigandage, but otherwise to mark time until the fate of Wuchang and Peking becomes known. Of Wuchang our latest news is that on the 4th November severe fighting was in progress; from Peking no one, not even the Governor-General, has heard for upwards of a month. Mr. Hewlett, the acting British consul at Ichang, telegraphed to me on the 13th to say that the republican leaders had told him that insurgent troops from Paoting Fu were in possession of Peking, and that the Empress Dowager and Emperor had fled to Tien-tsin, the Manchu Princes by rail to Russia. Should this news be accepted as true here, Szechuan will either throw in its lot with the republicans or will declare its independence.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 4 in No. 45.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtu, November 21, 1911.*

IN yesterday's "Shang-pao" was published an appeal to the people of Szechuan in the names of the nine principal leaders of the T'ung Chih Hui (railway guild), Lo Lun and his colleagues, whose arrest on the 7th September, and release on the 14th November, I have reported.

The appeal is for cessation from civil strife, on the ground that the objects for which the guild was instituted, have now been attained. These objects were, the recovery of the railway and cancellation of the loan agreement. The writers maintain

that, by the terms of the agreement itself, political disturbance automatically renders that instrument null and void. The allusion is obviously to article 16, though the text has—it is almost needless to say—been garbled. That article is made to run as though the sole words therein that have force are “If . . . any political . . . crisis should take place . . . then this contract shall become null and void.”

The writers promise, on behalf of the “kuanfu” (which, when the context is considered, can only mean Governor-General Chao), that there shall be no prosecutions for past offences. They undertake also to press the authorities to give relief from (a) “fleecing by means of harsh levies (chüan, the so-called ‘benevolences’), and miscellaneous taxes”; (b) the depredations and exactions of soldiers and bandits; (c) the rise in cost of food-stuffs and salt. They will move for the reduction or for the temporary abolition of the land tax in districts that have suffered during these risings; for the payment of compassionate allowances where lives have been lost or families broken up; and for the restoration of stolen property. On their own behalf they undertake to bear no rancour on account of their personal griefs.

They point out that the season is come for the sowing of spring crops (by which wheat is mainly indicated), and that if this is not done, next year may bring famine in addition to civil war. They accordingly entreat the people to turn back into the paths of peace.

Meanwhile, daily conferences are said to be held between these men and the Governor-General. There is a report that another general meeting of the shareholders of the Ch’uan Han Railway will be summoned; but of this I have no confirmation. T’ang Ssu-yeh is my authority for saying that Chao chiht’ai is compiling, with the aid of the league leaders, a set of regulations (chang-ch’eng) that will endeavour to sequester the bandit element in the insurgent force.

Everyone, however, is obviously waiting for reliable news of events in Peking. So far we have nothing but the assertions of the insurgents at Ichang and Yünnan-fu, to the effect that the Imperial Family has fled, to Tien-tsin, or to Shanhaikuan, or to Russia. Mr. Hewlett telegraphed last night from Ichang that the Chinese Government is completely paralysed. He added that Canton had declared itself to be an independent republic, and that at Nanking the Manchus were massacring the Chinese, whom, as I learn from a letter addressed by the Wuchang Chamber of Commerce to the Ichang Chamber of Commerce, they had first deprived of their arms.

If all these reports are true, they may have the most serious consequences here at Chengtu. The Governor-General, however, is, as we have seen, evidently making his peace with the league; meanwhile he is bringing up from Yachou, by instalments, the border troops, for whom he sent three months ago; some 800 have already reached Chengtu, while I am told that the one battalion of Hupeh regulars that arrived here last week has been sent back to Tzu Chou, where Tuanfang still lingers.

If his veterans of the Marches remain faithful, Chao Erh-feng, supported also, as he would certainly be, by the Manchu troops, and entrenched behind the city walls, may appear too formidable an adversary to be lightly attacked, and may succeed in making his own terms with the revolutionaries.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 5 in No. 45.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtu, November 25, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 14th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a further letter from Mr. Openshaw, describing the siege of Yachou in greater detail. For more than six weeks, from the 14th September to the 30th October, that city was closely invested by the insurgent forces and defended by a contingent of “hsün-fang” troops recalled from the Marches. In spite of frequent assaults, it does not appear that the city was in any imminent danger of falling after the arrival of these seasoned troops, who entered the town on the 19th September, and it is probable that the insurgents found their wooden cannon and kerosene oil-tin armour of little avail against the up-to-date rifles of the Government soldiers. In Mr. Openshaw’s opinion, the withdrawal of the rebel forces was due to the arrival of reinforcements from Thibet viâ Ch’ingch’i Hsien; the official paper here, however, attributed the relief of the beleaguered city to the “luchün” troops, who recaptured

Ch'ung Chou, while a third hypothesis is that the rebels were recalled by their leaders to the neighbourhood of Chiating, where the insurgents have of late been concentrating. The fighting outside the walls of Yachou seems to have been carried on with all the ferocious barbarity characteristic of Chinese rebellions in former days, and we hear of Government spies being skinned alive in retaliation for the wholesale decapitations of rebel prisoners.

Although, according to Mr. Openshaw's letter, the Government reinforcements got through to Yachou from Thibet towards the end of October—having presumably passed through Tachienlu—nothing more has been heard of my French colleague, M. Bons d'Anty, who, according to an oral message received here a month ago, has been held up in the latter town ever since the middle of September. Now that the murder of the French travellers near Ningyuenfu has been practically confirmed by a telegram from Yünnan-fu, great anxiety is naturally felt for M. Bons' safety.

From Messrs. Wellwood and Humphry, of the American Baptist Mission at Ningyuenfu, no news has been received since the commencement of the rebellion. But, as the murder of the French travellers is reported to have taken place some distance south of that town, there is every reason to hope that these missionaries are safe within the city walls.

Native evangelists who have recently come into Chengtu from the country to the west, report that the districts where the troops have been operating of late are now quietening down, though brigandage is everywhere rife. One of the evangelists came from the city of Ch'ungh'ing Chou, one day's journey due west from Chengtu, which has recently been cleared of insurgents. The conduct of the rebels in this city, which has of old borne an evil reputation for the lawless and quarrelsome nature of its inhabitants, seems to have been particularly savage and barbarous. Thus the chief of police and the chairman of the municipal council were both beheaded, and their bodies divided into fragments, which were scattered over the countryside. Over 200 other persons were decapitated on suspicion of being Government spies, their livers being in many cases eaten, and their tongues cut out, dried, and powdered into medicine as a specific against gunshot and sword wounds. These evangelists also report considerable anti-foreign feeling amongst this section of the rebel forces, numerous Roman Catholics and one Protestant convert having been beheaded as spies; the rumour had also got about that the missionaries at Ch'ung Chou (who have since all withdrawn) were spies in the service of the Imperial Government. This antagonism to the foreigner is, I suspect, merely the natural outcome of disorganisation and defeat among the few banditti left behind after the withdrawal of the main body of insurgents, for we have had repeated proof that the real T'ung Chih Hui, or revolutionary forces, who hold the Min River round Chiating, are still taking the greatest pains to protect the foreigners.

The country between P'i Hsien and Kuan Hsien is still in a very disturbed state, and the latter city remains in the hands of the insurgents, who have proved in this neighbourhood too strong for the Government troops. Considerable anxiety is now felt for the Kuan Hsien irrigation works, on which the fertility and prosperity of the entire Chengtu plain depends. The time is near at hand when the barrages should be prepared for cutting off the water supply, that the dikes and ditches may be cleaned and repaired for next season's irrigation. According to to-day's "Shang-pao," the gentry and notables of Chengtu have now persuaded the Governor-General to allow them to send two of their number to negotiate with the insurgents at Kuan Hsien, where the rebels would seem to be rather brigands than revolutionaries; these deputies are, according to the newspaper, to be authorised to propose an armistice and announce an amnesty on behalf of the Governor-General. Whether these gentlemen would have the courage to penetrate as envoys of the Governor-General into the rebel country is, however, highly improbable; but were they to go as representatives of a Republican Government they might, perhaps, meet with some success.

For some time past rumours have been rife that the tribesmen of the aboriginal country west of Chengtu were up in arms, though whether to fight under the standard of the T'ung Chih Hui or to raid the plains on their own account was not clear. That all is not well in the tribal region is now proved by the proclamation, translation of which forms the second enclosure to this despatch. This notification was issued recently by his Excellency Tuanfang from Tzu Chou, where the Imperial commissioner is now residing—or, as some say, where he is now besieged. In this proclamation his Excellency Tuan calls on the native chiefs and headmen in the neighbourhood of Sungp'an, Li-fan, Mao Chou, and Wench'uan, and on the settlers in the Chinese military colonies round Mengkung, to preserve the peace. He reminds them that they

owe all they have to the Imperial grace, and points out that to rise in arms in the present crisis is but a poor requital for the favours they have received from the Throne.

It has recently come to my knowledge that a British exploring and sporting expedition, consisting of Messrs. Smith, Owen, and Wallace, is now in Kansu. I understand that these gentlemen propose to travel through the Kokonor, and descend thence into Szechuan through the tribal country. I have written to Dr. Smith, the leader of the expedition, urging him to abandon his proposed journey, and to make for Russian territory, or the China coast without delay. Once the border tribesmen rise in revolt there is no knowing how far the movement will go, and the news from the Chiench'ang valley tends to show that they will not preserve the same neutrality towards foreigners as the Chinese revolutionaries have hitherto done.

From the China Inland Mission stations at Bat'ang and Tachienlu I have had no news whatsoever, nor is it possible to get in communication with them. It is to be hoped, however, that the good relations which the missionaries have established with the surrounding Thibetan tribesmen will prevent their coming to any harm, should trouble have arisen in the Marches.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 6 in No. 45.

*Extracts from Letter from Mr. Openshaw, Yachou, September 23 to November 13.*

THE city gates were shut on the 14th September, and we have been in a state of siege ever since. The enemy controls every approach to the city, and has effectively cut off our rice supply. Fortunately there was a considerable stock on hand in the public granaries, shops, and private-families.

The bad characters across the river were pushing the city pretty tight, and secured the ferry-boats, and some of their representatives were outside the East Gate. On Sunday the 17th, the wildest rumours were afloat. The shops were closed, and the people panic-stricken. Many moved out of the city, being let down by ropes over the city wall. A guard of fourteen soldiers was sent to our place. We packed some bedding, food and necessaries, and were ready to move out to a small official's place at a moment's notice. The next day it rained, and some negotiations were begun, whereby it was hoped the rebels might be bought off. Some peace envoys actually crossed the river, but they were badly treated. Some escaped, and are still in hiding.

On the 19th a large contingent of soldiers from Thibet arrived, and from that time on affairs began to take on a better aspect. These reinforcements had had to fight their way through, and lost two men killed and three wounded, some 50 *li* from here. Some of the rebels appeared in coats of armour made out of standard oil tins. The soldiers are good fellows, who have seen service in Thibet. Both officials and people took heart after the arrival of these reinforcements. The next day there was firing back and forwards across the river without any damage being done on either side. On the 21st the East Gate was opened, and the soldiers cleared up those in the vicinity, and attempted to dislodge the fellows across the river. A number were killed, and they brought in two prisoners. The hsieu (magistrate) promptly chopped off their heads, and hung them outside the city walls as a warning. The next day the soldiers went out again, and there was a regular pitched battle, which I watched from the city wall. The enemy were routed, and six or seven houses burnt. Many were reported killed, and the soldiers brought in six heads and a number of left ears; also some guns and four prisoners, who were beheaded later.

On Friday 22nd, I was asked by the taotai to attend to some of the wounded soldiers quartered in the middle school. This I was glad to do. . . .

On Saturday 23rd, we were treated to a distinct earthquake shock. No engagement since Thursday. . . . The poor are suffering a great deal, and the public granaries have been opened. Five or six soldiers come daily for treatment, and I enjoy caring for them. We go about the city freely; shops still closed, and the streets look like they do at New Year time.

October 10.—We are still besieged, and have had some terrible experiences. After two weeks of comparative inactivity on the part of the soldiers, and an abortive effort on the part of the taotai to buy off the rebels, an attack was planned. On the 6th October, a Chinese festival day, the soldiers rushed out of the South and East Gates, surprising and putting to rout the enemy, and setting fire to the suburbs. It was a



day of fire and blood. Five or six soldiers were killed, and a number wounded. No one knows how many of the enemy were killed, but the troops say hundreds. They captured several alive, and I saw one poor fellow marching in front of the troops as they returned with four heads tied round his neck. By actual count there were eighteen headless men in front of the camp at the middle school; eight in front of the camp at the Hsien school; eight in front of the Hsien yamên, and twenty strewn in front of the taotai's yamên. I was called out to attend the wounded soldiers, and had to pass by such a sight twice during the day. Men were hired at 100 cash a body to throw the corpses over the wall. The soldiers captured lots of ladders, one big fellow capable of allowing six or seven persons to climb abreast. Guns of all kinds, and two big home-made cannon.

These were made of oak trees hollowed out and bound by iron and telegraph wire bands. They carried a good heavy ball, and were charged when captured. Without doubt they had planned to bombard the city on the night of the 5th, but it poured with rain, and their fuses would not burn, so the attack was put off. Now the two worst suburbs are clear, and the position of the city is much safer. We are in the midst of a real rebellion. The majority in the ranks are thugs. Most have nothing to gain and the rebellion will cause untold suffering. There are several thousands in their ranks, but they can make no headway against a walled city and our thousand trained troops. A lot of volunteers have been enrolled to help to patrol the wall.

*October 16.*—Lots of firing from across the river. The official got five fellows to go across in a little boat at night, and try to set fire to the buildings which the enemy are using for head-quarters. They got the fire started, but three of the five were apprehended and skinned alive. The taotai announces a reward of 3,000 taels for the rebel leader, Lo Lao-pa. . . . The soldiers out from Thibet are suffering from the change of climate, and a lot of them have malaria.

*October 23.*—Eatables are growing scarcer and dearer. No more pigs in the city are to be killed. . . . The enemy have been strengthening their position, and it was certainly expected there would be another battle this week. On the 20th a secret messenger from the prefect to the Viceroy arrived, after a return trip right through the rebel lines. I had him in my study for a chat. He said that the rebels were many and fierce. Several night attempts have been made to scale the city wall. The rebels stuck straw men on poles, and stuck them up to see if the guard were asleep, and frequent shots have been exchanged and ladders captured.

*October 30.*—This has been an eventful week. On the 24th a decisive battle was fought outside the South Gate, the soldiers taking the fortified hill in good shape. Only a few were captured, and one head was brought in, but the soldiers captured cannon, guns, flags, and loot. On the 25th a big temple, just outside the north-east point of the wall, was burnt to the ground. The enemy had been using this as a camp. . . . On the 29th the Catholic priest, who had been out itinerating when the trouble began, came back through the enemy's lines, having been protected by the rebel leader. On the 30th, without warning, the rebels decamped, going down river. Soldiers out scouring the country.

*November 6.*—While the leaders of the movement let it be known that they were not after foreigners or church members, separate bands of rascals acted as they pleased and did anything to plunder or persecute. . . . I went down over the city wall, and out to see the Salquist house. The South Gate suburb is a total wreck. Beggars were still covering up corpses. They said they had buried over 100, and there were still more, which we were sure of from the stench. All told there must have been some 600 slaughtered in the battle of the 6th October. I found the Salquist property a wreck.

*November 13.*—The rebels, after leaving Yachou, dropped down river, looted some places on the way, and easily took Hung Ya. The official fled for his life, and arrived here in the guise of a beggar. The soldiers have gone to relieve Hung Ya. It is said on the approach of the soldiers the rebels left for Chiating, where things are reported hot. Two French travellers and the magistrate at Ningyuenfu have been killed, but we understand that the prefect has the situation in hand, and we hope for the safety of the Wellwoods and Humphrys.

A military official with a company of soldiers was compelled to go over to the rebels. After being in the rebel ranks for over a month they were supposed to have been won over, and it was planned that they should go against the Government troops, who were coming over the pass from Ching Chi Hsien. The rebels had strongly fortified Ta Kuan, on the mountain, and were determined to keep the soldiers from joining force. By a prearranged plan with his men, they lined up in one section, shot

down the fellows manning the big guns, shot into the others, and captured or killed five of the leaders. The chief they took over the hills to the general, who promptly beheaded him. It was a great stroke, and the news of this defeat was the immediate cause of the speedy withdrawal of the rebels from Yachou. . . .

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Enclosure 7 in No. 45.

*Notification by the Imperial Commissioner Tuanfang, exhorting the Aboriginal Tribesmen of the Frontier to abstain from Rebellion.*

(Issued at Tzu Chou and published in the "Tu Hsing Jih-pao" of November 23, 1911.)

I, THE Imperial commissioner, have been honoured by commands from the Throne to proceed to Szechuan and there arrange matters after enquiry. My principal idea is to pacify the people, and I have not the least intention of taking up arms against them. As regards the popular disturbances, repeated enquiries show that there are among the insurgents many good people, who have either been compelled to take up arms under false pretences or who, though repenting of their evil ways, dare not reform. Therefore the gracious commands of the Throne have been published far and wide bidding the people disperse and return each to his own affairs, for the protection of all good men. All those leaders who now surrender not only need not fear any enquiry into their past doings, but will be rewarded by marks of approbation; those of their followers who were compelled to take up arms and now disperse and return to their homes will be protected from any trumped-up charges of their neighbours and from reckless examinations of official underlings; while those who have already repented and gone home are in no way to be distinguished from good people. This method of procedure has been repeatedly announced in proclamations posted throughout the land, and deputies from officials and gentry have been sent in all directions to exhort the people in a similar sense. The sincerity of the Imperial commissioner is such as would affect even gold or stones.

It has now come to my knowledge that the T'u-ssu (chiefs of the aboriginal tribes) in the neighbourhood of Wenchuan and Lifan have collected bands of barbarian soldiers, who have taken this opportunity to come swarming out. On receiving this news I could not restrain my grief. Ever since you T'u-ssu became civilised you have reverently observed the Imperial laws, and you have been frequently steeped in the grace of the Throne, which takes thought for you from afar. The favours which you have received in the food you eat and the ground you tread on call for some requital. At the present time, when the frontiers of Szechuan are disturbed, it is all the more fitting that you should defend the barbarian boundary, in order that you may prevent the banditti from entering and disturbing the peace. How is it that you suddenly break out into hostilities and seize this opportunity for creating trouble? The colonies have ever borne an honourable reputation, which is now being tarnished by your conduct. Ask yourselves, are you behaving as you ought? I, the Imperial commissioner, am firmly resolved to allay by peaceful methods the disturbances inside the province, and am equally anxious to deal peacefully with the outer dependencies. I believe that this is but a momentary aberration on your part, and the idea of overawing you by force of arms is abhorrent to me. Therefore, as well as sending deputies to remonstrate with you in this sense, I now call on all you native chiefs and headmen, large and small, in the neighbourhood of Sungpan, Lifan, Mao Chou, and Wenchuan, and on you men of the five T'un (military colonies) of Mengkung, to pay due attention to this proclamation. Those of your soldiers who have crossed the frontier must instantly return and not harass the main roads; those who have not yet overstepped the border must not listen to idle tales or recklessly commence hostilities. The affairs of the dependencies should be carried on as usual, according to the old laws, every man attending to his own affairs, in order that the country may be pacified and the rupture of harmonious relations be avoided. Such is my earnest hope. Let all tremble and obey this proclamation.

November 24, 1911.

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## Enclosure 8 in No. 45.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

Chengt'u, November 25, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 21st instant, I have the honour to enclose translation of a circular telegram to the officials and people of Szechuan issued by Chao Erh-feng, Acting Governor-General of Szechuan, his executive council, and certain representatives of the various classes (gentry, traders, students) at Chengtu, and published in the "Chengt'u Jih-pao" of the 22nd.

In this document his Excellency is made to express deep contrition for having "taken too violent action when the railway troubles reverberated." It is affirmed that only now "a beginning has been made at reparation"; but that "the whole body of officials and gentry are now united in their aim, and are working together with a single mind all to help the common weal."

This, of course, means that Chao Chiht'ai has surrendered his policy, if not also his authority, into the hands of the Chengtu gentry. The fact that the very considerable concessions now made are granted without reference to a Central Government is significant; indeed, were it not for the solitary reference to the Sovereign (literally "Lord and Father"), this paper might have emanated from the Cabinet of an independent State.

The most striking of the changes thus effected, or at any rate promised, is the total abolition of the *li-kin*, both "old" and "new," and of the provincial lottery. Reductions are made in the price of salt (which here, as elsewhere in China, is a Government monopoly), together with the fees payable in lawsuits, and will be considered in the case of other imposts, such as fees on land transfer, and the excise on sugar and butchers' meat. "Four cash a catty on salt" is, when reduced to English measures, about  $\frac{1}{12}$ th of 1*d.* for a pound and a third of that necessary, and its removal would seem to be an infinitesimal, almost derisory, boon. Yet, in the aggregate, this tax has, the telegram declares, produced 1,200,000 taels of yearly income. "Ten strings of cash," the fee payable on each lawsuit, is equivalent to about 18*s.*, and is moderate indeed when compared to judicial fees in England. There is no doubt that the fees on land transfer stand badly in need of revision.

Exemption from land tax (for the current half-year) in the case of farms that have suffered through the present disturbances, and compassionate allowances, are usual in similar cases, but these have hitherto been acts of grace on the part of the Sovereign, and not the grant of a provincial committee. With the question of the proper duties of the "t'uan-pao," or local train-bands, a Governor-General might perhaps deal on his own initiative and authority, without reference to the Throne. He would certainly, however, announce his intention of submitting a memorial on the subject. In the present case no hint is given of any such intention. On the contrary, the two clauses "which should be adopted as twin pillars of government" are represented as having "been assented to unanimously" by a mixed meeting of high provincial officials and local gentry.

In short, government of Szechuan by the Szechuanese has dawned. It remains to be seen what is the exact nature of the concordat that must have been entered into between the Szechuan malcontents and, on the one hand, Chao Erh-feng, and, on the other, the revolutionaries at Wuchang.

I have, &amp;c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

## Enclosure 9 in No. 45.

*Circular Telegram to the Officials and Gentry throughout Szechuan, issued by the Acting Governor-General, the four Commissioners, the two Intendants, and the Gentry and the Elders of the various Classes (at Chengtu).*

(Published in the "Chengt'u Jih-pao" of November 22, 1911.)

THE misfortunes of Shu (Szechuan) are to-day extreme. Ever since the railway controversy started, the gentry and people of the whole province have not shrunk from running to and fro, imploring till their voices grow hoarse and their mouths cracked,

seeking some acceptable and satisfactory solution. I, the acting Governor-General, and my council at first were also extremely bent on circumventing (the difficulty) and giving strenuous assistance. Unexpectedly disturbances repeatedly arose, one outbreak leading to another, until they culminated in the present situation—heartrending, grievous to the eye, and most pitiable. During the last few months for hundreds of *li* round the capital the able-bodied have steeped barb and point, while the old and weak have been rolled in the ditches. Fields and gardens, towns and hamlets, have been overgrown with weeds, traders and husbandmen deplore their loss of goods. The life and property of the people have been sacrificed, amid arson, pillage, robbery, and violence, in numbers unknown, yet disorder still prevails, and the time of its ending is not yet.

Alas! is this what the elders of our State expect when they ask guidance of the officials and look up to the gentry? Of those who have suffered from the strife provoked, and consequent troubles, is there one who is not a child of the court? Why should these delight in running, sword drawn, into danger, to be caught in the meshes of the law and to bring misfortune on hearth and home?

It may be that the principles of government failed of efficiency, or that education and training were without precept, so that in ordinary times, when men suffered from hunger and cold they could not tell their griefs, and when the railway troubles reverberated, too violent action was unfortunately taken. Hence they could not avoid assembling together and getting involved, nor fail to take the opportunity to think of rising.

In short, how could their hearts be in it? Then when the railway developed into excited controversy, and from that into rapine and disorder, the officials and gentry at the head of affairs certainly cannot be excused from responsibility. I, the Governor-General, who was in charge of this principality, could not nip the trouble in the bud, nor could I subsequently suppress the upheaval. When I examine my conscience I am the more ashamed of my wrong-doing.

It is not till now that a beginning has been made at reparation, and we, officials and gentry, have no means of escaping from criticism. If we still look idly on or hesitate, and do not seek eagerly for some way of bringing back salutary government, then shall we be ungrateful to the Sovereign above and deceitful towards the people below. How could such a sin be forgiven? Now, fortunately, the whole body of officials and gentry are united in their aim, and are working together with a single mind, all to help the common weal. They have agreed upon several schemes for suppressing disorder, and I, the Acting Governor-General, have examined and approved them severally, and now issue them for general observance.

1. The officials and gentry shall co-operate to lighten the burdens of the people, in order to show compassion for the people's hardships.

Szechuan is a great and populous province, and the various dues and duties payable to the State are numerous. Of late, as there has been so much that is waiting to be done, the demands on the people have increased, while no solid benefit to the people has resulted. The source of the revolt of the poor (or of poverty and the revolt) really has its beginning here. It has now been proposed to make certain reductions, As regards the land tax in districts that have suffered on this occasion, the officials and gentry will ascertain the facts and will submit requests in each case for exemption, together with compassionate allowances in the case of those families who have suffered wounds or death, or are in straitened means through the disorders. The other reductions or abolitions that are to be effected are as follows:—

(a.) *The additional 4 cash per catty on salt* imposed to make up for the opium-tax brought in each year about 1,200,000 taels; this it has now been resolved to abolish altogether.

(b.) *The old and new li-kin.*—The old *li-kin* was collected at all offices and barriers throughout the provinces; the new *li-kin* in the eastern circuit. The yearly receipts were about 500,000 taels. It is now proposed to abolish altogether both the new and old *li-kin*, and to take down at once all *li-kin* and barrier stations.

(c.) *Fees in lawsuits.*—By the regulations the fee payable in each suit was ten strings of cash, of which one-half was sent to Chengtu to meet judicial expenses, the other half being retained for local Government purposes. It is now proposed to remit the half sent to Chengtu.

(d.) *The Lottery.*—A lottery differs in no way from a tax on gambling, and is most harmful to the people. The lottery office has now been ordered to make up its accounts, when a date will be fixed for its abolition. All tickets that people have

bought for lotteries not yet drawn may be brought to the office, and the money paid for them recovered, the tickets being handed back and cancelled. In outside departments and districts the redemption of lottery tickets not yet drawn will be settled conjointly by the officials and gentry who will apply for instructions before taking action.

The above four matters have been already decided as regard abolition or reduction, and telegrams will at once be sent to stop sales and purchases, though a separate batch of instructions will be issued for guidance. Whether in the case of other imposts, such as fees on transfers of land, the sugar benevolence, and the *li-kin* on meat, there is room for reduction, will be decided later after discussion, and announcements will be made from time to time.

2. The officials and gentry of each district will assist in the rectification of the train bands as an aid to local good government.

The institution of the "t'uan-pao" was intended for mutual watch and ward, so that the people of any given neighbourhood could keep off trouble from that neighbourhood. The idea was good, the system was excellent, and for a long time the results were satisfactory. Of late, however, there has been a loss of efficiency, leading to numerous evils, which is much to be regretted. Every effort ought now to be made to secure an effective "t'uan-pao." The gentry should prepare a roster which they should submit to the local authorities to choose from. Vacancies in the train bands should be filled by selection from respectable and courageous husbandmen; no vagabonds should be appointed. Bye-laws for expenditure should be adopted at a meeting of householders, and extortion and oppression should be strenuously forbidden: or an arrangement might be made for grants in aid from public funds. When once formed they should be zealously drilled and inspected from time to time by the local officials, and promoted or degraded. If instructors are lacking, application could be made for some to be detached who would exert themselves in giving a good training.

When nothing was doing the men could disperse and return to their farm labours. In the case of trouble arising they would unite to guard against it. But their duties will be limited to keeping watch and ward, and making arrests and protecting their own districts. To leave their bounds and fight in battle is not what is to be expected from "t'uan-pao," who ought not to be compelled to suffer hardship or change their condition to one of danger and alarm. The whole system will be in accordance to the regulations which have been approved from time to time. They will be carefully amended, the guiding principle being that the gentry will act while the officials superintend.

In this way the duty of the soldier will be to fight; that of the train-band man to keep watch. Nevertheless at the time of actual war, the t'uan-pao may still assist, so that petty thieves shall have no place to hide in, and evil weeds will be mown down.

The above two causes are plans which in the present attempt to suppress disorder should be adopted as twin pillars of government. They have been assented to unanimously, and I, the Acting Governor-General, have approved them after careful consideration. The officials and gentry everywhere should study them, and carry them into effect with all sincerity, so as to ensure the conversion of peril into peace.

Still more important is it, in view of the dangers of the times to aim after unanimity. Officials and gentry in their intercourse must grasp at sincerity with a view to mutual confidence. What the right of things makes it proper to strive for, that they should persist in, however irksome. When the interests of the public demand, self should be disregarded and no personal loss grudged. If only they can exert themselves to help a state of good government may be gradually attained.

The majority of the crowds who have of late assembled and who are causing trouble, have been deceived or forced into joining, have had no option, but really possess no property to defend or home to which to return. The local officials and gentry ought in all sincerity to admonish them to get them the sooner to disperse. At the same time they should carefully consider the peaceful disposal of them, and they may be provided with food.

They must first of all issue notices far and wide, that all may know everywhere that if they will but put by spear and buckler, they will assuredly not be prosecuted for their past. I, the Governor-General, have recently circulated for obedience detailed orders to disperse. If after present exhortation there are still any who have not the sense to reform, but defiantly assemble and refuse to disperse, harrying the countryside, then

these must be scoundrels obstinate in wickedness, whom the officials and people of all our Szechuan should regard as public enemies. The army will combat them with martial strength to prevent them from causing harm to the populace. There is no option but to remove the violent and to give peace to the good.

What besides should be done in the way of encouragement or abolition must be proposed for consideration after public discussion before it can be carried into effect.

I, the Acting Governor-General, and the whole body of the officials and the gentry at the time of the upheaval, were mistaken in our action; we admit our fault and are ashamed, and are sick at heart day and night. If peace is delayed a day, the situation will be a day longer in settlement, and our heavy fault a day more unforgiven. This will be to employ to the utmost our fond sincerity in strenuous search of redemption. Will you not, fathers and elders of the State, also regard our purpose and listen to our words?

Our tears flow as we recount all this, when it reaches you we trust you will forgive and take note.

Published by the Governor-General, the financial, educational, judicial, and salt gabelle commissioners, the police, and commercial intendants, and the whole body of the elders among the gentry, traders, and students of Chengtu.

No. 46.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 28, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai, reporting the presentation on the 20th instant of the identic communication to their Excellencies T'ang Shao-yi and Wu Ting-fang from the Governments of France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, and the United States, and describing the manner in which it has been received.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 46.

*Consul-General Fraser to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Shanghai, December 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that so soon as your telegram was received yesterday my staff set about preparing three copies for each of the consuls-general of the six Powers presenting the identic note to the peace negotiators, their Excellencies T'ang and Wu.

The Chinese version was drafted by Mr. Bristow, with the aid of my Japanese colleague who kindly came to lend his assistance. At Mr. Ariyoshi's request I revised their very difficult work and tried to make the translation depart as little as was absolutely necessary from literalness.

At 4 o'clock the six consuls met at the office of the senior, Mr. von Buri, and were handed the copies of the English text; the Chinese version being sent them somewhat later. It was arranged that we should assemble this forenoon at the Russian Consulate, which is nearest the Commissioners' residences, and proceed together to present each his note to Mr. T'ang first and then to Mr. Wu.

This arrangement was duly carried out.

Mr. T'ang simply replied that he would inform his Government of this act of friendly interest, which he was sure would be highly appreciated. He would consult Dr. Wu as to making an identic reply in writing.

Dr. Wu enquired whether reporters, who were in waiting, might be present. We expressed an adverse opinion. Thereafter he expressed gratitude for the good wishes of the six Powers; he was himself a man of peace, member of several peace societies, and we did not need any assurance of his desire to avert war. But, however peacefully inclined, he must likewise not ignore the will of his people who were fighting for freedom and a better Government—objects which no patched-up

settlement could attain permanently. Therefore, if peace were agreed to, it must rest on sure and solid foundations, so as to ensure that no further revolution should be evoked hereafter.

I have, &c.  
E. H. FRASER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 46.

*Identic Communication.*

THE Legation of \_\_\_\_\_ at Peking has been instructed by its Government to make the following unofficial representation to the Commissioners whose task it is to negotiate the conditions for restoring peace in China.

The Government of \_\_\_\_\_ considers that the continuation of the present struggle in China exposes not only the country itself but also the material interests and the security of foreigners to grave danger.

Maintaining the attitude of absolute neutrality which it has hitherto adopted the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ deems it its duty unofficially to call the attention of the two delegates to the need of arriving as soon as possible at an understanding calculated to put an end to the present conflict, being persuaded that this view is in accordance with the wishes of the two parties concerned.

No. 47.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 27, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 8th December,\* I have the honour to report that immediately after the recapture of Hanyang by the Imperial forces on the 27th November negotiations were opened for an armistice, and were successfully concluded. The period of three days, which was prolonged for fifteen more, has now again been extended to the 31st December. It was intended that the truce should apply to all parts of the country which could be reached by telegraph, but it is doubtful if in all the annals of warfare the spirit and letter of an agreement of the kind have been so little honoured by the combatants. Both sides have made daily representations to this legation against violations of the arrangement. It may be said, however, to have had two useful results—it has enabled the conference to assemble at Shanghai and it has averted for the present any further fighting at Hankow. I have done what I can with both sides to discourage any resumption of hostilities at that port. It is true that the rebels still hold the capital of the province, but the Yang-tsze, which may be roughly said to represent the line of cleavage between the constitutional north and the republican south, now separates the opposing forces; the honours have been fairly evenly divided, and, but for the intense suspicion with which each side regards the other, there would seem to be no good reason why the generals in command should not stay their hand pending the outcome of the Shanghai conference. As, however, I do not wish to appear to prejudge the efforts of the negotiators, I have not approached Yuan Shih-kai yet with a definite proposal that Hankow should be neutralised. I may take this opportunity of recording my sense of Mr. Goffe's services, whose timely and useful offices contributed largely to the suspension of hostilities.

Seven hundred Japanese troops are due at Hankow about the 1st January.

Mr. Giles, His Majesty's consul at Changsha, reports that Mr. Arlington, the postal official, withstood the attempts of the Revolutionary Government to take charge of his office. As in the case of the Imperial Maritime Customs, I considered that any interference with the free and normal working of the Imperial postal service under the foreign staff should be strenuously resisted, and in every case where the necessity has arisen, I have instructed His Majesty's consular officers to lend their assistance to this end.

Mr. Giles informs me, to adopt his forcible but accurate language, that the local Government is at the mercy of a military mob. One of the inevitable effects of the revolution has been a subversion of all military discipline, and the troops have been

\* See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No 141.

quick to realise their newly-found power. It was only after they had received large increases of pay and advances that 50,000 of them who had been ordered to Hupeh would consent to proceed and that a violent military outbreak was averted. The 20,000 or 30,000 who remain may be trusted to keep the officials on tenterhooks for some time to come. Since these events a British gun-boat had gone to Changsha, where she will remain for the present.

His Majesty's consul adds that the rest of the province is comparatively quiet, though brigandage is prevalent in several districts.

At Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, the situation is not altogether satisfactory, owing to the weakness of the local leader and to the presence of an anarchical society styled the "Hung Kiang Hui" (or Red River Society), which, according to accounts supplied by His Majesty's consul at Kiukiang, is merely biding its time to plunder and destroy indiscriminately. General Ma has gone from Kiukiang to investigate, and it is possible that he may succeed in putting matters on a more orderly basis. The foreign women and children have been withdrawn to Kiukiang.

Wuhu has remained quiet—due, probably, to the presence of three or more foreign war-ships in the port. The provincial capital, Anking, has, on the other hand, been the scene of looting, burning, and general terrorism, due to the usual struggle for supremacy among the rival revolutionary factions. Half the city is reported to be burnt and nine-tenths of the population have left. At most of the inland missionary stations trouble is brewing or has broken out, but no actual harm to foreign persons or property is reported.

Considering that Canton is in the hands of ex-robber chiefs, the wonder is that any pretence at order prevails there. An interesting reappearance is that of Liu-Jung-fu, the famous leader of the Black Flag against the French in Tonquin in 1884 and a man of 75 years of age. He was given the command of all the newly enlisted troops by the military governor, but his claim to the appointment is disputed by Lu Lan-ching and by two other ex-bandits, who refuse to recognise Liu on account of his advanced age, his obsolete methods, and his addiction to the opium habit. As Liu has some 40,000 retainers, Canton seems likely to start a civil war on its own account. General Lung, the representative of the old order of things, sums up the situation as "very ugly." The whole province, he says, is overrun with robbers; he asserts that he could suppress these disorders, but if he left Canton would break out.

Since the province of Kuangsi declared its independence at Kueilin on the 7th November the capital has been free from disorder. Trade at the West River ports of Wuchow and Nanning has been completely dislocated by the revival of piracy, but Mr. Coales, acting consul at Wuchow, reports that there have been no signs of anti-foreign feeling in the province.

Mr. Twyman reports that people are resuming their normal occupations at Chinkiang. Governor Ch'eng and General Liu, between whom there has been no little jealousy, have apparently composed their differences and stood joint sponsors for one Cheng Ch'uan whom, with general approval, they have appointed military prefect of the city. Chinkiang has been selected as the base for one of the armies which will operate against the north if hostilities are resumed. Most of the missionaries in the north of Kiangsu have withdrawn on the advice of His Majesty's consul given under my circular instructions. Some few have decided to trust to their own judgment as to leaving, and in such cases I do not propose that further pressure should be exercised. The degree of disorder varies greatly in different localities, and so long as danger is to be apprehended only from bands of robbers, as is the case at present, and no general anti-foreign movement has declared itself, local knowledge appears to me to be the surest guide.

Since the 14th November matters in Yünnan appear to have been going from bad to worse. On the 10th December the commissioner of customs at Ssumao telegraphed that the situation was impossible, and he was leaving that day. The next intelligence was that one of the newly recruited regiments, which was on its way to Yünnan-fu from Mengtse, was seriously disaffected, and that the capital was being strongly fortified and provisioned against an expected attack. On the 16th December there was a military rising in the city. Some soldiers tried to seize the armoury, but were overpowered after a short fight. They belonged, apparently, to the society termed the "Ko Lao Hui," which has played a prominent part for many years in fomenting trouble in China. This organisation showed great activity during the massacres at Sianfu, and it augurs ill for the country that an association already notorious for its murdering and thieving propensities should reappear in the remote provinces of Yünnan and Kueichow.

Szechuan declared its independence on the 27th November. The Viceroy agreed to surrender his seal and resume his post as Warden of the Marches, but pending his



departure to remain at Chengtu to advise the new Government. The protocol which his Excellency signed with the usurpers provided that the Manchu garrison should be allowed their usual rice for the present; the executive and judicial officers were at liberty to continue to serve or to take their departure; all officials were to be protected against violence; and no distinction was to be made between Manchus, Mongols, Chinese, or Mahomedans.

A few days later the news arrived, which there is only too good reason to fear is true, that his Excellency Tuan-fang had been done to death at Tzuchow by his own soldiers. This dastardly and cowardly deed was apparently prompted in the main by avarice. Certainly no excuse whatever for it can be found on the ground of political necessity, for since the beginning of his special mission Tuan-fang's whole efforts had been directed towards conciliating the Szechuanese, and it seems that he had abandoned all ideas except that of effecting his safe escape to the north.

Batang, in the far west of the province, is also involved in the rising, and the missionaries have fled, some to Yünnan-fu and some to Assam. No casualties are reported.

Just before the signing of the armistice the Imperial troops made a forward movement into Shansi and captured the rebels' position at Niang-tzu-kuan on the Shansi Railway. The latter made a feeble resistance and fled in all directions. The contemplated advance to retake Taiyuan-fu was then stopped by orders from Peking out of regard for the terms of the armistice. A British officer who was in the neighbourhood reported on the 15th December that all the stations on the railway were again flying the dragon flag, that Taiyuan-fu was quiet, and that the police in the streets had already discarded their revolutionary badges. The main rebel force has retired southward towards Ping-yao, possibly with a view to joining hands with the rebels operating in Shensi.

The north of Shansi is overrun with brigands.

The return of Shantung to Imperial allegiance was brought about through the influence of Wu Ting-yuan, who is a strong supporter of the dynasty and was recently appointed to the command of the 5th division, with whom long association had made him very popular. The change was again effected quite quietly, the representative Assembly has effaced itself, and throughout this not very edifying exhibition of provincial politics Governor Sun Pao-chi has succeeded in retaining his billet. His Excellency has even acquiesced in the wish of Chefoo to maintain its own independence for the present. The latter port is still much perplexed for money, but except for a slight fracas on the night of the 17th December no disorders have broken out, and the constant presence of German, American or Japanese war-ships is a guarantee for the protection of foreigners.

The acting consul-general at Mukden reports that, though there has been some rioting at one or two places, there has been nothing to justify press reports of widespread disorders. Such disturbances as have taken place have subsided or been suppressed.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 48.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 28, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an Imperial decree which was issued this evening. The decree states that the question of a constitutional monarchy or a republic is one which vitally affects the foreign and domestic relations of China, and cannot be decided by the Court or by any particular section of the people, but only by an expression of the national will. It recommends a complete cessation of hostilities, and suggests the preparation of arrangements for convening a National Assembly.

The decree is couched in conciliatory language, and although the proposal it embodies may be a somewhat unpractical one in an Eastern country yet it seems to afford the only possible solution of a problem which is, I fear, almost insoluble by peaceful methods.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

## Enclosure 1 in No. 48.

*Imperial Decree of December 28, 1911.*

THE following decree has been received from the Empress-Dowager Lung Yü. The Cabinet has presented a telegraphic memorial from T'ang Shao-yi as follows :—

“ Wu Ting-fang, the representative of the republican army, insists strongly that the aims and aspirations of the people demand that the political system be changed to that of a republic (*i.e.*, literally a federal form of government).”

When the revolution broke out at Wuchang the Throne acceded to the request made by the Senate and published a constitution in nineteen articles, also taking an oath to maintain the same before the ancestral temple. We hoped thus to end the war and to give our people the blessings of peace, but for the most part our declarations have been treated as empty words and the struggle has frequently recommenced. In our opinion the question whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic is the most suitable is an important question affecting internal and external affairs. It is certainly not a private matter for one class of people to decide, nor is the Throne on its part capable of deciding it. A National Assembly must be convoked to decide the matter publicly.

The Ministers of State and others have memorialised suggesting that the Imperial princes and dukes of the blood nearest to the Throne should meet together and be personally asked their views. On this being done, there were no objections raised to the above proposal.

Let the Cabinet telegraph our intention to T'ang Shao-yi, ordering him to inform the representative of the republican army, so that the notice may be published in advance. At the same time, let the Cabinet proceed immediately to draft, assist in deciding on and put into force the mode of election, and let them summon a National Assembly as soon as possible. At the same time, arrangements should be made with Wu Ting-fang for both sides to cease hostilities. In this way we will secure the lives of the people and end their great sufferings.

Heaven in creating men has placed at their head a Sovereign in order that he may govern them “ as a pastor.” The original intention was that one man should take care of the Empire, and not that the Empire should serve one man.

The Emperor, while still in his infancy, has inherited the Throne from his ancestors. How can it be tolerated that the population should be wiped out and that the whole State be involved in ruin? Our only hope is that the decision of the National Assembly will guarantee the interests of the State and the well-being of the population. Heaven sees by the eyes and hears by the ears of the people.

It is our desire and profound wish that the soldiers and people who love their country should manifest their deep sense of justice and work together in their great task.

## No. 49.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Peking, December 29, 1911.*

IN my despatch of the 14th instant I had the honour to report on the steps that were being taken to get into communication with the missionaries and other foreigners in the province of Shensi.

The military authorities at Tungkwan have now informed the Premier that little hope is held out of an effective escort being arranged for any relief party proceeding by that route.

M. Wallenberg, the Minister for Sweden, who has just arrived in Peking from Tokyo, is specially interested in the situation of the numerous Swedish missionaries in Shensi and beyond, and I invited him yesterday to a conference at which the Ministers for Japan and America were also present, and at which the whole question was fully discussed. The result of the interview which my colleagues and I had with his Excellency Yuan Shih-kai was explained to M. Wallenberg, and it was suggested that when he called on the Premier he should take up the question again, with a view to

the possibility that the situation on the frontier between Honan and Shensi had now changed for the better. I also communicated to my colleagues the latest news from Mr. Sowerby's relief party.

Hearing last evening that Mr. Philip Manners had just arrived from Sianfu I asked him to call this morning, and invited some of my colleagues to hear his experiences. Mr. Manners is the young postal officer who was at first reported to have been killed at Sianfu.

Mr. Manners stated that he left Sianfu on the 30th November—that is, a month and nine days after the rising. By the advice of the revolutionary general he took no baggage or provisions with him (except a sleeping sack), and he was unaccompanied, except by two soldiers provided as an escort by the same general. At Lungchüchai, in the south-east of Shensi, he got a boat to go down the Tan River, and his escort was changed for two men of the local train bands or militia. These left him near the border of Honan, and he was robbed soon afterwards, while anchored at night in the middle of the shallow stream, of all the silver he had with him, which had been supplied for his journey by the rebel leaders. The country through which he passed was in great disorder, and he witnessed many scenes of pillage by bands of roving marauders. After crossing the border into Honan he found the country more peaceful, but he had a difficult journey over steep mountain passes to perform from Sichwanting, where he left the river viâ Nanyangfu, until he reached the Peking-Hankow Railway at Süchow, and took train for Peking. For his journey through Honan he had an escort of two men provided by the Imperialist authorities at Kingtzekwan.

As regards events in Sianfu, Mr. Manners confirmed the accounts already received of the slaughter of Manchus during the first two or three days. He estimated the ordinary Manchu population at 20,000, and corroborated Mr. Shorrock's statement that some 10,000 were killed. He thought about 5,000 had escaped and the rest had committed suicide. He did not believe that more than 100 Chinese (Han) had been killed, for the resistance was not determined. He attributed the slaughter, however, to the fact that the Manchus continued to offer sporadic resistance after agreeing to surrender. The murder of Mrs. Beckman, Mr. Watne, and six children was committed, he understood, by fourteen Szechuan chair-coolies, who thought the watchword was the old Boxer cry of "Protect the dynasty : exterminate the foreigner." After completing their bloody work these ruffians petitioned for a reward, but they were all summarily beheaded, and the cue was thus given that foreigners were to be protected.

As soon as order was comparatively restored, a party of fifty cavalry was sent out to escort the missionaries in the neighbourhood into the city, and all within a radius of some 20 miles had been safely brought in. For the first two or three days there were no supplies to be had, but afterwards all the neighbouring villages sent cartloads of vegetables, &c., into the city, and handed them over voluntarily, without payment, to the new administration. Order was never entirely restored—the shops were closed, and only opened on pain of forfeiture a month after the rising. The foreigners in the city never left their houses without escorts. Moreover, they lived under a constant dread of a further outbreak, due to panic, on account of reports that the Mahomedan, General Ma, was coming to attack the city with 10,000 men.

Mr. Manners further stated that a large party of foreigners, about sixty, including twenty Japanese, were to leave Sianfu on the 3rd December and try to reach Hankow. They were to travel by the same route as he had as far as Kingtzekwan, but from there they would strike south to Laohokow in Hupei, on the Han River. They would be escorted to Lungchüchai by forty cavalry soldiers. They would carry arms and provisions, and Mr. Manners expressed the fear that this would excite the cupidity of the brigands on the way and expose them to the danger of attack. They would require, he thought, at least 30 chairs for the women and children of the party, each chair being carried by 3 men. Altogether the party would consist of some 200 persons, and there would be great difficulty of accommodation in the miserable little inns in Shensi, where they would have to spend the nights. According to a telegram recently received by the American Minister from Hankow, this party was expected to arrive at Laohokow about the 22nd instant, but Mr. Manners thought that owing to the want of depth of water the journey would take longer. Mr. Manners said that with the exception of Dr. and Mrs. Young, who were to join the party coming out, the members of the English Baptist Mission, Mr. and Mrs. Shorrock and others, were remaining at Sianfu.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 50.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)*

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 11, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a translation of the communiqué, published by the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs in to-day's "Official Messenger," relative to Mongolia.

I have, &amp;c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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Enclosure in No. 50.

*Official Communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in the "Official Messenger" dated December 29, 1911 (January 11, 1912).*

THE Mongols, having declared their independence at Urga, and having elected as khan their spiritual head, Schebtsun-Damba-Khutukhta, appeal to Russia for support. The Imperial Government, in reply to this request, advised the Mongols to act with moderation and endeavour to find a basis for an agreement with China. The Russian consulate at Urga by its advice prevented the destruction of the Kalgan-Kiakhta telegraph line and the plundering of the branch of the Daitsin Bank at Urga, and assisted the Chinese amban, Sando, by enabling him to leave Mongolia freely viâ Russian territory.

Subsequently the high official, Kueh-fan, appointed by the Peking Government to negotiate with the Mongols, inquired of the Russian chargé d'affaires at Peking whether he could rely on the friendly mediation of the Imperial consulate at Urga in these negotiations. Simultaneously, the Mongols begged the Imperial Government to mediate between them and the Chinese.

The Imperial Government considered it possible to meet these requests. Recognising that an agreement between the Chinese and Mongols is possible only if the latter are guaranteed their autonomous régime, the Imperial Government considered that this agreement should be embodied in some act guaranteeing the non-violation of this régime by the Chinese. As is known, the Mongols regard the following three measures, which have been taken by the Chinese Government in Mongolia, as infringements of this régime, namely, the establishment there of Chinese administration, the formation there of Chinese regular troops, and the settling of Mongolian territory with Chinese. In reply to the request for mediation made by the Peking Government through its representative, Kueh-fan, the Imperial Government therefore indicated the three points above mentioned as a basis for a possible agreement between the Chinese and Mongols.

At the same time, the Imperial Government recognised that real tranquillity in Mongolia can prevail only if the Mongols clearly realise that the measures which are being taken in their country for its development meet with the approval of both the Imperial and the Chinese Governments, and that no differences of opinion exist between Russia and China in connection with Mongolian affairs.

For this reason, the Imperial Government deemed it in accordance with the interests both of Russia and China and of the Mongols to express its readiness to give its friendly support in the carrying out in Mongolia of all necessary measures, whether administrative, or economic, or cultural in their character.

The above-mentioned bases on which Russia would agree to mediate, as requested by the interested parties, between the Chinese and Mongols, were communicated by the Imperial chargé d'affaires at Peking to the Chinese Government, with the additional statement that should it agree to the establishment of Chinese-Mongolian relations on the above specified bases the efforts of Russian diplomacy will be directed towards inducing the Mongols not to sever their connection with China and to observe the obligations taken upon themselves.

It depends on the good-will of the Chinese Government whether the mediation of Russia on these conditions is accepted or rejected.

Not desirous of intervening in the struggle taking place in China, and harbouring no aggressive designs on Mongolia, Russia, however, cannot but be interested in the establishment of lasting order in this province adjoining Siberia, and in which Russia

possesses large commercial interests. An armed struggle between the Mongols and the Chinese is not desirable for us, because our interests would inevitably suffer thereby. It is this consideration which has above all induced the Imperial Government to express its readiness to undertake the difficult task of mediation between the Chinese and the Mongols so hostilely disposed towards the former.

On the other hand, these large interests in Mongolia do not permit the Imperial Government to ignore the Government which has been practically established in that country. If Mongolia severs her connection with China, the Imperial Government, with every desire to see the Chinese Mongolian dispute ended, will be compelled by force of circumstances to enter into business relations with the Mongolian Government.

No. 51.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 15, 1912.*

MY telegram of yesterday.

Private secretary to Yuan Shih-kai tells me that, as the greater part of China has declared for a republic, it has been decided to accept the inevitable at once, since the convocation of a national Assembly to decide the question would involve delay and consequent risk. An edict will, he says, probably be issued shortly by the Empress Dowager by which the abdication of the Manchu dynasty will be announced and Yuan Shih-kai authorised to carry on a provisional Government until a President of the Republic has been elected.

Meanwhile, the armistice has been renewed for a further fortnight from to-day.

No. 52.

*Consul-General O'Brien-Butler to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Yünnan-fu, December 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch which I am sending to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, recording the course of events in the province of Yünnan up to the end of November.

I have, &c.

P. E. O'BRIEN-BUTLER.

Enclosure in No. 52.

*Consul-General O'Brien-Butler to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Yünnan-fu, December 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report the following events in the province up to the end of November.

A proclamation was posted in Yünnan-fu on the 5th November ordering the people to have their queues removed within the space of five days. It was, however, generally disregarded, as no punishment was mentioned to meet the case of disobedience to the order.

But when the period had elapsed soldiers were posted in the principal streets and with big shears snipped off the queues of all the townspeople who still wore them. The effect was magical. Within twelve hours not a queue was to be seen in the city, and now even in the neighbouring villages most of the men are queueless, and those who have not conformed to the new order of things have their hair dressed for them at the nearest police box they may happen to pass when affairs bring them to the city suburbs.

Generally speaking, excellent order has been kept by the new Government, persons found guilty of looting or extorting money or provisions from the people being promptly shot. The heads were then cut off and exhibited as a warning to others. A certain

number of soldiers have, from time to time, deserted, in some cases taking their arms with them and probably joining the highway robbers, who are becoming increasingly active in various parts of the province. In other cases where a life of violence does not appeal to them, they have thrown their rifles into ponds and ditches. The Government has offered a reward for the recovery of these rifles, and also of a number of horses that stampeded or have been stolen. Donations of rice and money were invited by the new Government, and it was feared at one time that soldiers would be sent to the houses of the wealthy inhabitants of the town to collect them, but the fear proved to be unfounded.

On the 13th November the ex-Viceroy, Li Ching-hsi, was allowed to leave for Tonkin, and was escorted to the frontier at Hokow by the student volunteer guard. He was, however, very apprehensive regarding the intentions of his escort, who appear to have treated him with considerable disrespect, and he relied for protection on the two French consular officers, M. Wilden accompanying him as far as Pohsi, and M. Beauvais beyond to the frontier. It is well known that Li Ching-hsi is a man of great wealth, and the general impression here is that he has purchased his freedom at a high price, the ransom going to swell the depleted local treasury. Mr. Shah and Mr. Tseng were smuggled out of the city during the evening of the 16th, and left for Tonkin by the first train next morning.

From about the 10th disquieting reports began to be received regarding a general want of security in the province, and I was warned that foreigners travelling ought to have a strong escort of men from the lu-chün to protect them against highway robbers. Many attacks have been made on Chinese, but so far foreigners have escaped molestation. On one occasion the mail was attacked by robbers while it was being conveyed between trains at one of the breaks in the railway, but the guard of twenty soldiers easily repulsed the bandits, of whom two were shot dead. On the 13th news arrived of the murder of a French missionary at Huilichou, in Szechuan, about twelve days' journey north of Yünnan-fu; and subsequently we heard that the Legendre expedition had been attacked near Ningyuan-fu, and that generally a state of chaos existed in Szechuan—at least in that part nearest Yünnan-fu—the Imperialists and revolutionaries contending together and the Lolos from the independent country attacking both indiscriminately. As it appeared likely that these troubles would spread to Yünnan, and in view of the increasing spirit of lawlessness generally, my French colleague, M. Wilden, and I considered it best to advise all persons whose presence in the province was not absolutely necessary for business reasons to withdraw, thus leaving fewer to flee at the last moment should such a course be necessary; and we recommended all persons living up-country to come to Yünnan-fu, at least, in preparation for possible flight. In consequence of my recommendation two Germans employed in connection with the electric light installation, who were about to return to the works near Anningchou, decided to withdraw to Hong Kong; and some missionaries going on furlough, and M. Helsgaun, of the Telegraphs, and his wife, who were about to leave for Shanghai, hastened their departure. Various disquieting rumours in the city crystallised by the 17th November into a report that a section of the soldiers intended to mutiny, kill the members of the Government, loot generally, and disperse. The time was to be possibly that night, but more probably the next. I had a talk with M. Wilden, and we agreed that it was desirable that all European ladies and children should leave the province as soon as possible.

Early on the 18th I wrote to the local secretary of the China Inland Mission, and gave him a formal order that British ladies and children should leave—there being no British ladies in the province unconnected with his mission—and I strongly recommended Miss Johnston, an American, to act as if she were a British subject, and had received an order to leave. At the same time I strongly recommended everyone under my care to sleep outside the city the following night, on account of the possibility of an outbreak. M. Wilden and I called on General Tsai with regard to the threatened outbreak, and urged on him the necessity of preventive measures being taken. The general affected to disbelieve the possibility of anything happening, and assured us that everything in the city and neighbourhood was quiet, and that the rumour that French troops had already reached Mengtsz on their way to Yünnan-fu—which had nearly caused a panic amongst the soldiers and the townspeople—was already generally disbelieved. Acting in accordance with the advice I had given to others, Mr. Gammon and I slept at the French hotel outside the city, and the next day returned to the consulate to find it untouched. Nothing had apparently happened, but we heard later that an outbreak had actually commenced but was immediately suppressed through the vigilance of the general, who had kept a large body of reliable troops under arms all the night, and was

prepared to withstand a siege in his head-quarters. Since then two more attempts at mutiny have been made, both being either frustrated or promptly suppressed by General Tsai. The disaffected soldiers belong chiefly to the old 73rd regiment, who think that they did not receive their fair share of loot in the sacking of the yamên on the night of the revolution; there is also an idea that the result of the revolution has been merely the substitution of General Tsai for Viceroy Li—King Stork for King Log. With regard to what may be considered rewards for their action in connection with the revolution, I hear that many soldiers secured no less than 400 taels worth of loot each. How it is that the men of the 73rd regiment got none I do not know. Recently General Tsai has presented to each man in this regiment a sum of 40 taels.

On the 19th November General Tsai sent 40 rifles and 6,000 rounds of ammunition to the French consulate, which certainly looked at the time as if he expected foreigners to defend themselves and not rely upon him for protection. Notwithstanding an assurance given me by Mr. Wang that the members of the Revolutionary Government are the best of friends and absolutely united in the work of administration, I have every reason to believe that the contrary is the fact. On one occasion, as the result of a violent altercation, General Tsai, the Hunanese, insisted on handing over charge to the second in command, General Li, the Yünnanese. Li did his best at administering the government for three days and then begged Tsai to relieve him of the burden.

The last resident ladies left Yünnan-fu on the 24th November.

I have already referred to the bad news received here from Ningyuan-fu, in Szechuan, which now appears to have been greatly exaggerated, and all Europeans were safe up to about the middle of November. The following are two extracts from letters with Ningyuan news addressed to the secretary of the China Inland Mission:—

“*November 10.*—Alive and well, after an exciting siege. On the 26th October 200 men entered the city, killed the district magistrate, and were then driven away from the prefect’s yamên by soldiers. They then encamped about 3 miles from the city. Early on the 29th October the rebels attacked the gates, but were easily repulsed. From that time on we felt more safe and reinforcements gave strength enough for an attack on the rebel camp on the 4th November. They were easily defeated, the leaders escaped but were soon captured. Four prisoners were put through the torture of the cross and over 150 were beheaded. Over 1,000 have been killed. The two French travellers attacked at Huangshui T’ang (members of the Legendre mission) are in the city in good condition; they lost everything and were somewhat cut up, but their wounds are practically healed now.—CHARLES HUMPHREYS.”

“*November 11.*—We have been kept in safety, though the ladies’ nerves were shaken quite a little. As you can imagine, we are glad to be at peace again. From what we can gather, the road is still blocked between Ningyuan and Yachou, though I think the soldiers will soon disperse the rebels there. Business is at a standstill, no mail has come through for about two months, and we are anxious to hear from the outside world again.—R. WELLWOOD.”

On the 16th November 1,500 soldiers, many belonging to the disaffected 73rd, started for Szechuan by way of Chaotung, probably to join the Republicans fighting in that province; although at the time General Tsai and his staff stated definitely that the object of the expedition was to conquer and annex the southern part of the province of Szechuan so that Yünnan, a notoriously poor province and one in the habit of receiving large remittances from wealthier provinces, would overcome the chief obstacle in the way of an absolutely independent republic and receive into the Treasury at Yünnan-fu the great wealth of its neighbour to the north. This body of troops was to be the advance guard and more were to follow.

On the 29th November I was informed by Mr. Interpreter Wang that the whole country from Tengyueh to Talifu was in a state of anarchy owing to a rising of the Mahomedans combined with some of the tribal chieftains against the new Government, and that a battle had been fought on the 26th November, near Hsian Kuan, in the neighbourhood of Talifu, between the Han regulars and the insurgents, in which the former were victorious. General Li, the second in command here, left on the 30th November with 3,000 troops to reinforce the garrisons in the west of the province.

The Yünnan delegates to attend the congress assembling at Shanghai left

Yünnan-fu on the 30th November. The party consists of Mr. Lu, chief secretary to General Tsai; Mr. Chang, councillor to the Government, and formerly procurator in the provincial Supreme Court; and three or four others.

I have, &c.

P. E. O'BRIEN-BUTLER.

No. 53.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received January 17.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, January 17, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 17th instant, from the commander-in-chief, China, relative to the Chinese rebellion.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 53.

*Commander-in-chief, China, to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*January 17, 1912.*

REBELS are transporting troops to north by sea with an escort of men-of-war. I am ordering His Majesty's ship "Kent" to Chefoo to watch operations, and to follow the transports in the event of their leaving for any other port. Sir J. Jordan concurs in this action.

No. 54.

*Wang Chung Hui, Revolutionary Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nanking, January 17, 1912.*

REPUBLICAN Government has been firmly established. To facilitate our intercourse with foreign countries and enable us the better to fulfil our international obligations, I earnestly urge upon you the advisability of recognising our Government at an early date.

No. 55.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 11th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram which has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of the military preparations for the protection of British interests in China.\*

The Army Council will observe that Sir J. Jordan considers that the serious outlook may render it impossible to spare troops from the North China Command for service in South China.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

\* No. 40.



## No. 56.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 18, 1912.*

I CALLED to-day to congratulate Yuan Shih-kai on escaping the attempt on his life.

He expressed himself glad of the opportunity to discuss the situation with me. Two solutions had been suggested :—

1. That a decree should be issued authorising him to carry on a provisional Government on a republican basis pending the election, to follow in about a week, of a President of a Republic by the provincial deputies already assembled at Nanking and Peking.

2. That he should be authorised by a similar decree to carry on a provisional republican form of Government, pending the election of the President of the Republic by a specially convened national assembly.

The first suggestion would have the advantage of enabling the new Government to start at once upon the task of restoring order and pacifying the country, and was therefore considered preferable. He intimated that an understanding on this point had been come to with the southern leaders, and that it was his intention to remove the seat of government for a few months to Tien-tsin. He had two reasons for this move. It was necessary, in the first place, to break away completely from the influences of the former régime; and, secondly, the republican leaders would not imperil their lives by coming to Peking at this moment.

He stated that the Court recognised that the national will must prevail, and assured me that he had acted throughout in scrupulous obedience to their wishes.

I gather that the decree will be issued within a week.

