

CHINA *at* WAR

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA



XIAOBING LI, EDITOR

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Santa Barbara, California • Denver, Colorado • Oxford, England

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

China at war : an encyclopedia / Xiaobing Li, editor.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-59884-415-3 (hardcopy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-59884-416-0 (ebook)

1. China—History, Military—Encyclopedias. I. Li, Xiaobing, 1954-

DS738.C5225 2012

355.00951'03—dc23

2011042572

ISBN: 978-1-59884-415-3

EISBN: 978-1-59884-416-0

16 15 14 13 12 1 2 3 4 5

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.

Visit www.abc-clio.com for details.

ABC-CLIO, LLC

130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911

Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911

This book is printed on acid-free paper 

Manufactured in the United States of America

To scholars and colleagues of Chinese military history.

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Note on Transliteration

The *hanyu pinyin* romanization system is applied to Chinese names of persons, places, and terms. A person's name is written in the Chinese way, surname first, such as Mao Zedong. Some popular names have traditional Wade-Giles spellings appearing in parentheses after the first use of the *hanyu pinyin* in the entry, such as Jiang Jieshi

(Chiang Kai-shek), as do popular names of places like the Yangzi (Yangtze) River and Guangzhou (Canton). Exceptions are made for a few figures, whose names are widely known in reverse order like Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan, or Sun Yixian), and a few places, such as Tibet (Xizang) and Yellow River (Huanghe).

Preface

China represents one of the oldest civilizations in the world with a recorded military history of 4,500 years. Based on its unique geographic setting, demographic characteristics, and political structure, China's military tradition emerged from its strategic concerns, war experience, civil-military relations, and technological development. As the largest country in Asia in both population and territory, China has frequently been involved in border conflicts, territorial expansion, civil wars, and invasions. China's war-fighting experience has become intertwined with Chinese history. Each imperial dynasty and modern government came to power through military struggle. In the twentieth century, the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) came to power through revolutionary wars against the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912) and warlords (1916–1927). And then the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Communist Party of China) defeated the GMD through the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Chinese military history is pivotal for a better understanding of Chinese civilization, political institutions, and foreign policy.

Whether China would ever go to war with the United States is a perennial foreign policy topic. Most pundits forget that, in fact,

both nations already fought 60 years ago. In October 1950, China sent its army to, in Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) words, "resist America, aid Korea, and defend the homeland." Over the next three years, more than 3 million Chinese troops battled the U.S.-led United Nations Forces (UNF), making the Korean War a conflict between China and the United States. Facing vastly superior firepower, China suffered 1.2 million casualties. While the American intent was to secure Korea through its police action, North Korean tenacity and China's intervention created a bitter stalemate on the Korean peninsula. The PRC reaped great benefits for the high price it paid in Korea. Having just been founded in October 1949, it created its dominant power status in Asia as a new communist state. Not only was China capable of fighting the world's most powerful country to a draw, but it also proved that Chinese society was secure enough to withstand a terrible conflict. Those factors brought first the Soviet Union and, after the Sino-Soviet split, the United States to seek Beijing's favor. Even today, the world's most powerful nations measure their standing in Asia by their relations with China.

China is rising in the twenty-first century. It has become the second-largest economy in the world by 2011, only after the

United States. The PRC is also modernizing its military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which includes the army, navy, air force, and strategic missile force. The PLA has the largest army in the world with a total of 2.3 million troops (the United States has 1.6 million). China policy debates focus on what it may mean to America. Many Americans and peoples of other nations are concerned about China's future course, especially in the area of its expanding military power. To learn more about Chinese military, the U.S. government and American schools are dedicating more resources to the study of the country's evolving modernization. American policy makers emphasize the development of a civil society and meeting of international standards as a step toward transforming China into a democratic society and for changing the relationship between the army and the party.

Scholars in the West have debated the "China threat." U.S. military historians and experts are attempting to determine if China threatens America and security in the Pacific region in the present and future. According to the China threat proponents, China's dramatic economic development will inevitably result in the expanding of its military power. This interpretation argues that no country that rose to power in modern world history did so in a peaceful manner, citing examples such as Great Britain in the eighteenth century, Germany toward the end of the nineteenth century, Japan during the first half of the twentieth century and the Soviet Union after the end of World War II (WWII). Conversely, they assert, any country that insists on the maintenance of peace will find it hard, if not impossible, to become a real power. Furthermore, the lack of political democratization in China and the distinct possibility of a war between the mainland and Taiwan (Formosa) make the future of

China uncertain, unpredictable and, therefore, extremely menacing. Others disagree and offer an entirely opposite view. Nevertheless, both sides of the argument link military modernization and political democratization.

Some of the American and Western military experts, however, are hindered by limited access to Communist sources. In China, scholarly research on the Chinese military takes a more social approach, paying more attention to the links between the military, politics, and society. Recent research in China focuses on the soldier's efforts to define his place within a socialist society. Moral issues, family values, individual concerns, a bureaucratic system, and educational factors were emphasized in academic discussions during the reform movement led by Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), the second generation of the CCP leadership. For political reasons, Chinese scholars still have a long way to go before objective, truthful, and scientific research on the history of Chinese military can be published in their home country. Broader coverage is needed to render an objective study of the Chinese military.

This encyclopedia offers students and general readers the opportunity to examine historically and better understand the key issues of Chinese military. These issues include strategy, sovereignty, national defense, domestic security, and technology, among others. Each entry provides a brief history of the topic with a solid, up-to-date foundation for learning about China's military in an accessible, engaging manner. Told through a Chinese perspective, the volume explores at the strategic level by examining how the leaders, whether emperors or presidents, made decisions and mobilized the country for war. It reveals how the leadership debated strategic decisions about objectives,

organization, and preparations for the final victory. It also examines the Chinese military structure, bureaucratic function, and technological development. Another focus of the book is on the Chinese operational experience at the strategic and tactical levels. It provides insights into Chinese battle planning and preparations, campaign organization and execution, tactical decisions, technology, and performance.

China at War looks into inner circles of the Chinese military that have defined the army's characteristics and changed through history. The Chinese army acted according to its own tradition and consistent logic in military affairs. The war experience often changed the direction of the country, and had a strong impact on China's economy, politics, culture, and society.

Chinese military history reflects a Chinese view of war. The values, concepts, and attitudes influenced their security concerns, strategic decisions, and approach to war. Comparing Chinese with Western views of war is a popular topic of discussion among military experts and the general public. Scholars in Europe and in America have studied the 4,500-year Chinese warfare and military thought, from Sunzi's (Sun-tzu, or Sun Zi) (544–496 BC) classic *The Art of War* and Mao Zedong's guerrilla warfare. Mao's military theories, which drew heavily on ancient classics like Sunzi's, remain a vital component of the Chinese military history and expertise. This consistent history reflects Chinese methods for conducting a war, some of which are diametrically opposed to the Western approach to war.

In comparison to the West, Chinese warfare offers a mixed picture. *China at War* shows several major features unique to the Chinese that are worthy of consideration, even if they may not constitute a separate way of war. First of all, Chinese warfare is

conducted by a political power center that can generate popular support for war. That power center could be a dynasty, government, rebel army, or political party that can mobilize the entire country and concentrate its economic resources on war through a highly centralized, well-organized, and very effective institution. Secondly, the Chinese emphasize the human component in war. Shaped by the military culture and traditional religions, the Chinese belief in human superiority over technology suggests a different attitude toward war and battle. The idea that a soldier or a warrior, because of his godliness and virtue, can vanquish stronger opponents is very traditional to the Chinese army. Thirdly, the Chinese operational culture emphasizes secrecy, surprise, and deception. Lastly, the Chinese do not consider protracted war as a favorable situation in traditional war fighting. The entries indicate that the Chinese military classics recognized the detrimental effects incessant warfare had upon the state.

This one-volume encyclopedia details the most important and influential people, events, ideas, battles, and technologies in Chinese military history. It provides a comprehensive resource on China's war-fighting experience in more than 4,500 years. The book expands beyond the conventional military perspective, addressing the Chinese view of war, their values, concepts, and attitudes. It includes entries by scholars from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. I would like to thank them for their work. I am grateful to David A. Graff, Kenneth Swope, Harold Tanner, Maochun Yu, and Xiaoming Zhang for their advice and support. My appreciations also go to my colleagues and collaborators at China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS, Beijing), East China Normal University (Shanghai), China Society for Strategy

and Management Research (CSSM, Beijing), China National Defense University (NDU), ROC National Defense University (Taiwan), Center of Academic Activities, Academia SINICA (Taipei), Chinese Historians in the United States (CHUS), and Chinese Military History Society (CMHS) in the United States. I am grateful to Col. Chuang Ming-hsien (ROC Nationalist Army, ret.), Dai Chaowu, Lt. Col. Guan Zhichao (PLA, ret.), Niu Jun, Wan Qing, Major General Wang Baochun (PLA), Yang Kuisong, and Zhang Pengfei for their help and advice on my research in China.

Many people at the University of Central Oklahoma (UCO) have contributed to the volume and deserve recognition. First, I would like to thank Provost William (Bill) J. Radke, Vice Provost Patricia A. LaGrow, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts Pamela Washington, Dean of the Jackson College of Graduate Studies Richard Bernard, and Associate Dean of the College of Liberal Arts Gary Steward. They have been very supportive of the project over the past three years. The UCO faculty merit-credit program sponsored by the Office of Academic Affairs and College of Liberal Arts research grant provided funding for my research and student assistants. The UCO student

research, creative, and scholarly activities (RCSA) grants sponsored by the Office of Research and Grants also made student research assistants available for this project during the past three years.

Special thanks go to UCO professor Stanley J. Adamiak who proofread and reviewed part of the manuscript. UCO graduate student Michael Molina managed the entire project through the years. The active UCO Rho Lambda Chapter of the Phi Alpha Theta international history honor society provided assistance in outreaching to contributors through its network. UCO professors Jeffrey Plaks and Michael S. Springer as UCO Phi Alpha Theta faculty sponsors supported this project from the beginning. Liuyue Cao designed and produced the maps. Sharon Kelting provided administrative assistance. Several graduate and undergraduate students at UCO contributed to the book, including Justin Burch, Jia Chen, Major Phredd Evans (U.S. Army, ret.), Charles David Heaverin (U.S. Air Force, ret.), Matthew J. Leeper, and Kevin Yang. I also wish to thank Andrew McCormick at ABC-CLIO, who patiently guided this project. Any remaining errors of facts, language usage, and interpretation are my own.

Xiaobing Li

Introduction

China, one of the earliest civilizations in the world, possesses rich historical documents, ancient relics, and folklore. Early Chinese military traditions evolved gradually through its prehistory, ancient, and classical periods. The contrasting military and strategic cultures developed during these great ages still stand out among the factors that differentiate China from other early civilizations: Roman, Egypt, and India. China's army acted according to its own consistent inner logic in its military affairs. Through its history, Chinese strategic issues, institutional characteristics, and operational behaviors created some general patterns through centuries of change, revolution, and war.

Ancient Warfare (2500–771 BC)

The ancient Chinese army experienced important transitions from warrior clans, to slave soldiers, and then to peasant soldiers, accompanying the development of a more unified civil government. A long period elapsed before the Chinese gradually progressed from living in groups to living as members of a clan (or tribe). Relics showing how primitive Chinese people lived in gens communes have been found in many parts of central China along the Yellow River (Huanghe), the cradle of Chinese civilization and military tradition. Warmer weather,

improved tools, and domestication of some animals in 12000–8000 BC led to agricultural development and expanding populations. The people had already acquired the skill of making stone and bone instruments and weapons. They also made bows and arrows for their hunting and protection. In approximately 3000 BC, many clans along the Yellow River developed patriarchal society.

Conflicts over arable land, slaves, and water resources evolved into large-scale warfare during the “Five-emperor Period” (*wudi*) (2600–2200 BC). This period marked the beginning of Chinese military history with the first soldiers, whose stone weapons and defense works protected the clans. Among the five emperors was the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi), who led many tribes in the Huaxia (Hua-Hsia) group along the western Yellow River. In 2250 BC, the Yellow Emperor's forces defeated the eastern army at Zhuolu. The Battle of Zhuolu was the first recorded battle in Chinese military history. The victorious Yellow Emperor marched his army farther east and south. Through three generations of military leadership—Yao, Shun, and Yu (or Great Yu)—the Huaxia group eventually conquered and unified Chinese territories. The Huaxia shaped Chinese civilization, with the Yellow River remaining central to China's historical development.

The Xia (Hsia) dynasty was established by the Great Yu (Dayu), which lasted from 2205 to 1766 BC. Although stone was still the major material for making tools and weapons, copper weapons appeared. Production of various kinds of tools and weapons had increased, and the progress made in the division of labor and the exchange of commodities sped up the development of the institution of private property and the division of society into classes. The Xia had a large army. Chinese rice productivity along the Yellow and Yangzi (Yangtze) Rivers generated enough wealth and food to support large numbers of troops. The Xia emperors also developed maps highlighting roads, rivers, and towns on their legendary “nine big tripods” for their commerce and military. Revolts toppled the Xia empire, leading to the creation of a new dynasty, the Shang.

The Shang dynasty (1766–1027 BC) established its capital first in Bo (modern Shangqiu, Henan Province) and then moved to Yin (Anyang, Henan). Under the Shang, China grew economically and militarily. Relics discovered in the Yin ruins indicate a structured government and well organized army. Walled cities appeared, along with bronze weapons. Inscriptions occur on some early bronzes, but most Shang writing has been found incised on “dragon bones,” actually the under-shells of tortoises, the scapulae or shoulder blades of cattle, and other flattish bones. But by the late Shang, continuous military expeditions, aristocrat factions and corruption, and hard punishments weakened the dynasty. Vassal or even rival states emerged, and the area under Shang control became smaller and smaller.

As the Shang declined, the state of Zhou (Chou), one of the Shang’s subordinate states in the west (modern Shaanxi Province), rose rapidly in terms of economy, military, and population. When the Shang

emperor asked the Zhou to join an eastern campaign, King Wu of the Zhou instead rebelled against the Shang. In early 1027 BC, King Wu, leading 45,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 300 wagons, marched east toward the Shang’s capital. Many anti-Shang troops joined him along the way. On February 4, the Zhou’s troops arrived at Muye, a small town about 30 miles from the capital. The Shang emperor led 170,000 troops, most of them slave soldiers, to meet the Zhou at Muye. The next morning, the Zhou king attacked the Shang’s center, the elite aristocratic troops. When the Shang’s elite troops fell back, most of the slave soldiers dropped their weapons and fled or joined the Zhou. The Shang emperor fled Muye and committed suicide in his palace that night. After the Battle of Muye, the Zhou king ended the Shang dynasty and established the Zhou dynasty.

The Zhou (Chou) dynasty (1027–221 BC) is historically divided into two periods: the Western Zhou (1027–771 BC) with the capital of Hao (Xi’an, Shaanxi), and the Eastern Zhou (771–221 BC) with the capital of Luoyi (Luoyang, Henan). The Zhou adopted a system of fiefs whereby land and people were awarded to various dukes or princes, even though all land technically belonged to the emperor. Each of the 200 lords’ domains consisted of a walled town and its surrounding countryside. Supported by his aristocratic warriors, the lord ruled over the peasant masses and the slaves. According to official records, 71 city-states were created in this manner. In 771 BC, the Western Zhou regime ran out of land and collapsed, and the imperial court moved eastward and established its capital at Luoyi.

Classics and Unification (771–206 BC)

The Eastern Zhou is divided into two historical periods: the Spring and Autumn Period (771–476 BC) and the Warring States

Period (475–221 BC). Because of the lack of central control and increasing competition among the rival states, philosophy, strategic theory, and literature flourished including Confucianism, Daoism (Taoism), and Sunzi's (Sun-tzu) (535 BC–?) military classic. Confucianism justified an authoritarian family pattern as a basis for social orders in political as well as in domestic life. The role of emperor and his officials was merely that of the father writ large. A district magistrate, who represented the emperor, was called the “father and mother” of the people (*fumu-guan*, parent-official). Confucius's (551–479 BC) philosophy became classical, since it provided ideas on how to overcome the civil wars and social disorders that all the Chinese rulers had to face during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods. It explains human nature or the natural laws of human beings through an ethical approach, whereas the Greek philosophers did so through logic, mathematics or physics, or religious approaches. Confucianism as a school of philosophy focuses on individual moral conduct, family relations, and moral government in the context of the society. Confucian and Daoist thoughts blended with Buddhist thought into the Chinese worldview.

Continuing social disorder and endless warfare spurred philosophical and strategic debate. Many schools of philosophy and strategy flourished, and all together they created “a hundred schools contended.” Among many military writers were Sunzi and his short book, *The Art of War* (Sunzi Bingfa), the most influential military classic. His strategic goal—winning the battle—underlies all 13 chapters. Sunzi argued that the differences between a skillful strategist and a boorish commander were that the former had wisdom, but the latter only bravery. Bravery without wisdom leads to sure failure; wisdom

without bravery, with smart planning, may be successful. The most dangerous military leader is not a brave commander, but a skillful strategist. *The Art of War* is the first important work on strategy and theory in world military history. His philosophical interpretations of the war and combat tactics have made his book a timeless bible for the Chinese military in the past 2,500 years. His principles are still studied today.

During the Warring States Period, among the seven states, the king of Qin (Ch'in) embarked on a dramatic conquest of ancient China's separate kingdoms. Having drafted a massive infantry army, he had an efficient military machine under strong commanders. Instead of using chariots, his army possessed cavalry, superior iron weapons, and the crossbow, all comparatively new developments at the time. His attacks on the others, especially sieges, became much more forceful and merciless. In 221 BC, China was unified under Qin (or Chin, from which emerged the nation's Westernized name: China).

The Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) established a highly centralized regime, the first of its kind in Chinese history. Ancient China ended, and imperial China began. Having concentrated all power in his own hands, Qin Shi Huangdi (the first emperor of Qin, reigned 221–210 BC) headed a huge bureaucracy. This central monarchical or imperial system lasted for more than 2,000 years without significant changes. A huge army was necessary to secure central control. A centralized taxation system drafted large numbers of peasants. The empire was based upon two main social groups, tax-paying peasants and rich landowners. The Qin terminated the separate city-state system and transformed land ownership from dynastic families, relatives, and lords to private owners. The tax-paying peasants and

landowners supported the entire empire and imperial system. The peasant paid onerous corvée and taxation. Regular taxes alone constituted two-thirds of his harvest. Besides, he was also required to spend one month per year working on roads, canals, palaces, imperial tombs, or military duties. If he failed to pay the tax, he had to extend his army service. Shi Huangdi used 2 million peasants to build the Great Wall and defend the frontier.

The Great Wall served two purposes, or two ways, for the empire. Externally, it was built for defense against the “northern barbarians,” including the nomadic Xiongnu, Turks, Khitan, Mongols, Xianbei, Jurchen, and Manchus. Internally, it walled Chinese society and created a political central gravity of the emperor. The Great Wall stretches for 2,000 miles, beginning in the western desert and ending in the eastern coast. Shi Huangdi did not have difficulty mobilizing large manpower. China’s population reached 54 million by the end of the Qin, at a time when the population of the Roman Empire was no more than 46 million. In the Qin draft system, all 21-year-old male peasants were required to register. Many of them served for two years, between their twenty-third and fifty-sixth birthday. The imperial bureaucracy carried out recruitment at different levels. Reporting late for military duty was a capital offense. Through Shi Huangdi’s sponsoring of Legalist policy, he influenced the whole future Chinese conception of law. The law in imperial China was the tool of the empire in its determination as a general scale of worthiness and unworthiness, merit and demerit.

In 209 BC, 900 Chinese peasants were drafted by the Qin government and sent to Yuyang (today’s Miyun county, Beijing) to perform military duties. When they passed through Daze (southwest of today’s Suxian, Anhui Province), there was a sudden

downpour, and they could not arrive in time. Since, according to the Qin law, late arrival for military duties was punishable by death, they decided that they might as well start a rebellion. They staged an armed uprising at Daze and quickly occupied Chenxian (Huaiyang), Henan (Honan) Province. They called on all the peasants in China to revolt against the Qin regime.

It was this kind of violence, spearheaded by peasants who had only hoes and clubs as weapons, that eventually toppled the Qin dynasty. Liu Bang (256–195 BC), one of the peasant leaders, eventually overthrew Qin and established the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD). This change began a cycle of dynasties in China that would continue for the next 2,000 years.

Emperor, Peasant Army, and Dynastic Cycle (206 BC–960 AD)

The Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) continued the conscription system through its provincial (*jun*) and county (*xian*) recruiting offices. Having witnessed the power of peasants during the period of the rebellion and having learned a lesson from the quick collapse of the Qin regime, the rulers of the Han paid particular attention to the promotion of agriculture. Needless to say, a policy of this kind benefited economic and military development. The Han emperors began to conquer territory outside the Great Wall. In 111 BC, Han Wudi (the Martial Emperor, reigned 141–87 BC) destroyed and annexed the semi-sinicized state of Nan-yueh (Vietnam), beginning 1,000 years of Chinese rule over northern Vietnam. He conquered Korea in 108 BC, and a Chinese command remained at Pyongyang until 313 AD. The Han soldiers began to wear armor made of lamellar, overlapping leather or metal plates sewn onto a cloth. Light and flexible, the armor provided

better protection during the frequent offensive campaigns.

The successful military expeditions and territorial expansion convinced the Han emperors and the Chinese people of their superiority in civilization and institution. The Han became the first glorious dynasty in Chinese history. The Chinese people began to call themselves the “Han people” (Hanzu, Han nationals, the majority, 90 percent of the current population). The Han emperors believed that China (Zhongguo) was the “Central Kingdom,” which was superior to any other people and nation under heaven, and that it occupied a central position in the known universe. This perception, combined with a moral cosmology, elevated the Chinese emperor as the “Son of the Heaven,” who possessed supreme power and heavenly missions, the “Mandate of Heaven.” It justified Han Wudi’s military invasions that incorporated the “barbarian” people into Chinese civilization through a continuous process of acculturation. The Han’s success became a benchmark for future leaders in terms of territory and geopolitics.

To secure China’s central position in Asia, Han emperors maintained a large army of over 1 million men. The conscription system, however, did not meet the extraordinary demands of frequent wars, even though the emperors had expanded the limits of ages from between 23 and 56 to between 20 and 65. The emperor and his imperial system promised the peasant opportunities and protection. Therefore, the peasant sustained traditional ideas, ethical codes, and a mutual obligation between the emperor and himself to serve the empire. For more than 2,000 years, the Chinese peasant was subordinate to the will of the emperor and tried to meet his duties and service. The late Han emperors also began to incorporate criminals and accept mercenary recruits in the

army. The former were those who committed a crime and were sentenced to service as punishment; the latter served for money. These measures failed to stave off the dynasty’s decline; its efforts to create an Asian empire had drained its resources without any significant economic return.

After the Han, Chinese historians describe their past as a series of “dynastic cycles.” That means the successive dynasties repeated the same story: a heroic founding, a period of great power, then a long decline, and finally total collapse. Usually, the last emperors, who lost the Mandate, were not only considered weak, but were often described as evil. After the collapse of the Han dynasty, China had two long periods of division and civil wars: Three Kingdoms (220–280) and Northern and Southern dynasties (317–582). During the Sui dynasty (581–618), although the emperors reunified the country, they squandered public treasure in building palaces for their own comfort and vanity. They attempted to reconquer Korea three times, and several million peasant draftees served as soldiers and laborers for the military expeditions. As a result, the peasants were exhausted and the Sui treasury nearly empty. The burden on the peasants had become unbearable, so they rebelled, dealing severe blows to the Sui regime. While the flames of peasant uprisings burned across the country, local landlords gained authority to recruit and occupied specific parts of China. These warlords safeguarded and then extended their power and influence. In 617, an aristocrat, Li Yuan, and his son Li Shimin (Li Ch’i-min) attacked and occupied Chang’an, the Sui capital. Next year, the Sui emperor was assassinated by one of his bodyguards, marking the end of the Sui regime. Li Yuan assumed the imperial title at Chang’an and called his new regime the Tang dynasty (618–907), which became

one of the most successful dynasties and made China once again central to Asian affairs.

The Tang emperor needed a self-sustaining army in order to prevent bankrupting the dynasty. To secure necessary manpower and economic resources, the Tang rulers carried on the *fubing* system, a peasant-soldier reserve system established by the Northern Wei dynasty in 550. The men in the *fubing* system were peasants in peacetime and reported to the local headquarters in times of war. In local administration, the two-tier system of provinces and counties prevailed, except for border and strategic areas, which were administered by garrison commands. The chief executive of each command, the governor-general, was responsible for military as well as civil affairs. From then on, the power of military governor-generals increased through the Tang dynasty.

China's development of gunpowder was first recorded in some books in the mid-Tang dynasty. The formula for gunpowder was initially discovered by Daoist alchemists when they attempted to make pills of immortality. Afterward, according to the formula, some Chinese artisans produced black gunpowder using a mixture of niter, sulfur, and charcoal in a certain proportion. Gunpowder was first used to produce firecrackers and fireworks, and began to be applied to the military much later. Between 1225 and 1248, gunpowder was introduced to Arabia and then to Europe, where it was not only extensively applied to the weapons industry, but also served various purposes such as construction. Chinese military culture runs counter to the Western Way of War in that the emphasis is on technology. While gunpowder was developed in China, it was not used in the same manner there as it was in the West. When it was brought to

the West, it became a catalyst for change and revolution due to the outward nature of warfare. While in imperial China, the development of gunpowder was controlled by the government, and its use in military engagements was sidelined to the employment of traditional military weapons. So the impact of such technologies was limited, since their spread internally could spell disaster for the emperors, whose political considerations limited the spread of more advanced military technologies and kept the Chinese military in a state of technological stagnation for many centuries.

Foreign Invasion and Peasant Rebellions (960–1840s)

To stop the decentralization during Tang, the Song dynasty (960–1279) divided the “*fubing*” into the central or urban army (*panbing*) and local or village militia (*xiangbing*). The first Song emperor, Zhao Kuangyin (Chao Kuang-yin, reigned 960–976), former commander of the imperial guards, took several measures to prevent the reemergence of separatist local regimes and concentrate all power in the central government. The central government took the authority that previously belonged to the military governors-general; only civil officials could be appointed heads of local military and administrative affairs. The domination of the civilian bureaucracy in military affairs contributed to the Song army's defeats by the Mongol invading troops. In 1279, the Mongols destroyed the Chinese army and ended the Song dynasty.

With the most powerful medieval military system, the Mongols based their forces on cavalry whose speed and mobility made them formidable. Their male population had all been trained since childhood as horsemen and mounted archers, a mode of fighting that had been dominant in central Asia steppes for centuries. Their tremendous

stamina and speed dazzled their Chinese opponents. They also used ferocious terror tactics, sparing cities that offered no resistance but often massacring all inhabitants of those that did. The Mongol rulers founded the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) in China, and controlled Xinjiang (Hsin-Kiang) and Tibet (Xizang) for the first time in Chinese history. The Yuan made China, once again, central to Asian economy and politics.

The Yuan emperor had an aggressive and victorious army. The Mongol rulers forcibly took large amounts of land from the Chinese peasants and distributed them among garrison troops and temples. Taxes, in terms of produce as well as labor, were extremely heavy. The Mongols also appropriated peasants' horses for military purposes. Many Chinese peasants in the north, after losing their land, became serfs to the Mongols. To sow discord among the various nationalities, the Yuan rulers divided all the people into four classes. The highest class belonged to the Mongols, followed in order by the Semu people, including Xia people and the Uighurs (Uyghurs) in the northwest; the Han people; and the southerners. This division prevented people of the other nationalities from forming a united front against the Mongols. Cruel oppression by the Mongols precipitated a series of revolts. In 1351, the Red Turban Army, arose in Yingzhou, Anhui (Anhui), and peasants in many other places joined. Peasant forces captured Dadu (Beijing), the Yuan capital; overthrew the Mongol regime and established the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).

The new ideas and new technology remained minor elements in the broad stream of Chinese military tradition. Ideas of change were spreading very slowly in the Ming dynasty, which shows a common pattern in terms of gunpowder and navigation technology. In each case, the Chinese

military was inspired by the new technology and yet had to be superimposed on old indigenous institutions, which persisted so strongly as to slow down the demand for innovation and application.

In Chinese history, the large-scale peasant rebellions frequently undermined dynasties like that of the Ming rulers. Toward the end of the Ming dynasty, government corruption went from bad to worse as eunuchs and court officials competed with one another for more power and privileges. The emperors maintained 2 million central, provincial, border troops, as well as village militia (*xiangbing*). The government became more bureaucratic and chaotic. In 1627, northern Shaanxi experienced a severe drought, and not one kernel of grain was harvested. Yet the government continued to demand peasant taxes. As thousands of them starved, the survivors raised the standard of revolt. From Shaanxi (Shensi) and Gansu (Kansu) Provinces, peasant leaders emerged, such as Li Zicheng (Li Tzu-ch'eng) (1605–1645) and others, who commanded dozens of insurgent armies jointly. Not only the Han, but also the Mongolians and the Hui (Muslim) peasants, supported this rebellion. Li raised the slogan of "equal landownership and zero taxation," which reflected the poor peasants' pressing needs. Wherever they went, Li and his men were welcomed by the masses. The insurgent army quickly snowballed to hundreds of thousands. In 1644, Li's troops moved toward Beijing and met little resistance. Having no place to flee, Chongzhen (Ch'ung-chen, reigned 1628–1644), the last Ming emperor, committed suicide by hanging himself at the Coal Hill behind the Forbidden City. Li led the grand army into Beijing, and the Ming dynasty came to an end.

In June 1644, however, Manchu troops entered the Great Wall from the north, defeating the peasant army and establishing

the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912). The Manchu state, which occupied northeast China (Manchuria), had been fighting the Ming army over the territory along the Great Wall for decades. The Manchu leaders saw that the collapse of the Ming weakened Li's military leadership. They decided to take the opportunity and rule China. At the time of the Qing, capitalism and industrialization rose dynamically in the Western world. Many countries expanded their empires by encroaching on Chinese territory. Owing to the Manchu rulers' closed-door policy, China's policies became more and more passive on the whole.

In the nineteenth century, the Manchu emperors commanded a diversified army of more than 1 million men, including the Manchu banner forces, regional armies, and local militia (*xiangyong* or *tuanlian*). The Qing's population reached 432 million in 1851, one-third of the world total. The Qing army improved Ming's firearms technology and established a small naval force. Yet, in the 1840 Opium War, Great Britain defeated the Qing army and partially opened China's market. The Qing fought the British with outdated weapons and no cohesive plan or military structure. This allowed the British to maintain the initiative through the entire war. The Qing army also failed to take advantage of their superiority in numbers to the British. The Opium War changed the views and practice of the Chinese military in three ways. First, China learned that Western forces were prepared to use force to gain trade concessions. Second, China came to understand its military forces were incapable of waging decisive warfare against determined resistance. And, third, the ruling Manchu minority lost power and prestige to the Han majority. Gradually the Great Qing Empire lost the central position and power status established by the Han

dynasty and increased by its early emperors such as Kangxi (K'ang-hsi, reigned 1662–1722) and Qianlong (Ch'ien-lung, reigned 1736–1795).

Another large-scale Chinese peasant revolt was the Taiping Tianguo (Heavenly Peace Kingdom) Rebellion, 1851–1864. The Taiping army began its military expedition from southwestern Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province against the Qing. Many peasants joined the Taiping when the peasant army defeated the Qing army from the west to the east along the Yangzi River and took over a half of the country. The Taiping army occupied Nanjing (Nanking) and renamed it “Tianjing” (Heavenly Capital). From 1853, the Taiping Army, nearly 1 million strong, launched northern expeditions in order to protect Tianjing and enlarge the regime's territory. In 1856, the Taiping Army defeated the two Qing forces sent to control the insurgents' capital by blocking the northern and southern approaches to Tianjing. Militarily, the Taiping regime had reached its highest point. At least 25 million people died during the Taiping Rebellion, making it the most destructive civil war in Chinese history.

Reform, Republic, and Revolution (1850s–1930s)

In the late nineteenth century, frequent peasant rebellions, foreign invasions, and anti-Manchu movements undermined the Qing dynasty's power. In 1895, China was defeated by Japan, losing its central position in Asia. The turn of the century marked major changes in Qing military organization, institution, and technology. To survive, the Qing dynasty established a “new army” (*xinjun*) in 1897, hiring German instructors and purchasing modern firearms from European countries. By 1906, the New Army consisted of five infantry divisions, totaling

50,000 men. It also established five officer training schools and military academies. Unfortunately, the New Army did not save the empire because the Manchu rulers refused to reform military institutions besides purchasing Western weapons. New recruits were soon disillusioned by the government's corruption, mismanagement, and, worst of all, its failure against European and Japanese forces during the 1900 Boxer Rebellion. Meanwhile, the foreign concessions in the treaty ports and foreign nations all gave shelter to Chinese rebels. The anti-Manchu movement found its revolutionary center overseas. Sun Yat-sen, one of its leaders, made Japan his revolutionary base.

In 1905, Sun, the founding father of Republican China, organized the Tongmenghui (or T'ung-meng Hui, the United League) in Japan. Among the 1,000 early members were liberal students, Christian merchants, and New Army officers trained in Japan. Sun and his secret society spread their revolutionary ideas and organization from Japan to the world by establishing offices in San Francisco, Honolulu, Brussels, Singapore, and many branches in 17 of the 24 provinces of China. Tens of thousands Chinese, including many New Army officers, joined the Tongmenghui and participated in multiple anti-Manchu activities, accepting Sun's Three Principles of the People (Sanmin zhuyi), including "nationalism" (both anti-Manchu and anti-imperialism), "democracy" (a constitution with people's rights), and "people's livelihood" (a classic term for social equality).

On October 10, 1911, amidst an anti-Qing plot in Wuchang, provincial capital of Hubei (Hupei), some New Army officers revolted (October 10, or "Double Tens," became the National Day for the Republic of China). The success of the Wuchang uprising led many officers to join the revolution. In the

next two months, 15 provinces proclaimed their independence from the Qing Empire. The rebellious provinces and Tongmenghui joined forces, setting up a provisional government at Nanjing. The provisional government elected Sun and inaugurated him as provisional president of the Republic of China (ROC) on January 1, 1912, at Nanjing. A breakthrough in Chinese history, this ended 2,000 years of monarchy and built the first republic in Asian history.

The Qing court's hopes rested with Marshal Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916), commander of the New Army. Sun and revolutionary leaders never had control of the army. In an attempt to avoid civil war, Sun and other revolutionaries negotiated with Yuan and offered him the presidency of the new republic. On February 12, 1912, Yuan forced the last emperor, only six at the time, to step down, thus ending the Qing dynasty. Then Sun resigned as president and reorganized Tongmenghui into the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party). On February 14, Yuan was elected by the provisional government the president of the Republic of China. Yuan, however, tried to establish his own dictatorship and monarchy and fought against the revolutionaries until his death in 1916. Thereafter, the central government collapsed.

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 was incomplete. Although it ended the Qing dynasty, the revolution failed to turn China into a truly independent and democratic country. After Yuan's death, the country entered the Warlord Period (1916–1927), in which military commanders of different armies controlled a province or a region. Among them, five or six major warlord armies divided the country and waged wars against each other. To seize control of the whole country, warlord armies competed for

human resources by drafting the young peasants into their armies. Some 500,000 men served in the warlord armies in 1916, increasing to 1 million by 1918, and about 1.5 million by 1924.

In the early twentieth century, the ideas of Marxism and Leninism seemed as effective as liberal democratic and republican ideas to inspire outright revolution in China. Communist movements became an alternative solution to problems facing angry peasants and urban poor, a large proportion of the Chinese population. As Soviet ideology and the Bolshevik revolution circulated, the time arrived for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). In July 1921, the CCP was founded. It convened its First National Party Congress from July to early August in Shanghai. Thirteen delegates attended, including Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), representing about 50 Communist Party members across the country.

In 1921–1922, Sun and the GMD made major policy change in favor of the Soviet Union and the CCP. In exchange, the Soviet government would help the GMD with its military establishment and officer training. On January 26, 1923, Adolph A. Joffe, a top Soviet diplomat, and Sun issued their “Joint Manifesto,” a pledge of Soviet support for China. In January 1924, the GMD National Congress enacted a new constitution and allowed Communists to join the GMD as individuals. On June 16, 1924, the Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy (the West Point of China) was founded, with the Soviet assistance. Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) became its commandant. On August 26, 1924, Jiang reorganized all the military units under the National Government into the National Revolutionary Army (Guomin gemingjun) with himself as its commander

in chief. After his successful Northern Expedition in 1926–1927 against the warlords, Jiang established his new National Government of the Republic of China under GMD control in Nanjing in April 1927, launching China’s Republic Period 1927–1937. However, the Communist movement’s rapid growth across the country and its increasing influence in the GMD worried the right wing, who controlled the GMD Executive Central Committee. They pressured Jiang to terminate the GMD-CCP coalition and purge Communists across the country.

After the “white terrors” of 1927, the military became absolutely necessary for the CCP’s survival. On August 1, 1927, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), He Long (Ho Lung) (1896–1969), and other CCP leaders led the Nanchang Uprising and created the CCP armed force. August 1 is celebrated as the birthday of the Chinese armed forces. The party mobilized the peasants, trained the officers, and received instructions and aid from the Soviet Union. The army protected the Communist base areas. Mao described this relationship thus: “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Mao and Zhu joined the force at the Jinggangshan (Ching Kang Mountains) in 1928, reorganizing their troops into the Red Army and creating a military center, or a base area, for the Communist revolution. In 1931, Mao’s base region became the center for all CCP Soviet governments. To win battles, Zhu and Mao also developed guerrilla strategy and tactics during these formative years. Mao’s ideas became the basis for the Communist military revolution. By the end of 1931, the Red Army totaled 150,000 men and had expanded its areas of operation.

The rapid growth and expansion of the Communists alarmed the GMD government. ROC president Jiang and the GMD high

command centralized army control and, from 1930 to 1934, launched five encirclement campaigns against the Communist-controlled areas. Jiang and his German advisors' "blockhouse" strategy worked. It forced the survivors of the Red Army to leave their base areas in central China and begin their Long March toward northwest China in October 1934. The First and Fourth Red Armies arrived in northwestern Shaanxi Province in October 1935. Over 13 months, they traversed 11 provinces and covered nearly 8,000 miles. By 1936, the Red Army maintained approximately 30,000 troops after the Long March, a huge decline from 150,000 men in 1931.

World War and Civil War (1937–1949)

The CCP-GMD civil war in 1931–1934 had weakened China's security and sovereignty. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army in Northeast China seized Shenyang (Mukden), provincial capital of Liaoning. The incident began Japan's aggression in four provinces of northeastern China. In the mid-1930s, Japan threatened movement south of the Great Wall and invading central and eastern China, an immediate threat to Jiang Jieshi's control. After the Xi'an (Sian) Incident (Xi'an shibian), in which Jiang was kidnapped by his own generals, the ROC president issued a public statement on December 24, 1936, at Luoyang, promising to form a united front that included the CCP. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army attacked the GMD troops at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) southwest of Beijing. On August 13, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai and threatened Nanjing. The GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP to jointly resist the Japanese invasion of China (1937–1945).

In August 1937, Japanese occupied Beijing and Tianjin (Tientsin). In November,

Japan concentrated 220,000 troops and began an offensive campaign against Nanjing and Shanghai. Jiang and the GMD high command deployed nearly 700,000 troops to defend the Nanjing-Shanghai region. On November 7, the Japanese Tenth Army successfully landed at the Hangzhou (Hang-chow) Bay. In December, they seized Nanjing, the capital of the ROC, forcing the GMD government to move its capital to Chongqing (Chungking), southwestern Sichuan (Szechwan) Province. By March 1938, almost all of north China fell into the enemy's hands. Jiang's troops suffered heavy casualties. From July 1937 to November 1938, Jiang lost 1 million men, while inflicting 250,730 Japanese casualties. Jiang's Nationalist army withdrew to China's southwest and northwest to conserve some of its troops. By 1941, the GMD had lost the coastal and other port cities that once had been its bases of power.

When Jiang lost some of his best troops in the war against Japan, Mao's Communist guerrillas successfully recruited a large number of peasants into their forces. The Red Army, then located in the northwest and numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army (Balujun) of the National army in August 1937. In the south, the Red guerrilla troops were reorganized into the Nationalist army's New Fourth Army (Xinsijun), totaling 10,300 men. The units of the Eighth Route Army carried out guerrilla operations and established military and political bases in the enemy-held areas. The Eighth Route Army increased from 46,000 men in 1937, to 220,000 men in 1939, and to 500,000 men in 1940 behind the enemy line.

With Nationalist forces, Communist guerrillas, and an uncooperative Chinese population, the Japanese military sought to wear down Chinese resistance and cut off China from outside assistance, chiefly from the United States. In September 1940, Japanese

forces moved into northern Indochina, and in July 1941, they moved into southern Indochina. These steps, an effort to cut the Chinese off from U.S. aid flowing from India, brought U.S. retaliation against Japan in the form of an economic embargo on certain critical war materials, especially oil. In turn, this triggered Japan's decision to go to war against the United States. Japan's December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and its war with Britain and the Netherlands broadened the conflict into a general Pacific war and severely strained its capability to conduct offensive operations in China.

In the wake of the Allied Forces' campaign against the fascists and militarism across the globe, Jiang and his GMD army received direct American aid and military training. With strong support from the United States, the Nationalist army throughout the war recruited 4.3 million regulars, in 370 standard divisions, 46 new divisions, 12 cavalry divisions, 8 new cavalry divisions, 66 temporary divisions, and 13 reserve divisions, for a grand total of 515 divisions. The new divisions were created to replace standard divisions lost early in the war. The average GMD division had 5,000–6,000 troops; an average army had 10,000–15,000 troops, the equivalent of a Japanese division. By 1941, the Nationalist army had 246 front-line divisions and 70 divisions assigned to rear areas, totaling 3.8 million troops. At that time, at least 40 Chinese divisions had been equipped with European- or American-made weapons and trained by American or Soviet advisers. In 1944, some of the elite armies had an armored regiment or battalion equipped with Sherman tanks.

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and its Red Army attacked the Japanese in China's northeastern provinces. On August 14, Japan surrendered unconditionally. On September 2, it signed

the instrument of surrender. The Chinese people, after eight years of bitter struggle, finally won victory in the Anti-Japanese War. The price in lives for resisting Japanese aggression was very high. Jiang's Nationalist army lost 2.4 million men, and Mao's Communist forces some 600,000 men, while the civilian death toll was estimated at more than 10 million lives.

After Japan's sudden surrender in August 1945, Jiang found himself facing an unprecedented challenge from Mao. At that time, the GMD had a total of 4.3 million troops, controlled three-quarters of the country with three-quarters of the population, more than 300 million people. They occupied all of the large cities and controlled most of the railroads, highways, seaports, and transportation hubs. The CCP's regular army had grown from 56,000 in 1937 to 1.27 million men in 1945, supported by militias numbering another 2.68 million. It was in fact an army equipped with "millet plus rifles." But they controlled the countryside, with a population of about 100 million. To save the GMD-CCP coalition, U.S. president Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) dispatched General George C. Marshall (1880–1959), secretary of state, as his envoy to China in December for further mediation. Though Jiang and Mao signed a cease-fire agreement in Chongqing, they made no political compromises and refused to cooperate with each other. China's full-scale civil war resumed between the GMD and the CCP in June 1949.

Chinese military historians divide the civil war into three phases. The first phase began on June 26, 1946, when Jiang launched an all-out offensive campaign against Mao's "liberated regions" (*jiefangqu*) in central China and other offensive campaigns from south to north. Mao's strategy was to avoid a total defense of all CCP-occupied regions and concentrate a superior force in order to

destroy one GMD unit in one of the regions. For example, the CCP Central Committee transferred 110,000 troops with 20,000 party cadres from central and northern China to northeast China (Manchuria) in 1946 to stop the GMD's offensive campaigns there. The northeast became the CCP's strategic base, securing communications and transportation between the Soviet Union and the CCP. Through 1947, the CCP troops successfully saved most of the "liberated areas" in Manchuria during Jiang's all-out offensive campaign.

In the civil war's second phase from March 1947 to August 1948, Jiang's strategy changed from broad assaults to attacking key targets. Jiang concentrated his forces on two points: the CCP-controlled areas in Shandong (Shantung) and Shaanxi, where the CCP Central Committee and its high command had been since 1935. Jiang failed again. When the GMD attack slowed down, a CCP strategic offensive began. Between June and September 1947, the CCP force began its operations in GMD-controlled areas.

The third and final phase, from August 1948 to October 1949, was a CCP offensive to seize the cities. These included three of the most important large-scale campaigns in the war: the Liao-Shen Campaign (northeastern China), the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign (Beijing-Tianjin region), and the Huai-Hai Campaign (eastern China). The three campaigns lasted 142 days, during which 1.54 million GMD troops were killed, wounded, and captured. As a result, the CCP gained control of all of northeast, most of north, and central China areas north of the Yangzi River. In late 1948, the CCP integrated all its troops into a national army and named it the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The reorganization transformed the CCP military from a regional level to a national level. In

the spring of 1949, the PLA had a total of 17 army groups, including 58 infantry armies, numbering 4 million men. On April 21, 1 million PLA troops crossed the Yangzi River. Two days later, Nanjing, the capital of the ROC, fell, and Jiang, his government, and 1 million GMD troops and government officials fled to Taiwan (Formosa). The PLA continued its drive into northwest, southwest, and central China. By September, the PLA occupied most of the country except for Tibet (Xizang), Taiwan, and various offshore islands. On October 1, 1949, Mao declared the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the new republic's alliance with the Soviet Union.

The Cold War: Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan (1950–1970s)

After 22 years of military struggle, the CCP and the PLA had acquired the experience, vision, and self-confidence to create a new communist state in the world. Mao declared the "lean-to-one-side" policy, which stated the new republic would favor the Soviet Union and join the socialist and communist camp in the post-WWII world. In December 1949, Mao visited Moscow and signed the "Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty" with Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) in February 1950. The alliance between Beijing and Moscow was the cornerstone of the Communist international alliance system in the 1950s. China began to move into the center stage of the global Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States and the two contending camps headed by the two superpowers.

The PRC's alliance with the Soviet Union and North Korea pulled China into a foreign war in Korea that changed the Chinese forces forever. China's intervention in the Korean War of 1950–1953 was the by-product of the Cold War. From the moment

the Sino-Soviet alliance came into being, Beijing's leaders regarded the United States as China's primary enemy and, at the same time, consistently declared that an important task of the Chinese revolution was to support international communist movements, especially those in Asian countries. China could be isolated by the Soviet Union in the Communist bloc, if Beijing had refused Moscow's request to send Chinese troops to the Korean War in October 1950.

On October 19, the Chinese People's Volunteers Force (CPVF) crossed the Yalu River. After October 1950, the Korean War then essentially became a conflict between China and the United States. China surprised the world when its troops launched a massive offensive south of the Yalu in early November. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the UN Force (UNF), reported to Washington that they faced "an entirely new war" in Korea. Although still confronting over 1 million GMD remnants on Taiwan and in southwestern China after the Civil War, Beijing decided to fight the U.S. armed forces in a new international war, the "War to Resist America and Aid Korea" (Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng). The Korean War was the first time Chinese armed forces engaged in large-scale military operations outside of China. Except for the thinly disguised title of "volunteers," the Chinese military went all-out in engaging one of the best militaries in the world. The Korean War was the only meaningful reference point for sustained PLA contingency operations beyond China's border.

By the time of the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, China had sent nearly 3 million men to Korea (out of 6.1 million PLA troops). Mao judged China's intervention a victory. It saved North Korea's Communist regime, prevented a perceived U.S. invasion of China, gained more Russian

military and economic aid, and established the PRC's status as a world power. From October 19, 1950, to July 27, 1953, confronted by U.S./UN air and naval superiority, the Chinese volunteer forces suffered heavy casualties, including Mao's son, a Russian translator at the CPVF HQ. According to Chinese military records, the nation suffered 152,000 dead, 383,000 wounded, 450,000 hospitalized, 21,300 prisoners of war, and 4,000 missing in action, totaling 1,010,700 casualties. Of the 21,300 Chinese POWs, 7,110 returned to China, the remainder went to the Republic of China on Taiwan.

The Korean War of 1950–1953 intensified the significance of East Asia in the Cold War. China also played an active role in supporting Ho Chi Minh's independence movement against France in the First Indochina War (1946–1954). Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, China had assisted the North Vietnamese Army (NVA, or the People's Army of Vietnam) against the French. Chinese military advisers participated in NVA battle planning, operations, and assessments in the major campaigns such as the Border Campaign of 1950, Red River Delta offensive from 1950 to 1951, and Dien Bien Phu Campaign of 1954. In 1951–1952, China armed and trained the NVA's 316th, 320th, 325th Infantry, and 351st Artillery and Engineering Divisions. By the end of 1952, China had equipped six NVA infantry divisions and one artillery division. According to the Chinese statistics, from 1950 to 1955, China had shipped 155,000 small arms, 58 million rounds of ammunition, 3,600 artillery pieces, 1.08 million artillery shells, 840,000 hand grenades, 1,200 vehicles, 1.4 million uniforms, 14,000 tons of food, and 26,000 tons of fuel to Indochina or North Vietnam. China sought to secure its southwestern border by eliminating a Western power's presence in Vietnam.

China's military assistance guaranteed North Vietnam's victory over the French forces and maintained Beijing's influence in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

China's increasing political ambition and rising international position demanded more military to defend itself against any invasion, keep its neighboring countries out of Western imperialist control, and enhance its prestige and influence in the international arena. To meet these goals, the PLA reforms and modernization continuing through the 1950s aimed to transform the PLA from a peasant army to a contemporary professional force. Following the Soviet model, the reforms centralized the command system, improved technology, advanced training and educational programs, reorganized defense industries, established a strategic missile force, and developed nuclear weapons. The centralization and bureaucratic power guaranteed the success of China's nuclear program through the 1970s. China launched its first missile in 1960, tested its first atomic bomb in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb in 1967. In less than 15 years, China had become a nuclear power. The nation launched its first satellite in 1970.

Despite its growing strength, China still feared an expanding American presence in Southeast Asia. During the Vietnam War of 1964–1973, the PLA again intervened in the war. In July 1965, China began sending its troops to North Vietnam, including surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery, railroad, engineering, mine-sweeping, and logistics units. Chinese forces operated anti-aircraft guns and SAM sites, built and repaired roads, bridges, railroads, and assembled factories. Chinese participation enabled Hanoi to send more NVA troops to the South to fight Americans. Between 1965 and 1968, China sent 23 divisions, including 95 regiments, totaling some

320,000 troops. The peak year was 1967, when 170,000 Chinese soldiers were present.

China and the U.S. in the Twenty-First Century

U.S. president Richard Nixon's (1913–1994) visit to China in February 1972 profoundly reshaped the Cold War world. First and foremost, it ended the total confrontation between the United States and China that had lasted for almost a quarter century—opening a new chapter in relations between the world's most powerful country and its most populous nation. Consequently, a new crucial feature in the Cold War emerged, dominated by a specific “triangular structure.” Taking the “Soviet threat” as an overriding concern, Beijing and Washington established a “quasi strategic partnership.” Toward such later crises as Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, Beijing's and Washington's reactions were compatible—they both condemned Hanoi and Moscow. Both also emphasized that interconnectivity between the events in Cambodia and Afghanistan, and both supported resistance movements in these two countries. In February 1979, China invaded Vietnam with 200,000 PLA troops.

Between 1972 and 1989, the PLA experienced tremendous fluctuations that corresponded with international as well as domestic politics. With the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) sweeping across China, the PLA moved to the center of the national politics in 1967–1971. Then, after defense minister Marshal Lin Biao's (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) death and a series of purges, the PLA moved out of the political arena. In 1972–1973, Mao brought back some of the government officials who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution. Among others, Deng Xiaoping (Deng

Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) was rehabilitated by Mao and appointed a member of the Central Committee in 1973. As a survivor of the Cultural Revolution, Deng announced new military reforms in 1975 and tried to “repair the damage” done to the PLA during the Cultural Revolution. But Mao dismissed Deng again in 1975. After Mao’s death in 1976, and on his third return, Deng launched an unprecedented seismic reform in 1978 and opened China to the outside world in order to bring about the “Four Modernizations,” including the defense modernization.

The PLA experienced a remarkable change in the 1980s. It transformed from a peasant army to a professional army under its new commander in chief, Jiang Zemin (1926–). In the 1990s, Jiang, as part of the third generation of military leaders, launched another round of military reforms known as the “two transformations.” First, the PLA would change from an army prepared for “local wars under ordinary conditions” to an army prepared to fight and win “local wars under modern high-tech conditions.” Second, the PLA would become an army based on quantity (manpower) to an army based on quality (new technology). This comprehensive reform and modernization effort cut across every facet of PLA activity. The new chairman made the PLA’s information-based capability the key for China’s military modernization. He also said that promoting a “Revolution of Military Affairs” (RMA) with Chinese characteristics would bring about profound changes to every aspect of the Chinese army.

After Jiang retired, Hu Jintao (1942–) became the party chairman and the country’s president in 2003, and the chairman of the CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2004. Hu became the new civilian

commander in chief of the PLA in the twenty-first century. Hu nurtured a relationship with the PLA by supporting a greater professionalism that emphasized educational credentials and merit-based promotion. He also reaffirmed the PLA’s modernization and transformation into an army with cutting-edge technology for the information age. Hu made these efforts to operate against the backdrop of Jiang’s legacies. He knew that his taking over the CMC chair did not eliminate the need to define the new style, scope, and depth of his own ties with the military. Hu removed some of the old-guard generals and improved the chain of command, reducing forces by 200,000 men in 2004–2005 to rebalance the ratio between officers and men.

China’s foremost task in its drive toward military modernizations depends on its successful completion of market economy reforms. To build a modern army, it must build an industrial and sustained economy. In the past 30 years, with an annual growth rate of 8.6 percent, the Chinese government was able to double its defense budget, purchasing new weaponry and importing high tech from Russia and the West to narrow the technology gap between the PLA and the West. Perhaps the most important among the factors for Chinese military modernization, and the most effective for the long term, is the significant improvement in China’s international standing related primarily to a reduction in global and regional threats. Chinese strategic analysts and military experts have an optimistic view of the country’s current national security in the near future. While insecurity and instability remain, China enjoys a secure environment, something seldom seen since the founding of the PRC.

Xiaobing Li

A

Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937)

A Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) led armed rebellion in rural areas against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government of the Republic of China (ROC). Historically, it was also known as the First Revolutionary Civil War or the Land Revolutionary War. With the military victory of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) in the Northern Expedition, the CCP became a political and ideological threat to his authority. On April 12, 1927, Jiang terminated the CCP-GMD coalition and outlawed the Communist movement in China. Throughout the GMD-controlled areas, Communist leaders were purged and killed. The urban-centered CCP revolutionary movement failed.

After the “white terror” of 1927, the CCP moved into rural areas and fought against Jiang and the GMD government. The CCP began to organize its independent armed force, which became absolutely necessary for the CCP’s survival. The party mobilized the peasants, trained the officers, and received instructions and aid from the Soviet Union. The army protected the Communist base areas and eventually seized state power for the party by defeating the GMD army on the mainland. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) described this relationship on August 7, 1927, stating that “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”

After the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927, Mao led the peasants’ Autumn

Harvest Uprising (Qiushou qiye) later that month in Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces. When Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) joined forces with Mao in 1928, they reorganized their troops into the Red Army and created a military center, or base area, known as the Jinggangshan (Jinggang Mountains) Revolutionary base area, in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province for the Communist revolution. Among their 10,000 men, 82 percent were peasants. In 1931, Mao made his base region a government center for all CCP soviet governments when he was elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Mao’s strategy and tactics became the basis for the Communist military revolution.

To attract peasant volunteers, the Fourth Army initiated a land reform in the mountainous area in 1928–1930. The army usually sent an officer with a couple of men to a village to help the poor peasants by reducing their rents and taxes. The officer took land from the rich landlords and redistributed it among the poor and landless peasants by small allotments. The land revolution movement became attractive to the peasants in this mountain region, one of the poorest areas in the country. Officers also helped the peasants to organize a peasant association, a new government, and self-defense militia with some weapons and basic training to protect their newly received land ownership. Then the officers moved on to another village. When all the villages in one area completed their “land revolution,” the army took over the town or the county to establish a Soviet-style government

(administration was run by a CCP committee and enforced by the Red Army). With the soviet government, a base area, or so-called red region (*hongqu*) or Soviet region (*suqu*) was founded. The army received material and human resources from their base areas, and in turn they provided protection for the local Soviet-style governments to continue their land reform movement. By the summer of 1930, the Communist governments and the Fourth Army secured their base areas in Jiangxi-Hunan Provinces, including nine counties with a total population of 2 million.

During this formative period, Mao and Zhu also laid some groundwork for the Communist army. They set up three tasks for the Fourth Army: fighting, raising money for the revolutionary cause (later changed to production), and work for the masses. Since the Fourth Army operated in remote, mountainous areas, a guerrilla warfare strategy worked. During the defense of the Jinggangshan region in 1928, Zhu and Mao perfected the guerrilla tactics, which they summarized as: “The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.” By the end of 1931, the Red Army totaled 150,000 men and expanded its areas of operation. About 25 percent of the rank and file were CCP members.

The rapid growth of the Communist troops and expansion of their controlled regions alarmed the GMD government. In the summer of 1933, Jiang concentrated 1 million GMD troops and launched his fifth suppression campaign against the Red Army. In September, 500,000 GMD troops attacked the central region. In October, the Red Army gave up their central region campaign and retreated westward. The survivors began their Long March toward northwest China on October 10, 1934, finally arriving

in northern Shaanxi in October 1935. By 1936, the army maintained a contingency of approximately 45,000 troops after the Long March. In 1937, the GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP on joint resistance in the Anti-Japanese War. By then, the CCP Agrarian Revolutionary War against the GMD government was over.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Encirclement Campaigns; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Jiangxi Soviet; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; Northern Expedition; Red Army; Red Army College; Red Army Recruitment; Soviet Union; United Front; Yan’an; Zhu De.

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American Volunteer Group (1941–1942)

The American Volunteer Group (AVG) was organized in mid-1941 by General Claire Lee Chennault (1893–1958) to assist China’s Anti-Japanese War. As an advisor to the Chinese Air Force, Chennault witnessed the disastrous damage inflicted by Japanese air bombings on the Chinese. He proposed to

hire American pilots for help, which was endorsed by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and also approved by U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945).

In the summer of 1941, about 300 young American pilots and ground crew arrived in Burma (present-day Myanmar, then a British colony), where three squadrons were organized. Two squadrons were sent to China, and the third participated in the Battle of Rangoon in Burma. The first air battle inside China fought by the AVG occurred on December 20, 1941, near Kunming, Yunnan Province, during which the AVG scored their first victory by shooting down some Japanese planes. At Rangoon, the group destroyed several dozen Japanese aircraft. In early 1942, the AVG played a key role in defending Southwest China as they made reconnaissance sorties, protected Chinese ground troops, and attacked the Japanese troops attempting to cross the Salween River (Nujiang). In less than a year, the AVG destroyed 296 Japanese planes while suffering a minimal loss. These successes earned the group worldwide fame, while the grateful Chinese praised them as the “Flying Tigers.”

The AVG was dissolved in mid-1942, but some of its pilots remained in China as part of the China Air Task Force which was further integrated into the Fourteenth U.S. Air Force in 1943. In the following two years, Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force shot down or damaged 2,600 Japanese planes, sunk 44 warships, and killed 66,700 enemy troops throughout East Asia. The Chinese continued to respect the Fourteenth Air Force as the Flying Tigers, yet some Westerners contend that the title should be reserved to the AVG. The difference between the two is that the AVG was a group within the Chinese Air

Force, while the latter was a formal U.S. air force.

Dr. Patrick Fuliang Shan

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chennault, Claire Lee; China-Burma-India Theater; Jiang Jieshi; Stilwell, Joseph; Nationalist Army.


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An-Shi, Rebellion of (755–763)

During the Tang dynasty (618–907), one of the generals of the Chinese military, An Lushan (703–757), launched an open rebellion against the Tang government that lasted from 755 to 763. The rebellious army made its way to the capital city and forced Emperor Xuan Zong (Hsuan Tsung) (reigned 712–756) to flee the country. An Lushan crowned himself the new emperor and proclaimed the founding of the Yan dynasty. After An died in 757, his son, An Qingxu, became the new emperor. Before long, An Qingxu was killed by Shi Siming (703–761), who next became the emperor, but in the year 761, he was killed by his own son Shi Chaoyi. The revolt lasted until 763 and was known as the An-Shi Rebellion.

At the beginning of the Tang dynasty, the emperors took measures to extend their rule.



Chinese painting in the Tang “blue and green” landscape style, *The Flight of the Emperor Ming Juang to Shu*. The painting depicts Emperor Xuan Zong, or Ming Huang, and the imperial concubine Yang Guifei and his entourage when fleeing to Sichuan from the An Lushan Rebellion of 755. (Werner Forman/Corbis)

The second emperor, Tai Zong (Tai Tsung) (626–649), along with his successor, Gao Zong (Gao Tsung) (650–683), initiated campaigns to solidify their reign and expand their power. However, an economic crisis hit the country by the time of the next emperor, Rui Zong (Rui Tsung) (684–690), and the Tang dynasty found itself in dire need of funds. In order to save money, the imperial government asked each state to organize its own regional military command. Although intended to protect the economy, this action created the factional regional power that would soon see the country plunged into war.

In an effort to strengthen their centralized rule, Emperor Xuan Zong assigned generals to rule the regions along the border. An Lushan, a frontier general, was one of three commanders stationed in the regions of Pinglu, Fanyang, and Hedong in Hebei (Hopeh)

and Shanxi (Shansi) Provinces. He carried out his duties during his time as general, though conditions in the empire would soon allow him to play an even greater role in the history of China.

The court of Emperor Xuan Zong had caused much discontent among the people. Falling in love with his favorite concubine, Yang Guifei (Yang Kuei-fei, or Yang Yuhuan) (719–756), Xuan Zong allowed her to fill the imperial court with many of her relatives, including cousins, brothers, and parents. Lady Yang manipulated the emperor in this manner and held great influence over him. The government became inefficient and corrupt as a result, though Xuan Zong would not listen to any complaints against his concubine. In 752, it was discovered that there was counterfeit coinage in circulation. The premier was about to make public the false coins

scandal, but Yang Guozhong (Yang Kuochung), Yang Guifei's brother, intervened. The counterfeit coins were brought to the capital and paid out there at the expense of the imperial court. This caused many merchants to become distressed and resentful of the government. The people's unhappiness increased with the onset of drought in the valley of Wei in 754. Other natural disasters continued to plague the kingdom and, coupled with the economic distresses, fostered an ever-growing discontent toward the emperor.

An Lushan, seizing on this discontent, spearheaded a rebellion in 755 that would have profound effects on the country. Emperor Xuan Zong assigned General Bi Sichen to the east to guard the capital of Loyang, but An Lushan defeated the imperial forces that were hastily assembled. Afterwards, he proclaimed himself the emperor of the new Yan dynasty. When An Lushan won the battle of Tongguan, Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, Xuan Zong retreated over the mountains into the upper valley of the Han River and rested one day at Mawei. There, the escorts mutinied and demanded the execution of the Yang family, who they saw as primarily responsible for all the troubles. Yang Guozhong was killed, and Yang Guifei was taken out and strangled.

Xuan Zong continued his flight into Sichuan Province; meanwhile, his son, the crown prince Li Heng, fled in the other direction to Lingzhou. After arriving in Sichuan, Xuan Zong was compelled to abdicate the crown in favor of Li Heng, later called Su Zong (Su Tsung) (756–762). The war raged on, and Su Zong's generals Guo Ziyi and Li Guangbi were able to recover the territories in Heybei that were protected by one of An Lushan's generals, Shi Siming. The Yan dynasty continued to face further troubles as the rebellion wore on.

In the year 757, An Qingxu killed his father An Lushan and proclaimed himself emperor. Following this, a struggle ensued for the throne that would leave a history of violence in its wake. Before long, An Qingxu was killed by Shi Siming. Shi Siming next became the emperor, but in the year 761, he was killed by his own son Shi Chaoyi. In the next year, Hui Qi, general of Emperor Dai Zong (Dai Tsung) (762–779) of the Tang dynasty, recovered Loyang, causing Shi Chaoyi to flee to Mozhou. Forces of the Tang dynasty marched on Mozhou, and Shi Chaoyi, last emperor of the Yan dynasty, committed suicide. With this act, the rebels were crushed, putting an end to the rebellion of An-Shi.

Kong Liu

See also: Fubing; Han Dynasty; Mongols; Song Dynasty; Tang Dynasty; Yuan Dynasty.

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Anti-Japanese Military and Political College (1936–1945)

Key institution in educational system established by the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP, or the Communist Party of China) Central Committee during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, frequently compared to the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) Whampoa Military Academy. At the outset of the Long March (1934–1935), Red Army College cadres and students, along with the personnel of two infantry schools and the Central Special Department School, were organized into special “cadre regiments” in preparation for the exodus from Ruijin (Juichin), Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province. Following completion of the Long March, the regiments became the basis for the China Soviet Republic Northwest Anti-Japanese Red Army College, founded in February 1936 for the continued training of military and political officers under Communist Party control. Combined with the Shaan (Shaanxi, or Shensi)-Gan (Gansu, or Kansu)-Ning (Ningxia, or Ningsia) Military and Political School and relocated to Wayaobao soon thereafter, the college was rechristened the Northwest Red Army College on June 1, 1936, under the direction of Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971).

Organizationally the college was first divided into three administrative sections: the first for the training of cadre-officers at the division level; the second for the training of midlevel cadres, and the third for the training of cadres assigned to companies and platoons. In July 1936, members of the first and second sections followed the Communist Party Central Committee to Bao’an, Shaanxi Province, then the Red Army headquarters prior to its relocation to Yan’an, Shaanxi. That November, the third section was merged with schools from the Red Second Front and Fourth Front Armies and named the Northwest Anti-Japanese Red Army College First School. The Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

(also referred to as “Resistance College,” or *Kang-da*) was subsequently established in Yan’an on January 20, 1937.

Between June 1936—Resistance College’s traditional founding date—and August 1945, nearly 28,000 individuals were trained by a staff that included high-ranking Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army figures Lin Biao, Luo Ruiqing (Luo Rui-ch’ing) (1906–1978), Yang Shangkun (Yang Shang-kun) (1907–1998), Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch’eng) (1892–1986), Hu Yaobang (1915–1989), He Changgong, Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-ch’ian) (1901–1990), Li Jingquan, Xu Wenlie, Mo Wenhua, and Fu Zhong. Those enrolled were primarily soldiers and military cadres, but also included educated young people from North and Northwest China, and overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia. By 1941, Resistance University had been relocated from Yan’an to Xingtai, Hebei (Hopeh) Province, where Communist forces were engaged in mass mobilization, guerrilla hit-and-run activity, and “people’s war” behind enemy lines. Of eight classes (*ban*) graduated during the nine-year period, the four largest were comprised of approximately 5,000–6,000 political and military personnel; Resistance College thus played a vital role in the replenishment of party and army ranks during the years of war with Japan and north China “puppet” armies.

In addition to the central college, up to 13 additional campuses (*fenxiao*) were established in the north China base areas under Communist control. In Shandong Province training continued into 1946; the institutional network created around Resistance College thus provided a bridge to the further expansion of Communist party and army ranks during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) with the Nationalists and subsequent

seizure of power that resulted in the founding of the People's Republic of China. In particular, the university's Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth campuses were all important components of the military and political education system of the New Fourth Army after 1939, and a separate Resistance University Central China General Campus was established under the New Fourth Army Headquarters in 1942. Other notable campuses include the Third (predecessor of the Beijing Foreign Languages University) and Fourth (predecessor of the Nanjing Army Command College).

Like Red Army College before it, Resistance University served a crucial function in establishing a military and political training system under direct Communist Party control. In his speech "To Be Attacked by the Enemy Is Not a Bad Thing but a Good Thing," delivered on May 26, 1939, Mao described "national liberation and social emancipation" as Resistance College's guiding principles. Equating revolution with patriotism not only justified Communist rivalry with Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) GMD Party, but also gave Resistance University a reputation for having contributed significantly to the anti-Japanese war effort that has carried through to the present day. Thus, as Mao's speech continued:

The educational policy of the college is to cultivate a firm and correct political orientation, an industrious and simple style of work, and flexible strategy and tactics. These are the three essentials in the making of an anti-Japanese revolutionary soldier. It is in accordance with these essentials that the staff teach and the students study. The progress and development of the college over the past few years have been accompanied by certain shortcomings. It has grown,

but difficulties have arisen too. The main difficulty is the shortage of funds, teachers and teaching materials. But led by the Communist Party, the college does not fear any difficulties and will certainly overcome them. There are no such things as difficulties for Communists, for they can surmount them.

Indeed, successfully combining organizational mystique, military prowess, and patriotic populism remains one of the most important narratives of the Communist Party's wartime history. The Anti-Japanese Military and Political College, as an institution intended to embody these virtues, has thus emerged as a potent symbol of Communist Party and People's Liberation Army contributions to China's national salvation.

Dr. Matthew David Johnson

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Jiangxi Soviet; Lin Biao; Liu Bocheng; Long March; Luo Ruiqing; Mao Zedong; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; People's Liberation Army; People's War; Red Army; Red Army College; Soviet Union; Whampoa Military Academy; Xu Xiangqian; Yan'an; Yang Shangkun.

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Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945)

Struggle between Japan and China that was fought for control of China. The Anti-Japanese War (or Sino-Japanese War) was sometimes known as the Second Sino-Japanese War to distinguish it from the war between these two states in 1894 and 1895. It began against the backdrop of repeated efforts of Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; Chinese Nationalist) Party leader Jiang

Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) to crush the forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976). Japanese efforts to control China flared into all-out war in 1937. Previously, an uneasy truce had held, despite Japanese encroachments into Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and the Chinese provinces outside the Great Wall. As Japanese forces moved onto the north China plain, the situation became more volatile, however, and a confusing three-sided conflict emerged until the Japanese surrender of August 1945.

Scholars of the conflict delineate up to four broad phases of the war. The first began with the September 1931 Mukden (Shenyang) Incident, in which intelligence officers of the elite Japanese Guandong (*Kwantung*) Army in south Manchuria blew



Chinese soldiers raise their hands in surrender to armed Japanese soldiers in September 1938. Japanese forces drove into the heart of China between 1937 and 1939, despite strong resistance. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

up a portion of track on the rail line at Mukden, Liaoning Province. They blamed it on the Chinese and used it as an excuse to occupy all of Manchuria, an area roughly the size of Texas and a major resource base. In succeeding years, the Japanese occupied more territory in north China outside the Great Wall as Jiang concentrated on “extermination campaigns” against Mao’s Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin (Juichin) of Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province in southeastern China. From October 1934 to October 1935, Jiang pursued Communist forces through China’s hinterlands to Yan’an (Yenan) in what became known as the Long March. When Mao’s forces reached the relative safety of Yan’an in northeastern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, Jiang ordered local warlords, nominally loyal to him, to continue the campaign against the Communists instead of concentrating on resisting Japanese expansion. The Xi’an (Sian) Incident in December 1936, a coup staged by two GMD generals, forced Jiang to accept a United Front against Japan and helped focus Chinese nationalist fervor against the Japanese.

The Lugouqiao (Lukou-ch’iao) or Marco Polo Bridge Incident began the second phase and marked the start of the larger conflict. On July 7, 1937, Japanese army troops demanded entry into the town of Wanping (Wan-p’ing) about 10 miles west of Beijing (Peking) in Hebei (Hopeh) Province. The town was held by forces loyal to Jiang’s Nationalist government. When the GMD troops denied entry to the Japanese, who were supposedly looking for a lost soldier, the Japanese threatened the use of force at Lugouqiao (the Marco Polo Bridge), where the opposing sides met.

In the aftermath of the Japanese demand for entry into the town and the Chinese refusal, Japanese forces began shelling Wanping and attacking the bridge. Larger

Chinese units held their positions and even drove the Japanese back. Negotiations then began, used by both sides to concentrate additional forces in the north China plain. On July 28, the Japanese attacked and seized control of the bridge; shortly thereafter the Japanese captured both Beijing and Tianjin (Tientsin), local Chinese commanders having decided to abandon these cities rather than risk their destruction. On July 31, Jiang informed the Chinese people that “the hope for peace has been shattered” and that the Chinese people had to fight the Japanese “to the bitter end” in order to expel the “invader.”

From July to December, Japanese forces seized most of the territory north of the Yellow River (Huanghe). The fighting was not confined to north China, for in August 1937 the Japanese attacked the great commercial city of Shanghai in Jiangsu (Kiangsu). Not until November, after three months of hard fighting involving the best Nationalist troops, did Shanghai fall. Japanese forces then advanced up the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, and in December they took Nanjing (Nanking), also in Jiangsu Province, where they committed wide-scale atrocities. Nationalist forces withdrew deep into the Chinese interior to Chongqing (Chungking), in Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, where Jiang established his new capital.

Over the next several years, Japanese forces conquered much of northern and east-central China. The Japanese moved somewhat predictably along railroad lines and major waterways in order to facilitate troop transport and resupply. In theory, this should have aided the Chinese defenders, since it reduced the element of surprise. China, however, did not present a truly unified front because it was more unified in theory than in fact. Although Jiang possessed the most modern Chinese military force, his armies were less powerful than

those of the Japanese. Other Chinese commanders were really regional military leaders, warlords unwilling to risk their troops and thereby weaken their position relative to other Chinese warlords. All too frequently, poorly led Chinese troops fought well for a brief time, but then they fled with escaping civilians.

By 1940, the Japanese controlled northern and eastern China, and the Chinese Communists dominated northwestern China. Late that year, the Communists launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive against Japan, but they were defeated by the better-equipped Japanese. The Communists then switched to guerrilla warfare against Japanese positions in northern and central China. This policy led to Japanese reprisals against both the Communists and the civilian population. Guerrilla warfare did not drive out the Japanese, but it did help disrupt their control and served to establish the Communists as dedicated opponents of Japanese rule, enhancing their postwar political position.

Also by 1940, the situation had stabilized, and a third, somewhat quieter, phase began. Although few major battles occurred, there were regular skirmishes in the three-sided conflict that had emerged after 1937. The Japanese occupied most of the eastern third of China, its major ports, and the bulk of its industrial areas. The Japanese-controlled territory included the majority of Han ethnic Chinese people. The Japanese established a puppet regime under Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei) (1883–1944), a left-wing member of the Guomindang who had been forced from power in December 1935. With Nationalist forces, Communist guerrillas, and an uncooperative Chinese population, the Japanese military sought to wear down Chinese resistance and cut off China from outside assistance, chiefly from the United States.

None of the three main contending armies could afford a major and costly campaign. Mao's Communist forces carried out a social revolution in the areas under their control, introducing land reform and seeking to improve the lot of the peasantry in health care and education. They also sought to identify landowners and other members of the Chinese upper classes with the hated Japanese occupiers. Mao remained vigilant against Jiang's armies, since the Chinese president continued to keep many of his best military units in a blockade of the Communist base area around Yan'an. Typically, Communist forces attacked troops and sought to convert the peasants to their cause in areas only weakly held by the Japanese.

Jiang also proceeded cautiously, for he intended to conserve Nationalist military strength to continue the civil war and crush the Communists once Japan had been defeated. For a time, the Soviet Union and the Western powers provided aid to Jiang, despite logistical challenges. The Soviets sought to keep Japan occupied in China to forestall any invasion of Siberia, but a Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact signed in April 1941 eased Moscow's fears of Japanese expansion and enabled Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to concentrate on the greater threat posed by Germany, which invaded in June. Britain, France, and the United States also provided assistance, but the German conquest of France reduced that aid to a trickle as Great Britain fought Germany alone while the United States gave highest priority to assisting Britain in its time of greatest peril.

The civil war, however, was never far from the surface, as evidenced in the so-called New Fourth Army Incident, or the South Anhui (Anhui) (Wannan) Incident of January 1941. As part of the United Front against Japan, Jiang permitted Mao to reorganize his

armed units into the Eighth Route Army and later authorized formation of the New Fourth Army. There was disagreement about its area of operations; Jiang expected the force to operate north of the Yellow River, but the New Fourth Army instead moved south into Shandong (Shantung). Consequently, GMD armies surrounded and attacked the New Fourth Army on January 6, 1941, badly mauling that smaller force and compelling the surrender of 2,000 of its troops.

Meanwhile, in September 1940, Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina, and in July 1941, they move into southern Indochina. These steps, an effort to cut the Chinese off from U.S. aid flowing from India, brought U.S. retaliation against Japan in the form of an economic embargo on certain critical war materials, especially oil. In turn, this triggered Japan's decision to go to war against the United States. Japan's December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and its war with Britain and the Netherlands broadened the conflict into a general Pacific war and severely strained its capability to conduct offensive operations in China.

Japanese military leaders were forced to reassign divisions from China to carry out the invasions of Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma (present-day Myanmar). In consequence, Japanese operations in China subsided. Jiang, confident of ultimate Allied victory, continued his policy of largely avoiding pitched battle with major Japanese military units, although he reluctantly agreed to commit some divisions to assist in operations against Japanese forces in Burma. Meanwhile, Chinese Communist forces continued their pattern of securing the loyalty of the peasants in areas they controlled while engaging in small-unit attacks against the Japanese. The general Nationalist military inactivity against the Japanese aided the Chinese Communists in that it

helped them secure the mantle of Chinese nationalism. The Japanese "Three-Alls" reprisal policy also assisted the Communists. Following a guerrilla attack, Japanese forces would move into a nearby populated area and "kill all, loot all, burn all." Their policy turned many of the survivors into new recruits for the Communists.

U.S. aid to the Nationalists increased after December 1941, but China was a distant part of the China-Burma-India Theater. In April 1942, Japanese forces in Burma took Lashio and cut the Burma Road, Nationalist China's only land route to the outside world. Thereafter, American aid had to be flown over "the Hump" of the Himalayas to reach Chongqing. Jiang's U.S. military advisor, Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell (1883–1946), tried to train and organize new Chinese divisions equipped by the United States, but he became increasingly frustrated with Jiang's refusal to commit them to fight the Japanese in Burma or in southeastern China. There was also disagreement among U.S. generals about aid to China. Major General Claire Chennault (1893–1958) wanted to build on the success of the Flying Tigers and their high kill ratio against Japanese pilots to commit most aid to the new U.S. Fourteenth Air Force in China.

In October 1944, Stilwell was recalled at Jiang's request, and the China-Burma-India Theater was separated into the China Theater and the Burma-India Theater. This final phase of the Sino-Japanese War (late 1944 to August 1945) highlighted the corruption and inefficiency of Nationalist forces. The United States had provided sufficient aid to build a modern army of 30 divisions and had also created the Fourteenth Air Force. Further, the United States began strategic bombing of Japanese air bases on Formosa some 100 miles from the Chinese mainland. Throughout 1943, American planners had

contemplated using either eastern China or Taiwan (Formosa) as a staging point for the men and supplies necessary to launch an invasion of the Japanese home islands. Early planning assumed that the new Chinese Nationalist divisions would reopen the Burma Road and contain Japanese forces in China proper. It also assumed that the Fourteenth Air Force would be able to subject Japanese coastal defenses to attack.

The successes of the U.S. amphibious forces in the southwest and central Pacific and the success of U.S. submarines in cutting the flow of food and raw materials, especially oil, from the Japanese-conquered territories to the home islands somewhat reduced the importance of China as a staging area against Japan. At the same time, Japanese forces in China launched a two-pronged offensive that demonstrated continued Chinese military weakness. Operation Ichi-go, which Japan conducted from April to December 1944, aimed to cross the Burma-India border through south China to seize Allied airfields at the western side of the Hump air-transport route, to capture key north-south railroads in China, and to seize Fourteenth Air Force airfields used to stage attacks on Japanese forces. The attack on Assam failed, as Allied forces in Burma under Lieutenant General Sir William Slim broke the siege of Imphal and then went on the offensive. But the Japanese attack in China succeeded. The Japanese first won control of the key north-south railroad between the Yellow River and Yangzi River; they then seized the airfields used by the Fourteenth Air Force, and later in 1944 they secured Guilin (Kweilin), Nanning, and Liuzhou (Liuchow) in Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province. Chinese Nationalist forces not only fought poorly, but peasants attacked them as they retreated, demonstrating the huge divide between the Chinese masses

and the government. Interestingly, the Japanese did not attack Communist base areas in northern and north-central China, causing some observers to speculate about a de facto Japanese-Chinese Communist truce that benefited both sides.

The Ichi-go operation was the high point of Japanese military operations in China. Thereafter, Tokyo began transferring its best divisions from China and Manchuria to meet the U.S. drive across the Pacific into the Philippines and later the Bonin Islands and the Ryukyus. Remaining Japanese forces in China were badly overextended, and Japanese commanders sought to consolidate, especially by summer 1945, to face a possible Soviet attack. Meanwhile, the weight of corruption and inefficiency was beginning to sink Jiang's Nationalist regime. The Chinese government had limited financial resources because Japanese troops occupied the populous and most productive part of China. Corruption and inefficiency also hurt the government. Jiang's regime responded by printing more and more paper money, driving down the value of paper and leading to dramatic inflation that wiped out much of the middle class. By contrast, Mao's Communist forces emerged from the war in a much stronger position because of their apparent honesty and commitment to the welfare of the peasants and their resistance to the Japanese.

By the summer of 1945, the war was drawing to a close. In early August 1945, Red Army troops—honoring Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's pledge at the February 1945 Yalta Conference that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan “two or three months” after the defeat of Germany—invaded Manchuria in overwhelming force and quickly occupied that Chinese province. On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered. The fighting in China had tied down some

1.2 million Japanese troops, with some 396,000 killed. China had sustained military casualties alone of more than 3.2 million, with more than 1.3 million dead. The number of civilian dead is unknown.

Unfortunately for the Chinese, the end of the long Sino-Japanese War did not bring peace to China. Ignoring American advice, Jiang moved troops to Manchuria to secure that key province before the Communists in north China could do so. Fighting broke out between the Nationalists and the Communists that led to a Communist victory in September 1949, bringing the long years of Chinese Civil War and international war to an end.

*Dr. Charles M. Dobbs and
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See also: Chennault, Claire Lee; China-Burma-India Theater; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Great Wall; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Hong Kong; Hundred Regiments Campaign; Ichi-go Operation; Jiang Jieshi; Long March; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge Incident; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; New Fourth Army Incident; Soviet Union; Stilwell, Joseph; United Front; Xi'an Incident; Yan'an.

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Art of War, The

Credited to Sun Zi (Sun Tzu) (544–496 BC), *The Art of War* is a military treatise that provides objectives for managing tactics and winning military engagements. Originally the work was called the *Sunzi Pingfa* and chiefly attributed to Sun Zi, who according to tradition wrote the treatise during the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BC) of the Zhou dynasty (1066–221 BC). The book is set somewhere between 722 BC and 481 BC. Over time, additional clarifications and commentaries were added to the original text by military philosophers such as Li Quan and Du Mu. The end result of the revised work retained the title *The Art of War* and is still credited to Sun Zi.

Tradition places Sun Zi entering the service of King Helio of the state of Wu about 510 BC. The state itself was just east of the main state of Chu and was considered a

semibarbarian state by ancient Chinese historians. Having secured command of King Heliu's armies, it was in this period that Sun Zi began to successfully employ concepts critical to military tactics and overall strategy. After numerous victories, Sun Zi then compiled the original 13 chapters of *The Art of War*, disclosing all aspects of how warfare was to be conducted effectively.

The Art of War covers every aspect of military strategy that was being employed at that time, including the discipline of soldiers, tactics, strategy, logistics, and the responsibilities of the commanding general. The significance of the work can be explained by the emergence of more organized warfare during the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–256 BC). The early kingdoms of this dynasty were fragmented into various warring states, each with separate rulers and laws and each vying for domination over their rival neighbors. These states included Zhao, Qi, Qin, Chu, Han, Wei, and Yan. Innovations in strategies and tactics were being explored in reaction to these conflicts. For example, in response to large cavalry formations being used by the various non-Chinese groups of the north, the northern state of Jin began to create defensive cavalry units. Gradually an understanding and appreciation of cavalry tactics were recognized by all the warring states.

The period also witnessed improvements on the fortifications of cities and massive defensive walls that spanned great distances. As a result of these defensive measures, armies had to have sufficient manpower and new techniques for attacking such fortifications. Maintaining an army for both offensive and defensive purposes required vast resources; for example, improvements in metallurgy increased demand for iron that was quickly being utilized for weapons no later than the seventh century BC. These

large-scale military engagements combined with military innovations inspired the emergence of prominent individuals with a deeper understanding of critical issues of warfare.

The Art of War is by no means the only work of this period that outlines military sieges or how to maintain an army, but it ranks as the most significant because it encompasses an understanding that tactics and strategies are dependent on the environments to which they are applied. The book argues persuasively that a plan of engagement is subject to change over time, since a majority of situations and environments a military commander will face are neither constant nor controlled. Thus every military action should be quick and decisive.

The 13 chapters of *The Art of War* cover the following subjects: laying plans, waging war, attack by stratagem, tactical dispositions, energy, weak points and strong, maneuvering, variation of tactics, the army on the march, terrain, the nine situations, the attack by fire, and the use of spies. Sun Zi begins by stressing that a military commander must know the limits of his own capabilities and understand the excessive costs of prolonged warfare, which means his actions must be decisive from the beginning.

The Art of War remains one of the most influential works for the study of warfare in the Far East. Not only credited with exclusive strategies concerning warfare, it has also become a philosophical model for gaining the advantage in both political and business conflicts. Even long after the unification of China under the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) in 221 BC, *The Art of War* has retained its influence on military commanders throughout the centuries, including Japanese military strategists for hundreds of years and the commanding forces of the Viet Cong army during the Vietnam War (1960–1975). Despite centuries of innovations in military technology,

the basic concepts of *The Art of War* remain relevant to conflicts on both a large and small scale and continue to be recognized by military strategists, commanders, historians, and business executives worldwide.

Alan Glen Chaple

See also: Guerrilla Warfare; Han Dynasty; Qin Dynasty; Shang Dynasty; Sun Zi; Warring States Period; Zhou Dynasty.

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Autumn Harvest Uprising (1927)

The Autumn Harvest Uprising was an insurrection in Hunan and Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Provinces in September 1927, led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976). Mao established a short-lived Hunan Soviet government and would later become chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and head of state of the People's Republic of China

(PRC). He was of peasant origins and was one of the founders of the CCP.

In April 1927, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei) (1883–1944) terminated the political coalition between the CCP and Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party), which led to the failure of the CCP urban-centered revolution. Also, unsuccessful attempts were made by Communists to take cities such as Nanchang, Changsha, and Guangzhou (Canton). On August 7, 1927, the CCP Central Committee convened a meeting in Hankou, which corrected Chen Duxiu's (Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (1879–1942) capitulations to the GMD, and decided on the general principle of carrying out agrarian revolution and armed resistance against GMD reactionaries. It also decided that the main task of the party was to mobilize the peasants to launch the Autumn Harvest Uprising. After the August 7 meeting, the party initiated many armed uprisings. In September 1927, Mao and the Hunan Provincial Party Committee led the Autumn Harvest Uprising at the border of Hunan and Jiangxi.

According to the Central Committee's plan, Mao was appointed secretary of the South Hunan Special Committee. At the provincial party committee meeting, however, Mao insisted on postponement of the rebellion because the Central Committee's plan did not rely on regular troops, a necessity for success. Mao argued that the peasants held no interest in such a large-scale rebellion unless the party was willing to center the movement in their areas, where a victory would benefit the peasants. The provincial committee agreed with Mao and changed the plan. They moved the armed workers, CCP-controlled troops, and security units from the cities to the countryside to support the peasants' rebellion. According to the

new strategy, the focus of the Communist military efforts shifted from urban uprisings to rural rebellion in Hunan and Jiangxi. Mao seemed more concerned about the peasants' mobilization and benefits for his region, South Hunan, than the revolutionary movement in the provincial capital and other cities. Thereafter, the CCP shifted its focus from an urban-centered revolution to a rural-centered military movement.

In late August, Mao organized the First Division of the Chinese Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants with three regiments and 5,000 men. Following the Central Committee's orders, on September 11, the division launched the Autumn Harvest Uprising along the Hunan-Jiangxi borders. Soon the GMD and local self-defense troops organized by the landlords, who were the target of the peasants' rebellion, counterattacked. On September 29, the badly damaged division reorganized into a single regiment with 1,000 men at Sanwan, Jiangxi. The rebellion's outcome was a failure because of the lack of heavy weapons and poor experience of the revolutionary fighters, as well as the defection of the fourth army group. All these factors contributed to near complete annihilation of the revolution.

Mao was then forced to retreat to the Jinggangshan (Jinggang Mountains) on the border between Hunan and Jiangxi Province, from which emerged an army of miners. This was the first armed uprising by the Communists, and it marked a significant change in their strategy. The emphasis for the Communists in fomenting rebellion was no longer in the big cities, but switched to the countryside. The change helped Mao to build strong rural revolutionary bases and

the Red Army. In addition, the Autumn Harvest Uprising remains one of the three biggest uprisings in the military history of CCP (the other two are Nanchang Uprising and Guangzhou Uprising). Mao and Red Army founder Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) went on to develop a rural based strategy that centered on guerrilla tactics, and made famous the strategy called “surround the cities from the countryside,” paving the way for the Long March of 1934–1935.

Yutong Yang

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Guangzhou Uprising; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; Zhu De.

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B

Bandit Extermination Campaigns (1949–1953)

Military campaigns by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) against bandits from 1949 to the end of 1953. The PLA high command employed 41 armies, including 140 infantry divisions and totaling 1.5 million troops, to carry out the nationwide bandit extermination campaigns which reportedly annihilated more than 2.6 million bandits and the remnants of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) troops.

Bandits had been a social cancer throughout Chinese history, but reached their peak after the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). During the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), they boasted huge numbers and wide influence. Well organized and well armed, they were actively engaged in rural areas by robbing local businesses and residents, and attacking villages and small towns. The bandit troops occupied many areas and established strong connections with the local police and local GMD officials. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the bandit troops joined with the anticommunist forces and represented an immediate threat to the security and safety of the new government of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). The bandit forces were composed mainly of the remnants of the GMD troops that could not flee to Taiwan after Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) lost the mainland to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War; traditional bandit forces; and

local militias organized by landlords to protect their real estate.

In June 1949, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP, called the PLA at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh CCP Central Committee for a new campaign to eliminate all the bandits in the country. Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), commander in chief of the PLA, issued orders to four army groups to sweep off the bandit forces. In early 1950, the PLA started the nationwide bandit extermination campaign, which focused on southwestern, northeastern, northwestern, and eastern regions. After the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, especially after the PLA armies entered Korea in October, the bandit extermination campaigns became the most urgent task to protect the new regime and secure the domestic order necessary for China to win a foreign war.

In the southwest, the PLA campaign began in February 1950 under the command of Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986), and He Long. They deployed the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighteenth Army Group, including 13 armies and totaling 37 divisions for the campaign. By July, the PLA eliminated 370,000 bandits in the southwest. By the end of 1950, killed, captured, and surrendered bandits totaled 850,000 in the southwestern region. From 1950 to 1953, the PLA exterminated 1.16 million bandits in the southwest.

The northeastern region was a popular region for bandits' activities. The PLA fought the bandit forces in this region for three years

with considerable success. In the first year, the PLA eliminated more than 30,000 bandits after the new local governments were established. Then the PLA army commands worked with local authorities by mobilizing the masses to join the bandit extermination campaigns. Villages and small towns established Communist militia by arming the peasants; local governments identified and made contact with the bandit families, who convinced their bandit family members to come home and surrender; and local business owners stopped supplying the bandit troops. The PLA wiped out the major bandit forces out by September 1951 and annihilated more than 53,000 bandit troops in the northeastern region.

In the northwestern region, the PLA started the campaign in November 1949 with 11 armies, including 37 divisions plus one brigade. They engaged the bandit forces in Shaanxi (Shensi), Gansu (Kansu), Ningxia (Ningsia), Qinghai (Tsinghai), and Xinjiang (Hsin-kiang) Provinces. In the first half of 1950, the PLA Northwest China Command added more than 19,000 troops to the bandit extermination campaign. By July 1953, the campaign in the northwestern region was completed with the killing of more than 91,000 bandit troops.

In the eastern region, there were an estimated 120,000 bandits in July 1949. From 1949, the PLA East China Command and the Third Field Army Command deployed 14 divisions to fight the bandit forces in Zhejiang (Chekiang) and Fujian (Fukien) Provinces. After more than one year of the bandit extermination campaign inland, the PLA annihilated more than 5,400 bandit forces. In 1950, Chen Yi (Ch'en Yi) (1901–1972), commander of the East China Command and the Third Field Army, reinforced five divisions to Fujian to fight against the bandits. By June 1950, the PLA exterminated 114,000 bandits inland of the eastern region.

Then the PLA moved the bandit extermination campaign from land to sea and fought the bandits on the offshore islands along the eastern coast. By the end of 1953, over a period of four years, the PLA had eliminated 246,000 bandits in the eastern region.

By the end of 1953, the PLA annihilated more than 2.6 million bandit troops. As a result, the new government of the PRC was able to exterminate the remnants of the GMD forces, eliminate GMD agents and spies, destroy secret societies, and disarm local landlords and peasants. The victory of the PLA bandit extermination campaigns consolidated the CCP regime and secured the domestic order for many years to come.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chen Yi; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; Guomindang; He Long; Korean War; Liu Bocheng; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Zhu De.

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Banner System (1601–1912)

The banner system was the military, political, and social organization created by the

Manchus led by Nurhaci (1559–1626) in the early seventeenth century. It later incorporated the Mongols and the Chinese, acting as the military tool for the Manchu conquest of China and serving as a backbone of the Qing Empire for centuries.

As the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) waned, the Jurchens (Manchus) led by Nurhaci started to consolidate power in northeastern China. Although Nurhaci monopolized the trade in the region, he recognized the importance of creating an effective and powerful military apparatus in order to unify the Jurchens and to realize the goal of empire building.

In 1601, Nurhaci created the banner system by organizing the Jurchens into four banners with four basic colors as identifications: yellow, white, red, and blue. As he recruited more warriors, he created another four banners in 1615: banners with flags embroidered with the four original colors. Historically, this system is called the Eight Banner System.

The banner system was administered through three levels: banner (*gusa*), regiment (*jalan*), and company (*niru*). The whole system functioned as a military force as the banners served as a tool in wars, and a membership in a given banner symbolized the status as a warrior. The stratification of the banner into three levels facilitated effective commandship as all banner men were required to be loyal to Nurhaci. To strengthen fighting capability, Nurhaci's descendants added eight Mongol and eight Chinese banners in 1634 and 1642.

The banner system was also a political polity as well as a social organization. Principally, all Manchus, Mongols, and the Chinese who surrendered early were banner men. The distinction between soldier and civilian was vague, and they were identical in many cases. At peace, banner men engaged in farming and

receiving military training; they were dispatched to the front once a war broke out.

When the Manchus conquered China in 1644, the total number of soldiers in the banner system reached 168,900. After 1644, the banner system became a hereditary military caste. By the end of the seventeenth century, the number of banner men totaled a quarter million, a stable figure until 1912. Roughly half of all banner men and their families were stationed in Beijing (Peking) as defenders of the capital. Over 100 banner garrisons were established in major cities or strategic locations throughout the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), such as those along the Grand Canal and the Yellow River (Huanghe) and Yangzi (Yangtze) Rivers, in the coastal regions, and in the northeast and northwest. A garrison inside a major city was called the “Manchu City” separated from Chinese civilians to avoid direct confrontation. Being in those isolated colonies, the garrisons remained one of the prominent institutions of the Qing dynasty.

Although the banner troops originally were fierce fighters, their life in a new environment in vast Chinese land eventually debilitated their militant spirit. The emperors often issued edicts to remind them of preserving tradition, but the banner system was gradually eroded by banner men's indulgence in an enjoyable life. In 1735, barely a century after the Manchu conquest, Emperor Qianlong (Ch'ienlung) (reigned 1736–1795) started to rely on the Chinese Green Standard Army to suppress bandits and uprisings. Even though banner men continued to be a state-sponsored military force, they were no longer a regular army.

The banner system proved to be ineffective during the First Opium War (1840–1842) and the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864). As a result, Hunan (Xiang) Army and Anhui Army replaced it. By the end of the nineteenth century, the rise of the New Army

(Beiyang Army or Xinjun) disfranchised the banner system as a military force.

As imperial decay continued, the banner system became a burden to the Qing government, as the state funding diminished. Consequently, banner men lived in poverty and were encouraged to seek self-support. Banner men in urban areas such as Beijing were absorbed into the urban labor force, while those who lived in frontier regions such as Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang) Province became farmers. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the abdication of the last Qing Emperor Xuantong (Puyi) (1909–1911) declared the demise of the banner system.

Dr. Patrick Fuliang Shan

See also: Beiyang Army; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Grand Canal; Ming Dynasty; Manchuria; Manchu; Mongols; New Army; Opium War, First; Qianlong, Emperor; Qing Dynasty; Sino-Japanese War; Taiping Rebellion; Xiang Army.

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Beiping-Tianjin Campaign (1948–1949)

The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign (Ping-Jin Campaign) was the last of the three large campaigns that effectively destroyed the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army in mainland China during the Third Chinese Civil War, or Liberation War of 1946–1949. The battle took place primarily in Hebei (Hopeh) and the municipalities of Beijing (Peking, or Beiping) and Tianjin (Tientsin) from late October 1948 to January 31, 1949.

Shortly after Lin Biao's Northeast Field Army (NFA) destroyed the Nationalist army in Manchuria (Liaoning-Shenyang Campaign, or Liao-Shen Campaign) and concurrent with the last stage of the Central Plains and East China Field Armies' victory in the central plains region (Huai-Hai Campaign), the Communists turned their attention toward Fu Zuoyi's (Fu Tso-yi) (1895–1974) General Headquarters for Bandit Suppression in north China. This army consisted of almost half a million men. Fearing that Fu would try to escape the impending trap, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and the Communist leadership believed it was imperative to destroy this army as soon as possible. However, the nearest Communist force, Nie Rongzhen's (Nieh Jung-ch'en) (1899–1992) North China Military District, was not strong enough to destroy or block Fu's army on its own, especially as it concurrently laid siege to Taiyuan. The only other unit in the vicinity was the NFA, but it had not yet had a chance to rest and refit after the Liao-Shen Campaign.

Despite the Communist fears, Fu had no intention of abandoning his position. By November, he had determined that the NFA was not ready to move south, and he planned

to stall the Communists for as long as possible in north China. Fu's army manned a 400-mile defense line that started at the port in Tanggu, ran through Tianjin and Beijing, and ended at Zhangjiakou. Unaware of Fu's intent, the Communists scaled back their attacks on Taiyuan and prolonged the Huai-Hai Campaign to project the illusion that Fu was not yet completely isolated.

Mao Zedong and the Secretariat, the CCP political and military high command, also were determined that NFA would have to complete its deployment into north China by November 22. This meant that Lin would have virtually no time to rest or reorganize his weary army. Nonetheless, by November 23, the NFA seized Shanhaiguan and severed the Beijing-Tianjin railroad. The Nationalists were unaware that these forces were from the NFA and believed Lin's army was still in Manchuria.

As the NFA continued its infiltration, Nie deployed the Second Army, commanded by Yang Dezhi, and Yang Chengwu's (Yang Ch'eng-wu) (1914–2004) Third Army to attack Zhangjiakou. Fu dispatched his best force, the Thirty-Fifth Corps, to relieve the city, but this element was trapped by the Third Army at Xinbaoan. Fu's rescue attempts failed at a cost of 13,000 men. However, the two Yangs did not pursue their attacks for fear that this would force Fu to consolidate his defenses or evacuate.

Despite the danger, Fu insisted on staying put, believing the NFA's main force was still a month away. In this, he severely miscalculated as the majority of Lin's army had already assumed their assigned positions by December 12. At this point, the Secretariat created the Beiping-Tianjin (Ping-Jin) General Front Committee and appointed Lin as commander in chief. This gave him jurisdiction over the Second and Third Armies as well as the NFA.

Having surrounded and isolated the major strong points of the GMD defenses, the Communists began a series of secret talks to convince Fu to surrender. These were facilitated by Fu's own daughter, Fu Dong, who was a member of the Communist underground. When these negotiations reached an impasse on December 19, Lin unleashed the Second and Third Armies, which proceeded to destroy the Thirty-Fifth Corps and capture Zhangjiakou. This action severed Fu's escape route west and cost him another 60,000 men.

Fu returned to the bargaining table, but this time he was greeted with the Communists' demand for unconditional surrender. In the meantime, Lin used transferred North China Military District armies east to reinforce the sieges of Beijing and Tianjin. After Fu left the bargaining table for a second time, the Ping-Jin Committee decided to attack Tianjin and cut the Nationalists off from the sea. The Communists captured the city on January 15, inflicting 130,000 casualties in a daylong battle.

As the loss of Tianjin left Fu completely isolated in Beijing, he submitted to a new round of negotiations. While Nie argued that the talks were sincere, Lin believed the Nationalists were stalling for time. In the end, Nie was proven correct, partially because he had prevented Lin from issuing a premature ultimatum. On January 22, Fu left Beijing and his army, still a quarter of a million men strong, were integrated into the Communist ranks. This act brought the campaign to a close.

In addition to eliminating the last major Nationalist force north of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, the Ping-Jin Campaign also established an important precedent. This so-called Ping-Jin Method offered isolated and defeated Nationalist forces two choices: a peaceful path (the Beiping method) or a military one (the Tianjin method). This was

to become the pattern for the rest of the conquest of China, with most Nationalists opting for the Beiping method.

Dr. Christopher Lew

See also: Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Field Army; First Field Army; Fourth Field Army; Fu Zuoyi; Guomindang; Huai-Hai Campaign; Lin Biao; Liao-Shen Campaign; Luo Ronghuan; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Nationalist Army; North China Field Army; Nie Rongzhen.

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Beiyang Army (1906–1927)

A Western-style army established by the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) in an effort to modernize the Chinese military. In the late nineteenth century, the frequent peasant

rebellions, foreign invasions, and domestic as well as overseas anti-Manchu movements undermined the Qing’s power. In 1895, China lost the war to Japan, and thereby lost its central position in Asia. The turn of the century marked major changes in the Qing dynasty’s military organization, institution, and technology. To survive, the Qing government established the Ziqiangjun (Self-Strengthening Army) in Hubei in 1896.

In 1897, another Qing official, Yuan Shi-kai (Yuan Shih-k’ai) (1859–1916), also established a new army, named “Xinjun” (New Army), in Hebei (Hopeh) or Zhili



As founder of the Beiyang Army and first president of the Chinese Republic, Yuan Shi-kai was a key player in the turbulent period of Chinese history that included the reforms instituted by the Qing dynasty, its abdication in 1912, and the early attempts at republican government in China. (Library of Congress)

(Chihli). He hired German instructors and purchased modern firearms from Germany and other European countries. Then Yuan's army was renamed the "Beiyang" (Northern Sea) Army, and by 1906, it consisted of five infantry divisions, totaling 50,000, near Beijing (Peking), the capital city. Yuan created five officer training schools and military academies in Baoding and Tianjin (Tientsin), Hebei Province. Soon Yuan became the "father of the warlords" in China. Nevertheless, military education and formal training were promoted by both European instructors and new technology in the New Army. By the turn of the century, China's New Army was a far more effective force.

Unfortunately, the New Army could not save the empire because the Manchu rulers refused to carry the reform into military institutions and organizations beyond buying Western weapons and hiring European instructors. Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) (1823–1901), Qing's prime minister, once said publicly that "Chinese civil and military systems are much superior in every aspect to these of the Westerners; only our firearms are far inferior to theirs." The Manchu grandees' refusal of further reform and brutal suppression of the reformers also alienated the regular men of the New Army and undermined their loyalty to the emperor himself. Moreover, the early new recruits were soon disillusioned by the government's corruption, mismanagement, and, worst of all, its failure against European, American, and Japanese forces during the 1900 Boxer Rebellion. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the Qing dynasty's political order and economic system crumbled under Western invasions and increasing domestic dissatisfaction, rapidly eroding Manchu authority in Beijing.

Meanwhile, the anti-Manchu movement founded its revolutionary center overseas. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), one of the anti-Manchu leaders, made Japan his revolutionary base. In 1905, Sun organized the Tongmenghui (or T'ung-meng Hui, the United League) in Japan. Among the 1,000 early members were some of the New Army's young officers trained in Japan. On October 10, 1911, amidst an anti-Qing plot in Wuchang, some New Army officers revolted. The success of the Wuchang uprising led many officers of the New Army to join the Revolution of 1911. In the next two months, 15 provinces proclaimed their independence from the Qing Empire. The rebellious provinces and Tongmenghui joined forces, setting up a provisional government at Nanjing (Nanking). The provisional government elected Sun president of the government, and he was inaugurated on January 1, 1912, at Nanjing. Sun proclaimed the founding of the Republic of China (ROC).

In an attempt to avoid civil war, Sun negotiated with Yuan and offered him the presidency of the new republic. On February 12, 1912, Yuan forced the last emperor, only six at the time, to step down, thus ending the Qing dynasty. Then Sun resigned as president. On February 14, Yuan was elected president of the ROC by the provisional government. Yuan, however, tried to establish his own dictatorship and monarchy against the revolutionaries. After Yuan's death in 1916, the country entered the Warlord Period (1916–1927), in which military commanders of different armies controlled a province or a region. The Beiyang Army became the main strength of the Zhili warlord clique under the command of Marshal Wu Peifu (Wu P'ei-fu) (1874–1939).

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Boxer Rebellion; China, Republic of; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Li Hongzhang; Manchus; New Army; Qing Dynasty; Sino-Japanese War; Self-Strengthening Movement; Sun Yat-sen; Unequal Treaties; Warlord Period; Yuan Shikai.

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Boxer Rebellion

The so-called Boxer Rebellion was initiated by the secret organization the Righteous and Harmonious Fists (known in the West as the Boxers) during the late Qing dynasty (1644–1911). The movement developed in northern China, and the Boxer Rebellion occurred from November 1897 to September 1901. Its objective was the removal of foreign influence over Chinese trade, politics, religion, and technology. The Boxers were so named because most of the adherents of the movement practiced martial arts, including Eastern-style boxing.

The Opium Wars of the 1840s and 1850s had led to Western nations imposing on the Chinese what became known as the Unequal Treaties, which gave them substantial

control over China's principal ports, dominance of the Chinese Customs Service (and hence much of the imperial revenue), and extraterritorial rights for Western citizens, rendering them immune from prosecution in Chinese courts. This environment provided Western businessmen a dominant position in the most lucrative parts of the Chinese economy and also encouraged the influx of Christian missionaries, who came to be seen as agents for the further spread of Western influence in China. Furthermore, because the missionaries were exempt from much of Chinese law, Christian churches often attracted miscreants who used the religion to invoke Western protection, further inflaming resentment against foreign influence.

China's humiliating defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, despite efforts to reform the government and promote self-generated development, was followed by still further demands for mining and railroad concessions and seizures of territory by Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. In November 1897, the German government retaliated against China for the murder of two missionaries in Shandong (Shantung) Province by occupying the port of Qingdao (Tsingtao). In December 1897, the Russians seized Lushun, located in Liaoning Province. The British joined in by occupying Weihai, Shandong, while the French seized Zhanjiang, Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province.

The Boxers came together as a nationalistic, antiforeign movement determined to reverse the expansion of Western influence in China and restore Chinese independence. Its influence was greatest in northern China, where Western dominance was most widespread. The initial stages of the Boxer Rebellion were simultaneous with the Qing Emperor Guangxu's (Kwang Hsu)

(1875–1908) so-called Hundred Days' Reform (June 11–September 21, 1898), an attempt to reorganize and make more efficient the imperial bureaucracy. The plan was opposed by his powerful aunt, the Empress Dowager Cixi (Tz'u Hsi) (1835–1908). The Boxers at first were hostile toward the ruling Manchu Qing dynasty. However, after suffering a stinging defeat during an engagement with imperial troops in October 1898, the Boxers suspended their antigovernment campaign to focus their assaults on Christian missionaries and converts, whom they saw as another form of Western imperialism.

The growing strength of the Boxers encouraged Cixi both to deploy them as a force to expel the Western powers from China and to reverse the emperor's reform program. The Imperial Court, soon firmly under her control, therefore issued edicts in January 1900 defending the Boxers. This move drew vociferous complaints from foreign diplomats. By November 1897, the Boxers had begun to launch widespread attacks against Western interests throughout northern China.

As the depredations of the Boxers spread, Western military forces began to build up their presence on the Chinese coast, beginning in April 1900. A mixed force of 4,500 troops was landed to safeguard Western interests in Tianjin (Tientsin), and on May 31, 430 marines and sailors from eight nations were dispatched to Beijing to reinforce the forces guarding the legations there. The nations that sent troops included Japan, Russia, Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany, Italy, and Austria. On June 9, 1900, the Boxers severed the telegraph line to Beijing. The following day, some 2,100 troops (mostly marines and sailors), part of another international coalition force, were dispatched to Beijing (Peking) to aid troops already in place defending foreign

embassies there. This force was commanded by British vice admiral Sir Edward Seymour.