## No. 57.

*Wang Chung Hui, Revolutionary Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received January 19.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nanking, January 19, 1912.*

MANCHU Government having entered into negotiations with Republic of China for purpose of abdicating their entire sovereign rights, power, and privileges, we fervently pray recognition to avoid disastrous interregnum.

## No. 58.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, December 13, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of the situation at Tengyueh.

I have, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 58.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, December 13, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 4th December, I have the honour to report that the trouble between Tengyueh and Talifu, induced by the foolish ambition of Chang Wên-kuang, has come to a head, though there is still hope that the matter may be settled without local disturbances.

The despatch of troops from Tengyueh to Talifu resulted, as reported in my despatch under reference, in a collision in which the Tengyueh party was defeated and driven

back. The number of casualties in this affair has since been given as 200, and a further encounter is reported to have taken place at Huanglienp'u on the road from Talifu to Yungchang, in which the Tengyueh party was again defeated with a loss of about a hundred men. This news was accompanied by the further information that Yu Jen-nung, who had been put in charge of the western circuit in place of Chao Fan, the latter being unwilling to take office, and had been instructed to deal with question of Chang's proceedings, was about to advance on Tengyueh with 1,000 men.

At this news Chang fell into a panic, and, sending for the frontier deputy, Chao, with tears entreated his advice. Chao, who had from the first warned Chang against the imbecility of the course he had adopted with admirable courage and perseverance, but whose advice had been disregarded, drafted a telegram to be sent by Chang to the revolutionary authorities at Yünnan-fu, asking that the expedition against Tengyueh should be recalled, and that a taotai and a ting might be appointed at Tengyueh, on the arrival of whom Chang would retire into private life, and affairs in Tengyueh might resume their normal condition. The Lungling Ting, who happened to be in Tengyueh, was ordered to Talifu to intercede with Yu Jen-nung, with whom he is on terms of friendship, and endeavour to have the expedition recalled.

The hopes that were entertained that a settlement on these lines would be effected and that Chang would be removed from power were destined to receive an immediate and severe shock. Before the Lungling Ting left for Talifu, Chang learned that he had previously sent a telegram to Yünnan-fu describing the actual state of affairs in Tengyueh, and referring to Chang in terms of reprobation, well deserved perhaps, but in the circumstances hardly discreet. Chang's terror now changed to fury, and he had the Lungling Ting arrested and instantly beheaded in the most barbarous manner, disregarding the protests of the old general and Chao, who did their utmost to dissuade him from this act of savagery.

The prospects of peace have been much diminished, if not annihilated, by this brutal murder, and it is stated that Chang intended to offer armed resistance to the expected expedition from Talifu. His chances of success in this are too small to be worth considering, and it is quite possible that he may change his mind, as he has often done before, more especially as there is very little ammunition available for his troops.

Nevertheless, the situation is disquieting. It is, of course, impracticable for those who have retained their senses to communicate by telegraph with the authorities at the capital on the subject of Chang's excesses, and, in the meantime, he is steadily exasperating public feeling by the arbitrary tyranny of his conduct. Excessive fines have been imposed in several instances, and in at least one case a severe bambooning was imposed in addition to a fine, in consequence, it is generally believed, of a personal grudge. Tame as the people generally are here, it is not impossible that, if the expedition from Tali should continue to approach, the fear of invasion combined with irritation at Chang's conduct may lead to disturbances, more especially if, as appears probable, the soldiers, who have been enlisted with reckless haste during the past month, should be disappointed of their promised pay.

The chief hope of avoiding serious trouble lies in Chao, the frontier deputy, whose ability and honesty are generally recognised, and who has succeeded on several occasions in restraining the violent and foolish impulses of Chang, and the retired General Chang, whose age, position, and long residence in Tengyueh give him the leading place among the local gentry. These two are exerting themselves to avert a catastrophe, and hopes are entertained that they may succeed in arranging a compromise.

I have, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

[2933]

No. 59.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 2, 1912*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a memorandum which, at the request of the Hong Keng and Shanghai Banking Corporation, I have addressed to the Wai-wu Pu, recording the non-payment of the instalments due in December for the service of the Chinese Government 6 per Cent. Sterling Loan of 1895 and 5 per Cent. Sterling Loan of 1896;

and stating the rate of exchange fixed for these payments by the commissioner of customs at Shanghai under instructions from the inspector-general.

The reference in my memorandum to the Wai-wu Pu's communication of the 20th November is to a note on the subject of the instalment due on the first-mentioned of these two loans, translation of which, together with copy of my note of the 12th November to which it was a reply, is enclosed herewith to complete the record. The reference to the Wai-wu Pu's communication of the 27th November is to the memorandum concerning the second loan, which formed one of the enclosures in my despatch of the 5th ultimo referred to above.

The question of setting free for the service of the foreign loans the customs revenue now accumulating to the account of the inspector-general has been delayed for some time pending the receipt of replies from some of the Governments concerning the proposals of the Shanghai bankers, but a meeting of the diplomatic body is to be held to-morrow to discuss the subject, and I trust that I shall soon be able to report that the proposed commission of bankers has begun to exercise its functions.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 59.

*Sir J. Jordan to Prince Ch'ing.*

Your Highness,

November 12, 1911.

ON the 16th April, 1909, I had the honour to receive a letter from your Highness on the question of settling exchange for the service of the Chinese Government loans, and with special reference to the Imperial Chinese Government 6 per Cent. Gold Loan of 1895.

A translation of this letter was communicated through the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in Peking to their branch in Shanghai, and as a result of the correspondence which ensued between the manager of the bank and the Shanghai taotai it was arranged that the latter should settle exchange for the service of the above loan in five weekly instalments during the five preceding weeks to the due date of the instalment.

In the statement of instalments and interest due on the 10th December, 1911, the following amounts and dates were agreed upon:—

44,800*l.* to be settled any day between the 6th and the 12th November;  
 44,800*l.* to be settled any day between the 13th and the 19th November;  
 44,800*l.* to be settled any day between the 20th and the 26th November;  
 44,800*l.* to be settled any day between the 27th November and the 3rd December;  
 44,800*l.* to be settled any day between the 4th and the 10th December;  
 making a total of 224,000*l.* for the instalment due on the 10th December, 1911.

I have the honour to inform your Highness, with reference to the above, that I have received a letter from the agent of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in Peking to the effect that he is in receipt of a telegram from the Shanghai branch advising him that the Shanghai taotai states that he is not in a position to settle exchange for the above amounts as he has no funds coming in.

Under these circumstances, I should be glad to learn what steps the Chinese Government propose to take in regard to this matter, and I have the honour to request that instructions may be issued as to the settlement of exchange and subsequent payment of the instalment and interest due on the 10th December, 1911.

Awaiting the favour of a reply, I avail, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 59.

*The Wai-wu Pu to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

3rd year, 9th month, 30th day (November 20, 1911).

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 12th instant with reference to the payment of the instalment of the Imperial Chinese Government 6 per Cent. Gold Loan of 1895 due on the 10th December, 1911 and in which you state [quotes note of the 12th November].

Our Ministry accordingly addressed a despatch to the Ministry of Finance and have now received a reply in the following terms :—

“As regards the customs receipts at those places where revolution has broken out, our Ministry has written to the revenue council asking for the issue of instructions to the inspector-general that for the time being it is not necessary to divide the duties received in the proportion of four-tenths and six-tenths, but that the whole collection should be devoted towards the payment of foreign loans and the indemnity. The above instalment of 224,000*l.* should then be appropriated from the customs revenue received at the aforesaid custom-houses and paid over to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation by the inspector-general of customs.”

Our Ministry has, therefore, notified the revenue council of the date when the instalment of the loan falls due and also of the procedure arranged in the past for settling exchange in instalments and have requested that the inspector-general may be instructed to take the matter in hand. At the same time we have the honour to address this reply for your Excellency's information, and beg that you will notify the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in the above sense.

We have, &c.

WAI-WU PU.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 59.

*Memorandum communicated to Wai-wu Pu by Sir J. Jordan.*

WITH reference to the Wai-wu Pu's communications of the 20th and 27th ultimo, His Majesty's Minister is now informed by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank that the following amounts due from the Chinese Government for the service of loans were not paid on the due dates, viz., 224,000*l.* due the 10th December, 1911, on account of the Imperial Chinese Government 6 per Cent. Sterling Loan of 1895; 80,579*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* due on the 20th December, 1911, on account of the Imperial Chinese Government 5 per Cent. Sterling Loan of 1896.

Exchange for the above amounts has been settled by the bank with the commissioner of customs, Shanghai, acting under the instructions of the inspector-general of customs as follows :—

December 6 : 44,800*l.* settled at 2*s.* 5 $\frac{5}{8}$ *d.*

December 7 : 44,800*l.* settled at 2*s.* 5 $\frac{9}{16}$ *d.*

December 8 : 44,800*l.* settled at 2*s.* 5 $\frac{5}{8}$ *d.*

December 9 : 89,600*l.* settled at 2*s.* 5 $\frac{1}{16}$ *d.*

December 20 : 40,289*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* (being that half share of the instalment which is due to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank) settled at 2*s.* 5 $\frac{9}{16}$ *d.*

Sir John Jordan has the honour to inform the Wai-wu Pu accordingly in order that the matter may be placed on record, and he begs that instructions may be issued for the early repayment of the amounts due.

December 30, 1911.

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No. 60.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 2, 1912.*

IN my despatch of the 28th December, I had the honour to transmit to you copy of a decree referring the question of a constitutional monarchy or a republic to the decision of a national convention, and I now beg to enclose two supplementary papers which explain the circumstances which led to the adoption of this step.

The first is a telegram from T'ang Shao-yi to Yuan Shih-kai, in which he states that his private enquiries had convinced him that the feeling in the southern and eastern provinces was entirely in favour of a republic, and that the only way of meeting the popular demand was to convoke a representative assembly to deliberate upon the question of the future form of government.

The second enclosure is a memorial by the Cabinet reciting the reasons which led to the dispatch of T'ang to Shanghai, acknowledging the good offices of myself and the

representatives of other Powers, and detailing, by quotation of extracts from T'ang's telegram, the history of the negotiations at Shanghai. The conclusion of the memorialists is that the uncompromising attitude of the revolutionaries, combined with the lack of resources on the Imperialist side, leave them no option but to recommend that the suggestion made by T'ang for the convocation of a National Assembly should be considered by the members of the Imperial Clan and receive the formal approval of the Throne.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 60.

*T'ang Shao-yi to Yuan Shih-kai.*

(Telegraphic.)

December 27, 1911.

I, T'ANG SHAO-YI, after receipt of the despatch from the Premier appointing me as head of the peace delegation, proceeded to Hankow, and subsequently owing to the venue for the conference being changed to Shanghai, I travelled thither by steamer. On the 18th and 21st December I had two conferences with Wu T'ing-fang, the representative of the revolutionary armies in the various provinces. I have in frequent telegrams to your Excellency reported what took place.

The chief aim and object of the revolutionary army is to establish a republican form of government, and if I will not accept this as a basis, then they are unwilling to continue the negotiations. My private investigations show that popular feeling in the eastern and southern provinces is firmly established in favour of a republic, and there is nothing to withstand the advance of this feeling.

Recently two aeroplanes have been constructed, and Sun Wen (Sun Yat Sen) has, further, arrived in Shanghai. He is engaged in organising a provisional Government with the idea of firmly establishing his base. Moreover, I learn that Sun Wen has intervened to prevent China from raising foreign loans. The negotiations broken off, war will again break out. It is to be feared also that financial straits will aggravate still further present difficulties, and that the situation of the dynasty will become critical. I realise all this, and if therefore I do not speak, how shall I face the Empress-Dowager and the Emperor on the one hand, and the people on the other hand?

When I was leaving Peking your Excellency instructed me to settle the question above all in a peaceful manner. The idea has come to me during the conference to arrange for the convocation of a National Assembly when the question whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic should be adopted might be decided upon by vote in order that a compromise might be arrived at.

Wu T'ing-fang states that representatives from the various provinces are present in Shanghai in quite sufficient numbers, that the majority of them are in favour of a republic, and that it is unnecessary to convoke another assembly. To this I rejoined that Manchuria, Chih-li, Shantung, Honan, Mongolia, Turkestan, and Thibet had not sent representatives, and that under these circumstances his proposition would not be just.

But Wu T'ing-fang would not consent to convoke an assembly.

The armistice is on the point of expiring. After mature reflection I consider that there is only one course to take, namely to demand the promulgation of an Imperial decree from to-day ordering the Premier to issue Cabinet instructions for the convocation of a provisional National Assembly which will deliberate upon the question of the form of government.

Moreover, I suggest that the Prime Minister be instructed to notify the commandants to withdraw all the Government troops from Hanyang and Hankow in order to manifest the Throne's sincerity of purpose in dealing with the people.

I, for my part, will respect the instructions of the Cabinet in consulting with Wu T'ing-fang on the date for opening the National Assembly. Finally, the revolutionary army must show respect for the articles of the treaty by not attacking the Imperialists, in order that the negotiations may result in a peaceful issue and that the war should be terminated as soon as possible. Thus the impartiality of the Emperor will be manifested to all, the Imperial Family will gain generous treatment, and the ancestral sacrifices will be for ever maintained.

I respectfully present this telegram containing an account of my negotiations at Shanghai and a request that a National Assembly be convoked at once. I beg you will memorialise on my behalf.

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## Enclosure 2 in No. 60.

MEMORIAL by the Cabinet stating that the Revolutionary Army having insisted on a Republic, the Peace Commissioner T'ang Shao-yi had suggested the convocation of a National Assembly. It was proposed, therefore, to summon a meeting of Imperial Princes and Dukes to discuss the matter and to request the issue of an Edict in order that a plan of action might be decided on.

SINCE trouble broke out at Wuchang the whole Empire has been disturbed, while misfortunes have like a fiery spring blazed forth on every side. The benevolent intentions of the Throne were frequently announced to the people, but the anger of the revolutionaries continued to increase in fury. After the retaking of Hankow the navy followed in revolt, and although Hanyang has been recaptured, Nanking has fallen. All the financial resources of the east and south are in their control, while the north-west shows a leaning towards them. It is thus difficult to sweep the provinces at once free from rebellion. They are strengthening their base daily and we have not the time to make the necessary preparations to meet them. To this must be added the fact that the Treasury is exhausted, there is no means of raising loans, and that our hands are tied as regards the purchase of guns and the raising of troops.

We had no option, therefore, but to accept the good offices of the British Minister, Sir John Jordan, whereupon a decree was issued appointing T'ang Shao-yi as head of the peace delegation to proceed to Shanghai to discuss the general situation with the revolutionary representative, Wu T'ing-fang, and at the same time to arrange terms for an armistice in hope that a peaceful settlement might be reached whereby the people might be rescued from their misery and the State saved from utter destruction. At that time the British Minister took the lead in promoting negotiations, but subsequently Japan, America, France, Russia, and Germany gave their support to the movement. But recently I have received successive telegrams from T'ang Shao-yi, stating as follows:—

“I have had frequent conferences with Wu T'ing-fang. The latter insists upon the formation of a republic, and that the monarchy must go. He adds that this view is unanimous in the eastern and southern provinces, and cannot be changed. His language was of a most vehement nature.”

I have sent frequent telegraphic instructions to T'ang Shao-yi that he should argue these points, but the other side maintain an absolutely unyielding attitude and will not make the slightest compromise. They demand that I shall accept the principle of a republic before they will consent to negotiate. T'ang Shao-yi further telegraphs as follows:—

“The identic communication presented by the Powers urging a peaceful settlement has been regarded by the revolutionary party as a recognition of them as a Government, and their enthusiasm has consequently greatly increased. Further, the identic communication merely expressed a hope for a peaceful settlement, and there was no mention of not recognising a republic. I, T'ang Shao-yi, am at my wit's end and am extremely worried. In my opinion, the only thing to be done is to summon a great National Assembly, bring together representatives from the various provinces and submit for their decision the question whether the form of government shall be a monarchy or a republic.”

The latest two telegrams from T'ang stated as follows:—

“The revolutionary party insist that, unless a republic is accepted, negotiations will be broken off. A rupture of the negotiations will mean that there will be destruction everywhere. Just reflect if war recurs, what are we to do for money and munitions of war, and how can we be so sure after all of victory? In the event of a defeat, the enemy will reach Peking, and how then are we to preserve the throne and the Imperial Family? Further, how shall we be able to protect foreign life and property? If, alas, the whole State should be involved in ruin, how can I face the Emperor on the one hand and the people on the other hand? Would it not be most fortunate if upon the convocation of a National Assembly to ascertain the popular will it should be decided that a monarchy should still remain the form of government? Even supposing the vote is for a republic, yet the Imperial Family would be sure to receive generous treatment. We can thus still hope that China's future path may be prosperous. One fact is quite clear, viz., if there is any further delay misfortune will soon be at our doors.”

T'ang Shao-yi also added that only three days remained of the present period of armistice. That unless a clear decree was issued consenting in definite terms to call a National Assembly, there was no hope of prolonging the armistice any further, and that a rupture would ensue. Under these circumstances, the only thing for him to do would be to resign the commission entrusted to him, and submit himself for punishment.

Your memorialists have perused the above with great sorrow. A study of internal conditions, and a glance at external affairs, have convinced us that there is no compromise possible. As regards the talk of peace, all arguments have been exhausted; as regards war, we are short of funds and munitions. Let us then adopt the suggestion made by T'ang Shao-yi to submit the matter to the vote of a National Assembly. But proper election procedure must be employed, and properly qualified representatives elected. This work cannot, however, be all carried out in the space of one day. The Revolutionary party insist there shall be no delay, and we do not know whether they are willing to adopt this course. Even if they consent to adopt it, it will be impossible to estimate beforehand what form of government will be decided on.

The question being one affecting the continued existence of the dynasty, we do not dare to act on our own authority. But we beg that the Imperial Princes and Dukes of the Blood be summoned together at once to discuss the matter, and we request the issue of a decree in order to settle the policy to be pursued.

We, the Ministers, have received office, although we lack capacity, and our policy has not succeeded in inspiring the people with confidence. For this we are very much ashamed and alarmed. We do not know what should be done, and we therefore trembling await the Imperial commands.

No. 61.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received January 22.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 3, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 6th ultimo,\* I have the honour to enclose copy of a despatch which I have received from the acting British consul at Chungking, giving a further instance of the disturbed state of the country between Kweiyang and Chungking. The party of missionaries, namely, Mr. and Mrs. Windsor, Miss Pearson, and Miss Shorsen, of the China Inland Mission in Kueichow province, whose adventure is described, arrived safely at Chungking on the 3rd December.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 61.

*Acting Consul Brown to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chungking, December 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 29th November I received an urgent appeal for help from Mr. Windsor, a member of the China Inland Mission in Kueichow province. Mr. Windsor's letter, which was dated the 27th, from Sung K'an, on the Kueichow-Ssuchuan frontier, stated that he, accompanied by his wife and the Misses Pearson and Shorsen, had arrived at that town from Tsun Yi-fu, on his way to Chungking, but that the party was now unable either to return or proceed, as communication in both directions was interrupted by robber bands, and he begged me to obtain an escort to bring them to Chungking.

On receipt of this letter I at once addressed a despatch to the magistrate at Ch'i Chiang Hsien, asking him to send an adequate escort to Sung K'an at once. As the post was in a disorganised condition, I sent this despatch the same day by two of the consulate servants, and instructed them to present it at the magistrate's yamên and then go on to meet Mr. Windsor at Sung K'an. In addition I gave them a document in Chinese, stating the object of their journey, and asking that they should be allowed to pass freely. This paper was worded vaguely, in order that protection might be afforded to them by both Government authorities and revolutionaries. At the same time, through the medium of Mr. Davidson, of the Friends' Mission, I informed

\* See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 138.

the new Government of Chungking of Mr. Windsor's plight, and messengers were also dispatched by them on the 30th November to Ch'i Chiang Hsien.

The two men duly arrived at Ch'i Chiang and presented the despatch, but acceptance was refused by the official, as the town was on the point of going over to the Railway League. My messengers then left for Sung K'an, but had not proceeded far before they were set upon by robbers and stripped of their money and most of their clothes. They eventually reached Cheng Chih Kai, a village near Sung K'an and returned in the company of Mr. Windsor's party. Before reaching Ch'i Chiang an attack was made on the party, but was beaten off by Mr. Windsor's Tsun Yi-fu escort with a loss to the robbers of two to three killed and four to five wounded.

On arrival at Ch'i Chiang the despatch, which had fortunately been left by my messengers with a friend, was presented, and, after some difficulty, an escort of twenty to thirty men was furnished. Mr. Windsor and party arrived in Chungking on the 3rd December.

I have, &c.

W. R. BROWN.

No. 62.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 4, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 12th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit the accompanying copies of four further reports received from His Majesty's consul at Nanking.

The matter of Mr. Wilkinson's despatches falls under three heads: the state of affairs in Nanking itself; the proceedings of the national convention; and the situation which has arisen on the southern section of the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway.

As regards the former it would appear that after the capture of the city the efforts of the new occupants to re-establish order were of a drastic if not altogether efficacious character. The jealousies and personal ambitions of the revolutionary leaders however—and in this respect the experience of Nanking is by no means unique—bade fair to occasion serious disturbances. The menace was temporarily alleviated by the disappearance of General Lin and, with him, of a large portion of the pay destined for his troops; a proceeding which apparently presented to the general's mind no inconsistency with his rôle as one of the liberators of his countrymen from the oppressive yoke of a corrupt and vicious despotism.

The account of the opening of the national convention and of the discussions which ensued in respect of the future form of Government is instructive if somewhat bewildering. I venture in particular to draw your attention to the concluding portion of the final enclosure in this despatch. It deals with a solution of the present crisis which, as far as can be judged, enjoys the approval of a not inconsiderable body of native opinion. The suggested policy is a peculiar combination of a republican federation coexistent with a nominal monarchy, apparently retained as a rallying point for the outlying dependencies of the Empire, but shorn of all power and prerogative. To the western mind the idea presents an extravagant anomaly, but the fact that it is seriously entertained in quarters of relative responsibility compels attention and puts in striking relief the danger of political prescription for China by foreign observers, however well-intended.

The proposal to instal Duke Confucius on the Throne is unlikely to gain many supporters, and the view that the name would fail to carry sufficient weight to restore and maintain the unity of the country is probably sound. Duke K'ung, with whom I am personally acquainted, is a man over 50 years of age and the representative of a Conservative caste. He has spent his life in Shantung secluded from foreign influences, and would hardly be in his element as the Emperor of a reformed and progressive China.

It was not clear to me what place this national assembly occupied in the scheme of things revolutionary, and on the 23rd December, I enquired by telegraph of His Majesty's consul at Nanking as to the position of Dr. Wu T'ing-fang and Huang Hsing *vis-à-vis* that body, and whether they were acting under its orders in the peace negotiations then proceeding at Shanghai. Mr. Wilkinson stated in reply that Wu T'ing-fang had received his appointment as peace commissioner direct from the heads of the revolutionary party and was not under the orders of the assembly, though the latter



would ratify any agreement he concluded. He added that the assembly had appointed General Li Yuan-hung to be commander-in-chief with Huang Hsing as his second in command, and it may, I think, be inferred generally that this national assembly claims for itself powers considerably more extensive than those ordinarily attributed to a deliberative body.

A further telegram from His Majesty's consul, dated the 26th December, informed me that although the Moderates had failed to carry the party with them on the question of retaining the Emperor, Ch'eng Tê Ch'üan, the former Governor of Soochow, who has accepted a similar post at Nanking under the revolutionary ægis, was still hopeful of peace. Ch'eng was of opinion that in this respect much would depend on the views of Sun Yat Sen, which were sure to carry great weight, and adhered to the belief that Yuan Shih-kai, if assured of his personal safety, would agree to a republic. The remarkable currency obtained by this belief is perplexing in view of the Premier's repeated and vehement denials of any such intention.

On the 29th December the National Assembly elected Sun Yat Sen as provisional President of the Republic. He arrived in Nanking on the 1st January and was formally installed in that office the same evening.

As regards the situation on the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway I have no information later than that included in Mr. Wilkinson's reports. Here, as at other places, where the opposing forces are within striking distance of one another it has not been easy to secure even an ostensibly proper observance of the armistice. Mutual recriminations have been freely bandied and in this locality, from which authentic information is difficult to secure, the determined pugnacity of the Imperial commander and the questionable faith of his revolutionary opponents have combined to make the situation doubly precarious. Thus the railway and the foreign interests which it represents find themselves between the hammer and the anvil, and, in the absence of any argument more forceful than words to assert the neutrality of the line, their prospects in the not improbable event of hostilities being resumed are gloomy. I am of opinion, however, that only in the very last resort should the British employées on the line be withdrawn as their presence constitutes the sole remaining moral restraint on the destructive instincts of an ill-disciplined soldiery.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, December 7, 1911.*

WITH reference to the situation at Nanking, I have the honour to report as follows:—

This morning my writer informed me that Mr. Li Shui Ching, the acting provincial treasurer of Nanking, had taken refuge at his house, in fear, it would seem, of assassination by General Lin. According to Mr. Li the general had demanded of him the sum of 200,000 taels, which was not only more than the total balance in the Treasury, but was a requisition to which, in any case, he was unable to accede, as being an official appointed by the Imperial Government, he could only hand over the money committed to his charge to a committee of local gentry, who could pass it on to the general or not as they liked. General Lin, however, had made it clear to him that he intended to have the money, by force if necessary, and had sent a guard to his yamên to enforce his request. On arrival of this guard Mr. Li had deemed it prudent to disappear.

Governor Ch'eng arrived at Nanking yesterday morning, and after an unsuccessful attempt to evict General Lin from the Viceroy's yamên, has taken up his quarters with General Hsü. These two officials together evidently think themselves strong enough to defy Lin, for they have given him notice that if he attempts to raid the Treasury, he will pay for his temerity with his head, and, as though to remove any doubts as to the seriousness of their intentions, they made an example last night of Mr. Su, Li Yuan Hung's alleged representative, who was found guilty of being an impostor and a thief, as well as a kidnapper of women, and executed. It is said that fifteen young females and 40,000 taels in cash were discovered on his premises. This afternoon I heard that Lin had withdrawn his guard from the Treasury, and had submitted to Governor Ch'eng's authority.

The latter called on me at noon to-day, and, as it was explained to me that his visit was an unofficial one, I received him without any ceremony in my office. He told me that General Lin would be going to the front at once, and that then he (Ch'eng) would be the only "tutu" at Nanking, although Huang Hsing, who was expected in two or three days, as supreme commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces, would be his superior. For the present Nanking would be the republican capital, but ultimately it would be Peking. Mr. Ch'eng was accompanied by a very strong military escort. Like every other important official now in Nanking, he is believed to be in terror of assassination by Lin, who bears a horrible, though possibly undeserved, reputation.

The latest news of General Chang is that he has arrived at Hsüchow-fu. The opposition he met with on his journey up the line appears to have been of a very futile description, and from the number of heads seen lying about at the places at which he stopped, he must have made very short work of it. He took on the train with him at Chüchow about 1,000 men, and left between 2,000 and 3,000 to follow on foot. The only serious fighting was between Linhuaikuan and Pengpu. The bridge broken by the revolutionaries is only about 11 miles up the line from Pukow, which seems to show that the object of its destruction was to prevent General Chang from returning; not to obstruct his departure. I learn from Mr. Li that the Viceroy and Tartar general are not with General Chang, but that they made their escape from Nanking separately at the time of the surrender.

The city is quiet, but General Lin's behaviour is causing great uneasiness. It is said that he refuses to leave until the 200,000 taels are paid to him. There is some looting still going on, mainly of houses belonging to alleged adherents of the Imperialist party, but things are no worse in this respect than under Chang Hsün's régime.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, December 11, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report as follows:—

I returned Governor Ch'eng's call privately on the 8th instant. The room in which Mr. Ch'eng received me was full of other guests and attendants, who crowded round our table to listen to the conversation. As soon, however, as Mr. Ch'eng grasped the fact that I was going to speak to him about the peace negotiations, he at once asked me to move into the next apartment, his bedroom, where we were able to continue our conversation undisturbed. He explained to me that he and most of the other leaders of the revolutionary party thoroughly realised the vital importance to the interests of China that a peaceful settlement should be arranged without delay, and that they intended to do their best to bring one about. They dared not, however, say so openly, for amongst their subordinate officers and the rank and file of the movement there was the strongest opposition to any compromise. Mr. Wu T'ing-fang would be their representative in any negotiations that might take place. Both Mr. Wu and Mr. Huang Hsing, he assured me, shared his views on the subject. Mr. Ch'eng left for Shanghai the next morning, whence he is expected to return to-day, accompanied by Mr. Huang Hsing.

On the 9th instant I received a visit from a Mr. Ma Hsiang Po, who informed me that he had been appointed head of the local Board of Foreign Affairs, and would attend to any matter regarding which I may have to write to the local Government. Mr. Ma, who was formerly one of Li-hung Chang's secretaries, and is now a member of the Kiangsu Provincial Assembly, speaks French fluently, and bears an excellent reputation. From him I learnt that it is expected that within ten days delegates from all the provincial Assemblies in China, except Kansu, will have arrived in Nanking, and a conference will be held at which, amongst other things, it will be decided by vote whether the future Government of China is to be a republic or a constitutional monarchy. He understood that a peace conference would also take place here between Wu T'ing-fang, as the representative of the revolutionary party, and T'ang Shao-yi and Liang Tun Yen, as Yuan Shih-kai's representatives. Mr. Ma had no hope that a settlement could be arrived at which would be satisfactory to the Manchu Government; for even if a constitutional monarchy was the form of Government

decided upon, under no circumstances would the revolutionaries agree to a continuance of the present dynasty. If they had to have an Emperor, their choice would probably be Duke K'ung, the descendant of Confucius. Personally, he built his hopes of peace on Yuan Shih-kai coming over to their side. The resignation of the Prince Regent had done more harm, he thought, to the Manchu cause than good, for it meant that the power behind the Throne would now be the Empress-Dowager, to whom the Regent is infinitely preferable. He attributed the Regent's fall to a Palace intrigue, not to any desire to placate the revolutionaries.

The only other caller at this consulate from amongst the present officials in Nanking, has been General Li Tien Tsai, whom I have already spoken of as in command of the troops who captured Tiger Hill fort. He told me that it was proposed to send two armies up to Peking, one from Hankow and one from Pukow. Some 10,000 men had already been moved up to Wuchang to assist General Li Yuan Hung, and they had now begun to organise the Pukow force. The latter would be some time in moving, because they had to train their recruits.

I hear from Mr. Tuckey that General Chang is still at Hsüchow-fu, where he and his troops are living in railway cars, apparently at the expense of the managing director. The latter, I should mention, is a native of Hsüchow-fu, and the wealthiest citizen of the town. It is generally understood that the General has orders to cease fighting and to proceed to Tsinan-fu, but presumably he is waiting until the troops he left behind him at Chüchow can join him.

Things are fairly quiet in Nanking, but lack of money to pay the troops is causing some anxiety to the officials. The Chekiang contingent was on the verge of mutiny yesterday because their pay was not forthcoming, and was only quieted by a promise that arrears would be made up to-day. This contingent shares with that from Kwangsi the reputation of being the bravest on the field, and the most undisciplined of it. General Lin has moved at last out of the Viceroy's yamên, where Huang Hsing is to take up his quarters, but he refuses to move to the front until all his demands in the way of money and supplies have been satisfied.

Trade is reviving slowly. It appears that there has been considerably more looting, especially of pawn-shops and empty houses, than was expected at first, but whether it occurred during or after the siege is a matter of doubt.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 62.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, December 17, 1911.*

I TELEGRAPHED to you yesterday that the revolutionaries, contrary to the promise given to Mr. Tuckey by their general at Pukow, had commandeered a ballast train on the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway for the transport of troops to Linhuaikuan.

Mr. Tuckey informs me that the train in question was composed of seventeen cars which had been specially brought down from Hsüchowfu, with General Chang's permission, for construction purposes. It was waylaid at Chüchow by a revolutionary officer, who sent it back to Linhuaikuan loaded with soldiers.

Shortly after sending my telegram I received your message of the same date instructing me to try and get Governor Ch'eng to suspend any movement of troops along the Tien-tsin-Pukow line until the expiry of the Hankow armistice.

As directed by you I called to-day on Governor Ch'eng, who returned to Nanking last night. Unfortunately the governor was laid up with lumbago and unable to receive me, but I saw his secretary, Mr. Ma, who assured me that, while the armistice lasted, the line would not again be used for military purposes. The officer who seized the train must have done so, he felt sure, without authority from his superiors, who were under the impression that the feat was impossible, as all the rolling stock of the line was at its northern end under General Chang's control.

This evening Mr. Tuckey writes to me that an officer has called on him to apologise on the Pukow general's behalf for the seizure of the train, and to assure him that such an action would not occur again. Mr. Tuckey adds that as his managing director on about the same date transported some 2,500 of General Chang's troops from the Huai River to Hsüchow-fu, neither side has much reason to complain of the other.

On the expiry of the armistice, should the peace negotiations fail, it is possible that the revolutionaries may insist upon making use of the railway. In that case Mr. Tuckey proposes, unless they defray the entire cost of keeping the line open to traffic, to withdraw all employees as, with the limited rolling stock available, it would not pay to run an ordinary service. I venture to suggest that Mr. Tuckey be given definite instructions as to what action he should take in the circumstances. The line should only be abandoned as a last resort. Even a free service would be preferable and probably less costly in the end.

The troops referred to in Mr. Tuckey's letter as having been taken up to Hsüchow-fu must, I think, be the force left behind by General Chang at Chüchow, in which case the report that they had disbanded is untrue. It is probable that a large proportion of the troops did disperse, and that the number given to Mr. Tuckey is excessive. In any case it means that General Chang has received a considerable addition to his army from the south as well as from the north, and that he must now have at least 5,000 men under his command. The revolutionaries are concentrating a force of 10,000 men at Linhuaikuan, most of whom, to judge by the numbers that have crossed the river, must have arrived, or be on their way, there by now. They are well supplied with artillery including several 4.7-inch guns.

I added to my telegram to-day, certain information regarding the coming conference at Nanking given me by Governor Ch'eng's secretary. It appears that the conference is not to be one of delegates from the provincial assemblies of all the provinces as originally intended, but of delegates appointed by the "tutus" or military governors of the revolutionary provinces only. This change was found necessary, in the first place, to reconcile the military element, and secondly, to ensure unanimity and prevent subsequent dispute. In consequence of this change the delegates of non-revolutionary provinces, all of which, except Kansu, are represented here, will not be permitted to attend the meetings. It is known already that the conference will decide in favour of a republican form of Government which will be inaugurated provisionally as soon as possible. The President of the Republic, who will be elected as soon as the Government is properly formed, is to be Yuan Shih-kai. The conference will open within the next three days.

There is still considerable dissension amongst the revolutionary leaders here. General Lin has been suppressed, but the officers of the Chekiang contingent are now giving a great deal of trouble. I am not sure what their grievances are, but they appear to be dissatisfied with the way military matters are being run, and especially with the idea of a winter campaign. Recruiting and drilling are going on steadily. The revolutionaries may be short of money, but it is not causing them to relax their preparations for war.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 4 in No. 62.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, December 21, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 17th instant I have the honour to report that yesterday I received a letter from Mr. Tuckey informing me that General Chang was sending troops by rail from his head-quarters at Hsüchow-fu to Nanhsüchow, a station on the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway, 47 miles south of Hsüchow-fu. Mr. Tuckey mentioned that the general had with him between 4,000 and 5,000 of his own troops, in addition to which he could rely for support on the large reinforcements sent him by train from the north and now encamped in his immediate vicinity, and also on the Honanese troops, estimated at about 5,000 in number, who have been operating recently in Northern Anhui and are now believed to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of Huaiyuan, about 50 miles due south of Nanhsüchow. The force, therefore, at his disposal is a considerable one. To-day Mr. Tuckey writes to me that the general's troops have advanced another 30 miles further south to Kuchen, which is only 26 miles from the Huai River, and he expresses the opinion that the revolutionaries will be forced now in self-defence to destroy the railway bridge over the Huai River, the biggest engineering work on the line.

It is difficult to understand why General Chang should select the present moment, when peace negotiations have just commenced, for what appears to be a forward

movement on his part. It is not impossible, of course, that it is the revolutionaries who have really taken the offensive by sending troops across the Huai River, and that this is merely a counter-move of General Chang's, or it may be a precautionary measure in view of the concentration at Linhuaikuan of a revolutionary army. In any case, as Mr. Tuckey remarks, it will be difficult to complain now if there are any further seizures of trains at this end of the line. I hear, in fact, that the revolutionary general at Pukow demanded a train this morning, and that it has been given to him. These breaches of the armistice must, I fear, be prejudicial to the success of the peace negotiations, and, if fighting should ensue, may lead to their abrupt termination.

The conference of representatives from the revolutionary provinces has commenced its sittings, but its deliberations so far have only made clear the great divergence in the views held by the various delegates. That they would vote unanimously in favour of a republican form of government was expected, but on no other point have they been able to agree. The choice of a capital and of a provisional president are among the questions on which no decision has been reached, the rival claims in one case of Wuchang and Nanking and in the other of Huang Hsing and Li Yuan Hung being eagerly upheld by their respective supporters. Perhaps the most important question discussed has been the desirability or otherwise of an advance on Peking, the debate showing that the delegates fully realise the great disadvantage under which their cause labours owing to the rivalries of the different provinces and their conflicting interests which prevents them from presenting a united front to the enemy. The feeling of the conference was obviously in favour of negotiation. Stress was laid on the fact that their financial position did not permit them to postpone the advance, and that a winter campaign would be all in favour of the northerners. A further argument for compromise was that, if hostilities continued much longer, the whole country would lapse into anarchy, and foreign intervention would certainly follow.

Yesterday morning I called on Mr. Ma, Governor Ch'eng's secretary for foreign affairs, to hear what he had to say of the conference at which he was personally present. He told me that nothing had been decided and then went on to talk of the peace negotiations at Shanghai which, he assured me, would end in a settlement satisfactory to both parties. The Emperor would be pensioned, but for the sake of the outlying dependencies of China, such as Thibet, Mongolia, &c., would be allowed to retain his title. The Government, nevertheless, would be a republic with the Emperor as a figure-head but without power of any kind. To get rid as far as possible of all Manchu influences the capital would, in all probability, be moved from Peking to Wuchang. The heads of the revolutionary party, Huang Hsing, Li Yuan Hung, Ch'eng Tê Ch'üan and others were all in favour of this solution of the question, and the delegates of the conference here, who were all *litterati* and therefore men of sense, would certainly not oppose it. There might possibly be some trouble with the rank and file of the party, especially the military element, but they would be persuaded in the end to consent.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

No. 63.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 6, 1912.*

WITH reference to my first despatch of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to describe the course of the peace negotiations which took place at Shanghai between T'ang Shao-yi and Wu T'ing-fang, dating from the opening of the conference on the 18th December to the recall of T'ang Shao-yi on the 2nd instant.

I should commence by stating that T'ang was given full powers to discuss the situation as peace commissioner, but not to conclude agreements without reference to Peking.

The earlier stages of the negotiations were occupied in mutual recrimination as to alleged breaches of the armistice which was due to expire on the 24th December. Fortunately, however, both sides were willing to accept an extension, and on the 20th December T'ang telegraphed reporting a prolongation till the 31st December. Subsequently on the 23rd December, T'ang came to an agreement with Wu as regards the meaning of the armistice, whereby, provided no advance to the attack was made, movements of troops or munitions of war were permitted.

From the outset T'ang Shao-yi found that the other side adhered resolutely to their demand for a republic and the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, and he appears to have been so influenced by his surroundings as to have expressed his sympathy with the republican ideal.

In repeated telegrams to the Premier, he enlarged upon the utter impossibility of persuading Wu T'ing-fang to accept a constitutional monarchy, and he recommended the issue of an Imperial decree authorising the submission to a national convention of the chief points at issue, viz., whether the future Government of China should be monarchical or republican. To illustrate the difficulty of his situation, T'ang tried to make out that the consular body in Shanghai favoured a republic, and he also laid stress upon the fact that the identic communication presented to both parties at the conference by the six Powers had been regarded by the revolutionary party as implying recognition by the Powers of their having formed a Government.

As you are aware from my despatch of the 28th December, the proposal to refer to a national convention the question of the form which the future Government of China should take was sanctioned by the Throne in an Imperial decree of that date. T'ang then proceeded to go ahead, and on the 29th December, without first referring to Yuan, accepted and signed four articles (Enclosure No. 1), which were, to say the least, one-sided and unfair to the Imperialists. By these articles he agreed that the Manchu Government should be precluded from raising any loan, and that all the Imperialist troops in Shansi, Shensi, Hupei, Anhui, and Kiangsu should retire to a distance of 100 *li* from their actual positions within five days from 8 A.M. on the 31st December.

In another telegram on the same day T'ang forwarded seven demands put forward by the Republican party (Enclosure No. 2), including the four conditions already signed. The three demands he had not accepted were:—

1. That two-thirds of the total number of representatives should form a quorum ;
2. That the venue should be Shanghai city ; and
3. That the convention should be opened on the 8th January.

Again, on the 30th December T'ang Shao-yi forwarded the text of a second set of four articles which he had signed that day with Wu T'ing-fang (Enclosure No. 3). These articles dealt with the composition of the national convention. Each province was to form one section, Inner and Outer Mongolia together one section, and Anterior and Posterior Thibet together one section. Further, each section would send three representatives and each representative would have one vote. The 4th article provided that the delegates from the southern provinces should be telegraphically convened by the Republican party and those of the northern provinces by the Imperial Government. These four articles also were drawn up without previous consultation with the Premier.

Yuan promptly replied to T'ang on the 30th December with regard to the first four articles signed, that Nos. 1 and 2 could stand, but that Nos. 3 and 4 relating to loans and the withdrawal of the troops must be applied equally to both sides. In a subsequent telegram that day Yuan reminded T'ang that his powers were limited to discussion, and stated that he could not ratify the second set of four articles signed on the 30th December. He accordingly requested that they should be cancelled, and urged T'ang to resume discussions with Wu in the sense of the Cabinet's repeated telegrams.

Telegraphing again on the 31st December the Premier pointed out that the principle to strive for was to obtain the verdict of the whole nation, and that, therefore, every sub-prefecture, department, and district should elect a delegate. He also communicated the election laws for the national convention which had been drafted by the Cabinet (Enclosure No. 4).

T'ang Shao-yi replied to these telegrams by tendering his resignation of his appointment as peace commissioner on account of his proceedings having met with disapproval in the north, and because the Premier refused to ratify the second set of four articles which he said had been elaborated only after many days' discussion. His resignation was accordingly accepted by the Cabinet on the 2nd January, and on the same day the Cabinet notified Wu T'ing-fang by telegram of the recall of T'ang Shao-yi. The Premier, moreover, suggested that, in view of the difficulty of finding a competent successor to T'ang, all negotiations for the time being should be carried on by telegraph between Wu and himself.

On learning of the deadlock in the negotiations and the critical situation which

had arisen I called upon Yuan Shih-kai on the 1st January, and impressed upon him the grave responsibility which a rupture would entail. As reported in my telegram of the 1st January, I found the Premier so extremely worried and depressed that he seemed at times to follow the conversation with considerable difficulty.

The points on which the negotiations finally broke down related apparently to the composition of the national assembly and the date and place of its meeting. On all these the balance of reason was undoubtedly on Yuan's side. It would have been a mere travesty to have convoked in less than a fortnight three delegates from each province of China. No assembly convened in such circumstances could have claimed to have any representative character, and Yuan is right when he says that any settlement arrived at in such a way could not be permanent. On the other hand, his own electoral arrangements seem to have been unnecessarily elaborate, and would probably have proved unworkable, but they afford at least a fair basis for discussion. As to the place of meeting, both sides seem to have been equally unreasonable. The Imperial delegates, who had attended the conference at Shanghai, on their return here had reported that the atmosphere was too republican to admit of freedom of discussion. But, in spite of Yuan's plausible arguments in favour of Peking, it was quite unreasonable to suppose that the southern delegates would come here to advocate their republican doctrines in the midst of Manchu troops and a large Manchu population.

T'ang's suggestion of Chefoo had much in its favour. Shantung has been a wavering province, neither Imperial nor Republican. Chefoo was the scene of important negotiations in 1876, and its situation might have served to inspire moderation in both parties. Wei-hai Wei and Tsing Tao, both close by, are examples of recent dismemberment, while, across the gulf, Corea, Dairen, Port Arthur, and Manchuria might have taught the extremists of both sides the lesson of avoiding further disintegration by arriving at a speedy settlement of their differences.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 63.

*T'ang Shao-yi to Yuan Shih-kai.*

(Telegraphic.)

December 29, 1911.

THE four articles agreed to at the conference at noon to-day are as follows:—

1. The two plenipotentiaries, after discussing with a view to making some clear and definite arrangement so as to restore peace in the country, have decided on the following articles:

2. A national convention shall be called to decide the constitution of the State, and the decision shall be by a majority of its members. Both parties shall abide by its decision.

3. Before the constitution of the State has been decided by the national convention the Manchu Government shall not touch any foreign loan already agreed upon, and shall not raise any new foreign loans.

4. Within five days, starting from 8 A.M. on the 31st December, all the Imperial troops in Shansi, Shensi, Hupei, Anhui, and Kiangsu shall retire to a distance of 100 *li* from their actual positions, and shall only leave patrols to police the district. The revolutionary forces must not enter and occupy (the places evacuated by the Imperialists) so as to avoid a collision. Within five days some rules will be drawn up for the withdrawal of the troops, and they shall at once be complied with. The Imperialists must not attack the positions held by the revolutionaries in Shantung and Honan, while the revolutionaries must not occupy any other places.

The above four articles have already been agreed to and signed, and I request that all the troops may be telegraphically instructed to comply with them.

Enclosure 2 in No. 63.

*T'ang Shao-yi to Yuan Shih-kai.*

(Telegraphic.)

December 29, 1911.

THE Republican demands are as follows:—

1. Before the constitution of the State has been decided by the National Convention, the Manchu Government shall not make any fresh loans, and shall not make any efforts to raise a foreign loan.

2. Within seven days, starting from 30th December, all the Imperial troops in Shansi, Shensi, Hupei, Anhui, and Kiangsu shall retire from these provinces. The Republican forces too must refrain from entering these provinces, except that the responsibility of administering these provinces shall devolve on the Republican Government. The Imperialists shall not attack the positions held by the Republicans in Shantung and Honan, and the Republicans shall not make any advance.

3. The National Convention shall be composed of representatives of the provinces. Each province will have three representatives, and each representative will have one vote. If any province sends less than three representatives to the convention, its representatives will still have three votes.

4. Two-thirds of the total number of representatives will form a quorum.

5. In any discussion decision shall be by a majority of voters. Both sides shall abide by the decision of the convention.

6. The scene of the convention shall be Shanghai city.

7. The convention shall be opened on 8th January.

Enclosure 3 in No. 63.

*T'ang Shao-yi to Yuan Shih-kai.*

(Telegraphic.)

December 30, 1911.

THE following four articles were signed at noon to-day :—

1. The National Convention shall be composed of representatives of every section of the country. Each province shall form one section, Inner and Outer Mongolia together shall form one section, and Anterior and Posterior Thibet shall together form one section.

2. Each section shall send three representatives to the convention, and each representative shall have one vote; but if less than three representatives are sent from any one section, such representatives shall still have three votes.

3. On the day the convention meets, debate may be opened if three-fourths of the sections are represented.

4. The delegates from Kiangsu, Anhui, Kiangsi, Hupei, Hunan, Shansi, Shensi, Chekiang, Fukien, Kuangtung, Kuangsi, Szechuan, Yünnan, and Kweichow shall be telegraphically convened by the Chinese Republic Provisional Government, while those from Chihli, Shantung, Honan, Manchuria, Kansu, and Hsinchiang shall be telegraphically convened by the Manchu Government. The Provisional Assemblies of Honan and Shantung shall be additionally notified by the Republican Government. The representatives of Inner and Outer Mongolia and Thibet shall be convened by both Governments.

Enclosure 4 in No. 63.

*Yuan Shih-kai to T'ang Shao-yi.*

(Telegraphic.)

December 31, 1911.

I COMMUNICATE to you herewith the most important points in the election laws drawn up by the Cabinet :—

1. The National Convention shall be convened in Peking.

2. Sub-prefectures, departments, districts, and prefectures having direct jurisdiction over places shall each elect a representative.

3. Banners of the dependencies and tribes in places where there is no banner designation shall elect a representative. In Thibet each city shall elect a representative.

4. In the provinces the chief executive officials of the prefectures, departments, and districts shall preside over the election.

5. In the dependencies the chieftains and the chiefs of the tribes or cities shall preside over the election.

6. Over two-thirds of the whole number of representatives shall constitute a quorum.

7. Apart from the exceptions given below, all registered males of over 25 years of age, having had a residence for over a year in the election district, are qualified to elect and be elected.



The following classes are disqualified :—

- (a.) Those who are deprived of their rights.
- (b.) Those who have been sentenced to imprisonment whether before or after the announcement of the election.
- (c.) Those who are disqualified to own property or are bankrupt.
- (d.) Priests, monks, and clergy of all religious sects.
- (e.) Imperial clansmen holding titles of nobility.
- (f.) Military men in actual service and all those recently enlisted owing to the present uprising.
- (g.) Officials holding office either in the Imperial Government or in the Revolutionary Government.

8. The method of election shall be single ballot.

9. Those who receive the most votes shall be elected representatives. They shall be furnished with credentials by the local chief executive officials of the prefecture, sub-prefecture, department, or district before they are sent to Peking, and on the arrival of two-thirds of the total number of the representatives the convention shall at once be held. The regulations for the convention will be drawn up separately.

No. 64.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from the acting British consul at Chungking reporting that that place joined the revolution on the 22nd November. The situation was forced to a climax by the approach of a body of mutinous soldiery, who had until recently formed one of the provincial garrisons in Szechuan. Being further intimidated by the anti-dynastic party within the city, who were armed with bombs, the local officials laid down their seals, and amid great excitement, but no disturbance, Chungking declared its adherence to the Military Government of the republic. A neighbouring suburb did not, however, escape the depredations of the robber bands, which are every day becoming a more familiar feature of the provinces, and in Chungking itself the scum which is always ready to come to the surface in times of trouble was not slow in making its appearance. So little control, in fact, had the Provisional Government established over the unruly elements and disaffected troops that, as reported in Mr. Brown's despatch of the 30th November, likewise enclosed herein, the consuls decided it was their duty to send the ladies and children away.

In a further despatch, of which I also have the honour to enclose copy, the acting British consul places beyond doubt the truth of the report that Tuan Fang, together with his brother, was murdered by the soldiers under his command.

Since my report of the 27th December was written, in which I informed you of the declaration of Szechuan's independence, so many conflicting rumours of subsequent developments have reached me that it is impossible to estimate the situation correctly, beyond the generally accepted belief that the whole of the province is in a state of chaos. The French bishop at Ningyuan-fu is the authority for a report that the Viceroy had been sent to pacify Western Szechuan and Thibet, that two days later the troops in Chengtu revolted and killed the new military governor, and that the city had been looted. He also stated that the Yünnan and Kueichow troops were besieged in Suifu by Szechuan rebels.

On the 4th January I received a telegram from the consul-general at Hankow to the effect that a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Ichang reported the departure on the 13th December by river of all foreigners at Chengtu, including the consuls. Mr. Hewlett further reported that the evacuation of Chungking was contemplated by the foreigners. This was corrected by a message from Ichang the following day, according to which the consuls at Chengtu were reported safe on the 24th December, and were still remaining at Chengtu, but Chao Erh-feng was said to have been executed. Trouble was not anticipated for the present at Chungking. My telegrams of the 5th and 6th January embodied the substance of the above-mentioned reports.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

## Enclosure 1 in No. 64.

*Acting Consul Brown to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chungking, November 24, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a revolution was proclaimed in this city on the 22nd November. In previous despatches I have alluded to the growth of seditious feeling on the part of the local merchants and gentry in the course of the past month. During this period the prominent townspeople have been quietly feeling their way towards open rebellion. Persistent efforts have been made to undermine the loyalty of the troops, and steps were taken to wrest the authority from the officials and declare the independence of the city at the first favourable opportunity. It was to be an "inner revolution" in the true sense of the words, and I am of opinion that the general idea underlying the movement was the wish to escape the inevitable blackmail to which local residents would be subjected were a revolution forced upon the city from without.

On the 19th November news was received of the arrival of a band of revolted troops at a point 20 miles distant from Chungking. These troops, the former garrison of Lung Ch'uan-yi, near Chengtu, had made their way across country via An Yueh and Lo Chih Hsiens, and they now proposed to enter the city.

A meeting of the Defence Bureau was at once called to discuss the situation, and the taotai, prefect, and magistrate were invited to attend, but this they declined to do in spite of repeated requests. At the meeting it was decided to seize the opportunity presented by the arrival of these troops to declare a revolution in the city. As the plans were not fully prepared, representatives were dispatched to the rebellious soldiery urging them to accept silver and provisions to leave the city in peace. If they declined to do this, the city forces would march out and attack them. On Monday the town representatives returned with the refusal of their offer. While the defence committee was considering the situation, a number of the genuine anti-dynastic party, who had been working secretly in the city, appeared armed with bombs. These men, who were of a more desperate stamp than the milk-and-water city revolutionaries, overawed the defence committee into proclaiming a revolution and forced them to consent to the entry of the troops. The officials were then notified that they must hand over their seals of office by 12 o'clock. This was accordingly done by the taotai and magistrate, but the prefect only handed over when threatened by a bomb. The news that the taotai had given up his seal travelled like wildfire through the city, which instantly broke out into a forest of white flags bearing the character "Han." At the same time parties of the town-guard and the gentry hurried from point to point taking over charge of all civil and military offices. Everyone was jubilant and, in spite of much excitement and confusion, there was a complete absence of violence. At 5 P.M. the gates were opened, and a body of 140 soldiers marched in bringing with them a machine gun. At their heels entered a rabble of several hundred unarmed men. These were said to be members of the railway league.

During the course of the evening I received a letter from the Szechuanese Military Government informing me that the city had been taken over and that all foreign subjects would be protected. As I was unable, in the absence of instructions from yourself, to recognise any authorities other than the Imperial Chinese Government officials, I made no reply to this letter.

As the police had completely disappeared the gentry ordered the town-guard to patrol the streets and preserve order, and the night passed without any disturbance in the city. This was not the case in Chiang Pei Ting, the large walled city, across the Small River, which forms the suburb of Chungking. Here a band of robbers attacked and looted the yamên and the salt and revenue offices. Continuous firing was heard until 3 A.M. on the 23rd November. I understand that some forty of the robbers were killed outside the wall and that thirty-one were captured. The two ringleaders were yesterday afternoon marched up to the small plot of ground just above the consulate and shot in the presence of an enormous crowd. The men were not killed outright, but they were, nevertheless, after an unseemly struggle with the crowd, which was completely out of hand, placed in the coffins. This morning it was discovered that one of these unfortunate men had managed to force open the side of his coffin, and had crawled away to die a few yards off from exposure.

Although the arrangements made for the taking over of the city were admirably carried out, it was soon apparent that no plans had been drawn up for the

government and defence of the city, and a scene of hideous confusion ensued yesterday. While the various factions were wrangling as to their claims to a share in the government, large bodies of armed desperadoes entered the city on all sides without hindrance. The numbers of the town-guard were fortunately sufficient to overawe them for the time, and, while robberies occurred outside the city, no actual outbreak took place within the walls. I have to-day had occasion to cross the city, and I have seen troop after troop of what can only be described as cutthroats entering and traversing the city. They are, for the most part, armed with spears, swords and home-made matchlocks of the crudest nature. A band of 210 of these men have just dispossessed the town-guard of the temple situated 100 yards above this consulate. I am told by the gentry that these men are robbers, but that the town-guard is powerless to resist them. A reign of terror now exists in the city, and the merchants and gentry are bitterly regretting the storm which they have drawn upon their own heads.

With regard to the new Government but few of the respectable citizens are represented. The power is in the hands of the scholars aided by a small group of English-speaking secretaries, most of whom are of questionable antecedents. I do not think that this Government will be able to exercise control for any length of time over the mob or even over their own forces. There is little money in the city, and funds are not coming in. Already the soldiers are dissatisfied with the reward that they have received for their services. It is further expected that the present dissension among the revolutionary factions will end in an armed conflict. Should there be street fighting the position of the foreign residents will be one of extreme danger. There is in Chungking nothing in the nature of a foreign quarter, the foreigners' houses are scattered over the city, and escape is almost impossible should trouble break out. I am therefore removing all women and children from the city, and am urging them to go down river while there is still this avenue of escape left them.

I have, &c.

W. R. BROWN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 64.

*Acting Consul Brown to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chungking, November 30, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that at a meeting of the consular body and the commanders of the French, German, and British gunboats, held on the 25th November, to consider the local situation, it was decided that adequate protection could not be guaranteed to members of the foreign community so long as they remained scattered over the Chinese city. The unanimous opinion of the meeting was that all women and children ought either to cross the river and take refuge in houseboats in the vicinity of the gunboats or proceed down river to Shanghai. The notification, of which I have the honour to enclose copy, was accordingly drawn up and signed by the American, German, and Japanese consular officials and myself.

As the steam-ship "Shutung" left for Ichang on the 28th November most of the remaining ladies and children took passage on her, and it was unnecessary to dispatch a gunboat to convey the party to Wan-hsien.

That the precaution of sending the ladies and children across the river was a wise one was shown on the 28th November, when a plot on the part of the disaffected soldiery and river police to discredit the new Government by making an attack on the consulates and missions was discovered and frustrated. News of the impending attack reached us at 10 P.M., and it was found impossible for those missionaries, who still remained in the town, either to escape from the city or to make their way to the consulates. Had the military authorities not been warned in time the situation of foreigners in the heart of the city must have been most dangerous.

I have, &c.

W. R. BROWN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 64.

*General Consular Notification.*

IT is the opinion of the consular body that serious disturbances may occur at any moment in Chungking.

There is no recognised authority who is in a position to protect the lives of

foreigners. This duty therefore devolves upon the commanders of the foreign gunboats. The said commanders declare that it is impossible to safeguard the foreign community (181 persons), so long as they remain scattered over the city of Chungking. In addition, the inevitable arrival of some 300 refugees from Chengtu and other parts of this and the adjoining provinces of Kueichow, will further complicate the situation.

It is therefore strongly urged that all foreigners should leave for Shanghai without delay. A gunboat will leave on the 28th November to convey the party to Wan-hsien. The state of the water does not permit the boat to go beyond that point, and the river between Wan-hsien and Ichang is considered reasonably safe for an unescorted party. In the commanders' opinion the only possible plan is for all foreigners to place themselves under the guns of the gunboats.

The undersigned consuls are in accordance with this view, and it is considered necessary that all men, women and children (except those men who receive the express permission of their respective consuls to stay) should be sent across the river at once.

Any person who declines to conform with this instruction is hereby warned that he can only remain at his own risk and responsibility.

In view of the impossibility of taking even a small number of the community on board the gunboats, everyone should at once engage boats and anchor in the immediate neighbourhood of the gunboats. This plan will enable the community to withdraw with the utmost degree of security, should it become necessary.

The question of concentration at Messrs. Mackenzie and Co.'s premises or elsewhere on the other side has been discussed and dismissed as impracticable by the commanders of the gunboats.

ALBERT PONTIUS, *American Consul.*

F. WEISS, *German Consul.*

W. R. BROWN, *Acting British Consul.*

N. KASAI (in charge of Japanese consulate).

*Chungking, November 25, 1911.*

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Enclosure 4 in No. 64.

*Acting Consul Brown to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chungking, December 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that 300 Szechuanese troops of the reserve (Hsun Fang) arrived on the 5th December at Fu T'ou Kuan, a few miles from Chungking. Yü P'ei, the commandant, a Manchu, had fled to Tzuchow when his men revolted, and they are at present under the command of a leader named Yü Ta-hung. Although they have the appearance of Hsun Fang troops, their approach to Chungking has been heralded by a series of robberies and outrages against the people of the districts through which they have passed, and there is reason to suspect that they are a band of robbers. On their arrival a deputation was at once dispatched to inform them that they must deliver up their arms before they could be allowed to enter the city. To give additional weight to their demand, the authorities posted a body of 500 soldiers with Hotchkiss guns in the vicinity of Fu T'ou Kuan, while a further force of 2,000 infantry was held in readiness to attack the newcomers should they persist in attempting to enter the city. At the same time the gates were closed, guns posted, and preparations made to defend the city walls. Intimidated by this show of force the leader, Yü Ta-hung, has now announced his intention of returning to his native province Anhui, and has requested the city authorities to take his soldiers into their service. To this the new Government has agreed, and the 300 men, who still refuse to hand over their rifles, are now quartered in the mint on the opposite bank of the river. By incorporating small detachments of these troops in their own forces, and sending them to garrison outlying districts, the authorities hope to remove the menace with which the city is now threatened.

On the 7th-9th December the Piao (1,500) of Hupei troops formerly under the command of Tuan Fang arrived here, bearing with them the head of the Imperial commissioner and that of his brother Tuan Liu, enclosed in a kerosene tin. A photograph of these ghastly trophies was yesterday made in the city. According to the statement of these men, Tuan Fang, on hearing of the fall of Chungking, bribed the men of the 32nd regiment to escort him north to safety. When this came to the ears of the 31st regiment, they also demanded money from his Excellency, and receiving none, for there was none to give, a quarrel arose, and the troops refused to allow him to start. Shortly after this special messengers from Chungking arrived with the news that

Hankow had been burned by order of the Manchu Government. Infuriated at the thought of the loss of their homes, the soldiers now resolved to murder Tuan Fang. Caught while endeavouring to leave the city in a small chair, his Excellency was dragged to a temple. The mob of troops now threatened him with death, and ordered him to kneel before them. Steadfastly refusing to kneel, he was struck to the ground by a soldier, and his head was then hacked from his body. His brother, pursued by the soldiers, fled to the officers' quarters, and, refused admittance by them, was put to death outside the door.

A ready welcome has been accorded to these Hupei troops, who have been made free of the city, and are everywhere hailed as the ridders of the scourge of Szechuan (Tuan Fang). The rifles and four mountain guns now in their possession will be purchased by the new Government for the use of the local garrison, and boats will be found to transport the men to Hupei.

I have, &c.

W. R. BROWN.

No. 65.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 6, 1912.*

THE condition of the Treasury during the peace negotiations at Shanghai, when the idea of a possible foreign loan was, perforce, definitely abandoned, seemed desperate. The next Chinese month began on the 20th December, and within the first four days of that month a sum of at least 700,000 taels (about 87,500*l.*) had to be found for immediate payment of troops and military equipment, to meet which there was only a balance of about 280,000 taels available out of funds received from the Tien-tsin mint. This estimate, moreover, did not include other more or less urgently necessary expenditure, and it was calculated that 3,000,000 taels (say 375,000*l.*) was the lowest amount that could keep the Premier's administration going, on a reduced scale, for two months.

In these straits the Premier had to scrape money somehow from the adherents of the Imperial party, whose cause he is defending. The enclosed cutting from the "Peking Daily News" of the 20th December last gives particulars of the issue of so-called "patriotic bonds," a scheme sanctioned some time ago, but now made a compulsory levy upon the official classes. This issue does not seem to contain the elements of a sound financial measure, but as a temporary expedient it has been fairly successful, and has realised already, report says, about 1,000,000 taels.