The troops met stiff resistance from imperial troops and had to retreat to Tianjin, arriving there on June 25, with the loss of 350 men. The imperial government ordered all foreigners to leave Beijing, and the following day the Boxers, joined by elements of the Imperial Army, attacked the foreign compounds inside Beijing. The American, British, Dutch, French, and Russian legations, all in close proximity to the Forbidden City in Beijing, joined together to form a fortified compound into which the staff of the Belgian and Spanish legations and other foreign citizens were able to flee. The German legation, however, was quite distant on the other side of the city and was stormed before the staff could escape.

Imperial Chinese troops, in the meantime, had reinforced the Dagukou (Taku) forts at the mouth of the Haihe River, cutting off the Allied fleet from the forces it had landed. On June 16, a joint Allied conference presented the Chinese with an ultimatum demanding the surrender of the forts. At 1:00 A.M. on June 17, a fierce artillery interchange between the forts and shoal-draft elements of the Allied fleet commenced, after which Allied landing forces assaulted the forts, capturing them by 6:30 A.M. along with four destroyers seized by naval boarding parties.

The success at Dagukou established a beachhead to build up strong forces to relieve the troops at Tianjin and advance on Beijing. By early July, 51 warships from eight nations were deployed in the mouth of the Haihe River. They brought with them 4,750 marines and naval landing forces plus almost 50,000 other troops, the great majority from Japan (20,840), Russia (13,150), and Britain (12,020), with smaller contingents from France (3,520), the United States

(3,420), Germany (900), Italy (80), and Austria-Hungary (75). This Allied force successfully assaulted Tianjin on July 13 and commenced its advance to Beijing on August 4.

The march to Beijing was opposed by approximately 70,000 imperial troops and some 50,000–100,000 Boxers. On August 5, 1900, Beijing fell, and the following day, American and British troops prevailed in a fierce engagement at Yangcun. On August 14, the Allied force arrived at Beijing, where troops from the U.S. Army's Fourteenth Infantry Regiment scaled the Tartar Wall and opened the way into the Outer City. The following day, the Allied force successfully assaulted the Inner City, ending the siege of the legations.

Following the capture of Beijing, Allied troops spread out over northern China, breaking up Boxer concentrations. On February 1, 1901, the imperial government officially abolished the Righteous and Harmonious Fists. On September 7, 1901, imperial officials had no choice but to sign the so-called Boxer Protocol, sometimes referred to as the Peace Agreement between the Eight-Nation Alliance and China. The Qing government was obliged to permit fortifications of foreign legations and the installation of foreign garrisons along the Beijing-Tianjin railroad. It also was compelled to execute 10 officials linked to the outbreak of the rebellion and pay war reparations of \$333 million. Both Britain and the United States subsequently remitted much of their portion of the indemnity, allocating it for the education of Chinese students at overseas institutions.

This humiliating defeat greatly contributed to the growth of Chinese nationalism and movements dedicated to the nation's

modernization and the overthrow of the foreign (originally of Manchurian origin) Qing dynasty. This would lead to the 1911 revolution and the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912. In the short term, however, it also paved the way for aggressive foreign expansion into China, especially by Russia and Japan in the north. The large number of American troops and ships deployed in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War allowed the United States to make a significant contribution to suppressing the Boxer Rebellion. This success reinforced the importance of the Philippines in maintaining America's interests in the Far East.

Paul E. Fontenoy

See also: China, Republic of; Eight Foreign Armies' Invasion of China; Manchus; New Army; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Sino-Japanese War; Unequal Treaties.

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C

Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries. *See*

Counterrevolutionaries, Campaign Against

Cao Cao (155–220)

Chinese general and poet, who rose to power at the end of the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), effectively ruled northern China from 200 to 220. The territory he conquered became the Kingdom of Wei (220–265) during the period of the Three Kingdoms (220–280). Cao Cao plays an important role in Chinese literature and folklore.

Born in 155, Cao Cao was the son of Cao Song, a minor official in the Han court. Cao Song is thought to have been the adopted son of an influential eunuch in the imperial court. (Much of the court bureaucracy in the later Han period was controlled by eunuchs.) Cao Cao followed his father into the bureaucracy and spent his early years in a number of midlevel court and military appointments. In 189, an attempted coup by General Dong Zhou broke the power of the Han emperor, sending China into civil war.

The region would suffer from continuous warfare from 189 to 200. Cao Cao quickly emerged as one of the leading contenders for power. A skilled tactician and a natural leader, he was soon able to pull together one of the most competent armies in northern China. As a number of warlords attempted to gain an advantage through force, diplomacy, or treachery, Cao Cao was able to gain the upper hand by the mid-190s. First, he

secured the loyalty of his officers and companion army troops. Second, he gained control over the young Han emperor Xian and gave his administration legitimacy. Third, he instituted a system of military agricultural colonies on his territories that provided him with a ready supply of soldiers. His power grew steadily, and by the year 200, he faced only one serious rival in northern China: Yuan Shao (?–202), an aristocrat whose family had held power under the Han administration.

In 200, Cao Cao's army met Yuan Shao at the Battle of Guandu just south of the Yellow River (Huanghe). Cao Cao won a decisive victory that left him the de facto ruler of northern China. Although the puppet Han emperor Xian still officially held the imperial throne, Cao Cao controlled all the real power under his self-appointed title of Imperial Secretariat. In the following years, Cao Cao extended his power north past the Great Wall of China and into the northern part of modern-day Korea. He also attempted to extend his control south of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, but his push south was halted in 208 at the Battle of Chibi (Red Cliff), where he faced the combined armies of Liu Bei (161–223) and Sun Quan (182–252). Liu Bei would later found the Kingdom of Shu (221–263) in southwestern China, and Sun Quan would found the Kingdom of Wu (229–280) in southeastern China. Together, with the Kingdom of Wei that would emerge out of Cao Cao's territory, they provided a balance of power in China known as the Three Kingdoms.



Cao Cao, a Chinese general and poet who rose to power at the end of the Han dynasty, effectively ruled northern China from 200 to 220 AD. (Instructional Resources Corporation)

Northern China enjoyed stability during Cao Cao's 20 years in power. In 213, the emperor officially granted him control of 10 cities in a region renamed the "state of Wei," and he named Cao Cao the duke of Wei. In 216, Cao Cao became the prince of Wei. He had between 25 and 30 sons with several different women. His official consort, Lady Bian, gave birth to four sons: Cao Pi (Cao Cao's heir), Cao Zhang, Cao Zhi, and Cao Xiong. Cao Zhi went on to become one of the premier poets in China. Cao Cao himself was an accomplished poet, and during his reign, his state actively supported the arts.

Cao Cao died of a brain tumor in 220 at Luoyang. Although his son Cao Pi had been content to remain officially a subject of the

Han emperor, within a year he had deposed the emperor and declared himself the first emperor of the Wei dynasty. At that point, the territory conquered by Cao Cao officially became the Kingdom of Wei. Cao Cao's family held power for another 40 years until the Sima family, who briefly reunited China under the Jin dynasty, overthrew them.

Cao Cao is an important figure in Chinese folklore. In the classic fourteenth-century novel *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, he is depicted as cunning and treacherous. Although classical Chinese literature generally portrays him in a negative light, historians credit him with restoring order to northern China during a chaotic period.

Ryan Hackney

See also: Chibi, Battle of; Eunuchs; Great Wall; Guandu, Battle of; Han Dynasty; Northern and Southern Dynasties; Three Kingdoms.

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Cao Gangchuan (1935–)

A general of the People's Liberation Army (PLA); served as the minister of defense of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 2003–2008, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), and chairman of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense from 1996 to 1998.

Cao was born in December 1935 in Wugang County, central Henan (Honan) Province. He joined the PLA in July 1954 and became a CCP member in July 1956. He studied in the PLA's No. 3 Artillery Ordnance Technology School and No. 1 Ordnance Technology School in Nanjing (Nanking) from 1954 to 1956. Then he enrolled in the PLA's Dalian (Dairen) Russian Language Special School from 1956 to 1957. His Russian instructors offered training in Russian language skills, revolution history, and military doctrine and culture. In September 1957, he was sent by the PLA to the Soviet Union for further studies in modern military technology. He attended the Advanced Artillery Military Engineering School of the Soviet Red Army's Artillery Corps at Leningrad. After six years of study and training in Russia, Cao graduated from the Soviet Army Artillery Academy and returned to China in 1963.

Speaking fluent Russian, Cao became an instructor at the First Artillery Ordnance Technology School in Nanjing. In the late 1960s, he served as assistant head of the Ammunition Division of Ordnance Department of the PLA General Logistics Department (GLD) in Beijing. The GLD was

established by Marshal Peng Dehuai, China's first defense minister, in October 1954. As in the Soviet Red Army, the department supervised national defense budget expenses, defense industry, military supply, transportation, and medical services. In April 1975, Cao was promoted to staff officer and deputy director of the General Planning Division of Military Equipment Department of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD). The GSD served as the headquarters for all the armed services and was the most important department among them. It carried out the staff and operational functions of the PLA and implemented military modernization plans. Within the Chinese defense hierarchy, the GSD conveyed policy directives downward, translated national security and defense policy into specific responsibilities for subordinate departments, oversaw policy implementation on behalf of the CMC, and commanded China's military operations in wartime. The GSD also performed important organizational functions such as procurement, operational planning, and intelligence. Cao's study in the Soviet Union built a solid groundwork of military technology and personal connections that helped his military career. In 1982, he was made deputy director of the Military Equipment Department of the GSD. In September 1988, when the PLA restored the military ranking system, he was given the rank of lieutenant general.

In 1989, General Cao was made the director of the Military Affairs Department of the GSD. Then, one year later, he became the head of the Office of Military Trade of Central Military Commission. From 1992 to 1996, he was deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA. From 1996 to 1998, he was the chairman of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense. In 1998, he gained control of the

PLA General Armament Department (GAD) as the chief of the GAD. The GAD, established in the spring of 1998, is in charge of PLA equipment, weaponry, and technology. In the same year, he was made a member of the Central Military Commission of the CCP. That year, Cao was promoted to the rank of general.

From 2002 to 2003, Cao became a member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CCP, and director and secretary of Party Committee of GAD. In March 2003, he was appointed state councilor. That year, he became the minister of the National Defense Ministry of the PRC until March 2008. As the defense minister, Cao played an active role in China's military diplomacy by visiting more than 20 foreign countries and met with military delegations from 60 countries. In November 2007, Cao met U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates and his delegation in Beijing and established the direct "military hotline" between Beijing and Washington to further develop China-U.S. military exchange and communication. In 2008, China also established a similar "military hotline" with Russia.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense; General Departments of the People's Liberation Army; People's Liberation Army; Peng Dehuai; Russia, Relations with China; Soviet Union.

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Changsha Uprising (1930)

An armed rebellion led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937), under the leadership of the CCP, the Third Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasant Red Army and the local militias in Hunan, Hubei (Hupeh), and Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Provinces launched an armed rebellion against the GMD garrison in the strategically important city of Changsha, capital of Hunan. The number of Communist troops at that time numbered more than 20,000 men. The rebellion in July 1930 is also called the Battle of Changsha.

In early July, the Border Special Committee of the CCP decided to concentrate the Red Army troops to take over the city of Changsha, when some of the GMD troops were transferred out of town. On July 22, the Red Army received information that the GMD had discovered the CCP's rebellion plan and prepared to attack the CCP troops. As a result, the CCP decided to launch the

uprising earlier. On July 25, the Third Red Army and local Communist militias attacked the GMD garrison at Shengguajian, an outpost of Changsha. After a brief battle, the Red Army killed more than 2,000 GMD defense troops. Wei Xiuzhong, commander of the GMD troops in Changsha, decided to retreat to the Jinjing defense position in the city. The Red Army continued their attacks on July 26 and successfully took over the Jinjing area. Because of the disparity of the GMD troops, Wei was forced to retreat to the last defense line of Changsha. On July 27, the Red Army seized the city of Changsha. Afterwards, the CCP established the Hunan Provincial Soviet government, which confiscated the properties of landlords and distributed them to the poor peasants who helped the Red Army during the battle and the Hunan Soviet government.

The victory of the CCP at Changsha shocked Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC) government in Nanjing. Jiang sent GMD warships along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River to support He Jian, GMD Governor of Hunan Province, to recover Changsha. Jiang also sent bombers and fighter to provide air support to He's counter-attacks. In early August, the Red Army engaged in defense battles against the GMD reinforcements at the Hungtu and Emin Hills. The Third Red Army eliminated more than 1,500 GMD troops through its defense battle. Nevertheless, without heavy artillery and effective defense work, the Red Army paid a disastrous price in the defense battles. To save the Third Army, the Hunan Soviet government decided to withdraw the CCP forces from Changsha. On August 6, 1930, the Red Army retreated from Changsha. The Changsha Uprising was over.

This uprising shocked Jiang and the GMD government. From 1931 to 1934, Jiang

launched five large-scale offensive campaigns, the Encirclement Campaigns, against the CCP Red Army in Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces. The Red Army withdrew from their base areas in 1934 after they lost their defense to Jiang's Fifth Encirclement Campaign in Jiangxi. The Red Army began the Long March in October 1934.

Yutong Yang

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Encirclement Campaigns; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Jiangxi Soviet; Long March; Red Army.

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Chen Geng (Chen Keng, 1903–1961)

Senior general of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and one of the most experienced and dedicated Chinese Communist military leaders. Chen Geng was born in Xiangxiang County, Hunan Province on February 27, 1903. He ran away from an arranged marriage by his father in 1916 and joined the Second Battalion, Sixth Regiment of the Xiang (Hunan) Army, a warlord army.

He served as a private in 1916 and staff sergeant in 1920 during the Warlord Period (1916–1927). Disappointed by the endless wars over military power and regional control, Chen left the Xiang Army in 1921 and got a job at the Hunan Railway Bureau as a desk clerk while he took some training classes at professional schools in Changsha, capital city of Hunan. He learned Communist ideas and participated in revolutionary activities at school. In 1922, Chen joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and enrolled in Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy in 1924. He was sent to the Soviet Union to study military science and intelligence in 1926.

After his return, Chen worked for Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) and He Long (Ho Lung) (1896–1969), participating in the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927. During the armed revolt, he became the commander of the First Battalion, Sixth Regiment, Third Division, Twelfth Army, under the command of He Long. From 1927 to 1931, Chen served as a secret agent of the CCP Central Intelligence Department in Shanghai and Tianjin (Tientsin). In September 1931, he was transferred to the CCP Central Soviet Region in Jiangxi (Kiangsi)-Hunan border area and served as regimental and then division commander in the Fourth Army of the Red Army. After the Long March, he became the commander of the Thirteen Regiment of the First Army Corps in 1935, and commander of the First Division of the First Army Corp a year later.

During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Chen became the commander of the 386th Brigade, 129th Division, Eighth Route Army, after the Communist Red Army merged with the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army through the CCP-GMD United

Front on August 25, 1937. His brigade moved behind the enemy lines and launched guerrilla warfare against the Japanese troops in Shanxi (Shansi) and Hebei (Hopeh) Provinces in 1938–1941. After his brigade won several battles against the Japanese, he was promoted to commander of the Tai-Yue Military District Command in 1942 and elected member of the CCP Central Committee at the party's Seventh National Congress in the spring of 1945. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, he was appointed commander of the Fourth Column (Division) and engaged the Nationalist army in central China. When the PLA was established, Chen became the commander and political commissar of the Fourth Army Group in the Second Field Army. He commanded his Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Armies and took over several major cities such as Nanchang and Guangzhou (Canton) in 1949.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, he was appointed commander of the Yunnan Military District and governor of the Yunnan Province in March 1950. In June Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969), China's vice president and CCP vice chairman, appointed Chen as the representative of the CCP Central Committee in charge of military advice in Vietnam. He entered Vietnam in July and worked with other officers of the Chinese Military Advisory Group at the headquarters of the Vietnamese Communist Army (Viet Minh). They offered Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) and the Viet Minh a Chinese model to mobilize vast sectors of the population and win the war against the French troops in the First Indochina War of 1946–1954. The Chinese advisors participated in the Viet Minh's battle planning, operations, and assessments. Chinese advisors and Vietnamese commanders often had sharp disagreements about how to conduct the battles. In some

cases, Chen called Ho or even Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) in Beijing (Peking) to explain why his plan was best for the Vietnamese. He even threatened General Vo Nguyen Giap (1911–) repeatedly that he would resign if the Vietnamese did not accept his plan. Chen left Vietnam for the Korean War in November 1950. In March 1951, he was appointed commander and political commissar of the Third Army Group of the Chinese People's Volunteer (CPVF) in the Korean War. On June 1, he was promoted to the CPVF's deputy commander in chief. When the commander in chief of the CPVF, Peng Dehuai, went back to China, Chen worked as the acting commander of the Chinese forces in Korea.

In June 1952, Chen was called back to China and appointed by the Central Military Commission (CMC) to create China's Military Engineering Academy in Harbin, Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang) Province. On September 1, 1953, the Military Engineering Academy was established and Chen became the president and political commissar of the PRC's first military academy. It became one of the most famous universities in China within a few years and engaged in developing high-tech weapons. On October 31, 1954, he was appointed deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA, and granted senior general status in September 1955 (one of only 10 senior generals in the PLA's history). In 1956, he became the acting chief of the General Staff and was elected a member of the CMC. In September 1958, when the CMC reorganized the Aviation Industrial Committee of the Defense Ministry into the State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, Chen was appointed vice chairman and focused on the ballistic missile program

and nuclear weapon program of China. Chen died of a heart attack in Shanghai on March 16, 1961.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Military Advisory Group; Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense; Eighth Route Army; General Departments of the PLA; Guomindang; He Long; Korean War; Liu Shaoqi; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; National Party Congress; Nationalist Army; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Second Field Army; Soviet Union; United Front; Warlord Period; Whampoa Military Academy; Xiang Army; Zhou Enlai.

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Chen Xilian (Ch'en Hsi-lian) (1915–1999)

General of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and a member of the Central Committee's Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) elected at the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh National Party Congresses (1969–1980). He fell out of favor during Deng Xiaoping's (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) reforms and was demoted with other Maoist political and military leaders to the lesser Central Committee member status in February 1980.

Born in Huang'an (Hong'an) County, Hubei Province, to a poor peasant family, Chen Xilian joined the CCP Red Army in 1929 and the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) a year later. He became a CCP member in 1930. During the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937), he was political commissar of the Thirtieth Regiment, Tenth Division, Fourth Red Army; political commissar of the Thirty-Third Regiment; deputy commander as well as political commissar of the Eleventh Division and commander of the Tenth Division, Fourth Red Army. He participated in the Long March of 1934–1935.

In the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), Chen was commander of the 769th Regiment, 385th Brigade, 129th Division, Eighth Route Army. On October 19, 1937 he led the 769th Regiment to attack the Yangmingbao airport, destroying 24 warplanes and killing more than 100 Japanese soldiers. His successful attack eliminated the Japanese air threat on the Xikou front. In the summer of 1940, Chen's regiment participated in the Hundred Regiments Campaign near Taiyuan, Shanxi (Shansi) Province. In September, he became the commander of the

385th Brigade of the 129th Division. During the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), Chen was commander of the Third Column and commander of the Third Army Group of the Second Field Army. He participated in the Huai-Hai Campaign and the Yangzi (Yangtze) River Campaigns. In the spring of 1949, after the fall of Nanjing (Nanking), capital of the Republic of China (ROC), Chen's army group moved into Zhejiang (Chekiang) Province and saw major action at Hangzhou (Hangchow) and Shanghai.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, Chen Xilian was appointed first party secretary and mayor of Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, in 1950. He later became commander of the PLA East Sichuan Regional Command, commander of the PLA Artillery Corps, president of the PLA Artillery Academy, and was promoted to general in 1955.

In 1956, Chen was elected alternate member of the CCP Eighth Central Committee at the National Party Congress. In 1959, after the fall of Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974), Chen was sent to Manchuria, one of the most sensitive regions of the Sino-Soviet border, where he served as the party secretary of the CCP Northeast Bureau. In 1965, Chen was made a member of the National Defense Council.

Chen Xilian's career reached its pinnacle during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). He was elevated to the Politburo at the Ninth National Party Congress in 1969, and became CCP first secretary of Liaoning Province in 1971–1974. In 1971, Chen was the first PLA commander to denounce Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) following his coup attempt against Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and subsequent death. After being reelected to the Politburo

in 1973, Chen became the commander of the Beijing Military Region Command in January 1974 and remained in that post until January 1980. He was also appointed vice premier in 1975–1980. In 1976, Chen was acting defense minister and secretary-general of the Central Military Commission. During Deng Xiaoping's reform movement, Chen left the political arena and was assigned to the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Advisory Committee in September 1982. He died in June 1999.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; Guomindang; Huai-Hai Campaign; Hundred Regiments Campaign; Korean War; Lin Biao; Long March; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Red Guards; Red Army; Second Field Army; Soviet Union.

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Chen Yi (Ch'en Yi) (1901–1972)

One of the most brilliant military leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), marshal of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chen was purged and died during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). On August 26, 1901, Chen Yi was born in Lezhi County, Sichuan Province. In 1919, he was accepted by a work-study program and went to France. While studying in France, he learned socialist ideas and participated in radical movements led by the overseas Chinese students. Chen was then sent back to China in October 1921 due to his active involvement in the socialist movement in France. After his return, Chen Yi joined the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in 1922 and became a member of the CCP in 1923.

During the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937), Chen participated in the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927, and then led the Xiangnan Uprising in 1928. In April, he joined forces with Zhu De (Zhu Teh) (1886–1976) and Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) at the Jinggangshan (Jinggang Mountains) Revolutionary base area to form the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army. He was party representative of the First Division and then commander of the Twelfth Division, Fourth Army. Afterwards he became political commissar of the Third Army and commander of the Twenty-Second Army.

In January 1929, he led the troops of the Twenty-Second Army into the south of Jiangxi (Kiangsi) and west of Fujian (Fukien) Provinces. He was seriously wounded in a battle and was asked to stay behind in Jiangxi when the Red Army fled for the northwest during the Long March in October 1934. In 1935, the remainder of Chen's forces,

numbering about 1,800 men, participated in active engagements in the south against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) troops of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) for the next three years.

During the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), when the CCP-GMD coalition established the New Fourth Army, Chen was appointed vice political commissar. In 1939, he followed the CCP's strategy and expanded the New Fourth Army into Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province and the areas between Nanjing (Nanking) and Shanghai. In October 1940, Chen Yi and Su Yu (1907–1984) commanded the Battle of Huangqiao, a major southern campaign coordinated with the Eighth Route Army in the north. In November, a joint headquarters for the New Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army was established with Chen as its deputy commander in chief. After the Wannan Incident (or the New Fourth Army Incident) in Anhui (Anhui), Chen was ordered to the CCP Central Committee to reestablish the New Fourth Army Command and served as its acting commander. Under his command, the New Fourth Army increased from four divisions in 1937 to seven divisions in 1945. In Jiangsu, the CCP troops numbered 90,000 men in 1940 and increased to 270,000 men in 1945.

During the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and held a concurrent position as commander of the Shandong (Shantung) Provincial Command and Shandong Field Army. In January 1947, he was appointed commander of the East China Field Army concurrent with its political commissar. In November 1948, he was one of the CCP leaders to command the Huai-Hai Campaign. Later, Chen became the commander and political commissar of the Third Field Army, totaling 1 million troops, which took over

Nanjing, Hangzhou (Hangchow), Shanghai, and many areas in southeast China.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Chen Yi was appointed mayor of Shanghai and commander and political commissar of the East China Regional Command. In 1954, Chen Yi was appointed vice premier of the PRC and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. In 1955, he became one of the 10 marshals in China.

In 1958, Chen Yi was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs. From 1959 to 1965, he visited many countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America as China's foreign minister with Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) and President Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969). During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the Red Guards, seeking to seize the Foreign Ministry and depose Zhou Enlai, attacked him. Chen Yi was hauled away in a struggle and beaten, but Zhou rescued him and led him to safety. Chen lost his office, his freedom and his health, and died on January 6, 1972. Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) attended his funeral. Mao Zedong, in failing health, even appeared at Chen's funeral services clad in pajamas to show his concern for his longtime friend. Chen Yi's funeral was Mao's last public appearance.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; Field Army; Huangqiao, Battle of; Jiangxi Soviet; Jiang Jieshi; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Liu Shaoqi; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; New Fourth Army; New Fourth Army Incident; People's Liberation Army; Red Guards; Third Field Army; United Front; Ye Jianying; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Chengpu, Battle of (632 BC)

During the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BC), the southern state of Chu spread north across the Yellow River (Huanghe) causing the state of Jin and its northern counterparts to join forces under Duke Wen of Jin (previously known as Chong'er). This conflict was the first great battle between two states in the Yellow River valley and the states of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River valley. The exact location is unknown, but it is thought to have taken place in today's Chenliu County, Henan (Honan) Province, and the southwest part of present Juan County, eastern Shandong (Shantung) Province.

On April 4, 632 BC, the battle began. The Battle of Chengpu showed for the first time a

well-organized and professionally constructed military since individual combat began in the early history of Chinese warfare. Armies grew vast in size due to the newly installed system of conscription. The two armies that went against each other had similar equipment, doctrines, organization, and tactics. Each side had three divisions facing each other that included a center and two flanks. The Jin field army under Duke Wen of Jin used over 700 chariots and maintained infantry personnel consisting of from 22,000 to as many as 52,000 troops. The size of the Chu army remains unknown, but chariots were used along with infantry. Since the latter half of the century, the use of chariots increased military strength by a factor of five, and the strength of armies was measured by how many chariots or vehicles could be put into the battlefield. Chariots were armored with strong leather, fashioned for heavy duty, and outfitted with foot-long bronze blades attached to the outer portion of the wheels to cut down soldiers who were too close in proximity. The chariot carried the usual aristocratic warrior crew consisting of a driver, archer, and a striker as support.

The Jin army moved in by advancing both flanks, and Xu Chen, the left flank commander, attacked Chu's right flank, which was thought to be weakest. Through the use of armored chariots, Chu's right flank was easily demolished and their troops became scattered, making the attack extremely successful. Jin's left flank became the holding force that protected the Jin center division and maintained the Chu center and therefore removed Chu's center division's ability to support their left flank. The Jin right flank meanwhile fought a small skirmish and faked a retreat by carrying the banners of the Jin commander. This led to the Chu left division to follow in pursuit, but their vision became obscured by chariots dragging tree

branches to raise dust, which allowed time for the right flank to re-form. The Jin troops maintained a fixed position on the Chu center, still cutting off support to their enemy's left division.

The Chu left attacked in an advance but was intercepted by Duke Wen's division of close followers creating a flank. The Jin right wing reformed and was supported by a division of chariots. As both wings of the Chu army were devastated, Zi Yu (also known as Cheng Dechen) of Chu ordered a retreat of all forces but was later executed by King Cheng of Chu for not following orders. After gaining a decisive victory, the state of Jin won hegemony for Duke Wen of Jin by being recognized by the King of Zhou, whose efforts kept Chu out of the north for another generation.

Daniel Mason Linsenbarth

See also: Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Warring States Period; Zhou Dynasty.

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Chennault, Claire Lee (1893–1958)

U.S. Army Air Forces general and leader of the Flying Tigers. Born in Commerce,



U.S. Army Air Forces major general Claire Chennault, founder and leader of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), known as the Flying Tigers, in China in World War II. Chennault subsequently founded Civil Air Transport (CAT), which later became Air America. (National Archives)

Texas, on September 6, 1893, Claire Chennault was raised in rural Louisiana. He taught English and business at a number of southern colleges until August 1917, when he became a second lieutenant in the army reserve. He remained in the United States during World War I, transferring to the Signal Corps and completing pilot training in 1920.

An accomplished airman, Chennault then held a number of assignments, among them the command of the Nineteenth Pursuit Squadron in Hawaii between 1923 and 1926. He developed into an outspoken advocate of fighter aircraft in a period when prevailing military thought subscribed to the doctrines espoused by Italian airpower theorist Giulio Douhet and their underlying assumption that “the bomber will always get through.” While serving as an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School in 1935, Chennault wrote *The Role of Defensive Pursuit*, an important but controversial book at

the time because it pointed out the need for fighter aircraft. In 1937, the army removed him from flying status because of a serious hearing loss and forced him into medical retirement as a captain.

In May 1937, Chennault went to China as aviation advisor to the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; Chinese Nationalist) government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975). When the Japanese attacked China that September, he became a colonel in the Chinese Air Force and began testing his tactical theories. In late 1940, Chennault was allowed to recruit American military pilots for service in the Republic of China (ROC), despite the strong opposition of the State, War, and Navy Departments. His American Volunteer Group (AVG), popularly known as the Flying Tigers, consisted of some 200 ground crew and 100 pilots flying semiobsolete Curtiss P-40B fighters. The AVG entered combat for the first time on December 20, 1941. By the time the unit disbanded in July 1942, it claimed 296 Japanese aircraft shot down, with only 12 of its own planes and four of its pilots lost.

In April 1942, Chennault was recalled to active duty with the U.S. Army as a colonel. A few months later, he was promoted to brigadier general and put in command of the newly formed China Air Task Force (CATF), a subordinate command of the U.S. Tenth Air Force in India. In March 1943, the CATF became the Fourteenth Air Force, with Chennault promoted to major general.

The CATF and the Fourteenth Air Force were economy-of-force organizations in a tertiary theater and therefore always operated on a shoestring. Utilizing Chennault's theories, however, both organizations achieved combat effectiveness far out of proportion to their size and resources. By 1945, the Fourteenth Air Force had destroyed some

2,600 Japanese aircraft and thousands of tons of supplies.

During his time in China, Chennault conducted a long-running and public feud with Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell (1883–1946), the equally stubborn and irascible U.S. commander of the China-Burma-India Theater. Chennault engineered Jiang's demand for Stilwell's recall, but Chennault himself was removed from command and forced into retirement for a second time on August 1, 1945.

After the war, Chennault remained in China. He established and operated the Civil Air Transport (CAT) airline, which supported Jiang's Nationalist government in its civil war with Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and the forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). In 1950, Chennault sold his interest in CAT to the Central Intelligence Agency, but he remained the chairman of the airline's board until 1955. He died at Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, D.C., on July 27, 1958. Only days before his death, Chennault was promoted to lieutenant general.

Dr. David T. Zabecki

See also: American Volunteer Group; Anti-Japanese War; China, Republic of; China-Burma-India Theater; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Stilwell, Joseph.

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Chi Haotian (1929–)

General of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the defense minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1993 to 2003. Chi Haotian was born in Zhaoyuan County, Shandong (Shantung) Province, in July 1929. He joined the Eighth Route Army in July 1945 and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in May 1946. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Chi served as squad leader, deputy company political instructor, instructor, and deputy battalion commissar of the Seventy-Ninth Division, Twenty-Seventh Army, Third Field Army of the PLA.

During the Korean War, he and his battalion entered Korea in 1950 as the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF). He served as battalion commissar and then deputy director of the Political Section of the 235th Regiment, Seventy-Ninth Division of the CPVF's Twenty-Seventh Army. He was awarded the First-class honor in 1952. After the Korean War, he was the director of the regimental political section and became a major in 1955.

In 1958, he enrolled in the PLA's Senior Infantry Officer Academy. Then he transferred to the Synthesis Department of China's Military Academy of the PLA to take up study on integrated warfare. After he received a college diploma from the academy, he was promoted to the deputy political commissar and then commissar of the 235th Regiment; head of the Political

Department of the Seventy-Ninth Division in 1966; deputy political commissar of the division in 1967; and deputy director of the Political Department of the Twenty-Seventh Army in 1969. From 1970 to 1972, Chi took the post of political commissar of the Eightieth Division, Twenty-Seventh Army.

Chi became the deputy political commissar of the Beijing (Peking) Military Region in 1973 and was also in charge of *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*), the CCP's mouth piece, as the newspaper's associate editor in chief. After the Cultural Revolution, he served as deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, and the director of the Political Department of the General Staff. Then he was appointed political commissar of Ji'nan (Tsinan) Military Region, chief of the PLA General Staff, and the party secretary of the General Staff. He was awarded the Third-class Liberation medal in 1985. In 1988, Chi was elected a member of Central Military Commission, and made the rank of general. In April–June 1989, he played an important role in deploying the martial law troops that surrounded Beijing. As the chief of staff, Chi organized the troops from the Beijing, Shenyang, and Ji'nan Military Regions and finalized their schedules to enter the capital city. Some of these troops were involved in the Tiananmen Square incident on June 4, 1989.

In 1993, General Chi became the defense minister and a State Council member until 2003. He was also the director of the Law of National Defense Commission. He was elected vice chairman of the CMC in 1995 and a member of the Politburo of the CCP Fifteenth Central Committee in 1997. He retired from the PLA in March 2003.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Intervention of the

Korean War; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; General Departments of the PLA; Korean War; People's Liberation Army; Third Field Army; Tiananmen Square Events.

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Chiang Kai-shek. *See* Jiang Jieshi

Chibi, Battle of (208)

A decisive battle between the northern army under the command of Cao Cao (155–220) and a military coalition of Liu Bei (161–223) and Sun Quan (182–252) from the south during the late Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD). The battle eventually created a triangle power structure in China, which ended the Han dynasty and started the Three Kingdom Period (220–280).

When the Han central government declined, generals developed personally accountable mercenary military troops and large landowners established private armies to protect their holdings. Desperate peasants turned to rebellions such as the Yellow Turbans. The Han efforts to put down the rebellions left the generals in effective control of large territories backed by personally loyal troops. As a result, various warlords controlled the different territories of China. Among the others were three powerful military leaders who established their domains separately and developed into territorial magnates. Cao Cao gained control over northern China, Liu Bei claimed the provinces in the southwest, and Sun Quan controlled the central and southeastern parts of the country along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River.

Cao Cao was the most powerful military leader of all the warlords. In 207, he defeated a major warlord, Yuan Shao, at the Battle of Guandu and gained control of the great plains of the Yellow River (Huanghe) in central China. After his victory at Guandu, Cao Cao continued his offensive campaign into south China by leading 300,000 troops toward Jingzhou in July 208. The governor of Jingzhou surrendered to Cao Cao in September. Cao Cao understood that his time was limited in his campaign against other warlords. Jingzhou was far from secured, and he still faced very dangerous threats to his power in south China from Liu Bei and Sun Quan. What Cao Cao did have was the advantage of a much larger combined army and navy compare to the Liu and Sun forces.

First of all, Cao Cao began to attack Liu Bei's force in the south. At the Changban Hill (Changbapo), some of Cao Cao's army had caught up with Liu Bei's bulky baggage train of troops, supplies, and civilians. Liu fought off Cao's forces at first but had to retreat after several days of fighting. The Cao

army soundly defeated Liu's entourage, and he barely managed to escape. Liu sought protection of southern warlord Sun Quan. In October, Cao pressed his advance into the Yangzi River area and prepared an attack on Sun Quan's force. Sun decided to team up with Liu and defend his domain south of the Yangzi River.

In December 208, Cao's army arrived at the Yangzi River. Then they traveled to the east to look for Sun Quan's main strength. Cao's 150,000 infantry troops marched along the northern bank of the river, while his naval fleet, totaling 70,000 troops, sailed east in the Yangzi River. Sun Quan sent General Zhou Yu, who commanded 30,000 naval troops and sailed west in the river to meet Cao.

Zhou Yu's troops met Cao's at Chibi (Red Cliff), which is located in Jiayu County, Hubei (Hupei) Province. When Zhou found that Cao's infantry troops were crossing the river, he ordered an immediate attack. Tired of consistent battles for months and unfamiliar with the southern weather, Cao's infantry lost the first battle and suffered heavy casualties. Many northern veterans were both sick from the movements of the boats and diseased from the tropical climate in the south. Cao had to withdraw his infantry troops back to the north of the river, and anchored his boats along the northern bank at Chibi. To stabilize the large fleet in the river, Cao's naval officers ordered the boats be chained together one by one.

Zhou Yu discovered another good opportunity to destroy Cao's fleet of chain boats. He ordered his general Huang Gai to lead a dozen small boats loaded with plenty of firewood, flammable oil, and dry straws. Then Huang feigned desertion. When his fire boats got to the northern bank, they lit up the boats and smashed into Cao's fleet with flame. Soon many boats were uncontrollably

on fire. Thousands drowned, burned, or were cut down as they fled once on shore. With his fleet destroyed, Cao took the remnants of his army and retreated north of the Yangzi River.

Thus, Sun and Liu defeated Cao's army in the Battle of Chibi. Zhou Yu's victory in which a weak army defeated a strong opponent became a classic in Chinese military history. With an experienced navy, especially in the Yangzi River, Zhou was in a position to stop Cao's steamroll into southern China. The victory at Chibi can be attributed primarily to the success of Huang Gai's fire attack and Zhou's tactical genius.

This one battle at Chibi separated China into three parts for the next 22 years. The Three Kingdoms as a historical period took place in ancient China between the Han dynasty and the Northern-Southern dynasties (317–582). They were known, respectively, as Wei (220–265) in the north with its capital at Luoyang under the control of Cao Cao; Shu (221–263) in the southwest with its capital at Chengdu controlled by Liu Bei; and Wu (229–280) in the southeast with its capital at Nanjing under the control of Sun Quan. Each kingdom waged war against the others over territory, population, and economic resources for many decades to come.

Xiaoyan Shen

See also: Guandu, Battle of; Han Dynasty; Northern-Southern Dynasties; Three Kingdoms; Zhou Dynasty.

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China, People's Republic of

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has an estimated 2012 population of 1.4 billion, making it the world's most populous nation. It covers a little more than 3.705 million square miles, just slightly smaller than the United States, and shares common borders with many states. To the north it is bordered by Russia and Mongolia; to the south by the South China Sea, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), India, Bhutan, and Nepal; to the west by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; and to the east by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(DPRK, North Korea) and the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. During the Cold War period, the PRC promulgated several initiatives that led to its emerging from this period in a far more consolidated condition than the Soviet Union. The PRC also developed more flexible external policies, with a strong focus on its relations with the two superpowers but also involving linkages with developing nations. By the late 1960s, the PRC had become a significant player in the international arena. Even as the PRC consolidated internally and sought to secure its borders, it positioned itself for a larger role in Asia and beyond.

The PRC officially came into existence following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949). On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), the chairman of the Central People's Administrative Council and leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), proclaimed the PRC. Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) became premier and foreign minister. The Soviet Union and its satellites immediately recognized the PRC, followed later by Burma, India, and (on January 6, 1950) Great Britain.

Domestically, the PRC followed varied political and economic policies, combining considerable centralized political control with an increasingly decentralized market economy in the final stages of the Cold War. Helping to drive the Chinese economy was its burgeoning population, which more than doubled during 1945–1991.

Despite the ideological rivalry with the United States, the CCP tried to convey its message to the American public through progressive writers such as Edgar Snow (1905–1972), Jack Belden (1910–1989), William Hinton (1919–2004), Agnes Smedley (1892–1950), and others even before it came

to power in 1949. Nevertheless, with the growing influence of the so-called China Hands and the China Lobby in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s, American administrations supported Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) rabidly anti-communist Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government.

This and the Korean War (1950–1953) set the stage for a Cold War freeze between the PRC and the United States that lasted for nearly 30 years. The situation was compounded by a series of restrictive trade policies enacted by the United States. As the chances of building understanding with the United States during the last years of the Chinese Civil War declined—despite the U.S. diplomatic missions of General Patrick Hurley (1883–1963) and General George C. Marshall (1880–1959)—from 1949 onward, the PRC looked to the Soviet Union for support.

During and after the Korean War, U.S. trade embargoes on the PRC, troop deployments to East Asia, and security alliances such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) along the peripheries of the PRC made the Chinese even more reliant on the Soviet Union. The 1950s saw massive Soviet arms sales, economic aid, and technical assistance to the PRC. After the United States and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) signed a mutual security treaty in 1954, cooperation between the PRC and the Soviet Union further increased.

The Communist Chinese and the Soviets differed on several political and international issues, however. When Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) cautioned Mao against an open break with the Nationalists, PRC leaders felt slighted by the superior attitude with which the Soviets treated the PRC and other socialist states. The leaders of the PRC and the Soviet Union disagreed sharply

over who should lead the world Communist movement following Stalin's death. The CCP also sharply criticized the Soviet leadership for its de-Stalinization campaign and for the policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States. The Soviet handling of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and its neutral position during the 1962 Sino-Indian border clash, greatly exercised the Chinese leadership. Closer to home, Soviet proposals for building a joint PRC-USSR nuclear submarine fleet and the construction of long-wave radio stations along the Chinese coast were seen by the CCP as infringements on its independence and further steps toward full PRC integration into the Soviet orbit. Likewise, the PRC refused to adhere to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, arguing that the treaty would impede the PRC's own nuclear program and make the nation all the more reliant on the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet split, which began in earnest in August 1960, along with repeated Soviet-Chinese border clashes, led the PRC to distance itself from the two superpowers. The PRC leadership strongly denounced both of them, accusing the Americans of capitalist imperialism and the Soviets of socialist imperialism. This led the Chinese leadership to identify with nations in the developing world, especially countries in Asia and Africa. In 1964, China exploded its first nuclear weapon and became the world's fifth nuclear power, after the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. The government communiqué issued on the occasion, while declaring a "no first-use principle," stated that nuclear weapons were necessary to protect the nation "from the danger of the United States launching a nuclear war." The PRC then developed long-range ballistic missiles

for countering threats from either the United States or the Soviet Union.

In 1954, China announced a good neighbor policy with the aim of building bridges along its periphery to counter what it saw as American encirclement efforts. In the mid-1950s the PRC, along with other Asian countries, also promulgated “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” which called for mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, and economic equality. By the 1960s, the Chinese had signed border agreements with Mongolia, Nepal, Afghanistan, Burma, and Pakistan. After the Korean War, however, China’s military engagements were mainly border disputes, such as in 1962 with India, in 1969 with the Soviet Union, and in 1979 with Vietnam.

During the 1970s, prompted by increasing threats from the Soviet Union, the PRC normalized its relations with the United States under the policy of *yitiao xian* (following one line). U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–) had secretly visited China in 1971, setting the stage for the Sino-American rapprochement. The following year, President Richard Nixon (1913–1994) made a historic visit to Beijing, opening the way for the normalization of relations. The Americans granted formal recognition to the PRC in 1978, and in 1979 both nations exchanged diplomatic legations.

Despite their differences on issues such as democracy, human rights, the environment, and labor standards, the United States and China worked together in opposing the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The 1979 trade agreement between the United States and the PRC granting most favored nation (MFN) status to each other went a long way in fully normalizing relations in the economic sphere. U.S. defense

secretary Harold Brown’s (1927–) visit to Beijing in early 1980 opened the prospects for American arms sales to the PRC, although President Ronald Reagan’s (1911–2004) 1982 decision to sell arms to the ROC put any such agreement on indefinite hold.

While the United States now recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of the Chinese people, the status of Taiwan remained unclear. A triangular strategic ambiguity thus came to exist in the relationship among the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan. The PRC has codified, as its minimalist policy toward Taiwan, the “three no’s”: no deployments of foreign troops on Taiwan, no independence movement, and no nuclear weapons on Taiwan. While the 8,000 U.S. troops stationed on Taiwan were withdrawn, the PRC’s threats to use force against Taiwan and concerted military modernization efforts with a Taiwanese focus not only increased U.S. arms supplies to the island but also prompted the passage of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act by the U.S. Congress. In the late 1970s, the PRC proposed its formula of one country, two systems, that is, one China and two different systems—socialist and capitalist—for eventual reunification of the PRC. This formula was also applied to Hong Kong and Macao in Chinese negotiations with the British and Portuguese.

The U.S.-Chinese rapprochement also had an impact on the PRC’s relations with Japan, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe. In August 1978, the PRC and Japan signed a peace and friendship treaty. The PRC leadership was highly critical of Japan’s occupation of Manchuria and much of coastal China during World War II, the Nanjing (Nanking) massacre, Japanese history textbooks glorifying Japanese militarism, and visits by Japanese prime ministers to the

Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo to honor the war dead. China badly needed Japanese financial and technological assistance, however, especially during its economic reform and modernization efforts that had begun in the late 1970s. The PRC therefore granted incentives to Japan, as well as to Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), to locate industry in China.

There was a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. China conveyed to the USSR that rapprochement was possible if the Soviets were to withdraw their troop concentrations from the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolia, cease their support of Vietnam, and pull out of Afghanistan. After 1989, Sino-Soviet relations continued to warm as some of the Chinese demands were met. Other demands were realized as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In the domestic political, social, and economic spheres, the PRC initially implemented a strong command-style socialist system with the CCP as the driving political force. During the Cold War, the CCP held eight national congresses, from the Seventh Congress in April 1945 to the Fourteenth Congress in October 1992. CCP membership grew from an estimated 1.2 million in 1945 to 39.6 million during the Twelfth Congress in 1982. Still, CCP membership was small compared to the PRC's population. Three generations of top political leaders existed during the CCP's Cold War history: Mao, Zhou, and Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) in the first generation; Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) and Chen Yun (1905–1995) in the second generation; and Jiang Zemin (1926–), Li Peng (1928–), and Qiao Shi (1924–) in the third generation.

Although there were eight other political parties, their role was quite limited. The PRC utilized competing political organizations

and their leaders in the early years of postwar reconstruction. A united front of all Chinese parties was reflected in the work of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which was formed in September 1949. It held six conferences between 1949 and 1983, although the CCP was clearly the only party that wielded political and governmental control.

Four constitutions were adopted (1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982) by the National People's Congress (NPC), the highest executive body of state power in the PRC. Six NPC congresses were held during 1954–1987. Delegates to the NPC are elected for a period of five years. They in turn elect the president, vice president, and other high-ranking state functionaries. The State Council is the executive body of the PRC and includes the premier, vice premiers, councilors, ministers, and others. A similar dual political structure is reflected at the provincial levels of the country. There are no direct national elections in the PRC, although at the village and county levels direct elections for some local officials were gradually phased in after the end of the Cold War.

During the Cold War, several political campaigns were launched, which set the PRC's political system apart from other socialist countries and indicated its willingness to experiment. The CCP carried out a campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries during 1951–1953, effectively ending opposition from remnant Nationalists, feudal lords, and other dissident groups. This period also coincided with the campaign against corruption among government officials.

In May 1956, the Hundred Flowers Movement was launched, inviting differing views from Chinese intellectuals. A barrage of criticism, however, led to the end of this program in the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957.

As China crushed the Khampa Rebellion in Tibet in 1959, sending the Dalai Lama to exile in India, the Soviets withdrew nearly 10,000 of their engineers and technicians in the latter part of 1960. This coincided with the disastrous failure of the Great Leap Forward, a massive program of nationwide industrialization launched by Mao in 1958 and sharply criticized by Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) at the 1959 Lushan Conference.

The 1960s brought more experiments. In May 1963, Mao began the Socialist Education Campaign to counter the growing influence of capitalism, end the corrupt practices of CCP cadres, and inculcate the idea of self-sacrifice among the population. The ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was launched by Mao via a 16-point program that encouraged Red Guards to “bombard the headquarters” of CCP leaders and take out those following the “capitalist road.” Many CCP leaders, including Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969), Peng Zhen (P'eng Ch'en) (1902–1997), and Luo Ruiqing (Luo Rui-ch'ing) (1906–1978), were summarily purged from the party and zealously persecuted.

Although Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) was anointed as Mao's heir apparent, he was killed—probably by design—in a 1971 plane crash in Mongolia. His crime was an alleged coup attempt against Mao. An anti-Lin Biao rectification campaign was launched from 1971 to 1973. The country underwent turmoil following the deaths in 1976 of Zhou in January and Mao in September, when several demonstrations were held in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, supposedly mourning Zhou but also challenging the political ascendancy of the radical Gang of Four. These leftist extremists, who included Mao's wife Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914–1991) and three Shanghai-

based Communist Party members—Wang Hongwen (1935–1992), Zhang Chunqiao (1917–2005), and Yao Wenyuan (1931–2005)—initially tried to implement strongly ideological policies harking back to the height of the Cultural Revolution. Within weeks of Mao's death in September 1976, Hua Guofeng (1921–2008), who became premier in April 1976, ordered the arrest of the Gang of Four, who were tried and convicted of antiparty activities in 1981. Deng, who was rehabilitated a fourth and final time, introduced pragmatic policies of “seeking truth from facts” and extensive economic reforms in 1978.

In response to rising prices, increased alienation among the people, and growing corruption among the ranks of the CCP cadre, students, peasants, and workers launched prodemocracy protests leading to the Tiananmen Square Incident of June 4, 1989, which had been triggered by the death that April of a reformist former CCP chairman, Hu Yaobang (1915–1989), whose sympathies with previous prodemocracy groups had caused his expulsion from the CCP. The crisis resulted in scores of deaths, the resignation of Deng as the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and the appointment of Jiang Zemin in his place. An antibourgeois liberalization campaign was launched after this incident.

In the economic arena, for most of the Cold War, China followed Soviet-style centralized Five-Year Plans designed to guide its economic and modernization activities. Given the backwardness and war-ravaged nature of the economy in 1949, when there was rampant and disastrous inflation, the PRC leadership undertook comprehensive measures in the reconstruction of the country. In the industrial sphere, private enterprise was encouraged initially to revitalize production, and 156 major projects were

begun with Soviet assistance. The PRC established nearly 4,000 state-owned enterprises during 1949–1989, some allowing for the gradual incorporation of private enterprise in joint firms or state enterprises after paying interest on the private shares.

In 1958, the Great Leap Forward was launched in part to increase iron and steel production by mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses. State-controlled industrialization, the construction of transport and telecommunication networks, and trade with other socialist countries based on import substitution have all been part of the Maoist self-reliance model of economic development at various times. While these endeavors greatly enhanced the PRC's economic prowess, they also led to waste and increased bureaucratization. In 1975, China initiated a four modernizations program of opening up to the outside world. The four modernizations dealt with agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense, in that order of priority. The program also adopted special policies and flexible measures to attract foreign investments and technology sharing and established special economic zones in the coastal regions for wholly owned or joint enterprises to promote exports.

In agriculture, the PRC immediately initiated land reform with the Agrarian Law of 1950. The regime seized land from landlords and redistributed it to the landless, a process largely completed by 1952. Through this reform, some 300 million peasants acquired 46 million hectares of land. By 1953, after the end of the Korean War, the PRC introduced mutual aid teams and gradually imposed agricultural collectivization. Following the Great Leap Forward, these farming co-ops were converted into People's Communes, combining industry, agriculture, trade, education, and the militia. More than 20,000 such communes were

established, although declining production and natural calamities limited their effectiveness.

In the post-1978 reform period, the collectivization and communalization process was reversed, beginning with the institution of household land contracts, rural industrialization, and incentives to private enterprises. The main features of the new reforms included contracting land to private households, which would control land use; increasing agricultural production; raising farmers' income; shifting to commodity agriculture; forming conglomerates; encouraging private enterprises to privately hire labor; and competing in international markets.

Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cold War; Cultural Revolution; Dalai Lama; Deng Xiaoping; Four Modernizations; Gang of Four; Guomindang; Hong Kong; Hua Guofeng; Jiang Jieshi; Jiang Zemin; Korean War; Lin Biao; Liu Shaoqi; Luo Ruiqing; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Marshall Mission to China; Mongols; National Party Congress; National People's Congress; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Russia, Relations with China; Shanghai Communiqué; Sino-Indian Border War; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; Sino-Vietnamese Border War; Soviet Union; Tiananmen Square Events; Tibet; Ye Jianying; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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China, Republic of

The Republic of China (ROC) was the recognized government of China until the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) forced it into exile on Taiwan in 1949. The Cold War prevented destruction of the ROC and then placed it at the center of tension and conflict in East Asia, where it remained even after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The origins of the ROC date from the Chinese Revolution of 1911, which destroyed the Qing dynasty. Two years later, military leader Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916) became president of the ROC after outmaneuvering Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), China's most vocal advocate of republicanism. Rising opposition to his dictatorial rule, especially after he had himself named

emperor, continued until his sudden death in 1916. During the Warlord Period (1916–1927) that followed, local military leaders waged constant warfare with private armies to build regional political power. In 1918, Sun reorganized his Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang; the Chinese Nationalist) party at Shanghai and supported protests against the Versailles Treaty during the May Fourth Movement of 1919. He proclaimed reestablishment of the ROC in 1921 at Guangzhou (Canton), based on his Three People's Principles of nationalism, democracy, and livelihood. He also formed a political alliance with the CCP and requested military and economic help and advice from the Soviet Union.

Chaos and instability motivated Sun to create a military academy to train officers, appointing Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) as its head. After Sun died in 1925, Jiang became leader of the GMD. In July 1926, he launched the Northern Expedition, which reunited China when Nationalist forces marched into Beijing (Peking) two years later. Not only had Jiang vanquished the warlords, but he had eliminated or undermined the Communists after he broke with them in May 1927. In October 1928, following Sun's plan, the GMD adopted a provisional constitution for the ROC as the basis for governing China during a period of tutelage that was to last for six years. With its seat of government at Nanjing (Nanking), the ROC introduced monetary reform to modernize China's financial system and promote modern industrial development. The Western powers recognized the ROC, granting tariff autonomy and revoking many foreign concessions. But the GMD neglected the land reform and rent reduction that would have helped the vast majority of the populace escape impoverishment and oppression. Under the

leadership of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), the CCP built support among the disaffected peasants.

In September 1931, Japan began its aggression against China by taking over all Manchuria and transforming it into a puppet state. Instead of defending China, Jiang concentrated on destroying the CCP, launching major assaults against the Communists and forcing the CCP to flee to Yan'an in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. His capture at Xi'an (Sian) late in 1936 forced Jiang to join a united front against Japan as the price of his release. In July 1937, Japan opened an offensive against Chinese forces that brought it control over much of the coast and major cities, compelling the ROC to relocate westward to remote Chongqing (Chungking). After World War II began in Europe in 1939, the GMD government fought as a partner in the war's Grand Alliance. Japan installed Wang Jingwei as president of the ROC at Nanjing, while its troops carried out a repressive campaign against the civilian population.

For the ROC, the war was a disaster. Continual fighting destroyed its best troops and bankrupted the government. Spiraling inflation devastated the urban middle class, eroding the GMD base of popular support. Still, Jiang represented China at the Cairo Conference in 1943, where he met with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) and British prime minister Winston Churchill (1874–1965). In 1945, the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the ROC rather than the CCP, although CCP forces controlled large portions of the country.

The civil war between the GMD and the CCP resumed following Japan's defeat in August 1945. U.S. ambassador Patrick J. Hurley (1883–1963) blamed his failure to arrange a cease-fire and coalition government

on treasonous American diplomats in China who wanted a CCP victory. Against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War in Europe, General George C. Marshall's (1880–1959) attempt at mediation in 1946 failed as well, creating anxiety for Americans over the prospect of a Communist China. Then in 1947, corrupt and incompetent officers further demoralized already-discouraged GMD troops, resulting in a string of Communist military victories and causing the United States to reduce assistance to the ROC. Jiang's forces fled to the island of Taiwan after Mao proclaimed the establishment in October 1949 of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The ROC insisted that it was still the legitimate government of China, but the PRC considered Taiwan a renegade province. Britain, the Soviet Union, and many East European countries recognized the PRC immediately, while India favored seating the PRC in the United Nations (UN). The United States delayed recognition because domestic political critics blamed President Harry S. Truman's (1884–1972) administration for allowing the loss of China to the Soviet bloc. But the United States was realistic in accepting as inevitable that the PRC would destroy Jiang's regime.

Taiwan, located 100 miles off the southeastern coast of China, became a Chinese province in 1885. Ten years later, the treaty that ended the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) made it part of the Japanese Empire. Following Japan's defeat in World War II, China regained title to Taiwan in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. Celebrating liberation from colonialism, the Taiwanese initially welcomed officials that the ROC sent from mainland China. But the GMD government treated the island as almost a conquered territory, exploiting its people and resources. Rising friction between the

ruling mainland minority and the native majority led to the systematic killing of thousands of Taiwanese leaders in February 1947. Two million Nationalist soldiers and civilians arrived on Taiwan in 1949 and soon depended on government stipends. Jiang Jingguo, Jiang Jieshi's son and chief of the provincial GMD, ruthlessly crushed political opposition and then imposed a rule more harsh, dictatorial, and exploitive than that of the Japanese. The official myth that the ROC was the legal government of China justified a political structure with a national party and government for all China and a separate provincial party and government for Taiwan. Mainlanders dominated this national government at the capital in Taipei, but Taiwanese held most offices in local government.

Cold War security concerns in Asia caused U.S. military leaders to conclude early in 1950 that the United States must prevent Communist China from seizing Taiwan. In June, the outbreak of the Korean War confirmed this emerging commitment when President Truman deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. After the PRC sent troops to Korea, the United States signed a military agreement in 1951 with the ROC, and the 1954 U.S.-China Mutual Defense Treaty provided the GMD government with \$2.5 billion in military aid and \$1.5 billion in economic aid from 1950 to 1965. In 1954, the PRC began shelling islands that the ROC held just off China's southeastern coast, prompting the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution empowering the president to defend Taiwan and "related positions and territories." Four years later, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis intensified the Cold War in East Asia and caused the United States to strengthen its defense of Taiwan. U.S. opposition, however, did not stop most nations—except for Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea),

and a few others—from recognizing Beijing rather than Taipei (Taipei). By contrast, the United States was able to secure enough votes at the UN to allow the ROC to retain its seat as China's representative.

Cold War tensions kept alive Jiang's dream of returning to the mainland but could not prevent change on Taiwan undermining his authority. Taiwanese entered the GMD bureaucracy and gained election to the provincial assembly, but the National Assembly remained composed of legislators elected in Nanjing in 1948. As these aging representatives passed away, replacements were made by appointment, ensuring that the assembly would not oppose the GMD dictatorship and its assertion of authority through various security forces. But economic development and increasing social stability encouraged greater freedom. In 1969, elections filled vacancies in the assembly, and a few Taiwanese won seats. Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo) (1910–1988), who became ROC president in 1978, opened the political process further. In 1986, parties other than the GMD were able to run candidates. Forty years of martial law ended in 1987, as did the ban on ROC citizens traveling to the mainland. When the now widely admired Jiang Jingguo died in 1988, Vice President Li Denghui (Lee Teng-hui) (1923–) became the first ROC president born on Taiwan, promising more political reform and restored power on the mainland.

Economic growth on Taiwan and failure in Vietnam resulted in the United States ending aid to the ROC in 1968 and reducing its Cold War commitments in East Asia. When President Richard Nixon (1913–1994) sought normalized relations with the PRC to gain leverage against the Soviet Union, the ROC was expelled from the World Bank in 1970 and from the UN in 1971. Nixon's visit to the PRC in February 1972, along with

issuance of the Sino-U.S. Shanghai Communiqué that declared Taiwan a part of China, sent relations between the United States and the ROC on a downward slide. In 1979, U.S. recognition of the PRC led to abrogation of U.S.-ROC defense treaties and the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel. In April, continuing bipartisan support for the ROC in the U.S. Congress forced President Jimmy Carter (1924–) to sign the Taiwan Relations Act, which sought to repair estrangement and build a new relationship based on wider economic ties. But Washington placed increasing importance thereafter on improving its relations with Beijing, advocating steps toward China's peaceful reunification. During the 1980s, the ROC, despite apparent U.S. indifference, improved its international standing as a fledgling democracy with one of the most industrialized and productive economies in the world.

In 1989, the Cold War ended without confirming the status of the ROC as the legal government of China because Communist rule on the mainland continued. Moreover, the PRC still claimed sovereignty over Taiwan, although after the death of Mao in 1976 Beijing changed its policy from seeking liberation of the island to calling for voluntary reunification. Within the framework of one China, Taiwan would have autonomy and the right to maintain its own government, military forces, and economic system. The ROC rejected the offer and remained committed to regaining power on the mainland. Meanwhile, unofficial trade between Taiwan and the PRC through Hong Kong grew steadily. Taipei's acceptance of expanded contact with the mainland reflected confidence that its progress toward democratization and socioeconomic opportunity as well as broader material comfort and a thriving cultural life on Taiwan had won the loyalty and support of its citizens. The

GMD hoped that the Taiwanese would convey to mainland relatives a belief in the superiority of the ROC's system. But these same factors caused other politicians to argue for declaring Taiwan's status as an independent nation, a course of action that Beijing warned it would prevent with a resort to force. During the 1990s, the ROC was at the center of what had become China's Cold War.

Dr. James I. Matray

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Cold War; Guomindang; Hong Kong; Jiang Jieshi; Korean War; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Marshall Mission to China; Northern Expedition; People's Republic of China; Qing Dynasty; Shanghai Communiqué; Sino-Japanese War; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996; United Front; Wang Jingwei; Warlord Period; Whampoa Military Academy; Xi'an Incident; Yan'an; Yuan Shikai.

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China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater

General geographic reference for the immersion of East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia in the war against Japan. China-Burma-India (CBI) also refers to an Allied military command structure in the Pacific Theater that was established early in World War II. At the December 1941 Arcadia Conference in Quebec, British prime minister Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965) and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) agreed to set up the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDA) under General Sir Archibald Wavell (1883–1950) in India. Separate from but nominally equal to the ABDA was the China Theater under Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) as supreme commander, in recognition of China’s role in fighting Japan since at least the start of the Sino-

Japanese War in 1937. Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell (1883–1946), who had more experience in China than any other senior U.S. Army officer and spoke Chinese fluently, became the senior Allied officer in the region. His two titles were “commanding general of the United States Army Forces in the Chinese Theater of Operations, Burma, and India” and “chief of staff to the Supreme Commander of the Chinese Theater” (Jiang Jieshi). The chain of command was confusing because American forces in China came under the authority of Wavell’s ABDA Command. Wavell also commanded forces in Burma (present-day Myanmar), whereas Stilwell was to have direct command of Chinese forces committed to Burma (initially, three armies of up to 100,000 men). From the beginning, Stilwell and Jiang did not get along, and Stilwell was repeatedly handicapped by Jiang’s interference in military matters.

In February, following the loss of most of the Netherlands East Indies, the ABDA command was done away with. From that point forward, the Pacific became an American responsibility, with the British assuming authority from Singapore to Suez. Jiang continued to control the China Theater, and Wavell, headquartered in India, had authority over India and Burma. At the same time, Stilwell formed a new headquarters, the American Armed Forces: China, Burma, and India. The command included the small prewar U.S. military advisory group and Major General Claire Chennault’s American Volunteer Group (AVG, known as the Flying Tigers), later a part of Tenth Army Air Force.

This command structure continued until the August 1943 Quebec Conference, when Churchill and Roosevelt agreed on the establishment of the more integrated South-East Asia Command (SEAC), with British Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979)

as commander and Stilwell as his deputy. Operations in Burma were separated from those in India, now under command of General Claude Auchinleck (1884–1981), commander in chief there since June 1943.

Designed to improve Allied military operations in the region, the new command structure did not achieve that end. Conflicts and different goals remained, with Jiang being the chief problem in Allied cooperation. But the British and Americans also had different priorities. The British were mainly concerned with the defense of India and preventing the Japanese military from exerting an influence on growing Indian nationalism. London saw defeating the Japanese in Burma as the chief means to bring about that end, rather than as a means to channel supplies to China. British military efforts in Burma would thus ebb and flow. The United States was primarily interested in building up China's military strength, and Burma would be a chief route for these supplies to reach China; indeed, President Roosevelt saw China taking its rightful place as a major world power at war's end. U.S. military planners also saw China as a potential location for heavy bombers to be used in the strategic bombing of Japan. These conflicting views were exacerbated by the personalities involved. Stilwell continued to feud with Jiang, and he also held that the British were more interested in defending their Asian empire than in fighting Japan. Stilwell wanted to recover Burma, and he worked hard to improve the fighting ability of those Chinese army units he could influence. The only way to get substantial military heavy equipment to China—which was essential if its fighting ability was to improve dramatically—was by way of Burma, and so construction of the so-called Ledo Road there became imperative. In the meantime, the United States undertook a massive logistical air supply operation to China from bases in

India over “the Hump” of the Himalaya Mountains, the highest in the world. The ubiquitous C-47 (DC-3) aircraft was the workhorse for much of this campaign.

Construction of the 478-mile-long Ledo Road to connect the old Burma Road from Ledo, India, to Bhamo, Burma, took 25 months. The new road ran through jungles, over mountains, and across 10 rivers. U.S. Army Brigadier General Lewis A. Pick (1890–1956) had charge of this vast project, one of the major engineering accomplishments of the war.

Meanwhile, Jiang refused to yield operational command of the growing Chinese military establishment to General Stilwell. Jiang saw the Chinese forces as much as a means to defeat the Chinese Communists (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) after the war as to destroy the Japanese forces in the current conflict. Stilwell fervently believed that, properly trained and equipped, Chinese soldiers could be the equal of any in the world, but all of his efforts to eradicate corruption, weed out ineffective leaders, and end political interference in the Chinese military were rebuffed by Jiang. The Chinese Nationalist leader repeatedly promised reforms but delivered only sufficient compliance to keep up the flow of U.S. military aid.

General Chennault and airpower advocates believed that Japan might be bombed into submission from bases in eastern China. Stilwell dismissed such views and pointed out that the Japanese could simply carry out an offensive to wipe out the bases. Nonetheless, the first production B-29 Superfortresses were sent to China from India, and an ambitious base-construction program was undertaken. Although a few air bombing missions were carried out, the Japanese responded by mounting a great ground offensive, the Ichi-go Campaign, in mid-1944, during which all the bases were captured without

significant Chinese ground resistance. The B-29s were shifted from CBI to the Marianas in the Central Pacific. Roosevelt now applied heavy pressure on Jiang to carry out the reforms advocated by Stilwell and place an American general, preferably Stilwell, in command of the Chinese army. Frustrated by its inability to turn China into a major theater of war, the United States increasingly used its massive naval strength to invest in the highly productive “leap-frogging” strategy of securing important islands as stepping stones toward Japan across the Central Pacific. As a result, China was more and more marginalized and downgraded to a minor theater of war, chiefly important for its role in tying down a million Japanese troops.

Stilwell, now at his wits’ end, reached an impasse with Jiang and was recalled to Washington in October 1944. He was replaced by U.S. Army major general Albert Wedemeyer (1897–1989), a far more tractable individual bent on getting along with Jiang. The demands for reforms in the Chinese military came to an end. In effect, CBI ended in October 1944 when it was divided into two spheres of command, India-Burma and China. Stilwell’s deputy, General Daniel L. Sultan (1885–1947), became the commander of U.S. forces in India-Burma and directed the Allied military effort in northern Burma.

The CBI featured unique air, guerrilla, and logistical operations. Among innovative military and air tactics originating in the CBI was the establishment of Long-Range Penetration Groups, more popularly known as Wingate’s Chindits and Merrill’s Marauders. Utilizing air assets, British and U.S. commanders projected ground troops far behind Japanese lines, their communication and supply provided by air. Here and elsewhere, guerrilla operations were developed and intelligence and insurgency

operations carried out. William Donovan and the Office of Strategic Services were active in the theater.

Finally, the CBI was a major scene of post-war confrontation. Early in the war, Japan had conquered and overrun much of China and most of the European and U.S. colonies in the Pacific. The arrival of Japanese forces in Indochina was a great blow to French influence, and the defeat of the British at Singapore had an even more powerful impact on British prestige. President Roosevelt envisioned the end of colonization after the war, but with the arrival of the Soviet threat, new U.S. president Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) was less sympathetic. Although the Philippines, India, Burma, and some other states gained independence just after the war, the process of decolonization was actually delayed in some areas, resulting in costly wars in the Netherlands East Indies and French Indochina. As for China, American efforts by Roosevelt’s inept ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley (1883–1963), to mediate between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists came to naught; that vast country soon disintegrated into civil war. The United States, which had already committed to Jiang, found itself unable to adopt a neutral stance and paid the price in influence when the civil war ended in a Communist victory in 1949.

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See also: American Volunteer Group; Anti-Japanese War; Chennault, Claire Lee; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Ichi-go Campaign; Jiang Jieshi; Stilwell, Joseph.

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
Chinese Civil War (1946–1949)

The armed forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) began a full-scale war against each other for supremacy of the country shortly after Japan surrendered in World War II. In 1945, to void a collapse of the CCP-GMD coalition, U.S. president Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) dispatched General George

Marshall (1880–1959), Secretary of State and former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as his envoy to China in December for further mediation. Though both parties agreed to a brief cease-fire mediated by Marshall in early 1946, Mao and Jiang made no political compromise and refused to cooperate with each other. After full-scale civil war broke out in the summer of 1946, Marshall announced the failure of his mission in January 1947.

The first phase of the civil war began on June 26, 1946, when Jiang launched an all-out offensive campaign against Mao-held regions. With U.S. aid and support, Jiang had military superiority in both manpower and weaponry. The CCP adopted a new strategy: “offense in the north; defense in the south.” In 1947, it transferred 110,000 troops with 20,000 party cadres to the northeast, which soon became its strategic base and secured communication and transportation between the Soviet Union and the CCP. The party center also organized its best troops into 27 field columns (armies) and six field brigades as strategic forces, totaling 610,000 men. The reorganization significantly changed the PLA’s structure, transforming it from a guerrilla force to an army capable of large-scale mobile operations. Thereafter, the Communist offensive campaigns started in the north and then swept into the south.

The second phase of the civil war, from June 1947 to August 1948, turned the GMD offensive into a CCP strategic offensive due to Jiang’s military setbacks on the front and political frustrations back home. During the land reform movement from 1946 to 1948, the CCP confiscated land from the landlord class and redistributed it among the peasants. More than 96 million peasants in the CCP-controlled areas supported the PLA or joined the army themselves. From July 1946 to



June 1948, the PLA enlisted 1.6 million peasants into their ranks. In 1947, Jiang had to change from broad assault to attacks on key targets. When the GMD offensive slowed down, a PLA strategic offensive began. Between June and September 1947, Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) led 120,000 PLA troops across the Yellow River (Huanghe), breaking through Jiang's line and bringing his offensive to an end. Mao called for "liberating our entire country" in that October. The PLA regular forces increased from 1.9 million in June 1947 to 2.8 million by June 1948.

The third and final phase included three of the most important PLA campaigns in the civil war: the Liao-Shen Campaign (northeast China), the Ping-Jin Campaign (Beiping-Tianjin region), and the Huai-Hai Campaign (east China), between September 1948 and September 1949. The three PLA offensive campaigns lasted altogether 142 days, during which 1.54 million GMD

troops were killed, wounded, or captured. As a result of these campaigns, Jiang lost his main strength and Mao controlled the entire northeast, most of the north, and the central areas north of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River. The PLA regular forces increased from 2.8 million in June 1948 to 5 million in 1949. Jiang asked for cease-fire talks. Mao refused Jiang's request and ordered 1 million PLA troops to cross the Yangzi River on April 21, 1949. Two days later, Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China (ROC), fell. The PLA then pressed on in its liberation drive into the northwest, southwest, and central China. By September, the PLA occupied most of the country except for Tibet (Xizang), Taiwan, and some other offshore islands. The GMD lost control of mainland China to the Communists in the civil war.

On October 1, 1949, Mao declared the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the new republic's alliance with

the Soviet Union. Jiang moved the seat of his government with 3 million GMD troops and officials to Taipei (Taipei), Taiwan (Formosa) in the same year. American officials and public viewed the establishment in China of a Communist government sympathetic to the Soviet Union as a major Cold War defeat, a perception enhanced by China's intervention in the Korean War in 1950. The Truman administration was blamed for "losing China" and not giving the GMD enough support in their civil war. Truman refused to recognize the new Communist China and continued to support and aid Jiang's government in Taiwan.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Cold War; Deng Xiaoping; Guomintang; Huai-Hai Campaign; Jiang Jieshi; Korean War; Liao-Shen Campaign; Mao Zedong; Marshall mission; People's Liberation Army; Ping-Jin Campaign; Soviet Union; Yan'an.

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Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

Ruling political party of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the PRC was

founded in 1949. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) runs the country from the top through its Politburo, Central Committee, 32 Provincial and Metropolitan Committees, 2,972 County Committees, and down to party branches, which had more than 80 million CCP members according to a 2012 estimate. According to the CCP Constitution, the party is the vanguard of the Chinese working class, the faithful representative of the interests of the Chinese people of all nationalities, and the core leadership over the socialist cause of China. Its ultimate goal is to realize the communist social system. The CCP takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) Thoughts, and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) Theory as its guide to action.

In the early twentieth century, the ideas of Marxism and Leninism seemed as effective as liberal democratic and republican ideas in inspiring outright revolution in China. Communist movements became an alternative solution to problems facing angry peasants and urban poor, a large proportion of the Chinese population. Russia's October Revolution in 1917 had a profound impact on China; it provided a model for the Chinese revolution to follow. On July 25, 1919, the Soviet government announced the abolition of all unequal treaties with China. The termination of all the former czarist privileges in China portrayed new Soviet Russia as a better nation than the old imperialist Western powers that had been dismembering China. Some of the radical liberalists were drawn to Marxism-Leninism and the Russian experience.

As Soviet ideology and the Bolshevik revolution were popularized, the time arrived for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. In January 1920, Li Dazhao (Li Tachao) (1888–1927), the head librarian at Peking University, visited Chen Duxiu



Chinese President Jiang Zemin, center, stands with Premier Zhu Rongji, third from left, and National People's Congress Chairman Li Peng, fifth from left, during a ceremony as the ruling Communist Party celebrated its 80th birthday on July 1, 2001, at Beijing's Great Hall of the People. (AP/Wide World Photos)

(Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (1879–1942), professor and dean of letters at the university, and talked about the possibility of setting up a Communist group. In April and May, Grigori Voitinsky (1893–1956), a representative of the Vladivostok branch of the Bolsheviks' Far Eastern Bureau, visited Li in Beijing and Chen in Shanghai, and discussed the establishment of Communist organizations in China. In August, Chen founded China's first Communist group in Shanghai, with Li doing likewise in Beijing. Meanwhile, Dong Biwu (Tung Pi-wu) (1886–1975) in Wuhan, and others in Guangzhou (Canton), Japan, and Paris formed their own Communist groups. In November, the first issue of the party journal, *The Communist*, was published.

In July 1921, the CCP was founded. It convened its First National Congress from July to early August in Shanghai. Thirteen delegates attended, including Mao Zedong, representing about 50 Communist Party

members across the country. Most of the delegates as well as the early CCP members were intellectuals. Soviet advisor Hendricus Sneevliet Maring (1883–1942), first official representative from the Executive Committee of the Comintern (Communist International Congress in Moscow), instructed the CCP to focus its effort on labor movements. The congress passed the CCP's first constitution and set up its primary goal to organize the working class and "promote a social revolution through the use of the strike weapons." Chen Duxiu was elected the secretary-general of the CCP Central Committee, which had its headquarters in Shanghai.

The CCP membership expanded rapidly after 1926 when the Northern Expedition, at war against the warlords, began by the CCP-Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) coalition. Military revolution remained a key

factor in the Chinese Communist movement. The CCP membership increased from 994 in 1925 to 57,900 in 1927, and many new members served in the GMD military. In April 1927, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) established his new National Government of the Republic of China (ROC) under GMD control in Nanjing (Nanking). However, the Communist movement's rapid growth across the country and its increasing influence in the GMD worried the right wing and conservatives, who controlled the GMD Executive Central Committee. They wanted to terminate the GMD-CCP coalition and put more pressure on Jiang, who did not intend to challenge the right wing, see the party split, or share national power with the CCP. To secure his military victory and national leadership, on April 12, Jiang and the right-wing government in Shanghai began to purge CCP members in order to contain the increasing Soviet influence and left-wing activities in the GMD party and the Nationalist army. In April, the Soviet Embassy compound in Beijing was raided. Li Dazhao and other CCP leaders were arrested, and Li was later executed.

The CCP organized its independent armed forces after the “white terror” of 1927, the worst period in the party's history. The military became absolutely necessary for the CCP's survival. The party and the army established an interdependent relationship before WWII in order to create a center in rural areas for revolutionary authorities. The party mobilized peasants, trained officers, and received instructions and aid from the Soviet Union. The army protected the Communist base areas and eventually seized the state power for the party by defeating the GMD army on the mainland. Mao described this relationship thus on August 7, 1927: “Political power grows out of the barrel of

a gun.” In 1931, Mao made his base region a government center for all CCP soviet governments when he was elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Mao's strategy and tactics became the basis for the Communist military revolution. By 1936, the Red Army maintained a contingency of approximately 45,000 troops after the Long March.

The Communist forces had significant development through the second CCP-GMD coalition during World War II (WWII). The Red Army changed its name to the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in 1937. By the end of WWII, when the CCP and GMD ended their cooperation and resumed the Chinese Civil War in 1946, the Communist military forces grew to 1 million regular troops, augmented by an additional 2 million militia. In 1948, the CCP renamed its armed forces as the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). In 1949, when the PLA defeated Jiang Jieshi's Nationalist army in the Chinese Civil War and controlled mainland China except Tibet (Xizang), it totaled 5.5 million regular troops. Mao became the president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

Following the Soviet experience, the Chinese Communist regime had adopted several high-handed measures in order to consolidate its power and fight the war. In the early 1950s, state control depended on radical movements and mass political participation. The radical movements included the Campaign against Counter Revolutionaries (Zhenfan Yundong) in 1950, Three Antis (Sanfan) and Five Antis (Wufan) Campaigns of 1951–54, and Anti-rightist Movement (Fanyou Yundong) in 1957. While the Campaign against Counter Revolutionaries rocked urban China, two other campaigns, the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns, expressed the will of the new

regime to impose order in industry and commerce. The Three Antis Campaign, which targeted corruption, waste, and obstructionist bureaucracy, reflected concerns of the CCP leadership about the moral decay of the rank and file of the revolution.

During the 1950s, the CCP carried out a Soviet-style social and economic reform. The Chinese Communist revolution established this new socioeconomic system with a mixture of Marxism-Leninism and its Chinese version—Mao’s Thoughts. After the founding of the PRC, the CCP developed an integrated plan for the nation’s economic recovery. Mao’s social reforms, based on Soviet doctrine, were modified for the Chinese situation. Chinese land reform, for example, followed after the Soviet “collective ownership” model. As a result, China emphasized the state’s new revolutionary and communist nature. Soviet financial, technological, and educational support aided China’s reconstruction and economic growth, marking the “closest collaboration” between China and the Soviet Union. In 1953, Mao called for a national movement to learn from the Soviet Union. In 1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward movement to industrialize the economy. The movement failed, and many people died of starvation in 1959–1961.

By the mid-1960s, questions about Mao’s Great Leap Forward policy and dissenting opinion in the party and government spread to some extent. With Marshal Lin Biao’s (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) support, Mao responded to the opposition with a new effort to mobilize support from outside the party, including soldiers and students, and launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Mao described the Cultural Revolution as a political struggle, a class struggle inside the party. On August 18, 1966, at a mass meeting celebrating the

“Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” Lin exhorted the youthful Red Guards to “smash all the old concepts, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes.” On the 20th, Red Guards in Beijing took the lead in an unprecedented assault against the “Four Olds.” It quickly swept the country. Coming out of the schools, the Red Guards blanketed the land in a “revolutionary Red Terror.” Instigated by Lin, and spurred on to a frenzy by the “Cultural Revolution Leading Group,” it degenerated into a wild spree of home searches, property destruction, free-for-all fights, and even murders. By the end of the year, social stability vanished. Industry, agriculture, and commerce were badly disrupted, causing widespread public resentment. Disturbances and conflicts increased. At the same time, since understanding and concepts varied among the numerous Red Guard organizations, they developed serious factional differences, and constantly argued and debated heatedly among themselves. China’s vast land rumbled and seethed. It had indeed reached the “ideal” stage of Mao’s “great chaos under the heavens” so earnestly sought by the revolutionary seer.

On September 9, 1976, Mao died. The power struggle in the party between the Maoists, or the Gang of Four, including Mao’s wife Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch’ing) (1914–1991), Zhang Chunqiao (1917–2005), Yao Wenyuan (1931–2005), and Wang Hongwen (1935–1992), and the old guard, including Chen Yun (1905–1995), Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-ch’ian) (1901–1990), Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986), Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch’en) (1899–1992), and Wang Zhen (1908–1993), surfaced. After the demise of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) staged his third comeback in 1977. He won an intense struggle in the post-Mao succession by removing

the Maoists and having a firm control of Beijing. Then he ended the Cultural Revolution and led China from a period of political turmoil to one of economic development by denying the need for any continuous domestic class struggle, the underlying impulse of Mao's Cultural Revolution. In 1978, he emerged as the new paramount leader, launched new reform policies, and opened China up to the outside world. Meanwhile, he represented a new generation of Chinese leadership.

Deng's reform movement brought tremendous changes to China, a "second revolution" comparable to Mao's 1949 revolution. For the first time in history, the country began to establish a market economy and participate in the international community. In 1987, he refused to become the chairman of the CCP, premier of the State Council, or president of the PRC, resigning from the Central Committee along with conservative senior party members to ensure continuity of his reform policies. Though officially retired, Deng remained at the center of China's reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the third generation of Chinese leaders came to power.

After the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, Jiang Zemin (1926–) became the chairman of both the CCP and CMC. At the Eighth National People's Congress held in March 1993, Jiang was elected president of the PRC and chairman of the government's Central Military Commission (CMC). By 1997, Jiang had established an unprecedented institutionalized authority that enabled him to preside over a vast central bureaucracy encompassing the party, state, and military. He developed his own theoretical principles for the party, military, and state as the "Three Represents." Addressing the local cadres during his visit to Guangdong on February 25, 2000, he stated that the CCP should represent

"the development of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the Chinese people." The Three Represents thereafter became the most essential requirements for the officials and officers to fulfill their obligations and duties during Jiang's era from 1990 to 2004.

After Jiang retired, Hu Jintao (1942–) became the party chairman and the country's president in 2003, and the chairman of the CMC in 2004. He and his generals emerged through a protracted service within the government or military. At 50, when he entered the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Fourteenth CCP Central Committee in 1992, Hu was the youngest member in the top decision-making body. He was reelected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo and a member of the Central Committee's Secretariat in 1997. In November 2002, when Jiang retired, Hu became chairman of the CCP at the Sixteenth CCP National Congress. In March 2003, Hu was elected the president of the PRC at the Sixth National People's Congress. In September 2004, Jiang gave up command of the Chinese military at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CCP National Congress. Hu became the new civilian commander in chief of the PLA in the twenty-first century.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Counterrevolutionaries, Campaign against; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; Gang of Four; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Jiang Zemin; Lin Biao; Long March; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; Nie Rongzhen; Northern Expedition; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Red Guards; Soviet

Union; Tiananmen Square Events; Tibet; Xu Xiangqian; Ye Jianying.

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Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (1950–1953)

In October 1950, China entered the Korean War, which, in essence, became a war between China and the United States, leading the two countries into their most mutually hostile period in history. On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out between North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK). After the United Nations (UN) adopted the resolution for using all possible means to aid the ROK on July 7, China began to pay greater attention to the Korean War situation. On the same day, at the suggestion of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), party chairman and the new republic’s president, the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) held the first meeting on national defense and decided to establish the Northeast China Border Defense Army (NCBDA), including four infantry armies totaling 260,000 troops, in case of an emergency situation along the Chinese-Korean borders. On August 4, when the attack by North Korea was repelled by the UN Forces (UNF), Mao called a Politburo meeting to discuss possible involvement and preparation of Chinese forces for the war. On the next day, Mao ordered the NCBDA “to get ready for fighting in early September.”

On September 15, U.S. troops landed successfully in Inchon and the war situation in Korea changed rapidly. On October 1, the UNF crossed the 38th Parallel. Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s leader, asked the Soviet Union for help and told Stalin to ask China to send troops to Korea. Stalin telegraphed Mao on October 1 and suggested that China

“should send at once at least five to six divisions to the 38th Parallel.” Chinese leaders then faced the emergency of sending their troops to Korea. However, there were divergent views when the Secretariat of the Central Committee met on October 2. At the time, Mao decided to hold an enlarged meeting of the Politburo, which on October 5 agreed to Mao’s idea and decided to send troops to aid North Korea. Three days later, Mao issued his order that the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) be established and that Peng Dehuai (P’eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) be appointed the commander in chief and political commissar of the CPVF. On October 19, the first wave of the CPVF including four infantry armies and three artillery divisions, about 300,000 troops, crossed the Yalu River and entered Korea. On October 25, the Chinese government announced that the PRC would send the Chinese volunteers to Korea, thus making China take part in the Korean War in the name of “Resisting U.S. Aggression, Aiding Korea and Defending the Homeland.”

The CPVF’s first battle in Korea was an unplanned engagement. From October 25 to November 5, the CPVF’s armies had head-on engagements with the ROK’s First, Sixth, and Eighth divisions and with the U.S. First Cavalry Division. The CPVF used some of the same combat tactics the PLA had perfected during the Chinese Civil War. During the campaign, Peng concentrated 120,000 to 150,000 men in the area north of the Chongchon River against 50,000 UN troops. He believed that the first campaign was a victory for the CPVF despite its 10,000 casualties. On November 24, the CPVF launched the second southward offensive campaign to counterattack General Douglas MacArthur’s (1880–1964) “home-by-Christmas” offensive. On the whole, the second campaign was a major

victory for the CPVF. They attacked the UNF from the surrounding hills, often establishing roadblocks that not only forced the American troops back but also threatened to cut them off. The bitter fighting combined with the bitter cold had made Chosin one of the worst battles of the Korean War for the Americans. By late November 1950, China had sent to Korea 33 divisions and 5 regiments, including 30 infantry divisions, 3 artillery divisions, 1 antiaircraft artillery regiment, and 4 engineering regiments, reaching 450,000 strong. This quick deployment apparently was unexpected by American generals. The CPVF’s superiority in manpower enabled the Chinese to overcome their inferiority in equipment and technology. It seemed rational to the Chinese leaders that a large force would be a decisive factor for their victory.

On New Year’s Eve, the CPVF launched its third offensive campaign across the 38th Parallel against entrenched UNF, an operation very different from earlier practice. In a matter of eight days, the CPVF moved into South Korea; recaptured Seoul, South Korea’s capital; and pushed the UNF down to the 37th Parallel. However, the CPVF units were exhausted after days of constant movement and fighting. By this time the American and UN forces had overwhelming firepower superiority, both on the ground and in the air. They inflicted heavy casualties and serious damage to the CPVF troop movements and their transportation and communication lines, signaling the need for a more cautious strategy. The Soviet Union and Kim, however, pressured the CPVF to launch the next operation to drive the UNF out of Korea as soon as possible. Mao also cabled Peng at the end of January and asked the CPVF to prepare the fourth offensive campaign to drive the UNF farther south. During the CPVF’s fourth campaign, the

two sides engaged in a series of back-and-forth mobile battles. China had to keep sending reinforcements to offset losses and meet the new demands of the rapidly expanding military operations and the unexpected manpower needs. By the middle of April 1951, the Chinese forces in Korea had increased to 950,000 men. Their combat troops consisted of 42 infantry divisions, 8 artillery divisions, 4 anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and 4 tank regiments, totaling 770,000 men. Their supporting troops consisted of 6 supply services headquarters, 4 railroad engineering divisions, 11 engineering regiments, and 1 public security division, totaling 180,000 men.

The CPVF fifth offensive campaign in April–May 1951 was the largest of the war. The Chinese and North Koreans deployed some 700,000 troops against 340,000 UNF, and the two sides fought for more than 40 days. The campaign failed, and the CPVF suffered the loss of 85,000 men, with its 180th Division completely destroyed. Additionally, 17,000 POWs were taken by the UNF. More importantly, the front line was pushed farther north. After the setback of its fifth campaign, the CPVF made some important tactical and strategic changes to limit casualties and negate the UNF's firepower. By the summer of 1951, the CPVF was no longer expected to drive into South Korea.

In June 1951, the Korean War reached a stalemate, and on July 10, the truce negotiations began at Kaesong. In order to achieve a favorable position in the negotiations, China sent more troops to Korea to turn the war situation around. By October, the number of the CPVF had reached 1,150,000 men, including 880,000 combat troops and 220,000 supporting troops. While the negotiations faced tremendous difficulties, the fighting continued. The CPVF began an active defense and constructed underground

tunnels along the front line. It also adopted more cautious and realistic strategies, including maintaining a relatively stable front line by increasing CPVF air force, artillery, and tank units as well as beefing up logistical support. By March 1953, the Chinese forces had reached a record high, totaling 1,350,000 men, since intervening in the Korean War.

From October 19, 1950, to July 27, 1953, when the Korean Armistice agreement was concluded, China had sent a total of 3 million Chinese troops to Korea. Confronted by US air and naval superiority, the Chinese forces suffered heavy casualties, including Mao's son, Mao Anying (1922–1950), who was killed as a Russian translator at the CPVF headquarters in an air raid. According to Chinese military records, the Chinese casualties in the Korean War were as follows: 152,000 died, 383,000 wounded, 450,000 hospitalized, 21,700 prisoners of war, and 4,000 missing in action, totaling 1,010,700 casualties. China had also spent in the war a total of about 10 billion yuan in *Renminbi* (Chinese currency, equal to \$3.3 billion according to the exchange rate at that time). In terms of the war materials and supplies, the Chinese government transported into Korea a total of 5.6 million tons of goods and supplies during its intervention.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Civil War; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Guomindang; Hong Xuezhong; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement; Mao Zedong; Nie Rongzhen; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Zhou Enlai.

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Chinese Military Advisory Group (1950–1955)

The Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) was sent by the Chinese government to North Vietnam to help the Vietnamese Communist (Viet Minh) armed forces in the First Indochina War (1946–1954). All of the CMAG members were commanders and officers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). As a Communist state bordering with Vietnam, China actively supported the Communist government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to fight the war against France during the First Indochinese War (or French Indochina War) after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). In October 1949, when Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) sent his representatives to Beijing (Peking) requesting a large amount of military and financial aid, the Chinese government agreed to support the North Vietnam Army (NVA, or People's Army of Vietnam, PAVN). In January 1950,

Ho secretly visited Moscow and Beijing for additional aid for his war against the French, who had occupied most cities and strategic points in Vietnam. The CCP Central Committee decided to send Chinese military advisors and war materials to Vietnam.

On January 17, 1950, the first group of eight Chinese advisors, headed by Luo Guipo (1907–1995), chief of the General Office at the Revolutionary Military Committee of the central government and later the first Chinese ambassador to Vietnam and vice minister of the Foreign Affairs, left Beijing for Vietnam to lay the groundwork for further aid. On January 18, the PRC became the first nation to establish diplomatic relations with the DRV. In March, Luo and Chinese advisors began work at Viet Minh Headquarters (HQ). In April, the CMC instructed the PLA's Southwest Regional Command to supply arms, ammunition, and equipment to the NVA on a regular basis. The regional command assigned a Chinese truck regiment to aid transportation over the border area.

Then Chinese leaders organized the “Chinese Military Advisory Group to Vietnam.” In early April 1950, Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969), vice president of the PRC, summoned Wei Guoqing (1913–1989) to Beijing, informing him about the CMAG and appointing him the head of the Chinese advisory group. In May, 281 officers reported to the CMAG, including 59 commanders and officers at battalion or higher levels. On June 27, two days after the Korean War broke out, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), and Liu met Wei and other high-ranking advisors in Beijing. Under the umbrella of CMAG headquarters, political, operational, technical, and medical advisory teams were organized. In July, Chen Geng (1903–1961), one of the most experienced

PLA army group commanders, also joined the CMAG.

On August 11, 1950, Wei led the CMAG, about 250 officers, accompanied by Hoang Van Hoan (1905–1991), Vietnamese ambassador to China, into Vietnam. The next day, NVA held a welcome meeting, and General Vo Nguyen Giap (1911–), commander in chief of the NVA, made a speech in Chinese. After their arrival, Wei, Chen, and top advisors served at NVA headquarters, including the department of general staff and bureaus of political affairs and general logistics. The other advisors served at the headquarters of the 304th and 308th Divisions, and at the headquarters of the 148th, 174th, and 209th Regiments according to their ranking and expertise.

The Chinese advisors took part in the NVA battle planning, operation execution, and campaign assessments in the Border Campaign in the fall of 1950, offensives on the Red River delta from December 1950 to June 1951, the Dien Bien Phu Campaign of 1954, and other major battles. The Vietnamese troops had experience with traditional guerrilla warfare and small-scale operations, but Chinese advisors believed that the NVA should engage in large-scale offensive campaigns and fight mobile decisive battles to drive French troops out of Vietnam. To fight this type of war and eliminate a greater number of enemy troops, the NVA needed more regular units. In 1950, the NVA had only three infantry divisions.

In May 1951, Chinese advisors began to establish and arm the 316th, 320th, 325th Infantry, and 351st Artillery and Engineering Divisions for the NVA. By the end of 1952, the NVA had six infantry divisions and one artillery and engineering division, all equipped with Chinese arms and supplies. From 1951 to 1952, the CMAG also provided many training sessions for NVA

middle- and high-ranking commanders, logistics officers, and medical personnel. The Chinese also trained the Vietnamese inside China by opening an officer academy; communication, technology, and mechanic schools; and driver training centers in China's southwestern Guangxi and Yunnan Provinces. The NVA sent entire units to China for training and rearming. For example, in 1951, the Vietnamese 308th Division and the 174th and 209th Regiments traveled to China for combat training. While they were in China, the Vietnamese troops received new arms, weapons, and equipment from the PLA. By 1954, the Chinese had provided military and technology training for 15,000 Vietnamese officers and soldiers in China.

In late November 1953, the NVA high command and the CMAG planned a response to the French occupation of Dien Bien Phu. The Vietnamese Workers' Party (VWP, Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam) Central Committee approved the plan on December 6. From December to early March 1954, the NVA encircled 15,000 French troops at Dien Bien Phu. In the meantime, the PLA sent one Vietnamese rocket battalion and one 75-mm recoilless gun battalion to Dien Bien Phu, which had been equipped and trained in China. On March 13, the NVA launched attacks to isolate French strong points. By late April, the French troops held only three points. On May 6, the NVA launched its final attack. The newly arrived Chinese-manufactured six-rocket launchers played an important role in the final assaults. The next day, the French surrendered. After eight years' fighting, Ho and the Viet Minh finally defeated 120,000 French troops in the First Indochinese War.

After the Geneva Conference, China tried to step down its military involvement in North Vietnam in order to reduce international tension. In September 1955, the CMAG returned to China, but China continued to provide

weaponry, equipment, and military training to North Vietnam.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chen Geng; Chinese Communist Party; Korean War; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Zhu De.

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Chinese Offensive in Korea, First (October 25–November 6, 1950)

During the first year of the war, the Chinese conducted six major offensives against the United Nations Command (UNC). Of these, their second and third offensives were the most destructive and raised many questions about the U.S. role in Korea. As a result of these two sudden Chinese victories, the UN decided to remain in Korea, build up its forces, and not let the Chinese be victorious. From January through May 1951, the Chinese conducted four offensives against the UNC, but still could not drive it from Korea. The failure of the Chinese People's

Volunteer Force (CPVF) from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to win decisive victories in these last four offensives convinced the leadership that China could not win the war. This led to a military stalemate over the course of the years before an armistice could be arranged between the opposing forces.

The entrance of the PRC into the war in Korea was sudden and unexpected in Washington. Through October 26, 1950, the first fighting in North Korea with the CPVF occurred between Republic of Korea Army (ROKA, South Korean) units and what was first thought of as "Chinese Volunteers."

U.S. military intelligence at first thought that the Chinese in Korea would "avoid any overt intervention" against U.S. forces. By November 1, U.S. commanders had come to realize that the CPVF was not in Korea just to handle supplies for the Korean People's Army (KPA, North Korea), but were trained combat veterans intent on major military activities.

From the beginning of the war, both North Korean and Chinese leaders had been confused over the policy and intentions of the U.S. government. Both North Korea and China believed that the UNC would stop at the 38th Parallel. Thus, the UNC crossing of the 38th Parallel on October 9, 1950, surprised the governments of both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and the PRC. Beijing (Peking) now decided to intervene militarily, and on October 18, Chinese troops began crossing the Yalu River into North Korea. By the end of October, Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) had six CPVF armies, 18 divisions in all, in the high mountains of central North Korea.

Reacting to the sudden Chinese entrance into the war, U.S. Eighth Army commander General Walton H. Walker (1889–1950)

ordered the First Cavalry Division to block the Chinese force that had overrun ROKA forces and was attacking toward Unsan. On the evening of November 1, the First and Second Battalions of the Eighth Cavalry Regiment had hardly taken up defensive positions north and west of Unsan when they were assaulted by two divisions of the Chinese Thirty-Ninth Army. Swarms of Chinese infantry engulfed the U.S. positions.

The remainder of the Eighth Cavalry Regiment was soon overrun by the rapid Chinese assault. By mid-morning on November 2, little fighting ability remained in the regiments as small units retreated on foot toward the rear. In spite of a counterattack by the Fifth Cavalry Regiment, the Chinese assault could not be stopped, and the Eighth Cavalry Regiment was almost destroyed.

The sudden attack by the CPVF created a period of confusion throughout Eighth Army's chain of command. Steps were immediately taken to withdraw I Corps below the Ch'ongch'on River. Elements of the Nineteenth Infantry Regiment of the Twenty-Fourth Division, along with the Twenty-Seventh British Commonwealth Brigade, were rushed into positions north of the river to protect bridges and tank fords over the river.

The boundary between I Corps and the withdrawing ROKA units crossed the Ch'ongch'on on a north-south line at Kunu-ri. On November 3, the Fifth Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the U.S. Twenty-Fourth Division took a defensive position at Kunu-ri behind withdrawing ROKA II Corps. The next morning, the Chinese broke through the ROKA positions, forcing ROKA units to retreat through the Fifth RCT. Chinese soldiers soon mixed with the South Koreans, making distinctions between Communist and UN units difficult. Some Chinese even

appeared in South Korean uniforms. In the confusion, some South Korean soldiers became casualties from U.S. fire. In spite of this turmoil, Colonel John R. Throckmorton's Fifth RCT held Kunu-ri and successfully protected the right flank of Eighth Army.

North of the river, the Nineteenth Infantry was fighting for its life as the Chinese moved to positions in its rear. Some units of the regiment were forced to withdraw south of the river and abandon a number of their vehicles. But many of the regiment's positions north of the river were restored, thanks to a counterattack by the Twenty-first Regiment of the Twenty-fourth Division.

On the western side of the bridgehead, on November 4–5, the Chinese struck with equal force against the Twenty-seventh British Brigade at Pakch'on. The U.S. Sixty-first Field Artillery Battalion (FAB), supporting the British, was partially overrun as it used direct fire by its 105-mm howitzers against the attacking Chinese. Elements of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Australians rushed to their rescue, and by November 6 the position was stabilized.

On November 6, Chinese units surrounding U.S. forces suddenly vanished. To this day there are no clear answers as to why the CPVF suddenly withdrew. Some have speculated that the first engagements were a warning to Allied forces to withdraw from North Korea. Others believe that the CPVF had run out of food and ammunition and needed to regroup and resupply before beginning any new offensive.

Colonel Daniel Randall Beirne

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Korean War; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army.

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Chinese Offensive in Korea, Second (November 25–December 24, 1950)

The second Chinese offensive in Korea took place in late November through December 1950. The Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF), or the People's Liberation Army (PLA), of the People's Republic of China (PRC) had concentrated in the high mountains of central North Korea during the month of November. Although the Chinese Communist (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) forces had first entered

North Korea in late October 1950 and made limited contact with Allied forces, they then withdrew back into the mountains to build up their forces. Then in late November two Chinese army groups, the Thirteenth in the west against U.S. Eighth Army and the Ninth in the east against X Corps, entered the conflict. This campaign consisted of two separate battles, one at Ch'ongch'on River (November 25–30, 1950) and Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir, and one with forces to the east (October–December 1950).

In the west, the CPVF Thirteenth Army Group of 18 divisions attacked U.S. Eighth Army directly. The weight of the Chinese attack was against the right flank of U.S. Eighth Army. Here the Chinese crushed the ROK II Corps and tried to outflank the U.S. IX Corps. The weight of the CPVF attack fell on the U.S. Second and Twenty-Fifth Divisions. The route of withdrawal of the Second Division was blocked by Chinese road blocks that caused heavy U.S. casualties. Other Eighth Army units along the Ch'ongch'on River west of IX Corps near Anju were able to hold back the Chinese assaults long enough for most of Eighth Army to withdraw. CPVF movement was slow, allowing Eighth Army to maintain a deliberate, orderly withdrawal back into South Korea.

CPVF activities against X Corps in north-east Korea in late October were a mirror image of their activities against U.S. Eighth Army. In spite of total destruction of the Seventh ROK Regiment near Sudong and fierce fighting with the Seventh Marine Regiment in early November near Chinhung-ni, Chinese forces suddenly melted away as they had at Unsan. As in the west, Chinese forces concentrated in the high mountains of central North Korea and awaited new actions by X Corps.

Instead of linking up with U.S. Eighth Army in the west, X Corps received orders

to attack north toward the Yalu River. Under this new plan, the U.S. First Marine Division pushed north up a very steep and difficult 64-mile-long road from Hungnam to the Chosin Reservoir. The Seventh Division was widely dispersed, while the Thirty-second Regiment attacked northwest to link up with the Marines. As a result, a gap of 80 miles extended between the Seventeenth Infantry and the other two regiments.

On November 28, the CPVF mounted its first big assault on Seventh Division forces east of the Chosin Reservoir. The Twenty-seventh Chinese army attacked the dispersed U.S. units. The Thirty-first RCT fell back to the First Marine Division perimeter at Hagaru-ri, on the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir.

Meanwhile, the Fifth and Seventh Marine Regiments attacked west of the reservoir to Yudam-ni. The First Marine Regiment had the mission of keeping open the main supply route from Hagaru-ri to Hungnam. All during this period of bitter cold weather the Chinese kept attacking the extended Marines and attempted to cut them off from their base of supply. The Fifth and Seventh Marines were cut off at Yudam-ni when the Chinese secured the Tokdong Pass in their rear on the route to Hagaru-ri. The two regiments bypassed the roadblock by moving overland to Hagaru-ri.

The decision for X Corps to withdraw was slow in coming. The size of the Chinese units caused major changes in X Corps commander Major General Edward M. Almond's (1892–1979) plans. His corps was widely dispersed, with isolated units vulnerable to renewed Chinese attacks. Now his mission was to preserve X Corps while conducting an orderly withdrawal. The first phase of the withdrawal was completed when marine and army units withdrew from both sides of the Chosin Reservoir into Hagaru-ri. X Corps'

withdrawal is considered one of the most masterly in military history.

In spite of heavy losses by U.S. forces, those sustained by the CPVF in northeast Korea in November and December 1950 amounted to a disaster. The CPVF Third Field Army started with 12 divisions of 120,000 men. Marine Corps studies estimate that in these divisions both battle and nonbattle casualties amounted to some 72,000 men.

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See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Korean War; People's Liberation Army; Third Field Army.

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Chinese Offensive in Korea, Third (December 31, 1950–January 8, 1951)

After the People's Liberation Army (PLA) sent the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF) to North Korea, the Korean War essentially became a conflict between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. On New Year's Eve 1950, the CPVF crossed the 38th parallel and attacked South Korea, or the Republic of Korea (ROK). Their forces consisted of four armies: the Thirty-eighth, Thirty-ninth, Fortieth, and Forty-second. The main weight of the attack fell on the U.S. I and IX Corps defending in western Korea directly north of Seoul. In addition to this attack, the Chinese Sixty-sixth Army and the North Korea's People's Army (KPA) forces attacked across the parallel in the center and east of the Korean peninsula. This last thrust threatened to envelop the ROK Army III Corps, struggling to hold back the Chinese thrust in central Korea.

The Chinese attack occurred at night and was preceded by massive artillery and mortar fire. After this artillery barrage came thousands of foot soldiers accompanied by the blowing of bugles. The U.S. Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Divisions bore the brunt of the attack. In spite of heavy U.S. counter battery fire, the Chinese continued to attack and take heavy casualties.

By daylight on January 1, 1951, CPVF forces had driven a wedge between the two U.S. divisions, attacking through the

weakened ROK First and Sixth Divisions defending the area between the Americans. Another Chinese force penetrated the UNC defense east of Seoul and threatened to envelop the city. General Matthew B. Ridgway (1895–1993), who had taken command of the Eighth Army on December 26 after General Walton H. Walker's (1889–1950) death in a jeep accident, ordered the U.S. I and IX Corps to fall back into a bridgehead around Seoul.

UNC commander General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) had given Ridgway instructions not to risk the destruction of the U.S. Eighth Army. As a result, the Eighth Army established lines upon which withdrawing UNC elements could coordinate their movements. Line C passed along the south bank of the Han River, except for the bridgehead around Seoul. At Yangp'yong it extended across the Korean peninsula to the east coast. Forty miles south of this, another line, Line D, passed from the west coast at P'yongt'aek northeast to the east coast at Woonp'o-ri.

By January 2, both I and IX U.S. Corps had formed a bridgehead of 10 infantry regiments around Seoul. Several hundred tanks and 15 artillery battalions of 105-mm, 155-mm, and 8-inch howitzers supported the infantry. Reinforcing these were offshore naval gunfire and close air support.

The defense of Seoul was thwarted, however, when ROK units on the central front collapsed. The CPVF was able to push around Seoul to the east of the city and outflank the Eighth Army. Rather than risking the destruction of the Eighth Army, Ridgway ordered a slow withdrawal from Seoul to Line C along the south bank of the Han River.

In spite of Chinese pressure, the U.S. I and IX Corps conducted an orderly withdrawal from Seoul. The only incident in

the withdrawal took place as the British Twenty-ninth Brigade was withdrawing. Elements of the Chinese Thirty-ninth Army overran two companies of the Royal Ulster Rifles. Counterattacks by infantry and tanks to recapture the lost positions cost 300 casualties, but the Chinese were forced to disengage. By January 4, the last UNC units in Seoul crossed over the Han River and took up defensive positions along Line C.

Indeed, the major problem in the evacuation of the two U.S. corps from Seoul was a flood of South Korean refugees who clogged the roads and river crossings by the thousands. Cold weather added to their suffering as they herded in masses just ahead of the slow-moving CPVF. U.S. engineers worried about the integrity of the Han River bridges and whether they could support U.S. Army heavy equipment as well as the thousands of Korean refugees. In spite of much confusion, a large number of refugees were able to board trains south of the river and travel directly to Pusan.

In the meantime, the CPVF continued its drive, shifting its thrust to central South Korea. This move threatened to envelop the U.S. I and IX Corps now defending along Line C. To prevent this from occurring, Ridgway ordered the withdrawal of all UNC forces back to Line D. On January 6, the Eighth Army began its move to the new line, accomplishing it in several days without incident. The Chinese ended their Third Offensive Campaign on January 8.

Once the army was stabilized on Line D, Ridgway ordered aggressive patrolling. The bitter cold winter was having its effect on Chinese forces and drastically slowed their movement. Gaps as wide as 20 miles appeared between the attacking Chinese and Eighth Army defenders on Line C. In these circumstances, Ridgway planned a counterattack to

regain the territory recently lost by the Eighth Army. By February 11, the U.S. I and IX Corps had begun the counterattack and were slowly progressing north to the Han River. X Corps, evacuated from Hungnam to Pusan at the end of December, was now preparing to move up to Line D to join the Eighth Army. The Tenth Corps was still composed of the U.S. Army Third and Seventh Divisions and the First Marine Division. Added to this was the U.S. Army Second Division, recovering from its losses in North Korea. During January 7–22, X Corps moved up to Line D in central South Korea. In this movement it encountered the KPA II and V Corps, which were pushing into South Korea directly to the east of the Chinese.

Colonel Daniel Randall Beirne

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Korean War; People's Liberation Army.

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Chinese Offensive in Korea, Fourth (January 25–April 21, 1951)

After the People's Republic of China (PRC) sent Chinese troops to the Korean War in October 1950, the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF) launched offensive campaigns one after another against the United Nations Forces (UNF) in the winter of 1950–1951. China was overwhelmed by the victory of the CPVF's Third Offensive Campaign from December 31, 1950, to January 8, 1951. In a matter of eight days, the CPVF crossed the 38th Parallel, moved into South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK); captured its capital Seoul; and pushed the UNF down to the 37th Parallel. The UNF had to retreat 80 miles south. After taking over Seoul, the Chinese government organized parades and parties to celebrate with fireworks. To many Chinese, the CPVF seemed to be winning the war in Korea. The Russian advisors in Beijing even questioned the CPVF Command why not follow up their victory with hot pursuit of the UNF into South Korea.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and North Korea's leader Kim Il-sung continually pressured the CPVF to launch the next offensive operation immediately to drive the UNF out of Korea with all possible speed. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) cabled Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) in January and urged a preparation of the CPVF's Fourth Offensive Campaign to drive the UNF farther south. The CPVF Command was under tremendous pressure from the political leaders of all three Communist

countries (China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea) for a quick victory. But the gap between this political goal and strategic realities grew wider at the end of each campaign. As the CPVF struck further south in the Fourth Offensive Campaign, the tactics that it had successfully used earlier began to lose effectiveness. The UNF had recovered from their early surprise. On January 25, it launched a counterattack to retake Seoul.

From January 25, 1951, the CPVF engaged in its Fourth Campaign and suffered a casualty of 53,000 men. China had to keep sending reinforcements in order to offset losses and meet new demands of the rapidly expanding military operations and unexpected manpower needs. In the spring of 1951, the PLA sent more reinforcements to Korea. By mid-April, the Chinese forces in Korea had increased to 950,000 troops, including 42 infantry divisions, 8 artillery divisions, 4 anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and 4 tank regiments. All of them were ground forces, since the CPVF air force had not yet been formally committed to the war. Their supporting troops consisted of 6 supply services headquarters, 4 railroad engineering divisions, 11 engineering regiments, and 1 public security division, an additional 180,000 men.