Another 2,000,000 taels is said to have been obtained by contributions from members of the Imperial family.

The third and most important source of income is that to which, as reported in my despatch of the 16th November last,\* the Premier has already had recourse, namely, the treasure stored in the Imperial Palace. I have it on good authority that three days ago his Excellency Yuan Shih-kai obtained from the Palace 8,000 bars of gold, of 10 taels weight each, equivalent to about 2,800,000 taels of silver, besides silver enough to make a total of 3,000,000 taels (say, 375,000*l.*), all of which he immediately converted for the use of the Government. How much more treasure there may still be in the Palace it is, as I stated before, impossible to ascertain, but it may be remarked that the Peking press has been lately calling attention to the millions that might be obtained by the timely sacrifice of the jewels, porcelains, and curios that are to be found in the interior of the Palace here. Overtures have been made to some foreigners with a view to realising the collection of porcelain and curios in the Imperial Palace at Mukden, and devoting the proceeds towards forming a pension fund for the retainers and more necessitous members of the Imperial family.

Whether or not the resources at the disposal of the Court can be counted on to the extent of the popular belief, there is no doubt that the present possession of ready money materially strengthens the Premier's hands in the crisis. It should also remove for the next three or four months the apprehension of anarchy in Peking arising from a collapse of the Government for want of funds.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

\* See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 101.

Enclosure in No. 65.

*Extract from the "Peking Daily News" of December 20, 1911.*

#### THE ISSUE OF PATRIOTIC BONDS.

TO-DAY, for the first time, the Chinese Government commences to issue patriotic bonds among its numerous officials with a view to tiding over the crisis. As is often pointed out, the Government has been thrown into a most stringent state since the outbreak of trouble and the consequent interruption of revenue from most provinces. The exchequer is at its lowest, and there is fear of a general paralysation in all the governmental functions in the near future. The Empress Dowager, who is evidently the most concerned over the situation, has more than once made gracious grants to meet the varied needs. But this is such an eventful time that it is impossible for a woman's purse to cope with it. Efforts have been made to raise foreign loans, but they have resulted in vain. Under the present circumstances the imposition of new taxes on the people is a dangerous thing. Public opinion agitates voluntary contributions from wealthy officials, especially Manchu dignitaries, but so far nobody has taken the lead. Some sure and prudent measure must be provided for, and this has embarrassed the financiers for weeks before the present arrangement is arrived at.

On the 9th of the 9th moon (the 30th October) the Ministry of Finance presented a memorial proposing the issue of patriotic bonds, and, without hesitation, the Throne gave its sanction. The Ministry was presently engaged in devising ways and means by which the task is to be carried out. A Bill to that effect was duly submitted to the Tzucheng Yuan, and, having gone through all the parliamentary stages, it was passed and handed over to the Cabinet. In referring it to the Throne for its final sanction the Ministry of Finance says: "The country is on the margin of danger, and its financial resources are exhausted. Being unwilling to increase the burden of the people, the Throne has repeatedly granted enormous amounts to supply the necessary funds. All our officials should be inspired and show their loyalty, giving their surplus to make up the deficit of the Treasury. Everyone should do his humble part to share the anxiety of the Throne. It is hoped that princes and nobles who have received unusual graces and bounties will endeavour to take more bonds than are required of them so as to set a good example for others to follow." The patriotic bonds will be sold under the following conditions:—

#### GENERAL REGULATIONS.

1. The issue of patriotic bonds shall be in charge of the Ministry of Finance, and the money thus realised shall be devoted solely to the military and ordinary expenses of the country.
2. The bonds shall be limited to 30,000,000 dollars, and the Ministry of Finance shall be responsible for their redemption.
3. Each bond shall carry an interest of 6 per cent. per annum.
4. The sale of bonds and the payment of interest shall be in charge of the Taching Government Bank.
5. The bonds shall be of the following denominations:—
  - (a.) 3,000,000 bonds at 5 dollars each ; total amount, 15,000,000 dollars.
  - (b.) 75,000 bonds at 100 dollars each ; total amount, 7,500,000 dollars.
  - (c.) 7,500 bonds at 1,000 dollars each ; total amount, 7,500,000.
6. The bonds shall be redeemed within nine years after their date of issue. During the first four years only interest shall be paid. Beginning with the fifth year, the bonds shall be redeemed at the rate of 20 per cent. each year till fully redeemed in the ninth year.
7. The bonds shall be transferable and mortgageable at the option of their holders.
8. The bonds may be kept by the Taching Government Bank as reserves for the issuance of bank notes.
9. The order of redemption of individual bonds shall be decided by ballots by the Ministry of Finance and published in the "Cabinet Gazette."
10. All Chinese subjects may purchase the bonds.

11. Those possessing the following qualifications shall be under obligations to purchase the bonds :—

- (a.) Princes, dukes, and hereditary nobles.
- (b.) Metropolitan and provincial high officials.
- (c.) Members of the ministries and yamêns in the capital or provinces.
- (d.) Employés in public services.

12. The Ministers, Viceroy, and governors shall make a census of the above classified officials whose income is above 1,500 dollars per annum, and decide the number of bonds each should purchase. Anyone who will purchase more bonds than is required of him shall be rewarded upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance.

13. Anyone who is required to purchase the bonds but refuses to do so shall be punished upon investigation and report of the Minister of Finance and other high officials concerned.

The regulations regarding rewards and punishments shall be enacted by the Minister of Finance.

#### BYE-LAWS.

1. The issue of patriotic bonds and the collection of loan shall be in charge of special deputies appointed by the Minister of Finance.

2. The Minister of Finance shall distribute the bonds among the chief authorities in the capital and provinces, who shall sell them in accord with the 7th bye-law below.

3. The sale of patriotic bonds shall be divided into two periods, the first extending from the 1st day of the 11th moon (to-day) to the end of the 12th moon, the second from the 1st day of the 1st moon next year till the end of the 2nd moon. All should make their purchases in time. They may also purchase their shares all at once.

4. The Minister of Finance shall send bonds to the different commercial and educational societies to effect voluntary purchases among private individuals. Anyone who purchases bonds up to 10,000 dollars or more shall be rewarded upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance and the Cabinet.

5. The treasuries of the different ministries and yamêns shall collect the loans and remit them to the Minister of Finance.

6. The interest on each bond shall be counted since the first day of the month following its issue, and paid partially in the 4th and partially in the 10th moon of the year.

7. According to the 12th article of the regulations the candidates shall make their purchases at the rates as below :—

- (a.)  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on incomes between 1,500 dollars and 2,000 dollars.
- (b.) 5 per cent. on incomes between 2,000 dollars and 5,000 dollars.
- (c.)  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on incomes between 5,000 dollars and 8,000 dollars.
- (d.) 10 per cent. on incomes between 8,000 dollars and 10,000 dollars.
- (e.)  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on incomes between 10,000 dollars and 20,000 dollars.
- (f.) 15 per cent. on incomes above 20,000 dollars.

(Income here includes salary, allowance, and special receipts a person receives in the year.)

8. A person who holds several offices shall make his purchase at the office where he receives the most income.

9. Anyone who purchases more bonds than is required up to 100,000 dollars or more shall be rewarded upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance and the Cabinet.

10. The loans thus realised shall be remitted to the Government Treasury every month by the yamêns concerned.

11. These yamêns shall make monthly reports on the remittances to the Minister of Finance.

12. The Government Treasury shall make monthly reports on the receipts to the Minister of Finance.

13. Pending the manufacture of bonds, the loans shall be acknowledged with official receipts, which shall be exchanged for bonds when they are ready.

14. The sale of patriotic bonds shall be limited to the end of the 2nd month of the 4th year of Hsüan-t'ung. In the following month all unsold bonds shall be sent to the Minister of Finance for destruction.

15. During the three months after the expiry of the sale the Minister of Finance shall make acknowledgments and announce the order of redemption of bonds in accordance with the 9th article of the regulations.

## SUPPLEMENTS.

(A.) Those who purchase additional bonds up to or above 10,000 dollars shall be awarded with a gold medal of the 3rd grade of the 3rd class and a tablet of Imperial writing.

Those who purchase additional bonds up to or above 50,000 dollars shall be awarded with a gold medal of the 2nd grade of the 2nd class and a tablet of Imperial writing.

Those who purchase additional bonds up to or above 100,000 dollars shall be awarded with a gold medal of the 1st grade of the 1st class and a tablet of Imperial writing.

(B.) Those who make false reports and purchase an insufficient share shall be made to purchase a double share.

Those who refuse to purchase shall be made to purchase a double share and fined duly.

No. 66.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 11th January, I have the honour to report that the comments which have so far appeared in the St. Petersburg press on the official communiqué made by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with regard to the situation in Mongolia have not been favourable to the Government's declared policy in that region.

The Opposition "Retch" of the 12th January publishes a long article jeering at the official declaration that Russia has no designs on Mongolia. The archives of Europe are already full of such declarations as to the preservation of a formal suzerainty over some Asiatic or African State, and no official communiqué is required nowadays to show how little they are worth.

The article then seizes upon the passage in the communiqué which speaks of Russia's readiness to assist Mongolia in her "administrative, economic, and cultural development," and declares that this is quite inadmissible. If Mongolia achieves her independence, Russia ought to support her with a view to forming an independent buffer State between herself and China. To go further than this, and institute any sort of protectorate, would be a violation of the *status quo* in the Far East, and would be contrary to the agreements concluded, not only with China, but with Great Britain and Japan, which would instantly demand compensation. Thus, the Far Eastern question in all its complexity would be reopened.

The "Novoe Vremya" of the 16th January takes an entirely different line, and upbraids the Government for endeavouring to persuade the Mongols to content themselves with autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. It declares that the Chinese Government, by entering into negotiations with the newly created Government at Urga, formally recognised that Government, and that Russia, instead of encouraging Mongolia's bid for independence, is now throwing her back into the arms of China.

News as to the general situation in Mongolia is still very vague; from time to time telegrams appear reporting the defection of this or that group of Mongol Princes, and to-day the "Novoe Vremya" publishes a sensational telegram from Peking, stating that the Chinese Government has offered to hand over Mongolia to Russia in exchange for a loan of 100,000,000 roubles.

News as to the situation in Chinese Turkestan is equally vague. The latest telegrams indicate that the revolutionary party, after considerable slaughter, has now won the upper hand at Kuldja, and is administering the affairs of the town in concert with the Russian consulate.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.



No. 67.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 22, 1912.*

SITUATION has considerably changed. Demands of southern leaders, which would apparently make it impossible to have any Government here during interval between the abdication of the Throne and the recognition of the republic, seem to be making great difficulties in forming an amalgamated Government of the north and south.

No. 68.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 23, 1912.*

YUAN SHIH-KAI'S secretary told me to-day that his position is becoming very precarious, and that Manchu princes, under the influence of Tieh-liang, formerly Minister for War, are working to displace him. Situation is strained, and may possibly become serious if, as secretary indicated, Yuan Shih-kai resigns or leaves Peking; but it is very difficult to arrive at the truth.

No. 69.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bryce.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 23, 1912.*

I TOLD the United States chargé d'affaires to-day that, as Mr. Knox had once or twice expressed the desire to keep in touch about China, I should like to give a short résumé of my view. The opinion of those who knew China best was that some kind of monarchy would be best suited to the country; but I had felt that the policy of non-intervention between the contending parties was the only one that was wise. To side with the north in favour of a monarchy might precipitate a separation of the south in the form of a republic, and it was desirable, if possible, to avoid such a separation. In the next place, foreigners had hitherto been untouched. British subjects, and, I supposed, American also, were distributed over China. It was impossible to protect them all if attacks were made upon them, and if we sided with one part of China it would lead to attacks upon our subjects in another part. It seemed, therefore, to me that it was still as true as it ever had been that in the interests of the unity of China and the safety of our own subjects we must avoid intervention.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

No. 70.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, December 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of the situation at Tengyueh.

I have, &amp;c.

C. D. SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 70.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, December 20, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 13th December, I have the honour to report that the situation here has somewhat improved, and that there is a fair prospect of a peaceful settlement of the disagreement with Talifu.

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The troops from Talifu and Tengyueh have both been withdrawn, and Li Kên-yuan, one of the leading revolutionaries in Yünnan-fu, who arrived at Talifu a few days ago, is to come to Tengyueh to make arrangements for the future. It is understood that Chang Wên-kuang will retain the position of commandant of the local garrison, and that Chao Fan, whose former position was not, as I was earlier informed, that of provincial treasurer in Kansu, but who held a taotai in Szechuan, will be appointed taotai here.

The state of affairs in the city has not undergone much change, except that a few days ago the authorities, indignant that the people in general should show so little enthusiasm for freedom, resolved that they should at least be compelled to discard the badge of Manchu servitude. Accordingly, all persons found wearing a queue in the streets were seized by the police and forcibly shorn of the obnoxious appendage. One of my own servants was seized in this manner, but was released unshorn with an apology on saying who he was. The main result of this measure being that queues, instead of being visibly worn, were coiled round the head beneath a cap or turban, the zeal of the police for freedom has often led to the snatching of headgear from inoffensive passengers in order to ascertain whether, in this reign of liberty, they still remain at heart slaves of the Manchu.

A person named Lin has assumed, apparently without any authority from the revolutionary organisation of the province, the title of Min-Cheng Ssu, or commissioner for civil affairs. He was a protégé of the Kanai Sawbwa, and is acting presumably with the concurrence of Chang Wên-kuang, but the doubtful nature of his position is evidenced by the fact that a letter of instructions addressed by him to Chao was returned to him contumeliously torn in two.

The post office is now working normally, as also is the telegraph office, the restrictions on the use of codes having been withdrawn or allowed to lapse.

The custom-house is still being conducted by a Chinese nominee of the revolutionists, and though I have on several occasions strongly advised that the commissioner should be invited to return and place the customs once more on a regular basis, there is no sign of any present intention of doing so. The commissioner is still living at Bhamo, where he has been instructed by the inspector-general to remain until he has instructions to return.

I have, &c.

C D. SMITH.

No. 71.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 10, 1912.*

IN my telegrams of the 4th and 5th January, I had the honour to inform you of the decision to put into force without delay the measures agreed upon between the commanders of the foreign troops at Tien-tsin for maintaining communication between Peking and the sea in accordance with the terms of the final protocol of the 7th September, 1901. The circumstances which rendered this desirable were the mutiny of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 79th Regiment of Infantry stationed at Lan-chou, disaffection in the 40th brigade near Chin-wang-tao, the interruption of railway traffic and telegraphic communication, and, as it was then thought, the not unlikely contingency that the line would be destroyed by either side when hostilities broke out between the Imperialist and revolutionary troops.

On the 5th instant I saw my Japanese, German, French, and Russian colleagues, and explained to them my view that our action should, so long as was possible, be limited strictly to the terms of the protocol which I interpreted in the sense that the railway and telegraphs were not to be occupied or taken charge of by the international troops, but merely protected in order to prevent any interruption, and ensure a regular passenger, goods, mail, and telegraph service. My colleagues concurred in this view, and also agreed to the Japanese Minister's proposal that, in accordance with the programme, of which the copy was sent to you in my despatch of the 19th December, Shan-hai-kuan should be included in the scheme. Since those arrangements were drawn up the Russian troops at Tien-tsin have been sufficiently reinforced to enable them to participate. The American section, which is being temporarily protected by British troops, will be taken over by the Americans on their arrival from Manila.

The enclosed report by the general staff officer, dated the 8th January, describes the steps taken by the commandants to give effect to the scheme.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 71.

*Captain Turner to the Military Attaché to His Majesty's Legation.*

Sir,

January 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of the scheme for the protection of the railway agreed to by the commandants of the various Powers concerned.

At a conference held on the 4th January it was decided that the time had arrived for protecting the railway, and the diplomatic body in Peking was informed. Each commandant, having received the consent of his Minister, then took measures to ensure the safety of his section.

On the 6th instant various communications passed between the Russian, Japanese, French, and British commandants, of which the result was that the French agreed to hand over the Tien-tsin Settlement Railway Station to the Russians.

The following arrangements were made by the various commandants to give effect to the scheme of protection:—

*British Section.*

Fengtai: 1½ Companies Somerset Light Infantry. Have not yet moved out.

Anting: 1 native officer and 35 men, 124th Baluchistan Infantry. Went on the 7th January.

Lofa: 1 British officer and 40 men, 124th Baluchistan Infantry. 12 non-commissioned officers and men went on the 8th January.

Changchuang: 1 native officer and 20 men, 124th Baluchistan Infantry. Have not yet moved.

Blockhouses, Changchuang to Yang-tsun, five in number: 50 men, 124th Baluchistan Infantry. Have not yet moved.

*French Section.*

Yang-tsun Bridge: 30 men. Went on the 6th January.

Canals north of Pei-t'ang Railway Station: 30 men. Went on the 6th January.

*Russian Section.*

A guard was placed on the Tien-tsin Settlement Station on the 7th January.

*German Section.*

Bridge and station, Hang-ku: 1 officer, 25 men. Left on the 6th January.

Bridge and station, Lut'ai: 1 non-commissioned officer, 20 men. Left on the 6th January.

Station, Tang-fang: 1 non-commissioned officer, 20 men. Left on the 6th January.

Station, Hsü-kê-chuang: 1 officer, 25 men. Left on the 6th January.

*American Section.* (Occupied temporarily by British troops.)

K'ai-p'ing: 1 officer, 30 men, Somerset Light Infantry.

Wali: 20 men, Somerset Light Infantry.

Kuyeh: 2 officers, 70 men, Somerset Light Infantry.

Leichuang: 1 officer, 40 men, Somerset Light Infantry.

(All left by the 7th January. 40 men went to Kuyeh on the 5th January for Lin-hai mines.)

*Japanese Section.*

Lan-chou Station and bridge : 4 officers, 120 men, 2 machine-guns.

Ch'ang-li : 1 officer, 40 men.

Tang-ho Station and bridge : 26 men.

Shan-hai-kuan Station and bridge : 1 officer, 40 men.

In addition to the above there are the following posts previously held by British troops :—

Tongshan : 2 British officers, 2 native officers, 111 men, 124th Baluchistan Infantry.

Chin-wang-tao : 1 British officer, 1 native officer, and 33 men, 124th Baluchistan Infantry.

Shan-hai-kuan : 24 men, 124th Baluchistan Infantry.

Kindly inform His Britannic Majesty's Minister accordingly.

I have, &c.

F. G. TURNER,

*General Staff Officer, North China Command.*

No. 72.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 29, 1912.*

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Mukden does not consider situation serious at present. It is possible that bandit levies under robber chiefs may get beyond control; otherwise it is expected that Viceroy will succeed in maintaining order unless revolutionaries send an expedition to Manchuria.

No. 73.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Chengtú, December 8, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, respecting the position of missionaries in outlying portions of this province.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure in No. 73.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtú, December 8, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 5th instant, reporting on the killing of foreigners in Shensi province, I have the honour to state that I have received letters from the Rev. G. F. Easton, of Hanchung, from which it would appear that the German postmaster was not killed by revolted soldiers, as reported, but was only slightly injured by brigands. As, however, this last news comes, as did the former, from Chinese sources, it is difficult to say how much or how little of it is true.

I have just received a letter from the Rev. R. Wellwood, of the American Baptist mission at Ningyuan Fu, which gives an account of the recent troubles in the Chiench'ang Valley. On the 21st November, the date of its dispatch, the officials of Ningyuan Fu seem to have had the situation in hand again, but it is to be feared that there will be a recrudescence of trouble when the news of the revolution in Chengtú reaches the Chiench'ang.

At the close of his letter, Mr. Wellwood asks for advice as to what he should do. I shall endeavour to get a message through to him, urging him to retire at once to the coast by whatever route may be left open to him.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

P.S.—As I close this despatch the long-expected trouble between the Luchün and Hsünfang troops has broken out. Fighting took place this morning, and now the banks are being looted all over the city.

W. H. W.

No. 74.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Chengtu, December 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting on the sacking of Chengtu city by the military during last night.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure in No. 74.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtu, December 9, 1911.*

I REGRET to have to report that the Hsün-fang and Lu-chün troops broke out into open disorder yesterday morning, and that they and the mob have looted the Financial Commissioner's Treasury, containing well over 2,000,000 taels, all the banks and most of the pawnshops, besides many shops and private residences.

The looting was followed by arson. At the time when I am writing, 2 o'clock in the morning of the 9th December, the Treasury is still blazing, while intermittent shots are heard in all directions. In the morning Chengtu is threatened with an invasion by the leaguers of the country districts, and I have little or no assurance that this despatch will reach you.

Ever since the Declaration of Independence on the 27th November, all things have been working towards this catastrophe. The released leaguers, who formed a Provisional Government, were soon seen to be at odds with more than one faction, while they quarrelled amongst themselves for place and position. As far as I can judge, the President, P'u Tien-chün, was in favour of a constitutional monarchy, while Lo Lun accepted no post in his Cabinet, but advocated a republic on the lines of that of the United States of America.

The men of other provinces, who form a large portion of the residents of Chengtu, believed that they were to be deprived of all power, and joined themselves together into a society to secure recognition and employment. The revolutionaries proper, known elsewhere as the Ko Ming Tang, formed another association, the T'ung Meng Hui, which held a meeting two days ago, convened in the name of Sun Wen (Sun Yat Sen), who was represented there by T'ung Hsiu-sheng. The latter opened proceedings by saying that people were far from satisfied with the administration of P'u Tien-chün, on whom it was necessary that a watch should be kept. If that administration failed to progress, it would be necessary to have a second revolution.

The meeting was next addressed by the Japanese wife of a Chinese, then by a Chinese young lady; next by a boy of seven or eight, and afterwards by one of the American instructors at the High School.

Meanwhile, the Government had decided to send six of the Hsün-fang battalions to guard the main road from Chengtu to Wan Hsien, being stationed respectively at Chao-chia Tu, P'eng-ch'i, Shunching, T'ai-ho Chen, Ta-chu, and Wan Hsien. Yün, one of their commanders, invited the officers to a lunch on the 7th December, at which they expressed their readiness to induce the men to obey these orders. A review, parade, or roll-call of both these Hsün-fang and the Lu-chün troops was arranged for yesterday morning on the eastern drill-ground.

About 11:30 on that morning there was a sudden fusillade, and the consequent stampede of the spectators and some of the Hsün-fang, a number of the latter taking refuge in the French Consulate hard by. What caused the commotion I am unable to state with precision. The most probable story is that the Hsün-fang were incensed at being granted a bonus of only one month's pay, while a bonus of three months had been given to the Lu-chün. Moved to anger, some of them made an attack on

Chu Ch'ing-lan, generalissimo of both forces, and vice-president of the Ssuchuan branch of the Ta Han State.

Whatever may have been the cause, the Hsün-fang proceeded at once to attack and loot the Ta Ch'ing Bank and the Shang-yeh Ch'ang (known to foreigners as the Arcade). The Lu-chün appear to have joined hands with them, and, aided by the mob, are now pillaging and burning Chengtu. P'u Tien-chün and Chu Ch'ing-lan have disappeared, and a new President is to be elected by the army.

I feared from the first that the feeble and unpopular rule of P'u Tien-chün would shortly render the precarious position of foreign residents in Chengtu still more perilous. He and his Government were, it is true, profuse in their assurances of protection to us, and I have no sort of doubt of their good faith. What I was not equally assured of was their ability to carry into effect their undertaking, and I strongly urged the British and American missionaries who remained here to take advantage of the lull in disorder to effect their escape to Chungking.

A party of thirty-one men, women, and children, all Canadians, did leave on the 2nd by water, but the rest have, I greatly fear, postponed their departure till too late. They will endeavour to get away to-morrow morning (or rather, I should say, this morning), but I can only conjecture what daylight may bring.

As long as their officers are able to control the troops and the troops the mob, I trust and believe that we shall be safe; but if both troops and mob get out of hand (as they are perilously near to doing at present) we are lost.

So far no foreign compound with which I am in communication by telephone has been attacked. To the consulates and to Dr. Mouillac (probably also to the Catholic and Canadian missions, but these are not on the telephone) some one, I trust some one in authority, sent a large white lantern inscribed "cheng" (upright) to be exhibited in our gateways. I have heard across the wire that, though the Chinese residence adjacent to the German Consulate was looted, no attack had up to midnight (when the telephone ceases to work) been made on my colleague's compound. None has so far (3 A.M.) been made on my own, though fires are blazing in various directions and shots are falling. Similar reports have reached me from the French Consulate, from Dr. Mouillac, and from Mr. Shipway, the architect of Bishop Cassels's hostel in the geographical centre of the city, to which Mr. Shipway had, I hope not imprudently, returned with his wife and twin children from the Ssu-sheng Tz'u.

At this crisis, and in the impossibility of communicating with you, I am taking upon myself the responsibility of ordering all British subjects to leave Chengtu as soon as they can do so with reasonable hope of safety. M. Weiss, my German colleague, now at Chungking, has already given such order to his four nationals, and I trust that M. Leurquin will succeed in persuading the members of the Catholic mission to depart. I fear that some of the sisters, at any rate, will feel it their duty to stay by their charges, the Chinese orphans. M. Fischer and M. Leurquin, again, and Mr. Teichman will be loth to leave unless I accompany them.

In any case we may none of us, missionaries, consuls, and others, succeed in getting away, but I am hastily penning this despatch in the hope that it may eventually reach you by the hands of some one of them.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

P.S.—9 P.M. No attempt was made to enter my "kungkuan." Mr. Fischer's, perhaps because he had not suspended consulate lanterns outside, was invaded early this morning by ten soldiers and some ragamuffins. When told that it was the German Consulate they advanced no further than the first court, and, having done no damage, retreated. Yet the compounds on either side were looted.

A similar experience befell the "kungkuan" of Mr. Bates. The residences all round were pillaged, the Fant'ai's yamen across the lane ransacked and burnt, but his door was not even knocked upon. (He himself was, as I have said, spending the night with me.) Mr. Torrance, who did not go to the Ssu-sheng Tz'u, makes the same report. From the Ssu-sheng Tz'u itself Dr. Kilborn has just written:—

"We are all right in these compounds, except for lack of sleep, and more or less anxiety during the night. We had no alarm at any of our gates."

M. Castel's "kungkuan" was entered this morning, but at sight of the foreigners the raiders withdrew. I understand that Dr. Mouillac and his household did not suffer; the Americans in the south-west of the city are safe. Very few natives appear to have been killed, as the rioters purposely fired in the air. The whole proceedings

were evidently conducted in accordance with a definite plan, and the fracas of yesterday on the drill-ground was merely simulated.

I am told that Chao Erh-feng left at dawn this morning, escorted by a mixed detachment of Hsün-fang and Lu-chün. A crowd of so-called T'ung-chih Hui (leaguers) then entered the city, where they are demanding payment of 5 dollars from each shop, though already pillaged. It is only too probable that the rioting will be renewed to-night. I cannot discover that there is any Government in Chengtu, and I am most strongly of opinion that all foreigners ought at once to leave.

I now anticipate no difficulty with any of the British or Americans, but I fear that the sisters of charity will refuse to abandon their orphanage.

W. H. W.

No. 75.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Chengtu, December 10, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking reporting on the arrangements for the safe departure of the foreign community of Chengtu.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure in No. 75.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtu, December 10, 1911.*

I HOPE, but cannot yet be certain, that all British subjects, except Mr. Teichman and myself, will succeed in getting away from Chengtu to-morrow.

We have had, as I reported to you in my last despatch, a most trying experience, and we are still in great anxiety. On comparing notes yesterday morning we found that the only foreigners who had suffered from the rioting were the Japanese consular assistant, Mr. Miura, and some of his nationals, instructors for the most part at one or other of the Government schools. These complain that nearly all their personal effects were either carried off or destroyed. At the Ssu-Sheng-Tzu, although at one time no fewer than fifteen conflagrations could be counted, and the mutinous troops passed continually in front of their main gate laden with booty, the premises were respected. Herr Fischer's (German consulate) were, it is true, entered at 5 A.M., but, as I have already reported, on discovering that it was a foreigner's residence the invaders withdrew.

Chengtu was left for a day without a Government, and rumours abounded that we should in consequence have a still more grievous riot at nightfall. About 10 A.M., Shih, who had resigned his post of Chengtu magistrate on the proclamation of independence, called to see me to ask whether the consuls could not take some steps to see that some sort of Government was formed. He hinted that Chao Erh-feng might be invited by the people to again take charge. I said that we must keep outside of China's domestic politics, and that all we asked was that our nationals should not be molested. Any Government which the Chinese themselves set up we should welcome, if only our treaty rights were respected.

As a matter of fact, Chao Erh-feng did issue that morning a brief metrical notification—

“ Let both forces Lu and Fang  
Return to the ranks without delay ;  
Yesterday's affair, having passed away,  
Shall not be mentioned.”

This notification was headed “Tsung-tu Pu-t'ang Shih” (“Proclamation by his Excellency the Governor-General”). Two other rhyming notices appeared, one issued in the name of the Chün Cheng-fu, or State Militant, the other by Li, chairman of the K'o-chi lien-ho-hui (“Association of the Out Provinces”).

The former was popularly ascribed to Chao Erh-feng, in conjunction with T'ien Taotai, and is as follows:—

“For the rioting last night the blame rests on the Government. We have hurt our people and involved them in the net of this grievance. Now a military force is being collected, and urgent plans are being made for the restoration of order. For a time the city gates are closed to collect together the troops. A close watch is being kept on the streets, and pillage will be strictly forbidden. Any offenders will be severely punished in order to give peace to the people. Do not be alarmed, but each of you abide in peace.”

The remaining notification is more noteworthy. It runs thus:—

“Orders have been received to recall the soldiery, making no distinction between luchün and hsünfang. Even though they have scattered and fled they will soon return and be good. Let bygones be bygones and the pay be according to rule. The Guild of the Two Hu (Huuan and Hupei) is enrolling men for defence. The Governor-General orders this in order to make the ranks complete.”

These notifications certainly read like so many *ballons d'essai* sent up to see whether the populace would recall Chao Erh-feng to power as Governor-General. If this were so, they evidently failed of their purpose, for last night Yün Ch'ang-heng, a Szechuan man, and a commandant in the luchün, was proclaimed president of the Ta Han Chün Cheng Fu, and Lo Lun vice-president.

Throughout the day the men who, under the banner of the Railway League (“Pao Lu T'ung Chih Hui”), have been engaged at Hsinching, Kuan Hsien, and a score of other places outside Chengtu, in fighting the regular troops, flocked into the city. Presently we heard of collisions between them and the hsünfang-tui, and feared that Chengtu was to be given up to street fighting. It soon became clear, however, that the hsünfang were outnumbered, and that the leaguers were masters of the situation. The early part of the night passed with only occasional shots, which in many cases would seem to have been only fired to show the evilly disposed that the guards were on the watch. At 2 A.M., however, there was a rattling volley, and rifle bullets cut through the trees at the back of what serves as the British consulate. Whether this was an encounter between the leaguers and the hsünfang or was an attempt of the latter to still further intimidate the citizens, I have not yet ascertained. In any case it was not repeated, at least in this neighbourhood.

The following morning I was told that the masonic society known as the “P'ao-ko” (“Brethren of the Robe”) had persuaded or constrained the people to divide up the city into lodges (the Chinese word is “ma-t'ou” (“bunds”)), and that what may be described as special constables were being enrolled. The new Government put out a brief notification calling on the people to reopen their shops and to display again the Han flag. This was followed in the afternoon by a longer paper, in which the new President announced that he was patrolling the streets at the head of an armed party, and would execute on the spot any lawless person found to be looting.

As a matter of fact, a considerable number of hsünfang caught with loot have been shot in the street, particularly in the Tung Ta Kai (“East Great Street”).

I hear that the turn in the scales was effected largely through two leaguers. One, known by his nickname of “Wu Erh-tai-wang,” had been operating against the regular troops at Wenchiang and Kwan-Hsien, supported by contributions from the local gentry. When the republic was proclaimed the subscriptions ceased, and Wu would have had to disband his force, said to be 4,000 strong, had not the news of rioting reached him. He hastened to Chengtu and placed his force at the service of the citizens. Another leader, Sun Tse-p'ei, with his 2,000 men, who was holding the field near Shuang-liu, is said to have been called in by Lo Lun, who left Chengtu for the purpose as soon as the disorders of the 8th began.

That these disorders were planned beforehand, there can, I think, be little doubt. The mere fact that foreign property (except, as I have said, Japanese) was spared, and that tutelary lanterns were sent to the consulates, to Dr. Mouillac, and the Ssu-Sheng-Tzu would be proof enough. The new Government, indeed, does not hesitate to maintain that the riot was instigated by officials of the old régime.

Whether the allusion is to Chao Erh-feng I cannot say. Seeing that by the destruction of the Ta Ch'ing Bank his Excellency lost nearly all his ready money at Chengtu, it seems very unlikely that he was the author of the turmoil, however much



he may have hoped to gain by this demonstration of the feebleness of the P'u Government.

Among the numerous rumours current during the night of the 9th instant was one declaring that "the Manchus are out to slay." The origin of the tale was, it seems, this: On the morning of that day the leaguers under Sun Tse-p'ei fell in with a number of hsünfang carrying loot from the South Gate. They promptly fired and killed several of the marauders, the rest taking refuge in the Manchu city. Subsequently the leaguers arranged with the Tartar-General to have these refugees stripped of their booty and their arms, and so expelled. The Manchus themselves have all along behaved with great discretion, except on one occasion, consequently Chengtu has not been disgraced by massacres of Manchus by Chinese, as at Si-an and Wuch'ang, or of Chinese by Manchus, as at Nanking.

The great majority of the foreign residents still remaining hired boats and went on board in the morning and afternoon of the 9th. Among them was Mr. Ritchie, the provincial postmaster, whose boat at once weighed anchor and went down stream. This morning he and his assistant, M. Chaudoin, returned, to my consternation. A few miles below their starting-point they had been held up, rifle shots being fired in front and over them, despite a large Union Jack that flew from their mast. Mr. Ritchie paid 100 dollars, but was presently again held up and forced to hand over another 100 dollars. When he was stopped a third time he abandoned his boat and hired men at 4 dollars a-head to carry his belongings back to where the other house-boats still lay (and I may say still lie) opposite the New Arsenal. The full extent of his loss he estimated at 800 dollars, while M. Chaudoin was robbed of everything but his clothes.

This attack came as a serious shock to us all, for hitherto Europeans and their property had been unscathed. It was clear that it would be hopeless to attempt to descend the river unless the new Government is able and willing to provide an escort; while a return to a city that had just been plundered and, in part, burnt down, did not commend itself to the refugees. I decided, after consultation with my German colleague, to try whether the new Government would make with us an agreement on the following terms:—

1. All foreigners at Chengtu should be escorted by river to Chungking with their baggage and servants.
2. Their houses and other property left behind at Chengtu should be safeguarded by the military Government.
3. All expenses, such as hire of boats and gratuities to escort, should be borne by the refugee foreigners.

I accordingly wrote to the Government requesting an interview. My messenger, I may remark, was challenged outside the Imperial city, now again head-quarters, by a sentry, who pointed a loaded rifle at his head. The messenger declared that another man was actually shot, apparently out of wantonness; but this I can scarcely believe.

I followed up the letter by telephoning to the Government. Over the wire I was told that a deputy would be sent to my consulate about 4 in the afternoon. The deputy was the same Shen Tsung-yuan who called on me on the 27th November. Herr Fischer was present when he arrived, and Mr. Miura came in during the interview. M. Leurquin was detained at his consulate awaiting a messenger who had brought in a letter from Tachienlu, while he himself was attending service at the cathedral. By telephone, however, he expressed full approval of the suggested agreement.

This the deputy also approved, but said that he must submit it to the President. He took the opportunity to express his regrets for the rioting, the blame for which he imputed, as I have said, to the ex-officials. An answer is promised me for to-morrow morning.

Meanwhile I have requested all British and American members of the boat party to regard Dr. Mouillac as their captain, since he is not only an old resident of Chengtu and a military man, but, speaking as he does English as well as French, is able to communicate readily with all the refugees. Dr. Mouillac reported to me at 4.30 P.M. that all was quiet, and at 5 P.M. that the men who had robbed Mr. Ritchie had been caught.

This news was a great relief to me, coupled as it was with yet another proof that the new Government is acting vigorously in the case of offences against foreigners. Mr. Shipway, the architect of Bishop Cassels' hostel, had sent his baggage through the city ahead of him. It was seized in the Tung Ta Kai by certain leaguers, who took it into an inn on that street which is serving just now as divisional head-quarters for

the Tung Chih Hui. Mr. Shipway applied at this inn, but could get no satisfaction. As soon, however, as the Government became aware of the incident they caused the baggage to be given up.

If the Government will continue in this course, and can secure the obedience of the country districts and towns, then the voyage of the refugees to Chungking will be safely accomplished and the consuls may remain at Chengtu with little hazard. At present, however, each town and city appears to be setting up as a republic in itself, and I cannot be certain how far the Government's passports will be respected at Chiating or elsewhere. I have endeavoured to get a letter through to Mr. Brown asking him to arrange for one of our gun-boats to go up to Suifu to meet the refugees; but here again I cannot be sure that the message will reach him. For three weeks the telegraph wire has been down, and now the postal service is, for a time at least, at an end.

You will have gathered that the consular representatives here have decided that until they are recalled, or are in more pressing danger of their lives, they must remain at Chengtu. Mr. Teichman has refused to leave me, and M. Leurquin cannot prevail with the Catholic missionaries to depart. It may be that the new Government will declare that it cannot guarantee the safety of foreigners beyond the walls of Chengtu; but if, on the other hand, it accepts responsibility for the lives and property of the refugees down to Chungking, then the only residents left here in a few days will be Herr Fischer, M. Leurquin, Mr. Teichman, the Catholic missionaries and sisters, and myself.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

No. 76.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 11, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 29th November,\* I have the honour to state that I have received a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Canton, reporting that, on his advice, the British steam-ship companies have decided to resume the service in the Delta and on the West River under the protection against piracy afforded by His Majesty's ships.

The ships engaged in this patrol are three torpedo boats, which will ply between Samshui, Kongmoon, and Wongmoon, and the gun-boats "Moorhen," "Sandpiper," and "Robin," to patrol between Samshui and Wuchow, together with the destroyer "Handy," which is being sent from Hong Kong.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 77.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 13, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that at a meeting of the diplomatic body on the 23rd November attention was drawn to the fact that the composition of the Wai-wu Pu, in the recently formed Cabinet, with Liang Tung-yen as its president, was not in accordance with the final protocol of 1901, which stipulates for the tenure of that office by a prince of the Imperial Family. It was felt that in the altered circumstances it might not be possible to demand the fulfilment of this provision, but that the Chinese Government had not the right to abrogate it without the assent of the signatory Powers. A suggestion that the Chinese Government should be reminded of this international principle and invited to approach the Powers concerned through their own representatives was unanimously adopted, and a collective note in this sense, copy of which is enclosed herewith, was sent in to the Wai-wu Pu on the 16th December. It was further agreed that pending the result of such representations the legations should communicate with the Wai-wu Pu by *notes verbales*.

\* See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 89.

I have the honour further to transmit copies in translation of two notes on the subject from the Wai-wu Pu, dated the 2nd December and the 21st December respectively. The former, evidently the counterpart of the communication made to your department on the 4th December\* by the Chinese Minister in London, is a somewhat cavalier announcement that a change has been made, and evinces little disposition to take into account the other parties to the instrument upon which the existing usage was based. The latter, however, approaches the matter from a more becoming standpoint, a result to which the receipt of our collective note no doubt contributed. After a detailed explanation of the grounds for the new composition of the Wai-wu Pu, it endeavours to show that the change is in essential conformity with the final protocol and seeks the consent of the signatory Powers.

It is understood that the reference in this note to the constitution and the oath taken to observe it was made in the hope of impressing the treaty Powers with the intention of the Throne scrupulously to respect its engagements to the people and as a sort of declaration which the Powers, if they so wished, might accept as a guarantee. The march of events has, however, eclipsed any significance the statement may have possessed.

A change of some sort is clearly necessitated by the fact that under the terms of the constitution Imperial princes are no longer allowed to hold offices of State, and at a further meeting of the diplomatic body on the 3rd instant, I drew the attention of my colleagues to this document and suggested that an expression of their views forthwith would be of assistance to the respective Governments in determining their attitude in the matter. The representatives thereupon declared themselves in favour of accepting the changes necessitated by the establishment of a constitution in China, and it was decided that each should submit the correspondence to his Government with a recommendation that they should assent to the proposed modification in the composition of the Wai-wu Pu.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 77.

*Wai-wu Pu to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Peking, December 2, 1911.*

ON the formation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1901, it was laid down that an Imperial prince or duke should control the affairs of the Ministry, and that one of the presidents should also be a member of the grand council.

At the present time a responsible Cabinet has been established, and, in accordance with the official system of constitutional countries, members of the Imperial Family do not take part in the Government administration. The various Ministers are, in addition to their own duties, charged with the general affairs of the State in a manner corresponding to the political system of many other countries.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, being also a Minister of State, has powers in no way differing from those held by the grand councillors of the past, and there is thus no infringement of the original arrangement.

Hereafter my Ministry, when corresponding officially with the Ministers of the Powers in Peking, will do so in the name of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, so as to comply with the general practice of other countries.

I avail, &c.

HU WEI-TÊ.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 77.

*Note communicated to Wai-wu Pu.*

LES chefs de mission soussignés, ayant chacun reçu du Ouai-wou Pou la communication officielle des nouvelles nominations dans ce département, ont dû constater que le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas tenu compte de l'article 12 du protocole du 7 septembre, 1901, se référant à l'édit Impérial du 24 juillet précédent, qui prenait acte de la condition posée par les représentants des Puissances, à savoir que le Ministre des Affaires

\* See "China, No. 1 (1912)," No. 107.

Etrangères de Chine devait être à l'avenir "un prince (ouang) ou un duc (koung), et appartiendra par suite à la Famille Impériale."

Les chefs de mission soussignés, tout en se rendant compte des raisons qui ont guidé le Gouvernement Impérial dans les dernières nominations, considèrent de leur strict devoir de veiller à ce que les engagements internationaux en vigueur entre la Chine et les Puissances soient intégralement respectés, et ont par conséquent l'honneur de conseiller au Ouai-wou Pou de s'adresser d'urgence soit aux Cabinets des Puissances signataires de l'Acte de 1901, soit à leurs représentants à Pékin, en vue de solliciter l'assentiment des Puissances au changement à introduire dans la constitution du Ministère chinois des Affaires Étrangères.

Cet assentiment est indispensable pour rendre tout à fait régulières les relations de pure forme entre le Ouai-wou Pou, tel qu'il est actuellement constitué, et les légations.

*Pékin, le 16 décembre, 1911.*

(Translation.)

THE undersigned heads of mission, having each received from the Wai-wu Pu the official communication of the new appointments in that department, have been obliged to note that the Imperial Government has not had due regard to article 12 of the protocol of the 7th September, 1901, referring to the Imperial edict of the 24th July preceding, which took note of the condition laid down by the representatives of the Powers, namely, that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs was in future to be "a prince (wang) or a duke (kung), and will consequently be a member of the Imperial Family."

The undersigned heads of mission, while taking into account the reasons which have led the Imperial Government to make the recent appointments, consider it to be their strict duty to see that the international engagements in force between China and the Powers are respected in their entirety, and they have therefore the honour to advise the Wai-wu Pu immediately to approach either the Cabinets of the Powers signatories of the protocol of 1901, or their representatives at Peking, in order to request the assent of the Powers to the change to be introduced in the constitution of the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Such assent is indispensable to render perfectly regular the purely formal relations between the Wai-wu Pu, as at present constituted, and the legations.

*Peking, December 16, 1911.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 77.

*Wai-wu Pu to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Peking, December 21, 1911.*

ON the 23rd April, 1901, a note was received from the then dean of the diplomatic body stating as follows:—

"Aux termes de l'article 12 de la note collective, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Chine s'est engagé à réformer l'Office des Affaires Étrangères.

"Les représentants des Puissances pensent, tout d'abord, que les fonctions précédemment conférées au Tsung-li Yamên étaient réparties entre un nombre trop grand de personnages et qu'il convient de substituer une responsabilité plus effective et plus sensible.

"Ils sont d'avis que l'Office des Affaires Étrangères doit avoir à sa tête un seul Ministre. Ce Ministre, qui aura le titre de 'Président de l'Office des Affaires Étrangères,' sera un prince (ouang) ou un duc (koung), et appartiendra par suite à la Famille Impériale. Il aura deux adjoints. Tous les trois auront la charge exclusive des relations directes avec les agents diplomatiques étrangers.

"Le nom du Tsung-li Yamên, qui ne rend pas suffisamment l'importance et l'autorité du pouvoir auquel incombent, sous la responsabilité et sous les ordres du Souverain, les plus hautes fonctions de l'État, est supprimé. Il sera remplacé par celui de Ouai-wou Pou, et dans l'ordre officiel des préséances passera avant les six bureaux ou tribunaux, &c."

(Translation.)

"In the terms of article 12 of the joint note, His Majesty the Emperor of China, pledged himself to reform the Office of Foreign Affairs.

“The representatives of the Powers think, in the first place, that the functions formerly delegated to the Tsung-li Yamên were divided among too large a number of persons, and that a more effective and fixed responsibility should be substituted for that body.

“They consider that the Foreign Office should have at its head a single Minister. This Minister, who will bear the title of ‘President of the Foreign Office,’ will be a prince (wang) or a duke (kung), and will consequently be a member of the Imperial Family. He will have two assistants. All three will have exclusive charge of direct relations with foreign diplomatic agents.

“The name Tsung-li Yamên, which does not adequately convey the importance and authority of the power on which, under the responsibility and orders of the Sovereign, the highest functions of the State devolve, is suppressed. It will be replaced by the name of Wai-wu Pu, and in the official order of precedence the Wai-wu Pu will come before the six other Ministries or tribunals, &c.”

On the 24th July, 1901, an Imperial decree was issued as follows :—

“We hereby order that the Office of Foreign Affairs (Tsung-li Ko Kuo Shih Wu Yamên) be transformed into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wai-wu Pu), and Prince Ch'ing is hereby appointed as president of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”

It is on record that the above decree has been complied with.

On the 1st November, 1911, an Imperial decree was received as follows :—

“Let Prince Ch'ing vacate the post of Prime Minister. Yuan Shih-kai is hereby appointed Prime Minister and is ordered to come at once to Peking to organise a complete Cabinet and to prepare a scheme for the reform of the administration.”

On the 3rd November, 1911, the Senate presented a memorial suggesting the adoption of the constitutional monarchy system as the best policy, submitting a draft of nineteen fundamental articles of the constitution, and requesting the Throne to take a solemn oath in the Imperial Ancestral Temple and promulgate the articles for the information of Ministers and people so as to consolidate the foundation of the Empire and to protect the Imperial Family.

Article 8 of the constitution states as follows :—

“The Prime Minister shall be elected by the National Assembly and appointed by the Emperor. Other Ministers of State shall be selected by the Prime Minister and appointed by the Emperor. Members of the Imperial clan cannot become Prime Minister or Minister of State; further, they cannot in any province hold office in the administration.”

On the same day the Imperial decree was received as follows :—

“We have perused the memorial from the Senate submitting a draft of nineteen fundamental articles, and we hereby direct that they may be sanctioned at once.”

On the 9th November, 1911, an Imperial decree was received as follows :—

“The Senate has presented a memorial recommending the election of the Prime Minister in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. In pursuance, then, of article 8 of the constitution, we hereby appoint Yuan Shih-kai Prime Minister.”

On the 16th November, 1911, an Imperial decree was received as follows :—

“Yuan Shih-kai has memorialised in person with regard to the selection of Ministers of State to compose the Cabinet. We hereby appoint Liang Tun-yen as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Until his arrival at his post, Hu Wei-tê is appointed to act temporarily.”

On the same day an Imperial decree was issued :—

“Yuan Shih-kai requests the appointment of assistant officials in the various Ministries. We hereby appoint Hu Wei-tê as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, but seeing that he is at present acting as a Minister of State, Tsao Ju-lin is hereby appointed for the time being to act for him.”

On the 26th November His Highness the Prince Regent performed the ceremonies on behalf of the Emperor in the Ancestral Temple and took a solemn oath that the

fundamental articles of the constitution would be observed. The oath stated as follows :—

“ After an extensive study of the best points of the constitutional monarchy system in vogue in various countries, and in obedience to our established regulation that no prince of the blood should participate in political affairs, we have sanctioned the constitution being carried out. We must jointly with our Ministers, soldiers, and people universally observe the provisions of the constitution, and our descendants must never act in any manner in contravention thereof, &c., &c.”

Moreover, the articles of the constitution have been printed on yellow paper and published throughout the Empire. Thus it is a fact that a responsible Cabinet has really been formed, and that, in accordance with the political system of a constitutional monarchy, members of the Imperial Family can no longer take part in the administration. A change of procedure, then, has naturally had to take place in regard to the stipulation that the affairs of the Ministry should be controlled by a prince or a duke.

However, the organisation of the Cabinet represents a combination of the various Ministries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still ranks before the other Ministries, the changes being that there is now a Minister of Foreign Affairs and a Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, who also serves as a Minister of State, seeing that he is specially responsible (for foreign affairs), can the more easily exercise a single control, thus in no way conflicting with the views expressed in the diplomatic body's note of the 23rd April, 1901, as to adequate recognition of the importance and authority of that Ministry, at the same time rendering the despatch of business more effective. But the question being one affecting treaty stipulations, we ought to approach the Powers who signed the protocol of 1901 requesting their consent to the above changes. I have the honour, therefore, to address this despatch to your Excellency with the request that you will communicate it for the information of His Majesty's Government and obtain their consent thereto, and so enable the principle of a constitutional monarchy to be effectively advanced in accordance with the articles of the constitution.

Awaiting the favour of a reply, I avail, &c.,

HU WEI-TÊ.

No. 78.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 30, 1912.*

SUN-YAT-SEN informs His Majesty's consul at Nanking that prospects of peace are good. In virtue of understanding between generals hostilities will not be renewed at Hankow.

No. 79.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 31, 1912.*

I HAVE received a despatch, dated the 29th November last, from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu with regard to the progress of the revolutionary movement in the province of Szechuan.

I should be glad if you would convey to Mr. Wilkinson an expression of my approval of his action as reported in the above-mentioned despatch.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 80.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 2.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 11th January, 1912, relative to the revolution at Urumtchi.

*India Office, February 1, 1912.*


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Enclosure in No. 80.

*Consul-General Macartney to the Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Kashgar, January 6, 1912.*

THERE was a small revolution at Urumtchi on the 28th December. The disturbance was immediately suppressed by beheading four Chinese leaders.

One amban was wounded. Peace apparently restored. No active part taken by troops of Tung-talie and natives.

Please inform resident in Kashmir.

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No. 81.

*Mr. Addis to Mr. Langley.—(Received February 2.)**Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,*

Dear Mr. Langley,

*31, Lombard Street, London, February 1, 1912.*

I ENCLOSE copies of telegrams which have passed between the Inspector-General of Customs and myself with regard to the amount of customs revenue deposited with the foreign banks in Shanghai for the service of Chinese loans in Europe.

You will note that I have requested and obtained the authority of the Inspector-General to publish the text of his telegram, which I think can hardly fail to have a reassuring effect upon the holders of Chinese bonds.

Yours, &amp;c.

C. S. ADDIS.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 81.

*Copy of Telegram dispatched by Chinese Maritime Customs, London, to  
Inspector-General of Customs, Peking, January 30, 1912.*

HONG KONG and Shanghai Bank considers to allay bondholders' anxiety and have reassuring effect on market time come for official or semi-official statement from you for publication that customs collection to extent of taels so-and-so for service foreign loans has been deposited with foreign banks Shanghai; that such collection will continue to be paid weekly into these banks in future; and also that international bankers' commission has been appointed by Powers with Chinese Government assent to disburse these funds in order of loan service priority. How much per cent. has monthly revenue decreased since September?

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Enclosure 2 in No. 81.

*Copy of Telegram received from Inspector-General of Customs, Peking, by  
Hong Kong Bank, London, January 31, 1912.*

FOR Hong Kong Bank for publication. No occasion for alarm. Net revenue collection for November and December deposited in loan service accounts in receiving banks Shanghai 3,300,000 taels. January collection not yet known will bring total

over 4,000,000 taels. Arrangements for bankers' commission providing for weekly remittance of net collection to loan service account now practically complete and payment will begin at early date. Monthly decrease revenue November and December approximately 31 and 24 per cent. respectively.

No. 82.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 15, 1912.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence respecting the failure of the Chinese Government to meet at the due dates the obligations imposed by the service of the foreign debt, I have the honour to report on the steps that are being taken by the diplomatic body at Peking with a view to realising for the service of the indemnity the third and most important security provided by the protocol of 1901, namely, the revenues of the salt gabelle.

The subject was brought up by one of my colleagues proposing that the administration of the salt revenues should be placed under the control of the Imperial Maritime Customs. This proposal was discussed at a meeting of the foreign representatives held on the 3rd instant, and after some consideration of the possibility of reorganising the salt gabelle under a foreign personnel, it was decided that the action of the diplomatic body should be limited for the present to securing that the revenues of the gabelle, exclusive of the portion previously set aside for other foreign loans, should be placed under the control of the Customs Administration. A committee, consisting of the representatives of Japan, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, and myself, was appointed to make representations in this sense to the Chinese Government.

On the 12th instant I accordingly invited my three colleagues to a conference, and after a preliminary exchange of views we proceeded to the Wai-wu Pu and laid the proposal before the Ministry. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs promised that our scheme would receive careful consideration, and undertook to consult the Ministry of Finance and the Inspector-General on the subject.

The question naturally arises, What is the total annual revenue derived from the salt tax administration of China? This question was put by the late Inspector-General in 1901 to the Commissioners of Customs at the various treaty ports, in a circular calling for all the information available on the subject of salt in China. The reports received in reply were subsequently printed for service use in the Customs, and the extreme variety of estimates given in answer to this question shows how difficult it is, in the absence of Government statistics, even to guess at the approximate total. One estimate gave the amount actually collected as 86,400,000 taels, and the revenue reported as 9,000,000 taels. The majority of the commissioners accepted the estimate made by Mr. George Jamieson in his "Report on the Revenue and Expenditure of the Chinese Empire," according to which the total annual salt revenue amounted to 13,659,000 taels. Since then another authority, Mr. H. B. Morse, in his "Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire" (Kelly and Walsh, 1908), has estimated that "the people of China pay 81,000,000 taels for their salt, of which sum 64,000,000 taels and more is taxation in one form or another, and 39,000,000 taels is taxation according to regularly published tariffs of charges; the collection reported to the Imperial Government is 13,050,000 taels." In the budget submitted to the "Tzu Cheng Yuan," or so-called "Senate," in Peking, at the beginning of 1911, the estimated revenue from "tea and salt duties" was put down at 46,312,000 taels, or, as revised by the Senate, 47,622,300 taels. Unfortunately, this statement does not distinguish between the tea revenue and the salt revenue; but as the latter must greatly exceed the former, it is evident that previous estimates of the salt revenue reported will have to be very largely increased in the light of more recent information. The figures given above may be approximately converted into sterling at the rate of 8 taels to the £.

Whatever may be the amount of revenue yielded by the salt gabelle, there can be no doubt that it could be substantially increased without additional burden to the tax payers, if the collection could be entrusted to an administration like the Imperial Maritime Customs. Reference, however, to Mr. George Jamieson's report above quoted will show how extremely complicated the system of administration is, with its mixture of official and mercantile agents of collection, and how extensive are the vested interests involved. Unless the present system is entirely upset by the progress of the revolution,



all that can be reasonably expected of the Imperial Maritime Customs is that they should extend the system introduced in 1898, when under the provisions of the Anglo-German Loan Agreement, foreign officials were stationed in certain districts to control the *li-kin* and salt *li-kin* revenues pledged for the service of the loan. The control so exercised has in practice amounted to little more than checking the amounts reported as received by the various collectorates. The extent of control that can possibly be introduced into the whole salt administration of the Empire will depend on many circumstances impossible at present to foresee, but at the least we may expect that as a result of the representations now being made by the diplomatic body some portion of the salt revenues will be definitely assigned to the service of the indemnity.

I have, &c.,

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 83.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 16, 1912.*

FOR some days past the question of the abdication of the Throne has been freely discussed in official circles here, and several plans have been adopted to bring home to the Court the necessity of no longer delaying to bow to the popular will. Rumours have been sedulously spread that the revolutionary forces are coming north by sea, and that a landing may be momentarily expected at Chefoo or Chingwantao, and the native press has not hesitated to advise the dynasty to retire gracefully rather than wait until it is obliged to go. Foreign public opinion has been pressed into the service of the movement, and the chambers of commerce at the different treaty ports have been given to understand that it would facilitate matters if they were to represent the loss which the present state of uncertainty is causing to trade, and to intimate to the Throne the advisability of adopting such measures of conciliation as are likely to satisfy the aspirations of the great bulk of the population.

Acting on this hint, the committee of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce addressed on the 12th instant the enclosed telegram to the ex-Prince Regent, Prince Ch'ing, and Yuan Shih-kai. The message was brought to me the same afternoon by Hu Wei-tê, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who asked me to ascertain from His Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai if it were genuine, and, if so, to what extent it represented the views of the foreign mercantile community at that port. Mr. Fraser's reply enabled me to inform his Excellency in due course that the telegram emanated from the committee of the chamber, and was believed to be endorsed by the majority of that body. I reported the action of the chamber to you briefly in my telegram of the 14th instant.

All accounts point to the early abdication of the Throne and the establishment of a Provisional Government by Yuan Shih-kai pending the settlement of the future form of government, which will in all probability be a republic. But the transition may be attended with grave difficulties, and there are indications that the Mongols and the northern provinces are not inclined to accept this solution with equanimity. A deputation of the members of the Senate, who favour the continuance of a monarchical Government, waited upon me yesterday, and the views which they expressed, as embodied in the accompanying memorandum by Mr. Barton, represent fairly accurately the latent attitude of the mass of the population in the north.

There can, however, be little doubt that Yuan Shih-kai has come to some sort of an understanding with the leaders in the south, and that the Manchus rely upon him to procure them liberal treatment. A Mr. Hsiang, who is said to be in the confidence of Sun Yat Sen, is known to have paid several visits to the Premier, and it is believed that T'ang Shao-yi, although no longer the accredited agent of Yuan, still keeps up a secret correspondence with him through Liang Shih-yi, another Cantonese, who is playing a leading part in this strange drama, which is intended to end in the peaceful ejection of a family which has ruled China for nearly three centuries.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

## Enclosure 1 in No. 83.

*Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to Ex-Prince Regent, Prince Ch'ing, and the Premier Yuan.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, January 12, 1912.*

1. WHEREAS throughout the whole of the southern, central, and western provinces the authority of the Ta Ch'ing dynasty has ceased to be effective, and in the greater part of China that dynasty is no longer in a position to afford to the lives and property of foreigners the protection guaranteed by treaty;

2. And whereas, even in the provinces which have not actually renounced their allegiance to the dynasty, delegates from the provincial assemblies have come to Shanghai professing to be empowered to declare in favour of a republican form of government;

3. And whereas the continuance of the present struggle must involve the ruin of both Chinese and foreign merchants, the dislocation of trade, failure to meet foreign obligations, jeopardy to the life and property of peaceful residents, foreign as well as native, and anarchical conditions inevitable from such absence of control as have already encouraged the criminal classes in many places to defy law and order;

4. And whereas the divergence of opinion between the supporters of the dynasty and of the Provisional Republican Government as to the constitution of a National Assembly to decide on the form of government is so great as to preclude that means of settlement of the present struggle within any short period;

5. And whereas further hostilities are inevitable unless some provisional form of administration can be agreed to by both sides;

6. And whereas such provisional administration, to be acceptable to the greater part of the country, must, so far as appears from existing conditions, be democratic in nature and preceded by renunciation of autocratic power;

7. Therefore, be it resolved that this chamber, through its committee, appeal to Prince Ch'ing and the former Regent, Prince Chun, to induce the Court and the Imperial clan to devise with all speed such measures of conciliation as will fairly satisfy the apparent desire of the bulk of the nation and enable peace and order to be restored pending the final decision of a representative assembly on the question of the future government of China; and resolved further to appeal to the leaders of the republican party on their part to meet any proposals made to them in a conciliatory spirit, making the good of China as a whole their foremost object.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 83.

*Memorandum by Mr. Barton respecting Interview with Senators.*

THE following called on Sir John Jordan at 2 P.M. as a deputation from the "T'ung Chih Lien Ho Hui" (United Society of the One-Minded):—

Yu Pang-hue, a senator for Chihli Province.

Cheng Ju-ch'êng, rear-admiral, Ministry of Marine.

Chu Ch'un-nien, Ministry of Education.

Chang Ch'uan, secretary in the former Board of Civil Office, son of the late Grand Secretary Chan Chih-tung.

Fêng Shu, Ministry of Marine.

Chang explained that the object of the society was two-fold, being to secure the protection of life and property in case of local disturbance and to further the cause of a constitutional monarchy for China. The members of the society comprised representatives of all the northern provinces, but they had also many sympathisers in the south. Knowing Sir John Jordan's interest in the future of China, and appreciating his friendly efforts to promote a peaceful settlement, they made bold to ask his opinion of their society and its aims.

Sir John Jordan replied that the protection of life and property was a laudable object, though he would have thought that the Imperial troops would undertake this duty; but as regards the effort to secure a particular form of government for China he could express no view.

Admiral Cheng explained that, in the event of the Imperial troops being all required at the front, the defence of life and property would be left to local effort, and the society had already enlisted train bands to the number of some 4,000 as a safeguard against the outbreak of disorder in the north.

Sir John Jordan hoped that there was no probability of such an outbreak, and that both parties would still come to an agreement. All the foreign Powers wished for was a stable Government which would keep China at peace and united. Many foreigners had at first held the view that a constitutional monarchy was best suited to the needs of China, but in view of the determined opposition of the south it seemed doubtful whether this could be obtained without war or the division of China into two States.

Yu Pang-hua stated that it was because they were convinced that a republic could never bring peace or stable government and that the majority in the south were not really in favour of a republic that their society had been formed with the idea of giving the real majority a chance to make their views known through the national convention.

Sir John Jordan agreed that the great majority of the people of China only desired peace and order, but how did they propose to overcome the opposition of the southern minority at present in power, and especially their evident determination to remove the present dynasty?

Yu replied that the violent opposition of the revolutionary leaders would disappear if their face could be saved. The proposed national convention would, the society believed, afford the required opportunity for the revolutionary leaders to moderate their demands without loss of face. As regards the dynasty, the society was prepared to accept the verdict of the national convention; they did not necessarily insist on the retention of the Manchus.

Chu Ch'un-nien then said that, as the Society's president for the Peking district, he was anxious to know whether there was any chance of the neutralisation of the city being secured through the good offices of the foreign representatives.

Sir John Jordan said that he feared this would be a difficult matter, but if the society would approach the other Ministers, and if the latter desired to move in the matter, he would be very glad to join in any representations that might be thought possible.

The deputation stated that they intended to visit the other legations and make a similar representation of their views to all the foreign Ministers.