During the Fourth Campaign, the two sides engaged in a series of back-and-forth mobile battles. On the night of February 11–12, 1951, elements of the Fortieth and Sixty-sixth Armies of the CPVF and II and V Corps of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) mounted a massive attack on the ROKA III Corps near Hongch'on. The ROKA Eighth Division was annihilated, creating a salient in the UNC front. The U.S. Second Division and the U.S. 187th Airborne RCT supporting the ROKA I Corps struggled to block the Communist penetration. By February 14, four CPVF divisions assaulted Wonju. U.S. artillery wreaked havoc on these Chinese forces

as they tried to swarm over the U.S. positions. The Communist assault divisions were shattered in this “Wonju Shoot,” and the attack came to a halt.

To the east, CPVF units attacked the Twenty-third Regiment and the French Battalion at Chip’yong-ni. These two UNC units formed a defensive perimeter around the town and refused to yield this strategic road junction. Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway (1895–1993) believed that this was a key junction and ordered the defenders to hold it against an estimated 25,000 Chinese attackers. For two days, the Chinese mounted attack after attack against the UNF positions, but the defenders refused to surrender. Finally the encircled defenders were saved by the arrival of elements of the U.S. First Cavalry Division. Unable to break through this Eighth Army line in central Korea while trying to hold back an Eighth Army drive west of the penetration, the CPVF withdrew to regroup at the former KPA defensive position in April just north of the 38th parallel. The Chinese leaders did not realize that their goal of driving the UNF out of Korea was unattainable until the CPVF’s Fifth Offensive Campaign.

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See also: China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese Offensive Campaign in Korea, Third; Chinese People’s Volunteer Force; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Peng Dehuai; Soviet Union.

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Chinese Offensive in Korea, Fifth (April 22–May 23, 1951)

China’s decisive battle in the Korean War after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) sent the troops to Korea in October 1950. During the winter of 1950–1951, the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) engaged in three offensive campaigns that were successful because of their surprise attacks and superiority in number. As the CPVF struck farther south into South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK), their Fourth Offensive Campaign against the United Nations Forces (UNF), the tactics that had been working began to lose effectiveness. From January 25 to April 21, the CPVF suffered 53,000 casualties.

In the spring of 1951, considerable disagreement arose among CPVF officers regarding the Fifth Offensive Campaign.

Most of the top commanders disagreed with Peng Dehuai's (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) idea, which was imposed by Chinese leader Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), North Korea's Kim Il-sung (1912–1994), and Russian leader Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), of striking south. They preferred an “in-house” operation, engaging the UNF troops after luring them into the northern areas occupied by the CPVF. Despite these arguments, Peng was determined to launch the Fifth Offensive Campaign (or the Chinese Spring Offensive Campaign) and regain the initiative.

The Fifth Offensive would be the largest Communist operation in Korea. The Chinese and North Koreans deployed some 700,000 troops, including nearly 600,000 CPVF troops of 33 infantry divisions and 4 artillery divisions, resulting in more than four weeks of combat.

At 10:00 P.M. on April 22, 1951, the CPVF launched a major attack against the Eighth Army of the United Nations Command (UNC) across a 40-mile front in the west. The Chinese committed nine armies of about 250,000 men in the attack. Six Chinese armies struck directly at the Eighth Army's I Corps above Seoul, while three armies attacked down the center of the peninsula toward X Corps. The CPVF Sixty-third Army struck the ROKA First Division and the British Twenty-ninth Brigade defending the left (west) end of I Corps. Although the ROKA First Division put up a strong defense, it was forced back several miles, leaving the left flank of the British Brigade exposed. It was eventually overrun by the massive Chinese attack, but not before a brilliant defense that produced enormous Chinese casualties.

Eighth Army units to the right of the British Twenty-ninth Brigade put up a

strong defense directly north of Seoul. To their right, however, the U.S. IX Corps was thinly disposed. Here the CPVF concentrated on the ROKA Sixth Division, which fled and left a gaping ten-mile hole in the Eighth Army's front. Through this poured thousands of Chinese, who overran many artillery units supporting the Eighth Army. The gap was finally plugged when the British Commonwealth Brigade set up a blocking position at Kapyong.

At the same time, the U.S. First Marine Division to the right of the gap shifted its position to slow down the penetration. Slowly, the Eighth Army withdrew to form a new position around Seoul, known as the No Name Line. The first eight-day combat after April 22 marked the largest single battle of the Korean War. It saved Seoul and inflicted some 70,000 casualties on the Communists.

On May 16, 20 Communist divisions—15 CPVF and 5 KPA divisions—in all 175,000 men, attacked the U.S. X Corps and ROKA III Corps, the five divisions of which extended to the east coast. The main weight of the Communist attack fell against the Eighth Army's weak right flank. Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet (1892–1992) had anticipated that the major attack would be against the heavily defended west flank of the Eighth Army protecting the ROK capital of Seoul.

The shock of the Chinese attack caused panic in ROKA units, many of which abandoned their defensive positions and fell back. A huge gap opened up on X Corps' right flank, exposing the rear of the Eighth Army's defense along No Name Line. Six CPVA divisions of 60,000 men struck the U.S. Second Division to the west of the salient, but it managed to hold its ground and even pushed into the flank of the

attacking Communist forces as air and artillery pounded the densely concentrated CPVA units. Simultaneously, the U.S. Third Division was dispatched from the Seoul area to block further CPVA movement into the salient.

Although the Eighth Army was severely tested, I and IX Corps units around Seoul held. ROKA units to the right of the salient and the U.S. Second Division to the left of the salient also held firm. In addition to the U.S. Third Division, the 187th Airborne RCT was rushed in to block the farthest point of the CPVA penetration and complete the encirclement of the salient. Communist forces could go no further. After five days, the determined Eighth Army stand, coupled with UNC artillery, airpower, mines, and barbed wire, brought the Communist Sixth Offensive to a halt.

The Fifth Offensive Campaign failed, and the CPVF suffered the loss of 85,000 men. Additionally, 17,000 prisoners of war were taken by the UNC. The 180th Division was completely eliminated, and 7,644 men became POWs, including 59 officers at division, regiment, and battalion levels. More important, the front line was pushed farther north. It was after this campaign that Mao realized the limit of China's military power. The Chinese Communists (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) never again came as close to Seoul or mounted another major southward offensive of such magnitude. Their defeat in this battle forced Mao to reconsider his aims on the battlefield. Realizing a huge gap between the capacity of Chinese troops in Korea and his ambitious aim of driving the UNF from the peninsula, the Chinese leadership became willing to conclude the war short of total victory. The Fifth Offensive Campaign is a deciding battle that not only determined the rest of the war and the truce negotiations,

which began in July 1951, but also helped create conditions that polarized East Asia through the Cold War (1946–1991) and beyond.

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See also: Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Fourth; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Cold War; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement; Mao Zedong; Peng Dehuai; Soviet Union.

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Chinese People's Volunteer Force (1950–1953)

Chinese Communist armed forces fought against the United Nations Forces (UNF) during the Korean War in 1950–1953. By using the name “volunteers,” the Chinese leaders expected to convince the world that the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF) were organized by Chinese volunteers, not the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). If entering Korea in the name of the government, China might risk a direct state of war with the United States and 16 other nations that had joined the UNF in Korea. In fact, the “volunteer” troops were the Chinese regular troops of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and commanded by the Chinese generals.

On October 5, 1950, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) decided to send troops to aid North Korea in the name of the CPVF. Three days later, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP and president of the PRC's central government, created the CPVF, appointing Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974), commander of the PLA Northwest Military Region and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the CPVF commander in chief and political commissar. On October 19, the first wave of the CPVF troops, without wearing China's army insignias, crossed the Yalu River and entered North Korea, beginning Chinese participation in the Korean War. The first wave of the CPVF had six armies, including 18 infantry divisions, 3 artillery divisions, and 7,000 supporting service troops—in all about 300,000 men. At first, China kept its military involvement secret. Not until November would the PRC

publicly acknowledge that the CPVF had entered Korea to assist the North Koreans in their war against American invasion. By late November, China had sent to Korea 33 divisions, totaling 450,000 troops.

During the Korean War, the CPVF used some of the PLA's most recent combat tactics in fighting the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army in the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). These included numerical superiority; engaging the enemy in mobile operations and avoiding trench warfare; and achieving surprise as much as possible in order to negate the usually superior enemy firepower. During the early offensive campaigns from late October to late November 1950, the CPVF employed all these familiar tactics.

The tactics proved very effective in their first offensive campaign. Peng also instructed the CPVF to engage the troops of the Republic of Korea (ROK) first in order to gain some experience before dealing with the more powerful U.S. units. The Chinese troops quickly gained battlefield experience, helped immensely by a nucleus of career officers and civil war veterans. For the first time since General Douglas MacArthur's (1880–1964) Inchon Landing in September, the CPVF stabilized the situation for the North Koreans, providing valuable breathing space by pushing the front line south of the Chongchon River.

On November 24, the CPVF launched the second southward offensive campaign to counterattack MacArthur's “home-by-Christmas” offensive. On the whole, the second campaign was a major victory for the CPVF. American airpower forced the Chinese to take to the hills, and much of what the Chinese soldiers required was carried on foot. They attacked from the surrounding

hills, often establishing roadblocks, which not only forced the American troops back but also threatened to cut them off. The retreat of the U.S. First Marine Division has become a part of Marine lore, but it was still a retreat, not a victory. The bitter fighting combined with the bitter cold had made Chosin one of the worst battles of the Korean War for the Americans. In nine days, the CPVF pushed the battle line to the 38th Parallel and recaptured Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, which had been captured by the UNF on October 19.

China kept sending more reinforcements to Korea to offset losses and meet new demands of rapidly expanded military operations and unexpected manpower replenishment. On New Year's Eve, the CPVF, while still undersupplied (home-supplied food met only a quarter of the minimum needs of the CPVF), launched the Third Offensive Campaign across the 38th Parallel against entrenched UNF troops, an operation very different from earlier practice. In a matter of eight days, the CPVF crossed the 38th Parallel, moved into South Korea, recaptured the capital Seoul, and pushed the UNF down to the 37th Parallel. Yet the CPVF units were exhausted after days of constant movement and fighting. The CPVF also faced mounting problems, including shortage of food and ammunition, extreme fatigue, poor rear area security, and delays in getting reinforcements.

On January 25, 1951, the UNF launched its counterattack to retake Seoul. It was not until after the CPVF's Fifth Campaign in April–May 1951 that Mao came to the conclusion that the goal of driving the UNF out of Korea was unattainable. Considerable disagreements existed among CPVF officers regarding how to execute the Fifth Campaign. Most of the top commanders disagreed with Peng's idea (which in fact was

imposed upon him by Mao, Kim Il Sung, and Joseph Stalin) of striking south. They preferred an "in-house" operation, engaging the UNF after luring them into the northern areas occupied by the CPVF. Despite these arguments, Peng was determined to launch the fifth southward offensive campaign in April and regain the initiative after months of being pressed by the UNF. By mid-April, the Chinese forces in Korea had increased to 950,000 men, including 42 infantry divisions, 8 artillery divisions, 4 antiaircraft artillery divisions, and 4 tank regiments, with a combat strength of 770,000 men.

The CPVF Fifth Offensive Campaign in April–May 1951 was the largest of the war. The Chinese and North Koreans deployed some 700,000 troops against 340,000 UNF troops, and the two sides fought for more than 40 days. The campaign failed, and the CPVF suffered heavy losses, including 17,000 POWs taken by the UNF. More importantly, the front line was pushed farther north. After the setback of their fifth campaign, however, the CPVF made some important strategic and tactical changes in order to limit casualties and negate the UNF firepower.

The Chinese command shifted its focus from eliminating enemy units in a mobile warfare to securing lines in a positional warfare. The CPVF command began an active defense by constructing underground tunnels in the summer of 1951. They placed greater emphasis on gaining and retaining the operational initiative in battles (including preemption), which was still seen as an optimum strategy. The Korean truce negotiations began on July 10, 1951.

By December 1952, the Chinese forces in Korea had reached a record high of 1.45 million men, including 5 infantry divisions, 10 artillery divisions, 5 antiaircraft divisions, and 7 tank regiments. As a result of the

rotation, more Chinese troops were sent to Korea, including five Chinese Air Force divisions that came under the CPVF command in September 1951. These air force divisions kept their bases within the Chinese borders, and the pilots flew into Korea when they were carrying out missions. CPVF numbers remained stable until the armistice agreement was signed in July 1953.

With regard to the scale of China's intervention in the Korean War, the Chinese Communist forces had sent 2.3 million troops to Korea from 1950 to 1953. In addition, 12 air force divisions had participated in the war, including 672 pilots and 59,000 ground service personnel. China had also mobilized a large number of civilian laborers for the war, totaling 600,000 men. As part of the Chinese volunteers, they entered Korea and worked in logistical supply and supporting services such as manpower transportation and railroad and highway construction. Thus, a total of 3.1 million Chinese volunteers participated in the Korean War.

From October 19, 1950, to July 27, 1953, confronted by U.S. air and naval superiority, the Chinese volunteer forces suffered heavy casualties, including Mao's son, who was killed while working as a Russian translator at the CPVF headquarters in an air raid. According to Chinese military records, the Chinese casualties in the Korean War are as follows: 152,000 dead, 383,000 wounded, 450,000 hospitalized, 21,300 prisoners of war, and 4,000 missing in action, totaling 1,010,700 casualties. The Chinese soldiers who served in the Korean War faced a greater chance of being killed or wounded than those who served in either WWII or the Chinese Civil War. Among the 21,300 Chinese POWs, 7,100 were repatriated back to China in three different groups after the war ended in July 1953. The rest of the

Chinese prisoners, about 14,200, were claimed by the UNF as refusing to be repatriated. All of them were later transported to Taiwan.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese Offensive in Korea, First; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Second; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Third; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Fourth; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Fifth; Chinese Summer Offensives in Korea; Guomindang; Guerrilla Warfare; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Nationalist Army; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union.

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Chinese Revolution of 1911

A republican revolutionary movement that overthrew the Manchu's Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and established the Republic

of China (ROC) in 1912. In the late nineteenth century, the frequent peasant rebellions, foreign invasions, and domestic as well as overseas anti-Manchu movements undermined the Qing's power.

To survive, the Qing dynasty established a "new army" (*xinjun*) in 1897, hiring German instructors and purchasing modern firearms from European countries. By 1906, the New Army consisted of five infantry divisions, totaling 50,000, and established five officer training schools and military academies. Unfortunately, the New Army did not save the empire because the Manchu rulers refused to carry the reforms into military institutions and organizations beyond buying Western weapons and hiring European instructors. Manchu grandees' refusal of further reform and brutal suppression against the reformers also alienated the rank and file of the New Army and undermined their loyalty to the emperor himself. Moreover, the early new recruits were soon disillusioned by the government's corruption, mismanagement, and, worst of all, its failure against European, American, and Japanese forces during the 1900 Boxer Rebellion. Meanwhile, foreign concessions in the treaty ports and foreign nations all gave shelter to Chinese rebels. The anti-Manchu movement founded its revolutionary center overseas. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), one of the anti-Manchu leaders, made Japan his revolutionary base.

In 1905, Sun, the founding father of Republican China, organized the "Tongmenghui" (or T'ung-meng Hui, the United League) in Japan. Among the 1,000 early members were liberal students, Christian merchants, and New Army officers trained in Japan. Sun and his secret society spread their revolutionary ideas and organization from Japan to the world by establishing offices in San Francisco, Honolulu, Brussels,

Singapore, and many branches in 17 of the 24 provinces of China. Thousands and thousands of Chinese, including many New Army officers, joined the Tongmenghui by participating in multiple anti-Manchu activities and accepting Sun's "Three Principles of the People" (*Sanmin zhuyi*), including "nationalism" (both anti-Manchu and anti-imperialism), "democracy" (a constitution with people's rights), and "people's livelihood" (a classic term for social equality).

On October 10, 1911, amidst an anti-Qing plot in Wuchang, the capital city of Hubei (Hupei) Province, some New Army officers revolted (October 10, or "Double Tens," became the National Day for the Republic of China). The success of the Wuchang uprising led many officers to join the revolution. In the next two months, 15 provinces proclaimed their independence from the Qing Empire. The rebellious provinces and Tongmenghui joined forces, setting up a provisional government at Nanjing (Nanking). The provisional government elected Sun president of the government, and he was inaugurated on January 1, 1912, at Nanjing. Sun proclaimed the founding of the Republic of China. As a great breakthrough in the Chinese history, it ended 2,000 years of monarchy and built the first republic in Asian history.

The Qing court's hopes rested with Marshal Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916), commander of the New Army. Sun and revolutionary leaders never had control of the army. In an attempt to avoid civil war, Sun and other revolutionaries negotiated with Yuan and offered him the presidency of the new republic. On February 12, 1912, Yuan forced the last emperor, only six at the time, to step down, thus ending the Qing dynasty. Then Sun resigned as president and reorganized Tongmenghui into the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the

Chinese Nationalist Party). On February 14, Yuan was elected by the provisional government the first president of the Republic of China. Yuan, however, tried to establish his own dictatorship and monarchy against the revolutionaries until his death in 1916. Thereafter, the central government collapsed.

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 was incomplete. Although it ended the Qing dynasty, the revolution failed to turn China into a truly independent and democratic country for the Chinese people. The Republican revolutionaries did not attempt to enlist the peasants in their struggle; rather they made efforts to win over secret societies and the New Army. As the 1911 Revolution lacked social content, Sun's movement, composed largely of students and intellectuals, secret societies, and Chinese abroad, gave impetus and momentum to the cause. Additionally, the revolt was almost totally urban. Initially, where the peasants reacted to the insurrection at all, they reacted positively. They saw opportunities to redress some of the wrongs suffered under the Qing regime such as taxation and land concentration, but it soon became clear that the rebellion served the rich landlords rather than the poor peasants. The local landowners and gentry class greatly increased their power. Not only did the gentry and local elite take over such duties as tax collection through the self-government bureaus, but they also gained greater influence over the local magistrates. Under such circumstances, the peasants' initial positive support came to a quick end.

After Yuan's death, from 1916 to 1927, the country entered the Warlord Period, in which military commanders of different armies controlled a province or region. Among them, five or six major warlord armies divided the country and waged wars against each other. Hoping to seize control of the whole country, warlord armies

competed for human resources by drafting young peasants into their own army. An estimated 500,000 men served in the warlord armies in 1916. The total increased to 1 million by 1918, and about 1.5 million by 1924. After Sun died in 1925, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) became the leader of the GMD. He led the successful Northern Expedition against the warlords in 1926 and established the GMD government of the ROC in 1927.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Beiyang Army; Boxer Rebellion; China, Republic of; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Manchus; New Army; Northern Expedition; Qing Dynasty; Self-Strengthening Movement; Sino-Japanese War; Sun Yat-sen; Unequal Treaties; Warlord Period; Yuan Shikai.

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Chinese Summer Offensives in Korea (1953)

The People's Republic of China (PRC) sent a large force to the Korean War against the United Nations Forces (UNF) in 1950–1953. By December 1952, the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF, the Chinese force in Korea) had reached a record high of 1.45 million men, including 59 infantry divisions, 10 artillery divisions, 7 antiaircraft artillery divisions, and 7 tank regiments. In the final week of May 1953, after a lull of several months, the CPVF conducted regimental-sized attacks against the UNF in the sector held by the Eighth Army's IX Corps, hitting both the Ninth and Capital Divisions of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) Army. Although the CPVF was unable to overrun these units, the attacks did signal a two-month-long increase in activity all along the front of an intensity not seen since April 1951.

On May 28, 1953, Communist forces struck the U.S. I Corps, hitting five outposts of troops of the U.S. Twenty-fifth Division and guarding the approaches to the Eighth Army's western positions. These outposts, 1,000 yards forward of the main line, were defended by troops from the division's Turkish Brigade. The four days of intense fighting that ensued often included hand-to-hand combat. Although the Chinese eventually took three of the five outposts, they suffered more than 3,200 casualties. The action ended only when the Turks were ordered to abandon the final two outposts. The Turks reported losses of 104 killed in action, 324 wounded in action, and 47 missing in action.

By the first of June, it appeared to Eighth Army intelligence officers that the Chinese planned a major blow soon. Their failure to immediately follow up the May attacks against I Corps seemed to indicate that these were diversionary efforts to screen their real intention of pushing the line southward. This was prompted by agenda item 2 of the armistice agreement, which called for the demarcation line and demilitarized zone to follow the final battle line. Although the first week of June passed quietly, the continued movement of Communist troops kept UNF troops on alert.

The Communist offensive opened on the night of June 10 as the Panmunjom negotiators began to draw the final armistice line. UNC leaders determined that the Communist objective was to achieve a more southerly line or, at the very least, the propaganda value of a symbolic victory at the end of the war. The initial probe, which turned into a general offensive, began as two Chinese divisions moved down both sides of the Pukhan River to attack the ROKA II Corps near Kumsong. Intense pressure resulted in the loss of Hill 973 by the ROKA Fifth Division, which failed either to retake the hill or stem the drive. The hard-pressed ROKA units continued to withdraw south approximately three miles along an eight-mile front until June 15, when they formed a new line.

The UNF situation was just as critical in the corps center, especially after June 12, when another Chinese division struck the ROKA Eighth Division, forcing it to withdraw. The failure of the two ROKA divisions to hold prompted UN commander General Maxwell D. Taylor (1901–1987) to shift the boundary between the ROKA II and U.S. X Corps and to commit two ROKA divisions, the Seventh and Third, then in reserve, to the battle.

While Communist forces concentrated their main efforts against the ROKA II Corps, they delivered other attacks on the line. Two outpost positions in front of the ROKA First Division of the U.S. I Corps fell at the end of June after prolonged attacks. Farther east in IX Corps sector, the Chinese employed battalion-strength forces against the U.S. Third and ROKA Ninth Divisions. In the eastern sector of the Eighth Army's front, North Korean attacks forced a readjustment of the main line positions on the X Corps' right wing. At the same time, Communist forces were successful in seizing Hill 351, the northern anchor of the ROKA First Corps line.

By June 18, the attacks had subsided, allowing General Taylor to stabilize the front and begin relieving the ROKA Fifth and Seventh Divisions. Beginning on June 21, he received reinforcements from Japan in the form of the U.S. 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the Thirty-Fourth Regimental Combat Team of the Twenty-Fourth Division.

The Communist side made no further attacks during June or during the first week of July 1953. Measured in terms of ground gained, their effort had been successful. Yet both sides had lost heavily; the Chinese suffered about 6,600 casualties, and the ROKA II Corps alone reported losses of more than 7,300 men.

Meanwhile, by June 18, the terms of an armistice agreement were all but complete. On this date, however, South Korean president Syngman Rhee unilaterally ordered the release of 27,000 prisoners of war. To protest, the Communist delegates denounced it as a serious breach of faith and delayed the final agreement for another month.

On July 6, there was another Chinese attack against ROKA forces near the Iron Triangle that inflicted heavy casualties on

the South Koreans, as well as a resumption of Communist attacks on Pork Chop Hill, a scene of heavy fighting in March. After an artillery and mortar barrage, a succession of Chinese infantry units assaulted Pork Chop Hill. The attackers far outnumbered the defenders of the U.S. Seventh Division, and the situation became chaotic as both sides fed companies, battalions, and then regiments into the battle. Chinese determination may be judged by the fact that they matched each new U.S. company with a battalion. Meanwhile, both sides continued to pound the hill with artillery and mortar barrages. By the morning of July 11, five U.S. battalions had been committed to holding a company-sized outpost against a full Chinese division. Faced with the prospect of sending additional units into the battle at a time when the armistice was near, Taylor decided to withdraw. Consequently, on July 11, U.S. units withdrew from Pork Chop Hill.

Elsewhere, on the night of July 13 the Chinese launched a three-division attack against the left flank of the ROKA II Corps in the Kumsog area and a one-division attack against the right flank of the U.S. IX Corps. Five Chinese divisions broke through the lines, causing the collapse of the ROKA Capital and Third Divisions, as well as weakening three other ROKA divisions amid great confusion in both corps areas. Setting a monthly record for artillery rounds fired, the Communists inflicted 14,000 casualties on the South Koreans. Taylor reacted quickly and directed commanders of the U.S. IX and ROKA II Corps to establish and hold a new main line along the south bank of the Kumsong River. As many ROKA soldiers continued to flee south, Taylor ordered the U.S. Second and Third Divisions to extend their sectors to cover gaps created by retreating units while he

moved the newly arrived 187th Airborne RCT and the Thirty-fourth RCT from Pusan to the front. The additional commitment of two units then in reserve, the U.S. Forty-fifth Division and ROKA Eleventh Division, greatly strengthened UN forces.

After the reorganization of UN forces, on July 17, the ROKA II Corps counterattacked with three divisions and managed, by July 20, to retake the high ground along the Kumsong River and to establish a new line six miles south of the original line. Although U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles voiced opposition to allowing the Chinese to finish the war with a victory, no attempt was made to restore the original line. With the armistice to be signed at any time, both Generals Taylor and Mark Clark (1896–1984), supported by Army chief of staff General J. Lawton Collins (1896–1987), thought it unnecessary to expend lives for terrain not essential to the security of the Eighth Army's front.

This final Communist offensive caused enormous casualties at the end of the war. UN forces estimated that the Chinese had lost more than 72,000 men, more than 25,000 of whom were killed. Of the five Chinese armies that had been identified in the attacks against the ROKA II and U.S. IX Corps, the Chinese lost the equivalent of seven divisions. Once the United States made plain its refusal to respond in kind, the Communists moved quickly to complete the truce talks. By July 19 the negotiators had reached an accord on all points. Details were worked out within a week, and the Korean Armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953.

Dr. Clayton D. Laurie

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Fifth; Chinese People's

Volunteer Force; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement.

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Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army (1927–1937)

The armed force of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) under the command of Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) and Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) engaged in the CCP Agrarian Revolutionary War (or the Land Revolutionary War) against the Guomindang

(GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government. On August 1 1927, Mao led the peasants' Autumn Harvest Uprising in central Hunan and Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Provinces and organized the First Division of the Chinese Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants (CRAWP, 1927–1930) with three regiments. Zhu De reorganized his revolting GMD troops from the Nanchang Uprising into the CRAWP on January 13, 1928, and joined Mao at Jinggangshan on April 24. They established the CRAWP's Fourth Army on May 4, about 5,000 men organized into six regiments, for which they had but 2,000 rifles. Zhu was the commander, and Mao was the political commissar. Soon other Communist troops joined them at Jinggangshan, which became the "cradle" of the CCP's military revolution against Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and GMD government. During this formative period, Mao and Zhu also laid some groundwork for the Communist army. They set up three tasks for the Fourth Army: fighting, raising money for the revolutionary cause (later changed to production), and work of the masses. To win battles, Zhu and Mao developed guerrilla tactics as new strategy.

Following the Jinggangshan model, other surviving units established their military bases one after another in the rural and border regions of Hunan, Fujian (Fukien), Jiangsu (Kiangsu), and Anhui (Anhwei). And, finally, the Central Committee accepted Mao's way, or his "up to the mountains" approach, after its last urban uprising failed in Guangzhou in December 1927. On May 25, 1928, the CCP Central Committee issued "CC#51: Military Task Guideline," the first systematic outline for CCP military organization, institution, and operation. The document instructed that the rebelling peasants be recruited into the regular armies. In this document, the Central

Committee incorporated all the CRAWP units into the "Red Army." For instance, Zhu-Mao's Fourth Army of the CRAWP became the Red Army's Fourth Army in June 1928. Praising the Fourth Army's experience in land reform to win over the peasants and its guerrilla tactics, the Central Committee ordered other armies to follow its example. Clearly, Zhu and Mao had created a military center at Jinggangshan for the Communist revolution at that time.

From 1928 to 1930, the Red Army engaged in many battles against the GMD and warlords' armies and successfully defended their military bases, forming 10 armies, about 70,000 men, plus 30,000 local self-defense militias. The Soviet Union increased its annual aid to the Jiangxi base areas to 600,000 yuan (silver dollars, approximately \$120,000 at that time). The weaponry and tactics improved. The Red Army experienced a new period of rural-centered development in more than 20 base regions across the country. In May 1930, the Central Committee secretly held a national representative meeting of the Red Army, which it renamed the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army. The Shanghai meeting became a turning point in the Red Army development, transforming scattered guerrilla operations into a more organized, central operation. By the end of 1931, the Red Army totaled 150,000 men and expanded its areas of operation.

The rapid growth of the Communist troops and expansion of the regions they controlled alarmed the GMD government. President Jiang Jieshi and the high command of the Nationalist army centralized their provincial campaigns into a coordinated suppression in order to round up the Red Army. From 1930 to 1934, Jiang's central government organized five major offensive campaigns against the Communist-controlled areas and the Red Army bases in the border areas along the

Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Hubei (Hupei), Jiangsu, and Shanxi (Shansi). After the Red Army failed during Jiang's fifth campaign, Mao and Zhu began the Long March toward northwest China in October 1934. The Long March was an attempt to save the Red Army by moving its main strength away from the GMD-controlled central region and to develop a new strategic initiative in a remote region. The Red Army suffered heavy casualties during its western movement due to the needed protection of the Central Committee and party administration, which traveled 8,000 miles with the army. The army shrank to 30,000 men in late 1934.

In October 1935, the First Front Army of the Red Army and the Central Committee arrived at a CCP-controlled area in northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. In July 1936, Moscow resumed telegraphy communication with the Chinese high command, which had made Yan'an (Yenan), Shaanxi, its new base area. Stalin increased the Soviet financial aid to the CCP Party Center from \$200,000 in 1936 to \$800,000 in 1937.

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese army attacked the GMD troops at the Marco Polo Bridge, located to the southwest of Beijing. This event, known as the "Lugouqiao Incident," marked the beginning of Japan's all-out aggression against China and of China's Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). On August 13, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai and threatened Nanjing (Nanking). The GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP on joint resistance. As part of this agreement, the main force of the Red Army, then located in the northwest and numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army of the National Army in August 1937, with Zhu as commander, Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) as deputy commander, and Ye Jianying

(Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) as chief of staff. In the south, the Red Army guerrilla troops were reorganized into the New Fourth Army, totaling 10,300 men, including four field columns (divisions). Each field column had two to four regiments. Ye Ting (Yeh Ting) (1896–1946) commanded the New Fourth Army. Thus, all units of the CCP's Red Army were reorganized into the Nationalist army during the Anti-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; Jiang Jieshi; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Jiangxi Soviet; Long March; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge Incident; Nanchang Uprising; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; Peng Dehuai; Red Army; Yan'an; Ye Jianying; Ye Ting; Zhu De.

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Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (1958–2008)

A ministry-level administration of the central government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) for national defense industry. During the past 50 years, it has played a significant supervisory role in China's military R&D, acquisition of defense technology, nuclear weapons testing, arms import and export control, and administration of all defense-industrial complexes.

In October 1958, the Central Military Commission (CMC) established the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and appointed Marshal Nie Rongzhen as its chairman. The COSTIND was a highly centralized top military authority in charge of defense industry and weapon development. Within this civil-military hierarchy in Beijing, Marshal Nie was in charge of the Nuclear Research Institute, Missile Research Institute, Fifth Academy (*wu yuan*), and Second Ministry of Machine Building (*dier jijie gongye bu*). The Fifth Academy, China's NASA, a ministry-level agency, was founded on November 4, 1955, to develop missile and space technology. It had been under the administration of the State Council before 1958. The Fifth Academy became, in the 1960s, the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building (*diqu jijie gongye bu*) and then, in the 1980s, the Space and Navigation Ministry of the PRC. The Second Ministry was also founded on November 4, 1955, in charge of atomic and hydrogen bomb development. Thereafter, November 4 became the national

anniversary of the Chinese nuclear and strategic weapon industry.

From 1956 to 1960, the COSTIND imported military technology from the Soviet Union and managed nuclear research and developments. In the 1960s, the COSTIND shaped innovation and technological development, coordinated the complicated interactions between the state and military, mobilized civilian professionals, and utilized national resources for its strategic weapons programs by centralizing the nation's science and technology development. Under the COSTIND, China's nuclear programs from the mid-1950s to the 1970s were characterized by centralization and bureaucratic power, which guaranteed the program's success. China's first nuclear bomb test took place on October 16, 1964, and the first hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967. In less than 15 years, China became a nuclear power. This was followed by its first satellite launch on April 24, 1970.

From the beginning, the COSTIND reported to two superiors: the State Council of the PRC and the CMC of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). But in fact, COSTIND was part of the PLA high command. Almost all of its officials were high-ranking military officers. For instance, Qian Xuesen (Ch'ien Hsueh-sen) (1911–2009), a rocket scientist and the "father of Chinese missiles," was vice chairman of the COSTIND and a lieutenant general of the PLA. During the reform movement in the 1980s, Lieutenant General Cao Gangchuan, later the defense minister, served as the chairman of the COSTIND and four vice chairmen were all lieutenant generals as well. This superior bureaucratic status yielded a wide ranging authority to the COSTIND.

In 1982, the COSTIND created the National Defense Industry Office (NDIO), National Defense Science and Technology

Commission (NDSTC), and Science, Technology, and Equipment Commission (STEC) to meet new needs in military technology. Since 1986, the COSTIND was also given responsibility for the commercial deals of China's entire defense industry. It was initially formed to improve efficiency and competence of military research and production, and its functions had been broadened over time until the mid-1990s.

Also in 1986, all four sectors of the defense-industrial complex (nuclear, aviation, space/missiles, and ordnance) were put under the control of the COSTIND. The COSTIND's authority over space and nuclear programs was clearly evidenced by its control of China's nuclear agencies and laboratories such as the China Atomic Energy Agency (CAEA, which was responsible for all nuclear regulatory activities), and the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (which ran nuclear weapons research), and of China's space industries such as the China Satellite Launch Agents, Ltd. Its extensive influence on the nuclear and space sectors also gave the COSTIND a close relationship with the PLA Second Artillery Corps, China's strategic missile force.

In addition, the COSTIND played a role in the acquisition of foreign military technology. For example, New Era (Xinshidai) Corporation and Galaxy New Technology Corporation, directly under the COSTIND's control, were both established to expedite the defense technology transfer from the Western world that had begun in the early 1980s. As a result, the COSTIND had a vast amount of personnel, units, testing and evaluation bases such as Xichang Satellite Launch Center, and had broad responsibilities over military production and R&D, technology acquisition, arms export and export control, as well as providing policy guidance related to China's defense

industry. A U.S.-based Rand study concludes that the COSTIND was the fourth most influential player in the PLA.

In March 1998 the COSTIND underwent the first restructuring since its establishment in the mid-1950s, and its status declined significantly. The COSTIND turned into a ministry-level agency under the State Council. At the First Session of the Ninth National People's Congress, the COSTIND was civilianized, and all of its military functions were removed and transferred to a new PLA department under the control of the PLA's General Armaments Department (GAD). For example, duties related to arms control and nonproliferation were taken away from the COSTIND. Another reported intelligence collection institute, the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC), used to be part of the COSTIND, was also transferred to the GAD.

Finally, at the First Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress in 2008, the COSTIND was disbanded and replaced by the new State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).

Tao Wang

See also: Cao Gangchuan; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; General Departments of the PLA; *National Defense White Paper* (1998); Nuclear Program; Second Artillery Corps; National People's Congress; Nie Rongzhen; People's Liberation Army.

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Communist Party of China. *See* Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

Confucian-Mencian Paradigm

The Confucian-Mencian paradigm is a Chinese ethical and philosophical system developed from the teachings of the Chinese philosophers Confucius (551–478 BC) during the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BC), and Mencius (372–289 BC), during the Warring States Period (475–221 BC). Mencius, one of the principal interpreters of Confucianism, was the most famous Confucian after Confucius himself. Mencius's interpretation of Confucianism has generally been considered the orthodox version by succeeding Chinese philosophers, especially by the Neo-Confucians of the Song dynasty (960–1279).

Humanity is the core of the Confucian-Mencian paradigm, whose goal is to achieve social harmony. Relationship is central to Confucianism, which clarifies five relationships (ruler to ruled, father to son, husband to wife, elder brother to younger brother, friend to friend). Specific duties were set

down to each of the participants in these sets of relationships. While juniors are considered in Confucianism to owe their seniors respect, seniors also have duties of compassion and worry toward juniors. Filial piety, children showing respect to their parents—including both the living and the dead, even remote ancestors—is considered among the greatest of virtues. Confucianism also urges all men to become gentlemen or perfect men and act as moral leaders to the society. A gentleman should cultivate himself morally, show filial piety and loyalty where these are due, and cultivate humanity. Confucius is regarded as a great standard of the perfect gentleman.

The philosophies of Mencius and Confucius were similar, but there were some differences. Mencius emphasized the significance of the common citizens in the state, while Confucius generally regarded rulers highly. Confucius admired kings of great accomplishment, but Mencius argued that a king had an apparently higher status over a commoner, but he was actually subordinate to the masses of people. Combining parts of Daoism with Confucianism, Mencius believed that individual endeavor was required to cultivate oneself and that the object of education was the cultivation of benevolence.

The Confucian-Mencian paradigm has a great impact on Chinese society. For example, the idea of filial piety influenced the Chinese traditional legal system: a criminal would be punished more severely if he or she had committed the crime against his or her parents, while fathers would have enormous power over their children. A similar discrimination was applied to other relationships. Today, filial piety is still built into law and continues to play a significant role in Confucian philosophy. For example, people have the responsibility to provide for their

elderly parents according to modern laws in Chinese society.

The paradigm's idea of meritocracy in part inspired the introduction of the imperial examination system into traditional China. This system started in 165 BC during the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), when the emperor called some candidates for public office to the capital to examine their moral excellence. This system had been well established by the Song dynasty and continued until it was abolished in 1905. Under the system, almost anyone who wished to become an official would have an opportunity to become an officer, a position that would bring wealth and honor to the whole family, if he proved his worth by passing written government examinations.

The Confucian-Mencian paradigm is a complex system of moral, social, political, philosophical, and quasi-religious thought that influenced mainland China but also Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, as well as various territories, such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao, where primarily Chinese people settle. The paradigm also had an impact on Western Europe. The works of Confucius were translated into European languages by Jesuit scholars stationed in China. Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) started to report on the thoughts of Confucius, and the life and works of Confucius were translated into Latin in 1687. Western philosophers of the Enlightenment were interested in the integration of the system of morality of Confucius into Western civilization.

Since the development of the Confucian-Mencian paradigm, a number of critiques of it have appeared, especially in modern times. Some critics claim Confucius has a negative view of women because he stated that women should have no dignity and less rights than men and that they should be at home, playing the role of a good wife and

mother. Some scholars argue that Confucianism has heavily shaped the Chinese people in the past 2,000 years, limiting their rights and freedom. Waves of criticisms along with outright vilification of Confucianism arose during the Taiping Rebellion of 1850–1864, the May Fourth Movement of 1917–1920, and the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1978 in the People's Republic of China.

Scholars still debate about the classification of Confucianism as a religion or a philosophy. Some maintain that the practices of Confucianism, such as ancestor worship, ceremony, and sacrifices, meet the standards of a religion, and that it is a state religion in some East Asian countries because of state promotion of Confucian philosophies. But many others argue that Confucianism is only a collection of moral teachings and is not a religion because it does not have the concept of afterlife.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: China, People's Republic of; Cultural Revolution; Han Dynasty; Hong Kong; Qin Dynasty; Qing Dynasty; Song Dynasty; Taiping Rebellion; Warring States Period; Zhou Dynasty.

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Counterrevolutionaries, Campaign against (1950–1953)

A three-year nationwide Campaign against the Counterrevolutionaries (or Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries) (*zhenfan yundong*) by the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to identify and eliminate the resistance and opposition to the new regime of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP and president of the PRC, justified and supported this suppression, stating that the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) had left many bandits, spies, and officers behind, who had been conducting guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and spreading rumors against the new government since it was founded on October 1, 1949.

By 1950, the new regime realized the necessity of stamping out any resistance. The officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who took over the cities from the GMD during the Chinese Civil War in 1946–1949, were apparently insecure in this new social environment. The Municipal Military Administration of Chongqing (Chungking), a large city in southwestern

Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, for example, had to enforce “martial law” from January to May 1950 because of endless riots, serious looting, and organized insurgents in that city. During these months, the city's military administration employed radical policies such as dissolving the GMD and other political organizations, outlawing all religious groups, and confiscating banks, enterprises, and properties of the “bureaucratic capitalists” (or the former GMD government-owned properties, *guanliao zhichan*) in Chongqing. The city's military authorities next removed the “bad elements” permanently from the city by jailing 7,400 former GMD officials and soldiers and executing 361 of them. The city's military administration then disarmed the population. The suppression worked well, as the military administration gained control of the city in the summer of 1950.

In his report to the Third Plenary of the CCP Seventh Central Committee on June 6, 1950, Mao recommended Chongqing's suppression efforts, though with some leniency. On July 23, the PRC's State Council and Supreme Court issued a joint instruction to start the Campaign against the Counterrevolutionaries in the cities. The mass movement targeted three layers of counterrevolutionaries, who were, by the official definition, enemies to the society, to the government, and to the party. The government reported that there were 600,000 spies, 600,000 core members of anti-CCP organizations, and 2 million armed remnants of the GMD and bandits on the mainland.

With the outbreak of the Korean War in June and China's intervention in Korea in October 1950, the Campaign against the Counterrevolutionaries escalated into a nationwide movement. On October 10, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a new instruction for the movement. Criteria of punishable crimes and sentences were

clarified and were noticeably harsher against former GMD officers and soldiers. The PRC government needed to secure the homeland when it fought the armed forces of the United States and the United Nations Forces (UNF) in a foreign land. The death penalty would be meted out not only to assassins and saboteurs but also to their accomplices. The CCP eradicated any resistance in an effort to consolidate control and order. The party also disarmed the local masses of their weapons and ammunition that had once been used during the long years of warlord and guerrilla fighting in the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Chinese Civil War.

The campaign then became swift and decisive in December, as thousands of suspected enemies of the revolution were rounded up, tried—sometimes on extremely limited evidence—and arbitrarily sentenced; according to Mao, around 1.27 million were incarcerated and 800,000 were executed in 1950–1951. On February 22, 1951, the central government of the PRC issued detailed punishments against the counterrevolutionaries. On May 10–16, the Central Committee of the CCP held another meeting to review the efforts and results of the campaign. The leadership believed that the campaign was necessary and should continue.

During the campaign, many of the accused did not have a lawyer, hearing, or even trial before they were sentenced or executed. Through a massive peasant movement in the rural areas, landlords and rich peasants as a social class were eliminated through the campaign that shocked much of the rural population, most of whom were unaware of the wrath of the revolutionary state.

By the summer of 1953, when the Korean War Armistice was signed on July 23, the Campaign against the Counterrevolutionaries ended. The CCP Party Center utilized the campaign to cement Communist control

over China's state and society. The Chinese leaders had constructed a Soviet-style institution that put severe limits on individual freedoms, such as movement, employment, and economic activities.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Warlord Period.

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Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

The Cultural Revolution, or the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, launched by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), to attack the “revisionist leaders” inside the CCP. In the summer of 1966, the Cultural Revolution became a nationwide political struggle accompanied by extensive purges. Mao used mass organizations such as the millions involved in the Red Guards to



publicly attack Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969), president of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), secretary-general of the CCP Central Committee, whose loyalty Mao questioned.

By the mid-1960s, questions about Mao's Great Leap Forward policy and dissenting opinion in the party and government spread. With Marshal Lin Biao's (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) support, Mao responded to the opposition with a new effort to mobilize support from outside the party, including soldiers and students, and launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. On May 16, 1966, the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee passed the "May Sixteenth Circular," drafted by Mao, pointing out a need to purge the "bourgeois representatives who wormed their way into the party, government, and army." On May 28,

the Politburo organized the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Leading Group as the leading organ to guide the national movement. In August, when Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914–1991), Mao's wife, became its chairman, the Cultural Revolution Leading Group gradually replaced the Politburo in 1966–1967 as the party's authority for the Cultural Revolution.

In the summer of 1966, Mao began to publicly attack, or "bomb" (*paoda*), the CCP and PRC hierarchy officials, including President Liu and Deng Xiaoping. The Red Guards, mostly college, high school, and middle school students, were empowered by Mao and called for "bombing the headquarters," "rebellion is justified," and "learning revolution by making revolution." From June to August 1966, all high schools and colleges dismissed classes and allowed the

students to participate in the new revolution. The Cultural Revolution was conceived from top to bottom.

On August 20, Red Guards in Beijing took the lead in an unprecedented assault against the “Four Olds” (the old concepts, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes). It quickly swept the country. Coming out of the schools, the Red Guards blanketed the land in a “revolutionary Red Terror.” Instigated by Lin, and spurred on to a frenzy by the Cultural Revolution Leading Group, it degenerated into a wild spree of home searches, property destruction, free-for-all fights, and even murders. By the end of the year, social stability vanished. Disturbances and conflicts increased. At the same time, since understanding and concepts varied among the numerous Red Guard organizations, they developed serious factional differences, and constantly argued and debated heatedly among themselves. It had indeed reached the “ideal” stage of Mao’s “great chaos under the heavens” so earnestly sought by the revolutionary seer.

On August 23, 1966, Lin called for “three-month turmoil” in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at the Standing Committee meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Some marshals and generals tried to stop the Maoists’ attempt to involve the PLA in the Cultural Revolution in early 1967. Their efforts failed, and they were branded the “February Countercurrent” against the Cultural Revolution. Mao asked them to leave their posts and make self-critiques. In March 1967, Lin mentioned several times the need to identify “a small handful in the army” and burn them to death. Lin used the Cultural Revolution mass movements to purge the military leaders who did not agree with his strategy and policy. With Mao’s approval, Lin dismissed

and jailed many marshals and generals. Among the marshals was He Long, Lin’s long-time rival, who was labeled the “biggest bandit” and died in prison. In early 1968, the Central Committee dismissed and jailed General Yang Chengwu (Yang Ch’eng-wu) (1914–2004), chief of the General Staff, and General Yu Lijin (Yu Li-jin) (1913–1978), chief of the air force. Lin then appointed loyal followers to these positions. Most marshals and generals lost their positions and were jailed or publicly criticized.

In Beijing, all the PLA departments became paralyzed. Commanders and officers were expelled from their positions. In the course of the cruel questioning sessions, many were tortured or beaten to death. For instance, in the General Political Department (GPD), Lin’s followers and leftists called for “destroying the GPD hell” (*yan-wangdian*) and overthrow of General Xiao Hua, director of the GPD on July 25, 1967. Thereafter, 40 top officers in the GPD were purged, and most of them died in prison. From 1967 to 1969, more than 80,000 officers were accused and purged. Among them, 1,169 officers died of torture, starvation, or by execution. Many military institutes were shut down, and research programs were cancelled. The number of military academies was reduced from 125 to 43.

At local levels, the regional and provincial commands were either paralyzed or divided into two or more factions because they were involved in local factional activities, some siding with one faction, some with another. For example, the Wuhan Regional Command had an armed clash with the Hubei (Hupei) Provincial Command because of their different opinion over the local, factional mass organizations in July 1967. Their armed conflict, known as the “July 20 Incident,” brought the entire province into a civil war. During and after

the incident, more than 180,000 officers, soldiers, and civilians were killed or wounded in the city streets of Wuhan.

Since early 1967, the situation worsened across the country as the Cultural Revolution entered the phase of a “total taking-over” of the authorities. The Red Guards took over the government offices at all levels, jailed officials, and administered provincial and local affairs. Different factions within the Red Guards had contradictory political orientations and different plans, leading to violent conflicts within the Red Guards in many places resembling a civil war. To stop the national turmoil, Mao ordered the PLA to control the situation by “three supports and two militarizations” (support leftist masses, manufacturing production, and agricultural production; and martial laws with military administration and training of civilians, “Sanzhi liangjun”). Mao employed the PLA to restore social and political order and to prevent a possible civil war in the country. On March 19, the CMC ordered all the PLA units to become fully engaged in the “three supports and two militaries” task in order to stop the armed conflicts and stabilize the social order across the country. Thereafter, tasking headquarters were established at regional and provincial commands, and the tasking offices were opened at the army and divisional levels.

Moving to center stage and under Lin’s command, the Chinese military replaced civilian governments at the provincial, district, county, and city levels through its military administration, or the “Military Administrative Committee,” from 1967 to 1972. The PLA used its officers as administrators for schools, factories, companies, villages, and farms. More than 2.8 million officers and soldiers participated in the tasks. The PLA takeover promoted the military-civilian integration and contributed

to another increase in military services. By the mid-1970s, the PLA numbered more than 6 million troops. From 1967 to 1971, the PLA became the dominant political force in the country. Lin’s power grew to an unprecedented level. At the CCP Ninth National Party Congress in April 1969, the Central Committee and the entire party recognized Lin as Mao’s “close comrade in arms and successor.”

In 1970, the Cultural Revolution took a sudden unexpected turn. A new political struggle between Chairman Mao and Marshal Lin erupted, a struggle that would rip a great hole in a political arena already gasping for breath from the battering it had endured. Lin and his family realized that Mao was directing the spearhead of his political struggle against them. Lin’s son, Lin Liguó (Lin Li-Kuo) (1945–1971), planned to assassinate Mao on his way back from Shanghai. Mao realized the danger and returned to Beijing early from Hangzhou on September 12. Lin Liguó’s plot failed. On September 13, 1971, at the urging of his wife and his son, Lin fled. He commandeered a plane at the Shanhaiguan Airport. They flew north, heading for the Soviet Union. For some unknown reasons, the plane crashed in Mongolia. Lin, his family, the crew, and others on board, eight in total, were killed in the crash.

As it was in the past, Mao’s political criticism was followed by another top-down purge and shakeup in the military. During the movement to “Criticize Lin and Confucius” (*pilin pikong*), most of Lin’s generals were purged, and his military programs were terminated in 1972–1973. By January 1973, the CMC had completed its thorough replacement and reorganization of all services and departments. On December 22, the CMC ordered all the chiefs of eight regional commands to exchange their positions

within 10 days. Thereafter, Marshal Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) took charge of PLA daily affairs with consultation of Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976). This Zhou-Ye system replaced the Lin-Jiang system in 1966–1971. A new power struggle began between Zhou-Ye and Jiang Qing, who continued to dominate the media and preach class struggle. The Great Cultural Revolution lasted until Mao's death in September 1976.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; Five Seven One (571) Plan; Gang of Four; General Departments of the People's Liberation Army; He Long; Lin Biao; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; People's Liberation Army; Red Guards; Ye Jianying; Zhou Enlai.

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D

Dalai Lama (1935–)

Tibetan in exile and Buddhist spiritual leader. His Holiness the Dalai Lama was born on July 6, 1935, in Taktser, Tibet (Xizang), the fourth child of a peasant family. His birth name was Lhamo Dhondrub. In 1937 he was recognized by Buddhist monks as the reincarnation of the Thirteenth Buddhist Lord of Compassion, and on February 22, 1940, he was enthroned as the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, beginning his reign in the Potala, a 1,000-room palace in Lhasa, Tibet. The Dalai Lama's education began when he was six years old, directed by Buddhist monks. It ended in 1959 when he was awarded the Geshe Lharampa degree (doctorate of Buddhist philosophy).

In 1950, Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) Chinese Communist forces invaded Tibet. By late 1950, a guerrilla war had erupted there as Tibetans resisted coercive modernization efforts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). On November 17, 1950, the Dalai Lama was called upon to assume the role of Tibetan head of state in order to give voice to Tibetan demands for political and religious autonomy. Until 1959, the Dalai Lama engaged in a careful policy aimed at preserving Tibet's traditional religious and political structures while attempting to negotiate with CCP leaders. In March 1959, however, the Tibetan capital of Lhasa erupted in violence after a huge anti-Chinese demonstration was savagely crushed by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Fearing for the Dalai Lama's

life, his advisors counseled him to flee Tibet, which he reluctantly did. He took up residence in Dharamsala, India, the official seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile.

Since his forced exile, the Dalai Lama has constantly sought to focus the world's attention on the plight of the Tibetan people, even appealing to the United Nations for support. He has also encouraged Tibetans to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience against Chinese Communist rule. He displayed considerable diplomatic and political skill in presenting Tibet's case on the international stage and won widespread respect. In 1989, the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent opposition to the Tibetan occupation. He has been widely received in capitals around the world and has met with all of the world's major religious leaders, including Pope John Paul II five times during 1980–1990.


The numerous publications of the Dalai Lama—both political and spiritual in nature—as well as his constant travel to make personal appeals for support and his nonconfrontational approach began to bear fruit in 2002. That year he again undertook negotiations with the Chinese government for Tibetan autonomy that are still ongoing.

Dr. Andrew J. Waskey

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Sino-Indian Border War; Tibet.

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The exiled spiritual leader of Tibet, Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, has maintained a vigilant effort to focus international attention on the plight of his country, which was annexed by China in 1950. (AP/Wide World Photos)

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Damansky Island (Zhenbao Island)

The Damansky Island (Zhenbao dao) is located in the Ussuri (Wusuli) River. It is about 200 meters to the Chinese side and 300 meters to the Russian side. The total area of the island is 0.74 square kilometers. Its middle part is a swampland with forests in the surrounding areas. Originally, it connected to the Chinese side, but water erosion separated it to form an independent island in 1915. Zhenbao in Chinese means “treasure,” a name given to the island because a huge ginseng root was discovered there in the nineteenth century by a Chinese fisherman. The Chinese claim that it has been under the administration of Hulin County, Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang) Province. This tiny island gained international fame due to the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the former Soviet Union shared a nearly 7,000-kilometer-long border. During the 1950s, the “brotherhood” between the two Communist states seldom reminded them of their territorial disputes. After Joseph Stalin’s (1878–1953) death, Nikita Khrushchev’s (1894–1971) de-Stalinization led to a bilateral ideological rift. In 1960, Khrushchev was accused by the Chinese of “emasculating, betraying and revising” Marxism-Leninism, while he labeled Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) as “an ultra-leftist, an ultra-dogmatist and a left revisionist.” After Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) took power in 1964, the ideological schism caused border clashes. The Chinese denounced the Soviet Union for being a new Tsarist regime just like the Old Russian Empire that seized over 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory through unequal treaties imposed by Russia on

China. With no intention of compromise, Brezhnev assumed a hard stance toward the border disputes by denying any treaties signed between the two countries were unequal. The subsequent negotiations on border issues brought no results. On the contrary, according to Chinese sources, the Soviets invaded Chinese territory 4,189 times between October 1964 and February 1969. On Damansky Island, as the Chinese claimed, the Soviets violated their territorial integrity 16 times from January 1967 to February 1969.

The military clash over Damansky Island occurred in March 1969. No third observer objectively reported it, and conflicting claims were rendered by the two sides. Each accused the other of provocation and aggression. However, a careful review of their existing sources reveals that the two countries fought three major battles on March 3, March 15, and March 17 respectively. These were not accidents, as both countries had stationed forces along the border for a long time in preparation for war.

On March 2, one group of Chinese soldiers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) camouflaged itself in snow in the wooded area in preparation for an ambush, while another group marched toward Soviet soldiers. As they got close, the Chinese opened fire. Both sides dispatched reinforcements, and the fighting lasted until late afternoon. Each inflicted casualties on the other side. The Soviets brought in four military vehicles yet were forced to withdraw.

On March 15, the Soviets sent 100 infantry and nearly 50 tanks and armored vehicles seeking retaliation. Three Soviet planes assisted the assault. The Soviet artillery bombarded Chinese territory up to seven kilometers beyond the border. The violent fighting lasted for nine hours, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. One foreign source claimed that Chinese casualties on that

day were over 800. The Chinese claimed to have repelled Soviet soldiers from the island.

On March 17, the Soviets dispatched 70 soldiers to stop the Chinese from towing away a newly invented Soviet T-62 tank left by the previous battle on the ice near the Chinese side. The Soviets were not successful, and the tank was soon dragged out and put on display in Beijing to show off a Chinese victory.

The three days of heavy fighting shocked the world and made the tiny island famous. Both sides claimed victory and decorated their heroes with honors and promotions. Nobody knows the exact figure of casualties, even though the Russians set their loss at 58 dead and 94 wounded, and the Chinese announced their loss at 29 dead, 62 wounded, and 1 missing.

After Damansky, the skirmishes along the border continued, but none of them matched the scale of Damansky. Only after the informal meeting between Aleksei Kosygin (1904–1980) and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) at Beijing Airport in September 1969 did the military confrontation subside, thanks to their agreement to separate forces in disputed areas and to solve border problems by peaceful negotiations.

Some scholars consider the Damansky clash a modern war since both employed their most advanced weapons in the intensive fighting. It ushered Sino-Soviet relations into a two-decade ebb during which both saw each other as the arch enemy. The Chinese claimed that the Damansky battle enabled them to smash the Soviet attempt to launch a major war against China, while the Soviets argued that the clash thwarted China's further territorial demands. The Damansky incident cast a shadow upon the two countries as their ideological and territorial disputes continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In a particular way, the Damansky clash changed Chinese relations with the West.

Soon after it, secret talks between China and the United States resumed, which led to an eventual normalization of their diplomatic relations. Indeed, the small war over the island triggered a significant shift in global balance of power by shaping a new world order.

After the clash, Damansky Island has been under Chinese control. In 1991, China and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to stipulate its belonging to China. In 1997, a Sino-Russian agreement endorsed Chinese ownership. In 2005, both the Chinese parliament and Russian Duma ratified a bilateral agreement to legalize Damansky as Chinese territory.

Dr. Patrick Fuliang Shan

See also: China, People's Republic of; Cold War; Cultural Revolution; Manchuria; Manchus; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Russian Relations with China; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; Soviet Union; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations; Zhou Enlai.

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Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997)

Deng Xiaoping was the secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and one of the greatest influences on the People's Republic of China (PRC). Rising to the head of the party, he helped usher in badly needed reforms that would transform the economy of China from centrally planned to more market oriented, paving the way for its ascendancy to the global power that it is today.

Deng was born in Guang'an County, Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, on August 22, 1904. In 1920 he traveled to France and was exposed to Communist ideology. Deng then joined the "Chinese Communist Youth League in Europe" and in 1926 made his way to Moscow to study Marxist theory in depth. He returned to China by 1927 and became a local leader of the CCP as well as the Red Army. Later, he led revolts against Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) forces in Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province. These revolts failed and he retreated to the Communist area of Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province. Deng served in the Red Army through the Anti-Japanese War and was later appointed secretary of the CCP Central China Bureau. Acting as political commissar of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), he aided the victory of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) over the GMD armies by capturing many key Nationalist-held cities, even in Sichuan. In late 1948, Deng captured Chongqing (Chungking), an important GMD city that was under the direct



Deng Xiaoping (shown here in a photo published in 1978) was the designer of China's policy of reform and opening. (AP/Wide World Photos)

command of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975). Deng's triumphs in the military field progressed to such an extent that by 1949, Communist forces had destroyed much of the GMD forces. The prestige of Deng continued to grow with every victory and helped him to rise through the ranks of the CCP, making him one of the premier members of the party by the time the war was over.

After the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, Deng was appointed chairman of the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee in 1952. He became deputy premier and general secretary of the CCP's Central committee in 1954 and was appointed to the Politburo in the 1960s. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Deng was purged by Mao for being too "Bourgeoisie" and forced to retire all his positions in 1966. He faced rehabilitation by first being placed

under house arrest and then being sent to a tractor repair factory in Jiangxi to work as a regular laborer.

By 1973, Deng was deemed fit to return to his leadership duties as deputy premier and member of the Central Committee. He became vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and chief of the General Staff of the PLA in 1975, and was elected vice chairman of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Accusations surfaced of Deng disparaging Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914–1991), Mao's wife, and he was dismissed again from his positions in 1976. It was not until Mao died and the Gang of Four expunged later in the year that Deng was allowed to return to the party fold.

As deputy premier, he began to consolidate his power and became the top leader

in China by 1977. Getting rid of the remaining Maoists, Deng delivered a speech, “Emancipate the Mind,” at the Plenary Session of the party’s Central Committee in 1978. In this speech, he stated that to bring modernity and economic prosperity to China, the country had to become more open to the outside world. In a phrase attributed to Deng, “it did not matter the color of the cat so long as it could catch mice.” With this new mandate in mind, Deng began to shift Chinese policy to become more reform oriented, moving further away from the ill-fated policies that Mao had spearheaded earlier. Given that these reforms were such a tremendous shift in policy for Communist China, Deng dubbed them the “second revolution.”

As the country adopted more reform policies, China began to open up to the world. Deng pursued an even closer relationship with the United States, paying the first ever PRC state visit to the States. Meeting with President Jimmy Carter (1924–), Deng underlined cooperation as he signed the Carter-Deng normalization agreements. Deng approached the British government in 1982 over the issue of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. He similarly approached the Portuguese with respect to returning Macau to PRC control. To help relieve Western fears over Communist control, Deng developed the “one country, two systems” policy. China and Britain finally reached an agreement in 1984 called the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong. Under the terms of the agreement, Britain would turn over control of Hong Kong by 1997, and China would administer it as a special region, allowing it to retain its unique social and economic freedoms for a period of 50 years. This was a major success for Deng, as the issue of foreign domination over Chinese territory had long been a thorn in the nation’s side.

A significant challenge to the successes of Deng occurred in the spring of 1989. As pro-democracy groups were beginning to speak out in Eastern Europe, some in China wished the government to allow similar freedoms in their country. In April 1989, students gathered in Beijing using the death of Hu Yaobang to voice their desire for democratic reforms and an end to corruption. Teachers joined their students, and the demonstrations grew ever larger. By the end of May the crowd of over 100,000 presented a serious dilemma to Deng. On June 3, he ordered action to be taken against the demonstrators. Utilizing the military, Deng had the Twenty-seventh Army and other units loyal to him move in to disperse the crowd. Closing off the area and shutting down the lighting, the military compelled the demoralized students to leave. The teachers and students in the surrounding area were caught by government forces and many were gunned down. Enraged by the wanton killing of their associates, some students took action against the army and began to kill troops as well.

Deng later spoke out against the demonstrations, calling them a “counterrevolutionary rebellion.” The West responded with outrage. Many countries imposed economic sanctions, and consideration was given to the expulsion of China from international organizations. The government of Deng absorbed the hit, although the leader himself took damage to his reputation. He was now on the defensive, and his critics grew more vocal. With the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union by 1991, Deng began a tour of the country in an effort to shore up support for his policies. Beginning in 1992, he visited the Special Economic Zones he had set up during the 1980s to highlight the progress made by these areas. The visit proved a success, and he decided

to open up even more regions for foreign trade and investment. By the mid-1990s, failing health forced Deng into retirement. Suffering from Parkinson's disease, Deng died on February 28, 1997 in Beijing.

Michael Molina

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Four Modernizations; Gang of Four; Guomindang; Hong Kong; Hui-Hai Campaign; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Sino-Vietnamese Border War; Soviet Union; Tiananmen Square Events; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations.

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Dixie Mission (1944–1947)

After mid-1943, Americans grew dissatisfied with China's Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and became interested in harnessing Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) to

the war effort. In early 1944, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) approved the distinguished diplomat John Paton Davies's proposal that American observers be sent to the Communist-controlled areas. Chiang reluctantly gave his consent in late June when meeting with Vice President Henry A. Wallace (1888–1965).

The Dixie Mission began when the U.S. Army Observer Group arrived in Yan'an, the Chinese Communist capital, on July 22, 1944. The Army Observer Group was redesignated the Yan'an Liaison Group after April 13, 1946. The mission was headed by seven army officers until it ceased operation in March 1947. The best known of these was Colonel David D. Barrett, the first Group officer, who served until the end of 1944. He was presiding at a critical moment when Americans and the Chinese Communists first came into contact, militarily and politically. His duties included the gathering of intelligence and weather information, assistance in the rescue of downed American pilots, and assessment of Communist military strength and political aims.

The highlights of the mission included the soon-to-be ambassador Patrick Hurley's (1883–1963) visit in November 1944 and General George Marshall's (1880–1959) visit in March 1946. Both presidential envoys failed in their efforts to mediate between Jiang and Mao. While working as political officers with the mission under Barrett, Davies and diplomat John S. Service recommended that the United States follow a policy of "conditional" but not "exclusive" support of Jiang by working directly with Mao. They were soon accused of being procommunist by Hurley and eventually persecuted by McCarthyism in the 1950s. Since the early 1970s, however, they have been remembered as advocates of a more realistic China policy

and even as forerunners of President Richard Nixon's (1913–1994) opening to China.

Dr. Jingbin Wang

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Marshall Mission to China; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations; Yan'an.

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Dongshan Island Landing Campaign (1953)

A landing campaign launched by the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) naval and ground forces against the People's Republic of China (PRC) occupied Dongshan Island. The island, off the coast of southeastern Fujian (Fukien) Province, was abandoned by the GMD troops during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). On July 16, 1953, the GMD troops launched a lightning invasion of Dongshan Island. The battle ended with

a victory of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), that drove the 10,000 GMD landing troops off of the island.

The battle, which took place in the latter part of the Korean War (1950–1953), was most importantly one of a series of coastal raids sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). After the PRC sent the Chinese troops to Korea in October 1950, the Korean War essentially became a conflict between China and the United States. By December 1952, the Chinese forces in Korea had reached a record high of 1.45 million troops, including 59 infantry divisions, 10 artillery divisions, and 5 anti-aircraft divisions. It was one of the CIA's efforts to divert Chinese Communist attention from the Korean front and relieve pressure on the United Nations Forces (UNF). As a strategic objective in the landing offensive, the GMD high command sought to establish a permanent base at Dongshan to support possible GMD advances into the Chinese mainland in the near future.

The GMD high command sent over 10,000 troops, including paratroops, who were trained and supported by the CIA. The GMD had only one regiment, less than 1,200 troops, as campaign reserve. On July 16, 1953, with overwhelming numerical superiority and naval firepower, the GMD troops immediately occupied the major part of the island by the end of the landing day. They were so impressed by their own success that the commanders declared victory immediately. But, in fact, the PLA defense had just started. The island defense proved to be much stronger than what the GMD officers had expected, and even disastrous for them in the end.

Among the other defense factors were the PLA mortar positions at the highest point of

the island. Within the range of the PLA mortar shelling were the landing fields and the largest port on the island, which was critical to the GMD supply lines and reinforcement. On July 17, at the port, three of the landing ships loaded with heavy equipment turned to sitting ducks as they were being unloaded. The PLA mortars shelled the landing ships, and the damages were deadly in effect. Three landing ships were sunk, heavy weaponry lost, and the only pier in need of repair. More importantly, due to the destruction of landing ships and therefore blockage of the waterway, most GMD troops engaged without needed artillery pieces or even machine guns. The GMD landing troops were inflicted losses of technical superiority.

Another area on the island still in the hands of the Communists was Bachimen, a key point for PLA's reinforcement. With the goal of establishing security barrier against possible PLA reinforcement, 2,000 GMD paratroopers were dispatched to capture Bachimen. But anchoring its defensive positions at Bachimen was the main strength of the PLA forces and garrison on the island. The lightly armed paratroops were no match for defenders in strong fortified positions. Shortly after their jump, more than 500 paratroopers were killed, a staggering 25 percent of the total airborne troops in the campaign. The invasion of Bachimen was thus repulsed.

After one day of fighting, the GMD landing troops suffered heavy casualties, and most of their key objectives had not been achieved. The next day, the PLA reinforcement arrived at the island. The PLA outnumbered the invading GMD troops. The GMD

high command decided to withdraw all remnant troops from the area. The Communists retook the island eventually. The Dongshan Island Campaign lasted about three days, 2,700 GMD soldiers were killed, and the PLA lost 1,250 soldiers killed. Nine days later, the Korean War Armistice was signed.

Tao Wang

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korea War; Guomindang; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement; People's Liberation Army.

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E

Eight Foreign Armies Invasion of China (1900–1901)

Western military coalition against the anti-Christian and anti-Western Boxer Rebellion (1900) in north China during the late Qing dynasty (1644–1911). After 1860, the appearance of many unwelcome foreigners aroused Chinese resentment. Western missionaries were given the right to preach Christianity and to rent or buy land for construction of churches throughout the Qing Empire. Antimissionary attitudes among the scholar-gentry often secretly promoted antiforeign activities in the Chinese society. The Chinese gentry distributed books with anti-Christian ideas and created an antiforeign atmosphere. A small but growing number of Chinese nationalists were resentful of the national humiliations that China suffered.

The Boxers originated in Shandong (Shantung) Province in north China. At the beginning, the Boxers blamed both foreigners and the Qing government. The Qing government first tolerated the Boxers and then supported their actions in an attempt to reduce foreigners' power and influence in China. As a result, the Boxer movement had become an antiforeign campaign by 1900. Chinese Christians were killed, railway and telegraph lines were destroyed, and foreigners were murdered. As antiforeign activities increased, Boxer disturbances spread farther to the Beijing (Peking) area. The situation swiftly spun out of control.

To rescue the Westerners in Beijing, the foreign powers quickly gathered an

expeditionary force and built up their naval forces along the northern China coast at the end of April 1900. At the request of foreign embassies in Beijing, an international force of 435 naval troops from eight countries was organized and dispatched by train for Dagu (Daku) Fort near Tianjin (Tienjin) to the capital. After arriving in the capital, these troops joined the legations and protected them from being attacked by the Boxers.

As the situation worsened, a second international force of 2,000 British Marines under the leadership of the British vice admiral Edward Seymour was dispatched from Dagu to Beijing on June 10. The Boxers bombarded Tianjin, and Dong Fuxiang's Muslim troops attacked Admiral Seymour's expeditionary force. With a difficult military situation in Tianjin and a total breakdown of communications between Tianjin and Beijing, the allied nations were determined to reinforce their military presence significantly. On June 17, they took the Dagu Forts.

The Eight-Nation Alliance, under the leadership of British Lieutenant-General Alfred Gaselee, eventually recruited 55,000 troops: Japanese (20,840), Russian (13,150), British (12,020), French (3,520), American (3,420), German (900), Italian (80), and Austro-Hungarian (75). The Eight Foreign Armies quickly and severely defeated the Boxers and the Qing troops. After one day of fighting, the international force occupied Tianjin on July 14. After the rebellion and Qing armies were crushed, the international force occupied Beijing on August 14. All the

nationalities in the international force raced to be the first to liberate the besieged Legation Quarters. The Empress Dowager Cixi (Tz'u Hsi) (1835–1908) fled Beijing for Xi'an (Shian).

Realizing that armed resistance to the foreign powers was useless, the empress called Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) (1823–1901), a high official and diplomat of the Qing government, to Beijing to reach a settlement with the foreigners. After much negotiation, peace was finally established. On September 7, 1901, the Qing court was compelled to sign the “Boxer Protocol,” known as the Peace Agreement between the Eight-Nation Alliance and China.

The treaty provided that China pay a large indemnity of 450 million taels of silver in 39 years at 4 percent yearly interest and that the Chinese custom income and salt tax be enlisted as guarantee of the reparation. The reparation required each Chinese to pay one tael (China had a population of 450 million). According to the treaty, foreign troops were allowed to be stationed at important points from Beijing to the sea, the Foreign Legation district in Beijing was enlarged and placed under the exclusive control of foreign powers, and the Chinese were not allowed to live in the district. The protocol ordered the capital punishment of 10 high-ranking officials associated with the outbreak of the Boxer rebellion and other officials who were found guilty for the murder of the Westerners in China.

Beijing, Tianjin, and other cities in northern China were occupied for more than one year by the international expeditionary force under the command of German General Alfred Graf von Waldersee. In the provinces, over 100 officials were tried and found guilty. Imperial edicts were issued to forbid further antforeign activities and organizations in the future. The Imperial

Civil Service Examinations were suspended for five years in areas of Boxer disturbances as a reprimand of the pro-Boxer scholars.

After suppressing the Boxer Rebellion, the great powers realized that the best way to govern China was through the Manchu officials, instead of direct dealing with the Chinese people. In the following decades, the Western powers began to establish their own sphere of influence in China to promote and protect their interests, rather than colonizing China. The Chinese imperial structure was for the moment maintained by the great powers, but the Qing dynasty was weakened significantly and the anti-Qing force was rising, which led to the 1911 Chinese Revolution that would overthrow the Manchu dynasty.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: Boxer Rebellion; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Li Hongzhang; Manchus; Qing Dynasty; Sino-French War; Unequal Treaties.

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Eight Trigrams Rebellion (1813)

The Eight Trigrams Rebellion refers to an uprising against the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), that occurred from September to October 1813. This rebellion involved over tens of thousands of Chinese villagers, members of a secret sect known as the Eight Trigrams, which some scholars consider an offshoot of the White Lotus movement.

Sectarian members originated from south of Beijing (Peking), and their use of the name “Eight Trigrams” stems from the *Book of Changes*’ ancient divination chart. Membership in this secret sect required a person to memorize a specific incantation that consisted of eight characters. Loyal followers worshiped the so-called Eternal Unborn Mother, who they believed was mankind’s progenitor. Part of their teachings also included the belief that a cosmic holocaust would soon destroy the world. Once this occurred, however, the sect masters assured their loyal followers, that the faithful among them would be saved. This certain salvation would result due to the Eternal Mother sending them the Maitreya Buddha of the Future.

Adhering to these teachings, the frustrated villagers roamed the countryside for weeks in September 1813. They achieved limited successes, which included their taking control of several villages in north China. Sectarian leaders firmly believed that if their dedicated followers could manage to seize the palace in Beijing, this would then influence the people to rise up and join their efforts. As they steadily made their way toward Beijing, sect members used their knives to discourage any opposition to their movement. Their efforts led to bloodshed. It has been estimated that at least 70,000 people lost their lives during this time of social unrest.

On September 15, about 200 members of the Eight Trigrams sect decided to attempt

an invasion of the Forbidden City in Beijing. Gathering in small groups, they situated themselves within shops located outside both the palace’s western and eastern gates. At the appointed time, they adorned themselves with strips of white cloth as waistbands and turbans to symbolize their association. Then, drawing previously hidden weaponry, the rebel forces rushed en masse into the palace gateways. While only a few managed to barge into the eastern gate before guards barred further entrance, approximately 70 swarmed onto the palace grounds from the west. Once inside, the invaders surged northward, heading toward the Great Within, which was the imperial residence area. A short battle ensued within the palace walls. The Manchu prince, Prince Min-ning, who later became the Daoguang (Tao-kuang) (1821–1850) emperor, took part in the fighting, personally killing at least two villagers. Moving across paved courtyards surrounded by magnificent gold roofs and red doors, sect members—commoners untrained in formal warfare tactics—soon found themselves isolated from their companions by palace guards. Government forces quickly suppressed their meager efforts, and all those involved in the attack were either killed or captured. Although their attempt failed, this troubling incident taught Prince Min-ning to fear the Chinese masses. The underlying social currents of discontent also remained, again rising to the surface in Chinese society during the famous Boxer Rebellion at the end of the nineteenth century.

Molly McLeod Mirll

See also: Banner System; Boxer Rebellion; Manchus; Qing Dynasty; Taiping Rebellion; White Lotus Rebellion.

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Eighth Route Army (1937–1945)

A Chinese Communist army fought against the Japanese forces during the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). Although the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army were two units of the Chinese Nationalist army of the Republic of China (ROC), they were always under the command of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). On July 7, 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army attacked the Chinese Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao), located to the southwest of Beijing (Peking). This event, known as the Marco Polo (Lugouqiao) Bridge Incident, marked the beginning of Japan's all-out aggression against China and the Second Sino-Japanese War. On August 13, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai and threatened Nanjing (Nanking), capital city of the ROC. The GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP on joint resistance through a political and military coalition.

As part of this agreement, the main force of the CCP's Red Army, then located in the

northwest and numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army (Balujun) of the National Army in August 1937, with Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) as commander in chief, Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) as deputy commander, and Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) as chief of staff. They commanded three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th. The 115th Division, commanded by Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) with Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch'en) (1899–1992) as deputy commander and Zhou Kun as chief of staff, had two brigades and two regiments, totaling 15,500 men. The 120th Division, commanded by He Long (Ho Lung) (1896–1969) with Xiao Ke as deputy commander and Zhou Shidi as chief of staff, had two brigades, one regiment, and two battalions, totaling 14,000 men. The 129th Division, commanded by Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986) with Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-ch'ian) (1901–1990) as deputy commander and Ni Zhiliang as chief of staff, had two brigades, one regiment, and two battalions, totaling 13,000 troops. Even though the GMD high command renamed the Eighth Route Army in September the Eighteenth Army Group, the CCP and Chinese people still called it the Eighth Route Army.

In September 1937, the GMD made public a declaration for GMD-CCP cooperation and recognized the legal status of the CCP. Thus, an anti-Japanese united front formally came into existence. The Soviet Union firmly supported the CCP-GMD coalition through World War II. Although Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) continued to send financial aid to the CCP, he began to support Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) GMD army as well. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) often complained about how little he received compared to the hundreds of million dollars Chiang had received from Moscow. In

September, the Eighth Route Army crossed the Yellow River eastward and reached north China. Most of their units moved into the countryside and mountainous areas. As Mao did in Jinggangshan, they conducted a guerrilla campaign in the mountains behind the Japanese lines. The divisions marched into the enemy-occupied territories, where they carried out guerrilla operations and established military and political bases. They could easily attack Japanese supply lines and small garrisons.

In September 1937, the 115th Division ambushed the Japanese troops at Pingxingguan, Shanxi (Shansi) Province, killing 1,000 Japanese and capturing a large amount of supplies and ammunition. This was the first Eighth Route Army victory. In October, the 120th Division ambushed the Japanese supply regiment, destroying more than 50 trucks and tanks and cutting off Japanese transportation lines. In November, the 129th Division attacked the Yangmingbao Air Base in Dai County, Shanxi, and destroyed 20 Japanese warplanes.

When Jiang lost some of his best troops in the war against the Japanese invasion on the front line, the Eighth Route Army's successful guerrillas behind the line recruited a large number of peasants into the army. The army increased from 46,000 men in 1937, to 220,000 men in 1939, and to 500,000 men in 1940. It established bases in the border regions of the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Provinces), Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Provinces), Shanxi-Suiyuan and also in the central section of Shandong (Shantung) Province. In 1938–1939, the Eighth Route Army spread from north China into central and east China. In August–December 1940, the army launched the Battle of Hundred Regiments to cut off the south-north transportation and communication of the Japanese forces in

central China. During the three-month campaign, the Eighth Route Army eliminated 20,000 enemy troops, took over 290 Japanese posts, and destroyed 900 miles of highways and 300 miles of railways. The army suffered heavy casualties with 17,000 men dead or wounded.

In 1941–1942, the Japanese command concentrated 64 percent of its troops in China to launch “mopping-up operations” against the Eighth Route Army's bases behind its line. Its policy was known as “Three Alls”: kill all, burn all, and loot all. Slowly and gradually, they wanted to stop the guerrillas in their rear area of operations by eliminating their human and economic resources. To overcome the shortage of food and supplies, the army officers and soldiers devoted themselves to increasing production. Many of them participated in the opening up of wilderness for crop cultivation, the raising of hogs, and the making of cloth. Even leaders such as Zhu De did likewise. After much hard work, many army units and offices succeeded in attaining total or partial self-sufficiency. The most difficult problems with logistical concerns for the bases were resolved by 1943, after which these areas continued to expand.

In the meantime, in 1944, the “liberated areas” under CCP control launched, partial counteroffensives and won important victories against Japan. By the spring of 1945, the CCP had 19 “liberated areas” with a total population of 95 million with 1.21 million party members across the country. Eventually, the CCP became a mass party in China. The Eighth Route Army began to intensify the counteroffensive in the summer of 1945. The army increased from 3 divisions in August 1937 to more than 40 divisions in August 1945, and its troops from 46,000 men in 1937 to 600,000 troops in 1945. On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on

Japan, and its Red Army attacked the Japanese in China's northeastern provinces. On August 14, Japan surrendered unconditionally. On September 2, it signed the instrument of surrender. The Chinese people and the Eighth Route Army, after eight years of bitter struggle, finally won victory in the Anti-Japanese War. Following the end of the Anti-Japanese War, the Eighth Route Army was incorporated into the new People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949).

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Guerrilla Warfare; He Long; Hundred Regiments Offensive Campaign; Jiang Jieshi; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Areas; Lin Biao; Liu Bocheng; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge Incident; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; Nie Rongzhen; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Pingxingguan, Battle of; Red Army; Soviet Union; United Front; Xu Xiangqian; Ye Jianying; Zhu De.

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Encirclement Campaigns (1930–1934)

Five offensive campaigns under the command of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC) and commander in chief of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army, against the Red Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in provincial border areas of central China. Jiang's army defeated the CCP force in the fifth encirclement campaign. The Red Army fled from their base areas in central China to the northwest during the Long March in 1934–1935.

In 1928, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and Zhu De (Zhu Teh) (1886–1976) joined the force at the Jinggangshan (Chingkang) Mountains. They reorganized their troops into the Red Army and created a military center, or a base area, for the Communist revolution. Among their 10,000 men, 82 percent were peasants. In 1931, Mao made his base region a government center for all CCP soviet governments when he was elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Mao's strategy and tactics became the basis for the Communist military revolution. By the end of 1931, the Red Army totaled 150,000 men and expanded its areas of operation. About 25 percent of the rank and file were CCP members.

The rapid growth of the Communist troops and expansion of their controlled regions alarmed the GMD government. ROC president Jiang Jieshi and the high command of the GMD army centralized

their provincial campaigns into a coordinated suppression in order to round up the Red Army. From 1930 to 1934, Jiang's central government organized five major offensive campaigns against the Communist-controlled areas and the Red Army bases in the border areas along the Hunan, Jiangxi (Kiangsi), Fujian (Fukien), Hubei (Hupei), Jiangsu (Kiangsu), and Shanxi (Shansi) Provinces. Both Mao and Zhu were placed on the "most wanted" list.

Through four counterencirclement campaigns, Red Army troops developed some of their operational principles, focusing on "luring the enemy deep" into their territory and using mobile warfare to annihilate the enemy troops. In the summer of 1933, Jiang concentrated 1 million GMD troops and launched his fifth encirclement campaign against the Red Army in the fall.

In September 1933, 500,000 GMD troops attacked the central region. By January 1934, Mao had lost his positions in the government due to the CCP power struggle. He lost his military authority to Soviet advisors like Li De (Li Te, Otto Braun) (1900–1974), a German Communist and military expert trained in Moscow for three years and then sent to China as Comintern military advisor for the CCP. The temporary Central Committee under the leadership of Wang Ming (1904–1974) and Li De employed an "all-out offensive" and "two fists fighting back" in their fifth antisuppression campaign. The Red Army failed, and Jiang's troops marched into the central region through his "blockhouse" strategy. Then the Central Committee organized a positional defense by "defending every point" and "using bunkers against the enemy bunkers."

The total defense did not work and failed to either slow down or stop the offensives. In October 1934, the Red Army gave up their central region campaign and retreated

westward. Thereafter, the CCP and the Red Army lost contact with the Soviet Union. The Red Army in other provinces abandoned all of their bases and Soviet areas across the country, except two in northwest China. The survivors of the Red Army began their Long March toward northwest China on October 10, 1934, to continue the CCP's Agrarian Revolutionary War (or the Land Revolutionary War) against the Jiang and the GMD government.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Guerilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Jiangxi Soviet; Long March; Mao Zedong; Red Army; Zhu De.

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Eunuchs

The term "eunuch" refers to a specific type of Chinese Imperial servant. Eunuchs, males

who had survived having their scrotums and penises removed, performed a variety of palace roles. Their original purpose, however, stemmed from the emperor's need for guards to protect his harem while avoiding questions regarding paternity. Traditionally valued by rulers for their fierce loyalty and military prowess, eunuchs also often garnered disdain for being uneducated, susceptible to corruption, and serving as Imperial spies. Under some dynasties, eunuchs increased in both numbers and power, accumulating excessive influence over the emperors and their courtly affairs. While some bequeathed both gifts and titles to family members, others servicing emperors who heavily favored their court scholars often faced persecution and death. A eunuch's influence at court waxed and waned depending upon each dynasty's emperors' temperaments and judgments.

In the 1400s during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), under Emperor Yongle's (Yung-lo) (1403–1424) rule, the famous Muslim eunuch Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho) (1371–1435) commanded a vast fleet of Imperial treasure ships, captained by eunuch sailors who were fiercely brave and loyal to their emperor. While Yongle's son later ordered such journeys discontinued and eliminated the eunuchs' prestigious positions, his grandson then restored his eunuchs' prominence, arranging for their education and once again appointing them to important military commands.

Because a eunuch had no direct ties to the royal family system, he lacked social standing and remained dependent upon the emperor's favor, but oftentimes, his close proximity to his master led to participation in both state affairs and courtly intrigue. Eunuchs could easily manipulate those who were minors or weak rulers. Working as his servants and companions, eunuchs often proved themselves a young emperor's most

reliable supporters in situations relating to an empress's family. One eunuch chief minister from the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) used deception to assure a younger son's succession, and eunuchs conspired to murder the brother of one Han (206 BC–220 AD) emperor's consort. Under the Tang dynasty (618–907), reforms in court practices regarding Imperial control of taxation curbed the influence of eunuchs controlling the treasuries. Under Tang Emperor Wuzong (841–846), a powerful eunuch handled Buddhist affairs until those who espoused Confucian thought suppressed Buddhism in China.

Through the centuries, eunuchs served as personal secretaries and envoys to tributary states, as tax auditors, and as members of secret police systems. Although the Chinese and Manchu rulers trusted their eunuchs due to their being entirely dependent upon them, the eunuchs often exploited their privileged positions. Their ability to manipulate a court's bureaucracy led to flagrantly corrupt and oppressive eunuch dictatorships, which resulted in reigns of terror. Approximately 70,000 eunuchs assumed administrative and political roles under the absolutist Ming rulers in Beijing (Peking). They eventually exerted considerable influence in the Inner Court, while using a security system to terrorize court scholars and officials. During later decades, Manchu emperors distrusted and restricted their eunuchs' official power by reducing their numbers to only a few thousand. Because no Manchu princes married ethnic Chinese women, their eunuchs also only transported specified nude and specially prepared Manchu women wrapped in rugs to the imperial beds.

Molly McLeod Mirll

See also: Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Han Dynasty; Manchus; Ming Dynasty; Qin Dynasty; Qing Dynasty; Tang Dynasty.

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Ever-Victorious Army (1860–1864)

The Ever-Victorious Army (EVA) was a Chinese-sponsored military force operating in the Shanghai area that quickly evolved from an ineffective collection of Western mercenaries into a Western-officered, Chinese-soldiered army. The EVA played a pivotal role in defending Shanghai from occupation by the Taiping, and later it contributed to the defeat of the rebellion. Frederick Townsend Ward, an American adventurer from Massachusetts, became the first commander of the EVA. When Ward died, his fellow American Henry Andreas Burgevine succeeded to the command of the EVA. Burgevine was popular with his army but had poor relations with the army's patrons, Shanghai Taotai Wu-Hsu and Yang-fang (aka banker Takee). The new British General Charles Staveley also wanted to replace Burgevine with a proper English officer; moreover, the American faced opposition from Viceroy Li Hongzhang

(Li Hung-chang) (1823–1901), who did not trust a foreign-led army in his domain, particularly one more successful than his own Xiang Army. To accomplish those ends, banker Takee deliberately withheld the monthly wages of the EVA in December 1862, provoking a near-mutiny in the ranks. In early 1863, Burgevine forcefully appropriated the amount in arrears and in the process gave Takee a bloody nose. Viceroy Li summarily dismissed Burgevine and put a bounty on his head “dead or alive.” Li's proclamation was an open challenge to extraterritoriality and created considerable support for Burgevine among Shanghai's foreign community. Li also used the incident to impeach and remove both Wu and Takee for taking too much “squeeze” (graft) from the army's accounts.

During the spring of 1863, Burgevine appealed his dismissal to the authorities in Beijing. Meanwhile in his absence, the command of the EVA had been awarded to Lieutenant John Y. Holland of the Royal Marines, who led the army to its only truly disastrous defeat at Taitsang. Holland was immediately sacked, and returned to England.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Gordon of the Royal Engineers then became the fourth and final commander of the EVA. Gordon achieved victories at Fushan, Taitsang, and Quinsan, after which he relocated the EVA headquarters to the latter place to assume more personal control. Since Gordon was successful, Viceroy Li would not reinstate Burgevine; consequently, the American recruited about 30 EVA officers, and they defected over to the Taiping side. While he was among the rebels, however, Burgevine never had the autonomy of command that he craved; and when Gordon defeated him at the famous Patachiao Bridge just south of the Suzhou (Soochow) city wall, Burgevine undertook negotiations for the surrender of his men to

Gordon's protection. Burgevine was exiled to Japan, from which place he maintained a surprisingly cordial correspondence with Gordon in China. When Burgevine secretly returned to China in the summer of 1865, he was captured by Zuo Zongtang's (Tso Tsung-t'ang) (1812–1885) men and, in all probability, executed on Viceroy Li's orders.

Under Gordon the EVA kept the Taiping occupied often relying upon his steamers *Hyson* and *Firefly* until he was ready to make the final assault upon Suzhou. Gordon promised the rebel generals amnesty if they surrendered, but Viceroy Li beheaded them instead. Gordon immediately resigned from his EVA commission, but in the spring of 1864, Gordon was reinstated to complete the destruction of the rebellion. Gordon's EVA had a series of victories in the regions north and west of Suzhou, however, Gordon also suffered one humiliating defeat. At Waisoo, on March 13, he lost 25 percent of his regiment when they broke formation. Gordon often granted amnesty to defeated Taiping soldiers and incorporated them into the EVA, even making reformed rebels into his personal bodyguard. By late summer of 1864, the rebellion had been effectively suppressed; so the EVA was disbanded, and its best men and artillery were amalgamated

with Viceroy Li's own army. The emperor's edict granted General Charles "Chinese" Gordon the vaunted Yellow Jacket of the first-rank military Mandarin, and he returned back to England as a Victorian hero.

*Dr. Gordon W. Knight and
Dr. Thomas E. Williams*

See also: Hong Xiuquan; Li Hongzhang; Qing Dynasty; Taiping Rebellion; Ward, Frederick Townsend; Xiang Army; Zuo Zongtang.

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F

Fei River, Battle of (383)

The Battle of Fei River (*Fei Shui*) was a military engagement considered one of the significant battles in Chinese history. The Eastern Jin dynasty (317–420) defeated the Qin dynasty during the Period of North-South disunion (220–589). The Jin had a force of around 80,000 against the Qin's 800,000 troops. After the Qin lost the battle, the dynasty plunged into civil war while Eastern Jin and other southern countries survived.

In 379, the Qin dynasty conquered the strategic city Xiangyang. In 383, forces of the Eastern Jin prepared to retake Xiangyang. To stop the Jin's threat, Fu Jian of the Qin dynasty organized a large army of 800,000 men in August to march from Chang'an. Emperor Sima Yao of the Jin dynasty hastily prepared a defense. He ordered General Huan Chong to defend the Yangzi (Yangtze) River and ordered Xie An and Xie Xuan with 80,000 soldiers to defend the Huai River.

Led by Fu Jian and his brother Fu Rong, the Qin army was made up of conscripted militaries from the conquered territories. The Qin troops came from a different background. For example, the front cavalry corps was from Xianbei, and nomadic cavalry corps came from Xiongnu. While the Qin army numbered over 800,000, many did not feel a sense of loyalty to the Qin dynasty, having been either forced or bribed into joining. Also, the army was poorly trained.

The Qin army encamped at the western bank of the Fei River, while the Jin army encamped on the eastern bank. Xie Xuan sent a message to the Qin suggesting that

the Qin army back off slightly to allow a small Jin force to cross the river. Fu Jian thought that the Jin were engaged in a suicidal operation and would give the Qin army a quick victory on the western bank of the Fei River.

Despite the protests of his generals, Fu Jian ordered a pull-back of his men from the western bank and allowed the Jin force to cross the Fei River. The Qin soldiers were confused and wondered why they had to retreat before a fight. Soon the Qin retreat became a disordered rout. The Jin army took the opportunity and made a quick crossing of the river. Then the Jin troops launched a sudden attack on the withdrawing Qin forces. The Qin army was in complete disarray. Fu Jian and his generals were unable to control their troops, who thought they had already lost the battle.

Taking advantage of this favorable situation, the Jin army pursued the enemy. The Qin troops fled the battle group and threw away much of their own equipment. The field was littered with the corpses of Fu Jian's soldiers. Fu Rong was killed in the battle, and Fu Jian was hit by an arrow but escaped. The brilliant Jin victory ensured the survival of the dynasty and the southern countries. The Battle of Fei River plunged the Qin dynasty into chaos and civil war.

Yong Tong

See also: Southern and Northern Dynasties; Qin Dynasty; Sui Dynasty; Three Kingdoms; Xiongnu.

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Fengtian-Zhili War (1922–1924)

Two major wars occurred during the Republic of China's (ROC) Warlord Period (1916–1927) between two warlords over the control of the central government. During the Warlord Period, some military commanders of the army controlled a region or several provinces and the central government lost control of the country. Seven or eight major warlord armies divided the country among themselves and waged wars against each other. They exercised autonomous political power by virtue of their personal control of their military force. Hoping to seize control of the whole country, warlord armies competed for human resources by drafting young peasants into their own army. An estimated 500,000 men served in the warlord armies in 1916. The total increased to 1 million by 1918, and about 1.5 million by 1924.

Among the major warlords were the Fengtian clique and the Zhili clique. The Fengtian clique controlled northeast China, or Manchuria, outside the Great Wall, including Liaoning, Jilin (Kirin), and Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang) Provinces, under the command of Marshal Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin) (1875–1928). The Zhili clique controlled north China inside the Great Wall, including Hebei (Hopei), Inner Mongolia, and Henan (Honan) Provinces, under the command of Marshal Wu Peifu

(Wu P'ei-fu) (1874–1939) and Cao Kun (1862–1938). The two groups had been engaged in some conflicts over the areas along the Great Wall in the early 1920s.

The first major war between the Fengtian and Zhili took place between April 28 and May 5, 1922. At that time, the Zhili clique had the support of the British and Americans, while the Japanese backed the Fengtian clique. In order to control the central government in Beijing (Peking), the Fengtian clique replaced Premier Jin Yupeng with Liang Shiyi, who was prone to support the Fengtian.

With the support of the central government, Zhang Zuolin and Duan Qirui (Tuan Ch'i-Jui) (1865–1936) formed a military coalition under the Fengtian to attack the Zhili force. Zhang Zuolin made himself the generalissimo. In April, Zhang's troops, totaling 120,000, entered the Great Wall through Shanhaiguan. On April 28, Zhang arrived at Junliangchen, Hebei, and ordered an all-out attack against the Zhili troops. The First Fengtian-Zhili War began.

Wu Peifu, commander of the Zhili force, concentrated 100,000 troops to defend their territories against Fengtian's attacks at Machang and Changxindian. Wu's strategy was to attack the enemy from the rear to cut off their supply lines and transportation from the north. Fengtian's armies were cut off and short of supplies. Zhang had to withdraw his troops out of the Great Wall through Shanhaiguan. Wu Peifu and the Zhili clique won the first war. On June 17, 1922, the two groups signed a cease-fire treaty. The Fengtian clique agreed to return back to Manchuria, and the Zhili controlled the central government in Beijing. In October 1923, Cao Kun became the president of the central government.

After the first Zhili-Fengtian War, the Zhili clique intended to unite China by force with the support of the central government.

In order to save the Fengtian, Zhang Zuolin negotiated with other warlords such as Duan Qirui from southeastern Anhui clique to form a new military coalition against the Zhili clique. In addition, they also gained the support of some Western countries that did not want to see the reunification of China.

The second Fengtian-Zhili War took place on September 15, 1924. Zhang Zuolin commanded 250,000 troops and entered the Great Wall in two places, Chifeng and Chengde. In response to Zhang's invasion, Wu Peifu led 200,000 troops in defense. However, there was an internal power struggle between Marshal Wu Peifu and General Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yu-hsiang) (1882–1948) inside the Zhili command. Feng refused to follow Wu's orders. On October 23, Feng signed a secret agreement with the Fengtian's Zhang Zuolin and Duan Qirui known as the "Beijing coup." Later, Feng and his troops left the Zhili group and formed the new Guomin (national people's) Army against the Zhili.

Wu Peifu now had to fight on the two fronts: Feng's revolting army and Zhang's invading armies. Wu reorganized his forces and marched toward Beijing, but Feng's Guomin Army defeated Wu's troops. Wu lost his main force and fled to the south. The Fengtian won the second Fengtian-Zhili War. Zhang Zuolin, along with Feng Yuxiang, created a new provisional government in Beijing. Anhui's clique Duan Qirui was selected as a figurehead to balance the interests of Zhang and Feng. They also invited Sun Yat-sen to Beijing from Guangzhou to discuss the reunification of China. Sun, however, died of cancer in Beijing in early 1925. Finally, national power fell into the hands of the Fengtian clique.

Yong Tong

See also: China, Republic of; Great Wall; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Manchuria;

Northern Expedition; Sun Yat-sen; Warlord Period; Yuan Shikai.

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First Field Army (1948–1950)

One of the main forces of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) reorganized its military forces after the collapse of the CCP-Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) military coalition during the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). Abandoning the designations that the CCP adopted after joining the GMD forces during the United Front, the CCP high command combined the Eighth Route Army with provincial military forces to assemble conventional forces into four standing field armies that were supported by militia and guerrilla elements.

On November 10, 1946, the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP established the Northwest Field Army, including the former Jin-Sui Field Army, Jin-Bei Field Army, 358th Brigade, and 359th Brigades of the Eighth Route Army. The reorganization indicated a shift toward generic geographic identifiers rather than provinces as a naming convention to meet the CCP's needs in winning the Chinese Civil War, which broke out in June 1946.

The first serious task for the Northwest Field Army was to tackle the offensive campaign by GMD troops against CCP revolutionary bases in the Shan-Gan-Ning region, comprising the areas of Shaanxi (Shensi), Gansu (Kansu), and Ningxia (Ningsia), and including the CCP capital of Yan'an. The field army defeated the GMD offensive and annihilated more than 14,000 GMD troops. These campaigns laid a solid foundation for a strategic counterattack and strengthened the revolutionary bases in the Shan-Gan-Ning region.

On July 31, 1947, the CMC appointed Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) as the commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army. By 1948, the Northwest Field Army totaled 45,000 troops. In November 1948, the CMC decided to reorganize its troops and called all the CCP forces the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). In January 1949, the CMC established four field armies, including the First Field Army in the northwest, the Second in central China, the Third in eastern China, and the Fourth in the northeast.

On February 1, 1949 the Northwest Field Army changed its name to the First Field Army of the PLA with Peng as its commander and political commissar. At that time the First Field Army had 155,000 men. To continue the CCP victory in northwest China, the CMC reinforced more armies into the First Field Army in the spring of 1949. By this time, the total number of the First Field Army reached 344,000 troops. The First Field Army launched its offensive campaign against the GMD troops in the northwest region in July 1949.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, the CMC issued the order to disband the PLA field army structure in April 1950. It reorganized the PLA armies into military

regions, thus bringing the PLA full circle in terms of its order of battle and command structure. The First Field Army was reorganized into the Northwest Military Region under the command of Peng.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Fourth Field Army; Guomindang; He Long; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Second Field Army; Third Field Army; Yan'an.

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Five Seven One (571) Plan (1971)

The Five Seven One Plan was a secret document and plan supposedly developed by Marshal Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), defense minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), along with his son Lin Liguo (Lin Li-Kuo) (1945–1971) and their associates to implement a coup d'état against Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP, during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The pronunciation of the document is also a homonym for “armed uprising” (*wuzhuang qiyi*). It was published by Mao and the Central Committee of the CCP as evidence

against Lin after he and his family were killed in a plane crash in Mongolia on September 13, 1971.

During the early years of the Cultural Revolution, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved to the center of domestic politics in 1967–1969. Marshal Lin became the second most powerful leader in the country, next to Mao, who also made Lin his successor in 1969. Their relationship, however, turned into a political struggle. Lin and Mao differed in strategy, foreign policy, and domestic politics. For instance, when Mao proposed that the PRC Constitution be amended to eliminate the post of the head of state, Lin made a counterproposal that Mao should assume the presidency. Mao repeatedly turned the offer down and said, "I cannot do this job. The suggestion is inappropriate." On the surface this was only a question of whether or not to retain the post of Head of State. Actually, it concealed a host of contradictions.

Tensions between Mao and Lin mounted at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the CCP from August 23 to September 6, 1970. During the meeting, Lin and his established group of supporters proposed a new seat of "state chairman" that would effectively limit and weaken Mao's authority and power in office. His generals voiced their support. The military leaders overplayed their hand in the party. Mao summoned an enlarged meeting of the Politburo and sternly criticized Lin and the military, sealing Lin's fate. The plenum ended on September 6 with Mao's concluding speech, which struck the party leaders like a thunderclap. After the stormy meeting at Lushan, some of Lin's lieutenants were criticized, compelled to make self-criticisms, or removed from office.

Mao continued his efforts to reduce Lin's influence in early 1971 by reorganizing the

Beijing Military Region and replacing the troops of the former Fourth Field Army (Lin's army) with Chen Yi's (Ch'en Yi) (1901–1972) Third Field Army in the capital to weaken and undermine Lin's political strength and his authority. In February 1971, Lin sent his son Lin Ligu to Shanghai, where the latter called together some close staff members and commanders of the air force and local garrison, including Zhou Yuchi, Yu Xinye, and Li Weixin. At the meeting, they outlined "Project 571." The plan criticized Mao's policy in the Cultural Revolution and his personality cult. It described Mao as the modern-day Qin Shi Huangdi (emperor). Project 571 called for "gaining an upper hand by striking first militarily . . . seize nationwide political power" and "seek Soviet help to tie down domestic and foreign forces."

In March 1971, Lin Ligu established a combat detachment, nicknamed the "joint fleet," headed by Mi Jianong in Guangzhou. All the members took an oath of allegiance to Lin Biao and Lin Ligu. Code names and code words were created for channel communications. On March 31, 1971, Lin Ligu called his joint fleet, consisting of Chen Liyun, Jiang Tengjiao, Wang Weiguo, and Zhou Jianping, to Shanghai for another secret meeting. The meeting placed Chen Liyun in command of Hangzhou, Wang Weiguo in command of Shanghai, and Zhou Jianping in command of Nanjing. Jiang Tengjiao was appointed liaison between the three locations for efficient coordination. In April, Lin Ligu instructed Wang Weiguo to install a training site in Shanghai for establishing armed forces for the counterrevolutionary coup d'état. Those trained were taught special sets of skills including arresting people, hand-to-hand combat, light weapon skills, and driving skills.

In August and September, Mao traveled around the country talking to local leaders,

both military and civilian, and stressing how serious the situation had become. In the Mao-Lin struggle, most of the military leaders chose Mao and denounced Lin. On September 5, Zhou Yuchi and Yu Xinye phoned Gu Tongzhou to correspond about Mao Zedong's discussions with leading personnel and their plans. The information was reported back in a written document sent to Lin Ligu and Ye Qun (Yeh Ch'un) (1917–1971), Lin's wife, chief of the General Office of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP.

The Lin family realized that Mao was personally directing the political struggle against them. Just like Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974), Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969), and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), Lin Biao would be the next victim of Mao's brutal political movement. Thus, Lin Ligu and Ye Qun agreed to assassinate Mao. By September 7, the joint fleet was called to combat-ready status. Between September 8 and 11, plans were worked out to assassinate Mao by attacking his train on its way back from Shanghai to Beijing with flamethrowers and 40-mm bazookas, dynamite on the bridge in Suzhou, or bombs from the air. There were also plans to blow up the oil depot in Shanghai where Mao would be murdered in the commotion, or let Wang Weiguo carry out the plot during Mao's reception.

On the evening of September 11, Lin Ligu and Zhou Yuchi were informed that Mao Zedong had realized the danger and left Shanghai earlier than his schedule. The assassination plot had fallen through, and the joint fleet members planned to flee south into Guangzhou. Lin's family had taken a fatal step from which there was no return. On September 13, at the urging of his wife and son, Lin and his family fled. Lin Ligu

commandeered a trident jet at the Shanhaiguan Airport northeast of Beijing. They flew north, heading for the Soviet Union. For unknown reasons, the plane crashed in Mongolia near Undur Khan. Lin Biao, his family, crew members, and others on board, eight in total, were killed in the crash. The same day, Zhou Yuchi, Yu Xinye, and Li Weixing hijacked a helicopter at Beijing's Shahe Airport to flee with state secrets and a large sum of U.S. dollars. The helicopter pilot saw through their scheme and tried to take them back to Beijing, but was killed when they landed.

The Lin incident was the most disruptive political event since the inception of the Cultural Revolution. Five days after his plane crash, the Central Committee, with the approval of Mao, notified its members of Lin's treasonous flight. Ten days later, Mao informed military officers and commanders at divisional and senior levels. On September 24, the Central Committee dismissed all the key members of Lin's group from their positions. On October 3, Mao dissolved the General Office of CMC, formerly controlled by Lin, and created a new CMC Office under Marshal Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986). The following day, Mao chaired the first meeting of the new office. The chairman said that Lin had controlled the armed forces for more than 10 years, that many problems existed in the military, and that the PLA must be unified and prepared for war.

Daniel Mason Linsenbarth

See also: Chen Yi; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Fourth Field Army; Lin Biao; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Soviet Union; Third Field Army; Ye Jianying.

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Formosa. See China, Republic of

Four Modernizations

The term “four modernizations” refers to a program for the improvement and advancement of the agricultural, industrial, national defenses, and science-and-technological fields in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). First suggested by Chinese Premier

Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) in 1964 and in 1975, this plan required sweeping governmental policy changes. After Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), passed away, a power struggle began between his appointed successor Hua Guofeng (1921–2008) and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), Chairman of the CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC). While Hua tried to continue his predecessor’s directives, Deng wanted to move China past the devastating Cultural Revolution. Although his detractors had accused him of taking the capitalist road in 1967, and he had then been politically rehabilitated in May 1973, Deng still disagreed with Mao’s theories regarding a classless society. Because his proposal included elements of capitalism, this left him open to criticism from radicals; however, as a pragmatist, he pushed forward. In 1978, after the four modernizations won approval by the Central Committee, ideology took a secondary position to material incentives.

Under Deng’s leadership in the 1980s, China experienced a decade of unprecedented national and international change, with “openings” occurring in many areas. Reforms to agriculture, industry, the military, and science and technology helped create a new, modernized China. Government officials soon noted the growth of a middle class and increases in luxury goods and Western influences. Under decollectivization, farmers across the country began working on family farms rather than at state-run communes. Utilizing mechanized farm equipment and chemical fertilizers, they achieved greater gains in agricultural production and improved their living standards. Now leasing their worked lands, China’s farmers also enjoyed the “responsibility system,” which let them keep profits once they

had remitted the appropriate taxes. Under similar conditions in the business and industrial fields, the private sector expanded at a breathtaking pace. Citizens took advantage of opportunities not only to produce goods, but also to sell them for personal profit. Changes to the infrastructure led to the creation of new transportation lines and oil pipelines, while new industries also appeared in rural areas, providing goods for local markets. Once government officials allowed business incentives and created special economic zones along the southeast coast, such as at Shenzhen near Hong Kong, this attracted foreign investors and consultants who explained their advanced technology.

While reducing the size of the Chinese military, Deng's plans also stressed training and the development of advanced weapons systems of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Students once again returned to their university classes or took the opportunity to continue their studies abroad. Specialists in the science and technology fields who had already received their training abroad now received respect rather than being shrouded in suspicion or persecuted. As Deng Xiaoping had hoped, the standard of living within his country improved as citizens became more economically prosperous. After he visited the United States in 1979, this diplomatic opening also led to dramatic increases in international relations. Tourism increased, and exchanges of experts in the various fields encouraged the sharing of information to assist the country's leaders in further developing the four modernizations.

Molly McLeod Mirl

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Hong Kong; Hua Guofeng; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations; Zhou Enlai.

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Fourth Field Army (1948–1955)

The main strength of the Chinese Communist forces in Northeast China, or Manchuria, during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). The army was formerly named the Northeastern People's Autonomic Army, Northeast Democratic United Army, Northeast People's Liberation Army, and then the Northeast Field Army. To maintain its control of this strategic region after the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) sent more than 110,000 troops to reinforce Manchuria from other parts of the country along with more than 20,000 military cadres as local administrators to mobilize the local masses and prepare a civil war against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government.

On October 31, 1945, the CCP established the Northeastern Autonomic Army with Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) as its commander. In January 1946, the CCP renamed the Northeastern People's Autonomic Army

as the Northeast Democratic United Army, which had a total of 270,000 troops. In March 1946, the army engaged its main force with GMD troops in the Battle of Siping. The battle lasted from April 8 to May 18, and both sides employed more than 400,000 troops. The CCP and GMD troops suffered tremendous losses at the city. In order to stop the GMD's continuing northward march into Manchuria, the army adopted a strategy of "offense in the south and defense in the north" in Manchuria. The CCP Central Committee reinforced the army, which had a total of 460,000 men in April 1947.

With continuing reinforcement, the army shifted its strategy from defense to counteroffense against the GMD force in May 1947. In August and September, the army concentrated 12 infantry divisions to attack the GMD-held cities and strategic points. By the end of 1947, the army controlled 15 cities in Manchuria, and had the full advantage of the battlefields in northeastern China.