*Peking, January 15, 1912.*

No. 84.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)*

Sir, *Peking, January 16, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that on the 13th instant the representatives of the six Powers met at this legation to consider the line of action to be adopted for meeting any of the several contingencies with which the commanding officers may find themselves confronted. There was a slight divergence of opinion on some points, but we were generally agreed in considering that, as the object was to ensure free communication between Peking and the sea, the commanding officers of the six Powers should take all necessary measures to keep the line in a running condition. Any attempt to do permanent harm to the line, stations, depôts, bridges, embankments, rolling-stock, &c., should, as far as possible, be opposed. On the other hand, we considered that the landing of Chinese troops and their conveyance by rail could not be resisted. Having outlined the general basis of procedure the diplomatic representatives thought it advisable to refer the question to the commanding officers at Tien-tsin, and request them to take it into their joint consideration and suggest in detail their proposals for giving effect to the principles which had been enunciated.

It was further held that the railway from Chin-wang-tao to T'ang-ho, a distance of about 5 miles, which is the property of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, should be included in the general scheme for the maintenance of communication with the sea, but as the line was British-owned, that the assent of the company to this course should be sought. This Major Nathan has readily given, and General Cooper

informs me that he is consulting with the Japanese general with a view to affording joint protection.

I have communicated to General Cooper the result of our deliberations.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 85.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 3, 1912.*

BRIDGE on Northern Railway 10 miles outside Shanhaikwan was blown up early this morning, and an eastward train wrecked in consequence with considerable loss of life. It is hoped to reopen it in two days.

No. 86.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 3, 1912.*

THE Ministers of the six Powers which made identic communication to the Peace Conference on 20th December have been officially informed to-day that Yuan Shih-kai received this morning a secret decree granting him full power to negotiate terms with revolutionaries.

No. 87.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the party under Messrs. Sowerby and Keyte which started from Taiyuanfu on the 4th December for the relief of missionaries in Sianfu and other stations in the province of Shensi, returned to Peking yesterday, having successfully accomplished the objects of their journey.

They have safely brought out thirty-two persons, all missionaries and their families, of whom nineteen are British, ten Swedish, and three (one family) naturalised American. The names of the rescued British subjects are as follows:—

From Suitehchow, Mr. and Mrs. J. Watson and two children, and Mr. W. E. Comerford.

From Yen-anfu, Mr. and Mrs. Borst-Smith and one child.

From Sianfu: Mr. and Mrs. Donald Smith, Dr. and Mrs. Charter, Misses Watt, Beckensale, Thomas, and Turner, and Messrs. Ellison, Shields, and Stanley.

The Swedish and American families rescued were all from Sianfu, and the British subjects escorted by this party from Sianfu are all members of the English Baptist Mission, the other foreigners in Sianfu having left on the 3rd December, as reported in my despatch above referred to.

I learned with relief, a few days ago, that the large party last mentioned had arrived safely in Hankow, but I am still without details of their journey.

I regret to say that three families belonging to the English Baptist Mission did not see their way to take this opportunity of escaping, and have remained for the present in Sianfu. They are the senior missionary, Mr. Shorrock with his wife and one daughter, Dr. and Mrs. Young and infant, and Dr. Robertson. The two medical men were actively engaged in work under the Red Cross flag, and Mr. Sowerby and his companions agreed that for them to leave their post would have been inconsistent with their professional duty. The relief party, however, did all they could to persuade Mr. Shorrock to bring his family out, and the enclosed copy of a resolution passed at a meeting of the party shows that their views were definitely expressed to him. I enclose copies of two letters which I have received from Mr. Shorrock describing the situation at Sianfu. In the second of these he explains his reasons for remaining. I may add

that Mr. Sowerby admitted that the revolutionary authorities might have put difficulties in the way of the departure of the whole of the foreigners, as they were very anxious that some should remain, especially Mr. Shorrocks, whose influence among the Chinese is said to be unique.

So long as the revolutionaries remain in possession of the city, these persons are perhaps safe enough, but at the time when the relief party left, on the 4th instant, a large force of Kansu troops, under Sheng Yün, the Governor of Shensi, had advanced from the west to within about 50 miles of the city, while from the east the Imperial troops of Honan were driving the rebels before them towards Tungkwang, and there was nothing but undisciplined bands of robbers to stop them before they reached Sianfu. There is thus every possibility of a siege of the city ending in its recapture and bloody reprisals for the massacre of the Manchu garrison, during which time the position of foreigners will be exceedingly precarious.

Mr. Sowerby led his party on the return journey by the direct route through Tungkwang to Honanfu, the one road which everyone seems to have agreed was impassable on account of the fighting. It is characteristic of the attitude towards foreigners of the responsible authorities on both sides in the present revolution to note that the advance of the Imperial forces in Honan was delayed for a whole day in order to let the party pass safely through the lines.

I desire to place on record my appreciation of the tactful and courageous manner in which this expedition has been carried out.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

P.S.—I have the honour to enclose herewith translation of a letter which was addressed to me by the military commander in Sianfu, and handed by him to Mr. Sowerby for transmission to me.

J. N. J.

Enclosure 1 in No. 87.

*Resolution passed unanimously by Shensi Relief Party on December 29, 1911.*

THAT seeing that the political conditions in Shensi are fully as serious as we were led to expect, we, the members of the Shensi Relief Expedition, feel bound to express the view that it would be quite unjustifiable for any ladies or children to be allowed to remain in Sianfu, and that all foreigners still in this city should act on the advice of His Britannic Majesty's Minister and leave for the coast immediately.

Carried unanimously. Resolution endorsing this moved at meeting of Sianfu foreigners and carried by 14 votes to 10.

Enclosure 2 in No. 87.

*Mr. Shorrocks to Sir J. Jordan.*

Dear Sir John,

*Sianfu, December 1, 1911.*

I HAVE already sent some account of our position here to the consul at Hankow but I am not at all sure that it will reach its destination, as the roads are still infested with bad characters.

A party of American missionaries and the postmaster of this province, Mr. Henne, are leaving in a day or two with an escort, and this gives an opportunity of sending to you. The wires are down for scores of miles, and we shall have no telegraphic communication with the outside world for many months to come. The post is disorganised, and will be all the more so after Mr. Henne's departure. All communications of importance must be made by private messengers. The revolution in this province has been very sanguinary. The Manchus were taken unawares, and after three days were practically destroyed. They had no chance. Their weapons were obsolete, while the revolutionaries were armed with quick-firing guns. A number of old men and women are left of the Manchu population, but there must have been nearly 20,000 put to death. At first I thought 10,000 would be the lowest estimate, but now, after careful enquiries, I judge the numbers to be nearer 20,000 than 10,000. During the first two days of the fighting those of us who were in Sianfu might all have been destroyed. No notice was given to any of us that a rising was planned. An American mission in

the south of the city was attacked and eight people killed, including six children. All other places were in imminent peril. We were surrounded by howling mobs intent on looting and killing, but the local gentry and some of the reformers acted splendidly, and we were brought safely through. In the country crowds of thieves and murderers sprung up everywhere. It was not till after considerable danger had been passed that two parties of our own mission were brought in by well-armed escorts.

At Yenanku and Suitehchow there are still some of our mission. The roads have been too unsafe for them to move. As yet they are safe after having been through very trying experiences. They will probably be brought here as soon as possible. There is little doubt that the reformers have been greatly handicapped by the presence of the "Ko-lao-hui," who are here in force. They united against the Manchus, and then had to unite somehow in constituting a government. This, as you may imagine has proved far more difficult. For some time they were distinguished as the Hung Han and Fu Han, the latter name being appropriated by the reformers and the former by the Ko-lao-hui. They have now so far united as to assume the same name. All are now included in the Fu Han. This does not by any means prove that differences have been composed, or that the aims and methods of the two parties will be henceforth alike. Far from it. The policy of the Hung Han is self-aggrandisement pure and simple; that of the Fu Han is patriotic. To many of the intelligent Chinese the union seems impossible. So it certainly seems to me. However, both parties are equally anxious to extend to us protection, and it seems as if we are for the present more safe here with such protection than on the road exposed to various unknown risks. One great danger has been an incursion of Mahomedans from the west. For many days lately the city of Sianfu has been in a great ferment through dread of this menace. It is certain that Sheng, the former Fu T'ai here and latterly Viceroy of the two provinces, escaped to Kansu and raised a force with the intention of taking vengeance on the Fu Han for the massacre of the Manchus. Whether the force will come on here remains to be seen. Probably the powers here will make it worth while for the Mahomedans to stay where they are. Sianfu has been well sacked. The banks have lost 4,000,000 taels, chiefly through the depredations of the soldiers and Mahomedans in the city. Money is very scarce, provisions are plentiful. Some of the banks in which our mission has money have gone to smash altogether, but the authorities say they will make up our losses. We will see. They have already lent me 1,000 taels. Our position is a peculiar one. Have we any treaty rights now? How are the provinces linked up now? We know nothing of outside matters. Is there any central authority? If so, where? The powers that be here wish us to remain on, and unless we find it impossible to continue here, most of us British missionaries (*i.e.* Baptist Missionary Society—for we are the only British representatives in Sianfu), will remain. We have liberty to go on with our work, and are being well looked after. If you can give me your opinion what is best from your larger knowledge of the state of the whole of China I shall be glad. Most of the men—I may say all—who are in authority here are young and inexperienced, and to me it is amazing how lightly they are taking everything.

With warm regards.

Yours, &c.

A. G. SHORROCK.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 87.

*Mr. Shorrock to Sir J. Jordan.*

My dear Sir John,

*Sianfu, January 3, 1912.*

A WEEK ago the party made up by Messrs. Keyte, Sowerby, and Nyström arrived here. We were heartily glad to see them, and we cannot sufficiently express our admiration for the courage and devotion of these men. They will give you all news about Sianfu, so I need not write at length. I must explain, however, why some of us are staying behind. There are two doctors here, Young and Robertson, and both have been eagerly sought after by the revolutionaries. Young is now 50 miles to the west doctoring the wounded there, who are very many, for fierce fighting is going on between the Shensi and Kansu forces. Robertson has the hospital here full of soldiers, most of whom were wounded in the east by the Honan troops. The doctors feel they cannot leave their patients nor desert the soldiers and leaders in the time of their extremity. I am remaining to support them, and help in every possible way. I have some influence

with the revolutionaries, and they are keen to keep me here. They have promised to protect us to the utmost, and have given us all the money we need. I am staying for another reason. There are still many missionaries left in Kansu—both British and American. It seems to me necessary for the safety and comfort of the friends who come down here that someone should remain in Sianfu. It is possible that some may arrive here in distress, and my wife and I, by keeping open our home, can materially help all who pass through, especially the women and children. The only other lady (a member of our mission) who is staying in Sianfu is Mrs. Young, and she is prevented from leaving because of her child, who has an illness which absolutely prevents his removal except at the greatest risk. I earnestly hope that our action in remaining will in no way interfere with or hinder your plans. If it should be deemed advisable to send a foreign force into the interior to pacify the country, I do not at all think our safety would be imperilled thereby. The leaders on both sides are sensible enough to know that they would lose infinitely by hostile action towards us at such a time. These two days most of the men who are in power here have paid very friendly visits to us. They desire to stand well with the nations we represent. Again and again they express regret and shame for the sad and dastardly occurrence at the south suburb in which eight people—including six children—lost their lives. It is a great mistake to suppose that this catastrophe indicated—or indicates—any settled policy on the part of the leaders. All that happened here affecting foreigners took place during the first few days of the rising when authority was absent and mobs were let loose on all sides not only upon us but upon the Chinese themselves. It is surprising that so few of us have suffered seriously. I know you will do what you can for us while we are here. Some communication sent from you direct to the chiefman, "Chang T'ung Ling," would have great weight and would make our position more secure. But I am not sure that you will be able to do this. So long as the revolutionary leaders are in power Yüan Shih-kai's authority is, of course, ignored. If, however, there should be a change in Peking I trust you will, if it is at all possible, communicate directly with the T'ung Ling here. It would help us greatly if you could do this at once. If I can be of use in attending to communications from the American Minister I shall be glad. I need not say how glad I shall be to hear from you and carefully attend to any instructions you may give. The condition of things here is not promising. Money is scarce, no business is being done, the Shensi forces are largely made up of new recruits, and they are being hard pressed by the Kansu troops who are led by Sheng the former Fu T'ai of Shensi. But we have been well cared for and attended to by the leaders here, and though the soldiers still greatly lack discipline, I think they are getting to be more under control.

With warm regards, yours, &c.

A. G. SHORROCK.

P.S.—Our daughter Mary (10) is with us, but we hope to send her down soon. If China continues very unsettled we shall go south to Hankow as soon as the friends in Kansu are out.

P.S.—At present it does not seem possible for the Kansu missionaries to come along the high-road to Sianfu. No Chinese will undertake to send any conveyance to or from the Kansu border while the fighting is going on.

A. G. S.

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Enclosure 4 in No. 87.

*Translation of Letter from Chang Fang, Commander of the Eastern Army of the Republican Government in Kansu, Shensi, and Honan, to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Transmitted through Mr. Sowerby.)

MY countrymen have for long suffered the oppression of a barbarous Government, which has forfeited the mandate given to it by heaven; day and night they have been anxiously seeking for means to protect themselves, and now at last are resorting to force in the hope of reforming the administration. I feel sure that all nations appreciate our desire to secure this benefit, and realise that we are not wantonly hazarding life.

Our forces have from the outset sought to preserve peace and order, and have done their utmost to protect all foreigners in accordance with the dictates of humanity.

I have heard that your Excellency, anxious to prevent loss of life and the hardships of prolonged warfare, undertook to mediate between us and the Manchu Government in the interest of a peaceful settlement, and our countrymen were all extremely grateful.

Later, when our forces had reached Hsia Shih, where they confronted the Manchu army, the Englishman Su [? Sowerby] courageously came forward to mediate, for which I highly respect him.

It is to be hoped that the cause will speedily triumph, in order that we may sooner enjoy the cessation of warfare and the blessings of peace.

Your Excellency is most benevolent, and I hope you will advise the court not to look on the right to rule as their private prerogative, and will support a republican form of government, and so remove the possibility of conflict between ruler and people and strife between Manchu and Chinese; by so doing you will confer a very great benefit on our country.

No. 88.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 19, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 16th instant, I have the honour to enclose the copy of a telegram addressed to me by the Hankow Chamber of Commerce, stating that that body very strongly endorses the views expressed in the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce's telegram of the 12th January, and trusts that the diplomatic body will lend their support to these representations.

I am circulating copies of both these telegrams to my colleagues.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 88.

*Hankow Chamber of Commerce to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.)

*January 16, 1912.*

REFERRING to telegram sent by Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to Princes Ch'ing and Ch'un, dated the 12th January, Hankow Chamber of Commerce very strongly endorse views expressed therein, and trust that the diplomatic corps will accord their support.

No. 89.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 5, 1912.*

MY telegram of 12th January.

Consuls at Chengtu were all safe on 20th January. General situation in Szechuan gradually improving.

No. 90.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, February 6, 1912.*

PLEASE report whether arrangements have been completed for establishing the Bankers' Commission for the service of the loans secured on the customs revenues.

I understand that this is the case.

See your despatch of 2nd January.



No. 91.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 6, 1912.*

I HAVE received your despatch of the 13th January last with regard to the change in the constitution of the Wai-wu Pu and the steps taken by the diplomatic body to remind the Chinese Government of their obligations under the final protocol of 1901.

I have to inform you that His Majesty's Government have no objection to the proposal that the president of the Wai-wu Pu shall in future be other than an Imperial Prince, and you are authorised to inform the Chinese Government of this decision provided always that the other signatory Powers similarly consent.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

No. 92.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 6th February.

Arrangement was completed and instructions sent to Bankers' Commission 30th January.

My despatch of 30th January, sent via Siberia, contains full report.

No. 93.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)*

Sir,

*Chengtú, December 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting on the publication at Chengtu of a poster libelling British rule in India.

I have, &amp;c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure in No. 93.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtú, December 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that an anonymous printed poster was published and distributed in Chengtu on the 18th December. The tenour of this document is to call on all good citizens to combine to support the new military Government, in order that Szechuan may be saved from destruction, an object which is in every way laudable. Unfortunately, however, the author cites the fate of India as an instance of the dangers which overhang Szechuan, and proceeds to relate the usual unprincipled falsehoods about the way in which the natives of India are oppressed by the British.

On my attention being drawn to this poster, I at once wrote a note to the President pointing out that while the main object of the anonymous author was no doubt the praiseworthy one of preserving the peace, his references to a Foreign State, and the unscrupulous falsehoods therein contained, were calculated to incite the populace to riot and to prejudice international comity.

On the following day the same poster appeared in one of the vernacular newspapers with the substitution of the words "another nation" for "English." As I had in the meanwhile received no answer from the President, I at once wrote a second time, urging that immediate steps be taken to stop the distribution and publication of the objectionable poster.

This morning Yang Shao-ch'üan, the vice-president of the newly-created Yang-wu

Pu, Board of Foreign Affairs (formerly known as the Yang-wu Chü), paid his official call at this consulate. Mr. Yang was an influential member, I believe the president, of the Chengtu branch of the Young Men's Christian Association, and speaks good English, a fact which naturally tends to greatly facilitate his conduct of foreign affairs. He referred at once to the affair of the poster, explaining that he had only just received from the President my two letters, begged me to overlook the delay in replying, and assured me that he had already sent out detectives to stop the distribution and publication of the poster.

Mr. Yang then proceeded to lay the following matter before me. He stated that the President, having created the various boards, has delegated to them full powers in their respective spheres; he therefore asked me to write in future not to the President, but to the Board of Foreign Affairs. I replied that nothing was further from my wishes than to embarrass the new Government, but that it had been the custom, under the old régime, for our consuls-general to communicate directly with governors or governors-general on all matters of importance. If, then, Szechuan was to form part of the Republic of China, I should consider it my duty, until instructed by His Majesty's Minister to the contrary, to continue to maintain the right of direct correspondence with the President, as representing the authority of the former governors-general. If, however, as appeared to be the case, Szechuan was to be an independent State, it would, of course, be in order for me to address my communications to the Board of Foreign Affairs. I then proceeded to put the direct question to Mr. Yang: Was Szechuan to be considered an independent State or part of a federal Chinese republic? Somewhat to my surprise, he replied that his Government were not yet in a position to say. But, he added, in consideration of the overwhelming amount of work devolving on the President at this crisis, he hoped that I would see my way to acquiescing in his request at any rate temporarily. To this I agreed, pointing out that it was our desire throughout to make matters as easy as possible for the new Government. My colleagues of France and Germany have since informed me that they will follow my lead in the matter.

Soon after Mr. Yang's departure I received from the Wai-wu Pu a note stating that steps were being taken to discover the authorship of the poster and to put a stop to its further publication.

I have, &c.  
W. H. WILKINSON.

No. 94.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Chengtu, December 23, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that ex-Governor-General Chao Erh-feng was executed yesterday by the revolutionary Government of Chengtu.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

No. 95.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 22, 1912.*

I HAD the honour to inform you briefly by telegraph on the 18th instant of the substance of a conversation which I had with the Premier on that day.

Yuan Shih-kai felt confident at that time of his ability to come to an understanding with the leaders of the Republican movement in the south for the formation of a Provisional Government to carry on the administration of the country during the interval between the abdication of the Throne and the election of a President by the members of the National Convention at Nanking and Peking. The idea was that a decree would be issued empowering him to form a Provisional Government during the week or ten days which would be required to conduct the election that would result in his own nomination as President.

This arrangement, as you will have learned from my telegram of to-day, has miscarried, and how this has come to pass will be best shown by the enclosed extracts from telegrams which have passed between Yuan and the revolutionary leaders

at Shanghai and Nanking. A perusal of the first three telegrams, dated the 14th and 15th January, goes to prove that Yuan was fully justified in assuming on the 18th January, the date of my interview, that Wu T'ing-fang had acquiesced in the proposed procedure. But the two telegrams from Sun-wên himself of the 20th January strike a very different note, and state definitely that no Provisional Government is to be established in the north, and that Yuan must receive his appointment from the republic and cannot derive any authority from the Manchus.

It is hard to see how under the terms laid down by Sun in these telegrams the interval between abdication and settled government is to be bridged over in the north. The object of the Republican party is doubtless to show that the victory rests with them, but how this is to be realised without creating a dangerous situation here is not so clear.

The unexpected hitch which has thus occurred has caused a feeling of renewed uneasiness in Peking, and has given encouragement to the opposition to abdication amongst the extreme section of the Manchus. The return to Peking of T'ieh Liang, an ex-Minister of War and a rival of Yuan Shih-kai, has greatly accentuated the difficulties of the situation, and among the bolder spirits there is a disposition to put him at the head of the Imperial forces and try conclusions with the Republican armies. All this is likely to prolong the present tension and to postpone a settlement.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure in No. 95.

*Extracts from Telegrams.*

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(1.)

*From Wu T'ing-fang to the Premier.*

*January 14, 1912.*

IT has been repeatedly declared that Sun is willing to withdraw in favour of Yuan, and there is no possibility of repudiation. If the Manchu Emperor abdicates, the Nanking Government can then publish a formal despatch withdrawing in favour of Yuan, thereafter the manner in which the two Governments are to be amalgamated can be settled after mutual discussion.

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(2.)

*Sun Wen to Wu T'ing-fang.*

*January 15, 1912.*

IF the Manchu Emperor really abdicates and proclaims a republic the Provisional Government will certainly not repudiate its promises, and I will then formally resign my appointment and withdraw in favour of Yuan as President, on the ground that his services and ability entitle him to the post.

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(3.)

*Wu T'ing-fang to the Premier.*

*January 15, 1912.*

IT has now been decided that on the day the decree is issued Sun Wen will resign his appointment and will at once recommend Yuan as President. Sun will forthwith proceed to Peking to consult personally as to the formation of a Provisional Government.

As regards the agreement for the treatment to be accorded to the Imperial Family, it has already been agreed that the Peking Government shall telegraph to Liu, Minister to Holland, to notify this to The Hague Tribunal, and after the establishment of the Provisional Government this shall be supplemented by a formal despatch, under seal, to be placed on record with the said Tribunal.

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(4.)

*Sun Wen to Wu T'ing-fang.**January 20, 1912.*

1. On the abdication of the Manchu Emperor, his whole authority shall cease simultaneously and shall not be secretly entrusted to any Minister or subject.
2. No Provisional Government shall be established at Peking.
3. Sun Wen shall place his resignation in the hands of the Assembly, and shall then proclaim the date fixed for his withdrawal from office.
4. The Assembly shall be asked to elect Yuan as President, and thus the procedure in this matter will be in order.

(5.)

*Sun Wen to Wu T'ing-fang.**January 20, 1912.*

1. The abdication of the Manchu Emperor is an actual abolition of the Imperial authority and not a merely nominal one.
  2. Yuan must receive his appointment from the republic, and he cannot derive any authority from the Manchus.
  3. Yuan can publish to Chinese and foreigners his intention to support a republic in order to render himself eligible for election.
  4. There cannot be two Provisional Governments, if disputes are to be avoided, and so when the Manchu Emperor has abdicated the Republican Government should likewise withdraw.
  5. Yuan can be elected as substantive President, and the term "Provisional" need not be used; by this means the republic can be consolidated, and north and south united.
- Please inform T'ang.

No. 96.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a letter addressed to His Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai by Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, lately Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Republican Government of China, forwarding copy of a manifesto to the foreign nations issued by President Sun Yat-sen, and requesting that it may be conveyed to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &amp;c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 96.

*Wu T'ing-fang to Consul-General Fraser.*

Dear Sir,

*Shanghai, January 5, 1912.*

ENCLOSED I have the pleasure of forwarding you a copy of a manifesto to the foreign nations under the hand of President Sun Yat-sen, countersigned by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and issued at Nanking under to-day's date.

As this document embodies the policy of the Republican Government, we would regard it as a favour if you would convey it to your esteemed Government.

I have, &amp;c.

WU T'ING-FANG.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 96.

*Manifesto from the Republic of China to all Friendly Nations.*

Greeting,

THE hitherto irremediable suppression of the individual qualities and national aspirations of the people having arrested the intellectual, the moral, and the material development of China, the aid of revolution has been invoked to extirpate the primary cause, and we now proclaim the resultant overthrow of the despotic sway wielded by the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of a republic.

The substitution of a republic for a monarchical form of Government is not the fruit of a transient passion. It is the natural outcome of a long-cherished desire for broad-based freedom making for permanent contentment and uninterrupted advancement. It is the formal declaration of the will of the Chinese nation.

We, the Chinese people, are peaceful and law-abiding. We have waged no war except in self-defence. We have borne our grievances during 267 years of Manchu misrule with patience and forbearance. We have by peaceful means endeavoured to redress our wrongs, secure our liberty, and ensure our progress, but we have failed. Oppressed beyond human endurance, we deemed it our inalienable right as well as our sacred duty to appeal to arms to deliver ourselves and our posterity from the yoke to which we have so long been subjected, and, for the first time in our history, inglorious bondage has been transformed to an inspiring freedom splendid with the lustrous light of opportunity.

The policy of the Manchu dynasty has been one of unequivocal seclusion and unyielding tyranny. Beneath it we have bitterly suffered, and we now submit to the free peoples of the world the reasons justifying the revolution and the inauguration of our present Government.

Prior to the usurpation of the throne by the Manchus the land was open to foreign intercourse, and religious tolerance existed, as is evidenced by the writings of Marco Polo and the inscription of the Nestorian tablet of Sian-fu.

Dominated by ignorance and selfishness, the Manchus closed the land to the outer world and plunged the Chinese people into a state of benighted mentality calculated to operate inversely to their natural talents and capabilities, thus committing a crime against humanity and the civilised nations almost impossible of expiation.

Actuated by a desire for the perpetual subjugation of the Chinese by a vicious craving for aggrandisement and wealth, the Manchus governed the country to the lasting injury and detriment of our people, creating privileges and monopolies and erecting about themselves barriers of exclusion in national custom and personal conduct which have been rigorously maintained throughout the centuries.

They have levied irregular and unwholesome taxes upon us without our consent, have restricted foreign trade to treaty ports, placed *li-kin* embargoes upon merchandise in transit, and obstructed internal commerce.

They have retarded the creation of industrial enterprises, rendered impossible the development of natural resources, and wilfully neglected to safeguard vested interests.

They have denied us a regular system and impartial administration of justice; inflicted unusual and cruel punishments upon all persons charged with offences, whether innocent or guilty, and frequently encroached upon our sacred rights without due process of law.

They have connived at official corruption, sold offices to the highest bidder, and subordinated merit to influence.

They have repeatedly rejected our most reasonable demands for better government, and have reluctantly conceded pseudo-reforms under most urgent pressure, making promises without intention of fulfilling them, and obstructing efforts towards national elevation.

They have failed to appreciate the anguishing lessons taught by the foreign Powers in the process of years, and have brought themselves and our people beneath the contempt of the world.

To remedy these evils and render possible the entrance of China to the family of nations we have fought and formed our Government, and, lest our good intentions should be misunderstood, we now publicly and unreservedly declare the following to be our promises:—

All treaties entered into by the Manchu Government before the date of the revolution will be continually effective up to the time of their termination; but any and all entered into after the commencement of the revolution will be repudiated.

All foreign loans or indemnities incurred by the Manchu Government before the revolution will be acknowledged without any alteration of terms; but all payments made to, and loans incurred by, the Manchu Government after the commencement of the revolution will be repudiated.

All concessions granted to foreign nations or their nationals by the Manchu Government before the revolution will be respected, but any and all granted after the commencement of the revolution will be repudiated.

All persons and property of any foreign nation within the jurisdiction of the Republic of China will be respected and protected.

It will be our constant aim and firm endeavour to build upon a stable and enduring foundation a national structure compatible with the potentialities of our long-neglected country.

We will strive to elevate our people, secure them in peace, and legislate for their prosperity.

To those Manchus who abide peacefully within the limits of our jurisdiction we will accord equality and give protection.

We will remodel our laws, revise our civil, criminal, commercial, and mining codes, reform our finances, abolish restrictions to trade and commerce, and ensure religious toleration.

The cultivation of better relations with foreign peoples and Governments will ever be before us. It is our earnest hope that the foreign nations who have been steadfast in sympathy will bind more firmly the bonds of friendship; that they will bear in patience with us the period of trial confronting us in our reconstructive work, and that they will aid us in the consummation of the far-reaching plans which we are now about to undertake, and which they have been so long and so vainly urging upon the people of this our country.

With this message of peace and good-will the Republic of China cherishes the hope of being admitted into the family of nations, not merely to share their rights and privileges, but also to co-operate with them in the great and noble task called for in the upbuilding of the civilised world.

SUN YAT-SEN, *President.*

Countersigned :  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Dated at Nanking, fifth day of the first month of the first year of the Republic of China (5th January, 1912).

No. 97.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 9, 1912.*

MUKDEN was strongly patrolled yesterday by Japanese troops in consequence of letter, subsequently ascertained to be false, which was received by the foreign consuls, ostensibly from General Lan, asking them to withdraw their nationals into the foreign settlements immediately.

General Lan was formerly in command of a brigade at Mukden, but deserted the cause, and is now at Chefoo.

No. 98.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Chengtzu, December 13, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting on the departure of the foreign community of Chengtzu by river for Chungking.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure in No. 98.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtú, December 13, 1911.*

THE European and American residents at Chengtu, who had embarked on house-boats on the 10th instant, finally succeeded in starting on their journey to Chungking at 4.30 yesterday afternoon.

I had been promised, by telephone, an answer to the letter of the consular body to the Government, to which reference is made in my despatch of the 10th instant, and I waited for it in vain throughout the morning of the 11th. Courteous but urgent reminders at last brought a brief note to say that two gentlemen named Yang and Liang had been sent that morning to arrange matters with me personally.

I at once replied that none had come near me, and deprecated further delay. At 4 p.m. a second note, evidently written in haste, reached me saying that men had been sent to protect the foreign boat party, and inviting me to go myself to the Huang Ch'eng (Imperial city, the head-quarters of the new Government) to discuss the matter of the escort down river.

As neither the president nor the vice-president has called on me, but only a delegate or deputy of theirs, I sent Mr. Teichman to represent me, accompanied by Mr. Brian Bates.

Mr. Teichman's subsequent report was as follows :—

“ We arrived at the Huang Ch'eng about 5 p.m. The streets in the neighbourhood were packed with armed men carrying every variety of weapon, from halberds and gingals to Martinis and Mausers. The crowds opened out and made way for the two foreigners with the greatest politeness.

“ After some delay, we were shown into a small reception room, where we met Yün Tu-tu. The president evidently expected us, and after discussing the matter shortly, left saying that he must ask the advice of “ Lo ta-jen ” (Lo Lun, the vice-president) in the matter.

“ Ten minutes later an elderly man, the father of Yen K'ai, another of the league leaders arrested on the 7th of September, appeared, and said that he had been deputed by the Government to arrange the matter. After some discussion, he told me that it would be quite impossible to provide the escort at daybreak the next day as I earnestly requested, but gave me a most explicit assurance that at least 100 men should be at the riverside ready to start at 3 p.m.

“ The Government appeared to me to be most anxious to do all in their power to protect foreigners ; but a visit to the business part of their head-quarters, in order to get a pass for that night through the east gate, showed the hopeless confusion in which everything is, and went far to explain the delay in providing the escort. Questioned as to the progress things had made since the sack, they stated that they are faced with one great difficulty, the financial, consequent on the looting of the provincial treasury. They also averred that the present Government, though brought into power by the T'ung-Chih Hui (Railway League), is being carried on by the Ko-Ming Tang, or revolutionary party. The escort is to consist of men furnished by both.

“ The undisciplined soldiers and braves, swarming in the courtyards of the Huang Ch'eng, increased the scene of confusion and disorder, but President Yun favourably impressed me. He is some 30 years of age, tall and thin, with short hair and alert movements. He was educated partly in Japan, and has been director of the Luchün School for Military Cadets.”

In the course of that same afternoon, the 11th December, Yang K'ai-chia (better known by his hao or familiar name of Shao-ch'uan), the quondam principal of the Young Men's Christian Association, warned me over the telephone that there may be again serious trouble in Chengtu, and that it would be better if not only their nationals left for Chungking, but the consuls also. He admitted that it was he who had sent the white lanterns inscribed with the character Cheng on the afternoon of the 8th, and he said that he had been down that morning to the boats to consult about the escort. I could not quite understand what is the precise danger that is threatening Chengtu, but I gather that the Ko-Ming Tang is still not altogether satisfied with the Government, and that at the same time a collision is to be feared with the regular army. Of this, however, I may have occasion to speak in a later despatch.

I could not make light of the warning after our experiences of the 8th instant ; but since the Catholic missionaries refuse absolutely to withdraw, and he expects almost daily the arrival of M. Bons d'Anty, M. Leurquin said that he must stay on at

Chengtū. Mr. Fischer and myself cannot, then, think of departing, and Mr. Teichman, whose pluck I commend, asked me to let him keep me company. Nevertheless, I felt I ought to take the opportunity to send away the family of my writer (who was brought here by Mr., now Sir Alexander, Hosie in 1902). Their home was completely wrecked by the rioters on the night of the 8th, and we are, I take it, morally, if not legally, bound to see that they are indemnified and meanwhile placed in safety. With them I sent down to Chungking the more valuable portion of my personal effects in the care of Mr. Bates.

In my capacity of acting senior consul, with the full concurrence of Messrs. Fischer and Leurquin, I requested Dr. Mouillac to act as captain of the boat party. He is an officer of the French army, he speaks English and Chinese, and is deservedly popular with both natives and foreigners. I have suggested to him that he may employ Mr. Bates as his lieutenant. The latter is an accomplished linguist, cool, level-headed, and courageous. The boat party, exclusive of the Japanese contingent, consists of 107 men, women, and children, distributed in 29 boats. It includes subjects or citizens of Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany, and Russia.

The Japanese contingent consists of 42 persons distributed over six boats. As Mr. Miura, the assistant to Mr. Consul Kasai at Chungking, is one of the party, I have left it to him to make arrangements with Dr. Mouillac.

Moreover, the Japanese contingent was unable to leave till this morning, whereas, as I have reported, the rest of the flotilla got under weigh at 4.30 yesterday afternoon. The Japanese boats, however, are smaller and lighter, and should speedily catch up with the others, which, owing to the shallow state of the upper reaches of the river, can proceed but slowly. The combined flotilla will then consist of 35 passenger boats, together with the craft conveying the escort.

The escort was partly provided by Wu Erh-tai-wang, hitherto a guerilla chief, but now acting with the Government. It is about 120 strong, the men neatly dressed in black uniforms and armed with good modern rifles. A patrol boat is being sent on ahead to give warning against interference, and late last night two passports were sent to me by Yang K'ai-chia. One of these is issued by, and bears the seal of, the Chün Cheng Fu (Chün, I imagine, is intended to translate the word "sovereign" rather than "military"); the other is in the form of a circular letter addressed to the revolutionaries by Yang Wei. Yang Wei was one of five students arrested four years ago by Chao Erh-feng. Two of the youths were shortly released, but the remaining three, including Yang Wei, were kept in prison till the day before the declaration of independence. Yang Wei is now one of the leading members of the T'ung-Meng Hui, the local branch (or, for what I know, the new designation) of the Ko-Ming Tang.

In any case, the reasons he gives for the policy of protecting foreigners are sound, and, as far as I can observe, commend themselves to all responsible persons of whatever party here. Provided with these two documents, which I forwarded to Dr. Mouillac this morning by mounted courier, I trust that the flotilla will meet with no hindrances.

At Dr. Mouillac's request I wrote this morning to the Government (which the force of circumstances compels us to recognise) thanking them for the provision of an escort, and saying that while arrangements had been made for the travelling expenses of these men, the foreigners thus protected would like to know what gratuities the Government would permit the escort to accept.

The Government replied suggesting that one dollar a-head would suffice, but offering to repay through me not only the sum of these gratuities, but the whole cost to the boat party of the escort. This is an exceedingly pleasant and liberal proposal, but I trust that, while expressing their sense of its generosity, the boat party will insist on themselves paying the gratuity.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

No. 99.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 27, 1912.*

THE course of events here during the last ten days has not brought the abdication of the Throne nearer fulfilment now than it was when I wrote my despatch of the 16th instant, and it cannot be said that present indications point to an early



settlement of the struggle which is going on between the Throne and the people, with Yuan Shih-kai acting the part of mediator.

It is quite impossible to follow the tortuous course of the negotiations between Yuan and the republican leaders at Shanghai or to disentangle the truth from the mass of conflicting statements in which each side throws the blame upon the other for the failure to arrive at a settlement. This may be partly due to the fact that two sets of negotiations are apparently proceeding at the same time—one conducted by telegram directly between Yuan and Wu T'ing-fang and the other carried on between Liang Shih-yi and T'ang Shao-yi.

Stripped of the verbiage with which the discussions have been invested, the net result seems to be that the reactionary party in Peking, headed by T'ieh Liang, have succeeded in inducing the Throne to abandon the intention of abdicating, and that Yuan Shih-kai has been obliged to fall back upon the proposal which was originally made for deciding the question by an appeal to a national convention.

A decree which was issued on the 25th January notified this change of attitude to the people, and at the same time conveyed the impression that as the arrangements for summoning a national assembly were being carried out there was no reason for the panic which the rumours of abdication had created in Peking.

In a telegram which was sent yesterday to Wu T'ing-fang, Yuan Shih-kai considerably modified his previous proposals for the election of a national assembly, with the view of making it a more manageable body. The revolutionaries are prepared to accept Yuan as President of the Republic as soon as he declares for their cause.

A more complicated position it is impossible to conceive than that which has existed recently in Peking, and the reign of terrorism which is now being inaugurated is possibly only the prelude to worse troubles. The attempt to blow up Yuan Shih-kai was followed last night by a similar attack upon Liang Pi, the capable chief of the General Staff, who has taken a prominent part in the movement against abdication, and the parts of the city which comprise the residences of leading officials are practically in military occupation. The machinery of the government is entirely disorganised, and the legation quarter and the concessions at Tien-tsin are full of refugees like Na T'ung and others who in the days of their power were never tired of abusing these privileged resorts of foreigners. The mutual distrust which is the dominant characteristic of all Chinese parties at present has temporarily silenced the clamour for the recovery of sovereign rights, and when the day of trial comes there is not a spot in all this vast Empire outside the much-abused foreign concessions where the rival parties can meet to compose their differences, or where the men who have governed the country in the past consider their lives and property safe from the violence which their own misrule has called into existence.

The armistice, or, more properly speaking, the suspension of hostilities, which was arranged through British mediation at Hankow on the 9th December, 1911, expires, after various prolongations, on the morning of the 29th instant, and is, so far as one can judge at present, unlikely to be renewed. Fighting has already commenced on the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway, where the redoubtable Chang Hsün has repulsed a large body of revolutionaries, and during the last few days a series of pamphlets and leaflets, copies of which have been sent to me by anonymous correspondents, has been issued, urging the necessity of leaving the national problem to the arbitrament of war. But it would not surprise me if these manifestos were largely meant to save appearances and if neither party showed much eagerness for further fighting.

One comic element in the situation has been the elevation of Yuan Shih-kai to the rank of Marquis. Yuan has been significantly told by the Throne that he must not decline the title, the acceptance of which he probably feels is not a suitable recommendation for the post of President of the Republic.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 100.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 28, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatches of the 16th and 19th instant respectively, in which I enclosed copies of telegrams forwarded to Peking by the Chambers of Commerce at Shanghai and Hankow, in favour of the abdication of the throne, I have

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the honour to state that the Shanghai Chamber telegraphed to Hong Kong the text of the representation they had made, and strongly recommended that the committee of the Hong Kong Chamber should telegraph to Prince Ch'ing and Prince Ch'un endorsing their appeal.

The Hong Kong Chamber adopted this suggestion, sending the message through the agent of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank here, and also took steps to inform the revolutionary leaders at Shanghai of the views they held.

I have, &c.  
J. N. JORDAN.

## No. 101.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 12, 1912.*

ABDICATION of the throne.

Three Imperial edicts have been issued to-night.

The first edict invests Yuan Shih-kai with full powers to organise a provisional Republican Government and to negotiate with the leaders of the Republican party with a view to the elaboration of a joint scheme uniting north and south in one republic, which is to be the established form of Government.

The second edict enumerates the terms of treatment accepted by the Imperial family, which both sides are to communicate to the foreign representatives for transmission to their respective Governments.

The third edict exhorts the officials and people to do their duty by the new Government, and orders measures to be taken for the preservation of peace.

## No. 102.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 12, 1912.*

MY telegram of to-day.

I have received three following official communications, with request that they should be transmitted to His Majesty's Government :—

1. Note from Minister for Foreign Affairs under old régime communicating decree of abdication.

2. Note from same as head of Wai-wu Pu under actual régime, stating that, under instructions received from Yuan Shih-kai as plenipotentiary for establishment of a provisional republic, he will continue to conduct international business in accordance with existing treaties pending creation of Provisional Government.

3. Note from Yuan Shih-kai, in above capacity as plenipotentiary, communicating terms agreed upon for future treatment of Imperial family.

## No. 103.

*Mr. Lew Yuk Lin to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)*

Your Excellency,

*Chinese Legation, February 13, 1912.*

UNDER instructions from the Wai-wu Pu, I have the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, translation of a telegram, received by me this morning, announcing the change of Government in China and the temporary alterations made in consequence, including a change in the national flag and in official dress.

I have, &c.  
LEW YUK LIN.

Enclosure in No. 103.

*Translation of a Telegram received from the Wai-wu Pu, dated February 12, 1912.*

THIS board has forwarded to all the foreign Ministers in Peking the edicts issued to-day by the Empress-Dowager, requesting them to communicate the decrees to their respective Governments.

By the command of Yuan Shih-kai, the chief Government administrator, who has been given full powers to organise the provisional Republican Government, we have to inform you that, the Ta Ching Emperor having abdicated and China being about to adopt the republican form of government, it is settled that the name of China will be the Great Chinese Republic. During the period of organising the provisional government the Ministers abroad will be called Representatives of China *ad interim* for Foreign Affairs, and will continue to discharge their usual duties. The members of the legations and the consuls will remain as before. The national flag will for the time being be rectangular in form and in five colours, namely, red, yellow, blue, white, and black, in horizontal bands.

The official dress will be changed temporarily to the usual dress of American civil officials. National decorations will be worn as usual. Until the provisional government is established the Ministers of the different boards will be called Chiefs, instead of Ministers, of Department.

Communications between you and the different boards will be in the form of letters instead of despatches, and will be signed and sealed with your private seal.

The year name will for the present be Hsin Hai.

*Chinese Legation, February 13, 1912.*

No. 104.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 14, 1912.*

MY telegram of 12th February.

In a circular to Legations, Wai-wu Pu have requested foreign Ministers to inform their respective Governments that title of Chinese representatives abroad is changed for the time being to that of "provisional diplomatic representatives."

No. 105.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 14, 1912.*

MY telegram of 12th February.

At a meeting of the diplomatic body held yesterday, it was agreed that we should return no answer to the notes, and that necessary business with Wai-wu Pu should be conducted by interviews or informal communications.

No. 106.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 14, 1912.*

ABDICATION of the throne.

The chance of a settlement is not improved by the attitude of the Nanking Provisional Government towards the abdication edicts.

Sun Yat Sen has telegraphed inviting Yuan Shih-kai to proceed at once to Nanking, and declaring that the republic cannot be instituted by the mandate of the Manchu Emperor. He states that, if there would be any risk of disorder in the north in the absence of Yuan Shih-kai, the latter should nominate someone to whom the Provisional Government would accord full powers to preserve the peace.

A deadlock is caused by this suggestion, which appears to be impracticable.

No. 107.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16, 1912.)*

Sir,

*Chengtú, December 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting on the execution of Chao Erh-feng, and the expected collision between Republican and Imperial troops in the vicinity of Yachou.

I have, &amp;c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure in No. 107.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtú, December 29, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report the reasons given by the Chengtú Government for the arrest and execution of Chao Erh-feng.

On the 23rd instant Yang Shao-ch'uan, the tzu chang (junior director) and pu chang (acting director) of the Wai-wu Pu of Szechuan—or rather of the Chengtú Chün Cheng Fu—personally informed Herr Fischer, acting German consul, that his Government had discovered that Chao Erh-feng was not only responsible for the riot of the 8th December, but was intriguing with Fu Sung-mu (Acting Warden of the Marches) now at Yachou with a force of border troops. He added that the President had more than once urged Chao to quit Chengtú.

Shortly after this conversation (which took place at the Foreign Office) Yang telephoned to me. Speaking in English he asked, "Have you heard that we have executed the Viceroy?" I replied, "Why?" He then said that it had been ascertained that Chao Erh-feng on the 5th December bribed each man with a dollar and each officer with ten dollars. Moreover, the Government had intercepted a messenger from the Viceroy to Fu Sung-mu at Yachou. He added that the Government was writing to order Fu to return to Tachienlu and act as warden on their behalf, but admitted that the real object of the move was to keep him out of mischief. An escort of one hundred men would be sent in a day or two to Ch'ung Chou to meet and bring on to Chengtú M. Bons d'Anty.

On the 26th I returned Yang's call at the Foreign Office, but he made no sort of allusion to the execution of Chao Erh-feng, and I did not consider it expedient to broach the subject.

Meanwhile, Fu Sung-mu at Yachou was, it appears, being besieged by the mutinous troops who looted Chiating on the 10th instant.

The impression prevailing here yesterday was that not Fu Sung-mu alone is at Yachou, but also Feng-shan, Commandant of the Hsi-chün ("Western Forces") at Batang, and that both are eager to avenge the death of their patron, Chao Erh-feng. To-day's "Szechuan Kung Pao," however, states, on the authority of letters exhibited by his wife, that Feng-shan is still at Batang, and that owing to rheumatism in his left leg he resigned his post of Commandant on the 9th November. The messenger who brought hither a letter from Yachou on the 26th December reported that Feng-shan was not in that city at the time of his departure.

Nevertheless, a strong expedition under Sun Tse-p'ei, the guerilla leader of whom mention has more than once been made in my recent despatches, has left Chengtú for Hsinching, Ch'ung Chou, and Yachou. A notification issued to-day declares that 5,000 Yunnan troops now at Sui Fu, and 4,500 of the Chungking Government forces are to co-operate. In the complicated struggle round Yachou that may result, the prospects of a safe journey for my French colleague and his companions are, I fear, not brilliant.

I have, &amp;c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

No. 108.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)*

Sir,

*Chengtú, January 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, covering an intelligence report for the quarter ended the 31st December, 1911.

I have, &amp;c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 108.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtú, January 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an intelligence report, compiled by Mr. Teichman, for the quarter ended the 31st December, 1911.

I have, &amp;c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 108.

*Chengtú Intelligence Report for Quarter ending the 31st December, 1911.**Review of the Political Situation during the Quarter.*

SINCE the date of the last intelligence report the political situation in Chengtú may be said to have passed through three distinct phases: firstly, up to the 27th November the continuation of the Imperial Government régime under Viceroy Chao Erh-feng; secondly, the rule of the first republican Government from the 27th November to the 8th December; and, thirdly, the establishment of the present military administration by the revolutionaries and the railway league. During the continuance of Chao Erh-feng's rule excellent order was maintained within the city walls, but the gradual dissemination amongst the populace of the news of the spread of the revolution in other provinces rendered the position an impossible one. At this crisis the policy of the Viceroy appeared at first to be one of resistance, since he took measures to remove the Luchün troops, whose loyalty was always open to doubt, from the city, and to concentrate the Hsünfang soldiers, who, as mercenaries recruited from other provinces, could be relied on to sell their services to the highest bidder within the walls. At the last moment, however, he changed his mind, and on the 27th November a republican Government was peacefully proclaimed, under the auspices, one might almost say, of the ex-Viceroy.

From the first it was evident that the new Government was an unstable one, unlikely to last. During the ten days it remained in power Chengtú presented a sight which astonished and alarmed the peaceful citizens. Hsünfang braves, who had lost all semblance of discipline, thronged the streets, bullying and robbing the shops, tea houses, and brothels with impunity, while robber chiefs with their armed followers flocked into the city, ostensibly to congratulate the new Government, but in reality to see what they could get out of the general confusion. The picturesque appearance of these fantastically dressed braves and bandits who crowded the principal thoroughfares was heightened by the new style of dressing the hair in a top-knot adorned with silver ornaments; this coiffure was adopted in opposition to the queue-cutting movement, the underlying idea being that, while the wearers are no longer slaves of the Manchus, they have no desire to ape the foreigner by cutting off their hair.

On the 8th December the expected explosion occurred, and the first republican Government collapsed. After two days of anarchy a new and firmer one was formed by a combination of the T'ung-Chih Hui and Ko-Ming Tang parties (the railway league and the revolutionaries), and conditions in the city rapidly improved. General satisfaction was felt at the combination of these two forces, as fears had been expressed lest they should come to blows. On the 22nd December there was a renewal of commotion and excitement consequent on the execution of Chao Erh-feng by the Government, and for a day or two there was a reign of terror, during which none knew

whose would be the next head to fall. But public confidence in the new Government was soon restored, and the city has now resumed, to a certain extent, its normal aspect.

Interest at present centres in the fact that the influence of the present Chengtu Government barely extends beyond the bounds of the Chengtu plain, and it remains to be seen whether the various other independent administrations in Szechuan will be willing to place themselves under Chengtu as the capital of the province. This Government naturally considers itself the Szechuan Government, and deputies have been sent to induce the other administrations to fall into line; it is also announced that P'u Tien-chün, the President of the first Republic in Chengtu, has been sent as delegate of the present Government to attend a republican congress at Wuchang. General Chu, the vice-president of the former administration, is said to be still in hiding in the city. Danger also threatens from the direction of Yachou, where Fu Sung-mu is in power with 1,000 seasoned troops from Thibet, who have not yet thrown in their lot with any of the revolutionary parties. The situation in that neighbourhood is further complicated by the fact that a body of 1,500 soldiers, who looted Chiating on the 10th December, are now attacking Yachou, not in the interests of any particular party, but merely for the sake of plunder.

Meanwhile, brigandage is everywhere rife, and the roads are unsafe for any but the most poorly dressed of travellers. In the immediate neighbourhood of Chengtu, however, the peasants appear to have been at work on their fields throughout the troubles, and if this has been the case in other parts of the province distress amongst the poor will not be as great as might otherwise have been expected.

It may be noted that the conduct of Manchus towards Chinese and of Chinese towards Manchus has been throughout exemplary. After the decapitation of the Viceroy grave fears were entertained lest the Tartar general and his followers should be the next to suffer. On the 24th December the Manchu city was surrounded by republican troops, and the Manchus were asked to surrender their arms. This they peacefully did, and it now appears that they will be allowed to merge quietly into the Chinese population, while the Tartar general will probably leave the city as soon as he can travel in safety.

#### *Missionary Affairs.*

As reported in previous despatches, all the Protestant missionaries left Chengtu on the 13th December by boat for Chungking accompanied by an escort of 100 revolutionary soldiers. On the 27th, 28th, and 29th December a deputy from the Foreign Office, accompanied by Mr. Teichman, went round to all the British and American compounds, missionary and other, sealing up the houses with the seals of the new administration. This was of course a mere formality, indicating that the Government took over all responsibility for the contents, for, if the houses were to be looted, entrance could easily be effected elsewhere than by the doors.

All the missionaries remaining at their stations in the interior of the province have been repeatedly urged by His Majesty's consul-general to leave for Chungking or the coast. It is as yet impossible to say whether all have done or intend doing so, owing to the extreme difficulty of communicating with them, and in some instances to their natural reluctance to leave their posts. At present, west of the capital, Mr. Openshaw is, it is believed, still at Yachou, Mr. Cunningham at Tachienlu, and Mr. Wellwood at Ningyuan. Repeated attempts have been made to communicate with these gentlemen, but, owing to the disturbed state of the country, messengers have the greatest difficulty in getting through with their lives.

To the north and east of Chengtu the following missionaries had until lately refused to withdraw: At Chungpa, Messrs. Stewart and Knipe; at Mienchou, Mr. Caldwell; at T'ungch'uan, Mr. Wigham; at Paoning, Bishop Cassels with a numerous staff, including ladies; at Shunch'ing, Mr. Evans and others. Since the departure of the foreigners from Chengtu all these missionaries have been communicated with and urged once more to depart without delay. It has been pointed out to them that, should there be any kind of foreign intervention down river, or even false rumours of such intervention, their position would be one of extreme danger, while their continued presence in the interior at this grave crisis, far away from any possible help, embarrasses not only the Chinese, but also their own authorities.

Letters now to hand from Paoning state that Bishop Cassels and most (it is feared not all) of the missionaries in that neighbourhood have already left by boat from Chungking; it is to be hoped that they will pick up Mr. Evans and others at Shunch'ing. The country in the latter neighbourhood is most disturbed by warring factions, and some anxiety is naturally felt as to their safety *en route*.

*Commercial.*

The greatest sufferers during the political troubles of the three past months in Chengtu have undoubtedly been the merchants, whose losses in the pillaging of the city on the 8th and 9th December were enormous. Many of the largest shop-keepers committed suicide during the sack, and even now, three weeks later, but few of the large shops have yet opened their doors.

The three foreign commercial agents—Mr. Bates, of the Eagle and Globe Steel Company; Mr. Fabig, of Messrs. Schuchardt and Schütte; and Mr. England, of the British and American Tobacco Company—have all left Chengtu. Mr. Bates stayed on as long as possible in order to get the shops of the new Government placed on the contracts he had obtained from the old one; but when the first republican Government collapsed on the 8th December, he considered it a waste of time to wait any longer, and left down river with the other refugees.

*The Policing of Chengtu City.*

Since the outbreak of the 8th there have been no uniformed police to be seen in the streets. This is because they took, after the Hsiüfang, the most prominent part in the looting of the city. A police head-quarters (Hsün Ching Tsung T'ing) has been established by the new Government, where a strong force of braves is kept ready to be moved to any part of the city to suppress disorders. But when an attempt was made to post policemen in the streets as of old, the people loudly protested, saying that on the first sign of trouble these men would seize the opportunity to loot and burn, as they did before.

Order is at present maintained by guards provided by public subscription in each street. These guards, of whom there are supposed to be twenty to a street, receive the small allowance of 150 cash a-day, and are armed with picturesque but useless-looking weapons, resembling those borne by the peasantry of England at the time of the Monmouth rebellion. From the same funds the inhabitants are putting up wooden barriers at the ends of each street, which, if not very formidable, may yet serve the useful purpose of diverting a looting mob towards another direction where there are no obstacles. These arrangements for local self-protection have been made with the approval of the Government, and appear to be effective. Executions of alleged evil-doers take place almost daily.

*Military and Arsenals.*

For the past few weeks the new Government has been busy recruiting soldiers and organising its military forces, and theoretically two divisions (chen) of 10,000 men each have been created. One division is termed Luchün, having for its nucleus those of the regular army soldiers who returned to their standards after the sack; the other is termed T'ung-Chih Chün, and embraces the members of the "min-t'uan" (peasant train-bands), who formed the fighting element of the T'ung-Chih Hui (the original rebel league). The aspect of these soldiers does not, of course, compare favourably with that of the troops under the former régime, and the braves of the T'ung-Chih Chün especially present a somewhat cutthroat appearance; but the discipline of all is nevertheless most praiseworthy. They are armed indiscriminately with Mausers, Martinis, Japanese carbines, and the modern small-bore rifles made during the last year or two at the new arsenal. The ammunition pouch has given way to the bandoleer, in consequence perhaps of the more martial appearance of the latter, and it is no uncommon sight to see a brave with three or four bandoleers criss-crossed around his body, stuffed with a variety of cartridges not always of the same bore as the rifle he carries. This superabundance of small-arm ammunition (turned out in large quantities by the old arsenal) is responsible for the haphazard shooting, fortunately usually in the air, which accompanies every political demonstration.

Not unnaturally the Government already finds itself in financial difficulties as regards the pay of all these troops, and many schemes are on foot to overcome them. One plan is the issue of paper money, secured not by reserves of silver, but by the stores of silks and furs recovered from captured looters; another scheme announced in the official paper is the establishment of offices for the receipt of voluntary subscriptions to defray the expenses of the army.

The reasons for this large military establishment are said to be as follows: Firstly, the suppression of brigandage and restoration of law and order in the country districts

secondly, to bring, if necessary, military pressure to bear on the other independent administrations in Szechuan to induce them to fall into line with the Chengtu Government; and, thirdly, to cope with isolated bodies of troops, such as those under Fu Sung-mu at Yachou, who have not yet joined the republican standard.

The German foremen at the new arsenal, whose contracts expired at the beginning of December, have left Chengtu, having received all the moneys due to them from the Imperial Government before the declaration of independence. The arsenal itself was looted by the apprentices, and has, of course, ceased to turn out rifles. It is feared that the valuable German machinery, brought to Chengtu at great trouble and expense, is now lying rusting and uncared for. In this connection it may be noted, however, that even when the arsenal was at work under the most favourable conditions the cost of a rifle made at Chengtu was considerably greater than the expenses entailed in buying and importing the same weapon from Europe, and this without reckoning the cost of the purchase, transport, and installation of the machinery. This is in part explained by the fact that one European workman at home will produce in a given period the same amount of labour as several Chinese coolies.

The first instalment of smokeless powder turned out by the new smokeless powder factory was nearing completion when the outbreak of the 8th caused Herr Zang, the Bavarian chemist and foreman, to leave with the other refugees. The fate of the powder is unknown, though it had reached a highly dangerous state, but the factory was, like the new arsenal, looted by the apprentices. Herr Zang, to whom large sums of money are owing, and whose contract has a year and a half to run, will wait in Chungking for the present in the hope of being recalled.

The old arsenal, where no foreigners are employed, is hard at work making cartridges (with black powder) and other munitions of war.

#### *The Mantzu Tribesmen.*

During the first stages of the rebellion in Szechuan the greatest anxiety was expressed by the Chinese at the news that the Mantzu tribesmen had descended from their mountains behind Kuan Hsien, and were harrying the Chengtu Plain. Towards the end of November, just before the declaration of independence at Chengtu, Kuan Hsien was taken by assault by the Imperial troops, and the tribesmen were driven back into their mountain fastnesses. We have no information of what has happened since then in that neighbourhood, but it is to be hoped that no news is good news, and that the Chengtu Plain is now free from the danger of incursions by these aborigines.

The following account by an eyewitness of the recent fighting around Kuan Hsien was courteously furnished to this consulate-general by the Rev. J. Hutson, and shows the formidable nature of these Mantzu tribesmen, and their somewhat peculiar methods of waging war:—

“From the 12th to the 26th of November fighting has been going on almost daily in or near the Kuan Hsien boundary. Owing to the small number of troops being sent out, these suffered several reverses from the Mantzu, who had been invited to help against the Government. The Mantzu are dead shots, and do most of their shooting from isolated and hidden positions, never appearing to draw the fire of the troops. They (the Mantzu) are clothed in armour of iron and brass, helmet on their heads, greaves of iron on their legs, breast-plates, and other articles. They retreat by turning a somersault and never by running away. About 500 of them were from Wassu (a native State whose chief is well known to many foreigners in Chengtu), another 500 from the t'un-ping, Chinese military settlers, of Mengkung, and another 500 led by a Mahomedan named Li from Mengkung, partly Mantzu and partly Mahomedans. The troops, being reinforced, carried the outposts on the 24th November, and on the 26th the attack on the city began about 11 a.m. The troops advanced from three different points. The rebels set fire to the large bridge outside the east gate, but the troops succeeded in saving part of it; they then got their heavy artillery into position, and soon smashed the east gate of the city to atoms, the heavy paving stones packed behind it being hurled far and wide. In four hours' time the city was taken and cleared of rebels as far as the bamboo rope bridge outside the west gate. The Mantzu of various kinds were driven back into their mountains with heavy loss.”

#### *Review of the Native Press during the Quarter.*

The vernacular press has undergone many vicissitudes during the quarter. While the Viceroy was still in power it was limited to two or three Government papers



published under strict censorship. With the declaration of independence on the 27th November freedom of the press was announced, a freedom which was, however, limited by the frequent wrecking of newspaper offices by the undisciplined soldiery whenever they considered that an article cast aspersions on the military body. When the second revolutionary Government was established, and law and order were to some extent reintroduced within the city, a flood of newspapers appeared, and six are now published daily. They are, however, with the exception of the "Kung Pao," of an ephemeral nature, and appear, disappear, and reappear in the most irregular way.

Since the above report was written letters have been received from which it appears that all the missionaries from Chungpa, Mienchou, and Tungchuan have left for Chungking and the coast. If this is so, the only Protestant missionaries left in the province would be Messrs. Cunningham, Wellwood, and Openshaw, referred to above; the two first named are British subjects, the latter an American citizen.

ERIC TEICHMAN.

No. 109.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, February 16, 1912.*

HIS Majesty's consul at Nanking telegraphed on the 15th February as follows:—

"Assembly this afternoon unanimously elected Yuan Shih-kai President of the Republic, and also ruled that Nanking should be the provisional capital."

No. 110.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, January 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of the situation in Tengyueh.

I am, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 110.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, January 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Li Ken-yuan and Chao Fan have at last left Talifu for Tengyueh, where they are expected to arrive, allowing for a few days' residence at Yungchang Fu to settle affairs there, in about three weeks, when I hope that a civilised government will be established here.

The course of events recently has been unsatisfactory. The soldiers employed on the expedition against Talifu returned to Tengyueh, with their numbers much diminished, towards the end of December.

Their return has done nothing to improve the local situation. In the first place it had become evident, even to Chang Wên-kuang, that in the reckless enlistment of men which followed on the *coup d'État* he had left out of account financial considerations, which now began to thrust themselves upon him, and it became necessary to discharge one man in every five. This filled the streets with numbers of bad characters without means of support, and gave rise to an increased amount of crimes of violence, and even at one time a not unreasonable fear of rioting. Secondly, the officer in command of the Talifu expedition is on bad terms with Chang. I have not met this person, whose name is Ch'ên Tien-hsing, but from all that I can hear of him he is somewhat incompetent. They have not arrived at an open rupture fortunately, but a regrettable consequence of their disagreement has been the withdrawal of the old General, whose influence in the cause of order was strong, to Burmah. The reason given by him for his departure was the illness of his wife, whom, together with the greater part of his

family, he had sent to Bhamo in the first days of November, but I learn privately that his preference for Chang had aroused the serious animosity of Ch'ên, and that he was believed to be in actual personal danger from the latter.

I have, &c.  
C. D. SMITH.

No. 111.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 27, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch addressed to me as dean by the senior consul at Shanghai, under date of the 22nd December, 1911, which sets forth the various measures of expediency taken by the consular body to secure the proper working of the mixed court of the international settlement in the absence of any established form of Chinese Government.

The changes in the working of the court which have been approved, at least as a temporary expedient, by the diplomatic body, are very far-reaching in character, and they embrace the reforms in the procedure of the court and the care of prisoners which have been advocated by a series of assessors.

I have, &c.  
J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 111.