On January 1, 1948, the Northeast Democratic United Army changed its name to the Northeast Field Army, with Lin Biao as its commander and political commissar. On September 12, the main strength of the Northeast Field Army moved southward and launched the Liaoning-Shenyang (Liao-Shen) Campaign. The offensive campaign occurred from September to November 1948 and took place in Liaoning Province, primarily around the city of Jinzhou and the countryside west of Shenyang (Mukden). The campaign, ended on November 2, lasted for 52 days. By all accounts, the Liao-Shen Campaign was a crushing strategic and tactical defeat for the GMD. Official PLA records cite 472,000 GMD casualties, which included 109,000 defections and 306,200 prisoners of war. This was an unprecedented victory for the Communists and would be the beginning

of the end for the Nationalist regime in mainland China.

In November 1948, the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP decided to reorganize its troops and called all the CCP forces the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). In January 1949, the CMC established four field armies, including the First Field Army in the northwest, the Second in central China, the Third in east China, and the Fourth in the northeast.

Based on the order of Central Military Commission of January 15, 1949, the Northeast Field Army changed its name to the Fourth Field Army of the PLA. Lin was appointed commander. It totaled 1.2 million troops.

By this point, the Fourth Field Army had become a strategic tactical unit of the PLA. From November 29, 1948, to January 31, 1949, the army received the order to move south into the Great Wall and launched the Beiping-Tianjin (Ping-Jin) Campaign. In March, the advanced command of the army moved to central and southern China. On April 20, the Fourth Field Army cooperated with the Second and Third Field Armies to launch an offensive campaign to cross the Yangzi (Yangtze) River. Then the main force of the Fourth Field Army started to move further south after they crossed the Yangzi River. In the summer, the Fourth Field Army traced the remnants of the GMD troops into southern Guangdong (Kwangtung) and southwestern Guangxi (Kwangsi) Provinces.

On October 1, 1949, Mao declared the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the new republic's alliance with the Soviet Union. From March 5 to May 1, 1950, two armies under the command of the Fifteenth Army Group of the Fourth Field Army crossed the strait and took over the GMD-held Hainan Island. In October 1950, the first wave of Chinese troops,

consisting of the Fourth Field Army's Thirty-Eighth, Thirty-Ninth, Fortieth, and Forty-Second Armies, entered the Korean War. In April 1955, the Fourth Field Army changed its name to the Guangzhou (Canton) Military Command.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Beiping-Tianjin Campaign; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; First Field Army; Fourth Field Army; Great Wall; Guomindang; Korean War; Liao-Shen Campaign; Lin Biao; Manchuria; Northeast Democratic United Army; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Tibet.

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Fu Zuoyi (Fu Tso-yi) (1895–1974)

A commander of the warlord army in the 1920s, a general of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army of the Republic of China (ROC) in the 1930s–1940s, and a governmental official of the People's Republic of China (PRC) after 1949. Born on June 2, 1895, in Linyi County, Shanxi Province, Fu joined the warlord army under the command of Marshal Yan Xishan (Yen Hsi-shan) (1883–1960) in his hometown. His

distinguished service made him an officer during the Warlord Period (1916–1927).

In 1927, Fu Zuoyi participated in the Northern Expedition and became the commander of the Fifth Army and the Tianjin (Tientsin) Garrison Command. He served under the command of Yan Xishan, who had declared his support to the GMD, but later participated in the failed coup against Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China.

In the early 1930s, Fu developed a close relationship with Marshal Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang) (1901–2001) and became the governor of Suiyuan Province in Manchuria. Fu resisted Japanese incursions from Manchukuo into Chahar through his successful Suiyuan Campaign (1936). During the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), he held numerous commanding positions in northern China. As commander of the Seventh Army Group, he fought in Operation Chahar, the Battle of Taiyuan, and the 1939–1940 Winter Offensive Campaign. By the end of World War II, he was the commander of the Twelfth War Regional Command, which included the provinces of Jehol, Chahar, and Suiyuan in northern China.

During the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), Fu Zuoyi commanded the GMD's force of 500,000 men and controlled the critically important Suiyuan-Peiping (Beijing, or Peking) Corridor that separated Manchuria from China proper. After the Fourth Field Army of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) captured the Manchurian provinces from the GMD in late 1948, the agents of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) infiltrated Fu Zuoyi's inner circle. The CCP representatives pressured him to negotiate a peaceful solution in the face of the inevitable Communist takeover.

Compounding the dilemma, Fu Zuoyi became disillusioned with Jiang Jieshi when

the last straw came in October 1948. During a critical strategic defense planning meeting of northern China, Jiang suddenly left Fu and flew to Shanghai to help one of his relatives who had trouble with the law. Fu Zuoyi and many other GMD commanders felt that Jiang placed the welfare of his family above the country. When Communist agents, including Fu's own daughter as well as his most trusted personal secretary, approached him, Fu Zuoyi began secret negotiations with Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), commander of the PLA Fourth Field Army. Their successful negotiations arranged the surrender of Fu's Beiping garrison, totaling 250,000 GMD troops, on January 31, 1949.

Fu Zuoyi's contributions to the CCP's success were rewarded with high posts such as the Minister of Water Resources in 1949–1958 and those in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and in the PRC's government. However, Fu was unable to protect his own family members during the Cultural Revolution, including his own daughter, Fu Dongju, who was strangled by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. Fu Zuoyi also died during the Cultural Revolution.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Beiping-Tianjin Campaign; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Fourth Field Army; Guomindang; Japan, Attack on Manchuria; Jiang Jieshi; Lin Biao; Manchuria; Northern Expedition; People's Liberation Army; Red Guards; Warlord Period.

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Fubing (550–1200)

A peasant-soldier service system acting as the Chinese military reserve during the medieval age. The Chinese Empire in the ancient time maintained a large army for domestic security and social order by creating a central authority and domestic control. The emperors of the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) had a regular army of over 1 million men. Peasants paid taxes in the form of grain, manual labor, and military service. The central government used the taxation system as a recruitment agency to conscribe the peasants to meet its needs for national defense and foreign expeditions.

Between 220 and 581, China experienced a long period of division and civil wars after the end of the Han dynasty. The country was first divided into the Three Kingdoms in 220–280; then civil wars occurred among the Eastern Jin dynasty and 16 states from 317 to 439; and the conflicts continued between the Northern and Southern dynasties in 420–582. Warfare lasted for more

than 300 years and drained economic and human resources. During the Northern-Southern dynasty, Turks in north China founded the Northern Wei dynasty in 386–535.

To utilize the available resources, the Wei emperors abolished the centralized taxation-based conscription system, and instead established a frontier military-farming system as a cost-effective reserve. At certain strategic points along the state border, the Wei offered free land on the frontier to poor peasants, who signed a land-service lease with the government as farmers in peacetime and soldiers in wartime. These peasant-soldiers were armed by the government and trained on a regular basis. This peasant-soldier reserve later became the *fubing* (territorial soldier) as the national military system.

In 581, the Sui emperor reunified the country and established a short-lived Sui dynasty in 581–618. A rebellion army defeated the Sui army and founded a new regime called the Tang dynasty (618–907). The Tang emperors continued the self-supporting fubing system and established 634 territorial command headquarters across the country. The commanding officers in many cases also served as local administrators. From then on, local power continued to increase as the generals controlled the civil governments at both

the county and provincial levels through the Tang dynasty. The fubing system ended when the Tang collapsed in 907.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Han Dynasty; Han Wudi, Emperor; Song Dynasty; Song-Mongol War; Sui Dynasty; Tang Dynasty; Three Kingdoms.

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Gang of Four (1966–1977)

The “Gang of Four” refers to four Maoist leaders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). They are Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch’ing) (1914–1991), Mao Zedong’s (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) wife; Zhang Chunqiao (1917–2005); Yao Wenyuan (1931–2005); and Wang Hongwen (1935–1992). This group expressed radical views and supported the Cultural Revolution policies of Mao, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). They supported the persecution of anyone who did not follow Mao’s directives. Their actions led them to become increasingly unpopular and greatly feared by the Chinese people.

After the politically moderate Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) became ill and hospitalized due to bladder cancer, his trusted assistant Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) unofficially assumed his duties. This outraged the fanatical Gang of Four, as Deng, who had ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and had been an important target during the Cultural Revolution, had also recently been politically rehabilitated. With Mao’s own health failing, speculation arose concerning who would succeed him as chairman. The Gang of Four thought that designation should fall to one of their group. After Zhou passed away on January 8, 1976, Deng gave the eulogy, but rather than officially naming him premier of the State Council, Mao appointed a favored CCP leader named

Hua Guofeng (1921–2008), who had been the first secretary of the party in Hunan Province and had proven himself loyal to Mao’s Cultural Revolution policies. This decision by the chairman infuriated the Gang of Four. Jiang Qing went so far as to publicly criticize Hua.

On April 5, 1976, thousands of mourners gathered in Tiananmen Square. Despite such actions being banned, many had come to honor Zhou Enlai’s memory at the traditional day of mourning known as the Qing Ming Festival. Some of those in attendance soon began to protest the Gang of Four. When the crowd’s animosity became readily apparent, Jiang and her allies responded by summoning police to disperse the boisterous demonstrators, and fierce rioting erupted. To then rid themselves of their most viable rival, the group blamed Deng Xiaoping for the Qing Ming Tiananmen Square incident. In response to this situation, Mao once again purged Deng from office. Although the Gang of Four then appeared to be in the strongest political position regarding his succession, Mao did not trust them to carry on his legacy. This he decided to entrust to Hua Guofeng.

In July, after an earthquake that struck the city of Tangshan, Hebei (Hopei) Province, killed hundreds of thousands, a superstitious Chinese populace responded negatively to the Gang of Four’s reminder to remain compliant with Mao’s directives by rejecting Deng Xiaoping’s revolutionary influence. After Mao Zedong died on September 9, 1976, the Gang of Four still believed one of their group rather than Hua Guofeng should



Chinese poster (ca. 1976) calling for people to “resolutely overthrow the anti-party clique” of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen. The so-called Gang of Four were brought to trial in 1980, accused of “persecuting to death” 34,800 people during the Cultural Revolution in China and of having “framed and persecuted” 729,511 other people during their years in power. (Stefan Landsberger)

be the rightful successor to Mao’s office. At the memorial service held in Tiananmen Square on September 18, Jiang Qing stood beside Hua as he read the eulogy. Despite this public appearance together, Hua—with the support of important military leaders like Marshal Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986), others in the Politburo of the Central Committee, and supporters of Deng Xiaoping—ordered the arrests of the radical group and their associates during the early hours of October 6, thereby crushing their planned coup d’état. Many in China, who thought the Gang of Four’s views too

fanatical, welcomed the news. A national media campaign commenced in which the group faced severe criticism for their excesses carried out during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. The accused spent four years in prison before their show trial began in 1980.

Jiang and her colleagues stood accused of many crimes, including either the persecution or killing of thousands of innocent people. Because adequate records had not been maintained, the true extent of their criminal activities remains unclear. While information presented to the court’s many judges estimated that 800,000 persons had been persecuted under the Cultural Revolution, it is well known that many deaths either went unreported or were covered up by the police or Red Guard members. Jiang Qing, the former actress and the group’s accused ring-leader, reacted dramatically to the charges in court. She shouted her opinions at the panel of 35 judges. At age 67, and having endured years of solitary confinement, she meant to be heard. Vehemently arguing that she had been acting under Mao’s great influence, she was still shrieking her personal views to the judges as she was dragged away from the proceedings.

While Jiang and Zhang declared their innocence, they each received death sentences, though the authorities later commuted these to terms of life imprisonment. Both Yao and Wang, who confessed and repented of their activities at the trial, earned a life and 20-year prison sentence, respectively. Unlike many of their Cultural Revolution victims, none of the condemned suffered rulings of execution. Several conspirators garnered guilty verdicts and lengthy prison terms for their collaborative efforts. Records reveal that the radical group members were subsequently released and that Jiang Qing committed suicide in 1991. While Wang Hongwen died the following year, both

Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan passed away in 2005.

Molly McLeod Mirll

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Hua Guofeng; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Red Guards; Ye Jianying; Zhou Enlai.

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Gao Gang (Kao Kang) (1902–1954)

Chinese Communist leader and general, born in Hengshan County, Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, around 1902. Gao Gang was a key leader of Communist forces in Shaanxi during the early 1930s. Gao served as the political commissar of the Shaanxi and Gansu (Kansu) Provinces guerrilla forces in 1931. Between

1933 and 1934, he was political commissar of the Shaanxi-Gansu Military Committee. Gao helped develop the Soviet area in Yan'an (Yenan) that would provide sanctuary to the survivors of the Long March (1934–1935) and to Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), who arrived there on October 19, 1935. Gao was trained at the Xi'an (Sian) Military Academy. He remained in Yan'an until 1945, when he was transferred to the northeastern region of China (Manchuria).

In May 1949, Gao was sent on a secret mission of top Chinese leaders to Moscow. Along with Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969), Gao headed the Chinese committee to handle Soviet loans and material assistance. On November 2, 1949, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Shenyang (Mukden) and established the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) Northeast Bureau, Gao Gang was named the secretary. Gao was especially powerful in the region because he held all major posts of the military, Communist Party, and government. He maintained close ties to senior government and military leaders in the USSR, as well as Russian railway and resource interests in Manchuria.

On August 4, 1950, a Politburo meeting convened in Beijing (Peking) to discuss accelerating preparations to assist the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in the Korean War. On August 5, 1950, Mao Zedong ordered Gao to mobilize the Northeast Border Defense Force (NBDF) to prepare for intervention in Korea by late August. With preparations ineffective, on August 15, Gao sent a telegram to Mao suggesting that mobilization be postponed. Mao responded by informing Gao that preparations must be completed no later than September 30. As commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region, Gao was ordered to "take

full charge of coordinating and guaranteeing all requisitions of supplies from the rear base, as well as for assistance provided to Korean comrades.”

During late August, Beijing increased pressure on Gao to complete mobilization for the possible intervention. Gao is reported to have opposed intervention at an October 4, 1950, meeting, primarily on the basis of economic concerns, arguing that the new republic could not support a war and the people would be “disenchanted.” Other reports contradict this, claiming that Gao supported Mao’s decision to intervene in Korea. In any case, on October 5, 1950, Mao’s decision to intervene prevailed. In the formal order of October 8, the NBDF was renamed Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF), with Gao in charge of supplies, transportation, and other rear services.

In the early summer of 1951, Mao sent PLA Chief of Staff Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-ch’ian) (1901–1990) to Moscow to secure munitions and military technology. Gao later was sent to assist, but the Soviets hesitated, fearing war with the United States and being distrustful of China.

As a regional commander, Gao commanded all PLA ground, navy, and air forces as well as the Public Security forces (including the border guards). He was responsible for training, recruiting, organizing, and arming all forces. He also commanded the militia and served as the custodian of its arms and ammunition. Gao also supervised support to specialized units, such as air defense, railway, airborne, and amphibious units within northeast China. Gao operated the local military schools and training centers, and he handled all inductions and separations. He was also responsible for the maintenance of law and order, including the arrest of “counterrevolutionaries, bandits, and enemy agents.”

From late 1953 to early 1954, Gao was the target of the first major purge within the CCP leadership since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both Gao and Rao Shushi, political commissar of Shanghai, were accused of building “independent kingdoms” and following erroneous economic policies. Gao, for example, had established one-man management within factories, an innovation Mao Zedong hated, rather than relying on the cumbersome revolutionary factory management committees. Rao and Gao were accused of trying to seize power from Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) and Liu Shaoqi to assume the senior positions next to Mao. Gao’s close links to the Soviet Union may also have been a factor in his downfall.

Gao disappeared in early 1954 without explanation. His last known public appearance was on January 20, 1954. For his alleged crimes, Gao was deprived of all his posts and expelled from the party. Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) later announced that Gao Gang had been guilty of the ultimate treason by committing suicide in 1954.

Lieutenant Colonel Susan M. Puska

See also: China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese People’s Volunteer Force; Deng Xiaoping; Korea; Korean War; Liu Shaoqi; Long March; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; People’s Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Xu Xiangqian; Yan’an; Zhou Enlai.

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General Departments of the People's Liberation Army

The general departments, or general headquarters (HQs), of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under the Central Military Commission (CMC) are the most important part of the PLA's chain of command. These departments make strategic decisions, provide military intelligence, plan and execute operations, recruit and train troops, research and develop new military technology, and secure China's borders. They command the Chinese armed forces, including army, air force, navy, and strategic missile force.

During the formative years of the Chinese Communist armed forces, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), then Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), formed the Chinese Soviet Central Revolutionary Military Committee as the high command of the Red Army. The Military Committee had the staff and political affairs departments during the CCP's Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937) against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government. In May 1933, the Staff Department was changed to the General HQs of the Red Army, including six bureaus: operations, intelligence, communication, training, recruitment, and organization.

During the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), the party maintained its control of the armed forces after the CCP-GMD coalition established in early 1937. In order to

command its own troops, in August 1937, the CCP Central Committee established a new Central Military Commission. It included the general staff, general political tasks, logistics, and medic departments. The Department of General Staff had operation, intelligence, and communication bureaus to command the seven divisions of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army through World War II. The CMC continued to serve as the high command of the CCP forces during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), in which the CCP defeated the GMD forces and took over the country.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, the central government established its own Central Military Commission, separate from the CCP's. In September 1954, the First National People's Congress (NPC) promulgated a new constitution, creating a new National Defense Commission under the central government and a new Ministry of Defense under the State Council. Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) became the first defense minister in this new configuration. Thereafter, Peng reorganized the command system. On October 11, 1954, the PLA established eight general departments, which paralleled those in the armed forces of the Soviet Union, including the existing General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Officer Corps Department. To follow the Soviet model, Peng also added four new general departments: equipment, training, finance, and auditing.

As with the Soviet Red Army, the GSD carried out staff and operational functions of the PLA and implemented modernization plans. Within the defense hierarchy, the GSD conveyed policy directives downward, translated national security and defense

policy into specific responsibilities for subordinate departments, oversaw policy implementation on behalf of the CMC, and commanded China's military force operations in wartime. The GSD also performed important organizational functions such as procurement, operational planning, and intelligence. Headed by the chief of the General Staff, the department served as the headquarters for the ground forces and contained directorates for the other armed services.

The GPD was responsible for ideological indoctrination, political loyalty, morale, personnel records, cultural activities, discipline, and military justice. Organizationally, the GPD provided the PLA with its party structure. The director of the department oversaw a system of political commissars assigned to each echelon of the PLA. One of the political commissar's primary tasks was the supervision of the party organization through party committees at the battalion level and above or through party branches at the company level. In the 1960s, the GPD exerted a considerable amount of political influence throughout the defense establishment.

The GLD was the least politically influential of the three general departments. Headed by a chief, the GLD supervised production, supply, transportation, housing, pay, and medical services. Before the Korean War (1950–1953), most of this support came from the civilian populace usually organized most frequently by commissars.

After the fall of Marshal Peng in 1959, Marshal Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), new defense minister, terminated many of Peng's military reforming programs. In 1959, the eight general departments merged into three general departments: GSD, GPD, and GLD. This commanding system of the PLA continued for almost 30 years until 1998.

During Mao's Cultural Revolution, the three general departments became paralyzed. On August 23, 1966, Lin Biao called for "three-month turmoil" in the PLA at the CMC Standing Committee meeting. On October 5, the CMC and General Political Department issued an urgent instruction that all the military academies and institutes should dismiss their classes and allow their cadets to become fully involved in the Great Cultural Revolution. In these general departments, commanders and officers were expelled from their positions. In the course of the cruel questioning sessions, many were tormented or beaten to death. For instance, in the General Political Department, Lin's followers and leftists called for "destroying the GPD hell" (*yanwangdian*) and overthrowing General Xiao Hua, director of the GPD on July 25. Thereafter, 40 top officers in the GPD were purged, and most of them died in prison. From 1967 to 1969, more than 80,000 officers were accused and purged. Among them, 1,169 officers died of torture, starvation, or by execution. Many military institutes were shut down, and research programs were cancelled. The number of military academies was reduced from 125 to 43. Many defense works were destroyed, and regular training actually stopped.

From 1966 to 1976, the PLA general departments experienced tremendous ups and downs that corresponded with international as well as domestic politics. After Lin Biao's death in 1971, Mao began another purge in the PLA. Then, after Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping, the second generation of the CCP leadership, launched a reforming movement in China, including military reform. In the mid-1980s, Deng downsized the PLA forces by 1 million troops within two years. By 1985, the staff and officers in the three general departments

were also reduced by 24 percent. In 1989, Jiang Zemin became the chairman of both the CCP and CMC as the third generation of Chinese leadership. Jiang continued Deng's reform and provided moderate leadership by sharing power with the military through a bureaucratic institution of the PLA. The three general departments play a more important role in the high command. In 1998, the CMC created a unified General Armaments Department alongside the three departments in a major overhaul of its command and control, logistics, and armament mechanisms. The commanding system of the four general departments continues today.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; Guomindang; Jiang Zemin; Jiangxi Soviet; Korean War; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; New Fourth Army; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Soviet Union.


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Genghis Khan (1162–1227)

One of the greatest and most notorious conquerors in Asia, Genghis Khan (Chinggis Khan or Chengiz Khan) was able to unite various Mongolian clans into an army that not only defeated everyone in its path but also helped him create an empire that eventually stretched from Beijing (Peking) to the Caspian Sea. The expansion of the Mongols' power affected not only inner Asia, China, and Korea but Russia and Hungary as well, and in each place the legacy of their terror was long remembered. Though brutal to his enemies (he once said that there was nothing better in life than killing one's enemies, stealing their horses and cattle, and taking their women), Genghis was a skilled tactician and ruler, one who successfully organized a multiethnic state.

Temujin, the man who would later become Genghis Khan, was born ca. 1162 AD to a powerful Mongolian family. Legend told that he was of divine origin. Most of what is known of his early life is found in the *Secret History of the Mongols*, a history compiled about two generations after his death. When Genghis was only nine, his father, Yesugei, was murdered. The Taychiut, a rival family in the clan, seized control and abandoned



Genghis on the steppe along with his mother and brothers.

The next few years were difficult ones, but in that time, Genghis found great help in his father's friend, Toghri Khan, the leader of the allied Kereit tribe. Among other acts of assistance, Toghri helped to rescue Genghis's wife, Borte, who was abducted by the Merkit. Toghri provided Genghis with a military force and convinced Jamuka, Genghis's childhood friend, to assist them. The combined forces rescued Borte and decimated the Merkit. Genghis then went after other tribes, including the Jurkin, which, like the Merkit, was destroyed. In the case of the Jurkin, Genghis killed all of the tribe's nobility and took its commoners as soldiers and servants. The absorption of conquered peoples into the Mongol Empire would become a common practice.

The alliance between Genghis and Toghri continued to thrive. When the emperor of China's Jin dynasty engaged in conflict

against the Tatars, Genghis and Toghri joined his attack. The emperor later rewarded them for their assistance. When Genghis had amassed enough power of his own, he went after the Tatars again and destroyed them. Genghis is said to have killed any Tatar who was taller than a cart axle and then absorbed the Tatar children into the Mongol Empire.

Genghis's power base was dealt a blow when he and Jamuka had a falling-out. The Mongols split between the two men, with Toghri, Genghis's old ally, aligning himself with Jamuka. Genghis ultimately prevailed over both Toghri's Kereit tribe and Jamuka's forces. By 1203, using a combination of war, threat of war, and alliance, Genghis had managed to establish himself as ruler of the Mongols, and by 1206, he was acknowledged as Genghis Khan, or "universal ruler."

In fighting other Mongol tribes and their neighbors, Genghis created not only an experienced, highly mobile army but also a very large one. Traditionally, the Mongols

had fought in tribal units. Genghis wisely created new, nonclan units of 1,000 horsemen each. Each of the commanders was personally loyal to him, which meant that Genghis could replace them (he sometimes did) and that older, usually stronger ties of family were less of a threat. Genghis created another unit, his own special guard of 10,000 men, many of whom were the sons of his generals. As the Mongol military moved away from the clan system, so did Mongol society, and both became more feudalistic.

Mongol expansion began in earnest once Genghis had neutralized the threat of neighboring states. Those who were not killed joined his ranks. The rapid expansion of Genghis's power was first felt with the Mongol conquest of China. Around 1206, Genghis campaigned against the Tangut kingdom of Xi Xia in what is today part of Tibet and sections of northern China. The Xi Xia's leader capitulated in 1209. In 1211, Genghis attacked the Jin dynasty. The land north of the Yellow River (Huanghe) became a wasteland: an estimated 90 cities were left in ruin. Parts of Beijing, for example, burned for a month when Genghis attacked it in 1215.

The war against the Jin lasted until 1234, though other matters often commanded the great khan's attention during that time. One such incident occurred when the ruler of the Khwarezm Empire executed several Mongol envoys. Leaving Muqali, one of his generals, in charge to continue the fight against the Chinese, Genghis turned toward Khwarezm. Between 1219 and 1223, the Mongols laid waste to Khwarezm.

While Genghis was away, the Xi Xia and the Jin united against the Mongols. Having avenged himself against the Khwarezm, Genghis headed back to Xi Xia in 1225. When he arrived with his 180,000 troops, Genghis found a force of 300,000 Xi Xia. Despite being outnumbered, the Mongols

decimated their enemy. Genghis left some of his forces to lay siege to the Xi Xia capital, while his son Ogadai took another portion west; Genghis moved with the rest of his forces to China's southern border. In 1227, the Xi Xia emperor surrendered. When the Jin tried to establish peace, Genghis refused.

Genghis experienced unparalleled success in his military adventures. In addition to his wars in Central Asia and China, he also threatened Korea, which out of fear became subject to him. His Mongols also sacked such great cities as Samarkand and Bukhara (both in present-day Uzbekistan). Under Genghis, many other peoples—those who did not resist him—were absorbed into the Mongol confederation, which made his empire a multiethnic state.

While there is little doubt that Genghis was a brutal leader, particularly toward cities, he nonetheless did some good in his time. Genghis was patron to Changchun, or Jiu Zhuji, a famous Taoist. In addition, though he was illiterate himself, Genghis mandated the creation and use of written Mongolian. He generally encouraged the arts—although his enthusiasm often meant forcibly moving artisans from their homelands. He also united the Mongols, who until his time had lived a difficult, pastoral life in the Central Asian steppes.

On August 18, 1227, Genghis died from wounds probably sustained either in battle or while hunting. Genghis's descendants went on to threaten Austria, Japan, Persia, and Poland. In particular, Kublai Khan, his grandson, capitalized on Genghis's ideas to create one of the greatest empires in Asian history.

James B. Emmons

See also: Jin Dynasty; Kublai Khan; Korea; Mongols; Mongols, Cavalry of; Song Dynasty; Song-Mongol War; Yuan Dynasty.

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Grand Canal

The Grand Canal of China, 1,114 miles long with 24 locks and some 60 bridges, is the oldest and longest canal in the world. The Grand Canal greatly exceeds the next two grand canals of the world: the Suez and Panama Canals built respectively in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Grand Canal runs from Hangzhou (Hangchow), Zhejiang (Chekiang) Province, in southeastern China to Beijing (Peking) in north China. As a major transportation hub in the past 1,500 years, the Grand Canal, joining the river systems from different directions, interconnected the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, Yellow River (Huanghe), Huai River, Hai River, and other rivers. Like the Great Wall, the Grand Canal is renowned as one of the most impressive examples of traditional Chinese architecture.

The Grand Canal was built section by section in different areas and during different dynasties before it was linked together during the Sui dynasty (581–618). From the

very beginning, in the late Spring and Autumn Period (722–481 BC) of the Zhou dynasty (1066–221 BC), a canal was constructed for trading purposes, as well as to ship supplies north. Work began in 486 BC. The canal, completed in three years, connected the Yangzi River to the Huai River by means of existing waterways, lakes, and marshes. In 604 AD, Emperor Yangdi (Yang-ti) (reigned 605–617) of the Sui dynasty ordered a large-scale expansion of the canal. It took more than six years to complete this great project, known as the Grand Canal. Approximately half of the 3 million peasants who worked on the project died of hunger and exhaustion, which in part contributed to the collapse of the Sui dynasty. Some sections of the Grand Canal were abandoned, and some decomposed during the Tang dynasty (618–907) and Song dynasty (960–1279). During the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), the Mongols moved the capital of China to Beijing and renovated the canal. For the first time, a summit section was dug to link Hangzhou and Beijing with a direct north-south waterway. The Grand Canal was renovated almost completely during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Between 1411 and 1415, a total of 165,000 peasants were forced to clean the canal bed and build new channels, embankments, and canal locks. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), many of the canal sections were not functional, and some parts returned to flat fields. After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the need for economic growth led the Beijing government to order extensive restoration work. Today the Grand Canal is used primarily to transport vast amounts of bulk goods such as bricks, gravel, sand, diesel, and coal.

The Grand Canal contributed to the invention of new technologies. In 587, the renowned engineer Liang Rui invented canal lock gates to regulate water levels for

the original canal along the Yellow River. In response to the requirements of greater safety for the travel of barge ships along rough waters of the Grand Canal, a double-gate system, known as the pound lock, was invented in 984. This system allowed ships to wait within a gated space while the water could be drained to appropriate levels.

From the Sui to Qing dynasties, the Grand Canal, functioning as the main artery between northern and southern China, was essential for the transportation of grain to the imperial capital. At its height, more than 8,000 boats transported 240,000–360,000 metric tons of grain during the Tang dynasty every year.

The Grand Canal also helped the imperial army to become self-sufficient farmers while stationed at the northern frontier, shipping food supplies easily from south to north. Besides its function as a grain shipment route, the canal furthermore promoted political integration between northern and southern China, as it had long been a government-run messenger route for the past 1,000 years. During the Ming dynasty, for example, official courier stations were placed at intervals of approximately 20 miles, and each courier station was given a different name. The expediency of transport along the Grand Canal also helped make possible the travel of emperors to southern China for inspections. During the Qing dynasty, Emperors Kangxi (K'ang-hsi) (1661–1722) and Qianlong (Ch'ien-lung) (1736–1795) made 12 trips to the south. Thereafter, the canal greatly improved the imperial administration and military defenses of China.

The Grand Canal also contributed to the Sino-Western cultural exchange. Marco Polo (1254–1324), for example, recounted the Grand Canal's arched bridges in addition to the stores and booming trade of its cities in the thirteenth century. Also, the famous Roman Catholic missionary Matteo Ricci

(1552–1610) traveled from Nanjing (Nanking) to Beijing on the canal at the end of the sixteenth century.

The Grand Canal contributed greatly to China's economy in the past 2,000 years. It was mainly used for shipping grain but also transported other commodities, and the corridor along the canal developed into an important economic ring, promoting trade and strengthening economic relations between northern and southern China.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: China, People's Republic of; Great Wall; Kangxi, Emperor; Ming Dynasty; Mongols; Qianlong, Emperor; Qing Dynasty; Song Dynasty; Song-Mongol War; Sui Dynasty; Tang Dynasty; Yuan Dynasty; Zhou Dynasty.

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Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. *See* Cultural Revolution

Great Wall

The Great Wall of China, now more than 2,000 years old, is one of history's most

ambitious construction projects. The Great Wall extends from Shanghai Pass (Shanhaiguan) to Jiayu Pass (Jiayuguan), for a total of about 4,500 miles. First begun as many disconnected fortifications in the seventh century BC, the Great Wall was combined into a single defensive fortification in the third century BC. Although it has suffered considerable damage due to warfare and weather over its long life, and its era as a functional fortification has now passed, vast sections of the Great Wall remain standing today as one of the most important symbols of China's strength and endurance.

Communist leader Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), founder of the People's Republic of China (PRC), reportedly told the Chinese people, "If you have not climbed the Great Wall, you cannot call yourself a great man," and visits to the wall by proud Chinese people have increased throughout the modern period. Traditionally, most Chinese have regarded the wall as a cultural barrier as well as a military one, a demarcation point separating their "civilized" land from the "barbarian" lands to the north. At the same time, the non-Chinese world has also become captivated by the wall, and most foreign tourists visit it when traveling in China. The United Nations recognized the importance of the Great Wall to all of human history in 1987, when it declared the structure a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site.

When construction of the Great Wall began, ancient China had emerged as a variety of independent states, often at war with one another and with raiding tribal groups from Mongolia and Central Asia. That chapter of Chinese history is known as the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BC) and the Warring States Period (475–221 BC) of the

Zhou dynasty (1066–221 BC), names that allude to the political climate of the time. In the seventh century BC, one of the most powerful Chinese states was the Chu, and its leaders began construction on what would eventually become precursors to the Great Wall of China. Calling their defense the "square wall," Chu's architects sought to build fortifications around the northern borders of the province in an effort to protect both the population and its resources from Mongolian raids. The success of the Chu wall inspired many other Chinese states to do the same, and over the next three centuries, a variety of walls were erected in many parts of what is now called China, including the states of Qi and Wei.

Between 214 and 204 BC, hundreds of thousands of workers from all over China were conscripted and sent to the northern border of China to build the Great Wall, meant to keep nomadic raiders out of China. The wall itself was made largely of earth, with tall watchtowers for sentries to observe any advancing hordes on the horizon. The notion of the wall remained central to Chinese military and political thought, and the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) of the second and first centuries BC rebuilt and expanded it, with important ecological and economic results. The Han wall was famous because it protected larger areas of land suitable for agricultural exploitation, and as a result, food production increased significantly, as did the population. Furthermore, the Han wall, which was expanded further by later emperors in the first century BC and first century AD, created a safe zone and natural passage for the Silk Road, the famed trade route that brought goods from the Mediterranean world east to China and back again. It was that trade that first brought Chinese goods to the West, and it was the Great Wall that allowed traders to

feel confident that their caravans would be able to cross through China without being robbed by bandits.

The Great Wall as it is known today was largely a creation of the Ming dynasty, which ruled China from 1368 to 1644. The Ming emperors found themselves threatened by the Mongols and suffered greatly at the hands of Mongol chief Esen Taiji when his forces attacked China between 1449 and 1454. A century later, the Mongols threatened China again, this time led by Altan Khan, who besieged the Chinese capital, Beijing, in 1550. As a result, Ming leaders determined to create a new Great Wall to serve as an impenetrable fortification that would protect China from further invasion.

Learning from the engineering mistakes of their predecessors, the Ming commanded their architects and engineers to create a much stronger wall made of local stone limestone or granite—or fired bricks mixed with egg whites and sticky rice for extra strength—with elaborate watchtowers, storehouses, and barracks built directly into the wall itself. Between 1560 and 1640, the Ming leaders channeled extraordinary amounts of money and manpower into this ambitious project. The new wall was taller, thicker, and larger than any of the previous walls, extending over roughly 4,000 miles of northern China, from the Bohai Sea in the east to the Uighur region in the west. This structure, upon completion, became the longest and most expansive fortification of all time. Moreover, in western China, the wall itself ended at the Jiayu Pass, an important Silk Road oasis on the edge of the Gobi Desert. The Chinese monitored conditions and possible invasions along the Silk Road with a series of watchtowers that communicated using smoke signals. In that way, the defense of the wall was expanded far beyond its physical presence.

The Great Wall continued to protect China through the centuries, with varying degrees of effectiveness, until 1933. In that year, the battle known as the Defense of the Great Wall was fought between China and Japan, after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Although the Chinese believed that the Great Wall would prevent the Japanese from crossing through the Shanhai Pass into fortified China, the Japanese used massive firepower to breach the wall and invade China. After that defeat, the Chinese realized that they were completely incapable of defending other parts of the wall, as their munitions were inferior to those of the Japanese, and the majority of China's army was equipped only with pistols, swords, and grenades. After several battles along the wall, the Chinese were forced to admit defeat and sign an armistice that created a demilitarized zone along the length of the wall. From that moment on during the Anti-Japanese War, it was clear that the Great Wall of China could no longer protect the nation from foreign invasion.

Despite its cultural significance, the Great Wall has seen at least 500 miles fall into disrepair in recent years, particularly in the western Uighur Autonomous Region of China. Other parts of the wall have been breached by roadways or stripped of materials for modern construction projects. However, the Chinese government has also funneled money into restoring and rebuilding large parts of the wall, including the Badaling area near Beijing, the most visited section of the wall today. Moreover, various Chinese municipalities have used the wall as a centerpiece for tourism, including the city of Tianjin, which began an annual Great Wall Marathon in 2000. Despite the fact that it no longer stands as a viable barrier between China and its enemies, the Great Wall continues to merit fame and fascination

throughout the world, and the People's Republic of China still recognizes the symbolic importance of this ancient marvel.

Dr. Nancy L. Stockdale

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Han Dynasty; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Ming Dynasty; Qin Dynasty; Silk Road; Warring States Period.

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Guandu, Battle of (200)

The Battle of Guandu (*Guandu Zhizhan*) was one of the three largest campaigns during the last phase of the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD). It was a battle between two warlords, Cao Cao and Yuan Shao, over the territory in northern China. Cao Cao won the battle and made it an excellent military example of defeating enemy troops with a force inferior in number.

In the late Han dynasty, army generals developed personally accountable mercenary military troops, and large landowners established private armies to protect their holdings. Desperate peasants turned to rebellions such as the Yellow Turbans. The Han efforts to put down the rebellions left the generals in effective control of large territories backed by personally loyal troops.

Several powerful military leaders established their domains separately and developed into territorial magnates. Among them were Cao Cao (155–220), who gained control of central China south of the Yellow River (Huanghe); Liu Bei (161–223), who claimed the provinces in the southwest; Yuan Shao, who occupied northern China north of the Yellow River; and Sun Quan (182–252), who controlled the central and southeastern parts of the country along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River.

In 199, having consolidated his control of the north, Yuan Shao began his southern expedition against Cao Cao. In December, Yuan Shan led 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry troops to attack Xuchang, capital city of Cao Cao's domain. After evaluating his military resources, Cao Cao decided to defend the city by building a forward defense line at Guandu (modern Zhongmu, Henan Province), about 75 miles northeast of Xuchang. At the earlier stage of this battle in January 200, Cao Cao utilized surprise attacks and killed Yuan Shao's two commanders, Yan Liang and Wen Chou, forcing Yuan Shao to delay his general attack. After several offensives in the spring, Yuan Shao failed to break through Cao Cao's defense line at Guandu. In the summer, Yuan Shao's aide-de-camp Xu You betrayed his lord and went over to Cao Cao's side. Xu suggested Cao Cao attack Yuan Shao's rear base of army provisions at Wuchao. Cao Cao accepted his advice and led 5,000 troops himself to attack Wuchao, burning all Yuan Shao's supply in October.

When Yuan Shao heard that the Wuchao supply depot was under attack, he decided to launch the final attack at Guandu. Cao Cao laid in wait and organized an effective defense. When Yuan Shao's offensive slowed down, Cao Cao ordered a counteroffensive at Guandu and destroyed Yuan Shao's main strength. Cao Cao pressed on in hot pursuit of the fleeing

Yuan Shao's troops to the Yellow River (Huanghe), and captured about 70,000 men as prisoners of war. Yuan Shao retreated to northern Hebei with just 800 men after the Battle of Guandu. Yuan Shao was never able to launch another significant offensive campaign against Cao Cao, who established his control in central China by 200.

Yutong Yang

See also: Cao Cao; Chibi, Battle of; Han Dynasty; Han, Cavalry of; Han Wudi, Emperor; Liu Bei; Three Kingdoms.

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Guangzhou Uprising (1927)

An armed rebellion led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party

of China) against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government in the city of Guangzhou (Canton), southern Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province. The leadership of the CCP learned that the Communist movement in China needed its own armed forces when the first CCP-GMD coalition ended in April 1927. The CCP Central Committee began its effort to create a new revolutionary army of the workers and peasants. But, after Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) Nationalist government had declared the CCP illegal, antigovernment, and a capital crime, most of the party members had either been killed or left the CCP. A few of the CCP members in the Nationalist army survived the “white terror.” In mid-July 1927, the Central Committee held an emergency meeting that terminated the leadership of Chen Duxiu (Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (1879–1942) and set up a five-member temporary standing committee in order to save the party. To save the CCP-controlled troops in the Nationalist army, the committee planned uprisings within the Nationalist armies in Nanchang, Guangzhou, and other cities.

The uprising at Guangzhou occurred despite the strong objections of Communist military commanders such as Ye Ting (Yeh Ting) (1896–1946), Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986), and Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-ch'ian) (1901–1990). On December 11, 1927, CCP rebels, directed by Communist leaders Zhang Tailei, Ye Ting, Huang Ping, Zhuo Wenyong, and Ye Jianying, attacked the city of Guangzhou, one of the most strategic positions in southern China. Except for those in the headquarters and armory of the GMD's Fourth Army Group, almost all GMD troops of Guangzhou's garrison were killed by the CCP armed rebels. Meanwhile, more than

20,000 armed local peasants joined the CCP insurrectionary army. After 10 hours of fighting, they took over Guangzhou. Then the Communist leaders officially renamed the city's new government the "Guangzhou Soviet."

However, the GMD and warlord forces quickly responded to the uprising. On December 12, the Guomindang government sent four divisions, with the naval support of England, the United States, Japan, and France. The GMD and warlord troops counterattacked Guangzhou from east, west, and south. After one day and one night of tough defense, the CCP rebels lost 1,000 men and retreated from Guangzhou. Zhang Tailei, the uprising organizer, was killed in an ambush. The attempted takeover failed by the early morning of December 13, 1927. When the Guomindang recovered Guangzhou, they killed more than 5,000 citizens who had supported the CCP uprising. After taking-over the city, the GMD troops continued their suppression and purge of the CCP rebels. Many CCP members were arrested and killed. In the meantime, the Guangzhou Soviet government was renamed the "Guangzhou Commune" or "Paris Commune of the East." It lasted only for a short period of time when more than 5,000 Communists were killed in the following week.

The Central Committee of the CCP blamed Ye Ting, military commander of the Guangzhou Uprising, for the disaster. In fact, the main cause of the CCP failure in Guangzhou was the obvious disadvantageous conditions for the uprising and weakness of the Communist force. Ye and other military commanders had pointed out these problems, and even opposed the uprising. Enraged by the party's unfair treatment, Ye Ting left China for exile in Europe and did not return until nearly a decade later. Despite its military failure, the Guangzhou

Uprising promoted the Communist movement and encouraged further uprisings across the country. After this failure, the CCP changed its strategy of revolution which was based on the experience of the Soviet Union: the urban-centered uprising. However, this approach was not suited to China's national conditions. The Chinese Communist leaders decided to transfer their focus of national revolution from city to countryside, which provided a better foundation for the CCP's efforts.

Yutong Yang

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Nationalist Army; Xu Xiangqian; Ye Jianying; Ye Ting.

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Guerrilla Warfare (1928–1949)

A weak army strategy fights a stronger opponent force to survive or to win a victory through guerrilla tactics such as operations behind the enemy lines, hit-and-run, surprise attacks, and night combat. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), applied it to the CCP's early military struggle in the remote mountainous and rural areas during the

Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937) and Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). Then the Chinese Communist forces continued to follow the strategy through the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) and the Korean War (1950–1953). Having won some victories in these wars, Mao made guerrilla warfare part of the Chinese military tradition and became the father of Communist guerrilla warfare.

Mao's guerrilla strategy was born during the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937). After the CCP Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927, the rebelling Communist troops failed to defend the city and establish an urban base. To save their army, commanders Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) and He Long (Ho Lung) (1896–1969) moved the rebel army southward from central Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province in late August and attempted to return to Guangdong, a former revolutionary base in the south. The Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT: the Chinese Nationalist) troops in Guangdong (Kwangtung), however, advanced north and stopped the rebels' southern movement with a strong defense. Zhu and He lost half of their troops by October, and many of the rebels surrendered, deserted, or returned to the GMD forces. Only 2,000 survivors, out of 23,000 men and officers at the Nanchang Uprising, moved into Hunan under the command of Zhu as the Twenty-Eighth Regiment, and later they joined Mao's forces in April 1928.

In August 1927, Mao led the peasants' Autumn Harvest Uprising in central Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces. Mao argued that the peasants held no interest in such a large-scale rebellion unless the party was willing to center the movement in their areas where a victory would benefit the peasants. The provincial committee agreed with Mao and moved the armed workers, CCP-controlled troops, and security units from the cities to

the countryside to support the peasants' rebellion. Mao seemed more concerned about the peasants' mobilization and benefits for his region, South Hunan, than the revolutionary movement in the provincial capital and other cities. Thereafter, the CCP shifted its focus from an urban-centered revolution to a rural-centered military movement.

In late August, Mao organized the First Division of the Chinese Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants (1927–1928) with three regiments and 5,000 men. In early October, Mao led a regiment southward and reached the Jinggangshan, a mountain range in the Luoxiao (Lohsiao) Mountains. At that point, some CCP leaders did not believe Mao could survive since there were no resources to support the troops and no people interested in the revolution in the mountains. Some considered Mao's move "up to the mountain" as betraying the CCP and becoming one of the bandits. Mao, however, survived and successfully established a military base area for the CCP revolution in 1928. Under his command, the regiment established the Jinggangshan base along the Jiangxi-Hunan border. Zhu and his troops joined Mao at Jinggangshan on April 24, 1928. They established the Fourth Army on May 4, about 5,000 men organized into six regiments, for which they had but 2,000 rifles. Zhu was the commander, and Mao served as the political commissar. Soon other Communist troops joined them at Jinggangshan (Chingkang Mountains), which became the "cradle" of the CCP's military revolution.

During this formative period, Mao and Zhu also laid some groundwork for the Communist army. They set up three tasks for the Fourth Army: fighting, raising money for the revolutionary cause (later changed to production), and work of the masses. To win battles, Zhu and Mao developed guerrilla

tactics during these formative years. Prior to the Jinggangshan period, most of the commanders followed examples from Russia's October Revolution and the GMD's Northern Expedition; some of them suffered heavy casualties in urban areas in 1927. They realized the Russian experience, or city-centered operations, did not work for the Chinese Communist military revolution, and that they had to look for a new strategy. Since the Fourth Army operated in remote, mountainous areas and away from the GMD military, which occupied the major cities, a guerrilla warfare strategy worked. During the defense of the Jinggangshan region in 1928, Zhu and Mao perfected the guerrilla tactics, which they summarized as: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."

Following the Jinggangshan model, other CCP surviving units established their military bases one after another in the rural and border regions of Hunan, Fujian (Fukien), Jiangsu (Ksiangsu), and Anhui (Anhui) Provinces. Finally, the Central Committee accepted Mao's way, or his "up to the mountains" approach, after its last urban uprising failed in Guangzhou (Canton) in December 1927. On May 25, 1928, the CCP Central Committee issued "CC#51: Military Task Guideline," the first systematic outline for CCP military organization, institution, and operation. In this document, the Central Committee incorporated all the CCP units into the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army (1928–1937). Praising the Fourth Army's experience in land reform to win over the peasants and its guerrilla tactics, the Central Committee ordered other armies to follow its example. Clearly, Zhu and Mao had created a definitive military center at Jinggangshan for the Communist revolution at that time.

During World War II, Mao applied his guerrilla strategy to the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). After the CCP-GMD united front was established in December 1936, the main force of the Red Army, then numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army (Balujun) of the Nationalist army in August 1937, with Zhu as commander, Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) as deputy commander, and Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) as chief of staff. They commanded three divisions, the 115th, 120th, and 129th, and crossed the Yellow River (Huanghe) eastward until it reached north China. Most of their units moved into the mountainous areas. As Mao did in Jinggangshan, they conducted a guerrilla campaign in the mountains behind the Japanese lines. In the south, the Red guerrilla troops were reorganized into the New Fourth Army (Xinsijun) of the National Army, totaling 10,300 men, including four field columns (divisions). Each field column had two to four regiments. Ye Ting (Yeh Ting) (1896–1946) commanded the New Fourth Army.

When the GMD lost some of their best troops in the war against the Japanese invasion, Mao's successful guerrillas recruited a large number of peasants into his forces. The units of the Eighth Route Army marched to the enemy-occupied territories, where they carried out guerrilla operations and established military and political bases. The Eighth Route Army increased from 46,000 men in 1937, to 220,000 men in 1939, and to 500,000 men in 1940. It established bases in the border regions of the eastern, northeastern, and northwestern regions. In south China, the New Fourth Army moved along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River and established bases in southern Jiangsu and also north of the river. In February 1940, the CMC ordered both the

Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies to recruit 300,000 more soldiers within that year. In May 1938, Mao wrote a treatise entitled *On Protracted War* that emphasized the paramount importance of a “people’s war” in the CCP guerrilla warfare. Mao instructed the high command to organize extensive peasant militias through the CCP network and transform illiterate peasants into capable soldiers.

By the fall of 1945, the CCP’s regular army had grown to 1,270,000 men, supported by militias numbering another 2.68 million. The Eighth Route Army increased from three divisions in August 1937 to more than 40 divisions in August 1945; the New Fourth Army increased from 4 divisions in 1937 to 7 divisions in 1945. Mao’s successful guerrilla war fighting experience prepared the CCP forces, or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), for the final victory in the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949 over the GMD forces and guaranteed their taking over of the country.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Eighth Route Army; Guangzhou Uprising; Guomindang; He Long; Jiangxi Soviet; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; Northern Expedition; Peng Dehuai; People’s Liberation Army; Ye Jianying; Ye Ting; Zhu De.

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Gunpowder

Gunpowder, also called black powder, is a mixture of sulfur, charcoal, and potassium nitrate. When burning rapidly, gunpowder produces a volume of hot gas made up of carbon dioxide, water, and nitrogen, and a solid residue of potassium sulfide. Because of its burning properties and the amount of heat and gas volume that it creates, gunpowder has been extensively used as a propellant in firearms and as a pyrotechnic composition in fireworks. Gunpowder is classified as a low explosive because of its relatively slow decomposition rate and consequently low brisance. But when low explosives detonate, they can generate a supersonic wave.

Gunpowder was first invented, documented, and used in ancient China. It was said that Emperor Wudi (Wu-ti) (reigned 156–87 BC) of the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) financed research done by the alchemists on the mystery of everlasting life. The alchemists experimented with sulphur and saltpeter, heating the substances in order to transform them. The alchemist Wei Boyang wrote the *Book of the Kinship of the Three* detailing the experiments made by the alchemists.

Chinese Daoist alchemists were the first people to invent gunpowder. During the Tang

dynasty (618–907) in the eighth century, they combined sulphur and saltpeter with charcoal to create an explosive called *huoyao*, or gunpowder, a substance that did not contribute to perpetual life, but was used as a fumigant to kill insects or to treat skin diseases. The first reference to gunpowder appeared in a Daoist (Taoist) text written in 1044, alluding to a variety of mixtures that included petrochemicals as well as garlic and honey.

When gunpowder's advantage as a weapon was made clear, the Chinese began to apply gunpowder to warfare. They started experimenting with gunpowder-filled tubes. They attached bamboo tubes to arrows and launched them with bows. Later, they discovered that these gunpowder tubes could launch themselves just by the power produced from the escaping gas. As a result, the first rockets were born. The Chinese produced a variety of gunpowder weapons, including flamethrowers, rockets, bombs, and land mines, before inventing guns as a projectile weapon. In China, explosive grenades, bombs, and rockets had been used extensively by the year 1000.

When the Chinese realized that when the powder packed behind a bullet was ignited, it generates enough pressure to force the bullet from the muzzle at high speed, but not enough to rupture the gun barrel, the true gun was invented. The earliest depiction of a gun is a sculpture from a cave in Sichuan dating to the twelfth century of a figure carrying a vase-shaped bombard with flames and a cannonball coming out of it. The oldest surviving gun, made of bronze, was manufactured in 1288 in northeastern China.

By the thirteenth century, Chinese military forces adopted gunpowder-based weapons technologies such as rockets, guns, and cannons, and explosives such as grenades and different types of bombs for use against the Mongols when they attempted to invade

and breach the Great Wall on the northern borders of China. After the Mongols conquered China and founded the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), they used the Chinese gunpowder-based weapons technology in their invasion of Japan, Korea, and other countries.

Since gunpowder is a mixture of sulfur, charcoal, and saltpeter (potassium nitrate), it has to be mechanically and carefully assorted. Highly sensitive to sparks, it is a very delicate mixture that often resulted in detonations and death owing to sloppy use of the ingredients. As a result, at the beginning, the formula for making gunpowder was not common information, and only a few special weapon makers knew how to make it. This hazardous and highly explosive weapon, however, spread to Europe through the Silk Road, the world's oldest and most mysterious trade route.

In the tenth century, Arab scientists began to study and carry out experiments with gunpowder and its applications in warfare. When Europeans invaded Arabian countries during the crusade movement from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, the Arabs used their newfound weapon against the Christian troops, sparking both fear and interest from the crusaders. The technology would later be adapted by Europeans for use in their military.

Gunpowder changed the course of human history, especially military history. Before the thirteenth century, warfare was primarily hand-to-hand in nature. When heavy cannons were introduced into warfare, the effectiveness of castle walls declined and armor became a burden rather than protection.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: Great Wall; Han Dynasty; Han Wudi, Emperor; Ming Dynasty; Mongols; Silk Road; Song Dynasty; Song, Fortified Cities; Song-Mongol War; Tang Dynasty; Yuan Dynasty.

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Guomindang

The Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) formed by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) in August 1912. Sun created the GMD to oppose, initially, the dictatorship of Marshal Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916) that was set up after the fall of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912). After the Revolution of 1911, Sun was elected the first president of the newly created Republic of China (ROC) on January 1, 1912, after his Tongmenghui group and rebellious New Army officers joined together. The commander of the New Army, Marshal Yuan Shikai, abandoned his Manchu leaders and sided with the rebellion. As a result of Yuan's defection, and after careful negotiation with the rebels, Sun stepped down as president, and the provisional government elected Yuan to the presidency on February 14, 1912. Soon after taking power, Yuan attempted to create a dictatorship to replace the new republic. Sun transformed his Tongmenghui movement into a

political party, the Guomindang, to oppose Yuan.

The GMD controlled the cabinet and parliament but not an army. The stalemate between Yuan and the GMD was broken when Yuan died in 1916 and the ROC government collapsed, resulting in China splintering into dozens of factions controlled by local warlords. The Warlord Period (1916–1927) at its height included over 1.5 million men in combat, but it is during this fractured civil war that the GMD began its rise to dominance.

Sun sent an energetic young nationalist, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), who caught his eye in Japan, to Moscow in 1924 to train with the Soviet Red Army. As a result of his education in the Soviet Union, Jiang returned to play a critical role in the formation of a new GMD army. The first major project for the GMD armed forces was the creation of a military academy. The Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy was founded on June 16, 1924, and Jiang was appointed its first commandant. As a condition of Soviet financing and training, Sun agreed to allow Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) members to join the GMD and take leadership roles. Although Jiang was not a Communist, he did set up the GMD National Revolutionary Army (NRA) along Soviet lines. Sun died on March 12, 1925 of cancer, and Jiang began his rise in the GMD independent of Sun's patronage.