*Senior Consul, Shanghai, to Sir J. Jordan, Dean of the Diplomatic Body.*

Your Excellency,

*Shanghai, December 22, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on the several measures of expediency taken by the consular body to secure the proper working of the mixed court of the international settlement, in the absence of any established form of Chinese Government:—

1. The consular body has confirmed in their functions the three magistrates, to act under the guidance of, and in concert with, the foreign assessors.
2. The prisons attached to the court are now in charge of the municipal police.
3. The summons and warrants are executed by the municipal police.
4. The inquests are held by the mixed court magistrate and a foreign assessor.
5. All criminal offences committed in the settlement are dealt with by the mixed court, including those deserving more than five years' imprisonment.
6. The municipal council has undertaken the supervision of the financial administration of the mixed court on behalf of the consular body; it receives the proceeds of all fines, and pays all expenses and salaries, exclusive of the magistrate's salary.
7. The magistrate's salary is paid by the consular body out of the Chinese Government's funds now in the hands of the senior consul.
8. Foreign assessors shall watch the hearing of purely Chinese civil cases; this reform to be likely to be put in operation next week.

D. SIFFERT.

No. 112.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that since the date of my despatch of the 27th December last the period of armistice has been successively prolonged by two fortnightly arrangements until to-day, and, so far as the opposing armies at Hankow are concerned, is likely to be indefinitely extended, for the very good reason that General Tuan's troops have caught the republican infection and morally forced him to come to terms with General Li. This has, however, in no wise prevented the movement of troops and fighting elsewhere, the chief feature of the present month being the transport of some 3,500 revolutionaries from the south to Shantung.

On the 16th January the acting British consul at Chefoo reported the arrival at

that port of the Chinese cruisers "Hai Shen," "Hai Yang," and "Han Shing," with 1,000 troops on board; and on the 20th January four vessels of the China Merchant Shipping Company arrived with another 2,500 men. Meanwhile the province again declared for the revolution, and the district magistrates were expelled. On the night of the 22nd January a party of revolutionaries raided Wei-hai Wei city and forcibly took charge of the yamèn, the magistrate fleeing to British territory. The Shantung expedition, however, seems to be more in the nature of a diversion to the rear of General Chang's army, while the main body of the revolutionary forces are concentrating preparatory to an advance in the direction of Peking by the Peking-Hankow and Tien-tsin-Pukow lines. There was, in fact, a skirmish between the advanced forces of the contending parties south of Hsü Chow on the Tien-tsin-Pukow line on the 26th January, ending in the momentary check of the revolutionaries. Severe fighting is reported to have since taken place in the same neighbourhood, and there is no doubt that the rebel forces are being pushed northward despite the armistice.

Wu T'ing-fang has telegraphed to Yuan Shih-kai that unless a speedy settlement is reached he will be unable to restrain any longer the zeal of the revolutionary troops, though, according to an account in the Chinese press, several southern soldiers have been shot lately for refusing to march north to Peking while the cold weather lasts. But as Wu T'ing-fang has confessed to His Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai that his party have no funds to pay their troops after the end of January, their anxiety to bring matters to an immediate issue and their repeated demands for recognition by the Powers are not to be wondered at.

Meanwhile, the state of affairs in the various provinces shows no sign of improvement. I have the honour to forward herewith copies of two interesting despatches from His Majesty's consul at Chinkiang, reporting on the course of events in his district (Enclosures 1 and 2).

The general pervading lawlessness is also reflected in the enclosed despatch of the 20th December from His Majesty's consul at Changsha (Enclosure 3), though it is satisfactory to note that here as elsewhere the movement has not yet taken an anti-foreign direction.

Since the date of Mr. Giles's despatch I received a telegram from Admiral Sir A. Winsloe to the effect that His Majesty's ship "Woodlark" was due at Changsha on the 29th December, and would remain there permanently. Moreover, His Majesty's ship "Nightingale" arrived there on the 24th December, and the "Vaterland" and "Sumida" were able to prolong their stay. I have approved Mr. Giles's representations to the revolutionary authorities in regard to the outrage perpetrated on the compradore of Messrs. Butterfield and Swire's steamer "Kian."

I have also the honour to enclose copy of a despatch from Mr. Giles, of the 29th December (Enclosure 4), giving an instructive account of the situation in Hunan under the new régime; and a later despatch, dated the 13th January (Enclosure 5), giving particulars of the state of brigandage prevailing in the province and of the activities of the Red Cross Society.

In a letter dated the 3rd January to the acting consul-general at Hankow, Mr. Lack, of the China Inland Mission, contradicts the somewhat alarming reports which had been circulated in the press with regard to the situation in Honan. The "Ren I Hui" (Boxers) who had attempted to create a disturbance in the Tai Kang and Fu kei districts some weeks previously, had been suppressed by the local authorities aided by the military. On the 11th January Admiral Sir A. Winsloe reported that the foreign concessions at Hankow had resumed their normal conditions and the independent control of their defences.

In three despatches, of which I have the honour to enclose copies herewith (Enclosures 6, 7, and 8), Mr. Moss, assistant-in-charge of the Pakhoi consulate, throws an interesting light on the conditions prevailing in the smaller southern ports.

Reports from Kiungchow, Canton, Swatow, and Amoy tell much the same tale, and testify to the absence of any serious form of local government.

The British detachment at Canton has been reinforced from Hong Kong, and two battalions of Indian infantry with one Indian mountain battery are being dispatched to Hong Kong from India. Through traffic on the Canton-Kowloon line, which was suspended on the 6th November, was resumed on the 14th December.

Manchuria has kept fairly free from the revolutionary infection, and the acting British consul at Harbin reported on the 20th December that quiet continued to prevail among the Chinese north of the three eastern provinces and that trade seemed to be pursuing its normal course—a marked contrast to the rest of China, where business is at a complete standstill.

On the 17th January Mr. Sly reported that the Chinese town of Hailar had been occupied on the 15th January by Mongols. The Hailar taotai escaped to the Russian railway settlement and thence to Tsitsihar. The Mongols thereupon proclaimed the independence of the territory of the Khalkhar tribe, which comprises all that portion of Mongolian territory bordering on Manchuria between Hailar and Manchuria Station. The Viceroy of Manchuria, however, is sternly repressing any manifestation of the revolutionary spirit in his province, and professes himself ready to defend by arms the claims of the Manchu dynasty.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 112.

*Consul Twyman to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chinkiang, December 29, 1911.*

THE peace negotiations at Shanghai have not interfered with the movement of troops on the revolutionary side, and it seems that while General Chang is strengthening his position at Hsüchowfu, preparations for an advance, and even actual progress in advance, are being made by the revolutionaries along the line of the Grand Canal. Since the date of my last report news has come of the presence of General Lin Shu-ch'ing at Yangchow with, it is said, some 10,000 men, of whom the majority are the pre-revolutionary Luchun regiments of Nanking and Chinkiang (33rd, 34th, 35th, and 36th), making about 6,000 men. The rest are recruits, not all armed.

There are also at Yangchow some 7,000 men commanded by Hsü Paoshan, chief of the salt-smuggling preventive service of North Kiangsu, and now military prefect for Yangchow. These are all well armed, and 2,000 of them have had some training; the remainder have had little training, but took part in the operations against Nanking. An advance has now been made to Chingkiangpu, which has been reinforced with 2,000 men, so that there should be at that place some 3,200 men of the revolutionary forces.

The British concession at this port has during the past month been repeatedly entered by armed revolutionaries, sometimes singly, sometimes in groups, large or small. I have on each occasion addressed a protest to such authorities as have been available, but as the nuisance continued I wrote a letter to Dr. Wu T'ing-fang complaining and asking him to take steps to have a check put upon it. Dr. Wu has not yet replied, but meanwhile my latest complaint to the prefect, Mr. Cheng Ch'ian, has had the effect of obtaining a promise from him to take certain definite measures to secure the desired end. He sent a Mr. Wang Hsienhua, a secretary of his staff, who speaks good English, to express his regret and to explain that the encroachments complained of were invariably by ignorant troops and their officers who were new to the place, and over whom he had no direct control, and he has now promised in writing to warn troops and their leaders against such encroachments, and to take other necessary measures.

In conversation with Mr. Wang I endeavoured to obtain from him some account of the present state of the administration here. He was unable to be very precise, stating, for instance, that the area of authority of the present Chinkiang military prefecture had not yet been defined, but he was sure that it extended beyond the city and the port. He explained that a line of demarcation existed between the Military Government and the Local Government. The former exists, he says, by authority of the revolution, and has in view the securing of the place in the revolutionary interest—it is essentially what the name implies. As far as I can gather, its arrangements, so far as they go, are fairly satisfactory—the local garrisons are under good control, and there is a court competent to deal with offences committed by the troops. There is, however, no effective control by the prefect over troops which happen to be passing through, and as the officers of such troops have not their men always well in hand they are a possible source of danger to order. The Local Government is intended to be as nearly as possible independent of the central authority, though, says Mr. Wang, there must be matters in which the military and local administrations are both concerned, in which cases the former is supreme. All civil affairs are, in the first instance at least, controlled by the local authority, and the courts, such as they are at present, are presided over by men appointed independently, though with the approval, tacit or expressed, of the Military Government. Mr. Wang added that he was beginning to realise that reconstruction after a revolution was by no means an easy affair.

I cannot learn that there is at present any court competent to deal with crimes of a serious nature committed by civilians, or with civil claims of any importance. The police are under local control, and by their appearance are by no means a credit to the new régime.

All matters are in abeyance here; the fugitive inhabitants of Chinkiang are not returning as quickly as was expected. The *lacunæ* in the system of government are thus not so disastrous as they might be; they are, however, one cause for the delay in the return of the population. Confidence has not been restored. The whole educational machinery is at a standstill; and the heads of the mercantile community, with the exception of the compradores of the foreign firms (mostly Cantonese) are still away. The local newspapers, however, report a revival of the silk-weaving industry—a hopeful sign.

I have, &c.

B. TWYMAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 112.

*Consul Twyman to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chinkiang, January 9, 1912.*

THE military prefect, Cheng Ch'uan, called upon me on the 1st January, and informed me, as he had already informed me by despatch, that the provincial representatives at Nanking had elected Sun Yat Sen Provisional President of the republic, and that his Government now desired to establish relations with the Powers. I replied with some enquiries respecting the forthcoming National Assembly. Mr. Cheng also informed me that his Government had now adopted the Western calendar. This step, I may mention, was only taken here on New Year's Eve, and left no time, of course, for any of the financial adjustments common among the Chinese merchants at New Year time. I observe that the local paper, which is rabidly revolutionary, still dates by the old calendar.

The past week has seen a regular epidemic of queue-cutting in the streets of Chinkiang city and suburbs, to the great indignation of the peaceful and quiet population. When the agents of the revolutionaries are questioned about the matter, they declare that it is the work of loafers and bad characters, but there is no doubt in my mind that it is done with the approval of the military leaders, and probably by their orders. One man, whom I found operating in a crowded street in the city with a huge pair of shears, answered my questions in the manner of a well-trained yamên servant, and stated he had been instructed to cut off queues by his superior military officer, "Chu Tajen." Mr. Wang Hsienhua, the amiable young civil officer whom I see from time to time, declared to me positively that there was no person in authority of that name in the place. On the same day I saw posted a notice (respecting some indifferent matter) by the "Officer commanding the Chekiang Contingent, Chu."

A police officer who, in response to a general outcry, punished one of the offenders was severely reprimanded by the prefect "for overstepping the limits of his authority." The fact is that the military party are uppermost; they are in charge of the situation and are organising the Government, and the passive civil population, rich and poor alike, who have, it must be recognised, made little effort to assert themselves, must, it seems, be grateful for the new Government, and with its benefits accept patiently, until time brings its revenges, the indignities put upon them by the militant party in their excitement and enthusiasm. Meanwhile there is no doubt that the dissatisfaction is very real, and it cannot be said that there is very great enthusiasm for the republic in Chinkiang. The country people are, I believe, absolutely indifferent; I am informed that orders have been issued for the collection of the land tax, but no proclamation has been issued yet.

The attitude of the Military Government towards the queue-cutting mania has been such as to inspire little confidence in its firmness should any crisis or difficulty arise. Several proclamations have been issued in feeble and equivocal phrases condemning violence, but announcing the impending total abolition of the queue; the latest published is one calling upon all, except the merchant classes, to become queueless, these being exempted on their own petition. Meanwhile not one punishment has been inflicted (except in the case above mentioned) for the many instances of this form of violence.

I have received a despatch from the prefect announcing the appointment of Mr.

Wang Hsienhua as Director of International Affairs; I have not replied to this despatch, and Mr. Wang informs me that he had asked Mr. Cheng Ch'uan not to write to me officially on the subject. From what I have seen of Mr. Wang, I think that he is a favourable example of young republican officers.

There are 7,000 troops still at Yangchow (Hsü Paoshan's men), 6,000 at Chingkiangpu, and 4,000 here. The last are mostly men of the old Hsunfang force, who are being worked up, with the addition of recruits, into the nucleus of a mixed brigade to be formed here, of which at present only the infantry portion is in existence, and that not complete. Recruits are being enlisted at 8 dol. 50 c. a-month. Chang Chen Fa, the officer charged with the formation of this brigade, seems to have primitive notions of military science; he told me that strategy was of little importance—the right spirit in the men was a sufficient guarantee of success.

I have, &c.

B. TWYMAN.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 112.

*Consul Giles to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Changsha, December 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the turbulence and lawlessness of the soldiery are causing increased uneasiness to the foreign as well as to the native community, although so far no anti-foreign feeling is apparent.

Considerable alarm was felt by the Changsha authorities when, after the loss of Hanyang, the Hunanese soldiers began to stream back to this province, looting as they went. When one batch of about 200 arrived here on the 3rd December, the city gates were shut and they were disarmed before being allowed to enter. Subsequently 5,000 soldiers who were proceeding to the front were kept in Yochow to prevent any further influx. Some 600 who commandeered the "Kweilee," formerly a China Merchants steamer, were thus stopped at Yochow and forced to land. The men are all disarmed as they arrive, the total amounting to over 20,000 at the present moment; but those who wish to rejoin are allowed to retain their arms. These are now being brought into shape again, and are to be sent to the front at the first opportunity. The men are sufficiently amenable once they are confronted with their officers; but between Hankow and Yochow, without any leaders to control them, they seem to be quite out of hand and loot freely, while most steamers travelling up and down the river have had to run the gauntlet of their fusillade from the banks or from native boats.

On the 15th December a large body of troops, variously estimated at from 3,000 to 6,000 men, with their general, came back to Changsha from Yochow. Great alarm prevailed here; the 49th regiment was called out to prevent them from getting into the city, and a battle seemed generally to be anticipated. The returning troops were, however, animated by no mutinous spirit; they allowed themselves to be disarmed, and the general explained that he had brought them back to Changsha to be reorganised. His excuse was not accepted, and he was executed in the presence of his men, who were afterwards disbanded.

Shên Ping-k'un, formerly Governor of Kwangsi, has arrived in Changsha with a further batch of 8,000 Kwangsi troops with Maxim guns. He is not returning to Kwangsi, but was to take up his quarters at Yochow, where he was to act as a sort of military agent, to supervise and to direct the movements of the troops, and to make arrangements for the fortification and the defence of Yochow. He fell ill here, and it was announced that he would be unable to proceed further. The soldiers, however, insisted that he was malingering, and threatened to "touch him up with a bullet" if he held back; whereupon it was stated that he hoped to be able to go forward after all. This is a fair sample of the lack of discipline at present prevailing among the troops.

In Changsha brawls are continually taking place, either among the soldiers themselves or between them and the civilians. In the latter case they have frequently arisen from the lawlessness of the soldiery, who have recently been stationing themselves at the city gates and along the main streets armed with knives and scissors, laying rough hands on the passers-by and forcibly cutting off their queues. The governor forbade the practice; but the proclamation on the subject contained an eloquent admission of his weakness by directing all to remove their queues within five days in order to obviate such disorderly scenes. The soldiers, on the other hand, paid no

attention whatever to the proclamation, and carried on their queue-cutting campaign, until on the 15th December they laid violent hands on the comprador of Butterfield and Swire's steamer "Kian" on the company's own wharf as he was going ashore, mishandled him when he resisted, and eventually, in spite of his appeals, cut off his queue.

I protested strongly against this outrage, adding that I did not suppose that the authorities connived at, or even approved of, such high-handed proceedings; but that one of the first duties of a Government was to preserve the public peace, and that if they allowed the soldiery to commit assault wholesale with impunity, then they could no longer lay claim to the title of Government, but were merely an anarchical faction. I wound up by requesting that the perpetrators of the outrage be severely punished.

The above is not the only time I have recently had cause to complain. In the early morning of the 3rd December the vice-president of the Foreign Board boarded the "Kian" with a few attendants, and searched her from end to end for smuggled rice. When this was brought to my notice, I protested against the violation of a British ship, and pointed out that the customs employes were the proper people to undertake the search and that no others had a right to do so without first obtaining my consent. In reply the Board made the excuse that the matter was urgent, as the ship was about to sail, but promised that such an incident should not occur again. Nevertheless, on the 15th December, when the "Kian" arrived in Changsha, she was stopped about half a-mile below the city by six soldiers, who came on board without credentials of any kind, without even an officer in charge, and, stating that they proposed to search for Imperialist spies or hired assassins, passed all the Chinese passengers in review, after which the steamer was suffered to proceed.

As soon as this was reported to me, I entered a protest against these arbitrary proceedings. I further informed the revolutionary authorities that I had instructed the captains of British steamers in future to ask for the credentials of any party proposing to search their ships for whatever reason; and that those unable to produce a written authority from me were not to be allowed to come on board.

The Foreign Board has since written apologising for both incidents and undertaking to adopt measures to prevent a recurrence thereof. In the former case they have promised to search out and punish the authors of the outrage, although I do not suppose that as a matter of fact they are strong enough to do so. In the latter case they have disavowed the action of the soldiery, stating that their general, who had retreated after the fall of Hanyang, was unable to control them and that they were altogether out of hand; that the general had been executed publicly, and that the soldiers are to be kept in order for the future—a pious aspiration which one hopes may be fulfilled.

Foreigners being equally interested with the Chinese in the maintenance of a stable form of Government of some sort, it is certainly advisable that all passengers arriving here by junk or by steamer should be carefully watched. Several attempts have already been made to assassinate the leading men in Changsha, which, if successful, would plunge the city into anarchy. All Chinese and their luggage going into the city are now thoroughly searched; and such search has in more than one instance led to the discovery of bombs or of explosives in one form or another. Those on whom they were found were executed, unless, as happened once, they managed to make their escape. One man, alleged to be a Manchu spy, was hacked to pieces in the street by the soldiery; his head was then cut off and borne to the governor's yamên. Another man was triced up on to a sort of triangle on the Japanese steamer company's bund, and riddled with bullets. These barbarous methods of dealing with supposed spies or traitors are of course intended to act as a deterrent.

As regards the rest of the province, brigandage appears to be on the increase in the country districts—especially in Liu-yang-hsien—in spite of the fact that the train-bands, under special instructions from the Government, are everywhere being mustered and drilled. The towns, however, remain peaceful as a rule, though there have been disturbances in Yung-chow-fu and in Pao-ch'ing-fu. They were in both cases due to the newly recruited soldiery, but order appears to have been quickly restored. In neither case was any attempt made to molest the foreigners resident there. Ch'ên-chow-fu, where the taotai still holds out against the revolutionaries, is very disturbed. The authorities recently asked me to remove all foreigners from that part of the country and concentrate them in Changtê, where protection would be afforded. There are, however, none left in those districts.

In a few days there will be only three British women left in the interior of Hunan, all belonging to the Wesleyan Mission—two in Pao-ch'ing-fu and one in I-yang-hsien.

Things, however, seem quiet in those two cities, and no danger to foreigners need be apprehended at present. In Changsha itself there are only three British women and no children remaining, one of whom is leaving before the final closing of the river, which may be expected in about a fortnight, as far as the river steamers are concerned.

As no British gun-boat can be stationed in Changsha during the winter, this port will be left without naval protection in about a fortnight or three weeks, when the "Vaterland" and the "Sumida" will have to take their departure; while His Majesty's ship "Woodlark," which is at present paying her second visit of a week's duration here, is under orders to leave on or about the 24th December. The prospect, owing to the state of affairs described in the present and in previous despatches on the subject, and especially owing to the lawlessness of the troops, is one which I cannot view without grave concern. The presence of foreign gun-boats here has undoubtedly been a factor in keeping the soldiery in check. Prominent Chinese among the gentry and the mercantile classes recognise this fact, and have frequently made anxious enquiries as to the length of their stay here. And I feel bound to submit my opinion that the total withdrawal of naval protection from this port will probably be marked by increased licence on the part of the soldiery, who are just beginning to realise their power, and whom no official in Hunan seems able to keep in order. The assurance that a gun-boat will visit Changsha from time to time would appear to leave out of account the period when the river is so low as to render the passage of a gun-boat impracticable or dependent on a fortuitous and temporary rise. In fact, it is only due to the unprecedented conditions prevailing this year that the arrival of a gun-boat would even now be a certainty.

Apart from their inability to control the troops, the authorities seem anxious to meet me half-way in the transaction of business. In spite of the embargo on the export of beans and wheat as contraband of war, they have at my request readily granted permission to Jardine, Matheson, and Co., to ship beans abroad, provided the firm entered into a bond not to land the cargo at Hankow. Other cases affecting British interests, which I have from time to time pressed upon their attention, have invariably met with prompt attention.

I have, &c.

BERTRAM GILES.

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*Note on the above despatch.*

I have also made representations to General Li about the lawlessness of the troops in Hunan and the boarding of British steamers by irresponsible soldiers. I impressed upon him that we would under no circumstances allow non-combatants to be taken out of a British ship, and I reminded him of the incident here on board the steam-ship "Tatung." General Li expressed his deep regret for the occurrences of which I had complained, and informed me that he had dispatched a telegram to Changsha strictly instructing the authorities there to take immediate steps to put a stop to such proceedings. Since then I have had no further complaints, and the master of the steam-ship "Kian," one of Messrs. Butterfield and Swire's vessels, on arrival two days ago, reported that his ship had not been molested in any way.

His Majesty's ship "Nightingale" left here a few days ago for Changsha, and she will be relieved later by His Majesty's ship "Snipe." The "Woodlark" is proceeding to Ichang, where, I understand, she will remain for the present.

H. GOFFE,

*Acting Consul-General.*

*Hankow, December 27, 1911.*

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Enclosure 4 in No. 112.

*Consul Giles to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Changsha, December 29, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward some notes on the financial situation, and on the administrative and other reforms introduced under the new régime.

The financial necessities of the new Government are most pressing. It was recently calculated that the calls upon the exchequer up to the end of the Chinese year amounted to nearly 7,000,000 taels, made up as follows: Army pay (which I have seen variously estimated at from 500,000 to 1,000,000 taels a-month), 2,200,000–2,300,000 taels;



other outgoings in connection with the army, at least 2,000,000 taels; share of Imperial indemnities and loans, 500,000 taels; repairs to embankments and famine relief, 1,000,000 taels; amortisation of provincial loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank and Messrs. Carlowitz and Co., 400,000–500,000 taels; administrative expenses, 150,000 taels; and margin for contingencies, 100,000 taels.

The army is the heaviest burden, but the officials dare not let the soldiers' pay get into arrears for fear of disturbances. All available funds appear to be devoted to satisfying the troops, and not until they have been paid in full is the balance used for other purposes. The civil officials have for some time past been receiving no pay, there being no money to spare; while the surplus revenue out of which the district magistrates used to pay themselves must now be remitted, without any deductions whatever, to the provincial treasury. An order was recently issued that all prefects, sub-prefects, and department and district magistrates were to draw salaries at the uniform rate of 200 dollars a-month; but I gather that these have so far not been paid.

The Government has been doing its best to meet the need for ready money by the sale of zinc ore from the Shui-k'ou-shan mines to foreign firms at the rate of 18.50 taels a ton for cash down. It is also being supplied to the Japanese against copper for the local mint, which is to be reopened in a few days. A proposal to substitute antimony for copper coins is at present under consideration, antimony being plentiful in Hunan, in order to check the flow of profits abroad. The Government has announced its intention of inviting subscriptions for a loan of 5,000,000 dollars to bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, repayment to commence in five years and to be spread over a period of ten years; and it is reasonably certain that native capital will hardly be attracted by such terms as these.

Other financial arrangements include the proposed abolition of *li-kin*; goods entering or leaving the province are to pay one import or export duty only. Imports are to be further subject to a destination tax, as are also goods circulating in the province. Tobacco, wine, sugar, and similar luxuries may be taxed at the rate of 10 per cent. *ad valorem*; the tax on other articles is to vary from 3 to 5 per cent. As the practice in Hunan has hitherto been to compound for *li-kin* by one single payment, the above change is less drastic than it sounds.

Land transfer and land mortgage fees have already been reduced until next China New Year to 4 and 2 per cent. respectively of the purchase price of the advance; this arrangement has been made retrospective in order to encourage holders of white deeds to register. After New Year the rates will be raised to 5 and 2½ per cent. respectively. The collection of these dues, as well as the land tax and the tribute rice, is to be placed in the hands of the local self-government organisation in each district, whose sphere of activity has been much extended under the Revolutionary Government.

New licences must be taken out by all to whom various sources of revenue have been farmed out by the Imperial Government; the licence fees vary from 500 to 300 taels, according to the value of the "farm."

Another device for raising funds consists in the appointment of deputies to tout for voluntary contributions throughout the province. It is expressly stipulated that no compulsion is to be used. This order will doubtless be liberally interpreted, otherwise it may safely be assumed that the returns will be small.

New opium taxation has also been devised, which is, however, avowedly rather a suppressive than a revenue-raising measure.

On the other hand, the chief revenues are estimated as follows: Land tax, 1,100,000 taels; tribute rice, 400,000 taels; *li-kin*, 1,400,000–1,500,000 taels; native customs, 30,000–40,000 taels; Imperial maritime customs, 300,000–500,000 taels; miscellaneous (including land transfer fees, stamp duty, levies on wine and tobacco, contributions due from licensed "farms," pawnshops, mining companies, &c.), 700,000 taels. This makes a total of something over 4,000,000 taels—considerably less than the estimated expenditure. In fact, as long as the present large and costly army is kept up, this province will find it impossible to make both financial ends meet. A speedy cessation of hostilities and a return to normal conditions is therefore essential if bankruptcy is to be averted.

Finally, I may mention that a new departure is indicated in the establishment of an audit department.

Partly as a measure of economy, and partly because the extension of local self-government renders their retention unnecessary, the posts of head magistrates—*i.e.*, district magistrates residing in prefectural cities—have been abolished. The Changsha and Shanhua magistrates in Changsha city have alone been temporarily retained, but they, too, are to disappear shortly.

In the judicial commissioner's department a new series of regulations has been promulgated, designed to strike the first blow at the abuses prevailing under the Manchu régime. Provision is made for clearing off outstanding cases; scales of fees have been published; runners' seconds, a fruitful source of abuses, are declared illegal; extortion is to be done away with. Kneeling in court is abolished, except in the case of the accused in criminal causes. As regards torture, its use is declared to be abhorrent to all civilised nations, and it is therefore abolished entirely, except in criminal causes where the transgression is of a very grave nature. As the decision on this point will presumably rest with the presiding judge, it will be interesting to watch the application of the rule.

An amnesty has recently been published granting either total or partial remission of punishments, except for serious crimes, such as murder, armed robbery with violence, and others.

The Provincial Parliament, which takes the place of the late Provincial Assembly, was elected last month, each district being allotted from one to three members, according to its population. It was opened on the 11th December by Governor T'an. In a somewhat verbose speech he declared that Manchu autocracy, the system under which the lives and the property of the people were at the mercy of an alien race, must go. The spurious constitutionalism which had been introduced of late years must also go to make way for a genuine democracy. The chief points to which attention must be paid under the new regime were:—

1. Finance, which was in a parlous condition;
2. The abrogation of private perquisites;
3. The abolition of *li-kin* and the introduction of a production and of a consumption tax; and
4. The restoration of credit, so as to enable the province to bear the burden of its own indebtedness, and thus obviate the necessity for foreign loans.

In his reply, the new chairman of the Assembly, Hsiung Chao-chou, referred to the fact that France and America had had to fight for years before achieving their independence, while in Hunan the revolution had been effected without a shot being fired. The Provincial Parliament, he went on to say, was now the legislative body, not merely a consultative assembly; and then proceeded to point out that a republican form of Government was not necessarily good in itself; there were good and bad republics, and he adduced North America and Central America respectively as instances. The difference he attributed to absence of orderliness and discipline in the latter; and he adjured China to set her house in order so that she might appear before the world as a model republic.

The present Parliament is merely in the nature of a provisional assembly which is to be dissolved as soon as a constitution has been framed to make room for a Parliament elected in accordance with its provisions. In the meantime its powers are extensive. In it alone are vested all legislative powers, as also the introduction of reforms in internal administration or in foreign affairs. Land tax and tribute rice cannot be increased without its assent. It has also to discuss the estimates and pass the budget, and to decide on all matters connected with provincial loans. It elects the superintendents of all departments controlling income and expenditure, receives petitions from the people, impeaches, if necessary, executive or judicial officials, may appoint delegates to investigate questions connected with the Government, and can call upon any official to prepare and submit statements showing the reason for any executive action taken by him.

As regards Parliament's relations with the governor, all Bills must be submitted for the latter's assent. Any measure with which he is not in accord must be referred back to Parliament for reconsideration. If it is passed a second time with not less than a two-thirds majority, it passes into law. The governor can attend Parliament, either in person or by deputy, to expound his views, but he has, of course, no voting power.

The session is, curiously enough, fixed at only twenty days, but it may be extended if necessary. Extraordinary sessions may also be convoked by the governor acting in conjunction with the chairman of the House.

Among the privileges enjoyed by the delegates is immunity from arrest while Parliament is sitting, except with the consent of the whole House; they can also claim privilege for anything said in the course of debate. They are paid their expenses while attending Parliament, the amount being left to the discretion of the governor.

Parliament has been very busy since it assembled, all the reforms recently introduced having been discussed and passed by the House before being promulgated. The record

of the debates will, under the rules of the House, be eventually published, with the exception of such portions as may have been specially declared to be secret.

The following official movements may be noted: An educational commissioner has been appointed in the person of Ch'ên Jun-lin, an Anhui notable; and a commissioner of communications in the person of Chiu I, a Ch'ang-ning notable. The latter at first made an attempt to obtain control of the Post Office, and, when that failed, proposed to start a rival Post Office under the Revolutionary Government. The scheme was found to be impracticable, and was abandoned. In the meantime I had warned British steamer companies against accepting their mails.

The head of the War Office is a Ning-hsiang notable named Hsiang Jui-ch'ung, while Hsiao Liang-ch'ên has been appointed chief of the general staff. The latter was formerly the general commanding the Hunan mixed brigade, but disappeared on the day that Changsha was seized by the revolutionary faction. He was, however, brought back; and as he expressed himself ready to join them, the revolutionaries have been glad to avail themselves of his military experience.

It is proposed to appoint an industrial commissioner, who will be in charge of Agriculture, Works, Commerce, and Mines. A local notable, Chang Ch'i-kuang, has been recommended for the post, but the appointment has not as yet been confirmed.

The Siangtan magistrate, Yü P'ing-yüan, who as Changsha magistrate was the popular hero at the time of the Changsha riot, has been appointed Changsha prefect; but at the special request of the Siangtan community is not to proceed to his new post for the present. Although noted for his anti-foreign bias, he is said to be an exceptionally energetic and capable official.

I have, &c.

BERTRAM GILES.

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Enclosure 5 in No. 112.

*Consul Giles to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Changsha, January 13, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 20th December, 1911, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's ship "Nightingale" arrived here on the 24th December, the day on which the "Woodlark" left. Her commanding officer informs me that he is under orders to stay until relieved by the "Snipe," the latter presumably staying in Changsha for the rest of the winter. The River Siang remains at an abnormally high level; steamers are still plying to and from Hankow—a quite unprecedented state of affairs; and there is now a distinct possibility that they may run without interruption through the winter.

Changsha itself has been considerably quieter since the date of my despatch of the 20th December. No further acts of lawlessness have been committed by the soldiery, and since my last protest no further attempts have been made to board British steamers.

In spite of the prolongation of the armistice and the generally favourable trend of the peace negotiations, the distrust of Yuan Shih-kai is as bitter and as deep-seated as ever. The general opinion of the Chinese here is that fighting will eventually be resumed; hence Hunan and Kwangsi troops continue to be dispatched to the front. I estimate the number that have gone forward during the past three weeks at not less than 8,000. Shên Ping-k'un has very reluctantly proceeded to Yochow, to take up his appointment as general supervisor of the combined Hunan and Kwangsi forces.

I have only had to call the attention of the authorities to one case in which an abuse of the Red Cross flag was involved. After the middle of October last a number of the gentry proposed to start a local Red Cross Society, and appealed to the foreign community for assistance in organising the same. The British and Norwegians having consulted me as to the advisability of associating themselves with the movement, I requested the gentry concerned to furnish a written statement explaining the scope and the aims of the society, in order to assure myself that it was one which British subjects could legitimately join. In reply I received a very satisfactory statement, in which it was declared that the society would confine itself solely to succouring the sick and the wounded of both sides, and that it would maintain the strictest neutrality, assisting neither the Imperialists nor the revolutionaries. I thereupon, on the 21st October, addressed a despatch to ex-Governor Yü, stating that, in view of the assurances I had received, I saw no objection to British subjects associating themselves with the society and co-operating in every way they could on the lines laid down.

The society was then constituted, my Japanese colleague and I (the only consular representatives in Changsha) joining the general committee. Good work was done from the beginning under the presidency of Dr. Yen, the medical officer to this consulate, although it took some pains to make it clear to the Chinese that the Red Cross symbol was not a badge to be worn by non-combatants to secure immunity from molestation. When, however, on the 21st December, a steam-launch packed with soldiers going to the front, and towing a number of junks similarly laden, was seen flying the Red Cross flag, I addressed a protest to the revolutionary authorities. I pointed out that it was only after assurances of the strictest neutrality had been given that I had agreed to British subjects associating themselves with the movement; and although I did not for a moment suppose that the Government had sanctioned such an improper use of the flag, yet foreigners would have no option but to withdraw from the society unless such abuses were immediately suppressed.

In their reply the Foreign Board, while disclaiming all knowledge of the incident, fully concurred in my point of view, and promised that the matter should be carefully investigated and the offenders dealt with. A proclamation was subsequently issued by the governor forbidding the improper use of the Red Cross flag, since when there has been no further cause for complaint.

As a set-off against the improved state of affairs in Changsha brigandage and disorder are steadily on the increase in the rest of the province, chiefly due to the disturbed state of the country, but partly also to the suicidal policy of the Government in disbanding locally recruited troops without paying them, owing to financial embarrassments. It is true that in Ch'ên-chou-fu the taitai, who upheld the Imperialist cause for so long, has at last agreed to lay down his arms and has been given a safe-conduct out of Hunan. With his departure the whole province has now turned over to the revolutionaries. His protracted stand is ascribed to the fact that his brother was a high official at the Peking Court, from whom he feared that reprisals might be exacted in the event of his own defection. But the tale of robberies throughout the province grows daily; there is hardly a district where disorders of some kind or another have not been reported. In Hsiang-hsiang-hsien no fewer than ten villages were attacked and looted in one day. Postal couriers have frequently been robbed; and the postal service to several places in the interior has had to be abandoned altogether. Outside the cities there is little or no security for travellers, and I have, generally speaking, advised all missionaries still resident in the interior to remain where they are for the present. Even in some of the towns the troops have created disturbances, and have been guilty of arbitrary exactions from the shopkeeping class, but in no case have foreigners been molested. Minor disputes, too, are continually arising out of the demands made by the deputies sent out to levy voluntary contributions to the war chest of the province, or by the numerous swindlers personating such deputies and obtaining money by false pretences.

The most serious troubles arose at the end of December in Liu-yang-hsien—always a disorderly district—to the east of Changsha, where one of the adherents of the murdered Military Governor Chiao raised a force of over 1,000 men, nominally to assist the Revolutionary Government. It is said that one part at least of their programme was to wreak vengeance on those who had assisted to put down the Liu-yang rebellion of 1906, and had taken part in the ruthless reprisals which followed. This host, however, eventually split up into small bands, and the enterprise seems to be degenerating into a series of marauding expeditions, which, though spreading anarchy throughout the district, can scarcely affect the peace of the province as a whole.

The authorities are doing their best, under circumstances of exceptional difficulty, to cope with the situation. In addition to dispatching troops to suppress disorders wherever reported, they have recently instituted a regular house-to-house search in each district, with a view to clearing the province of evil-doers and thus stamping out anarchy. But no measures are likely to be of much avail as long as the resources of the Government are chiefly devoted to holding their own against the Imperialists; and until peace is definitely restored and the authorities can once more turn their whole attention to the internal situation, it is idle to expect that they will make much headway against the prevailing disorders.

I have, &c.

BERTRAM GILES.

Enclosure 6 in No. 112.

*Mr. Moss to Consul-General Jamieson.*

Sir,

*Pakhoi, December 5, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that by the kindness of the captain of S.M.S. "Jaguar," now in port, I have this day sent a wireless telegram to you through the commodore, His Majesty's ship "Tamar," requesting you to enquire of the Republican Government at Canton who are their responsible and accredited agents for Pakhoi and district. The German consul, Dr. Mercklinghaus, sent a telegram to the same effect, addressed to Hu Tutu.

These telegrams were sent at the request of the Chinese chamber of commerce, which asked us to assist them in their efforts to bring to the notice of the Republican authorities at Canton the serious and critical situation which has arisen here owing to the absence of any competent and responsible government.

The local situation is briefly as follows:—

Since the outbreak of the revolutionary movement in China, Pakhoi and district has been dependent for news on the Hong Kong newspapers. In answer to its urgent requests to Canton for troops and protection, the chamber of commerce has only received two despatches from Hu Tutu, one proclaiming the Canton Republic, and enclosing copies of Canton proclamations, and the other informing the chamber that Pakhoi must look after itself for the present.

About the middle of November all Imperial officials fled from Pakhoi, where for about a week there were no officials at all. The Ch'in (chou) Lien (chou) taotai, Kuo, proclaimed a republic at Ch'in-chou, the head-quarters of China's south-western frontier force of some 5,000 well-equipped troops, and ordered all Government moneys at Pakhoi to be collected as usual and sent to him every ten days.

At Lienchou, 18 miles north-west of Pakhoi, the old prefect continued the administration under the direction of Kuo Taotai as Hsing Chêng Fên Fu, with the assistance of the magistrate, whilst at Kaochou the Canton Republic was proclaimed. The Lienchou-Pakhoi chên'ai, a personal enemy of Kuo's, alarmed at the omission of his name from Kuo's despatches, abandoned his post and fled. Kuo sent some officers of his own to command the chên'ai's troops. These soldiers (all old-style troops) had not been paid for five months. On failing to obtain payment of their arrears they mutinied, murdered Kuo's officers, destroyed the yamêns, released 700 prisoners from the gaols, and looted freely. The prefect, a much-beloved and honest official, turned up at the consulate next day disguised as a coolie and with his queue shorn. I obtained for him the shelter of the customs, he having been till then superintendent of the customs. He left for Hong Kong by next steamer. After a reign of terror, which lasted two days, the Canton Republic was proclaimed at Lienchou by Ch'ên Wu, a Lienchou man, and brother of the Republican leader at Kaochou, who disavowed all connection with Kuo at Ch'in-chou. This revolution seems to have been in preparation for some time, as it became immediately apparent that Kuo's local troops were in sympathy with the Lienchou movement and not to be relied on by Kuo. Ch'ên himself is a respectable middle-aged Chinese gentleman of no marked ability, but his lieutenant and right-hand man, Wang Chi-shih, a law student from Tokyo, only 25 years of age, displayed remarkable energy and power of administration. He paid the troops by means of forced levies, enrolled all active sympathisers and many deserters from Kuo's troops, organised a body of police, and enforced some semblance of law and order in the town, at the same time entering into active and successful negotiations to detach Kuo's troops from their commander. Ch'ên caused proclamations to be posted up to disseminate the news of a purported telegram from Hu Tutu to the effect that a large and well-equipped army (subsequently reported as 6,000 strong, under command of Huang Shih-lung) was on its way from Canton to proclaim the republic and pacify the district. For various reasons I believe this telegram to be a bluff, organised between Ch'ên and his brother at Kaochou. The Lienchou Republicans also directed Pakhoi taxes to be paid to them.

As, however, there was much doubt as to the validity of the respective Ch'in-chou, Lienchou, and Kaochou Republican credentials, and as many cases of lawlessness were reported in the town (the old police deputy was lynched and the 21st company murdered their commanding officers), the Pakhoi chamber of commerce definitely took command of affairs. The chamber had all through the lawless period acted as a kind of vigilance committee on its own responsibility, and now refused to receive orders from any of the

three Republican parties in the absence of written formal confirmation from Canton, which has not been forthcoming. The chamber organised a police force of some 1,000 men, 543 of whom were armed with rifles, with a monthly pay-sheet of 12,000 dollars. They thereupon felt themselves strong enough to order a few executions (after which the livers of the victims were eaten by the "police") and to inaugurate a system of night-passes, with the result that lawlessness was temporarily checked. Their efforts to protect the town from being plundered were much strengthened by the timely arrival of His Majesty's ship "Atlas" on the 27th ultimo, for whose presence the president of the chamber expressed his gratitude. S.M.S. "Jaguar" arrived on the 29th, and the "Atlas" left the next day. The French destroyer "Fronde" arrived on the 1st instant.

Meanwhile, Kuo, a man of strong character, though he is detested by the people, who have never forgiven him the ruthless severity with which he suppressed the Sanna rebellion in 1908, determined to make the first move before all his troops had become disaffected. He therefore sent all his Kwangtung troops (reported between 3,000 and 4,000 men) on route marches outside the town, invited all the leading gentry of Ch'inchou to "drink wine" with him, informed them that they were his prisoners and hostages for the obedience of the townsfolk, and shut himself up in the city with some 300 Hunanese soldiers, fellow-provincials and devoted to his person. The troops which were shut out had about half a-month's pay, their rifles, and very little ammunition. Many deserted at once to Lienchou, but the main body, apparently to some extent under the control of a Lienchou officer prominent in the treacherous negotiations, were bribed to stay where they were by the payment of 10,000 dollars hurriedly raised by subscription in Lienchou, where the utmost perturbation prevailed on the news that they were marching thither for the purpose of "assisting the Republican Government." Their possible advent was also much dreaded at Pakhoi.

This is the last reliable information to date from Ch'inchou, though there are many rumours and conjectures. One theory is that Kuo (who is reported in a Canton newspaper to have offered his services to go north with his troops to fight the Imperialists) is negotiating an honourable retreat for himself and his devoted Hunanese (presumably to Tunghsing on the Tonquin frontier), leaving the Ch'inchou situation in the hands of Fêng Hsiang-jung, ex-taotai of Lungchow, in Kwangsi, and the man reported to be the choice of the gentry and soldiers. Another theory is that Kuo is now gradually reasserting his authority over the shut-out troops and over the gentry, who, in the light of the latest news from Lienchou, are reported to be becoming convinced that they and the country need a strong man. It is unlikely that Kuo, who is a very able and ambitious, though cruel, man, would remain longer than necessary in this remote corner of China, where he is intensely disliked and feared by the people, when his energies may find a greater scope in the north. He is, however, a factor in the local situation which must be carefully watched. It is obvious that whoever is strong enough to maintain control of the well-drilled frontier force will be the real master of the whole district, and it is equally obvious that under present conditions the man who would control this force must devise some extraordinary means of paying it, in view of the temporary stoppage of the usual money contribution from Canton. In the absence of definite news, nothing can be safely predicted as yet as to the ultimate outcome of this critical question.

As to Lienchou, there is some definite and at the same time disquieting news. On the night of the 3rd-4th instant serious rioting took place, the chief offenders being the police and soldiers. Fires were started in various places, and about one-eighth of the town was burnt, including 140 of the principal shops. The pawnshops were first looted, and then almost all the shops inside and outside the walls. The foreign mission buildings are safe. There was a good deal of shooting and a little loss of life; many women were violated and kidnapped. The chief victims were the Cantonese, and the plight of the refugees arriving in Pakhoi (many of whom were robbed and violated on the way) is indeed pitiable.

In spite of large rewards offered by the Pakhoi chamber of commerce for loyalty, it is felt that the local levies are altogether unreliable. It is probable that, but for the presence in port of foreign men-of-war, the native town would have already shared the fate of Lienchou. Many robberies have been reported, and last night the police themselves plundered 143 bales of silk and piece-goods from a junk. No arrests were made. The town is full of bad characters, and the chamber of commerce appears to be losing control of its "police." The people are panic-stricken, and fully expect the town to be burnt and looted shortly. All the junks are moored out in the harbour, where they would not be in danger of catching fire. The shopkeepers seem paralysed with

fear and unable to defend themselves, though only a little resolution on their part should be sufficient to keep the bad characters in check. Since yesterday guards of ten sailors each have been posted in the French and German consulates, and an armed cutter from the "Jaguar" is lying off the custom-house to cover a possible embarkation of the foreign women and children. The captain of the "Jaguar" offered me a guard for the consulate, which I declined with thanks. I told him, however, that in case of danger I would gladly avail myself of his kind offer for the British community, but, as a guard is in the German consulate, next door to this, I did not think a special guard a necessity here.

As far as foreigners are concerned, there seems to be no animosity whatever evinced by the populace, and there seems to be no reason to apprehend any attack on our houses or lives unless the native town be thoroughly looted, when, of course, there might always be possible danger from a Chinese mob. There is no danger to be feared from the revolutionaries as such. They have repeatedly assured us of their desire to protect our property and lives to the best of their endeavours; the chamber of commerce is most anxious to do the same.

The state of panic in the town is most regrettable, and the shopkeepers seem utterly unable to help themselves, relying entirely on paid rascals, whom they admit are not to be trusted. The danger of the town being burnt and pillaged is very real, and no resistance worth the name would be made to a determined attack by a well-led and courageous band of pirates and brigands. Bad characters are daily flocking in, and no attempt is made to drive off suspicious junks, obviously here for piratical purposes. In view of the importance to foreign trade, and especially Hong Kong trade, of the preservation of Pakhoi as a commercial centre, the presence of foreign men-of-war is an absolute necessity, and, in view of the imminent departure of the "Jaguar," it is hoped that a British man-of-war may arrive to relieve her. The whole town could easily be saved if the commander of the British man-of-war were allowed to use his discretion to land an armed force to patrol the land side (fifty or sixty men would probably be sufficient) and clear the harbour of "pirate" junks.

I am sending copy of this despatch to the commodore, His Majesty's ship "Tamar," and to his Excellency the Governor of Hong Kong.

I have, &c.

G. S. MOSS,

*Assistant-in-charge of His Majesty's Consulate.*

Enclosure 7 in No. 112.

*Mr. Moss to Acting Consul Major.*

Sir,

*Pakhoi, December 16, 1911.*

THOUGH there is reason to take a more hopeful view of the general outlook for Pakhoi and district, conditions at the moment are still very bad. The disbanded soldiers and the lawless characters of the neighbourhood appeared to have desisted from their openly-expressed intentions of plundering Pakhoi, deterred in some measure by the military police organisation of the provisional administration and chamber of commerce, but chiefly by the presence of the foreign men-of-war. They are now engaged in "protecting" the more distant villages, where no resistance is usually made to their demands. Some of the "protectors" have been killed by the exasperated peasants, but the vengeance subsequently wreaked on them has been such as to discourage any general opposition. Numbers of cattle have been driven off; blackmail and robbery, murder and rape, are frequently reported. The roads are unsafe a mile or two out of town, and the country-people are undoubtedly in great distress, though it is evident that conditions are not nearly as bad as commonly believed in the town. The lawless characters appear to have split up into independent marauding parties, and unless they combine there should be no serious danger for Pakhoi. In every case of reported pillage which I have been able to investigate the facts, though very bad, have been greatly exaggerated, and the panic-stricken state of the townsfolk has been chiefly due to the wild rumours circulated and readily believed by them. The exodus to Hong Kong of most of those who can afford it still continues, and speaks eloquently of the lack of confidence felt by the Chinese in their Revolutionary Government and in themselves. Robberies in the town are becoming more frequent, and there have been several cases of blackmail by the "police," who have not shrunk from using their fire-arms on occasion (this morning three men were killed and nine seriously wounded by

rifle bullets in an affray in the main street), but so far no very serious rioting has occurred. The chamber of commerce continues to control the situation in a praiseworthy manner, in spite of many defections of prominent men who have fled to Hong Kong or Canton. The president, Mr. Li, and Mr. Yen, an ex-president, who has been elected provisional republican administrator, are showing a bold and steady front to the alarmists, and have the entire confidence of the best elements of the town. Signs are not wanting that their action is having a reassuring effect on the general population, which is showing increased confidence in their ability. There is no doubt that the timely advent of His Majesty's ship "Atlas," followed by the "Jaguar" and the "Fronde," has given the chamber the necessary support to their determined attitude in protecting the town, and that failing the presence of the foreign men-of-war Pakhoi would have shared the fate of Lienchou. Messrs. Li and Yen have been to see me almost daily, and have discussed with me various points as to the organisation of the "military police," the question of the unemployed, &c., and there is no doubt whatever that they will do their utmost for the protection of foreigners and their property. The charitable organisations were giving free meals to a number of unemployed coolies, but these will now be made to work a little in exchange for their food on a scheme for cleaning out and improving the town drains devised by Dr. Thompson, M.D., of the Church Missionary Society, and myself. Dr. Bradley had two years ago volunteered to bear the expense of improving the drainage, but his generous offer was refused owing to the opposition of some of the gentry on the score that his scheme would affect unfavourably the geomantic conditions of the town. Unless the drainage problem is taken in hand seriously there is no hope of the scourge of bubonic plague abating which visits Pakhoi every spring.

As against the deplorable state of the country districts there is definite news that ex-Taotai Kuo, under his new style of Chinese republican provisional administrator of Lienchou and Ch'inchou, is now engaged in handing over formally to ex-Taotai Fêng Hsiang-jung, and will make his way with his Hunanese troops to Canton via Wuchow. He appears to be taking a long time to hand over office, but confirmation of his impending departure may be found in the fact that he has sent for a Hunanese soldier who was lying ill in the church mission hospital. His departure will be hailed with general satisfaction, as he is intensely unpopular, mistrusted, and feared.

The most reassuring news, however, is that received by wireless that General Lung Chi-kuang is expected here to-morrow from Canton with some 2,000 regular troops. I am glad to say that the chamber of commerce is inclined to ascribe this welcome development largely to the good offices of His Majesty's consul-general at Canton, as no assistance was forthcoming in answer to their previous frequent unsupported appeals for efficient protection.

S.M.S. "Jaguar" will await the arrival of these troops before leaving for Hong Kong, as it is considered unsafe to leave the foreign communities without foreign naval protection (the "Fronde" having gone to the assistance of the menaced French mission on Weichou Island) until an efficient Chinese administration is in power.

When a regular republican administration is installed in Pakhoi it is probable that the question of the control of the customs and the post office may again be raised. Hitherto any attempts at interference have been successfully evaded.

Considerable gratitude is felt by the British community at Pakhoi for the considerate action of the German authorities in permitting S.M.S. "Jaguar" to prolong her stay here at a time when her presence has been called for in other ports, she being the only sea-going German man-of-war on the South China coast. The utmost cordiality and co-operation has characterised our relations with the German ship, the German consul, and the German community.

I have, &c.

G. S. MOSS,

*Assistant-in-charge of His Majesty's Consulate.*

Enclosure 8 in No. 112.

*Mr. Moss to Acting Consul Major.*

Sir,

*Pakhoi, December 21, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that General Huang Chi-kuan arrived from Canton with 2,000 Republican troops on the morning of the 17th instant, and has been received



with joy by the townspeople. He will be followed shortly by General Lung Chi-kuan with more troops, reported to number 3,000.

The Cantonese troops were landed in the morning, and immediately got out of hand, joining the townsfolk in a desultory attack on the men of the 21st company, who have been hitherto "policing" the town much as wolves might be expected to herd sheep. A wild action, at which no officers appeared on the scene, and which lasted some twenty minutes, took place on the beach to the east of the custom-house, ending in the expulsion of the 21st company from their barracks at the new law courts and the killing of three spectators by stray bullets.

The guard of sailors was withdrawn from the German consulate at 12:30 P.M., and at 12:50 P.M. a sudden attack was made on a guard-house adjoining this consulate, occupied by twenty-two men of the detested 21st company who had been so rash as not to join their companions in their flight in the morning. The attack was made from two sides by a mob of some 300 Republicans, egged on by some townspeople, and was so stupidly executed that retreat was left open to the attacked soldiers over the grounds of this consulate and down the narrow lane between the British and German consulates. After a short resistance the defenders fled under very rapid but wild rifle fire, and about half of them escaped along the only line of retreat open to them. Bullets were flying freely over a corner of the German consulate grounds and over this consulate, the main building of which was hit twice close below the roof-terrace from which I was watching the fight. Of the fugitives who fled over the consulate grounds, two made their way to my office, knelt down, and refused to leave. The compound was by this time being surrounded by the excited soldiers, who were looking over the low walls and threatening to enter in search of the fugitives. One of the men hid in the stable, and I just had time to lock the other in the prison before ejecting the first soldier who entered the gate. The office servants and their families were very much alarmed, except the head messenger and my "mafu," who followed me. Fortunately I found a Yunnanese corporal who spoke Mandarin, and who stood by me and warned his companions against entering the British consulate. The corporal told me that his captain was in the town, and I at once sent a messenger to the general requesting him to take command or to send a commissioned officer to do so. Desultory firing and cross-country chases, in which local knowledge generally prevailed, continued till about 2:30, and at 3 P.M. the excited soldiery departed. The two fugitives made good their escape at 3:30 P.M., just before the arrival of a captain sent by General Huang to apologise for the occurrence. I told the captain that I was glad to see him, but that he had arrived about three hours late. I complained strongly of the disorderly conduct of the soldiers and of the disgraceful way in which they had been allowed to get out of the control of their officers, and also of the fact that I had not been officially warned of the attack on a house adjoining the consulate grounds. I was able to add force to my remarks by producing the two bullets which had struck the office close to the flag. The captain apologised very fully, and I told him that I would expect a despatch from his general or a personal call. The general sent a guard of men for the consulate in the evening, and promised to call.

The next day His Majesty's ship "Atlas" arrived, and Commander Donaldson, R.N., and two of his officers were present when the general called in the afternoon with a numerous staff.

After expressing regret at the occurrence of the day before, he informed us that his troops were now under strict control, and that he expected to be joined shortly by General Lung Chi-kuan with 3,000 troops. After restoring order in Pakhoi he proposed to proceed to Lienchou, Kaochou, and Ch'in-chou, and did not expect any opposition, except, possibly, at Lienchou. Kuo Taotai, he said, was leaving Ch'in-chou with his Hunanese troops for Hunan and Wuchang.

After establishing the republic in this district, General Huang stated that he and his troops would go north at the end of second Chinese moon. The southern troops, he said, could not carry on military operations in the north during the winter, and gave me to understand that he regarded the present truce negotiations on the Yang-tsze as a cloak to enable the southerners to consolidate their position, and that they would complete the expulsion of the Manchu dynasty in the spring. He did not seem to think that any permanent peace could result from the Yang-tsze negotiations.

Next morning we returned the general's call unofficially, and on our departure we were provided with an escort and band through the native town.

This attention by the general, and the fact that proclamations have been posted everywhere enjoining the people to protect foreigners, and especially missions, lead me

to believe that the period of tension is now over, and that foreigners and the town of Pakhoi need no longer fear the attack of rioters and brigands. The arrival of His Majesty's ship "Atlas" immediately after the departure of S.M.S. "Jaguar" has undoubtedly had a very salutary effect on the Chinese mind. The foreign communities are very grateful for the considerate protection accorded by the naval authorities and the Hong Kong Government.

No serious trouble marked the entry of the Canton troops into Lienchou.

The situation has undoubtedly been saved by the arrival of the army from Canton, which has been received with enthusiasm by the people. All the shops are reopened, and general confidence is restored. The troops have received four months' pay in advance.

General Huang and his staff do not give the impression of marked ability, and the work of reconstruction will be watched with interest. It is too early for any prophecy, but they have the good-will and best wishes of the population, which is very glad to be rid of the lawless disorder of the past weeks.

I have, &c.

G. S. MOSS,

*Assistant-in-charge of His Majesty's Consulate.*

No. 113.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)*

Sir,

*Peking, January 30, 1912.*

IN my despatch of the 5th ultimo, I had the honour to report that the other foreign representatives had agreed to submit to their respective Governments the proposals drawn up by the bankers in Shanghai for the formation of a bankers' commission to receive and dispose of the customs revenues for the service of the foreign debt.

Replies from the various Governments came in slowly, and it was not until the 3rd instant, that the diplomatic body were in a position to discuss the further steps to be taken. By this time replies had been received from all the Governments approving the proposals, and at the meeting which was held accordingly on that day consideration was also given to the Wai-wu Pu's note of the 2nd December last, enclosing the suggestions made by the inspector-general for devoting the customs revenue to the service of the foreign debt. Copies of this note and of its enclosure were forwarded in my despatch of the 5th December above referred to.

Of the four clauses in which Mr. Aglen's scheme was submitted, clauses 1 and 2 are intended to give effect to the arrangement already made with the Wai-wu Pu for disposing of the revenue at all the treaty ports, while clause 3 accords with the proposals for a bankers' commission accepted by the Powers. These three clauses were, therefore, unanimously accepted; but a difference of opinion arose with regard to clause 4, which provides that the commission of bankers should be requested to arrange for the temporary suspension of repayment of principal due on the loans, leaving, for the time being and until sufficient revenue accumulates, only the interest to be paid on the dates due. The opinion was expressed by one of my colleagues that the diplomatic body had not the power to modify the amortisation of the Imperial loans as regulated by the terms of each agreement, and after some discussion it was agreed that this question should be referred to our respective Governments.

It was also agreed that the banks should be requested to submit to the diplomatic body a quarterly statement, showing the appropriation of the revenue received.

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the note which, with the approval of my colleagues, I addressed to the Wai-wu Pu on the 15th instant, communicating the decisions adopted by the diplomatic body. I also enclose copy of the Wai-wu Pu's reply, dated the 21st instant, covering a memorandum in which the suggested terms of reference to the bankers' commission are formulated under eight heads. These heads embody the proposals made by the bankers with the additional two clauses proposed by the diplomatic body, and with the addition of the following words: "The said commission shall decide all questions of priority of claim between foreign loan payments, and shall draw up a schedule of the various payments to be made in this connection for the guidance of the Commissioner of Customs at Shanghai." The words quoted substantially represent clause 3 of the original suggestions received from the Wai-wu Pu on the

2nd December last, and in circulating copy of the Wai-wu Pu's reply amongst my colleagues, I suggested that, as clauses 1, 2, and 3 of these suggestions had been accepted in principle by the diplomatic body, there was no objection to these words being embodied in the terms of reference to the commission.

The assent of the foreign representatives having now been received, an identic letter (copy enclosed) is being addressed to-day by the heads of missions through the consuls to the managers of their respective banks in Shanghai, stating that the terms of reference, as formulated under heads 1 to 8, have been approved by the diplomatic body, and instructing them to be guided by these terms in their action as members of the commission. At the same time, the Wai-wu Pu is being requested to issue instructions in the same sense through the inspector-general to the Commissioner of Customs at Shanghai.

I have stated above that the question of temporary suspension of repayment of principal due on the loans has been reserved by the foreign representatives for the decision of the respective Governments concerned. I have accordingly the honour to request your instructions on this point. I should explain that, according to an estimate made by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the funds collected should be sufficient to meet the repayments of principal and the payments of interest on all the pre-Boxer loans up to the end of next March, but will probably not be sufficient to meet the instalments of principal after that date. As a matter of legal right, it seems to me that instalments of principal, equally with sums of interest due, should be paid in strict accordance with the priority of the different loans; but, as a matter of expediency and in the interests of the bondholders, I think the banks would agree that, until sufficient revenue accumulates, it would be better to modify the amortisation schemes so as to maintain the payment of the coupons of all the loans. I venture, therefore, to submit to your favourable consideration the proposal that His Majesty's Government should concert with the other Governments concerned with a view to empowering the bankers' commission to make arrangements accordingly.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 113.

*Copy of Note communicated to the Wai-wu Pu by the Dean of the Diplomatic Body.*

THE foreign representatives have carefully considered the note received from the Wai-wu Pu on the 2nd December last, containing suggestions, under four heads, prepared by the inspector-general of maritime customs, for devoting the customs revenue at all the ports to the service of the foreign loans and the indemnity, and have charged the dean to reply as follows :—

The arrangements proposed under clauses 1, 2, and 3 of the above scheme are accepted by the diplomatic body as satisfactory. As regards the proposal in clause 4, that the commission of bankers be requested to arrange for the temporary suspension of repayment of principal due on the loans, leaving for the time being and until sufficient revenue accumulates only the interest to be paid on the dates due, the diplomatic body does not feel competent to give a decision, and the proposal is reserved for the consideration of the Governments concerned.

In further reference to clause 3, the dean has to explain that the foreign representatives had already requested the managers of the foreign banks at Shanghai to draw up a scheme for the formation of a commission to receive the customs revenues from the inspector-general, and to advise upon the best manner for disposing of these revenues in accordance with the obligations for which they were hypothecated. A meeting of bankers at Shanghai was accordingly held on the 23rd November last, and the dean has the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Wai-wu Pu, a copy of the minutes of this meeting, showing the proposals under six heads, made by the bankers in accordance with the above request.

The diplomatic body has approved the bankers' proposals, and considers that the following additions should be made thereto :—

1. The commission is to furnish to the diplomatic body at Peking, through the consuls at Shanghai, a quarterly report showing the appropriation of the revenues received.

2. The arrangement is subject to future revision should circumstances require it.

On learning from the Wai-wu Pu that the above proposals meet with the Wai-wu Pu's approval, the diplomatic body will at once send instructions to Shanghai for the appointment of the commission of bankers and the enforcement of the arrangement suggested.

*Peking, January 15, 1912.*

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Enclosure 2 in No. 113.

*Minutes of Bankers' Meeting.*

AT a meeting of the managers of the foreign banks at the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China on Thursday, the 23rd November, at 4:30 P.M., to consider the question referred to them by their respective consuls, viz., a telegram from the diplomatic body in Peking recommending the formation of an international commission during the present troubles in China to supervise the custody and distribution of the customs revenue, pledged primarily to meet the service of foreign loans contracted previous to 1900, and secondly, the indemnity payment provided for in the final protocol, it was resolved as follows:—

1. To recommend to the diplomatic body through their respective consuls that the international commission should consist of the managers of the banks interested in the service of all outstanding loans secured by the customs revenue contracted previous to 1900, and/or the indemnity payments.

2. That the banks chiefly interested, viz., the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the Russo-Asiatic Bank should be custodians of the customs funds.

3. That the inspector-general of customs be asked an undertaking that he will account to the commission appointed for the net customs revenue until such time as the Chinese Government are in a position to resume payments of loans and indemnity.

4. That the inspector-general of customs arrange for weekly remittance of net revenue from all collecting points at Shanghai.

5. That the inspector-general of customs arrange that the net revenue accumulated at Shanghai be divided weekly in as nearly as possible equal amounts between the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the Russo-Asiatic Bank for account of the loans concerned and indemnity payments, and that the Commissioner of Customs be authorised to draw upon these accounts for loan payments as they fall due according to the priority of such loans.

6. That if normal conditions are not restored by the end of 1912, then at that time an account be taken of the surplus available for the indemnity, and that such account be sent to the diplomatic body for their decision as to its disposal.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 113.

*Memorandum communicated to the Dean of the Diplomatic Body by the Wai-wu Pu.*

THE Wai-wu Pu has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the memorandum from the dean of the diplomatic body, dated the 15th instant, on the subject of the proposed scheme for devoting the customs revenue at all the ports to the service of the foreign loans and the indemnity. A copy of the minutes of the meeting of bankers, held on the 23rd November, was also enclosed.

The Wai-wu Pu accordingly referred the matter to the inspector-general of customs, and has now received a memorandum from the latter, formulating the scheme with certain new additions, copy of which is enclosed herewith.

The Ministry has the honour to observe that in article 1 the inspector-general has merely added the following words, viz. : "The said commission shall decide all questions of priority of claim between foreign loan payments, and shall draw up a schedule of the various payments to be made in this connection for the guidance of the commissioner of customs at Shanghai." Again, in article 2, namely, that "the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the Russo-Asiatic Bank shall be custodians of the customs funds," the words "at Shanghai" have been added,

No alterations have been made in the other articles. If the diplomatic body has no objections to offer, both sides can adopt the scheme in eight articles, prepared by the inspector-general of customs, and instructions can at once be sent to the foreign banks at Shanghai for their guidance.

The favour of a reply is requested.

*Peking, January 21, 1912.*

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Enclosure 4 in No. 113.

*Memorandum communicated by Wai-wu Pu.*

THE diplomatic body having accepted as satisfactory the first three clauses suggested by the inspector-general of customs and reserved decision as to the fourth clause, and having also approved the Shanghai bankers' proposals under six heads, with the proposed addition of two new clauses, the terms of reference for the bankers' commission may be formulated as follows :—

1. The International Commission of Bankers shall consist of the managers of the banks interested in the service of all outstanding loans secured by the customs revenue contracted previous to 1900, and/or the indemnity payments. The said commission shall decide all questions of priority of claim between foreign loan payments, and shall draw up a schedule of the various payments to be made in this connection for the guidance of the commissioner of customs at Shanghai.

2. The banks chiefly interested, viz., the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the Russo-Asiatic Bank shall be custodians of the customs funds at Shanghai.

3. The inspector-general of customs shall account to the commission appointed for the net customs revenue until such time as the Chinese Government are in a position to resume payments of loans and indemnity.

4. The inspector-general of customs shall arrange for weekly remittance of net revenue from all collecting points to Shanghai.

5. The inspector-general of customs shall arrange that the net revenue accumulated at Shanghai shall be divided weekly in as nearly as possibly equal amounts between the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the Russo-Asiatic Bank for account of the loans concerned and indemnity payments, and the commissioner of customs shall be authorised to draw upon these accounts for loan payments as they fall due, according to the priority of such loans as determined by the commission of bankers in terms of clause No. 1.

6. If normal conditions are not restored by the end of 1912, then at that time an account shall be taken of the surplus available for the indemnity, and such account shall be sent to the diplomatic body for their decision as to its disposal.

7. The commission shall furnish to the diplomatic body at Peking, through the consuls at Shanghai, a quarterly report showing the appropriation of the revenue received.

8. The above arrangement is subject to future revision should circumstances require it.

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Enclosure 5 in No. 113.

*Identical Despatch addressed to the Bankers at Shanghai.*

Sir,

*Peking, January 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegraphic communication of the 21st November last on the subject of the proposed International Commission of Bankers to supervise the custody and distribution of the customs revenue, pledged for the service of the foreign debt of China, and with reference also to the resolutions passed at the meeting of the managers of the foreign banks, held in Shanghai on the 23rd November last, I beg to inform you that the diplomatic body have approved the following terms of reference to the International Commission of Bankers :—

1. The International Commission of Bankers shall consist of the managers of the banks interested in the service of all outstanding loans secured by the customs revenue contracted previous to 1900, and/or the indemnity payments. The said commission

shall decide all questions of priority of claim between foreign loan payments, and shall draw up a schedule of the various payments to be made in this connection for the guidance of the commissioner of customs at Shanghai.

2. The banks chiefly interested, viz., the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the Russo-Asiatic Bank shall be custodians of the customs funds at Shanghai.

3. The inspector-general of customs shall account to the commission appointed for the net customs revenue until such time as the Chinese Government are in a position to resume payments of loans and indemnity.

4. The inspector-general of customs shall arrange for weekly remittance of net revenue from all collecting points to Shanghai.

5. The inspector-general of customs shall arrange that the net revenue accumulated at Shanghai shall be divided weekly in as nearly as possible equal amounts between the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the Russo-Asiatic Bank for account of the loans concerned and indemnity payments, and the commissioner of customs shall be authorised to draw upon these accounts for loan payments as they fall due, according to the priority of such loans as determined by the commission of bankers in terms of clause No. 1.

6. If normal conditions are not restored by the end of 1912, then at that time an account shall be taken of the surplus available for the indemnity, and such account shall be sent to the diplomatic body for their decision as to its disposal.

7. The commission shall furnish to the diplomatic body at Peking, through the consuls at Shanghai, a quarterly report showing the appropriation of the revenue received.

8. The above arrangement is subject to future revision should circumstances require it.

The Imperial Chinese Government has approved the above terms, and is being requested to issue instructions accordingly to the commissioner of customs at Shanghai.

I request that you will be guided by the above instructions in your actions as a member of the commission, and that when the schedule referred to in clause 1 is drawn up, you will be good enough to communicate a copy to me for my information.

No. 114.

*Mr. Lew Yuk Lin to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)*

Your Excellency,

*Chinese Legation, February 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a translation of a telegram I have just received from the Wai-wu Pu, announcing the election of Yuan Shih-kai to be president of the provisional Government by Northern and Southern China as well as by the Bannermen and the Mongols.

The Manchurian provinces are declared to be tranquil.

I have, &c.

LEW YUK-LIN.

Enclosure in No. 114.

*Translation of Telegram received from the Wai-wu Pu, dated February 16, 1912.*

AT two o'clock P.M. yesterday (the 15th) the Advisory Council at Nanking accepted the resignation of Sun Yat Sen and unanimously elected Yuan Shih-kai to be president of the provisional Government. He was also similarly elected by the Northern Provinces and by the Bannermen and the Mongols. The three eastern provinces are tranquil.

*Chinese Legation, February 17, 1912.*

No. 115.

*Consul-General O'Brien-Butler to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)*

Sir,

*Yünnan-fu, January 13, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a report on the events in Yünnan, Kueichou, and parts of Szechuan which I have sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

I have, &amp;c.

P. E. O'BRIEN-BUTLER.

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Enclosure in No. 115.

*Report on Events in Yünnan, Kueichou, and parts of Szechuan during the month of December.*

THE month began ominously by a series of attacks, in one case by soldiers and in others by brigands on both foreign and native property in the neighbourhood of Mengtsz.

At 8 o'clock in the evening of the 3rd the garrison of Mengtsz rose, looted the native city, where they obtained some 200,000 taels alone at the Treasury, and devoted their attentions to several buildings in the foreign quarter, outside the city wall. Capobianco's hotel and store (Italian), the premises of Messrs. Speidel and Co., general merchants (German), and the French Railway Company were looted. At the last-named place 25,000 taels of customs duties, deposited in the company's safe, were taken, and the store of Messrs. Kalos Brothers (Greek) was looted and then burnt. There was a good deal of promiscuous firing, and three Greeks with Kalos's store were wounded, another Greek who disappeared at the time, and for whom the worst was feared, turning up subsequently unhurt. The cause of this outbreak is reported to have been a delay in issuing pay to the troops. The following night the house and workshop of an Italian contractor, named Allietto, situated near La Tour station, 209 kilom., on the French railway, were attacked and looted, a Frenchman being wounded and a coolie killed. Allietto was fired upon by a party of bandits while passing along the line in a trolley, one of his coolies being wounded. During the night of the 5th, a party of bandits attacked the foreign and quasi-foreign establishments at Tchetsouen (Chih-ts'un) 152 kilom. A hot fight ensued, the small foreign party taking refuge in a house and successfully keeping off the marauders, but the foreign-style hotel, belonging to a Chinese, and the house of Vaglio, an Italian contractor, were looted, and a waggon-load of opium (a rich prize) was carried away. At the first sound of the firing a party of three, including a lady, hurriedly boarded an engine which happened to be under steam, and, leaving the other foreigners to do as best they could, proceeded south with all speed. The nightly record, however, was not kept up, the next, and last attack, occurring about the middle of the month when Pellini's hotel (Italian) at Pouo-hi (Pohsi) 296 kilom. was looted.

The situation at Mengtsz appeared to be so precarious, owing to the attitude of the soldiery and the presence of bands of pillagers in the neighbourhood, that the non-official foreigners residing there withdrew to Tonquin, and the French consul was of opinion that a total evacuation would eventually be necessary. Tranquillity has, however, been restored at that port by the dispatch thither of some five hundred reliable soldiers from Yünnan-fu and the withdrawal, after considerable difficulty, of the former mutinous garrison. These men at first openly refused to obey orders but, after the shooting of two of their officers, they sullenly yielded, and by the end of the month they had all arrived in Yünnan-fu. Here twelve of the ringleaders in the outbreak were publicly executed, and finally some of them gave up their arms and the rest subsequently submitted to being sent off to Szechuan, all having previously declared that they would rather fight than yield in either of these respects. The military governor had not expected so easy a victory, as the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs had mentioned in conversation that should we hear the sound of battle outside the city there would be no cause for alarm as it would mean that the mutinous soldiers were being "coerced."

For the protection of the railway a dozen French gendarmes and some twenty or more "auxiliaires annamites" have been distributed among the principal stations with

the full knowledge beforehand of General Tsai, who subsequently, as a matter of form, protested against their presence to the French consul.

I do not think that it is an exaggeration to say that the news of the looting of Mengtsz caused the utmost consternation at Yünnan-fu. The soldiers at Mengtsz having secured so easily in a few hours the equivalent of many months' pay, it was hardly to be expected that their comrades here, disaffected as many of them were, would abstain from following the evil example set. It was known that preparations had been made for a general rising and that the disaffected soldiers had a list of 117 wealthy residents whose places were to receive the first attention; moreover, many strangers of evil appearance arriving daily by train were to be noticed hanging about in the southern suburb evidently awaiting the signal to commence operations, while the Mahomedans were restless and ready to take advantage of any outbreak among the troops. But General Tsai set to work with his characteristic thoroughness. The walls of the city were manned nightly and the South Gate, which as formerly is kept open till midnight, strongly guarded in preparation against attack from outside, while strong patrols visited all parts of the city and suburbs. A number of arrests were effected, speedily followed in most cases by summary executions. The artillery were said to be as disaffected as the 73rd Infantry Regiment; two artillery officers were shot on the 5th December, one of them because he was discovered to have in his possession some badge or token of a secret society. Another officer was shot on the 9th December, twenty-four soldiers were executed on the 10th, and a major from the Linan garrison who had come to Yünnan-fu on private business, which turned out to be really business connected with a secret society, was also executed about the same time. At last, on the 16th, an outbreak actually did occur and was promptly suppressed. Early in the afternoon a number of recruits hitherto unarmed tried to rush the armoury and arm themselves expecting, it appeared, to find arms and ammunition lying about ready to hand. Soldiers from the neighbouring barracks and military head-quarters, formerly the normal school, promptly pounced upon them, and after a short struggle, in which seven of the mutineers were shot, 120 were captured. Of these five were beheaded the next day and other executions followed. The chief of the band was not captured. It was discovered that all these men belonged to the Ko Lao Hui and that their attempt on the armoury was part of a preconcerted plan. If they had succeeded 2,000 more Ko Lao Hui men would have risen and plundered the city, after which a new Government was to be set up, officials having been designated to take charge of the various *yaméns*. It is interesting to know that the fullest protection was to have been accorded to foreigners and their property.

On the 18th, probably from information obtained from the captured men, eleven leaders of the society were arrested, of whom three were promptly beheaded and the others detained in prison. As the head man of all succeeded in escaping and the society was still obviously very powerful it was feared that another rising would be attempted, but it would appear that General Tsai's energy has disconcerted all would-be disturbers of the peace as, notwithstanding several rumours of impending trouble, the city has been quiet ever since.

The possibility of trouble being caused by those who have not seeking to take from those who have prompted General Tsai to think of the establishment of a body of "Commercial Militia" (*shang t'uan*). About 2,000 men have been enrolled and receive each 6 dollars a-month pay. Shopkeepers were asked either to furnish a man or else pay 6 dollars a-month for a substitute to be found by the general, and it is not surprising to learn that by far the greater number of these men are substitutes. The streets of the city are now patrolled at night by the militia, but the guards placed at night on the city walls have been withdrawn.

The Yünnan regular army has now been reorganised and increased to six regiments. The old Luchün numbers have been abandoned and the infantry regiments have been numbered from one to six, these numbers in Chinese and foreign figures being sewn on the collars of the uniforms. I am informed that practically all the old Luchün soldiers are away from Yünnan-fu and that those in the town are mostly new recruits. The total number of troops in the Yünnan army is about 24,000; of these about 6,000 are stationed in Yünnan-fu and the south of the province, the same number in the west and about 12,000 have gone in detachments at various times to Szechuan.

The former normal school, a large building or series of buildings, which has been converted into the military head-quarters, barracks, and Government offices generally, is being connected by walls with the armoury some 200 yards distant, and bastions are being erected at intervals with a view to the combined buildings being converted into a strong citadel. At the same time defects in the city wall are being made good, especially



near the north-west corner where the heavy rains of the past summer caused the outer face to slip down and expose the earthen core.

One great source of anxiety to the military Government at the present time is money, or rather the want of it. The former industries taotai, now a councillor to the military Government, told Mr. Kaufmann, the provincial postmaster, a short time ago that there was just enough money in the provincial treasury to last until the beginning of the coming second moon, about the middle of March. A proclamation was issued asking the people to make contributions to the Government, and as a result 20,000 dollars was received. Now it is intended to issue currency notes to a total amount of 500,000 dollars, and loans on the foreign plan and a state lottery are also talked about.

In consequence of the recurring news of attacks on foreign property along the railway line, the disturbances in the west of Yünnan and the likelihood, as it seemed at the time, that the troops sent to Szechuan would be driven back by the Imperialist forces, I considered it advisable that all persons residing up-country, men as well as ladies, who had not already left their stations, should withdraw, and the local secretary of the China Inland Mission at my request sent out circular telegrams to that effect. My idea has been that everyone whose presence was not imperatively necessary in Yünnan-fu should either retire to Tonquin, or at least to some point below the break on the railway; and as through communication between Yünnan-fu and Tonquin has recently been re-established, I have let it be known that I am satisfied that British subjects should stay at any point along the railway between Yünnan-fu and Tonquin.

On the 12th December the new Commissioner of Foreign Affairs assured me that the whole of Yünnan was tranquil, including Kaihua, Ssumao, and Tali; he admitted, however, that Kueichou was in a bad state owing to the presence of numerous bandits, scarcity of funds and a small army. From other sources this has since been confirmed. On the 11th December I received a telegram from the commissioner of customs at Ssumao, informing me that he was leaving at once as he found the situation intolerable. For some days subsequently no replies were received to telegrams known to have reached Ssumao, which raised the presumption that disorders were proceeding there; but finally news arrived that all was quiet, and it would appear that the commissioner had withdrawn as a matter of prudence, having received strongly worded telegrams from the commissioner at Mengtshu urging him to do so.

On the 7th December the Government received a telegram that the leader of the rebels at Tali, a former district magistrate, had been killed by villagers in a locality where his followers were pillaging, and it was considered that the situation as regards the west of the province would be much improved thereby. Large garrisons are remaining in the neighbourhood of Tali to overawe any attempt on the part of the Mahomedans.

On the 4th a telegram came in from the missionaries at Anshun-fu in West Kueichou to the effect that chapels were being burnt and that the missionaries were leaving for Yünnan-fu. I at once telegraphed to the Kueichou Military Government and urged that steps be taken to protect Christians and their property, and I received a reassuring message in reply. The party from Anshun-fu arrived on the 22nd, and I then learnt that the information sent me had been considerably exaggerated, and that only one earth-brick house used as a chapel had been demolished. The missionaries reported that the roads were infested with brigands; they were not, however, molested as their caravan was a large one owing to the presence of several ex-officials from Kueichou who travelled with them and an exceptionally strong escort. One of their servants who had been sent on ahead to secure accommodation was set upon and robbed. Mr. Adam from Anshun-fu informed me that the present Government of Kueichou is in the hands of the Ko Lao Hui or at least that the society had absolute power in managing affairs. The prefect of Anshun-fu and the local Ko Lao Hui leader had a consultation together regarding the strength of the escort to be furnished to the missionaries. The foreigners in Kueiyang have decided to remain in the city owing to the unsafe condition of the roads, judging it more prudent to remain, as all seems quiet.

When the Government of Kueichou were hesitating as to the policy they should pursue, their action was precipitated by threatening telegrams from Yünnan-fu and Changsha. A reply that Kueichou had revolted was returned.

Two parties of missionaries arrived from Chaotung and Tungch'uan in north-east Yünnan. They had passed large bodies of soldiers on their way to Szechuan and found these men on the whole extremely well behaved and friendly. In one instance, however, a number of soldiers were distinctly hostile; one man in particular shouted out, "We suffer you foreigners now but our time will come," and another spat full in the face of

the five-year-old daughter of one of the party. I have given General Tsai particulars of these men's behaviour, and he has expressed his regret and promised that they shall be suitably punished if they can be discovered.

The Yünnan soldiers sent to Szechuan penetrated in one direction as far as Huilichou, in the Chiench'ang valley just across the border, and withdrew after a few days. The magistrate assured the commanding officer that he was a declared republican but could govern his locality perfectly without outside assistance of any kind. Other Yünnan troops proceeded north-eastwards. Suifu on the Yangtze is reported to be garrisoned by a few hundred Yünnan and Kueichou troops and to be besieged by 10,000 Szechuanese. The gymnastic instructor (Japanese colonel, calling himself Li) accompanied the troops to Szechuan, and I have recently heard that he has been assassinated on the road. It was, I understand, anticipated when he left that he would not return.

Letters have arrived from the missionaries at Ningyuan-fu reporting that all is well; the last letter being dated the 13th December. The French bishop here has since received news from his colleague at Ningyuan-fu that that city is now republican and also giving news of the revolution at Chengtu and the ensuing mutiny of the troops and the killing of the new military governor. Several missionaries arrived here on the 7th from Batang and Thibetan Szechuan viâ Weihsi and Tali. They gave me a very interesting account of their journey. Western Szechuan appeared to be in a state of anarchy, Tibetan laymen, lamas, Chinese and the various native tribes all fighting against each other, the lamas alone being friendly towards the foreigners. They also mentioned movements of other foreigners, notably Mr. Bons d'Anty, the French consul-general at Chengtu, who, when they last heard of him, was with a party of French priests and nuns approaching Litang. I have since heard through Ningyuan-fu that this party had reached Tachienlu in safety escorted and befriended by Thibetans, and the latest news (3rd January) is that they all, as well as the French engineers building the bridge over the Yalung, were shut up in Yachou and unable to proceed.

I have more than once alluded to General Tsai's ability in dealing with the turbulent military and other elements under his rule. He is a remarkable man in many ways, and if he survives the present revolution will probably rise to eminence in years to come. Many persons hate him, more adore him. I understand that many of the gentry and students here, as well as many of the soldiers and the three south-eastern prefectures of Linan, Kaihua, and Kuangnan, are strongly opposed to him, but with the aid of his friends and by his own undoubted ability he has managed to hold his own so far, and I have no doubt that Yünnan-fu will be quiet as long as he remains in power. He is still quite a young man, being only thirty years of age.

No. 116.

*Acting Consul Brown to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)*

Sir,

*Chungking, January 19, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting on the proposals of Chungking for the amalgamation of the rival Szechuan administrations. At Mr. Consul-General Wilkinson's request, I also enclose a copy of his despatch of the 5th January, as the information contained supplements that given by him.

I have, &c.

W. R. BROWN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 116.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtu, January 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of a telegram sent on the 29th December last by the Government of Chengtu to the Government of Chungking, containing proposals for the amalgamation of the two Governments.

It is suggested that Chengtu shall be the seat of Government for the Republic of Szechuan, but that at Chungking shall be stationed a high official with the title of chen-fu shih (protector) at the head of a garrison of one division, or 10,000 men. Yün Ch'ang-heng, the present tu-tu here, shall be recognised as the tu-tu (president) of all

Szechuan. The actual tu-tu of Chungking, Chang Chi-wu, shall become vice-president (fu tu-tu) of united Szechuan, while Lo Lun and his fellow-vice-president of Chungking shall be appointed to the posts either of protector or of chairman of the council or of chief of staff. The directors and sub-directors of the various boards shall be chosen impartially from among men of ability in either city.

It would appear as though Chungking has made the first advances. If this is the case, then the amalgamation of the two Governments, so much to be desired in the interest of the peace of this distracted province, may well result.

The present communication, I should add, is described as a telegram, but in point of fact the telegraph line is interrupted between Tzu-yang and Lu Chou, the only sections that remain intact being from Chengtu to Tzu-yang and from Lu Chou to Chungking.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 116.

*Chengtū Chün Cheng Fu to the Chungking Shu Chün Cheng Fu.*

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

December 29, 1911.

FOR the perusal of Chang and Hsia, presidents of the Chungking Shu (Szechuan) Chün Cheng Fu.

Consequent on the recent declaration of independence, this Government had the honour to receive a succession of telegrams from you. To these it was intended to reply in detail, but the riot of the 8th December suddenly arose, and Pu (Tien-chün) and Chu (Ch'ing-lan) resigned their posts. We, (Yün) Chang-heng and (Lo) Lun, under friendly pressure from the soldiers and people, were constrained to come forth and accept the burden; but fortunately the feelings of the soldiery were more settled, and the populace had become calmer. On the 22nd December the malignant Chao yielded up his head, and the banner troops surrendered their arms. The cause of independence has been thereby made more secure.

I, (Chang) Chih-hsiang, on my return from Chungking, represented the admirable views of your honourable presidents and of the gentlemen of Chungking for the furtherance of amalgamation. These prove your public spirit, and are indeed for the advantage of the common weal; we are lost in admiration of them.

Of late, the various districts are here and everywhere becoming independent, and all Szechuan is split up. We, (Yün) Chang-heng and (Lo) Lun, planning and reflecting night and day on the way to secure peace, hold that, unless the main departments of military affairs and finance are unified, we shall be unequal to warding off aggression from without. This happens most fortunately to accord with your own views.

The gist of the procedure for amalgamation of the two Governments we would now outline as under:—

1. Chengtū shall be the seat of the Szechuan Government.
2. Chungking must be regarded as its chief protection, and there will be stationed there a protector (chen fu shih) with one division (10,000 men) under his command.
3. At the suggestion of (Lo) Lun, it is proposed that the Chengtū president be president of Szechuan, and the Chungking president vice-president of Szechuan.
4. It is proposed that the two (actual) vice-presidents be appointed to be protector at Chungking, or chairman of the council (shu mi yuan), or chief of the general staff (chün-shih ts'an-i-yuan).
5. The directors and sub-directors of the various Ministries (Pu) will be constituted from men of ability from both places.
6. The conciliators (an-fu hsuan-wei shih) sent by both Governments must, as soon as possible, communicate to one another the amalgamation scheme, so that they may work together. Each shall take their point of contact to be the limit of his jurisdiction.

If your honourable Government considers that the above arrangements are feasible, we hope that you will be good enough to reply by telegram, and that you will then proceed to constitute a protectorate (chen-fu fu), at the same time asking the president, the executive officials, and the leaguers generally to come at once to the capital to frame the new Government. This will enable the more important matters to be

successively started, and the country to be the sooner tranquillised, to the great good hap of all Szechuan and to the great good hap of China (Chung Kuo).

(Signed by Yün Chang-heng, Lo Lun, Chang Chih-hsiang, Lung Ling, Tung Hsiu-wu, Wang Ch'i-ch'ang, Teng Hsiao-ko, T'ung Hsien-chang, Lung Shao-po, Yang Wei, Li Chih, Liu Yün-k'ai.)

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Enclosure 3 in No. 116.

*Acting Consul Brown to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chungking, January 19, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the negotiations for the amalgamation of the Chengtu and Chungking Governments are now being conducted in a most friendly spirit. The Chengtu administration have expressed their willingness to give way to Chungking, and the Chungking Government, not to be outdone in courtesy, profess themselves ready to yield to Chengtu.

The counter-proposals of Chungking to those advanced by Chengtu (given in the despatch from Chengtu of the 5th January) are as follows:—

1. Chengtu to remain the provincial capital.
2. Chungking to be the residential seat of the president.
3. Chang Chio-p'ei, present head of the Chungking administration, to be president.
4. Yun Ch'ang-heng to be vice-president.
5. Hsia Chih-shih, assistant administrator of Chungking, to be an additional vice-president.
6. Lo Lun to be chairman of the council or chief adviser.

In support of articles 3 and 4, it is urged that Chang Chio-p'ei, as an ex-military student from Japan and a scholar of renown, is better fitted for the post and administrative functions of president of a military Government than is Yun Ch'ang-heng, whose special talent as a leader of troops could be employed to greater advantage by the new Government in the position of vice-president, where he would be in charge of the army and military operations.

If the rival administrations are sincere in their conciliatory protestations, which it is permissible to doubt, a compromise will no doubt be speedily arranged on a basis satisfactory to both parties; but if neither side will withdraw their candidates it is possible that a way out of the difficulty will be found by the selection of Wang Jen-wen, former Governor-General, *ad interim*, of Szechuan, as president. This gentleman arrived here yesterday from Chengtu. The nature of his business, which is stated to be important, is unknown, but is probably connected with the present negotiations.

I have, &c.

W. R. BROWN.

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No. 117.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a report which has been addressed to me by the military attaché at His Majesty's Legation respecting the movement of troops and the probability of a peaceful settlement.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure in No. 117.

*Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby.*

DURING the past few days further significant movements of Chinese troops, in whom the Premier has confidence, have taken place, viz., from the 27th to the 29th January: The 9th Infantry Regiment (three battalions), a battalion (three batteries) of the 3rd Artillery Regiment, two squadrons of cavalry, three companies of the 3rd Engineer Battalion, and various details. The whole, amounting to some 3,300 men, were transported by the Peking-Mukden Railway from the neighbourhood of Lan-chou and Pei-tai-ho to Peking.

The three battalions of new Ho-nan troops from Chêng-ting-fu (South Chih-li) were also brought up at this time, and orders were issued and trains provided for the recall.

of three train-loads of the "Wu Wei Tso Chün" (old style troops) from Yang-kao, beyond Kalgan. These latter, however, had not arrived up to the 31st January.

On the 31st January, the Peking-Mukden Railway received orders to provide transport for a further 2,000 of the 3rd Division from Pei-tai-ho, Liu-shou-ying, and Lan-chou to Fêng-t'ai junction (just outside Peking), and on the 1st and 2nd February these troops arrived, viz., the 12th Infantry Regiment, 600 of the 3rd Artillery Regiment (with eight field and six machine-guns), six machine-guns, and details.

Two troop-trains also passed through Fêng-t'ai during the night of the 1st and 2nd February bound for the Yung-ting Men station (just outside the central south gate of the "Chinese" city of Peking). I saw the greater number of these troops (12th Infantry) at Fêng-t'ai station this afternoon; they were partly billeted in the neighbouring villages, and part remained in the cars. The men were very dirty and untidy, but seemed good-humoured and contented. They were warmly clad in sheep-skin coats, and with fur flaps to their forage caps. Their food supplies were ample, and many trucks loaded therewith were standing in the station sidings.

The troops that detrained at the Yung-ting Men station between the 27th and 29th January were at first encamped on the open space to the east of the Temple of Agriculture, but have now been moved into the Tartar city, where they are distributed about in various quarters.

Of the newly-raised troops of the "Wu Wei Yu Chün" from South Chih-li and Ho-nan, also, five "yings" (battalions) in all, are said to have arrived at Peking.

On the 23rd January, also, a squadron of the 6th Cavalry from Pao-ting-fu arrived here.

Consequent on the above-mentioned movements, and reckoning the troops that were previously here, the forces in and about Peking now appear to be as follows:—

						Approximate Strength.	
Imperial Guards Division. The bulk of the division (less two "yings" said to be at the Western Tombs) at Hai-tien (about 4 miles north-west of Peking)—							
1 regiment of infantry	..	..	..	..	..	8,000	
1 squadron of cavalry in the Imperial city	..	..	..	..	..		
1st (Manchu) Division. At the Pei-yuan—							
1 regiment infantry	..	..	..	..	..	3,000	
7 batteries artillery	..	..	..	..	..		
1 (?) squadron cavalry	..	..	..	..	..		
2 companies engineers	..	..	..	..	..		
2 companies transport	..	..	..	..	..		
(The remainder of the division is away, either on the lines of communication of the "1st Army" or with the force sent up to Kalgan and beyond.)							
2nd Division—							
1 battalion of the 8th Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	500	
3rd Division—							
9th Infantry Regiment	..	..	..	..	..	7,300	
10th Infantry Regiment	..	..	..	..	..		
12th Infantry Regiment	..	..	..	..	..		
2 battalions 3rd Artillery	..	..	..	..	..		
2 squadrons 3rd Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..		
3 companies 3rd Engineer Battalion	..	..	..	..	..		
A portion of 3rd Transport Battalion	..	..	..	..	..		
6th Division—							
1 squadron 6th Cavalry Regiment	..	..	..	..	..	200	
<i>Old Style Troops and Police.</i>							
"Wu Wei Tso Chün"—						Approximate Strength.	
In Peking—							
6 infantry "yings" (battalions)	..	..	..	..	..	6,000	
In the Nan-yuan—							
2 infantry "ying" (battalions)	..	..	..	..	..		
2 batteries (of 1st Artillery Battalion)	..	..	..	..	..		
1 battalion of new gunners (but not yet provided with guns)	..	..	..	..	..		
½ squadron of new cavalry	..	..	..	..	..		
At Tung-chou—							
4 infantry "yings" (bodyguard)	..	..	..	..	..	2,000	
2 batteries (one of 1st and one of 2nd Artillery Battalions)	..	..	..	..	..		
1 troop cavalry	..	..	..	..	..		
"Wu Wei Yu Chün"—							
5 (new) infantry "yings"	..	..	..	..	..	2,000	
"Huai Chün" (Chih-li provincial troops). In Nan-yuan.	1	squadron	..	..	..	200	
"Pu Chün" (Manchu) 3 "yings"	..	..	..	..	..	1,200	
Police (Manchu)	..	..	..	..	(about)	5,000	
Total						33,400	

Of these 33,000 (odd) troops, some 19,000 are Chinese, and only 14,000 Manchu, these latter including some 5,000 only of the Imperial Guard Division (the whole of the 4th Infantry Regiment of the guards and the bulk of the engineer and transport battalions, and part of the guards artillery, being Chinese), the 1st Division, the "Pu Chün," and the police.

Thus the Manchu troops are already greatly outnumbered in and about Peking.

It is significant that the last day or two a leaflet has been distributed in the streets, emanating ostensibly from the Imperial Guards Division, stating that of late rumours have been circulated by ill-disposed persons for their own ends, that the men of the guards are animated by sentiments of hostility towards the Chinese troops, that this is entirely false, that they are all comrades in arms, and that, mindful of the miseries that have been brought upon the central provinces by civil war, the guards are determined that, so far as it rests with them, there shall be no disturbance of the peace of the capital, &c.

All accounts from the "1st Army" tend to show that their fighting spirit has been entirely broken by the way they have been trifled with from Peking. The severe test imposed upon them of making them retire from positions won by hard fighting, coupled with the "loss of face" involved in submitting to the breach of faith committed by their opponents in reoccupying (in defiance of the agreement) the section of railway given up them, would have sufficed to destroy the *moral* of almost any troops. Small wonder, then, if they are disinclined to fight further for authorities who have so little regard for them.

Besides the movements of troops to Peking mentioned above, there have been other moves from Hu-pei and Ho-nan towards Peking, viz., on the 25th January two of the machine-gun companies with the "1st Army" came up to Pao-ting-fu.

On the 24th January a large batch of new recruits from Chêng-ting-fu arrived at Pao-ting-fu.

At Pao-ting-fu a new battalion for the guards is being enlisted, but they are not to come on at present to Peking.

As regards Chih-li province, therefore, the indications point to the likelihood of a peaceful settlement, which the Empress Dowager, moreover, is said to have decided on. The irreconcilable elements whence trouble may still be expected are the troops of General Chang Hsün at Hsü-chou-fu (in Kiang-pei) and the Manchurian "Hsün Fung Tui" (provincial troops) under the ex-robber chiefs, Chang Tso Lin and Fêng, who have proclaimed their intention of marching on Peking should the Emperor abdicate and a republic be established. The Viceroy, Chao Erh Hsun, also appears lately to have hardened his heart against the revolutionaries, embittered possibly by the recent murder of his brother, Chao Erh Fêng, the Viceroy of Szechuan, by them.

M. E. WILLOUGHBY, *Military Attaché.*

*Peking, February 2, 1912.*

No. 118.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 8, 1912.*

SINCE I wrote my despatch of the 6th January, I have received several further despatches from the acting British consul at Chungking reporting on events in the south and south-west of Szechuan.

The situation in that province, where chaos may be said to have reigned ever since the railway outbreak early in September, is now further complicated by the establishment of three or four independent Governments, notably those of Chengtu, Luchou, and Chungking. The country districts are kept in a state of terror by the depredations of secret societies and marauders, either acting under the cloak of the Railway League or throwing off all disguise and plundering at their pleasure in bands of from 10 to 1,000 strong. In addition to all this uproar a state of war exists between the military Governments of Chengtu and Yünnan-fu.

Chungking itself, where trouble has been constantly expected, has fortunately so far remained quiet, and Mr. Brown has been able to render good service in assisting the passage of refugees from up-river stations. One such party, composed of Messrs. Stericker and Rowntree, of the British-American Tobacco Company, who left Chengtu on the 27th November, were fired upon by Government troops at Ho Chiang, probably

because they were flying the revolutionary flag. They were also challenged and held up at several other places on the river, but eventually reached Chungking safely. They reported that though the revolutionary forces held Suifu, Chiating, and Luchou they were unable to exercise any authority over the surrounding districts.

In these circumstances it seemed desirable to do what was possible to provide an escort for a party of Canadian missionaries, who were known to be following the same route, and, at Mr. Brown's request, Lieutenant-Commander Marryat proceeded, at some risk owing to the difficulty of navigating the Upper Yang-tsze at this season of shallow water, to Li Ch'ang Chen, some 20 miles below Suifu, where he embarked the party in His Majesty's ship "Teal," and returned with them to Chungking on the 15th December. The leader of this party was a Mr. James Neave, but no other names are mentioned. The acting British consul at Chungking states that the situation of the refugees was unquestionably a very precarious one, and that he cannot speak too highly of Lieutenant Marryat's action in proceeding to their rescue over an almost impassable stretch of river. I have brought this favourable report to the notice of the commander-in-chief.

On the 12th December Mr. Brown received a letter from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu, written on the 5th December, and stating that the situation in the city was extremely critical. The Hsun Fang Tui (provincial troops) and Lu Chun (regular troops) were in a state of great tension. The streets were full of armed soldiers wandering about without any semblance of discipline. The Government, under the presidency of P'u, was already beginning to suffer from internal divisions. The Ko Ming Tang party was dissatisfied with the Government. Many robber chiefs, so-called T'ung Chih Hui (Railway League) leaders, were in the city with armed followers, looking for rewards for their services to the cause; and anarchy and robbery were rife in the north.

Mr. Wilkinson therefore proposed to send all the women and children and inexperienced missionaries out of Chengtu, and expressed the hope that the senior naval officer would be able to send a gun-boat to Suifu to await the arrival of the party. The river had, however, been falling steadily, and Lieutenant-Commander Marryat reported that it was impossible for a gun-boat to get even as far as Luchou. Mr. Brown accordingly applied to the revolutionary Government at Chungking for assistance, and they willingly consented to do their best. The steam-ship "Shutung" was, they said, to proceed to Ho Chiang and Luchou with troops to suppress the robber bands in those districts, and if the vessel were still at Luchou when the fugitives arrived there she would have orders to bring them down. Mr. Wilkinson contrived to get this large party, numbering 149 persons in all, out of Chengtu, on the 12th and 13th December, and the enclosed despatch from Mr. Brown of the 28th December reports their arrival at Chungking.

The continued and increasing disorder in the province at length compelled Mr. Brown to issue a circular on the 17th December, advising all British subjects who were no longer in communication with His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu to leave for the coast at once, and again warning all those residing in Chungking native city that he could not accept responsibility for protecting them where they were.

The two despatches from the acting British consul, which I have the honour to enclose, indicate that there was no improvement at the end of the year, either at Chungking or in other parts of the province. Whether the more recent events in the provincial capital, reported to you direct by Mr. Wilkinson, will ultimately conduce to the restoration of order it is impossible to say. The execution of Chao Erhfeng, whose military achievements in Thibet and the Marches were the pride of his countrymen but a few short months ago, does not seem to me likely to have much effect in reconciling the factions which are striving for the mastery in Szechuan.

For the space of about four weeks I could obtain no reply to telegrams which I sent to His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu through Ichang for transmission by courier. This ominous silence has, I am glad to say, at length been broken, and I have to-day received a telegram from Mr. Wilkinson, dated the 27th January, which states that Chengtu is quiet and all well.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

## Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

*Acting Consul Brown to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chungking, December 18, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report on the further progress of disorder in this province.

Information has just reached me from Sui Ting-fu that, while the local missionaries are uninjured, the Church Mission's hill house has been wrecked and the new girls' school burnt.

In view of the seriousness of the situation I yesterday issued a circular warning British subjects resident in the interior of Ch'uan Tung circuit that they should at once leave for the coast, and that all women and children should be sent away without delay by the safest route. In case British subjects within the jurisdiction of His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu were not in direct communication with Mr. Wilkinson, I have addressed this circular to them also.

In spite of Mr. Wilkinson's warning that no unmarried ladies should be left alone in the interior, it appears that there are still unmarried ladies residing without male protection in the Church Mission stations at Nan Pu, Kuang Yuan, Pa Chou, and Yin Shan. At present every land route is, as I have pointed out before, beset by robbers, and the waterways to Chungking alone remain comparatively safe. How long these will remain open it is at present impossible to say, but I hope that the ladies in question will arrive here before it is too late.

Chungking city is in a state of turmoil. Grave discord exists in the Government, and fighting is expected to break out at any moment. A proclamation was yesterday issued warning the people to keep off the streets if fighting took place in the city. The local levies want guns; the Kweichou troops demand money, and are clamouring for it. The river police force, whose commanders were recently treacherously executed by the military administration, is still in existence, and is only waiting its chance to take revenge.

The Ko Lao Hui (secret society) men are in greater numbers than before, and are hobnobbing with the soldiers. The 300 ex-Hsun Fang, now brigands, are still in the mint with their arms, where they have been joined by some 200 of the "Kan Ssu" or "Death or Victory" brigade, all of whom are said to be robbers from other districts. Four military leaders, conspirators against the Government, were arrested to-day and at once shot. This has produced a degree of temporary calm, but the outlook is grave, and I have again warned British subjects residing in Chungking that the gun-boats cannot afford them adequate protection so long as they remain within the city, and that they should therefore either proceed down river or engage boats and anchor in the immediate vicinity of the gun-boats. I have pointed out to them that this office will not accept responsibility for those who deliberately elect to disregard this instruction.

I have, &amp;c.

W. R. BROWN.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 118.

*Acting Consul Brown to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chungking, December 28, 1911.*

I REGRET to report that the local situation shows no sign of improvement. After the receipt of the news of the disturbance in Chengtu preparations were at once made for the dispatch of an expedition to the capital, ostensibly to restore order in the city and neighbourhood, but in reality to seize the capital in the interest of the so-called Szechuanese military administration of Chungking, whose youthful administrator, Chang P'ei-chio, cherishes the ambition of becoming the supreme lord of Szechuan.

I was yesterday informed by the head of the police department that Hsia Chih-shih, the assistant military administrator, would leave to-day for Chengtu with a force of 10,000 men, composed of contingents from Kueichou, Yünnan, and Hunan provinces, in addition to the local troops. I am not in a position to verify this figure, but there is no doubt that the expedition is on a large scale. Some 1,000 to 2,000 Kueichou Lu Chun troops, who recently arrived here, have proceeded towards Chengtu, and will be joined *en route* by a body of Yünnanese regulars, 2,000 to 3,000 strong, who have already arrived at Suifu, where they have occupied the town preparatory to taking part in that



concerted move on the capital. The advance guard, 300 men of a Hunanese force, reached Chungking last week, and at once pushed on along the Chengtu road.

This evening, however, I learn that the local soldiers, who were under orders to leave this morning, have refused to start. The authorities have refused a demand for a bonus of three months' pay made by the local Hsun Fang troops, and the latter are now on the verge of mutiny. These men are believed to be in communication with the riotous Chengtu Hsun Fang troops, some of whom are reported to have already reached this city.

To complicate the situation still further, several boat-loads of Railway League men are now outside the city, and the presence of robber chiefs within the walls is strongly suspected. The ranks of the local levies are full of Ko Lao Hui, or secret society men, all of whom bear resentment against the present military administration on account of the treacherous execution of their colonel, a prominent member of their society, and they are ready to join in any demonstration against the Government. It is to be hoped that such demonstration will not take the form of an attack on the foreign consulates and missions in the hope of discrediting the administration in the eyes of the foreigners. It will be remembered that some such hostile movement against us on the part of the river police was frustrated some weeks ago by the prompt action of the military authorities.

The party of foreign refugees who left Chengtu on the 12th December arrived here safely on the 26th. They had been fired on by the Government troops besieged in Ho Chiang Hsien, but had fortunately managed to run the gauntlet with but one man, a Chinese boatman, wounded. Most of the British members of the party will leave for the coast as soon as arrangements can be made for their departure. I have strongly urged them to take this course while the river is still comparatively free from danger, as I fear that any outbreak of trouble at Chungking will result in piracy and general lawlessness along the river to Ichang. Should this condition ever arise, it will be impossible for unescorted parties of foreigners to proceed to the coast, and, owing to the difficulties of navigation during the winter months, His Majesty's gun-boats are unable to afford them any assistance.

That serious trouble in the city is expected by the merchants was shown to-day at the meeting of the local chamber of commerce, when resolutions were passed declaring that each shopkeeper should at once provide himself with four baskets of quicklime for use against the looters, and that barricades of furniture should be erected on the streets on the outbreak of trouble in order to impede the progress of the soldiers.

Conditions in other parts of the province are no better. The Friends' Mission at T'ung Chuan Fu reports that that town is surrounded by large numbers of Hsun Fang troops from Chengtu, who are demanding silver from the inhabitants. Women and girls are being kidnapped indiscriminately, and a reign of terror prevails in the district.

Bishop Cassels, accompanied by a party of ladies and children, has to-day arrived from Pao Ning Fu. A member of his party reports that the local garrison recently revolted and fired on the city. Numbers of the Chengtu troops have entered the Pao Ning district laden with rifles, ammunition, and silver. Their good fortune is a direct incitement to the local soldiers, and is producing a very bad effect. Bands of robbers are operating everywhere.

Wang Fan-tai, formerly Governor-General *ad interim* of Szechuan, is now on his way to Pao Ning Fu, where he will be set up as ruler of Northern Szechuan.

I have, &c.

W. R. BROWN.

No. 119.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, March 1, 1912.*

RIOTS in Peking.

About 8 o'clock yesterday evening the troops of the third division, which are Yuan Shih-kai's own men, broke out and indiscriminately looted and burnt a large section of the Tartar city, which is now in ruins. Intermittent firing continued all through the night, the object being to intimidate the inhabitants and thus facilitate

the work of plunder, and there seems to have been little loss of life. Cause of the rising said to be reduction of pay.

Foreigners suffered no harm, and British subjects are safe within the legation quarter. Yuan Shih-kai is safe, and this morning the city is quiet again.

No. 120.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, March 1, 1912.*

RIOTS in Peking.

My telegram of to-day.

Extent of damage done in the Tartar city proves on further examination to be very much less than was supposed at first.

No. 121.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, March 1, 1912.*

RIOTS in Peking.

My telegrams of to-day.

Yuan Shih-kai says that he hopes to be able to control the situation with the remaining troops, whom he believes to be trustworthy, the outbreak having been practically confined to two regiments of the third division.

No. 122.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, January 31, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, on the subject of the situation in Tengyueh.

I have, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 122.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, January 30, 1912.*

I HAD the honour to report to you by telegraph that the determination of the local authorities to prevent the taotai appointed by the provincial authorities to be in charge of the Western Circuit from coming to Tengyueh had given rise to a serious situation which might involve actual hostilities in the immediate neighbourhood.

For this state of affairs the responsibility rested chiefly with Ch'ên Tien-hsing, who was the leader of the Talifu expedition which resulted so disastrously. The provincial authorities appear to have decided to hold him, and not Chang Wên-kuang, responsible for the Talifu affair, and it is stated that orders were sent to Chang for his execution. These orders it was not within Chang's power to carry out, as Ch'ên was still at the head of the troops he had led back from Tali and kept a guard of 300 men in the yamên he occupied. Ch'ên thus had ample warning of the intentions towards himself, entertained by the higher authorities, and took measures to oppose their entrance into Tengyueh. He recalled a number of troops from Yungchang and posted them at Kan-an Chai, a village a few miles distant on the hills which bound the Tengyueh plain in the direction of Talifu. Li Kên-yuan's answer to this move was to bring with him from Talifu a body of 2,000 men, who were followed two days later by Chao Fan, the taotai, with another 1,000.

In spite of his experience in the earlier conflict with the Tali forces, and the ridiculous disproportion between the number and equipment of the troops at his disposal

and those of the approaching army, Ch'ên Tien-hsing maintained his intention of offering resistance until Li Kên-yuan was actually at Yungchang-fu. Up to the morning of the 27th there seemed no probability that hostilities would be averted, but on that date, to my great relief, I received a call from the Frontier Deputy Chao, with whom I had had some previous conversation on the subject, and who now informed me that Ch'ên had at last allowed himself to be persuaded to leave Tengyueh. He had decided to go to Hupei, and being for obvious reasons unable to go by the land route, requested that he might be supplied with a passport to enable him to travel through Burmah and take the sea route. With this request I very readily complied, as his continued residence in Tengyueh must have led to serious trouble, while his departure would involve no greater inconvenience than the disappointment of those who wanted his head, and at the same time would render unnecessary the advance of a large body of troops.

I did not, however, feel quite confident that the danger was over until Ch'ên Tien-hsing actually left Tengyueh, and therefore did not inform you of the changed situation until the 29th January when he started for Burmah.

On the same day, Chang Wên-kuang left for the Salween Bridge, on the Yungchang road, to meet Li Kên-yuan and Chao Fan. On their arrival the civil functions of Chang will cease.

The commissioner of customs having informed me that he had been authorised by the inspector-general to come up and consult with the new authorities as to the replacing of the customs on a proper basis, and requested me to inform him when the situation would admit of his doing so, I telegraphed on the 28th January asking him to come, and trust that he is now well on the way. Though I have missed no opportunity of urging the recall of the commissioner, it was a waste of breath during the régime of Chang Wên-kuang, who has, I hear, gone so far as to state his intention of maintaining the existing arrangement in perpetuity. Chao Fan will, I trust, have a less parochial view of the functions of the customs, and a less complete ignorance of the nature of international engagements.

I have, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

No. 123.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, March 2, 1912.*

T'ANG SHAO-YI wrote me this morning saying that situation was becoming most serious and suggesting that I should call a meeting of the diplomatic body to devise measures for protection of capital.

At meeting held this afternoon it was decided to establish wireless telegraphic communication with Taku, to increase legation guards by 1,000 men drawn from Tien-tsin, and to parade principal streets daily with strong contingents of foreign troops. It was considered this last measure would be welcomed by people, and might have a reassuring effect.

The mutinous troops who pillaged Peking on 28th February proceeded to Pao-ting-fu and committed similar excesses there, involving, it is reported, destruction of foreign property. To prevent their return here orders have been given for breaking railway.

No. 124.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, March 3, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from Tien-tsin:—

“Looting and burning by soldiers and mob in native city last night. Much damage done. Quiet this morning, but situation very grave. Police exercised but little control. German doctor, Schreyer, shot dead as he was driving past scene of disturbance.”

No. 125.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Chengtu, January 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting on the efforts being made by the present Chengtu Government to avert a conflict with the Yünnan and Kueichou troops now in Szechuan,

I have, &amp;c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure in No. 125.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Chengtu, January 20, 1912.*

THE external difficulties which confronted the Chengtu Military Government at the beginning of this month were mainly four: the rivalry of the Chungking Military Government, the expected advance from Yachou on Chengtu of the acting-warden of the marches, a possible peril from the Imperialists in Kansu, and the occupation of Tzu-liu-ching, Sui Fu, and Ch'ien-wei by troops from Yünnan and Kueichou.

The first of these difficulties is, it would seem, in process of solution; the second has been effectually solved by the recapture of Yachou and the flight (some say the arrest) of Fu Sung-mu. With regard to the third, there is talk of the appointment of a general officer to "pei fa," to strike at the north—in other words, of a military expedition against Kansu. The fourth is apparently now to be settled in conjunction with the Chungking Government.

Mr. Brown, writing on the 8th instant, says:—

"The administrator" ("tu-tu," president) "Chang (Lieh-wu) leaves to-day or to-morrow for Sui Fu, where trouble has broken out between the Yünnan troops, invited to take part in the march on Chengtu, and the T'ung Chih Hui. Chang is going there to arrange matters. Thence he will proceed to Tzu-liu-ching and the neighbourhood, which is very disturbed by robbers."

To-day's "Chün-sheng Pao" contains a report to the Chengtu president from the conciliator ("hsüan-wei shih") of the South Riding, Hung Ping-ju. He found (at Chiating, it would seem) that rumours were rife as to the intentions of the Yünnan contingent. Some believed that they designed to annex portions of Szechuan territory, notably Nan-ch'i and P'ing-shan (above and below Sui Fu), others, that they were opposed to the Han Government; but all these rumours originated from leaguers who had been defeated by the men from Yünnan.

On the 7th January the conciliator arrived at Ch'ien-wei, where he had an interview with Chang K'ai-ju, the commandant of the Yünnan detachment. The latter said that the Yünnan troops set out to secure the independence of Szechuan, and it was not until they reached Sui Fu that they learned that things were settled. At Sui Fu they found a large and disorderly crowd of men, styling themselves T'ung Chih Hui (leaguers), who were troubling the public peace. These they drove out, ordering them to disperse. The whole of the southern circuit of Szechuan, said the commandant, was overrun by pretended leaguers and brigands, whom it was necessary to put down, lest the general situation should be endangered. Had not Sun Wen (Sun Yat Sen) declared that unless peace was restored within six months China might be partitioned by the Powers? Moreover, the Shu Chün Cheng Fu (the Chungking Military Government) had twice telegraphed, asking for help for Szechuan, and the Szechuanese residents in Yünnan had subscribed money, and had urgently appealed to the Yünnan Government for aid. The eighteen provinces had been notified, and if Yünnan really entertained the barbarous idea of annexation, would not those provinces intervene by force? Once matters are settled in Szechuan, he would lead his men back to their homes.

The conciliator, commenting on this, remarks that the sentiments are excellent; but do not altogether explain why the leader of the Yünnan forces had appointed one P'eng Ho-shu to be home magistrate at Sui Fu. The right of appointment rests with the Government, and he suggests that some able official be now sent to take over this

post. The magistracy at Ch'ien-wei is also vacant, and Wang Huai-hsüan is recommended by the conciliator. The Yünnan troops are, it is true, still garrisoning the town, but they are not interfering with its civil governance.

He added details of the strength of the Yünnan contingent, which he estimates at between 5,000 and 6,000 men. It is divided into two columns, under Han Kuo-ch'ao as commander-in-chief. The detachment sent to Ch'ien-wei consists of nine battalions of infantry, with two mountain and two machine guns, and two battalions of engineers—1,200 men in all. After resting a few days at Ch'ien-wei, they propose to go on to Chiating, and thence perhaps to Chengtu. The conciliator urges the Chengtu Government to send a special envoy at once to treat with their commander-in-chief, so as to stop his advance. He hopes that, at the same time, a force will be dispatched along various routes to clear the country of brigands, so as to remove all excuse for interference by others. Those of the Tung Chih Hui, who have come to Chengtu with muskets, might be taken into service; those not properly armed should be dispersed, but not allowed to return and trouble their neighbourhood.

In the Lower South Riding (presumably Tzu-liu-ching) there must be several hundreds, he observes, who, under the name of leaguers, are guilty of conduct far from correct. These men, too, some measures must be taken to suppress, that the people be no longer trodden under foot.

On his way hither along the main road from Chungking viâ Tzuchou to Chengtu (7th–17th January), Mr. Ritchie, the provincial postmaster, met a large body of troops marching south, who, he learnt, were intended to support the remonstrances of the Chengtu Government against the progress northwards of the Yünnan and Kueichou men. If these last are satisfied with the sums they have, it is said, exacted from the notables and merchants of Tzu-liu-ching and Sui Fu, and with a promise of continued subsidies from Szechuan, they may be persuaded to return home; otherwise, further fighting would seem to be inevitable.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

No. 126.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 4th ultimo, I transmit herewith copies of further despatches from His Majesty's consul at Nanking on the subject of the revolutionary movement at that port. These interesting reports continue the narrative of the series of events which are passing daily at the provisional capital of the self-constituted new republic, and will form a useful record for purposes of reference.

Those under review in the present despatch describe the state of affairs on the termination of the sittings referred to in previous despatches of the delegates from the thirteen revolutionary provinces, whose final act was to appoint Li Yuan Hung commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces with Huang Hsing as second in command, thus reversing the previous decision of the party in Shanghai who had given the higher appointment to Huang Hsing. I may mention, in passing, that Li Yuan Hung has the reputation in this country as second only to Yuan Shih-kai as a man of character and determination, and should anything untoward befall the latter, it is thought that Li might very possibly be called upon to assume the mantle of Yuan.

The official reason given for the appointment of Li as commander-in-chief was that the present peace negotiations having been entered into by Yuan Shih-kai with him, it would never have done at that stage to place anyone over his head. General Li has remained at Wuchang in command of the Hupeh army and Huang Hsing has assumed command of the forces at Nanking.

With the arrival of Dr. Sun Yat Sen at Nanking on the 1st January, the proceedings of the party entered upon a new phase. Dr. Sun, as I have previously stated, had been elected on the 29th December last, by twelve votes to one, provisional President of the revolutionary republic, at a special meeting of the late conference of delegates from the revolutionary provinces.

On taking his oath of office he is reported to have sworn that he would rid China of the Manchu dynasty, and resign the Presidency as soon as a proper republican Government was formed and recognised by foreign Powers. The offer of the

Presidential chair has since been repeatedly made to Yuan Shih-kai, and there is no doubt that it will be accepted as soon as the abdication of the Manchus is officially announced.

The feature of the celebration of the election of Dr. Sun was the arbitrary action of the Chekiang troops, who, without official notice or otherwise, paraded the streets of Nanking armed with shears, with which they cut off the queues of all the Chinese still wearing them. No distinctions were made, queues of old and young, rich and poor, all sharing the same fate.

The queue is an institution which students of Chinese history pretend dates back to the ancient Hsung-nu (B.C. 200-A.D. 200) and their immediate descendants the Turks (A.D. 500-800), who all wore plaited hair. Coming however to more modern times, the wearing of the queue is more directly traceable to the Manchus, who, on driving out the Ming dynasty, had no way of clearly differentiating the "faithful" or renegade Chinese, who assisted them in various ways, beyond that of making them adopt the Manchu dress and pigtail, instead of the complicated "topknots" and puffy sleeves, petticoats, &c., of the Mings. In 1644, the regent in charge of the Manchu boy Emperor decreed that, under pain of death, all Chinese being then "subjects" must adopt the Manchu queue and also shave the front of the head entirely, except during periods of mourning.

The feeling amongst the people of Nanking was very bitter over the outrage of the Chekiang troops, who added to their iniquity by a house to house search for citizens who had evaded their vigilance. For some time previously, all Chinese in South China had removed their queues in token of adhesion to the revolutionary party, and the inhabitants of Nanking were justly indignant at being given no opportunity of escaping the humiliation involved on them in public. They were already anything but satisfied with their experience up to date of revolutionary Government, and the arbitrary method of raising funds by means of forced loans and compulsory levies from merchants, by which all the population was affected, coming simultaneously with the queue-cutting campaign, greatly increased the odium into which the cause had fallen in that city. The masses are beginning to realise that the vista of immunity from all taxation and of other popular illusions of prosperity to be brought about by the new Millennium has no foundation in fact, and in many instances they are beginning to regret the sympathy and support they have given to the revolutionary movement.

The proclamation read by Dr. Sun at his inauguration explained the aim and policy of the republic which is to federate the revolutionary provinces under a common central Government, and ensure thereby unity of administration in both civil and military affairs. It also enumerated various reforms which it is proposed to introduce, and concluded with an expression of thanks to the foreign Powers for their neutrality during the crisis, and sympathy with the revolutionary cause, and a declaration of the earnest intention of the new Government to carry on its duties so as to win speedily the rights of a civilised State.

The 1st January was specially chosen for the inauguration of the President in order that the date of the commencement of the republic should coincide with that of the foreign year, and provide the Government with a valid excuse for adopting the Gregorian calendar, a change which, as Mr. Wilkinson observes, however desirable, conflicts with Chinese sentiment and is bound to be unpopular with the mass of the people.

The first questions to engage the attention of the Cabinet nominated by the President, and subsequently approved by the conference of revolutionary delegates, have been how to obtain funds to carry on the Government, and the preservation of order in cities, such as Nanking, in which the soldiery have got considerably out of hand. The President has presided at all the Cabinet meetings, but otherwise his chief occupation appears to have been the issuing of proclamations and manifestos of various descriptions, with the main object, no doubt, of making the establishment of the new Government and his own office as widely known as possible.

The result of the deliberations of the Cabinet is not yet known, but it is understood that a form of constitution has been drafted on the model of that of the United States. In the meanwhile, lack of funds is preventing any progress being made with the reorganisation of the civil administration, and it seems probable that until a permanent Government is established, martial law will continue to prevail throughout the whole of republican China.

Mr. Wilkinson's despatches describe how Yuan Shih-kai has been invited by the provisional President, on the abdication of the Manchu Government, to proceed to Nanking and take over the Presidency, and the varying conditions to this offer which have been made from time to time. It seems clear that the eventual assumption by the

Premier of the Presidency is the only possible way in which peace and order can be restored in China.

On the 28th of January, Dr. Sun formally opened the first national convention of the provisional republic of China. Seventeen out of the nineteen provinces of China proper were represented, the two exceptions being Shantung and Kansu. The convention would, however, appear to be national only in so far that every province, with the exceptions named, has its delegates, but as the delegates are the nominees of either the provincial Governor, or, where there are none, of the Government at Nanking, it cannot be said to be representative of the people. The opening of the new convention was preceded by the dissolution of the old conference of delegates which elected Dr. Sun as President. The difference between the two assemblies is, however, not a very great one, and it is understood that it is by the new convention that the revolutionaries propose that the question of the form of government to be adopted in China shall be decided.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 126.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, December 27, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report that the conference of delegates from the thirteen revolutionary provinces has terminated its sittings. Its final act was to appoint Li Yuan Hung general-in-chief of the revolutionary forces, with Huang Hsing as second in command, thus reversing the decision of the heads of the party in Shanghai, who quite recently gave the higher appointment to Huang Hsing. The official reason given for Li Yuan Hung's appointment is that, the present peace negotiations having been entered into by Yuan Shih-kai with him, and Wu Ting-fang being his representative in them, it would never have done at the present stage to place anyone else over his head. As far as I can learn, these appointments were the only business which the conference succeeded in putting through.

The preparations for war on a grand scale that are being made by the revolutionaries are not a cheerful augury for peace. The number of troops that have been sent up north from Nanking, and are now concentrating at Linhuaikuan and Pengpu, must already well exceed 10,000 men, of whom the greater part have left here since the armistice was declared. Only a small proportion of these troops have travelled up by railway. Some have marched up, but the majority appear to have been shipped to Pengpu in junks by way of the Grand Canal. As General Chang is also being continually reinforced, some 800 men having arrived at Hsüchowfu from the north on the 25th instant, in numbers the rival armies are probably well matched, but in point of discipline and general appearance the revolutionary levies compare very unfavourably with the troops General Chang took away with him.

Huang Hsing arrived here yesterday to assume supreme command of the revolutionary forces at Nanking, General Li Yuan Hung remaining at Wuchang in command of the Hupei army. It is not expected that Huang Hsing will proceed in person to the front, but he will act rather as Minister of War, leaving the conduct of the troops in the field to General Hsü. The Nanking army consists, I am told, of three divisions, each numbering 7,000 men. The difficulty with the Chekiang troops, who refused to take the field during the cold weather, has been satisfactorily settled. They are to guard the lines of communication.

The local war chest has been replenished within the last week by a forced levy of 200,000 taels from the merchants of Nanking. It has caused a considerable revulsion of feeling in favour of the old régime.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 126.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, January 2, 1912.*

IN my despatch of the 27th ultimo I informed you that the conference of delegates from the revolutionary provinces, which had been sitting here for the

previous fortnight, had been dissolved. On Friday last, however, the 29th ultimo, the members were summoned to a special meeting to appoint a Provisional President of the Revolutionary Republic. The official candidate was Dr. Sun Wen, who was elected to the post by twelve votes to one, the only opposition coming from the delegate for Chekiang, who lent some variety to the proceedings by voting for General Huang Hsing. Dr. Sun Wen arrived in Nanking by special train yesterday afternoon, and took up his quarters at the Viceroy's yamên. Great preparations had been made to meet him, the whole of the road from the railway station to the yamên, a distance of 6 miles, being lined with troops, but instead of alighting from the train and driving up, the new President had his car shunted on to the city line, and came up to the yamên by train. This change in the programme was made at the last moment, there being some reason to fear that a bomb might be thrown at him. Last night the ceremony of inaugurating him as Provisional President took place. It is said that in his oath of office he swore to rid China of the Manchu dynasty; also that he would resign the presidency as soon as a proper republican Government was formed and recognised by the foreign Powers, which seems to confirm the general opinion that he is only keeping the place warm for Yuan Shih-kai. A proclamation announcing his appointment and the policy of his Government is to be issued by the new President to-day.

The election of Dr. Sun Wen as Provisional President was celebrated by the Chekiang troops quartered in Nanking in characteristic fashion. Bands of them paraded the principal streets during the day armed with shears, with which they cut off the queues of all the Chinese still wearing them that they came across. No distinctions were made, the queues of old and young, rich and poor, all sharing the same fate. The feeling amongst the people here is very bitter indeed over this outrage. As they justly complain, no notice, official or otherwise, was given them to have their queues removed, so that they were taken entirely by surprise, and given no opportunity of escaping the humiliation which their forcible removal by soldiers in public amidst the jeers of onlookers involved on the victims. I am told that the military authorities are as indignant as everyone else at the conduct of the Chekiang troops, but they dare not restrain, much less punish, the offenders, who are now adding to their iniquity in the eyes of the people by a house-to-house search for citizens who have evaded their vigilance. By this time, however, there must be very few men left in Nanking who still retain their queues, for, to escape the indignity of their removal *coram populo*, practically every male in the place has now cut his hair. Even young girls wear their hair coiled in a bun on the top of their heads instead of letting it hang as formerly in a plait down their backs.

The success of the compulsory levy of 200,000 taels from the mercantile community of Nanking referred to in my last report has encouraged the military authorities to devise further ingenious expedients for raising money from the public. They have now issued orders that all tenants of house property in this city are to pay their next three months' rent in advance to the military authorities, who will refund the amount to their landlords when order is again restored in the country and their finances permit. If possible, this forced loan is even more unpopular than the compulsory levy from merchants, for the whole population is affected by it, and, coming simultaneously with the queue-cutting campaign, it has greatly increased the odium into which the revolutionary cause has fallen in this city. I have spoken recently to several of the merchants and gentry of Nanking, and from not one of them have I heard a good word for the present régime. They one and all regret the sympathy and support they have given to the revolutionary movement.

There can be no doubt that the present state of affairs at Nanking is unsatisfactory from every point of view. Governor Ch'eng, of whom much was expected, has not spent more than three or four days in this city, of which he is the "tutu," since the place was taken over by the revolutionaries a month ago. It is said that his efforts to establish some form of civil Government have been so obstructed by the military that he has left the place in disgust, and will not return if he can help it. Within the last three weeks three provincial treasurers have been appointed and resigned. Nanking, in fact, is still under martial law, with the soldiers quite as much as their officers in control. I have already referred in previous reports to the turbulent behaviour of the Chekiang and Canton troops. Though less in evidence than either of the latter, I am told that the Soochow levies are an even greater plague to the inhabitants, for they are one and all thieves, and the numerous robberies in the city have in almost every case been traced to them. Amongst the places looted by these soldiers are such of the Government schools as were spared by General Chang Hsun's men. It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that trade, which on the first arrival of the revolutionaries



showed some signs of reviving, has come to an almost complete standstill, and that more people are leaving the place than coming to it. Not a single school in the city, I may mention, has reopened.

Within the last few days some 4,000 Cantonese troops have arrived at Nanking from Shanghai and have been quartered within the city. To make room for them, for the barracks are all overflowing, an equivalent number of Soochow and Chekiang troops have been moved out of Nanking, the latter to Pukow, the former back, I understand, to Soochow. The presence of so many troops from his own province should considerably strengthen the position of the new President.

On the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway everything appears to be quiet. Mr. Tuckey, who has just returned from a trip to Linhuaikuan, tells me there were between 7,000 and 8,000 troops there. The line had been destroyed for some miles between Pengpu and Kuchen, but no bridges had been blown up, although that over the Huai River had been mined for the purpose. An attempt by about 500 revolutionaries, commanded, it is said, by a Frenchman, to destroy the bridge at Kuchen had failed. Construction trains are now running regularly between Pukow and Linhuaikuan, Mr. Tuckey having succeeded in procuring a few additional cars. The line has been used recently to bring troops down from Linhuaikuan, but not to take men up.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 126.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, January 5, 1912.*

I HAVE been supplied with a copy of the proclamation read by Dr. Sun Wen at his inauguration here as Provisional President of the Chinese Revolutionary Republic. This document, which was issued and posted in Nanking yesterday, explains the aim and policy of the republic, which is to federate the revolutionary provinces under a common Central Government, and ensure thereby unity of administration in both civil and military affairs. It enumerates various reforms which it is proposed to introduce, and concludes with an expression of thanks to the foreign Powers for their neutrality during the crisis and sympathy with the revolutionary cause, and a declaration of the earnest intention of the new Government so to carry out its duties as to win speedily the rights of a civilised State.

The ceremonies which attended the arrival and inauguration of the new President are described at length in the Shanghai newspapers. They were arranged by the military authorities, the people of Nanking, who, as I have mentioned before, are anything but satisfied with their experience up to date of revolutionary government, taking no part, nor apparently any interest, therein. It is worthy of remark that amongst the lower classes here Dr. Sun Wen is commonly referred to as the new Emperor, the term President, which they do not understand, being merely regarded as a euphemism for the higher title.

The first of January was specially chosen for the inauguration of the President, so that the date of the commencement of the republic should coincide with that of the foreign year, and provide the Government with a valid excuse for adopting the Gregorian calendar, a change which, however desirable, conflicts with Chinese sentiment, and is bound, therefore, to be unpopular with the mass of the people.

The names of the Cabinet Ministers nominated by the President, and subsequently approved by the conference of revolutionary delegates, was published yesterday. The list had been given to me the previous day, but I delayed telegraphing it to you until the conference had confirmed the appointments. The new Ministers are :—

Vice-President, Li Huan Hung.  
 Minister of War, Huang Hsing.  
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wang Chung Hui.  
 Minister of Marine, Huang Chung Ying.  
 Minister of Justice, Wu Ting Fang.  
 Minister of Finance, Ch'en Chin T'ao.  
 Minister of Agriculture, Chang Chien.  
 Minister of the Interior, Ch'eng Tê Ch'üan.  
 Minister of Education, T'sai Yuan P'ei.  
 Minister of Communications, T'ang Shou Ch'ien.

Messrs. Huang Hsing, Wu Ting Fang, Ch'eng Tê Ch'üan, Chang Chien, and T'ang Shou Ch'ien are, of course, familiar names to you. Mr. Wang Chung Hui is a returned American student with a great reputation as a law expert. He has been acting as assistant delegate to Mr. Wu Ting Fang in the peace negotiations. Mr. Chen Chin T'ao is also a returned student from the United States. He was Vice-President of the Board of Finance in Yuan Shih-kai's Cabinet. Both he and Mr. Wang Chung Hui are Cantonese. Captain Huang Chung Ying, the Minister of Marine, is a native of Fukien. He has been in command of one of the smaller cruisers of the Peiyang fleet for some years.

Public opinion being inarticulate in Nanking, I am unable to say how these appointments are regarded by the people here. On the whole, however, there appears to be little fault to find with the President's selection, except, of course, that most of the new Ministers are totally without administrative experience.

The preparations that are going on for war show few signs yet of slacking off. It is true that no fresh troops have arrived quite recently, but drafts from the local garrison, which is estimated to number close upon 15,000 men, are being sent northwards almost daily. It is noticeable, however, that none of the Cantonese troops have been moved out of the city, the reason given me being that they lack the necessary equipment for a winter campaign, though my own impression is that no such campaign is intended. I hear that railway cars, borrowed from the Hangchow line, are being shipped to Pukow from Shanghai, and though no use has yet been made of them, their being sent there seems to show that, on the expiration of the armistice, the revolutionaries have every intention of making full use of the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway. It is difficult to get any news of General Chang, who controls the telegraph at Hsüchowfu, but the main body, at any rate, of his army has withdrawn thence over the Shantung border.

In Nanking the wealthy citizens continue to be blackmailed for contributions to the military chest, the usual method employed being to seal up their houses and threaten confiscation unless certain sums are forthcoming.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 4 in No. 126.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, January 11, 1912.*

THE Cabinet of the provisional republic has now been completed by the appointment of the following officials as Vice-Ministers :—

Vice-Minister of War, Chiang Tso Pin, Hupei.  
 Vice-Minister of Marine, T'ang Hsiang Ming, Hupei.  
 Vice-Minister of Justice, Lü Chih Yi, Yunnan.  
 Vice-Minister of Finance, Wang Hung Yu, Hupei.  
 Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wei Ch'en Tsu, Fukien.  
 Vice-Minister of the Interior, Chü Cheng, Hupei.  
 Vice-Minister of Education, Ching Yao Yueh, Shansi.  
 Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Ma Ho, Kwansi.  
 Vice-Minister of Communications, Yü Po Hsün, Shansi.

A further appointment announced is that of Chuang Yün K'uan as Tutu of Kiangsu in succession to Ch'eng Tê Ch'üan, now Minister of the Interior. I used to be well acquainted with the new military governor when I was at Wuchow, where in 1905 he was prefect and acting taotai. He is a man of exceptionally strong character. A name missing from the Cabinet is that of Mr. Wen Tsung Yao, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs until quite recently to Wu Ting Fang. He was appointed Minister of the Dependencies in the Cabinet, but the post was struck out by the conference of delegates on the ground that in the new China there would be no dependencies but only federated provinces.

With the exception of Mr. Ch'eng Tê Ch'üan, who is seriously ill at Shanghai, all the new Ministers have arrived at Nanking and are already hard at work. The first question to engage the attention of the Cabinet has been how to obtain funds to carry on the government. The present revenue of the revolutionary party is barely sufficient for their military requirements, and there is nothing to spare for other

purposes. Under the circumstances it has not taken the Cabinet very long to realise that, if an effective administration is to be organised and order evolved out of the chaos now prevailing in the revolutionary provinces, fresh sources of supply must be sought elsewhere and at once. Since a foreign loan is recognised to be out of the question, the decision arrived at by the Ministers has been to issue bonds for a domestic loan of 100,000,000 dollars bearing interest at 8 per cent. The proceeds of the loan, after providing for the immediate necessities of the Government, are to be devoted, it is announced, to the establishment of a new currency which is to be on a gold basis. The object with which this announcement has been made is no doubt to give confidence to possible subscribers, who, if they thought the money was to be squandered on military preparations, would be very chary about buying the bonds, and also, I imagine, to impress foreigners with the determination of the new Government to introduce thoroughgoing reforms. It is difficult, at any rate, to believe that the Ministers really think that the subscriptions will suffice even to meet the immediate expenses of the administration, though I am told that they are confident that the bonds will be eagerly taken up in South China and by Chinese abroad.

The only other question connected with the internal administration of the country which to my knowledge has been discussed by the Ministry is the preservation of order in cities such as Nanking, in which the soldiery have got considerably out of hand. To assist the police in carrying out their duties and especially to deal with military offenders a military gendarmerie is to be formed.

The President has presided at all the Cabinet meetings held, but otherwise his chief occupation has been issuing proclamations and manifestos of various descriptions, with the main object, no doubt, of making the establishment of the new Government and his own office as widely known as possible.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 5 in No. 126.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, January 20, 1912.*

THERE has been little to report since I last addressed you on the 11th instant. For the past week the Cabinet has been sitting jointly with the delegates from the revolutionary provinces discussing the constitution of the new republic. The result of their deliberations is not yet known, but it is understood that a form of constitution has been drafted consisting of forty articles, and that it is modelled on that of the United States. In the meanwhile, lack of funds is preventing any progress being made with the reorganisation of the civil administration either here at head-quarters or in the provinces, and it is probable now that, until a permanent Government is established, martial law will continue to prevail throughout the whole of republican China. As an illustration of the embarrassed condition of the Provisional Government, I have been told that the revenue available for administrative purposes is insufficient even to pay the salaries of the Ministers, the duties of most of whom are so entirely nominal that they are unprovided as yet with either offices or staffs.

The important task of raising money to meet the immediate needs of the administration has been entrusted to Mr. Ch'en Chin T'ao, the Minister of Finance, who is now trying to negotiate a foreign loan at Shanghai. The most valuable security which Mr. Ch'en Chin T'ao has to offer for a loan is the Hangchow-Ningpo Railway. The domestic bonds referred to in my despatch of the 11th instant are not yet on the market, but promises of subscriptions for a very large amount are alleged to have been already received from South China and the straits. It is difficult, however, to believe that the revenue expected from this source can be very great, or there would be less anxiety to raise money abroad.

The President has been chiefly occupied of late with the peace negotiations. He appears to be sanguine that a favourable settlement will be arrived at, and is prepared, I am told, to make greater concessions to that end than his party quite approve of. His position, from all accounts, is anything but a bed of roses, and an intrigue to oust him from the presidency has already been started.

The condition of affairs in Nanking is much the same as usual. To the great relief of the inhabitants, between 5,000 and 6,000 troops, mostly belonging to the Chekiang and Soochow contingents, have been moved out of the city over to the Pukow side of

the river, whence they are being sent up in batches by train to Linhuaikuan. It is hoped that with their departure looting will become less prevalent. Unfortunately some of the recently-arrived Cantonese regiments left in the city, now that they have found their bearings, are following in the footsteps of their fellow-warriors from Chekiang and making themselves extremely objectionable to everyone. The conduct of these soldiers has already been made the subject of a joint complaint by the consular body to the authorities, partly on account of their insulting behaviour in a few instances to foreigners, and partly because of their unpleasant habit of firing off their rifles in the air to the great danger of the public. The offenders in the former case have generally been men rather the worse for drink. It is noticeable that there is considerably more drinking amongst Chinese soldiers now than used formerly to be the case, one of the consequences, no doubt, of the abolition of opium.

The new year was officially celebrated here on the 15th instant. A public holiday was proclaimed, and the streets were gaily decorated with flags distributed to householders in honour of the occasion. In the afternoon a reception was held by the President, which, I understand, was well attended by the Republican officials, though no foreigner was present. The public generally took no notice at all of the event. The shops all remained open and people pursued their vocations just as usual.

The outlook for peace, which was excellent until a day or two ago, has suddenly become less bright. Only last week Yuan Shih-kai was invited by the President on the abdication of the Manchu Government to come to Nanking and take over the presidency. This offer has now been withdrawn, and the Premier has been informed that he cannot participate in the Republican Government until the republic has been recognised by the Powers and peace and harmony reign again in the provinces, which is like putting him off until the Greek calends. The revolutionaries also object very strongly to any Provisional Government being started at Peking, claiming that, if Yuan Shih-kai takes over the direction of affairs there, it must be under their orders.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

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Enclosure 6 in No. 126.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, January 24, 1912.*

IN my despatch of the 20th instant I mentioned that the outlook for peace had become less bright, owing to a sudden change of attitude on the part of the President here, who, after inviting Yuan Shih-kai to take over his office from him on the abdication of the dynasty, had apparently withdrawn his offer and framed a new set of terms which not only forbade the establishment of a Provisional Government or vice-regency at Peking, but excluded the Premier and the Manchus from any participation in the Provisional Government in Nanking. In the "North China Daily News" of this morning there is, however, an authorised statement by Dr. Sun Wen, from which it appears that it is in no way intended by the new terms to eliminate Yuan Shih-kai from the Government, but merely to postpone his appointment to the presidency until the republic is recognised by the foreign Powers, which, if there is no vice-regency at Peking, will, it is expected, be a matter only of a few days, but may otherwise be delayed for a considerable period, during which Yuan Shih-kai, if not genuinely resigned to a republican form of Government, may find an opportunity "to select his own delegates or to act otherwise than under the provisionally arranged plan for the Government of the Provisional Republic of China." The same paper also publishes a translation of a telegram, dated the 22nd instant, from Dr. Sun Wen to Wu Ting Fang, in which he explains the conditions under which, after the abdication, he will hand over the presidency to Yuan Shih-kai, his aim being to ensure that the Premier genuinely severs his connection with the Manchu Government and becomes a loyal citizen of the republic. The conditions laid down by Dr. Sun Wen, assuming, of course, the voluntary abdication of the Emperor, are by no means impossible ones for Yuan Shih-kai to accept. The assumption by the Premier of the presidency appears to be the only possible way in which peace and order can be speedily restored in China.

For this last hitch in the negotiations a good deal of blame has been thrown on the President, which I cannot help thinking is quite unmerited. As I have mentioned before, his position is an extremely difficult one. The military and extremist sections of the revolutionary party, to the latter of which Dr. Sun Wen really owes his present

position, are almost unanimously in favour of a continuation of the war, from which they think they have everything to gain and nothing to lose, since they are quite confident of victory. Both sections have consequently been opposed all along to any sort of compromise either with the Manchus, who, in their opinion, deserve no consideration, or with Yuan Shih-kai, whom they suspect of trying to overreach them and of aspiring to Imperial honours for himself. Under the circumstances, as may well be imagined, the task of holding the balance between them and the more moderate elements in his party has been no easy one for the President, and it may be said to his credit that his influence has almost always been on the side of those in favour of a peaceful settlement.

The arrivals of troops from Shanghai have shown some falling off recently, but large numbers continue to be dispatched north by the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway. The revolutionists estimate that by now they have 50,000 men in the field, who, if the peace negotiations should be broken off, will advance north from three bases where they are now being collected—Chengyangkuan in North Anhui, Linhuaikuan, and Chinkiangpu. The commander of the Linhuaikuan army is General Po Wen Wei, an ex-officer of the 9th division. He is quite a young man, trained in the local military college, and seems exceptionally smart.

The departure during the past week of at least half the garrison of Nanking has apparently given the authorities courage to try and put some check on the excesses of the soldiers. They have now appointed General Hsü Shao Chen warden of the city—quite a new title, I believe—with instructions to organise at once the military constabulary which is to assist the police in the execution of their duties. The new warden has begun well. He has just executed the colonel in command of one of the regiments which was most notorious for its insubordination and general misconduct, and has made several examples, too, amongst the soldiers. An attempt is also being made to organise some kind of civil administration in the city, which has, until now, been under martial law. At the head of the new administration is to be Mr. Ma Liang, the present Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, who has been given the title of prefect, with duties corresponding to those of the “shuntienfu” in Peking. Directly under him is an official called a “min cheng chang,” who combines the duties formerly exercised by the two city magistrates. These changes, which are not finally decided on, have been introduced by a new Government department called the Legislative Bureau, at the head of which, with the title of director, is a Mr. Sung Chiao Jen, an ex-member of the “Komingtang” party, with Mr. Tang Hua Lung, formerly president of the Hupei Assembly, as vice-director. It is this department, apparently, which is to reorganise the political divisions of the provinces, which are to be divided hereafter into districts or “hsiens” only, all other divisions being abolished. The local “shenpanting,” or law courts, are also being reopened, as are many of the elementary schools, and I am told that a new military college is about to be started. The higher schools remain closed.

Yamêns have now been assigned to all the Ministries with the exception of those of Finance and Foreign Affairs, which, for convenience' sake, are being accommodated for the present in the President's residence, the ex-Viceroy's yamên. Nanking has always been exceptionally well off for yamêns, so there has been less difficulty in housing the different Ministers than in providing them with staffs, which most of them still lack. The new Ministers are every one of them alleged to have very sweeping reforms in view in their departments, but they are still, of course, on paper. The Minister of Education, I notice, has announced that the elementary schools will hereafter be mixed, that is, open to boys and girls alike, which is regarded by the Chinese as a very radical innovation. The ages of the children attending these schools range from 11 to 16 years. He announces further that all eulogistic references to the Manchu dynasty are to be cut out from school books. Some very drastic reforms are also foreshadowed in the Salt Administration, which is under Mr. Chang Ch'ien, the Minister of Agriculture. The news has so alarmed the salt merchants that they have presented a protest to the President, who has assured them that no changes will be made without consulting them. All that is contemplated for the present is a transfer of the head-quarters of the administration from Yangchow to Nanking.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

## Enclosure 7 in No. 126.

*Extract from the "North China Daily News."*

## THE NEW PROPOSALS.

*Dr. Sun to Dr. Wu.*

AN urgent telegram was dispatched by President Sun Yat Sen, at Nanking, to Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Shanghai, on the 22nd January, 1912. The message, which appears in the Chinese press, may be translated as follows:—

"Yesterday's telegram noted. Referring to my former telegram, declaring that Provisional President would on the same day resign when the Ching Emperor had abdicated, I thought that Yuan could sever his connection with whatever concerned the Manchu Government, and could become a citizen of the republic, so I promised forthwith to elect Yuan.

"Subsequently, judging by the telegrams received from him afterwards, Yuan's idea is not only that he wishes to remove the Manchu Government, but at the same time he demands the necessity of cancelling the Republican Provisional Government, while he would form another Provisional Government in Peking. But who knows whether such a Provisional Government will be that of a monarchical constitution or that of a republic? Even assuming that he himself calls it a Republican Government, then who guarantees it? Therefore my telegram of yesterday states that my office will be relinquished when all the Powers have recognised us; my sole aim and desire is nothing less than the consolidation of the foundation of the republic, and there is no clashing between my former and later inclinations.

"If Yuan can really carry out the clause of severing his connection with what concerns the Manchu Government and become a citizen of the republic, then I will still keep my words. As to apprehensions being felt because the officers and men of the north as well as the territory would be left without a person to control and maintain them, people do not understand that after the Ching Emperor has abdicated the officers and men of the north will be officers and men of the republic, and the preservation of peace and order in the north shall be attended to also by the republic. Only, change cannot be effected without the means of an understanding. My opinion suggests that Yuan be requested to nominate a well-known and respected man to rule temporarily the north.

"With regard to the question of the diplomatic corps being left without a proper man for intercourse: As soon as the Manchu dynasty is removed, the foreign Ministers would, as a matter of course, hold intercourse with the republic—this is the proper course to take. The transition period, during which diplomatic relations may be interrupted, would assuredly be so short as not to affect anything.

"I have fixed the procedure as follows:—

"1. The Ching Emperor abdicates, then Yuan shall at once notify the foreign Ministers at Peking, who will telegraph the information to the Republican Government that now the Ching Emperor has abdicated his throne, or order the consuls of Shanghai to do so.

"2. Simultaneously, Yuan shall declare his political views, saying that he absolutely supports the object of republicanism.

"3. I, upon receipt of the information that the Ching Emperor has abdicated his throne from the diplomatic body or from the consular body, will at once resign my office.

"4. The Senate shall then elect Yuan as the Provisional President.

"5. Yuan, after having been elected Provisional President, shall swear that he will obey the constitutional law enacted and passed by the Senate, before he can take over his duties and power.

"Clauses 1 and 2 are framed for the purpose of enabling Yuan to sever connection with whatever concerns the Manchu Government, and to become a citizen of the republic.

"This is my list plan for a solution. If Yuan cannot even act as set forth, he must surely be deemed as unwilling to support or approve the republic, nor willing to arrive at a peaceful solution. Then the clauses with respect to the generous treatment of th

Imperial Family and the Eight Banners cannot be carried out, hostilities will be resumed, and blood-shedding throughout the world (the nation) will result—the crime must be traced to an author.

“ Please inform Yuan.

“ SUN WĒN.

“ *January 22, 1912.*”

Enclosure 8 in No. 126.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, January 30, 1912.*

AS I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 26th instant, and again yesterday, fighting has recommenced between the revolutionary forces and General Chang Hsün's troops. The revolutionaries, hearing last week that Chang Hsün was moving troops down the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway from Hsüchowfu, sent a small force up the line from Linhuaikuan to reconnoitre. On the 25th instant they came into contact with the Imperialists near Kúchen, a station 76 miles south of Hsüchowfu and 41 miles north of Linhuaikuan. It is not clear yet which was the first side to attack, but the result was that the revolutionaries were driven back with some loss to Hsinchiau, the next station in this direction. Strong reinforcements were promptly sent up from Linhuaikuan, and another engagement took place on the 27th instant, in which the Imperialists were apparently worsted, for they withdrew, leaving a damaged engine behind them. The revolutionaries are now following them up, and were reported yesterday to have reached Nansuchow, 36 miles above Kúchen. The Imperialists are reported to have made a very poor fight of it, and to have retired far sooner than was necessary. They left as they had come down—by train. The Government here, not unnaturally, claims this engagement as a great victory, and is much elated over it. It is not known how many men the revolutionaries had in the field, nor what losses were sustained by either side.

The fact that the armistice expired yesterday, and that fighting had begun, made me rather anxious lest the peace negotiations might have come after all to an unfavourable conclusion. I therefore called at the President's yamèn yesterday afternoon to enquire how matters exactly stood. Dr. Sun Wen was engaged and could not see me, but he sent me a message through one of his secretaries, the gist of which was that, although the armistice had expired, the prospects of peace were nevertheless quite good. At Hankow an understanding had been arrived at between Generals Tuan Chi Jui and Li Yuan Hung, which would prevent hostilities from breaking out again in that part of the field, and it would not be long now, in the President's opinion, before all the other Imperial generals followed General Tuan's example, which would leave the Throne no option but to abdicate. The only general who was apparently going to show fight was Chang Hsün, who seemed to be irreconcilable, and it should not take long to dispose of him. I telegraphed this message to you yesterday, as it seemed to me of some importance, in view of the pessimism in regard to the situation of the Shanghai press, which may possibly be reflected in Peking.

Apart from the peace negotiations, the chief event of the past week has been the formal opening by President Sun on the 28th instant of the first National Convention of the Provisional Republic of China. Seventeen out of the nineteen provinces of China are represented in it, the two exceptions being Shantung and Kansu. The convention is only national, however, in so far that every province, with the exceptions named, has its delegates, but, as the delegates are the nominees in every case of either the provincial “tutus,” or, where there are none, of the Government here, by no possible stretch of imagination can it be called representative of the people. Yet it is by this convention, I understand, that the revolutionaries propose that the question of the form of Government to be adopted in China shall be decided. It explains to a great extent their fierce opposition to the suggestion that, after the abdication of the Emperor, a Provisional Government should be established at Peking with Yuan Shih-kai as Vice-Regent. The Premier, I have no doubt, could bring together a convention which, without being one wit less national or representative of the people, would vote as unanimously for any form of Government he desired as the present convention will for a republic.

The opening of the new Convention was preceded last week by the dissolution of the old conference of revolutionary delegates which elected Dr. Sun as President, and to whose proceedings I have constantly referred in my despatches. The difference

between the two Assemblies is not a very great one. The conference was also composed of nominees of the "tutus" and other leaders of the Revolutionary party, whose opinions they voiced, and practically all the old delegates have found a place too in the new convention. But in the old Assembly the number of delegates was not fixed, some provinces having three or four representatives, and others one only or none, whereas in the present one each province has, or is entitled to, the same number of delegates, namely three, and all are supposed to be represented, though for some reason or other Shantung and Kansu have as yet no deputies. According to one of the Vice-Ministers whom I questioned on the subject, the new Assembly, though called by the foreign press the National Convention, is really the House of Representatives, or Legislative Assembly of the Provisional Republic.

The Cabinet, which now meets twice a-week, is still occupied with financial questions to the exclusion of almost all other business. There can be no doubt that the Government is very hard pressed for money, as its scheme for raising funds by mortgaging the property of the China Merchants Steam-ship Company shows. Its efforts to borrow money abroad have apparently not been successful, the condition laid down by the foreign financiers approached being that the republic must first be recognised by the foreign Powers. There are already large arrears of pay due to the troops, and unless money can be speedily found or peace intervenes the *moral* of the army is certain to be very badly affected. The critical state, however, of the peace negotiations and the aggressive attitude adopted by General Chang has rendered any relaxation of military activity quite out of the question. For the past few days about 1,000 men have been leaving Pukow daily *en route* to Linhuaikuan, and from the reports sent me I estimate that the number of troops at the front cannot be far short now of 25,000 men. Of the various levies in the field the Cantonese contingents are undoubtedly the pick, being far better equipped than the rest and extremely keen, which none of the other troops seem to be. With the large force at their disposal the revolutionaries should have no difficulty in disposing of General Chang, who, I have no doubt, will retire into Shantung as soon as he considers the situation dangerous.

It is not known yet whether during the recent fighting at Kuchen any damage was done to the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway, but the probabilities are that the Imperialists have destroyed portions of it to hinder as much as possible the progress north of the revolutionaries.

The situation locally continues to improve. The soldiers left in Nanking are now under far better discipline than formerly, and for the last week or so no complaints have been recorded against them. As a result of the representations made by the consular body proclamations have been issued by General Hsü forbidding soldiers, except when on duty, to carry arms, an order which has effectually stopped the promiscuous firing which was making the city as dangerous as a battlefield, and warning them also against improper behaviour to foreigners, which not only injured their own good name, but brought the revolutionary cause into disrepute.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

No. 127.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 10, 1912.*

IN my despatch of the 27th January, I expressed the opinion that even should the armistice which was then on the point of expiring not be renewed, it was unlikely that there would be a continuance of hostilities between the Imperialists and the republican armies, and this forecast has to a large extent been fulfilled. Some days later the very remarkable memorial, copy of which is enclosed, appeared in the newspapers. This pronouncement, which was signed by some forty-four generals and commanders, was at first received with some incredulity, and its genuineness was openly doubted until it became apparent that it must be taken as a reply to the reactionary movement started in Peking by T'ieh Liang and a few of the Manchu princes, which threatened for a time to make the capital the scene of a racial contest between Manchus and Chinese. The Throne was given clearly to understand that it could no longer count upon the support of the army in forcing upon the people a form of government to which they objected, and that it had better make up its mind to accept the verdict of the country and declare itself in favour of a republic. This declaration was little



more than half a truth. The country as a whole cannot be said to want a republic or any change of government, but the portion of it which is at present articulate will have no more of the Manchus, and a republic is the only alternative to a continuance of Manchu rule.

The desertion of the army had the desired effect. Prince Kung, Duke Tsai-tsé, and their uncompromising associates felt that there was no further scope for their activities in Peking, and most of them have now gone to Mukden to see if there is any chance of resuscitating the fallen fortunes of the dynasty in the home of their race. In the meantime, Yuan Shih-kai has been making all his preparations for relieving the country of the Manchus on terms which will allow them an honourable retirement. These terms have formed the subject of much bargaining, relieved at times by flashes of humour peculiar to China. The republicans proposed to reduce the annual civil list of the Emperor from 4,000,000 taels to 4,000,000 dollars, on the ground that the latter would form the only currency of the future, and when the Empress-Dowager pressed that the Emperor should retain command of the Imperial Guards, Yuan Shih-kai suggested that the point need not be considered until His Majesty had attained his majority. The honorific title to be retained by the Emperor has given rise to endless discussion, and whether the final act of the Manchu dynasty should be "resignation," "retirement," or "abdication" has received much earnest consideration at the hands of the subtle politicians who have for years past exercised similar ingenuity in the interpretation of the treaty rights of foreigners.

While conducting these delicate negotiations with a Court which three years ago had driven him from public life and forced him to seek personal safety in flight, Yuan Shih-kai was engaged in a still more difficult task in endeavouring to induce the southern leaders to join hands with him in forming a united Government to take over the heritage of the Manchus. The telegraphic messages which passed between him and Dr. Sun Yat Sen have largely become public property, and it is unnecessary to do more than bring out the salient differences in their points of view.

Yuan's chief preoccupation was that there should be as little interval as possible between abdication and the establishment of a coalition Government of north and south. For this purpose he proposed to crowd into a single day a series of striking events which it is safe to assert no single day in China has ever before witnessed. The issue of the abdication decree, the resignation of the provisional presidency by Sun Yat Sen, his own election as President by the Republican Senate at Nanking, and the inauguration of the amalgamated Cabinet of the north and south were all to take place within the space of a single day, and the new Government was to burst at once from the brains of this versatile statesman fully armed for the great task of bringing order out of chaos.

Sun Yat Sen, whose political views seemed to be tinged with a certain suspicion of Yuan, did not entertain this comprehensive proposal with much favour. He suggested, as a preferable course, that Yuan should himself come to Nanking and be there elected President of the Republic which public opinion had already acclaimed. Yuan naturally did not feel inclined to separate himself from his army and trust himself as a private citizen to the tender mercies of the new republic, and after interminable discussions which have led to nothing, he has been obliged to adopt the only course open to him.

It is understood that the abdication decree will be issued within the next few days, and that Yuan will be empowered to form a provisional republic for all China, in the hope that he may be in a better position to negotiate for a coalition with the south. He himself seems to be certain that having rid himself of the Manchu incubus, he will soon come to terms with the men of his own race in the south.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure in No. 127.

*Generals' Memorial in favour of a Republic.*

TELEGRAPHIC Memorial by Tuan Ch'i-jui and others, presented through the Cabinet, the General Staff, and the Ministry of War, requesting the immediate formation of a Republican Government, so as to strengthen the position of the Throne and relieve the general situation.

WE have heard a report to the effect that the armistice and two months of negotiations have at last produced some result. The Throne has yielded to the wishes

of the people and decided to change the form of constitution to a republic, the position of the Imperial Clan and the status of Manchus, Mongols, Mahommedans, and Thibetans being regulated by articles to the following effect :—

1. The Ta Ch'ing dynasty will be hereditary for ever.
2. The yearly allowance to the Emperor shall be fixed at not less than 3,000,000 taels.
3. The bannermen shall be provided with means of livelihood, and all restrictions on Manchus, Mongols, Mahommedans, and Thibetans shall be abolished.
4. Manchus, Mongols, Mahommedans, and Thibetans shall rank on an equality with Chinese.
5. The position of princes and nobles shall remain unchanged.
6. Their private property shall be protected.

The republican representative, Wu T'ing-fang, agreed to these articles and to their being embodied in an official communication to The Hague for purposes of record.

The report continues to the effect that the telegram announcing this news was sent to the papers, and was hailed by the whole nation with the utmost enthusiasm as the one stroke really adapted to the situation and calculated to secure the position of the Throne. We have been looking forward with the keenest excitement to seeing the publication of an edict so full of happy augury, but now we hear that, through the intervention of Duke Tsai-tsê and Prince Kung, this scheme has not been carried out completely, and the constitutional question must still await decision by a National Assembly.

We are quite ready to push on our preparations for war, and patiently wait for the administrative changes to be completed, but we feel that since the outbreak of the revolution, every one of the edicts from the Empress-Dowager has been dictated by love for the people, by a desire to restore the national prosperity, and by horror at the useless waste of life, while the publication of the articles of constitution, the swearing of the oath, and the reference of the constitutional question to a National Assembly show clearly that the Throne recognises the people as forming the basis of the State.

The armistice has been extended time and again, but at no time have the republican forces observed it strictly, and I fear it would be very difficult to wait quietly till a National Assembly could be convened. Meanwhile, without going into the question of a delay of some months, our troops are deserting, the people are in tumult, and the country is overrun with bandits and robbers, and China is faced, if not by total destruction, at any rate by imminent danger of partition. During these two months of armistice, the republicans have been raising money and recruiting troops, with which they have filled the country. Our troops, on the other hand, can obtain reinforcement from nowhere. Always numerically weak, they are still more helpless from the fact that they have to guard against attack in several directions at once. The revolutionaries, wherever they go, join hands with the local bandits, extort money to pay their troops, pillage the countryside, and spread misleading reports; while in spite of the armistice they have actually sent troops and attacked Yentai in Shantung, Yingchow, Shouchow, &c., in Anhui, the district from Hsüchow southwards in Chiangpei, Kuangshan, Shang-ch'eng, and Kushih in Honan, Kaoch'eng, Hsiangyang, and Tsaoyang in Hupei. We, on the other hand, are all put up in one small corner with no room to expand. They have but to advance one step and Shantung, Anhui, and Honan are lost to us. Although we are ready to strive to the utmost, to sacrifice our lives if needs be, our coffers are empty, and the troops consequently wavering, appearances are all in favour of a republic, and so the officers are hesitating too. With such disorganisation in the camp we have no reliable forces to fight with, while we fear that defeat would involve the overthrow of the Imperial line, and the Imperial Clan would find it hard to obtain a livelihood. But if a determined effort is to be made to set up a northern and a southern State, then, as far as the loyalty of the people counts, the uproars in the north-west are plain evidence of disaffection, while, geographically speaking, the centre of China is utterly lost to us, and we have nothing left but to sit down and wait for death. It is true that we have led our troops badly, and we are ready to die, but if we sacrifice our lives, we merely die simply but loyally, while the Imperial sway will be for ever destroyed, and no amount of repining would remedy matters. This would be but a poor return for the favours the Throne has showered upon us.

Supposing a National Assembly is called, it is not certain on what sort of constitution it will settle, but if the trend of public feeling be any criterion, we are

afraid there is only one possible outcome, a republic. In such case it will be hard to call back our acts, and if we continue to fight it will merely be the subjecting of the people to several months of misery for naught. How much better it would be for the Throne to make up its mind at once to treat the nation with justice, to make its subjects one and all sing the praises of its wisdom, with tears of gratitude likening the present reign to the glorious days of Yao and Shun!

We generals have received such favours from the State that we feel it our bounden duty to think for the nation as a whole, and thus we are emboldened to set out the merits and demerits of the case. We therefore fearlessly request the issue of a gracious edict announcing to all the world the immediate formation of a republican system of government, with the present Cabinet and Ministers of State acting *ad interim* as representatives of the Government, responsible for the treaties, the foreign debts, and all international questions at present outstanding. Then a National Assembly should again be summoned and a Central Republican Government formed, thus making a sweeping reform affecting native and foreigner alike, in the hope of securing speedily the welfare of the people and restoring order in the State. Then the nation must arouse itself and strive to regain its strength, and so shall China open up for herself the vista of a glorious future.

(Signed by Tuan Ch'i-jui, Chiang Kuei-t'i, Chang Hsün, and forty-four other commanders.)

No. 128.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 13, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 15th ultimo, reporting the action taken by the diplomatic body with a view to having the revenues of the salt gabelle placed under the control of the Imperial Maritime Customs for the service of the indemnity debt, I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of recent correspondence with the Wai-wu Pu on this subject.

It will be seen that the question is still under the consideration of the Ministry of Finance, and under the existing circumstances I doubt whether any steps can be effectively taken to hasten a decision.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 128.

*Note communicated to Wai-wu Pu by Dean of Diplomatic Body.*

THE dean of the diplomatic body having approached the Wai-wu Pu on the question as to whether the Chinese Government is prepared to place the salt gabelle under the control of the Imperial Maritime Customs to be used for meeting the indemnity payments, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to Sir John Jordan that there would be practical difficulties in acceding to the request. The dean has reported the tenor of this communication to his colleagues, and is now authorised to ask in the name of the diplomatic body what proposals the Chinese Government is prepared to make for utilising the revenue of the salt gabelle to meet the obligation which it undertook under article 6 of the protocol of 1901.

*February 3, 1912.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 128.

*Memorandum communicated to the Dean of the Diplomatic Body by the Wai-wu Pu*

WITH reference to the memorandum from the dean of the diplomatic body stating that he is authorised by his colleagues to ask what proposals the Chinese Government is prepared to make for utilising the revenue of the salt gabelle to meet the obligation

which it undertook under article 6 of the protocol of 1901, the Wai-wu Pu has the honour to state that the matter has been referred to the Ministry of Finance, and that the proposals of the said Ministry will be reported in due course to the dean.

*February 7, 1912.*

No. 129.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 13, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs enclosing copy of an edict issued yesterday in which the Empress Dowager, acting on behalf of the boy Emperor, formally announced to the country the abdication of the dynasty and the arrangements made for the establishment of a republican form of government.

As the last act of a dynasty which had ruled China for 267 years, and whose earlier Emperors had raised the country to a state of prosperity and greatness it had never before attained, this valedictory edict is one of some historical interest, but although great pains were taken with its preparation, it is evident that its authors felt some difficulty in proclaiming the conversion of an ancient Empire into a new-born republic.

The decree recites the events which brought about the confusion throughout the country in consequence of the national uprising, and states the attempts which had been made to find a solution of the question by leaving the form of government to the decision of a National Convention. The republican cry, which at first had been taken up by the southern provinces, found an echo in the memorial from the generals in the north until it eventually became the universal desire of the whole nation. The Throne had no desire from motives of personal interest to stand in the way of the national will, and the Empress Dowager, following the precepts of the sages of old, who regarded the Empire as a possession held in trust for the people, handed back to the nation the prerogatives of government and formally declared in favour of a republic. At a period of transition between old and new it was essential that means should be found for restoring the union between north and south, and Yuan Shih-kai, who had a popular mandate in virtue of his election as premier by the National Assembly, was empowered to organise a provisional republican Government and confer with the representatives of the republican army as to the best means of effecting a union which was to comprise Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Turki, and Thibetans in one homogeneous dominion.

Peking has received the edicts with marked indifference, and the people follow their ordinary pursuits unmoved by political changes. A Manchu here and there enquires whether his pension is secure under the new régime, and the citizens of the latest and largest republic in the world cannot yet grasp the fact that government is possible without an Emperor. The future will show whether that idea will disappear or reassert itself at no distant date.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 129.

*Wai-Wu Pu to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*February 12, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that an Imperial edict has been issued to-day in the following terms:—

[For Imperial edict, see Enclosure 2.]

I have the honour to transmit a copy of this Imperial edict for your Excellency's information, and I beg that you will communicate it to His Majesty's Government.

I avail, &c.

HU WEI-TÊ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 129.

*Imperial Edict, dated February 12, 1912.*

(Translation.)

WE (the Emperor) have respectfully received the following Imperial edict from Her Imperial Majesty the Empress Dowager Lung-yu :—

As a consequence of the uprising of the republican army to which the different provinces immediately responded, the Empire seethed like a boiling cauldron and the people were plunged in utter misery. Yuan Shih-kai was therefore especially commanded some time ago to dispatch commissioners to confer with the representatives of the republican army on the general situation, and discuss matters pertaining to the convention of a National Assembly for the decision of the form of government to be adopted. Two months have elapsed and no really suitable mode of settlement has been discovered. Separated as the south and the north are by great distances, the unwillingness of either side to yield to the other can result only in the continued interruption of trade and the prolongation of hostilities, for so long as the form of government is undecided the nation can have no peace. It is now evident that the hearts of the majority of the people are in favour of a republican form of government; the provinces of the south were the first to espouse the cause, and the generals of the north have since pledged their support. From the preference of the people's hearts the will of heaven can be discerned. How could we then bear to oppose the will of the millions for the glory of one family? Therefore, observing the tendencies of the age on the one hand and studying the opinions of the people on the other, we and His Majesty the Emperor hereby vest the sovereignty in the people and decide in favour of a republican form of constitutional government. Thus we would gratify on the one hand the desires of the whole nation who, tired of anarchy, are desirous of peace, and on the other hand would follow in the footsteps of the ancient sages, who regarded the Throne as the sacred trust of the nation.

Now, Yuan Shih-kai was elected by the Tzu Cheng Yuan (Senate) to be the premier. During this period of transference of government from the old to the new, there should be some means of uniting the south and the north. Let Yuan Shih-kai organise with full powers a provisional republican Government and confer with the republican army as to the methods of union, thus assuring peace to the people and tranquillity to the Empire, and forming the one great republic of China by the union as heretofore of the five peoples, namely, Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mahommedans, and Thibetans, together with their territory in its integrity. We and His Majesty the Emperor, thus enabled to live in retirement free from responsibilities and cares, and passing the time in ease and comfort, shall enjoy without interruption the courteous treatment of the nation, and see with our own eyes the consummation of an illustrious government. Is not this highly admirable?

(Bearing the Imperial seal and signed by Yuan Shih-kai, the Premier; Hoo Wei-teh, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs; Chao Ping-chun, Minister of the Interior; Tan Hsueh-heng, Acting Minister of the Navy; Hsi Yen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Works, and Commerce; Liang Shih-yi, Acting Minister of Communications; Ta Shou, Acting Minister of the Dependencies.)

*25th day of the 12th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuant'ung.*

No. 130.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 14, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum by Sir S. Head, third secretary at His Majesty's Legation, recording some of the more interesting events which have taken place at the ports in the interval.

I have, &amp;c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 130.

*Memorandum by Sir S. Head.*

THE reports which have been received since the date of Sir J. Jordan's despatch of the 27th January would seem to show that the provinces are beginning to weary of their régime of unbridled lawlessness, and will not be sorry to accept any form of government which enables them to resume in safety their normal occupations. In a despatch dated the 6th January the acting British consul at Wuhu reported that the local authorities, both Imperial and republican, showed anxiety to cultivate the friendship of all foreigners, whether officials, merchants, or missionaries.

The main difficulty of the revolutionary leaders has been the question of funds to pursue their military and political campaign. There have been renewed attempts at some of the treaty ports to take over the administration of the native customs as well as that of the Post Office, and it was necessary for His Majesty's consuls at Nanking, Foochow, and Wuhu to make, in concert with their colleagues, unofficial representations to the provisional authorities to prevent any tampering with the existing conditions of these important services.

Frustrated in this direction, the revolutionaries redoubled their energies in obtaining loans and forcible contributions from whatever sources available. Amongst others the property of Lord Li, formerly Chinese Minister in London, was taken possession of by the provisional authorities at Wuhu, who are collecting the rents and holding the property in fee until the owner can be persuaded to disburse a substantial contribution to the party funds.

With regard to the activities of the military authorities, Mr. Pearson reports as follows:—

“On the 23rd December I received a complaint from the agents of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co. and Messrs. Butterfield and Swire that revolutionary troops were repeatedly boarding their steamers, arresting passengers as suspected Imperialist agents, or removing their personal effects under the pretext of being contraband. One case of the latter was very flagrant, and upon receipt of a complaint from the captain of the steam-ship ‘Ngankin’ that 450 sycee taels had been forcibly taken from one of his Chinese passengers, and that the passenger himself by the intervention of the ship's officers but narrowly had escaped arrest, I at once interviewed Li Pao-lin, with the result that he left me directly for the military head-quarters, and within two hours the money was returned to the passenger. In a subsequent interview with Wu I arranged that in any case of suspected contraband of war I should be invited to board the steamer if British, and that no seizure should be made without my consent. Two raids were also made later on the hong buildings leased by Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co. on the shore, the first on the pretext that the comprador was smuggling arms. This man seems to enjoy an unenviable reputation. I obtained an apology for the search from the Commandant Wu, who pleaded ignorance that the building was foreign property, and I instructed Messrs. Jardine, Matheson's agent to hoist the Union Jack over their premises. This was done, but in spite of the fact that two foreign flags were flying over the building on the outbreak of a queue-cutting epidemic on the 31st December, the hong was forcibly entered and the queues of a large number of employés of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co. were roughly removed by the soldiery of Liu Hsin-wu. On my protest against his action in particular, and the whole measure in general, as contrary to public peace and order, proclamations were promptly issued forbidding the tonsure being executed under compulsion; at the same time, at the time of writing, no Chinese with a queue is allowed to enter a military yamèn.

“As to the protection afforded to Wuhu by foreign gun-boats there is no cause to complain. A British gun-boat of some description or other is invariably stationed here. The commander-in-chief has apparently conferred with the United States admiral on my suggestion that it was necessary to have ships of war of both nationalities in port until perfect tranquillity is restored. The actual size of the vessel is of less importance than the necessity of the constant presence of ships able to land at least forty or fifty men between them. In case of local disturbances a landing party of say twenty men from each of two vessels is required, the one to protect foreigners, mainly British, who would concentrate at the consulate, the second to protect missionaries, mainly American, at I Chi-shan. It seems improbable, at present at any rate, that any landing party will be required at Wuhu.”

Nevertheless, Mr. Pearson adds, "native Wuhu is becoming restive, and there is imminent trouble brewing if, as it is foretold, the old troops be sent away to the frontier and the 'dare-to-dies' alone retained. The former are, at least, amenable to the discipline of their old leader Li Pao-lin. Liu Hsin-wu is in charge of the new recruits, and his personality and the character of his troops are distinctly rather a menace to peace than a safeguard, and are the source of most of the uneasiness prevalent in Wuhu." Of the outlying districts of Anhui practically none can be said to be in its normal condition of peace, and bands of raw recruits and bad characters are scouring the country for loot. Many incidents are reported in connection with these roving adventurers which recall the exploits of the famous cobbler of Köpenick. At Kinshien a young ne'er-do-well dressed himself up in an officer's uniform and with a bodyguard formed of half-a-dozen coolies appeared before the yamên and demanded the official seals and money, which were handed to him without further enquiry.

The state of famine, prevalent in Kiangsu, has made many missionaries who had been recalled to Chinkiang anxious to return to their districts to assist in relief work. Mr. Jameson, an American engineer, has been displaying considerable activity in organising famine relief, and public appeals for funds have been issued. His Majesty's consul at Chinkiang considered that it would be unsafe for the British missionaries to proceed as far as Chingkiangpu, as they desired to do, and certainly not beyond it; since, though that place was at present quiet, any attempt to transport thither large quantities of rice would prove an irresistible temptation to robber bands. Mr. Twyman accordingly refused to sanction British missionaries returning to resume permanent work in their districts, but agreed, with Sir John Jordan's approval, to their going as far as Chingkiangpu for famine relief purposes as a temporary and emergency work, while warning them that they did so at their own risk.

From a report received from His Majesty's acting consul at Wuchow, it appears that the West River still continues to be infested with so-called pirates, who are nothing more than bands of robbers who extend their sphere of operations to vessels plying on the river. His Majesty's consul-general at Canton also reported the pirating of the British launch "Sze Yup" near Kongmoon on the 23rd December, and on the 9th February His Majesty's ship "Sandpiper," while standing by to protect an American vessel on the West River, was fired upon both from junks and from the shore. The "Sandpiper" returned the fire and the pirates dispersed.

Besides His Majesty's ships which have been detailed for the purpose, some Chinese gun-boats are also patrolling the river, but unfortunately only to prove their utter incapacity for the task.

In Shantung disorder continues to prevail. The acting British consul at Tsinan, writing on the 18th January, reports that the loosening of the reins of government has enabled the unruly element of the population to prey on their more peaceful brethren and defy what feeble force can still be brought against them. The exceptional floods of the summer are resulting in wide-spread famines, and the areas to the south and south-west of Shantung are amongst the most affected. The pangs of hunger drive the wretched inhabitants to swell the numbers of the marauders, who, in roving bands of from 50 to 1,000, raid the small towns and villages and levy with impunity what toll they choose. These raids are often accompanied by acts of the most barbarous cruelty.

The Lai Yang and Hai Yang districts south of Chefoo are, as always, infested with robbers, and the seaboard is harassed by pirates. As practically every fisherman is at heart a pirate, the bad seasons have led many to throw off their disguise and, from the seclusion of lonely islands, to make raids on the villages along the shore. At one time the outlook at Chefoo was so alarming that the foreign community telegraphed through their respective consuls enquiring whether steps could not be taken to secure the neutralisation of Chefoo in the event of hostilities taking place between the Imperialist and republican troops in the immediate neighbourhood, but it was not found practicable to accede to this request. As, however, the insurrectionary infection spread to the neighbourhood of Wei-hai Wei, it has been decided, at the request of the commissioner, Sir Stewart Lockhart, to detach one hundred British troops from Tien-tsin to assist in the task of maintaining order in the district. Vice-Admiral Sir A. Winsloe has arranged to keep His Majesty's ship "Kent" in northern waters until the situation becomes quieter. She is at present at Chefoo.

The acting consul-general at Tien-tsin reports the capture of a gang of bomb-makers in the French concession. These men have been deported to Shanghai for trial in the mixed court, and it is to be hoped that the practice of bomb-throwing,

which at one time threatened to become popular with the more desperate characters of both parties, will now be discarded in favour of more peaceful methods of persuasion.

February 14, 1912.

No. 131.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 15, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 16th January, I have the honour to enclose copy of the detailed arrangements for the protection of the Peking-Shanhaikwan Railway, together with copy of the orders issued by General Cooper to officers commanding detachments detailed for that service.

The arrangements need little comment. Having regard to the fact that the line is not occupied but only guarded, it was necessary, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, to make it known that both sides would be at liberty to use the railway and the telegraph line, but that any attempt to damage permanently important parts of the line would be resisted by the combined forces of the six Powers.

General Cooper is in negotiation with the railway authorities as to the maintenance at Tien-tsin and Shanhaikwan of repair trains and sufficient rolling stock for the rapid transport of troops referred to in clauses 3 and 5.

The American reinforcements have arrived from the Philippines and have taken charge of their section, which had been temporarily guarded by British troops.

I have reported to you by telegraph the destruction on the 3rd February of a bridge on the railway 10 miles east of Shanhaikwan. So far as I know, it has never transpired who committed this act of destruction.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 131.

*Arrangements for Protection of Peking-Shanhaikwan Railway.*

THAT troops should be placed at important stations, bridges, &c., along the line of railway.

2. Both the Chinese Imperial and revolutionist troops are at liberty to utilise the railway line and adjoining piers and wharfage for the purposes of transportation, landing, or embarkation, and will not be interfered with.

3. Both parties will be notified to avoid any interference with the railway and to refrain from damaging it in any way. The board of the Imperial Railways of North China will be requested to maintain at both Shanhaikwan and Tien-tsin a repair train loaded with suitable materials for repairing damages.

4. Any attempts to permanently damage important parts of the line, such as stations, depôts, machinery, bridges, &c., will be resisted by the combined forces of the six Powers co-operating in the defence of the railway.

5. The board of the Imperial railways of North China will be requested to always keep ready at Shanhaikwan and Tien-tsin sufficient rolling stock to transport 250 infantry in order that reinforcements can rapidly be dispatched.

6. The telegraph offices are to be protected and telegraphic communication maintained. Chinese troops of either side may make use of the line.

7. Officers commanding posts and patrols should be informed of the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 6, and told to do their best, with the forces at their disposal, to carry them out.

Enclosure 2 in No. 131.

*Orders regarding Protection of the Line for Officers Commanding Detachments.*

THE line is to be protected and no damage of any sort permitted.

2. Both the Chinese Imperial and revolutionary troops are at liberty to utilise the railway line and adjoining piers and wharves for the purposes of transportation, landing, or embarkation, and will not be interfered with.



3. Telegraph offices are not to be seized by either belligerent, but both may be permitted to send messages.

4. Should troops in such numbers as to render it impossible for the detachment to prevent their carrying out their intention commence to damage the railway, the officer commanding our detachment will protest, and inform their commanding officer that such damage will involve military action by the six Powers guarding the railway. In any case, he should be told not to remove more than one rail at any given place nor to damage any bridge with spans of over 30 feet. A report should at once be sent to head-quarters.

No. 132.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 15, 1912.*

IT will be remembered that one of the conditions attaching to the terms arranged between Yuan Shih-kai and Wu T'ing-fang regarding the treatment to be accorded to the Imperial Family, was that copies of the agreement should be communicated by both sides to the foreign representatives in Peking. In a note dated the 12th instant, copy of which in translation I have the honour to enclose, Yuan Shih-kai, writing in his new capacity as plenipotentiary for the organisation of a provisional republican Government for China, forwarded to me the articles of agreement, with a request that they should be communicated to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 132.

*Yuan Shih-kai to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Translation.)

Sir,

*Hsin Hai year, 12th month, 25th day (February 12, 1912).*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the various articles for the courteous treatment of the Imperial House have been negotiated by me with Wu T'ing-fang, the representative of the republican army, and have been finally concluded and the Throne memorialised.

I have the honour now to transmit the text of these articles together with a copy of the Imperial edict issued to-day by His Majesty the Emperor.

I beg that your Excellency will communicate them for the information of His Majesty's Government.

I avail, &c.

YUAN SHIH-KAI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 132.

*Final Agreement as to Terms of Treatment to be accorded to the Imperial Family, &c., contained in a Telegram from Wu T'ing-fang to Yuan Shih-kai, dated February 9, 1912.*

(A.) *Treatment to be accorded to the Manchu Emperor after his Abdication.*

THE Manchu Emperor having proclaimed his acceptance of a republican constitution, the Republic of China will, after the abdication of His Majesty, accord him favourable treatment as follows :—

1. The Manchu Emperor may after his abdication retain his title as before, and the Republic of China will accord him the same respect as that usually accorded to the monarchs of other countries.

2. The annual civil list of the Manchu Emperor shall be fixed at 4,000,000 taels. This amount shall be changed to 4,000,000 dollars on the adoption of the new currency. This sum shall be provided by the Republic of China.

3. The Manchu Emperor after his abdication shall temporarily reside in the Imperial Palace, but later on he shall move his residence to the Summer Palace. The Imperial bodyguard shall remain as before.

4. After the abdication of the Manchu Emperor the ancestral temple and

mausolea services shall be maintained for all time, and the Republic of China shall provide the necessary guards for their proper protection.

5. The mausoleum of the Emperor Kuang Hsü shall be duly completed and the interment of his remains carried out in accordance with the ancient customs. All actual expenses shall be borne by the Republic of China.

6. The Manchu Emperor shall retain the services of all officials having duties in the Palace, but no more eunuchs shall be employed.

7. After the abdication of the Manchu Emperor, his private property shall receive the special protection of the Republic of China.

8. The guards division shall be under the control of the Republican Ministry of War. Their numbers and establishment shall remain as heretofore.

(B.) *Treatment to be accorded to the Imperial Clan.*

1. The titles of the nobles shall continue as heretofore.

2. The Imperial clan shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, public and private, as ordinary citizens.

3. The private property of the Imperial clan shall be respected.

4. The Imperial clan shall be exempt from military service.

(C.) *Treatment to be accorded to Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Thibetans.*

1. They shall be treated alike with Chinese.

2. Their private property shall be respected.

3. The nobility in their various grades shall continue as heretofore.

4. Steps shall be taken to provide means of livelihood for needy members of the nobility.

5. Provision shall be made to secure a livelihood for the members of the Eight Banners, and in the meantime their officers and men shall receive the customary allowances.

6. The former restrictions on occupation and residence shall be abolished and [the members of the Banners] shall be free to inscribe themselves on the register of any district in the country.

7. Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Thibetans shall be free to adhere to any of their national religions.

The above terms will be embodied in formal despatches addressed by the representatives of both sides to the Ministers of the Powers at Peking for communication to their respective Governments.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 132.

*Imperial Edict, dated February 12, 1912.*

(Translation.)

WE have respectfully received the following Imperial edict from Her Imperial Majesty the Empress Dowager Lung-Yu :—

On account of the perilous situation of the State and the intense sufferings of the people, we some time ago commanded the Cabinet to negotiate with the republican army the terms for the courteous treatment of the Imperial House with a view to peaceful settlement. According to the memorial now submitted to us by the Cabinet embodying the articles of courteous treatment proposed by the republican army, they undertake to hold themselves responsible for the perpetual offering of sacrifices before the ancestral temples and the Imperial mausolea, and the completion as planned of the mausoleum of His late Majesty the Emperor Kuang Hsü. His Majesty the Emperor is understood to resign only his political power, while the Imperial title is not abolished. There have also been concluded eight articles for the courteous treatment of the Imperial House, four articles for the favourable treatment of the Imperial kinsmen, and seven articles for the treatment of Manchus, Mongols, Mahommedans, and Thibetans. We find the terms on perusal to be fairly comprehensive. We hereby proclaim to the Imperial kinsmen and the Manchus, Mongols, Mahommedans, and Thibetans that they should endeavour in the future to fuse and remove all racial differences and prejudices and maintain law and order with united efforts. It is our sincere hope that peace will once more be seen in the country, and all the people will enjoy happiness under a republican Government.

(Signed by Yuan Shih-kai, the Premier; Hoo Wei-teh, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs; Chao Ping-chun, Minister of the Interior; Tan Hsüeh-heng, Acting Minister of the Navy; Hsi Yen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Works, and Commerce; Liang Shih-yi, Acting Minister of Communications; Ta Shou, Acting Minister of the Dependencies.)

*25th day of the 12th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuant'ung.*

No. 133.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 15, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note from the head of the Wai-wu Pu under the new régime, in which he informs me that in pursuance of instructions received from Yuan Shih-kai, as plenipotentiary for organising a Provisional Government for the Republic of China, the various Ministers in Peking shall, for the time being, continue to remain in office, but that their designation shall be changed to that of "shou ling" (chief or head), and that foreign affairs shall, as before, be conducted by the head of the Wai-wu Pu in strict accordance with the treaties.

A further notification is promised as soon as the Provisional Government is formed.

This communication was considered at a meeting of the diplomatic body held at this legation on the 13th instant, and it was decided that, in view of the abnormal situation which now prevails, our best course was to transact all necessary business with the Wai-wu Pu by personal interviews or by informal letters written in the third person. This would obviate any question of recognising the alteration in the title of the President of the Board, and would not mark any departure from the procedure which, as reported in my despatch of the 13th January last, we have adopted for communicating with the Wai-wu Pu since the post of president ceased to be held by a prince of the Imperial family.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 133.

*Head ("Shou ling") of Wai-wu Pu to Sir J. Jordan.*

*Hsin Hai Year, 12th month, 25th day*

*(February 12, 1912).*

Sir,

HIS Majesty the Emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty having abdicated, the former Prime Minister, Yuan Shih-kai, has full powers to organise a Provisional Government for the Republic of China.

Instructions have now been received from plenipotentiary Yuan that the Ministers in the various Ministries should, for the time being, continue to remain in office, but that their designation in the various Ministries should be changed to that of "shou ling" (*i.e.*, chief or head). Foreign affairs then will continue to be conducted by the head of this Ministry as before, in strict accordance with the treaties. Upon the formation of the Provisional Government your Excellency will be again notified.

I have the honour to address this note for your Excellency's information, and I beg that you will communicate it to His Majesty's Government.

I avail, &c.

HU WEI-TE.

No. 134.

*Sir C. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)*

*Tokyo, March 5, 1912.*

(Telegraphic.)

TWELVE hundred Japanese troops are proceeding to Tien-tsin from Port Arthur. This raises the Japanese force in North China to 2,400 men. The number agreed upon after the Boxer outbreak was 2,600.

No. 135.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, March 5, 1912.*

THE Russian Government are sending troops from Harbin either to Tien-tsin or Peking as may appear most desirable to Russian chargé d'affaires. Six hundred men are being dispatched, but if it is necessary the number may be increased by another 400. I have been given this information by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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No. 136.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, March 6, 1912.*

REGRET to inform you that Frederick Day, missionary, Society for Propagation of the Gospel, was killed Monday night at Chichow, south of Paoting-fu.

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No. 137.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)*

Sir,

*Berlin, March 5, 1912.*

A BERLIN telegram to the "Kölnische Zeitung," dated yesterday, announces that 100 men have been ordered to Peking from the German garrison at Tsingtau for the protection of the Germans living in China, and that this number had appeared to the German Minister to be sufficient for the present.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

No. 138.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, March 7, 1912.*

IT has been suggested to me by the general officer commanding in North China that the troops under his command should be reinforced by a battalion from Hong Kong together with an Indian mountain battery. I have considered the question with care, and have come to the conclusion that the British contingent now in North China is sufficient to meet any eventualities for the present. It is still rather stronger than any of the other foreign contingents, and I am inclined to think that the Hong Kong force had better be kept as mobile as possible, so that, if needs be, it may be sent to Central China or Tien-tsin with delay.

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No. 139.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, March 8, 1912.*

SINCE the general officer commanding in North China made the suggestion reported in my telegram of yesterday's date, an extra five battalions have been promised by the other Powers, some of the additional troops having arrived already.

I am reporting this to make the position clear.

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No. 140.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)*

(Telegraphic)

*Peking, March 8, 1912.*

IT has been arranged that Yuan Shih-kai will take oath here as provisional President on Sunday next; that he will then nominate his Cabinet, who will assemble at Nanking and take over from Provisional Government there; that Sun Yat Sen will then resign; and that Cabinet will come to Peking to establish Provisional Government of Republic. Arrangement is expected to be completed in a fortnight.

Foreign representatives will be notified of ceremony on Sunday, but not formally invited to attend.

No. 141.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, February 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking on the subject of the situation in Tengyueh.

I have, &amp;c.

C. D. SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 141.

*Acting Consul Smith to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Tengyueh, February 9, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 30th January, I have the honour to report that the situation in this district has now undergone a marked improvement, and indeed may be described as nearly normal.

The taotai, Chao Fan, and Li Ken-yuan arrived here on the 1st February. The former addressed to me on the following day a despatch announcing that he had assumed charge, and a letter couched in more than usually friendly terms proposing to call on me on the 4th February. At the interview I accordingly had with him on that date he expressed himself in the most cordial manner, and declared his intention of placing the affairs of Tengyueh on a normal basis without any delay. In particular, he intended at once to ask the commissioner of customs to resume charge of the custom-house. On the following day I received a call from Li Ken-yuan, who was equally friendly.

The taotai is a man of about 60 years of age, a native of Chien-ch'uan Chou, in Li Chiang-fu, the prefecture north of Tali-fu, in this province. He has held office as taotai in two Szechuan circuits, and officiated for a time as provincial judge in the same province. As taotai at Chungking he has had some experience of foreign affairs, and if his conduct in office should prove to correspond to a reasonable extent with his very friendly professions he should be a most satisfactory taotai.

Li Ken-yuan is a native of Nantien, where his father still lives. He has studied seven years in Japan, where no doubt he acquired his revolutionary inclinations. Up to the time of the revolution he was superintendent of the military school at Yünnan-fu. He is about 40 years of age.

Between 2,000 and 3,000 troops accompanied these two to Tengyueh. Li Ken-yuan informed me, however, that he will only stay about a fortnight in Tengyueh, and will then take the bulk of these troops back to Tali-fu. Meanwhile, the troops under command of Chang Wên-kuang have been disbanded, and Chang himself, though continuing to reside in the general's yamên, is entirely without power.

The first official act of the taotai was to declare the Tengyueh district a prefecture, under the name of T'êng-ch'ung-fu, which I am informed was its designation under the Ming dynasty. Chao K'ai-hsün, the frontier deputy, was appointed to officiate as prefect, with the substantive office of Tengyueh hsien. This appointment is in every way a most satisfactory one. For the past three months Chao has been in a very difficult and even dangerous position here. Compelled into the service of the

revolutionaries, he was never fully trusted, and his courage in offering unwelcome advice and criticism has on several occasions gained him the disfavour of Chang Wên-kuang. But that his ability and the confidence reposed in him by the gentry and people made him indispensable, his survival of the régime of Chang would be a matter of astonishment. Indeed, his friends often advised him to be less frank and more cautious. His present appointment is a gratifying indication that his capacity is recognised by the new authorities, and at the same time it will enable him to exercise an influence on frontier affairs the value of which his conduct as frontier deputy and the esteem it has won him among the frontier officers of Burmah are sufficient to prove.

A further change contemplated by the new régime is the transfer of the administrative functions of the sawbwás to Chinese officials. This scheme has not yet been decided upon, and is to be referred to the higher provincial authorities before being put into effect. The precise details of the proposed arrangement are not yet in my possession, but I understand that it is intended to transform Nantien, Kanai, Chanta, and Lungchuan into hsien districts, probably including Husa and Lasa, which are too small to make into separate hsien, in Lungchuan or Kanai. In effecting this change, it is not intended in any way to interfere with the property of the sawbwás.

The commissioner of customs, whom, in anticipation of the change of policy I expected to ensue on the arrival of the taotai I had already requested by telegram to come up, left Bhamo on the 1st February and arrived here yesterday afternoon. The substitute placed in charge of the custom-house by Chang Wên-kuang had been directed by the taotai to have everything ready to hand over charge. The commissioner's staff, however, having been left in Burmah, owing to the uncertainty then still existing as to the attitude which would be adopted by the new authorities, it was not possible for him to assume charge immediately: and he was also anxious to arrange matters before resuming charge, so that the head office and sub-offices could be simultaneously taken over, to ascertain the state of affairs resulting from three months of Chinese administration, and to come to a full understanding with the taotai as regards the future. He has to-day telegraphed for his staff to follow him, and it is expected that within a fortnight foreign control of the customs will be restored.

My proposal to deal directly with the sawbwás in frontier matters has been rendered unnecessary, and indeed impracticable, by the restoration of government in Tengyueh. It was founded on the impossibility of doing business with a person like Chang Wên-kuang, who was not only incompetent, ignorant, vacillating, and utterly uncivilised, but was in conflict with that party in the rest of the province, whose cause he professed to have won here. Whether it will be possible to arrange a belated frontier meeting before the rains is not yet certain. The work of reorganisation will inevitably keep the Chinese officials very busy for some time to come, and it may be impossible for them to absent themselves from Tengyueh soon enough. I am consulting the Government of Burmah as to their wishes in the matter, and shall of course do my utmost to make arrangements accordingly.

I have, &c.

C. D. SMITH.

No. 142.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the translation of a note which I have received from the Wai-wu Pu, informing me that the foreign, *i.e.*, Gregorian, calendar will henceforth be adopted by China.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 142.

*Hu Wei-tê to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*February 18, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received instructions from the newly-elected provisional President, Yuan Shih-kai, to state that the foreign calendar will henceforth be adopted in all public documents, and that the 1st day of

the 1st month of Jen Tzu year will become the 18th day of the 2nd month of the 1st year of the great republic of China.

In future, my Ministry in corresponding with your Excellency will, from to-day's date, adopt the foreign calendar.

In addressing this note for your Excellency's information, I avail, &c.

HU WEI-TÊ.

No. 143.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 22, 1912.*

IN my despatch of the 15th February I had the honour to forward to you details of the arrangements made for the protection of the Peking-Shanhaikwan Railway by the combined forces of the six Powers, and I added that General Cooper was in negotiation with the railway authorities as to the maintenance at Tien-tsin and Shanhaikwan of repair-trains and sufficient rolling-stock for the requirements mentioned in clauses 3 and 5 of Enclosure 1 in my above-mentioned despatch.

I have now the honour to forward copy of the reply received by General Cooper from the general manager of the North China Railways, stating the extent to which he is able to meet these requirements, without interfering with the working of the line. The foreign commandants have all agreed that these suggestions will meet the needs of the case.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 143.

*Mr. Ricketts to Brigadier-General Cooper.*

Sir,

*Tongshan, February 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your communication of the 2nd instant.

I have brought the matter before our directors. As regards paragraphs 3 and 5, I beg to place before you the following suggestions, which will, I hope, meet your requirements, and at the same time not unduly interfere with the working of this railway:—

*Paragraph 3.*—We already maintain at Fengtai, Tien-tsin, Tongku, Tongshan, and Shanhaikwan a covered and locked wrecking car, loaded with the necessary appliances. These cars are available at a moment's notice to proceed to any post where an accident occurs. We also maintain in our yards at these stations such heavy material as may be required for serious repairs, and available to be rapidly loaded up as demanded for any particular accident, but it would be inexpedient to keep materials such as rails, sleepers, long logs of timber, &c., loaded on cars. Every car we have is urgently required for duty and the earning of railway income; also, it is harmful to cars to keep them standing loaded for lengthy periods.

*Paragraph 5.*—This matter has been referred to the board in Peking, but, pending their reply, I beg to point out that we are very short of cars—we have just had to supply the Kinhan Railway with 250 cars for military purposes—and we have a large number of cars in the Tongshan shops undergoing repairs from damage done during military operations. We thus deprecate tying up any rolling-stock to be used as is proposed, unless no alternative offers.

I therefore make the following proposals, *i.e.*, that we guarantee to give the foreign troops, on demand, preference for transport, as indicated in paragraph 5, and put at their immediate service any passenger or freight trains or rolling-stock at that time on the section of the railway where the demand is made, for the purpose of rapidly forwarding reinforcements.

It is to be noted that it is as much to our interest as to that of the military guards that repairs to any damage done to the railway should be effected as soon as possible.

I have, &c.

D. B. RICKETTS,

*Engineer-in-Chief and General Manager.*

No. 144.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)*

Sir, *St. Petersburg, March 9, 1912.*  
 WITH reference to my despatch of the 17th January, I have the honour to report that the "Novoe Vremya" of the 8th March publishes another article urging immediate Russian action in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.

The article says that the disorders in China proper do not directly affect Russian interests, but that unrest in Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan threatens the whole length of the frontier. China in times past at least maintained some sort of order in these districts, but now she has too much to occupy her attention within her own borders.

The article closes as follows :—

"Mongolia and Turkestan need political advisers—we must send them. They need military instructors—we must furnish them. They are not in a position to organise an administration or create an army without money—we must advance it. Both districts are wealthy enough to offer ample security for money advanced. Time presses. Russian diplomacy has no skill in creating conditions favourable to itself. In this case the conditions have arisen of themselves, and all that remains to be done is to take advantage of them."

I have, &c.  
 GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 145.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

Sir, *Chengtzu, January 20, 1912.*  
 I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reporting that the Government at Chengtzu has officially announced its receipt of the news of the proclamation of a Chinese Republic under the presidency of Sun Yat Sen.

I have, &c.  
 W. H. WILKINSON

Enclosure 1 in No. 145.

*Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Chengtzu, January 20, 1912.*  
 AT 9 o'clock this morning men paraded the streets of Chengtzu beating gongs and distributing the handbill of which I have the honour to enclose translation. All householders were required, by order of the Chengtzu Government, to display for the next three days the national flag in honour of the establishment of the Chung-hua Min-kuo, or Republic of China.

Mr. Ritchie, the provincial postmaster (who returned from Chungking with his assistant, M. Chaudoin, on the 17th instant) tells me that he has received an official notification from the Chengtzu Government in the above sense; but, so far, no communications have been addressed to the consular body.

I have, &c.  
 W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 145.

*Circular Notification by the Chengtzu Government, January 19, 1912.*

(Translation.)

CHUNGKING has to-day forwarded telegrams from Ichang and Nanking to the effect that a Provisional Central Government has been set up; that Sun Wen has been elected president (Ta Tsung-t'ung); that the capital is to be at Nanking; and that the solar calendar will be substituted,



Circular instructions have been issued to the prefectures, departments, and districts, and the text of the telegram is now published.

The various offices, committees, schools, shops, and residents in the provincial capital will, beginning from to-morrow, all alike fly the national flag for three days to display their congratulations.

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*Telegram from Chungking dated the 8th day of the First Moon (N.S.), (January 8, 1912) to Yün and Lo, Presidents of the Szechuan Chün Cheng Fu.*

Telegrams have just been received from the Assembly of Delegates of the various provinces at Nanking and from Tai, conciliator (An Fu-shih) at Ichang, by which we are glad to learn that a Provisional Government has been set up. Mr. Sun I-hsien (Sun Yat Sen) has been chosen as President. The solar calendar will be substituted, the 13th day of the winter moon becoming the 1st day of the 1st year of the Chung-hua Min-kuo (Republic of China). On that day he arrived at Nanking and assumed office. The capital will be at Nanking.

Our poor place (Chungking) at once chose a day for flying flags in congratulations and to celebrate the great event.

The various departments and districts have been notified, and we now telegraph to convey to you the news.

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No. 146.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 23, 1912.*

THE accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai is of interest as affording some indication of the dislocation caused in everyday matters of the international settlement by the interregnum between the cessation of Imperial authority and the establishment of republican rule. Mr. Fraser's despatch was written just before the abdication of the Throne, and the election of Yuan Shih-kai as President of the provisional Republic. It is to be hoped that the gradual consolidation of north and south under a new Government will tend to regularise things, and remove the anomalies of which Mr. Fraser complains.

On the other hand it is quite clear from Dr. Wu T'ing-fang's circular instructions to the military governors that the recovery of sovereign rights will be as prominent a feature in the programme of the new régime as it was in that of the old, with this difference, however, that the new men will bring far more knowledge and experience of Western methods to the prosecution of the movement.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 146.

*Consul-General Fraser to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Shanghai, February 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report on the difficulties arising from the failure of the Republican Provisional Government to establish a regular system of administration in this district.

Soon after the revolution started Wu T'ing-fang notified us of the officers of the new administration. They included a military governor of the Shanghai army, but no officer to replace the taotai. On the 19th November this governor wrote to the senior consul that he had appointed a Mr. Hsü, formerly interpreter to the Italian lawyer Musso, and a Mr. Ts'ai as commissioners for international affairs, and these two tried to intervene in mixed court matters. On the 16th January Mr. Wen Tsung-yao informed us that he was commissioner of trade and foreign affairs by appointment of the President, Sun; and in conversation he assured me that he was the only local authority thus duly appointed, and that Hsü had been warned off. Hsü, however, remained in the yamên in the city of the self-appointed military governor, and recently sent a launch which seized a British cargo-boat loading ammunition for the Russian

gun-boat "Mandjour," at Hankow, on to a Japanese river steamer. Mr. Wen's efforts to get the capture returned succeeded only after the lapse of a week, and I had privately to ask Mr. Wilkinson to move the President to have the powers and functions of the republican officers here put on a proper footing before even this success was attained.

The various authorities have, however, no subordination, and no head to whom effective appeal can be made to redress wrongs, such as the holding to ransom of respectable native residents in the settlement. The military governor is quite superfluous, as the troops are under their own generals and the garrison under an ex-convict, while the Woosung Forts are a separate command.

Money is raised by forced subscription supplemented by contributions from abroad, there being as yet no time for the Nanking council to regulate the revenue. Trade is consequently very poor, and republican enthusiasm among the mercantile classes is waning.

Mr. Ma Soo, private secretary to the President, Sun, called on me on the 3rd instant to assure me that various complaints I had asked His Majesty's consul at Nanking to bring to the notice of the President had been attended to.

The absence of any duly recognised native authority with whom we can hold official relations has naturally caused great inconvenience, especially in regard to the mixed court, and the transfer of land inside and outside the settlement.

At the end of November the military governor's commissioner for foreign affairs suggested a system for the rendition of offenders, and the production of witnesses wanted in the mixed court and in revolutionary courts outside the settlement, but the scruples of some members of the consular body prevented any arrangement being come to.

The awkward position thus created gave the senior magistrate, Kuan, an excuse for applying for and accepting for himself and his two assistants appointment and seal at the hands of the new rulers; but this step he recalled at the instance of the consular body.

More recently the question of appeals in civil cases heard in the mixed court has come up. The acting Italian consul-general maintains that under his treaty which contains a provision identical with article 17 of our Treaty of Tien-tsin, the only appeal is to himself assisted by Chinese authorities. Others have suggested the court of consuls, or the consul-general concerned with two others as assessors, or that the chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce replace the taotai; but none of these proposals meet the obvious difficulties, that no one can enforce a judgment on a party to a suit in an extra-territorial place except that party's own national authority, and that the republicans are not likely to let their commissioner for foreign affairs be passed over in favour of the head of a concern semi-official at best. Litigants in the mixed court are not bound to surrender the right of appeal, and to accept a re-hearing before several of its judges in lieu thereof. The result must be delay, if not injustice, until Mr. Wên is recognised as taking the taotai's place.

As regards land the republicans do not object to the consular body's arrangements within the settlement, but beyond its limits they demand that deeds shall be stamped by their commissioner, who shall also decide as to the payment of sheng-ko, and of rates for land in excess of title-deed area.

I do not think any of the persons immediately concerned would object to the republican proposals, provided they were sure that in the event of the present *de facto* administration being upset the validity of their titles under its officer's seal could not be called in question.

The only objection, and it is a serious objection, would arise were we to let the new Government appoint the magistrates of the mixed court, since native residents would thereby be laid open to enforced contributions to republican funds. There would, however, in my opinion not be any difficulty at present, at least in postponing any interference with the present provisional arrangement regarding that court with the improved working of which all classes of Chinese are content, or in preventing the reappearance of the abolished runners, who were and would be the instruments of irregular pressure on native residents.

That the new rulers may not prove complaisant of our privileged position is, however, indicated by a circular issued by Wu T'ing-fang to all military governors of which a summary is enclosed.

I have, &c.

E. D. FRASER.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 146.

*Summary of a circular embodied in a notification issued by the Shanghai Director of Civil Administration from Dr. Wu Ting-fang to Military Governors.*

THE circular opens by charging the Manchù dynasty and its representatives with ignorance of foreign affairs and gross incompetence throughout their dealings with the Powers, with whom, when the barrier to alien intercourse was first removed, the Government contracted treaties. From an initial policy of illogical hectoring they made an abrupt *volte-face* to one of surrendering more of our sovereign rights than the treaties covered in response to every harsh demand; the deplorable result was to set up precedents for all sorts of disaster.

These prerogatives the new Government must set itself promptly to recover, though for the moment he deprecated raising too many foreign problems in view of the stress of military questions. While on important issues yielding would be improper, temporary maintenance of old custom pending later measures was a position that could not be denied.

Whilst the provinces were being fought for and won back, each had managed its own foreign affairs; the result had been that in some instances they had overreached, in others fallen short of, the mark. In the former case no advantage had accrued and friendly relations were impaired, in the latter sovereign rights were lost and the seeds sown of future misfortune. Still the difficulties of the situation were excuse for past imperfections. But now that the general position of affairs in the south and east had more or less resolved itself it was proper that all matters affecting foreign relations should be entrusted to one administration, which was therefore step by step absorbing responsibility for all questions falling within the realm of international intercourse.

In Shanghai, however, some provisional arrangement (which might also serve as a pattern for other treaty ports having concessions) to checkmate aggression and encroachments and assure effectiveness of future reforms was rendered an urgent necessity by the importance and magnitude of foreign interests there.

Such an arrangement, drafted in the form of regulations, he now circulated to military governors to be enjoined on citizens and soldiery by public proclamation.

*Regulations of the Republican Government of China to be observed in matters affecting the Settlements.*

1. The recovery of authority at Shanghai, where the civil and police administration of the international and French settlements is controlled by foreigners, must be left until the political situation is securely established, and Chinese in the settlements must not meanwhile suddenly set the authorities at defiance or act with indiscretion.

2. Criminals in hiding on the settlements or engaged there in smuggling contraband must be reported to the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, who will make the proper representations to the consular body. In the case of arrests the bureau shall, before such arrest can be effected, apply to the senior consul to back the warrant. No other board and no private individual nor military authority shall approach the senior consul direct or effect arrests on their own initiative.

3. Chinese of whatever condition, official or otherwise, may not carry arms on the settlements. Should it be necessary for persons bearing arms to pass through the settlements, the military governor shall notify the Bureau of Foreign Affairs specifying the route to be followed, the numbers of the party and of the arms carried. The bureau shall then obtain from the municipal council a permit enabling the party to pass along the route in question.

4. The officers hitherto appointed by the Manchu dynasty to the mixed court at Shanghai were for the most part a degenerate lot who fostered rank corruption, and when the city seceded to the republican cause the court set up for itself, and did not come again under our control. This sort of proceeding properly called for challenge, and some scheme by which the court's authority can be wrested back is vitally imperative. The Bureau of Foreign Affairs shall therefore make it its business to negotiate to that end with the foreign consuls, subsequently selecting suitable officers to administer the court, and gradually work out a revision of its rules. Whilst the discussion is in progress, however, we republicans must not interfere and so create fresh complications.

*Additional Rules.*

5. The premises of native and foreign residents and shopkeepers on the settlements shall not be liable to arbitrary search. Should the search of premises be necessary the bureau shall apply to the consul for a warrant duly endorsed authorising search in conjunction with the settlement police.

6. In the interests of public order munitions of war held in store in Shanghai are immune from random search. The bureau shall, however, ascertain the owner of such stocks, or, on the military administration establishing and reporting their origin, may require from the owner his import and export permits, and record the facts to his consul. Should the munitions subsequently be illicitly exported, the steamer on which they are shipped shall be examined on clearing port limits, and the bureau shall on receiving its officer's report move the consul concerned to depute officials to accompany the bureau's officials to detain the munitions, which shall be sent to the prize court to be dealt with.

7. Merchant steamers of neutral Powers shall be immune from examination within the limits of the port, the bureau approaching the consul concerned should proof of its carrying contraband be established.

8. By international law, foreign vessels of war and all other Government vessels and lighters are exempt from search and detention, and this usage must be rigidly observed.

9. By universal usage Government stores imported in foreign steamers have hitherto been exempt from duty and all restrictions. If it be proved beyond question that contraband is concealed in such stores, they are still immune from detention, and the facts can only be reported to the bureau, who will approach the consul concerned.

10. The above regulations shall apply to foreign concessions at other treaty ports, modifications being made to suit local customs and precedent, and any variance of treaty procedure. The circumstances shall, however, be notified to the authorities of the port in question to enable an alternative arrangement to be promulgated.

No. 147.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Nanking reporting upon the reception there of the edicts announcing the abdication of the Throne and the appointment of Yuan Shih-kai to form a republican Government.

Much of the information contained in Mr. Wilkinson's despatch has already been reported to you from this legation, but the views of the republican Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the possible removal of the capital to Nanking may be of interest.

I do not altogether endorse the belief, which appears to be widely accepted, that the revolution could have been crushed had the Imperialists followed up their success after recapturing Hanyang instead of concluding the armistice. There had already been a wholesale secession of the provinces, and it therefore seems to me inaccurate to represent the movement as being then in its infancy. There can, I think, be no doubt that at the best a long and bloody war would have ensued if terms had not been arranged.

The deputation from the south, headed by Tsai Yuan-pei and T'ang Shao-yi, are due to arrive here to-morrow.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 147.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, February 16, 1912.*

THE news that the abdication edicts had been issued at Peking reached the Government here on the evening of the 12th instant. The same afternoon a joint sitting of the Cabinet and Assembly had been held at which the decision had been arrived at to send an ultimatum to Yuan Shih-kai stating that, unless the abdication of

the Emperor was proclaimed within three days, all negotiations would be broken off. It was within half an-hour of the despatch of this ultimatum that Yuan Shih-kai's telegram announcing the issue of the edicts was received so that the two messages must have crossed one another. I saw the president in connection with the difficulties of the Post Office the following morning when he gave me the news, and mentioned that, though the text of the edicts had not yet reached him, from the summary of them telegraphed it was evident that they were satisfactory. The provisional capital was the only point over which there was likely to be some difficulty, for, of course, his Government wanted Nanking to be the seat of government, whereas Yuan Shih-kai wished it to be at Peking. As the full text of the edicts arrived that evening, I called the next day on Mr. Wang Chung Hui, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to enquire whether the opinion of his Government was still as favourable as at first. Mr. Wang Chung Hui assured me that they were quite satisfied with them and especially so with the personal message from Yuan Shih-kai which had followed them. The only fault they had to find on perusing the edicts was that Yuan Shih-kai was appointed head of the republican Government. The head of a republican Government could be elected only by the people, and Yuan Shih-kai's appointment as such by a mandate from the Manchu Emperor was a contravention of the right of the people to select their head themselves. They had, therefore, telegraphed to Yuan Shih-kai suggesting that, as a matter of pure formality, he should resign his position when he would be at once elected President of the Republic by the National Assembly. As Yuan Shih-kai appears to have taken this message amiss, I should mention that it was sent before his personal telegram to the Government here was received, otherwise I feel sure that the quibble would never have been made.

I then asked Mr. Wang Chung Hui whether any arrangement was likely to be come to on the question of the provisional capital, in which the Foreign Ministers were deeply interested. It appeared to be asking a great deal of the latter to move south with all their staffs for what might only be a few months, since it was by no means certain that Nanking would be the capital eventually chosen by the national convention. Besides, there was the additional objection that there was no accommodation in this city for the legations. Mr. Wang Chung Hui replied that his Government fully recognised this difficulty, but, apart from other reasons, it seemed to them absolutely essential to the peace of the country that the capital should not be moved for the present from Nanking. As I was no doubt aware, it was no easy matter for them, even now, to keep the extremist elements in their party, and especially the army, under control and to shift the centre of authority at this crisis to the north would lead to fresh outbreaks of disorder in all the southern provinces and possibly to a fresh rebellion. Yuan Shih-kai, on the other hand, could come down to Nanking with no real danger to the peace of the north, and it was for this reason that they were so anxious that he should take over the presidency here instead of forcing them to go up to Peking. He could leave the Government at Peking in the hands of anyone he cared to appoint. To deal with the diplomatic body, some special arrangement would have to be made which would enable the Ministers to continue to reside at Peking until it was finally decided where the new capital was to be located. The Minister for Foreign Affairs could, for instance, have his office in Peking. Whether Nanking or Wuchang would be eventually chosen as the capital it was impossible to say, but if Nanking remained the provisional capital it would probably be given the preference over Wuchang. Mr. Wang Chung Hui then went on to say that the President and Cabinet were placing their resignations in the hands of the Assembly which would consider the edicts and decide on the next step to be taken.

Mr. Wang Chung Hui's contention, that the removal of the capital just now from Nanking to the north might cause serious trouble in the southern provinces is not, I think, without justification, for Mr. Ma Liang, who is personally in favour of Peking as the provisional capital, is also of this opinion, and he is by no means of a pessimistic turn of mind. Whether the abandonment of Peking in favour of Nanking would have an equally bad effect on the north is a point on which the Government here is probably unable to judge, but I believe they are quite sincere in their belief that it would involve far less risk of disturbance than the removal of the Government from here.

On the evening of the 13th instant Messrs. T'ang Shao Yi and Wu T'ing-fang came up to Nanking to attend a special conference of the Cabinet, at which it was decided to send a delegation to Peking at once, headed by Mr. T'ang Shao Yi, and including, amongst other officials, Mr. Tsai Yuan Pei, the Minister here for Education, to confer with Yuan Shih-kai and endeavour to persuade him to come to Nanking and take over the presidency.

The National Assembly also sat that afternoon to consider the resignation of the President and Cabinet, and the appointment of a new President, the session continuing until yesterday evening, when it was announced that the resignations of Dr. Sun Wen and his Cabinet had been accepted, but that they had been asked to continue in office until Yuan Shih-kai, who had been unanimously appointed to succeed Dr. Sun Wen as President, was able to take over the duties of his office. The Assembly also decided in favour of Nanking as the provisional capital, though only after much discussion and apparently by a small majority. In his message sending in his resignation Dr. Sun Wen strongly recommended the appointment of Yuan Shih-kai as his successor, but made it conditional, it is said, on his coming to Nanking to take over the presidency. I understand, however, that Yuan Shih-kai's appointment by the Assembly has no conditions attached to it, though, by making the provisional capital Nanking, they have made it necessary for him, if he accepts the post, to come to Nanking to take it up.

There can be no doubt of the genuine satisfaction with which the news of the abdication has been received by the Government in Nanking, which is evidence, if any were needed, of the earnest desire of the authorities here for peace. The Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to be quite confident when I last saw him that the delegation which was going up to Peking would be able to convince Yuan Shih-kai of the desirability of retaining the capital provisionally at Nanking, and to persuade him to come here in person to take over the Government. A certain amount of suspicion as to Yuan Shih-kai's ultimate aims and ambitions still exists in the south, and though his cordial message to the President has done much to dissipate it amongst the leaders of the party, who fully recognise the debt the country owes to Yuan Shih-kai for staying his hand at Hanyang, when he had every chance of crushing the revolutionary movement in its infancy, and for his masterly policy since in effecting the retirement without further bloodshed of the Manchu dynasty, the rank and file of the party, and especially the army, still regard the ex-Premier with considerable distrust. This distrust, in the opinion of the Government here, will only be completely dispelled if Yuan Shih-kai consents to come to Nanking, and it explains why it is feared that his refusal to do so, and the consequent removal of the Republican Cabinet to the north, which would probably follow, may result in a fresh outbreak of disorder in the southern provinces, where it will be regarded as proof that Yuan Shih-kai is not reconciled to the new form of government against which he harbours nefarious designs.

Outside the official world there appears to have been no excitement over the edicts, the issue of which have been expected for some time. Amongst the gentry and merchants of Nanking there has always been considerably more confidence in Yuan Shih-kai's good faith than amongst the officials, and no doubt has been felt that he would arrange the abdication in a satisfactory manner. The event was officially celebrated yesterday by a special salute at noon and by a military review, which, as practically all the troops left in Nanking, about 5,000 in number, are recruits, gave one a poor idea of the strength and efficiency of the revolutionary army. The President, riding a small Chinese pony, which was led by a groom in semi-foreign costume, attended the pageant, accompanied by a large staff, but he appears to have attracted less attention than a company of Amazons, who almost monopolised the interest of the few spectators.

Since I last addressed you the local newspaper has published the remaining sections of the draft of the constitution of the provisional republic, but as some of the clauses are still under discussion by the Assembly I am waiting for the final version before sending a translation to you. Its most important provisions are as follows:—

Chinese citizens are granted full liberty of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of creed. Their property and person are to be inviolable. They are, in fact, to be as free henceforth from any possible form of political oppression as the citizens of any other country in the world. As an offset to these advantages, education, military or naval service, and the payment of taxes are made compulsory. The powers of the President are almost identically the same as those of the President of the United States of America, while the Assembly combines the duties of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives. The President, however, though head of the executive, is in no way answerable for the acts of the Government, for which the Ministers bear the entire responsibility. The judicial administration is also reformed. I understand that it is the irresponsibility of the President to the country that has met with the disapproval of the Assembly, which proposes, too, to curtail his power by the appointment of a Premier after the French system. I should also mention that the President is appointed by the constitution the representative of the nation to receive

foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, which puts a further difficulty in the way of having the legations in Peking and the President at Nanking.

As I telegraphed to you on the 13th instant, the interference with the postal administration by the authorities here was made the subject of verbal representations by the consular body to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who assured us that there was no intention on the part of the Government to interfere with the *status quo* of the administration or with the stamps in use, though it was proposed to issue a special set of stamps, for use in China only, to commemorate the establishment of the republic. He also undertook to send instructions in this sense to the revolutionary provinces, in which the postal authorities were now experiencing difficulty with the local governments. The President was also present at the interview. Before calling on Mr. Wang Chung Hui we had of course made ourselves fully acquainted, through the postal commissioner here, with the grievances of the Post Office; but it was on the ground that the confusion and disorder into which the Chinese postal organisation was being thrown was affecting its relation with the union post offices that we based our complaints.

The revolutionary army appears to be again advancing up the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway. On the 14th instant their outposts were within 10 miles of Hsüchow-fu, which General Chang Hsün was preparing to evacuate.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

No. 148.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

Sir,

*Peking, February 27, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have received from Shanghai copies of the minutes of the first two meetings of the bankers' commission appointed to supervise the custody and distribution of the customs revenue pledged to the foreign loans and indemnity payments. These meetings were held on the 8th and 10th instant respectively, and the first was attended by representatives of nine foreign exchange banks.

A statement was drawn up showing the seven outstanding loans according to priority of signature, and also a list of the due dates of instalments of principal and interest on these loans from the 20th November, 1911, the date of the first default, until the end of 1912. At the first meeting it was decided that while loans rank first according to priority of signature of loan agreement, payments should be made out of customs funds in hand and be received in future according to the due dates of instalments of principal and interest. Should default be made on a payment due, then the next funds coming in should be applied to complete the payment of such instalment of principal and/or interest, after which payments would again be proceeded with according to the list referred to above.

The second meeting was held to discuss the rate of interest to be charged on overdue instalments of principal and interest, and it was agreed that on all instalments overdue on account of the loans, interest should be charged at the rate of the respective loan, subject to the approval of the issuing banks. A question of priority between a payment due at Shanghai on the 31st December, 1911, on account of the 6 per cent. gold loan of 1895, and a payment due on the 20th December on account of the 5 per cent. gold loan of 1896, was decided in favour of the former.

The above-mentioned lists, together with the decisions adopted by the commission, were duly communicated by the secretary of the commission on the 12th instant to the commissioner of customs at Shanghai for his guidance, and the latter was requested to forward to the respective banks as soon as possible his cheque for the amounts at present due to them.

It will be seen from the above that repayments of principal are to be on the same footing as payments of interest. The total payments due for the service of the loans up to the end of 1912 according to the list drawn up by the bankers' commission, amount to a total of approximately 3,871,093*l.* Under normal circumstances the customs revenue is amply sufficient to cover this sum, but as explained in my last despatch on this subject, it is possible that at the beginning of next April there may

not have been time for sufficient revenue to accumulate to carry on uninterruptedly the service of the loans if principal as well as interest has to be paid.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 149.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

Sir,

*Peking, March 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's consul at Nanking, reporting upon the attitude of the Nanking Assembly in the matter of the seat of the Provisional Government, and showing that the idea of retaining Peking as the permanent capital of China is now no longer entirely rejected in the south.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 149.

*Consul Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Nanking, February 22, 1912.*

THE Chinese New Year holidays, which have intervened since I last addressed you, brought all public business to a standstill from the 17th to the 20th instant. Nominally, the Government offices were only closed on the first of the Chinese year, but as they were deserted by every soul connected with them from the last day of the old year until yesterday, they might just as well have been shut up for the whole of the period. By the people at large the change from the lunar to the Gregorian calendar, inaugurated by the new Government, has been utterly ignored. The new year is being celebrated in the usual way and with the usual ceremonies; clothes have been taken out of pawn, the streets are full of Chinese in their best dress exchanging congratulatory calls, and all shops and other business establishments are closed.

As I had the honour to telegraph to you yesterday, General Li Yuan Hung, whose resignation reached the National Assembly too late to be considered simultaneously with that of the President and Cabinet, was unanimously re-elected Vice-President of the Provisional Republic at a special meeting held on the 20th instant. I also gave you in the telegram some particulars of the voting of the Assembly on the question of the provisional capital. It appears that, in spite of the conditions attached by President Sun to his resignation, namely, that the provisional capital should be at Nanking, and that Yuan Shih-kai, if elected as his successor, should come to Nanking in person to take over office, the Assembly, after accepting Dr. Sun's resignation, voted that Peking should be the provisional capital by a majority of sixteen provinces to one, Nanking finding only one supporter—Canton. As this was a rebuff for the retiring President, to which it was hardly to be expected that he would submit, the strongest pressure was at once brought to bear on the members of the Assembly to reverse their decision, the chief argument used being that the removal of the provisional capital to Peking would not be tolerated by the army. In any case the Assembly gave way, and on a second vote being taken there was a majority of over two-thirds in favour of Nanking. I am informed, however, that it would be quite wrong to deduce from the figures of the first vote taken that all the provinces with the exception of Canton are in favour of Peking as a provisional capital. The real explanation of their vote is that the large majority of the members of the Assembly are so very anxious for peace, that they voted for Peking with the object of removing the only serious obstacle, the location of the capital, in the way of a successful issue to the negotiations for the formation of a coalition Government.

I also learn that on the first vote for the Presidency there were thirteen provinces in favour of Yuan Shih-kai, three in favour of Sun Wen, and one in favour of Li Yuan Hung. Mr. Ma Liang, who, I should explain, is the public orator of the Nanking Government, thereupon addressed the Assembly, pointing out the importance of unanimity on the subject, and his arguments were evidently so effective that on a second vote being taken Yuan Shih-kai was unanimously elected to the position.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I had occasion to see yesterday on



business, professes to have no doubt that Yuan Shih-kai will agree to come to Nanking and assume the Presidency, but I was struck by the fact that he no longer rejected the idea of Peking as the permanent capital. It is not impossible, therefore, that some understanding has been arrived at with Yuan Shih-kai. Mr. Wang Chung Hui's explanation of the vote given by the Assembly in favour of Peking was, that it was given under the impression that the permanent capital was being voted for. The President was entitled under the constitution to return the Bill with his objections to the Assembly for reconsideration, so that there was nothing unconstitutional in the action he had taken in the matter.

I have, &c.

F. E. WILKINSON.

No. 150.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

Sir,

*Peking, March 3, 1912.*

MY telegrams of the 1st March briefly acquainted you with the disturbances which occurred at this capital on the previous evening and during that night.

As I had the honour to inform you the trouble began in a regiment belonging to the 3rd Division, a section of Yuan Shih-kai's own troops, quartered in the military school. It would seem that reports had been circulated to the effect that the soldiers in Peking would be disbanded on Yuan Shih-kai's proposed visit to Nanking to be inaugurated as President, that their queues would be compulsorily discarded, and that their pay would be reduced from war footing pay, viz., 5 dollars per month, to pay on peace footing, viz., 4 dols. 15 c. a-month. The real cause of the outbreak is, however, still uncertain.

Firing was heard at about 7.30 P.M., and the first attack, it is stated, was made on the Nanking delegation quartered in the nobles' school, as they were supposed to have insisted on the President's going to Nanking. The delegates escaped and took refuge in the legation quarter, where they are staying at the hotel. In the meantime another regiment of the same division stationed outside the Ch'i Hua Mên started for the city, and, firing their rifles in the air, began their acts of incendiarism and looting. By 9 o'clock several houses were in flames, and from one point of view a dozen places were burning, the majority in the east city north of the Wai-wu Pu, and a few outside the Ch'ien Mên to the east. The Tung An market was also burnt to the ground. Looting began in earnest and the soldiers were strengthened by a large mob following. The plundering and shooting continued throughout the night, and all next day the revolted troops were moving about everywhere perfectly unconcerned as if nothing had happened.

Fears were entertained that foreigners living outside the legation quarter were in danger, and escorts were sent out to bring them in. This was accomplished without any difficulty, and many foreigners who watched the acts of the soldiers throughout the night were not molested. Hatamen Street, Wang Fu Ching Street, and other streets in the neighbourhood, were looted and burnt, but not many attempts were made to kill or wound, unless householders resisted the deprivation of their property. The legation quarter was closely guarded and men were posted at strategic points; but beyond a stray bullet or two which found their way into the British Legation compound, and a shell which was discovered unexploded in the American Legation grounds, the quarter suffered in no way from the disturbance.

Another cause to which the trouble is attributed is the alleged anger of General Tsao Kun at the pressure which T'ang Shao-yi and the southern delegates were bringing to bear upon Yuan Shih-kai to induce him to go south, which was shared by his officers and men. The probability is that the general unrest following the overthrow of the old order of things was also a factor in producing the revolt. Whatever the cause may have been, the defection of the troops, on whom Yuan Shih-kai placed his main reliance, seems to have been entirely unexpected. The previous day (the 28th February) I saw T'ang Shao-yi, and found him in a very optimistic frame of mind. He spoke confidently of Yuan Shih-kai's going south in a few days and made light of the task of maintaining order in Peking during the President's absence. According to him the harmonious union of north and south was within reasonable distance of being accomplished, and the various Chinese parties would offer an example of self-denial and patriotism

worthy of imitation by the whole world. The following night the speaker was a fugitive in the legation quarter, and the city was a scene of desolation.

It is noteworthy that one of the first places which the soldiers attacked was the nobles' school where the southern delegates were lodged, and this fact, coupled with the remarkable consideration shown towards the Manchus, who hardly suffered at the hands of the marauders, would seem to indicate that the movement, if it had any political complexion, was not anti-Manchu at all events.

A portion of the mutinous troops commandeered a train and proceeded to Paoting-fu where they committed similar excesses, including, it is believed, the destruction of the French missionary property there. Yesterday it was reported that they were returning to Peking by train, and by order of Yuan Shih-kai two bridges were broken on the Peking-Hankow line to bar their progress.

In a note, copy of which is enclosed, T'ang Shao-yi requested me to convene a meeting of the diplomatic body, and several members of the Wai-wu Pu verbally preferred similar requests to me and other Ministers. The meeting held at 3 P.M. yesterday regarded the situation as still grave in spite of the drastic measures which had been taken to repress further disturbance. After long discussion, it was decided to call up another 1,000 men from Tien-tsin as a reinforcement for the legation guards, and to parade the streets daily in force with the view to giving moral support to what government existed. It was also considered advisable to make arrangements for maintaining communication by wireless telegraphy with Taku, and the Japanese Minister undertook to move his Government to send a ship there for that purpose.

The President has issued a manifesto to all foreign residents in Peking conveying his regrets and stating that every measure was being taken to prevent the recurrence of such a deplorable incident. Notices were also issued by Yuan Shih-kai to the troops on the 1st and 2nd instant. Copies of all these documents are enclosed.

A large number of the rioters were beheaded and their bodies left exposed in the streets, but in spite of the measures taken to repress the disorders, they have spread to Fengtai, the first post outside Peking on the line to Tien-tsin, and to Tien-tsin itself where, as I had the honour to report in my telegram of to-day, the troops have also mutinied and shooting and plundering have been taking place.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 150.

*T'ang Shao-yi to Sir J. Jordan.*

My dear Sir John,

March 2, 1912.

THE condition is getting most serious, news has just reached me that a large body of the troops from Paoting-fu are on their way to Peking. I beg to suggest that your Excellency should at once call a meeting of the diplomatic body and resolve measures to protect the capital from further looting and cause of bloodshed.

Yours very sincerely,

T'ANG SHAO-YI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 150.

*Notice issued by Yuan Shih-kai.*

TO all foreign missionaries, merchants, and other residents in Peking, greeting :

The unexpected disturbance last night on the part of a section of my soldiers has filled me with much sorrow. It is one of my chief duties to see to it that order is preserved in the capital, and until last night I was uniformly successful. To you, strangers in a strange land, I wish in particular to convey my sincere regret for the untoward incident and the very natural anxiety that you felt. Every measure and precaution is now taken to prevent the recurrence of such a disturbance.

YUAN SHIH-KAI,

*Provisional President of the Republic of China.*

*Peking, March 1, 1912.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 150.

*Précis of Extract from "Gazette" of March 2, 1912.*

NOTIFICATION BY YUAN SHIH-KAI TO THE TROOPS.

AN army is maintained for the sole purpose of protecting the people, and if they do not guard the lives and property of the people and preserve order, the very object of their existence is defeated. The credit of the army depends on a strict observance of discipline, and obedience to orders is the first essential. At the present time, too, when the republic has just been declared, it is all the more necessary that the troops and people should work in harmony to advance the welfare of the State, and it is therefore a matter of special disappointment that it should have been the troops who have taken the lead in breaking the laws.

I hereby instruct the officers of all the troops and the local authorities to capture all soldiers who are breaking the peace and the robbers who accompany them and deal with them under martial law. In future not only will any soldier who dares to make trouble and injure the merchants and people be most severely punished, but his commanding officer will suffer with him. No quarter will be given.

The Peking Chamber of Commerce has presented a report stating that great damage has been inflicted on the market by mutinous soldiers and that the people are terrorised, and requesting that the troops and police be instructed to take measures to preserve order, &c.

The disturbances and fires caused by the soldiers and their attendant rabble on the night of the 29th February, as well as the looting last night in the West City, are much to be deplored. Yesterday I issued instructions to the officers of the army and the local authorities to capture and punish by martial law all the soldiers found breaking the peace and the robbers who accompany them, and I also issued instructions that a calculation be made of the losses sustained by the merchants and people, in order that they may be compensated. I now further instruct all the troops to observe the regulations and to keep order, and I also command the Min Cheng Pu to order the police officers of the inner and outer cities to increase the police in the city and to make every effort to protect it from disturbance.

1. Besides the police who will be on duty as usual, extra patrols must be prepared. Chiang Kuei-ti's troops will be responsible for the patrolling of and the prevention of robbery in the whole city to-night.

2. The 3rd Division and General Hung's command will be off duty to-night.

3. In case of any sudden alarm to-night, the 3rd Division and General Hung's command will wait for orders, and must not go out or come in without authority.

4. Any person found disturbing the peace under cover of night shall be summarily executed.

To the merchants and people of Peking :

The outbreak of the troops was due to my mismanagement and lack of proper preparation. I am prepared to carry out to the best of my ability the duties of the high post to which the people have called me, but I am inexperienced. A large number of the soldiers have now returned to their allegiance, and they must atone for their past sins by a careful observance of the military regulations and the extinction of the flames of revolt. I have given orders for a calculation to be made of the losses of the merchants, that compensation may be given, and I hope that the markets, merchants, and people will carry on business as usual so as to allay panic.

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No. 151.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, March 18, 1912.*

YOUR despatch of the 30th January.

You are authorised, in concert with your colleagues, to agree to the suspension of repayments of principal on loans, if found necessary.

No. 152.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 20.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, March 19, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 19th instant, from the commander-in-chief on the China Station relative to the situation in China.

I am, &amp;c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 152.

*Commander-in-chief, China, to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, March 19, 1912.*

AUTHORITIES have sent back revolutionary troops to be disbanded ; 16,000 to 20,000 reported here ; Nanking, Shanghai, and generally all Yang-tsze River being disturbed in consequence. Men cannot be paid off or sent home for lack of money. Consider if more are sent they will cause serious trouble. Have requested Sir J. Jordan that Peking authorities be advised accordingly. "Newcastle" coming to protect Nanking, "Cambrian" to Shanghai.

No. 153.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 20.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, March 20, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 20th instant, from the commander-in-chief, China, relative to the movement of British troops in China.

I am, &amp;c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 153.

*Commander-in-chief, China, to Admiralty.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shanghai, March 20, 1912.*

WITH concurrence of His Majesty's Minister at Peking and consul-general at Canton have ordered men of Yorkshire regiment back to Hong Kong from Canton, leaving there the naval force in Clio and 170 Indian troops.

No. 154.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)*

Sir,

*Peking, March 8, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby, military attaché to this legation, relative to an incident which occurred on the night of the 3rd instant at Fengtai in connection with our protection of the northern section of the railway. The affair might easily have proved of a serious nature, and it is largely due to Colonel Willoughby and Mr. Barton that unpleasant consequences were averted. I desire to place on record my sense of the obligations which we owe to both of these officers for the tact and skill with which they treated a very delicate situation. In doing so, I should like to add that but for the presence of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the energy and decision shown

by Lieutenant-Colonel Hancocks, the efforts of Colonel Willoughby and Mr. Barton to effect a peaceful eviction of the Chinese troops from Fengtai would certainly have failed of success.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure in No. 154.

*Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby.*

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*Eviction of Mutinous Chinese Troops from the Vicinity of Fengtai Railway Station.*

THE wave of indiscipline which has swept through so many of the units of the Chinese army in the last few days spread to the troops at Fengtai Junction on the night of the 29th February–1st March (the same night that the outbreak occurred among their comrades of the 3rd division in Peking, a few miles distant). The Chinese troops at Fengtai, stated to be some 2,000 men in all, were the three battalions of the 12th Infantry Regiment and a portion of the 3rd Artillery Regiment (both field and mountain), all under the command of Brigadier-General Cheng Wen Yun, the commander of the 6th Infantry Brigade. These troops were hurriedly brought up from the neighbourhood of Lanchou at the beginning of February, just after the issue of the memorial of the Imperial generals urging abdication of the Throne, when a Manchu reactionary movement was apprehended. Practically the whole of the 3rd division was at that time brought up and concentrated in and about the capital. That portion of the division which came to Fengtai has remained there ever since, and has once or twice already given cause for anxiety, *e.g.*, on the 7th February the officer commanding British post at Fengtai telegraphed to me that “the general of 3rd division here has money to pay troops, but has not paid them. They seem very discontented, and talk of raiding stations if not paid before the 13th instant.” When the military outbreak occurred in Peking on the night of the 29th, the troops at Fengtai could easily have seen the glare of the conflagration in the city, and probably have heard the sound of the firing, which alone might have sufficed to start them rioting, without any actual communication or pre-arrangement with their comrades in Peking. At 3.30 A.M., on the night of the 1st March, I received the following telegram from the officer commanding British post at Fengtai:—

“Foreign staff and some Chinese withdrawn to British post at Fengtai, troops looting.”

Quickly followed by the following message:—

“Chinese troops started firing at Fengtai at about midnight. Have robbed station, and all foreigners have joined the British post for protection. It is advisable to cancel 7.2 up-train at Tien-tsin. I do not expect 7 down to leave Peking, and I cannot say as to 3 down at the present time.”

Subsequent enquiries showed that they had broken into all three station offices and robbed the safes, but had not actually molested any of the foreign railway staff.

On the evening of the 2nd March the officer commanding British post, Fengtai, telegraphed:—

“The Chinese guard on station took two deserters from 5.15 down. A good deal of excitement prevailed. After train had gone, some mutinous troops opened fire on 3rd division troops. Both cleared off. Chinese general here states mutineers mean to loot mail up-train, so have decided to stop at station below here till daylight. Mutineers have mountain guns, and Chinese general says he cannot capture them. Am standing by for developments.”

This day also Brigadier-General Cooper, commanding His Majesty's troops in North China, telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister:—

“It is impossible to adequately protect the railway at Fengtai if the Chinese troops are allowed to billet in large numbers close by. Position of the garrison there was somewhat precarious in the early morning of the 1st instant. In view of your wishing to reinforce the garrison of Peking, I suggest sending a battalion to Fengtai

to-morrow to drive off mutineers who are firing on trains. We can then reinforce Peking from Fengtai whenever required. Would suggest the advisability of asking for the Indian mountain battery and one battalion from Hong Kong."

His Majesty's Minister replied that he approved of the movement.

The Inniskilling Fusiliers accordingly (less the company at Wei-hai Wei) were railed from Tien-tsin to Fengtai on Sunday, the 3rd, arriving at about 5·15 P.M. *En route*, Lieutenant-Colonel Hancocks had telegraphed to Captain Wardlaw, commanding the detachment Somerset Light Infantry at Fengtai, to inform General Cheng that his troops must quit the vicinity of the station forthwith, which message was duly delivered to General Cheng. The Inniskilling Fusiliers arrived about 5·15 P.M., a portion of the train that brought them carried on to Peking the detachment of the Somerset Light Infantry which had hitherto been occupying the post at Fengtai.

Meanwhile a further message had arrived from the officer commanding British post, Fengtai, that—

"Trains passing through all right to-day. Troops here seem quiet. Have arranged with Chinese general to keep his troops off the station, and am occupying it with half a company and covering gunners' quarters and platforms as trains pass through. General ordered special for gunners to go to Yung-ting-men. They loaded up kit and then unloaded it, and said the move was cancelled."

In view of this message, and the possibility—or, rather, probability—of arranging for the complete removal of the Chinese troops from Fengtai without resort to actual hostilities, the ultimate result of which, as regards international relations, could not be foreseen, I ventured to suggest to His Majesty's Minister the advisability of moving the President or the War Minister to issue the necessary orders for their removal elsewhere. His Majesty's Minister approved of my suggestion, and Mr. Barton, Chinese secretary of the British Legation, was deputed to arrange accordingly with the President. About midnight Mr. Barton returned, and told me that the Minister wished me to accompany him at once to Fengtai. I accordingly started with Mr. Barton and Colonel Chiang, of the General Staff (a smart young officer who speaks Japanese), from the Chien Men station, in a special train provided for us by the Board of Communications under directions from Yuan Shih-kai, at about 12·40 A.M.

Colonel Chiang was somewhat nervous—thought he heard firing Fengtai way. He was pessimistic about our errand; said he had returned from Fengtai yesterday morning, where he had been sent to reason with the troops. He said that the general was quite reasonable, and he thought that the 12th Infantry would be so, but that the artillery were in a very obstinate mood, and that one of the artillery officers had made use of forcible language which he was unwilling to repeat to us. We arrived at Fengtai at about 1·15 A.M. without incident. Everything seemed quiet. We had arranged that Colonel Chiang should, on arrival, proceed without us to interview General Cheng and try and arrange for the peaceable withdrawal of the troops, and subsequently let us know, when we (Barton and I) would also go and interview him. We, meanwhile, went to find Colonel Hancocks.

Colonel Hancocks told us that on arrival, at about 5·15 P.M., he had at once informed the Chinese general that his troops must all be cleared out of an area extending some 2 li in each direction from the station within an hour; that the general had expressed his willingness to move but had asked for an extension of time, as there were a lot of stores to be moved and transport arrangements had to be made, and also arrangements for shifting the guns, ammunition, &c., all of which could hardly be done in the dark. Colonel Hancocks had agreed to allow him until 8 A.M. this morning, and had warned him that if the whole were not out of the area mentioned by that hour he would proceed to forcible measures to turn them out. He added that between 11 P.M. and midnight the traffic inspector and station-master had come to him with a report that the men of the artillery were greatly incensed at the eviction order, and had cleared off north, threatening to collect their comrades scattered about in the villages north of Fengtai and return and attack the British post. He did not, however, attach much importance to this report.

Mr. Barton and I then went on to the station-master's office, where we heard the story of the looting of Fengtai station, which began at 1 A.M. on the 1st March. The infantry were concerned in it as well as the artillery. They looted all three stations, including the safes containing the money. Many of the employés had fled, and the station-master had been continually at work and without sleep for four nights. He looked absolutely worn out.

About 4.20 A.M. an officer from General Cheng arrived and said the general would come and see us. Mr. Barton and I therefore proceeded with this officer to the station-master's room. Colonel Hancocks overtook us on the over-bridge and accompanied us. After about twenty minutes the staff officer who had come to us returned with General Cheng, and we had a long discussion until about 6.30 A.M., the upshot of which was that it was arranged that thirty-one cars and an engine, to convey carts, remaining guns, and stores of the 3rd Division troops to Liang-hsiang-hsien should be provided, the bulk of the artillery and infantry to march to Chang-hsing-tien. This took a good deal of arranging for, as it was necessary to get one of the Kin-Han locomotives from Chang-hsing-tien, but the I.R.N.C. were able to find the cars. Colonel Hancocks agreed to the necessary extension of time (beyond 8 A.M.) to enable this evacuation to be made. General Cheng then, in our presence, proceeded to make out the necessary orders and sent them off by the staff officer. It remained then to be seen whether the troops would obey these orders.

We broke up the meeting about 6.45, and Mr. Barton and I went to Mr. Rigby's house. On our return to the platform about 8 A.M., we were relieved to find the Chinese busy loading up the cars. The process of loading took up all the morning. The artillery we ascertained had already marched off, but had left in a swampy compound, just north of the station buildings, two of their new Krupp field-guns and the six limbers. When I saw them at about 10 A.M. they were minus their sights and breech-blocks. Large gangs of villagers eventually succeeded in dragging these guns out, matting being put down at the particularly swampy places. The train got off about 1 P.M., an engine having arrived from Chang-hsing-tien shortly before with a train of line trucks. We detained this engine, and it hauled the military train back.

The I.R.N.C. traffic inspector had told us that none of their employes dared to take a train down on to the Kin-Han Line, and Captain Symons, R.E., who had come up with the Inniskilling Fusiliers, had volunteered, if necessary, to drive the engine. When it became clear that the Chinese troops would all be got out by the middle of the day, Colonel Hancocks had decided to take his battalion back to Tien-tsin (all but two companies under Major Jones, left at Fengtai), and had arranged for the train with the railway authorities. Mr. Barton and I and Colonel Chiang were also given a special train to take us back to Peking, where we arrived a little after 2 P.M.

I think Mr. Barton and Colonel Chiang are both to be congratulated upon the tactful manner in which they succeeded in arranging this business, which contained all the elements of serious trouble, and it is probably a matter for congratulation that these turbulent troops were evicted from the neighbourhood of Fengtai without fighting, as the outbreak of hostilities here might have given an anti-foreign complexion to the disturbances which are now rife in this province.

M. E. WILLOUGHBY, *Military Attaché.*

*Peking, March 6, 1912.*

No. 155.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)*

Sir, *Peking, March 11, 1912.*

ON the 3rd instant I had the honour to report by telegram that the troops and the mob had been engaged the previous night in looting and burning the native city of Tien-tsin. The situation was completely beyond the control of the Chinese police. Doctor Schreyer, a German subject, was shot dead as he was driving past the scene of the disturbances, but foreigners have not otherwise suffered injury. The accompanying copy of a despatch from the acting consul-general supplies a report on the subject.

Two days later I received a telegram from Wang Chung Hui, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Nanking, to the effect that the Government of the Republic of China deplored the disturbances in Peking and neighbouring places, that it accepted responsibility for the situation, and was sending reinforcements to assist the President-Elect to restore order. His Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai telegraphed at the same time to say that troops were being sent up from Hankow, Pukou, and Chefoo, and that British shipping companies' steamers were being chartered by the republican authorities for the purpose. According to the acting consul at Chefoo, the dispatch of troops from that port was also imminent. So far from restoring confidence this step was regarded

with grave misgiving here, as being more likely to create fresh disorder than to make for tranquillity.

On the 6th March I learnt that two regiments of the 20th Division had been ordered from Tang-ho to Tien-tsin and might leave that night. I accordingly felt that no time should be lost in having these movements frustrated. The international commanders at Tien-tsin had already held a meeting on the 5th March, at which they decided that Chinese troops should not be permitted to enter the zone of 20 *li* round Tien-tsin, and that the Viceroy should be informed accordingly. If Chinese troops entered the zone, Major-General Abe, the Japanese commandant and senior officer, was to lodge a protest. If this failed, hostile action was to be taken against them.

In view of the situation which had arisen I called a meeting of the diplomatic body for the following morning, and, in the meantime, I requested Yuan Shih-kai to cancel the order for the movement of the two regiments from Tang-ho. I also instructed Mr. Porter to warn the Military Governor of Chefoo that no Chinese troops of any kind would be allowed within the interdicted radius of Tien-tsin, and that the foreign commandants were strictly enforcing this prohibition.

At the meeting of the diplomatic body the next day my colleagues endorsed my action. The orders to the troops had already been cancelled by Yuan Shih-kai and the Military Governor of Chefoo respectively, but to make doubly sure that foreign interests at Tien-tsin should not be exposed to any risk which could be prevented, a collective *note verbale* was signed and presented to the President-Elect, reminding him of the arrangement concluded with Prince Ch'ing in 1902. I have the honour to enclose copy of our communication.

I have not heard any more of the proposed dispatch of troops from Hankow and Pukou, and I think it is probable that the project has been abandoned, at any rate for the present.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 155.

*Consul-General Fulford to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*Tien-tsin, March 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report on the circumstances attending the looting and burning of an extensive part of the native city of Tien-tsin during the night of the 2nd-3rd instant.

The news of the recent rioting in Peking evidently excited the lower orders of the populace of Tien-tsin and a certain number of the soldier rioters of the Chinese 3rd Division came to Tien-tsin from Peking by train on the 1st and 2nd instant. It is supposed that these men were the ringleaders in our local disturbance. They were joined by men of the Tien-tsin fire brigades and local militia guards and a mob of the lowest classes. The Chinese police force showed itself quite unable to cope with the situation, and many of them are said to have aided in the work of robbery and incendiarism.

The disturbances commenced about 10 P.M., and continued through the night. The looters fired repeatedly in the air in order to terrify the occupants of the houses they wished to rob, but there was comparatively little loss of life. Houses were set on fire in all directions, and several of the principal business streets were reduced to ashes.

There would appear to have been a degree of system in the way in which the attacks were made upon the richest business quarter of the town. The looters were evidently under the guidance of men who knew the character of the places selected for plunder.

Not a single *yamên* or police-station suffered. The former were strongly guarded and the latter offered no inducement. The mob was not a savage one, and was keen only for loot. The number of them who carried arms was small.

The Pei Yang Mint was completely gutted by fire, and its valuable machinery destroyed. There was a large amount of *sycee* there, stated at 450,000 dollars, which was secured by the looters.

Appeals were made by telephone from the Chinese city police head station to the police offices of the various foreign concessions during the night for assistance in quelling the outbreak. It was obviously impossible to comply with these requests.



The foreign troops were on the alert to assist the police of the concessions in warding off any entry of the rioters.

A detachment of the Somersetshire Light Infantry was sent to the city railway station about midnight by rail from the settlements station in answer to an appeal for protection. They arrived just in time to prevent an attack by a band of men armed with rifles. Had the station and offices been sacked there would have been a rich booty, for there were some 800,000 dollars there. The Somersets were relieved the next morning by the French troops, who are charged with the protection of that section of the line.

On the 3rd instant the gentry of the city held a meeting at the Governor-General's yamên, and subsequently appealed to the consular body through the police commissioner to procure the assistance of foreign troops to keep order at night at the city.

The consular body met the same day and approved the principle of lending such assistance if possible, but left the decision of the mode of procedure to the officers commanding the various foreign troops. So far, the commanders, in view of the number of troops at their disposal, and the large area of the concessions which they have to guard, and the possibility of attacks upon the concessions by mutinous Chinese troops, have not considered it advisable to detach any troops for the purpose mentioned.

The city has remained quiet both by day and night since the outbreak. Its business is paralysed for the present, and it will take considerable time under the most favourable circumstances for it to recover. All traffic is stopped after 8 P.M., and great uneasiness is felt that there may be a renewal of the looting. The concessions are well guarded by the foreign troops.

I have, &c.

H. E. FULFORD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 155.

*Collective Note to Yuan Shih-kai.*

THE foreign representatives have the honour to remind his Excellency Yuan Shih-kai that, in accordance with the proposals contained in the identic note addressed on the 12th July, 1902, by the Ministers of the Powers having representatives on the Tien-tsin Provisional Government to Prince Ch'ing and accepted by the Chinese Government in his Highness's note of the 18th July, Chinese troops are not permitted to come within a radius of 20 *li* from the city of Tien-tsin. The commandants of the troops of the various Powers stationed in North China have already notified his Excellency the Viceroy of their intention to enforce this stipulation.

*Peking, March 7, 1912.*

No. 156.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)*

Sir,

*Peking, March 11, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received a letter, dated the 8th instant, from his Excellency Hu Wei-tê, head of the Wai-wu Pu, notifying me that Yuan Shih-kai would take the oath of office as Provisional President of the Chinese Republic at 3 o'clock on the 10th March.

Mr. Hu called upon me before he wrote this note, and sought my advice as to the propriety of inviting the foreign representatives to attend the ceremony. I suggested that a formal invitation might cause some embarrassment, and that it would be advisable to confine himself to a mere notification of the ceremony. He fully agreed, but expressed a wish that I should convene a meeting of the foreign representatives and let my colleagues know that although no invitation was issued, the Government would be prepared to make arrangements for any foreign visitors who wished to be present.

At the meeting of the diplomatic body which was held at this legation on the 9th instant, it was unanimously decided that the only correct course for us in the circumstances was to abstain from attending the function in any capacity, and an expression of regret at our inability to attend was duly conveyed to Mr. Hu Wei-tê.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

No. 157.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)*

Sir,

*Peking, March 12, 1912.*

SINCE I wrote my despatch of the 8th ultimo, the reports which I have received from His Majesty's consular officers in Szechuan indicate some improvement in the situation.

It appears that the invitation to Yünnan to send an armed expedition into Szechuan emanated from the Chungking Government at a time when the Imperial authority, represented by the late Viceroy Chao Erh-feng, still ruled at Chengtu, and Ho Chiang Hsien, on the Yang-tsze, still held out against the republican attacks. Yünnan's assistance was invoked, and now that it is no longer required for the original purpose, it is thought that it may still be utilised for ridding the province of the scourge of robbers of which it is still the prey. If the behaviour of the undisciplined and unemployed bands into which many of the troops in other parts of the country have resolved themselves can be taken as a criterion, it is more than likely, as the British consular officers at Chengtu and Chungking both predict, that the Yünnanese troops have no intention, in euphemistic language, of returning home empty-handed.

Apart from the fears entertained in respect of this circumstance, the acting consul at Chungking reports that the local authorities are directing their efforts to pacifying the country, a task which should be facilitated by the amalgamation of the Chengtu and Chungking administrations.

Provinces like Szechuan, which are not only self-supporting but have been in the habit of contributing substantial subsidies to poorer provinces, may possibly be inclined to make terms before entering the Republican Union. Szechuan resented the centralising policy of the Manchu Government as embodied in the railway loan, and it will be interesting to see the attitude which it and other provinces with autonomous aspirations adopt towards the Republican Government when the new rulers are obliged, as obliged they will be, to organise a system of increased taxation to meet the foreign obligations which they are daily adding to the legacy of external debt handed down by the Manchus.

I have, &amp;c.

J. N. JORDAN.