On July 1, 1926, Jiang took the NRA into battle in what is known as the Northern Expedition. The Northern Expedition's goal was to attack northern warlords, at first in Hunan and Hubei (Hupei) Provinces and later as far north as Jiangsu (Kiangsu), and bring the region under GMD control. In just a few months, Jiang defeated two northern warlord armies and enticed the other

warlords to join him. Soon half of China was in GMD hands. In April 1927, Jiang reestablished the ROC under GMD control in nearby Nanjing (Nanking) with himself as president. On April 12, Jiang unleashed the “White Terror.” In Shanghai, GMD sympathizers purged the city of Communist leaders and supporters. Throughout the GMD-controlled areas, the CCP was outlawed, and Communist leaders were removed from positions of authority and killed.

Jiang controlled the NRA and thereby the GMD. The GMD pushed the CCP and its military wing, the Red Army, into the Jinggangshan (Chingkang Mountains) and later on a forced retreat into northwest China called the “Long March.” However, even with these successes the GMD only controlled a handful of provinces, facing an encroaching Japanese Empire, and persistent CCP/PLA military confrontation. The GMD instituted economic reforms and set up new bureaucratic control of cities, towns and rural areas.

As the Communist and Nationalist civil war continued through the 1930s, Japan increased its territorial expansion onto China. Jiang had decided early on to focus on defeating the Communist forces, in his mind the larger threat, rather than engaging the remaining warlords or confronting Japan. On December 4, 1936, Jiang was placed under arrest by GMD commanders at Xi’an (Sian) and forced to agree, after refusing to do so in the past, to a second coalition with the CCP to repel the Japanese.

After the July 7, 1937, Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in which Japanese forces attacked GMD troops, both Nationalist and Communist forces united to fight a war with Japan that lasted until Japan’s defeat in 1945 by the United States. Jiang suffered heavy losses during these years as the Japanese increased their territory in China. The

GMD was forced to move their government several times and lost most of coastal China to the invading armies. As the American war in the Pacific chipped away at Japanese hegemony in Asia, both the GMD and CCP forces started to see successes against a faltering Japanese war machine. Japan surrendered on August 14, 1945.

After a failed peace conference in August 1945 at Chongqing (Chungking) between GMD leader Jiang and CCP leader Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), the CCP-GMD civil war resumed. Over the next four years, the Communist and Nationalist armies clashed, and slowly Jiang’s grip on control of China slipped away. Corruption, GMD infighting, and an inability to recruit the rural peasant to the Nationalist cause weakened Jiang’s government and army. Mao successfully recruited both support and army volunteers from the rural poor after the CCP announced a land redistribution plan in September 1947. Perhaps the most damaging events for Jiang and the GMD were the PLA success at luring Nationalist armies into traps and destroying them. Jiang moved from offensive operations to defensive retreat by the fall of 1948. He removed the seat of his government from the mainland to Taiwan in late 1949 after he lost the Civil War to the CCP.

Jiang maintained control of the Guomindang in Taiwan until his death on April 5, 1975. In 1954, Jiang and the GMD secured the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which guaranteed American protection from the Communist-controlled mainland government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a result of the MDT, the GMD was able to survive and economically grow into a modern manufacturing country. Although the GMD was successful in maintaining its existence on Taiwan, the GMD lost international recognition over

time as the United States pursued a policy of engagement with the PRC. Taiwan lost its seat in the UN in 1972, and the United States ended official recognition of the GMD government in 1979.

Jiang Jieshi's son, Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo) (1910–1988), became president on March 27, 1978, and in 1987 began democratic reforms in the GMD-controlled ROC on Taiwan. Jiang Jingguo ended martial law, which had existed since his father moved his GMD government to Taiwan in 1949, and legalized opposition parties. After Jiang Jingguo's death in 1988, the pace of reforms quickened. The GMD domination of politics on Taiwan was coming to an end. The presidency and vice presidency were opened to popular national vote, and by the mid-1990s, the ROC was a functioning multiparty democracy. The Guomindang still plays a major role in the politics of the ROC today, but it is no longer the first and last word in Taiwan.

Justin E. Burch

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Boxer Rebellion; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Cold War; Encirclement Campaigns; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement; Long March; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo

Bridge Incident; National Revolutionary Army; New Army; Northern Expedition; People's Liberation Army; Qing Dynasty; Red Army; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; Yuan Shikai; Warlords Period; Whampoa Military Academy; Xi'an Incident; Zhu De.

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H

Han, Cavalry of (206 BC–220 AD)

The Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) became the first great dynasty in Chinese history, and the Chinese people began to call themselves the “Han people” (*Hanzu*, Han nationals, the majority, 90% of the current population). Successful military expeditions and territorial expansion convinced the Han emperors and the people that they were superior in civilization and institution. The Han emperors began to conquer the territory outside the Great Wall.

In 111 BC, Han Wudi (Wu-ti) (the Martial Emperor, reigned 141–87 BC) destroyed and annexed the semisinicized state of Nan-yueh (Vietnam), and started a thousand years of Chinese rule over northern Vietnam. He conquered Korea in 108 BC, and a Chinese command remained at Pyongyang until 313 AD. The Chinese soldiers began to wear armor made of lamellar in which overlapping leather or metal plates were sown onto a cloth. Light and flexible, the armor provided better protection during the frequent offensive campaigns.

Emperor Wudi also moved away from traditional chariot warfare in favor of faster, more maneuverable mounted cavalry after a failed military campaign using chariots in 133 BC. The Han Empire was under threat from the Xiongnu, a tribal state in the north of China. The Xiongnu was a nomadic people skilled in cavalry warfare that the charioteers of the Han were unable to subdue. Wudi initiated a series of campaigns to defeat the Xiongnu in 129 BC that lasted until 90 BC.

After a long period of peace and stability, Wudi reorganized the economy of the Han dynasty by raising taxes, selling imperial offices, and confiscating noble lands. With his treasury expanded, Wudi launched his campaign on the nomadic peoples of the north. Chinese governments struggled for centuries to protect themselves from agile horseback raiders. Wudi’s campaign was only temporarily successful in forcing the Xiongnu to accept Han suzerainty. The nomadic nature of the Xiongnu ensured long-term conflict with future Han rulers. It justified Han Wudi’s military invasions that incorporated the “barbarian” people into the Chinese civilizations through a continuous process of acculturation. Han’s success forced many later rulers to look back and compare themselves with the glorious age of antiquity in terms of territory and geopolitics.

Chinese historian Chang Chun-shu eloquently argued that the cavalry Wudi created was one of the main elements in the Han dynasty’s success in subduing the north of China and fueling the great expansionist period. Documentary evidence of the period claims that at the height of the Xiongnu campaign, 110 BC, the Han cavalry numbered over 300,000. Modern scholars warn students today to be wary of the authenticity of these contemporary numbers; however, it is clear that the Han cavalry was large by the standards of the period and played a crucial role in the history of China.

Justin E. Burch

See also: Great Wall; Han Dynasty; Han Wudi, Emperor; Xiongnu.

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Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD)

Founded by a commoner, the Han dynasty lasted more than 400 years, longer than any other dynasty in Chinese history, and was the only empire that could compete with the Roman Empire at the time. The Han dynasty is divided by Chinese historians into the Western (or Former) Han (206 BC–23 AD) and the Eastern (or Latter) Han (25–220). Because of its enormous wealth and large population, the Han dynasty has been revered by the Chinese in the succeeding periods. During the Southern and Northern dynasties (420–589 AD), Chinese living in China proper were called “Han,” an ethnicity that constitutes almost 92 percent of Chinese people today. Throughout its 400 years, there were five major wars in the Han dynasty.

After centuries of wars among states, most people in China thought the unification by Qin Shi Huangdi would end their plight. However, the unification was just the beginning of more sufferings: the building of the Great Wall, the wars with minorities in the north and south, and the construction of

the tomb of Qin Shi Huangdi. The Qin also imposed harsh laws on its people (e.g., anyone who failed to reach his designated destination on time would be executed, without exception). In 209 BC, six years after Qin Shi Huangdi had died, Qinershi, the second emperor of Qin, drafted a group of poor people to defend Yuyang. In the middle of this engagement, the people encountered heavy rains, and it was certain that they would not be able to reach Yuyang on time. By law, all of them would be killed. Two leaders, Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, called for a rebellion. Their small army quickly expanded, with more people joining in en route. They took several big counties and boasted tens of thousands of followers. Chen Sheng made himself a king and founded his kingdom “Zhangchu.” While Chen Sheng and Wu Guang were fighting the Qin, other rebels such as Xiang Yu and Liu Bang also rose up. In 208 BC, Chen Sheng and Wu Guang were suppressed by Qin general Zhang Han. But the forces led by Xiang Yu and Liu Bang survived and continued to grow. Both Liu and Xiang installed Chuhuaiwang, a young progeny of the former king of Chu, as the leader of all rebels. At the same time, all former states whose territories had been conquered by Qin Shi Huangdi were now restored.

In 207 BC, Qin general Zhang Han was besieging the rebel state of Zhao at Julu. Due to the formidable strength of the Qin army and Zhang Han’s threat to attack anyone who provided assistance to Zhao, no rebel force from the other states dared to help Zhao. Xiang Yu killed his superior Song Yi for cowardice and led the army of Chu to Julu. After Xiang Yu had crossed the Zhangshui River, he ordered his soldiers to destroy their own ships and cooking pans to show their determination to fight the Qin to the death. Although Zhang Han’s

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army was stronger than Xiang Yu's, Xiang Yu's forces defeated Zhang Han and killed all Qin soldiers in Julu. With no effective troops to defend them, Xianyang, the capital of Qin, and Ziyang, the last Qin emperor, were captured by Liu Bang without a major battle in 206 BC.

From 206 to 202 BC, the war was between two leading rebels: Liu Bang, king of the state of Han, and Xiang Yu, the Grand King of Chu. Assisted by numerous able ministers and generals, Liu Bang, who had lost many battles at the beginning, turned out to be the final winner of the war, known in Chinese history as the "War between Chu and Han" (*chuhan xiangzheng*). Liu Bang established the Han dynasty in 202 BC and became its first emperor.

Learning the lesson that Qin fell because of no help from the vassal states, Liu Bang

created many vassal states and appointed his sons and brothers to be kings. Yet this seemingly far-seeing idea ended up as a nightmare for Liu Bang's successors. Not only did many vassal states become more disobedient, but their kings also posed serious threats to the empire. Han Jingdi was first aware of the problem. He accepted political advisor Chao Cuo's suggestion and began limiting the power of the states by taking territories from them. Yet, when Jingdi attempted to take Huiji and Yuzhang counties from the most unruly state, Wu, the king rebelled by allying several other states with the excuse of "Killing Chao Cuo, and Cleansing the Side of the Emperor" (*zhuchaoquo qingjunce*). Assuming that the death of Chao Cuo would quell the insurrection, the intimidated Jingdi ordered that Chao Cuo be killed. But the rebellion

continued because the king of Wu wanted himself to be the emperor. Jingdi then appointed general Zhou Yafu, who stationed his army inside the fortresses and avoided direct confrontation with the rebels. Zhou's purpose was to exhaust the supplies of the rebels before any military action. That strategy worked well as the king of Wu had to retreat after depleting his supplies. Zhou Yafu chased and defeated the rebel from Wu. The king of Wu was subsequently killed, and the coalition of rebels collapsed. After suppressing the rebellion, Jingdi prohibited the kings from governing their states, and all state officials had to be appointed by the emperor. Hence, the central power was strengthened, and during the reign of Han Wudi (Han Wu-ti) (140–87 BC), the power of vassal states had further been eclipsed. By the end of the Han dynasty, however, when Wang Mang, the regent and a relative of the empress dowager, founded a new empire, the weak vassal states could no longer assist the central power as Liu Bang had foreseen in the fall of Qin.

Han Wudi was one of the greatest emperors in the Han dynasty. His biggest feat was undoubtedly his military campaigns against the northern Huns. Ever since the outset of the Han dynasty, the Huns had been a dire threat to the Han. Even Han founder Liu Bang had been besieged for seven days by the Huns and barely survived. Emperors before Han Wudi generally followed a policy of "marriage alliance" (*heqin*; intermarriage between imperial families of the Han and the Huns) in order to appease the Huns. But the policy had not always been successful, and the threats from the Huns remained. When Han Wudi was enthroned, the Han dynasty had accumulated resources and military might. Wudi launched a total of 15 military campaigns, resulting in the split of the much-weakened Huns.

In 133 BC, Wudi agreed to the suggestions of Wang Hui, the imperial minister of vassal affairs (*daxing*), that it was time to counterattack the Huns. Four years later, generals Wei Qing, Gong Sunhe, and Li Guang launched a three-pronged attack on the Huns. But only Wei Qing came back successfully. In 127 BC, the Hun army of 2,000 invaded Shanggu and Yuyang. General Wei Qing again won several battles and reoccupied lost territories in the Hetao region. In March 124 BC, Wei Qing expelled one of the leaders of the Huns and captured dozens of Hun princes. Another major battle was fought in 121 BC. Huo Qubing, the nephew of Wei Qing who swiftly emerged as one of the most famous generals of the Han, led an army of 10,000 men and met and defeated the Hun cavalry in Gaolan. Huo chased the Huns for about 500 kilometers. In the summer, Huo marched 1,000 kilometers to the heart of the Huns and decimated them. The last and biggest battle between the Han and the Huns was fought in 119 BC. Wei Qing and Huo Qubing led a large army of 100,000 soldiers attacking the Hun ruler 1,000 kilometers in the north. The Hun ruler dared not fight the Han and fled with only several hundred cavalry. The Han army killed almost 20,000 Hun soldiers and captured 74,000. After this battle, the Huns moved further north and no longer posed a major threat to the Han. Han Wudi ordered the migration of hundreds of thousands of Chinese to the areas taken from the Huns.

With his resoluteness and smart strategy, coupled with the abundant resources inherited from his predecessors and extraordinarily able generals, Han Wudi was able to eliminate the northern threats that had haunted Chinese rulers from the late Warring States Period to the early Han. However great the military campaigns had been, the large and rich Han dynasty also suffered

immeasurable loss in human life and national wealth. The Former (or Western) Han started to decline after the death of Han Wudi.

In 8 AD, Wang Mang (45 BC–23 AD), regent and general in chief, toppled the Han dynasty and founded the Xin dynasty. But Wang Mang's subsequent reform policies failed to solve the existing social problems. Instead, commoners' living standards sharply deteriorated, which triggered mass rebellions across the country. There were two principal rebel armies: the Red Eyebrow (*chimei*) and the Green Wood (*lulin*). Liu Xiu (6 BC–57 AD) and his brother Liu Yan, both landlords and descendants of a distant branch of the Han imperial clan, joined the Lulin rebels. Liu Xiu's military talent was fully reflected in the Battle of Kunyang. In 23 AD, Wang Mang sent a huge army of 420,000 soldiers trying to regain Kunyang, a city that had been taken over by the Lulin rebels. With less than 10,000 soldiers inside the city, most rebels demanded retreat. But Liu Xiu persuaded other rebels to stay and led 13 cavalry sneaking out of Kunyang for reinforcement. When Liu Xiu came back with 10,000 more rebels, he began attacking Wang Mang's army. Despite their small numbers, the rebels fought bravely and defeated their much bigger opponent. The Battle of Kunyang not only paved the way for Liu Xiu's leadership among the rebels but also helped turn the tide of the war as Wang Mang's dynasty fell shortly afterwards.

Two years after the death of Wang Mang, Liu Xiu in 25 AD restored the Han dynasty and became the first emperor of the Latter Han or Eastern Han dynasty. That year, Liu Xiu was only 31 years old. The next step for Liu Xiu was to reunify China. In 26 AD, General Deng Yu was sent to attack the Chimei rebels but was defeated. In 27 AD, General Feng Yi replaced Deng as the new commander in chief. Feng fought a battle with

Chimei at Xiaodi and destroyed their main force. Liu Xiu led the army against the remaining Chimei rebels in Yiyang and forced Liu Gong, their leader, to surrender. After crushing his biggest enemy, Liu Xiu sent troops to suppress other, smaller insurrections and in 36 AD finally reunified China.

By the end of the Latter Han, the dynasty was already in deep crises: political power was generally in the hands of the eunuchs; most land was controlled by big landlords and many landless farmers had to be tenants of the landlords; and the rulers had fought endless wars with the Qiang minority that further weakened the state. In 184 AD, Zhang Jiao, the founder of "The Way of Peace" (Taipingdao), a Daoist sect, called on his followers to rebel against the government. The total followers of Taipingdao were around 100,000. Self-named "The General of Heaven" (*tiangong jiangjun*), Zhang Jiao and his two brothers Zhang Bao and Zhang Liang conquered one county after another. Because all rebels would put a yellow turban on their foreheads, they were called "Yellow Turban Bandits" (*huangjinzei*). The growing threat of the Yellow Turban pressed the government to respond speedily. Han Lingdi (Ling-ti) (168–189) sent Generals Lu Zhi, Huangpu Song, Zhu Jun, and Dong Zhuo to quell the rebels. But all the generals were defeated by the Yellow Turbans. As the war went on, the Yellow Turbans exposed their own problems such as the lack of coordination among different rebels. The government forces quickly found the weakness of the rebels and defeated them individually. To protect the capital from rebel invasion, General Huangpu Song first assaulted and put down the Yellow Turbans in Yinchuan, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. The next big battle was in Wancheng. Although the Yellow Turban seized the city three times, they ultimately lost it.

After Zhang Jiao, the founder of the Yellow Turban, died, Huangpu Song suddenly attacked his brother Zhang Liang and killed him, along with almost 80,000 rebels. In 185 AD, with the death of Zhang Bao, another brother of Zhang Jiao, in Xiaquyang, the main Yellow Turban rebel was eliminated. The remaining Yellow Turban forces continued to fight until 205 AD. While the Latter Han succeeded and clamped down on the Yellow Turbans, many powerful regional military leaders such as Liu Bei and Cao Cao, who had emerged during the suppression, would soon bring down the dynasty and found their own governments.

Qiang Fang

See also: Cao Cao; Great Wall; Guandu, Battle of; Han Wudi, Emperor; Julu, Battle of Mongols; Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Rebellion Led by Chen Sheng; Terra-Cotta Army.

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Han Wudi, Emperor (156–87 BC)

Wudi (Wu-ti) (Martial Emperor), who was the sixth emperor of the Han dynasty, reigned from 141 to 87 BC. He became one of China's most famous emperors. Under Wudi's rule, China expanded its borders, repelling threats from the north and introducing the Silk Road, a trade route that became an international highway of commerce and cultural transmission. Wudi was



Portrait of Wudi, sixth emperor of the Han dynasty, who reigned from 141 to 87 BC. During his reign, the boundaries and influence of the Chinese Empire were greatly extended through a series of military campaigns. (Instructional Resources Corporation)

also responsible for establishing Confucianism as China's state religion.

Wudi, also called Wu or Liuche, was born in 156 BC. He was the son of the Han emperor Jingdi (Han Ching-ti) (156–141 BC). Little is known of his childhood or early upbringing except that his relatives groomed him to be his father's successor, despite the fact that Wudi had several older brothers. Wudi's relatives and teachers apparently exposed him to two competing schools of thought: Taoism and Confucianism. When his father died in 141, Wudi succeeded him as emperor. He spent his reign engaged in military conquests and expansion of China's territory, earning him the name "Wu," meaning "martial."

China had been unified when the Han emperor was crowned, but various regions were threatening to break off from China. The Han Empire rivaled its contemporary, the Roman Empire, for size and glory. Many of Wudi's policies were aimed at creating unity among the various cultures and nationalities that made up the Chinese Empire. To make alliances firmer, he married his children and allies to the leaders of other nations. He also increased China's territory, conquering some small kingdoms in the south and annexing Hainan Island and the islands of the South China Sea, as well as portions of northern Vietnam and northern Korea.

The Xiongnu, an ancient nomadic tribe in northern China, threatened the northern border regions, and Wudi appointed two generals to lead expeditions against them. They fought against the Xiongnu several times and finally forced them north of the Gobi Desert, ensuring the security of the Hexi Corridor, a crucial passageway on the northern border of China that became an important part of the Silk Road. To increase northern China's security from nomadic invaders from Mongolia, Wudi had the Great Wall of China renovated.

Wudi's wars against the northern nomads indirectly resulted in opening up trade between China and the West. In 138, he sent a group of representatives led by Zhang Qian to central Asia in an attempt to secure allies in his fight against the Xiongnu. They did not make any alliances, but they did return to the Han court with tales of foreign cultures and goods. Wudi was very interested in those foreign lands and eventually opened the Silk Road, which became a highway of commercial and cultural exchange between the East and West.

Wudi's military enterprises were expensive; to fund his campaigns, he raised taxes and confiscated property owned by nobles. He also had the state take over many private businesses. Nevertheless, China prospered during his reign.

The Han dynasty, in general, was a time of national strength and cultural advances. Wudi believed that the Qin dynasty had fallen because of its repressive cultural policies, particularly its emphasis on Legalism. He ordered a revival of Confucianism, proclaiming it the official state philosophy. The Qin emperor Shi Huangdi had ordered the destruction of many Confucian books, but now Wudi ordered the surviving books to be collected and sent to the national capital in Changan, where he created an academy to educate government officials thoroughly in Confucianism. The institution was formed on the foundation of the five Confucian classics, since the Han emperor believed that Confucian scholars should help with the national government. That training system for the civil service lasted for centuries after his death, and Confucianism remained the prevailing philosophy through many succeeding dynasties.

The Han emperor believed that encouraging culture would also encourage civilized behavior among the people. To that end, he

supported the writing of literary works; one of the most famous books to come out of his reign was the *Historical Records of Sima Qian*. He created a national music bureau and ordered his government officials to enlighten the people with musical education. He also revived many ancient religious rituals and encouraged his government officials to perform them. Wudi died on March 29, 86 or 87 BC. He was succeeded by a child, Zhaodi (Ch'ao-ti) (86–74 BC), although the empire was run by a regent until the boy came of age.

Amy Hackney Blackwell

See also: Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Great Wall; Han Dynasty; Martial Arts; Mongols; Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Silk Road; Xiongnu.

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He Long (Ho Lung) (1896–1969)

Military leader of the Chinese Communists and marshal of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Born in Sangzhi (Song-chih) County, Hunan Province, on March 22, 1896, He Long began his military career in 1914 by raising a voluntary revolutionary

army in his native province. In 1920, He's personal army became a part of the National Revolutionary Army and participated in the Northern Expedition. In late 1926, He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), and in April 1927, he took command of a corps in the Red Army. In July 1927, He attended a meeting in Jiujiang (Kiukiang) in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province with Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), and others to plan a response to the anticommunist program begun by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975). They planned the unsuccessful Nanchang Uprising in Jiangxi, marking the beginning of an independent Chinese Communist military tradition.

After suffering defeat in the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) Fourth Encirclement Campaign, He's forces belatedly joined the Long March to northwest China in 1935, a year after Zhu and Mao had broken out. When the Eighth Route Army was formed in 1937, He commanded its 120th Division. During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, his command responsibilities grew steadily. In 1943, he was named commander of the United Defense Headquarters at Yan'an (Yenan) in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province and given overall responsibility for the defense of the Shaanxi-Gansu (Kansu)-Ningxia (Ningshia) and the Shanxi (Shansi)-Suiyuan (an old province constituting today's central Inner Mongolia) border areas. He was concurrently commander of the 120th Division and the Yan'an garrison army.

Like many other Communist military commanders in the 1930s and 1940s, He Long came to question Mao's emphasis on ideological guerrilla warfare in the face of

the conventional tactics of both GMD and Japanese opponents. He was able to expand Communist control of territory by taking advantage of the confusion brought about by the Japanese Ichi-go offensive of 1944. More frequently, however, expansion was achieved by alliance with local guerrillas.

In 1945, He was elected to the Communist Party Central Committee and served as commander of the First Field Army in southwest China during the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949. He rose in both the political and military hierarchies of the new government of the People's Republic of China after 1949, and in 1955, he was named a marshal of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). During the Cultural Revolution, among the other marshals, He was labeled the "biggest bandit" and later died in prison on June 9, 1969.

Dr. Errol MacGregor Clauss

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; Encirclement Campaigns; First Field Army; Ichi-go Offensive; Jiang Jieshi; Long March; Nanchang Uprising; Northern Expedition; People's Liberation Army; Yan'an; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Hong Kong

British colonial port city that functioned as a key strategic Cold War outpost as well as an ideological battleground between Western-style capitalism and communism. Bordering southeastern China and the South China Sea, Hong Kong is roughly six times the size of Washington, D.C., and was acquired by the British after the First Opium War in 1841. The British long considered Hong Kong a logical stepping-stone in developing Chinese trade ties and as an entrée to markets throughout Southeast Asia. After World War II, Britain recovered control of Hong Kong from the Japanese and was determined to retain it for commercial as well as strategic reasons. Its population at the time was about 600,000 people.

The establishment of the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, which extended Cold War rivalries in Asia, hardened British intentions to retain the colony. Hong Kong's value to Britain's Asian policies was twofold. First, it was the starting point in an effort to contain communism and protect British interests, which ran from Hong Kong through Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, India, and Sri Lanka. Second, the British hoped that retaining Hong Kong would facilitate Anglo-Chinese trade.

From a broader point of view, Britain entertained the idea that a prosperous and stable Hong Kong might dissuade the PRC from leaning toward the Soviet Union or promoting an Asian-style Titoism. To accomplish this, Britain took great efforts to develop Hong Kong.

The PRC also seemed to realize that a foreign-run Hong Kong would best serve their interests. Despite their one-nation cause, the Chinese Communists had no plans to retake Hong Kong. Their policy was summarized as “long-term planning, full exploitation,” meaning that there was no urgency to retake Hong Kong, whose colonial status could be utilized to maximize national interests. By 1997, when the British returned the colony to the PRC, Hong Kong had been transformed into an ultramodern city, an international financial center, and a vital seaport.

Hong Kong’s value to the PRC was multifaceted. Economically, Hong Kong served as one of the few trading channels for the PRC to buy Western materials and earn coveted Western currencies. This thinking was soon justified when both the United States and the United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions on China during the Korean War and when the Soviet Union stopped assisting the PRC in the late 1950s. Diplomatically, Hong Kong helped the PRC gain diplomatic recognition from Britain, the first Western country to do so. From a strategic vantage point, by tolerating British control of Hong Kong, the PRC hoped to drive a wedge in the Anglo-American alliance, which was at least partially achieved when Britain demonstrated reservations and sometimes opposition to U.S. efforts to place embargoes on Hong Kong and the PRC during the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s. As the only port along the Chinese coast remaining in foreign hands, Hong Kong also became a vital window and observation post for the PRC, allowing it to contact overseas Chinese, promote the PRC’s cause, continue the civil war against the Republic of China (ROC), and counter American containment efforts.

The United States also found Hong Kong strategically useful. Given the absence of a

diplomatic relationship with the PRC, Hong Kong served as the Americans’ primary contact point with mainland China, from which intelligence gathering could take place with relative ease. Moreover, Hong Kong’s port facilities provided the U.S. Navy with a convenient fueling station during military expeditions, especially during the Vietnam War. In view of these advantages, America supported Britain’s retention of Hong Kong and encouraged the British to improve the colony’s economic and social conditions in hopes of making Hong Kong a free-world outpost that would stand in sharp contrast to conditions on the mainland.

Hong Kong’s strategic importance began to recede in the early 1970s when the PRC and the United States normalized diplomatic relations. Hong Kong’s diminished value was confirmed in 1984 when the PRC and Britain agreed on the return of the colony to Chinese control in 1997. Hong Kong’s Cold War value was briefly revived after the PRC’s Tiananmen Square crackdown on June 4, 1989, when Hong Kong’s future sovereignty became contingent upon the PRC’s international conduct and human rights record. In the end, it is hard to overstate Hong Kong’s importance in the waging of the Cold War.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People’s Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Cold War; Korean War; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Soviet Union; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958; Tiananmen Square Events.

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Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiu-ch'uan) (1814–1864)

Inspired by prophetic dreams, Hong Xiuquan founded a millenarian religious group called the Taiping Tianguo (Taiping Heavenly Kingdom), which rebelled against the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911) in mid-nineteenth-century China and came close to overthrowing it. In the process, Hong created an elaborate bureaucracy, reformed the calendar, placed women on more equal footing with men, and outlawed the use of opium. His Heavenly Kingdom established stable control over sufficient territory to create a functional utopian society, at least for a time, inspiring and anticipating many revolutionary ideals of twentieth-century China.

Born Hong Huoxiu on January 11, 1814, in Fuyanshui village, Hua County, 30 miles from Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, Hong was the third son of a poor Hakka family. The Hakka are a Chinese minority group with a distinctive diet and language who gradually moved south through China over the course of centuries and now live in large numbers in south China. Hong's father was a poor farmer who worked his own land.

When Hong showed signs of scholarly aptitude, his family made sacrifices to see

that he could attend school, in hopes that some day he might pass the hallowed civil service examinations and become an official in the Qing government. Though Hong succeeded in the preliminary examinations, he met with frustration in the provincial examination. Given the extraordinarily high level of competition in the tests held in Guangdong Province, such failure was the rule; less than 1 percent of those who sat for the examination passed.

While in Guangzhou for the provincial examination in the spring of 1836, Hong received nine Christian tracts distributed near the examination hall by a Christian missionary named Edwin Stevens and his Chinese assistant, Liang Afa. Though Hong may have glanced at the tracts, he paid them little heed at the time. A year later, Hong again made the trip to Guangzhou to retake the examination, and upon his repeat failure, he collapsed. In a delirium, he had a series of dreams involving a heavenly meeting with an old, paternal figure and an elder brother, who informed him that humans had taken to worshipping demons and that his task was to rid the world of those demons. To that end, the father figure presented Hong with a sword and changed his name to Hong Xiuquan.

Six years after that series of vivid and terrifying dreams, Hong returned to the Christian tracts he had never discarded and began to read them. In them, he found the key to his mysterious dreams. The old man was God, the elder brother was Jesus Christ, and he himself was a son of God—a Chinese son of God sent to rid China of demons. Hong and his cousin Hong Rengan, who was also moved by the Christian tracts, baptized one another and went about destroying idols and preaching the doctrine Hong had derived from his dreams and the tracts.

In time, Hong's fellow villagers complained about his activities, and he was

obliged to leave Hua County in April 1844 with one of his converts, Feng Yunshan. After preaching in obscure border areas of Guangdong and Guangxi (Kwangsi) Provinces, Hong returned to his native place in late November while Feng settled near Zijin Shan, or Thistle Mountain, in Guangxi. Within a few years, Feng had gained thousands of converts to Hong's doctrine. Most were Hakkas, and often they were miners and charcoal burners.

In August 1847, after years of preaching in Hua County, Hong tracked Feng to Zijin Shan. All along, with aid from an American Baptist missionary named Issachar Roberts, Hong had been studying the Bible and developing his theology. Now he found himself in an area receptive to his millenarian message because of the local history of secret societies and the need of Hakkas to unite to defend themselves against other groups in the area who posed a constant threat. It was at that time that the demons Hong had seen in his prophetic dreams assumed a specific, earthly form: the Manchus and their supporters. (Earlier, Hong thought the demons might be Confucian scholars or Taoist priests.)

Beginning in June 1850, after a number of clashes between his group and the local self-defense corps, Hong assembled the members of the society he had organized to initiate the Taiping Rebellion. The military elements of Hong's organization had become far more disciplined, subject to careful drill and a strict chain of command. The number of Hong's forces may have reached as many as 30,000 men and women, 10,000 of whom were involved in military preparations. The local government reacted in December by sending troops against the assemblage, but those troops were unable to disperse the worshippers.

The dwindling resources of the area compelled Hong to move his base, and the

Taipings marched to Jiangkou, which they took in January 1851. That victory began a somewhat chaotic period of early Taiping military aggression, which climaxed in 1852 and 1853 with a series of remarkable military victories as the Taipings captured a large number of rich cities along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River. In March 1853, they took Nanjing (Nanking) and named it "Tianjin," the Heavenly Capital.

The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a theocracy ruled by a number of men who entered trances, during which they claimed to channel the words of God, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit. Hong (the Heavenly King) and Yang Xiuqing (known as the East King) were mouthpieces for Jesus and God, respectively. That allowed them to carve out tremendous power for themselves in a community where proximity to the divine commanded the obedience of the faithful.

While Hong promised his followers a heaven on earth, largely shaped by a communitarian plan to divide all land and wealth fairly, he also demanded great sacrifices. There would be no toleration of opium or tobacco smoking, prostitution, slavery, dancing, imbibing of alcohol, gambling, polygamy, the binding of women's feet, or ancestor worship. While those proscriptions set clear cultural boundaries between the Taipings and other Chinese, there was also the visible difference that the Taipings refused to shave the front part of their foreheads and braid their hair into the Manchu-ordained queue; their long hair fell loosely around their shoulders.

From about 1856 on, however, the success of the Taipings began to decline, in large part due to the increasing hubris of Yang Xiuqing, who had been the commander of the Taiping armies since 1850. Since the establishment of the Heavenly Capital, he had increasingly appropriated power formerly held by Hong.

Hong, in fact, had withdrawn from public view and become a mysterious figure. But when Yang attempted to depose Hong in 1856, a bloodbath ensued. Yang had taken advantage of the temporary absence from Nanjing of Hong's strongest supporter, Wei Changhui (known as the North King), to initiate his coup, but Hong secretly recalled Wei, who not only murdered Yang but promptly slaughtered roughly 20,000 of his followers. Wei soon became as overbearing and threatening as Yang had been, and at the command of Hong, he too was killed. Those events also brought about the alienation of the greatest of the Taiping generals. Though there were Taiping victories in the years to come, 1856 marked the beginning of the end, which finally came in July 1864.

Beginning in the period of great internecine slaughter, Hong spent more time in a world of women. In addition to his 86 consorts, his realm was run by a bureaucracy of women, with the serving maids and family members bringing the number of female inhabitants of Hong's palace to 2,000 or so. Hong spent his time rewriting the Bible, deleting passages he felt tainted the holy text, and correcting wording to reflect his personal communications from God.

Though the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom saw a brief period of hope when Hong's cousin, Hong Rengan, came to Nanjing after several years of religious study in Hong Kong, that hope was soon extinguished. Hong Rengan worked to modernize the Taiping world after the Western model he had come to admire in Hong Kong. From his arrival in 1859 to the defeat of the Taipings at Nanjing, Hong Rengan witnessed five years of decline. The provincial forces loyal to the Qing under Zeng Guofan (Tseng Kuo-fan) (1811–1872), his brother Zeng Guoquan, and Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) (1823–1901) had, slowly but surely,

retaken the areas conquered by Taiping troops in preceding years and encircled the Heavenly Capital. On July 19, 1864, the Chinese forces burst into Nanjing, and a most extraordinary massacre of Taipings ensued.

The exact date of Hong's death is uncertain, since different accounts give differing dates. On or around June 1, 1864, he died, perhaps after having taken poison. The news was suppressed for 10 days, after which Hong's son, Hong Tianguai, was enthroned as the new Heavenly King. He did not reign for long, however, because the Qing wiped out all the Taiping troops in the summer of 1864.

Whether Hong was, as Issachar Roberts declared, "a crazy man, entirely unfit to rule," or one of the greatest political and social visionaries of Chinese history will never be satisfactorily resolved. His social reforms and communitarian ideals both echoed ancient Chinese utopian ideals and presaged the Chinese Communist revolution of the twentieth century.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Chinese Communist Party; Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Ever-Victorious Army; Li Hongzhang; Manchus; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Small Sword Society; Taiping Rebellion; Ward, Frederick Townsend; Xiang Army; Zeng Guofan.

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Hong Xuezhì (Hong Hsue-ch'i) (1913–2006)

Chinese general, deputy commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF, Chinese army), and chief of the CPVF Logistics Department during the Korean War of 1950–1953. Born in Jinzhai County, Anhui (Anhui) Province, in 1913, Hong joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and the Red Army in 1929. He became captain and director of the political departments in the Red Army's Ninety-third Division and then the Fourth Army during the Long March (1934–1935). In the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), Hong served as the deputy commander and chief of staff of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army. During the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), he was the commander of the Sixth and Forty-third Armies of the Fourth Field Army, and the commander of the Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang) Provincial Military District, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong became the deputy commander and chief of staff of the Fifteenth Army Group and then the Thirteenth Army Group.

When the CCP Central Military Commission established the Northeast Border Defense Army (NBDA) in July 1950, Marshal Lin Biao, commander of the PLA's Fourth Field Army, transferred Hong to the NBDA in Manchuria. In October, the NBDA was reorganized into the CPVF with Hong as its

deputy commander in charge of operation, logistics, and security of the headquarters. Hong became the head of the CPVF Logistics Department when it was established on May 19, 1951. He set up a configuration system that fit the needs of the CPVF's new positional/trench warfare doctrine from the spring of 1951 to the end of the war. This new system aimed at directly supplying front locations rather than army units. Since October 1950, the PLA logistics system had first delivered food and munitions from the Manchurian headquarters in China to each CPVF army in Korea. The army next distributed the supplies to its divisions, each division delivered them to its regiments, and so on. The Chinese soldiers in the company had to carry their food and munitions on their shoulders, usually enough for a week. Supplies therefore always lagged behind CPVF operations, and the old system was inadequate. After a week's operation, the men had to stop and wait for their supply. In the third offensive in late December 1950, front-line troops received 30 to 40 percent of their minimum needs.

Hong's new system established area supply depots along the front lines to supply all the CPVF units stationed within the area, it didn't matter if it was a regiment or a battalion. The CPVF troops moved in and out, but the area supply depot remained; it could also be used by both Chinese and North Korean troops. The new supply system improved CPVF logistics capacity at the battalion and company levels and increased front-line troops' mobility and combat effectiveness. As in other cases, the CPVF logistics performance reflected a learning curve.

Hong and the CPVF Logistics Department were also in charge of rail and road transportation; air defense of warehouses, bridges, and train stations; medic and field hospitals; railroad and road repairs; combat engineering; communication and electricity;

and local security in North Korea. By October 1951, the CPVF Logistics Department had 6 local headquarters, 28 supply depots, 7 security regiments, 13 truck regiments, 29 transport regiments, 39 field hospitals, 8 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 3 communication regiments, and 6 engineering regiments, totaling 180,000 troops. Hong also commanded the 149th Infantry Division, Eighteenth Security Division, and Sixty-fourth Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, totaling more than 40,000 troops. In addition to these regular troops, the Logistics Department also employed a large number of civilian laborers for the war. They entered Korea and worked in the rear supply, road repair, manpower transportation, warehouse keeping, and railroad and highway construction. They totaled 600,000 men throughout the entire war period.

After 1953, Hong became the deputy chief, chief, and political commissar of the PLA General Logistics Department (GLD) from 1954 to 1957. He was made general in 1955. Hong worked closely with Minister of Defense Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) to professionalize the PLA seeking to modernize and organize the army along Soviet lines, but such steps were opposed by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976). In 1959, Hong was dismissed from all his military posts because of his defense of Peng Dehuai, who was purged by Mao. Hong was demoted and reassigned as director of the Petro-Chemical Bureau in Jilin (Kirin) Province during the Cultural Revolution, and worked there until 1977. After Mao died in 1976, Hong was rehabilitated and returned to the PLA. He became director of the National Defense Industry of the PRC in 1977, and again chief and political commissar of the General Logistics Department from 1980 to 1990. He was made general again in 1988. He also served

as deputy secretary-general of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC). He lost that post in 1989, reportedly because he opposed using the army to crush the Tiananmen Square student pro-democracy movement. Hong died in Beijing in 2006.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Cultural Revolution; Fourth Field Army; General Departments of the PLA; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement; Lin Biao; Long March; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; New Fourth Army; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Tiananmen Square Events; Soviet Union.

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Hua Guofeng (1921–2008)

The top Communist leader served as the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China)

and the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP, and premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) for a couple of years in the late 1970s after the death of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976). Hua Guofeng was born on February 16, 1921, in Jiaocheng, Shanxi (Shansi) Province. He joined the CCP in 1936 and aided Communist guerrilla forces in 1938 as they struggled against Japan during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945. He served in the Eighth Route Army. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Hua relocated to Hunan and became the secretary of the Xiang-tan Special District, which included Shaoshan, Mao's hometown.

In 1959, a memorial hall he dedicated to Mao impressed the chairman. Hua also attended the Lushan Conference that year as a delegate of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and came to Mao's attention for his strong defenses of both his communes and Great Leap Forward policies. During the Cultural Revolution, at the Ninth Party Congress of the CCP in 1969, Hua Guofeng became the first secretary of the party for the Hunan Provincial Committee, before then gaining membership into the Politburo in 1973. After Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou Enlai) (1898–1976) passed away on January 8, 1976, Mao named Hua as China's acting premier on February 8.

Chairman Mao's own health had been worsening, and he suffered from various ailments toward the end of his life. Speculation arose regarding his own successor. Hua Guofeng led a group positioned between the moderates, represented by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), and the radicals or Gang of Four, which included Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914–1991), Mao's wife of 38 years; Zhang Chunqiao (1917–2005); Yao Wenyuan (1931–2005); and Wang Hongwen (1935–1992). That April, Chairman Mao officially

appointed Hua as premier of the State Council. On April 5, crowds of approximately 2 million gathered in Tiananmen Square for the Qing Ming Festival, a traditional day of mourning. When those who had originally come to honor Zhou Enlai's memory also began protesting the radical policies of the Gang of Four, police responded and a riot ensued. Although Deng Xiaoping had been Zhou Enlai's trusted assistant, giving his eulogy and becoming first vice premier so he could continue his predecessor's work, this radical group's denunciations led to his temporarily losing his official posts. Mao replaced him with Hua, who became first vice chairman of the Central Committee.

Mao Zedong's decision infuriated the Gang of Four, leading Jiang Qing to criticize Hua openly. By political standards, he seemed of minor importance, and his chubby-faced appearance led the 55-year-old politician's detractors to often refer to him as "pumpkin head," yet his personal loyalty impressed Mao. His decision stemmed not only from his belief in Hua's dogged devotion, but also because he believed his Cultural Revolution policies would be honored. Shortly after midnight on September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong passed away. Following his death, Hua Guofeng became the chairman of the CCP and the CMC. At Mao's memorial service held in Tiananmen Square on September 18, he gave the official eulogy with Jiang Qing standing at his side, but the political atmosphere remained tense. With the support of top military officials, influential Politburo members, and Deng Xiaoping loyalists, he then ordered the predawn arrest of the Gang of Four and several of their associates on October 6, a move that effectively blocked Jiang and her revolutionary clique from seizing control of the government.

Despite his actions, Hua remained loyal to Mao's ideals. As a relative newcomer to

the country's tight circle of political elites, however, he lacked clout. Throughout 1977 and 1978, his official policy, soon referred to as the "Two Whatever's," stated that the Chinese people should continue to obey Mao's previous directives. Hua also favored returning the country's political and economic systems to a more regimented Soviet style. His supporters tried to buttress his position by linking his reputation with that of Mao's, even arranging for his hairstyle and clothing to resemble that of his predecessor on huge propaganda posters, but Deng's political influence continued to overshadow Hua's efforts. By December 1978, at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had assumed power. Hua toured several European countries in 1979, but his fate at home seemed sealed. Deng worked to discontinue previous Cultural Revolution bans, attacked Hua's Two Whatever's policy, and successfully aligned himself with the military, effectively numbering Hua Guofeng's days as party chairman. In China, the economic situation continued to change, and population control became an important issue. Before he was forced from office in 1980, Hua called for the now famous one-child-per-family policy. That year, Zhao Ziyang replaced him as China's premier. In 1981, he lost the post as party chairman to Hu Yaobang and chairman of the Central Military Commission to Deng Xiaoping. He remained a member of the Central Committee until 2002, and, unlike former PRC leaders, he faced neither physical harm nor imprisonment upon leaving office. On August 20, 2008, Hua Guofeng passed away at the age of 87 in Beijing.

Molly McLeod Mirll

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party;

Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; Gang of Four; Guomindang; Mao Zedong; Soviet Union; Zhou Enlai.

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Huai-Hai Campaign (November 1948–January 1949)

One of the major offensive campaigns fought by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) guaranteed the final victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) over the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) Army during the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949. The so-called Huai-Hai Campaign took place between the Huai River in the west and Huang Hai (Yellow Sea) in the east from November 1948 to January 1949. The troops of the PLA were under the command of Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986), Chen Yi (Ch'en Yi) (1901–1972), and Su Yu (1907–1984).



Huai-Hai Campaign, November 7, 1948–January 10, 1949. (Bettmann/Corbis)

After the conclusion of the Liaoning-Shenyang (Liao-Shen) Campaign, Chinese Communist forces launched the Huai-Hai Campaign on November 6, 1948. The Huai-Hai Campaign was the largest military operation in the Chinese Civil War. Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC), decided to hold the key city of Xuzhou, near the Grand Canal and a key railway junction. He mobilized 920,000 troops from seven armies and three military zones. Jiang attempted to appoint General Bai Chongxi, chief of the GMD Central China Command, who commanded 600,000 troops, as the commander in chief of the Huai-Hai operation. For some political as well as military reasons, General Bai turned down Jiang's offer. Jiang's second choice was his favorite protégé, Lieutenant General Du Yuming,

deputy commander of the General Suppression Headquarters of Xuzhou (Hsu-chow) Garrison. But when Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), commander of the CCP Fourth Field Army, attacked the Nationalist troops during the Liaoning-Shenyang Campaign on September 12, 1948, General Du had to rush to Manchuria to salvage the GMD situation in northeast China. President Jiang, without much choice, appointed General Liu Zhi (1892–1972) as commander in chief of the General Suppression Headquarters of Xuzhou Garrison and prepared for the Huai-Hai battle.

Su Yu, deputy commander of the East China (later the Third) Field Army, sent a telegram to Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and the Central Military Committee (CMC) on September 24, 1948 and proposed an offensive campaign to destroy

the GMD Seventh Army under Lieutenant General Huang Baitao stationed near Haizhou District, Lianyungang. This strategic plan later evolved into the decisive campaign to eliminate the Nationalist troops north of the Huai River. Mao ordered the deployment of two field armies, the East China Field Army under Chen Yi and Su Yu, and the Central China (later the Second) Field Army under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, totaling 600,000 men. They also gathered 600,000 militias and over 1 million peasant laborers, who provided logistical support.

On November 3, 1948, Jiang Jieshi sent General Gu Zhutong, chief of the General Staff to Xuzhou, to chair a military conference on the coming battle. General Gu tasked the nationalist Seventh Army under Huang Baitao and nationalist Sixth Army under Lieutenant General Li Yannian to withdraw from Haizhou and Lianyungang, and join up with the Second Army under Lieutenant General Qiu Qingquan and the Thirteenth Army under Lieutenant General Li Mi in Xuzhou. Lieutenant General Sun Yuanliang was commander of the Sixteenth Army and held the vital railroad around Suxian, a key retreat route for the Nationalist army. Lieutenant General Liu Rumeng, commander of the Eighth Army, was defending the area south of Suxian. President Jiang Jieshi also ordered the elite Twelfth Army under Lieutenant General Huang Wei to reinforce the Xuzhou Garrison from Queshan County, Henan (Honan) Province. Jiang also held meetings with General Fu Zuoyi (Fu Tso-yi) (1895–1974), commander in chief of the North China Command, about the possibility to give up Beijing (Peking) and reinforce Xuzhou with 500,000 troops from northern China. The former warlord rejected Jiang's plan, and it was shelved. Unknown to Jiang and other

top Nationalist commanders, high-ranking Communist moles had already infiltrated their command and government structure. Deputy chief of staff Liu Fei and director of the war-planning board Guo Ruhuai leaked vital military information to the Communists' intelligence and unraveled the Nationalist operational plans.

On November 6, 1948, 300,000 Communist troops of the East China Field Army attacked the Nationalist Seventh Army near Haizhou District, Lianyungang, and the long-awaited Huai-Hai Campaign began. Huang Baitao, the Nationalist commander who led the Seventh Army to Xuzhou, was two days behind schedule. He had to wait for the Forty-Fourth Corps and the 100th Corps to arrive near the Grand Canal. He also made the critical mistake of not securing several bridgeheads. The Communist troops caught up with the rearguard elements of the 100th Corps and eliminated three divisions. On November 7, General Huang Baitao asked Li Mi, commander of the Thirteenth Army, to cover his retreat. However, General Liu Zhi, commander in chief of the GMD Xuzhou Garrison, had already ordered the Thirteenth Army to withdraw back to Xuzhou. The next day on November 8, Generals He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia, deputy commanders of the third military zone, who were supposed to protect the flank of the Seventh Army, suddenly revolted on the battlefield, taking 23,000 Nationalist soldiers to the Communists. The Communist forces proceeded to surround the Seventh Army in Nianzhuang, and set up defensive lines along the vital positions of Caobaji and Daxujia to block possible Nationalist reinforcements. Jiang Jieshi immediately summoned Defense Minister He Yingqin (1890–1987) and chief of the General Staff Gu Zhutong to discuss the situation, eventually deciding to recall Du Yuming from Manchuria.

When Du Yuming returned from Manchuria, the GMD troops were in chaos. Communist forces under Liu Bocheng had taken over Su County, 30 miles south of Xuzhou, and cut off the GMD retreat route. Now the GMD forces around Xuzhou faced the possibility of complete encirclement. Du Yuming offered two plans. The first plan was to concentrate the Second, Thirteenth, and Sixteenth Armies to attack the six Communist columns (divisions) that occupied the vital railway link at Su County. Hopefully, their attack would rescue General Huang Baitao's Seventh Army. The second plan was to deploy the five corps from the Second and Thirteenth Armies to rescue the Seventh Army and defend Xuzhou. General Liu Zhi was not in favor of the first plan as he thought it was too risky to launch an attack. Liu Zhi also doubted whether Huang Baitao could hold on long enough for the rescue. So Liu approved the second plan. Due to a strong Communist defense, General Li Mi was unsuccessful in executing the plan. General Qiu Qingquan did not commit his elite Fifth Corps to the battle. The GMD battle plan did not work.

In the meantime, CCP's commander Liu Bocheng deployed 200,000 soldiers to surround the GMD Twelfth Army under General Huang Wei. On November 23, 1948, Huang Baitao's Seventh Army was eliminated at Nianzhuang, and General Huang committed suicide. On November 30, Jiang Jieshi ordered the Nationalist armies to retreat to the south and to save Huang Wei's Twelfth Army. The Communist East China Field Army surrounded the Twelfth Army before any rescue could arrive. Then the CCP Central China Field Army destroyed the GMD Twelfth Army on December 15, 1948. When the GMD Sixteenth Army broke out on its own on December 6, the Nationalist forces already lost much of their

supplies and equipment. The GMD air force was unable to provide enough food and ammunition for 220,000 men.

An all-out attack was launched by the Communist armies on January 6, 1949. The GMD defense collapsed. General Du Yuming was captured, and General Qiu Qingquan was killed in action while trying to break the Communist siege with his Second Army. Only General Li Mi was able to escape through the line. The Huai-Hai Campaign was a catastrophe for Jiang Jieshi and the ROC government. The scale of the campaign was unprecedented in Chinese military history. By the spring of 1949, nearly all of Jiang's best troops were wiped out by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the CCP armed forces. As a result of the campaign, the country north of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River was taken over by the CCP. Thereafter, the PLA troops were poised to threaten Nanjing (Nanking), the capital of the ROC. After the failure of the campaign, ROC vice president Li Zongren and General Bai Chongxi forced Jiang Jieshi to resign from his presidency on January 31, 1949.

Kevin Tian Yang

See also: Chen Yi; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; Fourth Field Army; Fu Zuoyi; Grand Canal; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Liao-Shen Campaign; Lin Biao; Liu Bocheng; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Second Field Army; Su Yu; Third Field Army.

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Huang Chao's Rebellion (874–884)

A peasant rebellion against the Tang dynasty (618–907), which had gone through its golden age and entered a period of decline. Many impoverished farmers and merchants were under a great burden of taxation, which led to the formation of many antigovernment rebellions during that period. Huang Chao was one of the leaders. Although his rebellion failed, it greatly weakened Tang's power and accelerated the collapse of the Tang dynasty.

Huang Chao was the son of a rich salt merchant. It was said that Huang was well educated and was also very good at riding, archery, and swordsmanship. He took the imperial examinations several times but was not able to pass them, so he became a salt merchant like his father. However, during that time, the tax on salt was very high. Many merchants, including Huang Chao, took risks to smuggle salt instead. Many of them became armed and organized. Inevitably, they had several armed conflicts with the local government.

In 874, Wang Xianzhi, who was also a salt privateer, launched an open rebellion against the Tang's domination, supported by

thousands of peasants and merchants. After Huang Chao learned of this, he led his men to join Wang's rebel army. The Tang and local government sent troops to suppress the rebellion. Soon Huang Chao became the rebel leader, and his rebel army won several skirmishes and occupied a couple of dozen counties. Threatened by Huang's rebellion, the Tang government attempted to buy them off. Wang Xianzhi wanted to accept the bribe, but Huang rejected it firmly. Before long, the rebel army separated into two groups. One group under the command of Huang Chao marched north toward Hebei (Hopei) and Shandong (Shantung) Provinces. Another group under the command of Wang Xianzhi took over central China. In 878, Wang Xianzhi was killed in a battle in Hubei (Hupei) Province. The rest of his forces joined Huang's army.

After one year of fighting in 879, the Huang army occupied Yuezhou, Quzhou, Jianzhou, and Guangzhou. Huang continued his northern expedition. In 880, Huang Chao led 600,000 troops and captured Tongguan (Tong Pass), which brought them close to the Tang's capital city of Chang'an. Huang pressed on his march. Emperor Tang Xizong (Hsi-tsung) (874–888) fled Chang'an to Chengdu, southwestern Sichuan (Szechwan) Province. Several days later, Huang Chao took over the capital city and established a new dynasty, called Da Qi, and made himself the emperor. The Tang government didn't give up. After settling down in Chengdu, Tang Xizong regrouped his forces and launched counterattacks. Soon the Tang army came back and surrounded Chang'an by cutting off the supplies to the city. Several hundreds of thousands of soldiers quartered in Chang'an ran out of food quickly. In October 882, Zhuwan, a general of Huang's rebel army, which guarded Tongzhou, surrendered to the Tang government. In

883, Huang Chao failed to defend the capital city, and his army was forced to evacuate from Chang'an. After the rebels retreated to central China, Huang attempted to take Chengzhou, Henan Province. He did not succeed and suffered very heavy casualties in early 884. Huang and remnants of his troops were on the run to avoid the Tang army and a total defeat. In May, Tang's army surrounded the rebels. In the last battle, thousands of rebels were killed, and in June 884, Huang Chao committed suicide in a valley under the Taishan (Tai Mountains). The rebellion, which lasted for 10 years, was put to an end.

Yong Tong

See also: Sui Dynasty; Song Dynasty; Tang Dynasty.

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Huang Kecheng (1902–1986)

Military leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and general of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Huang Kecheng was born in 1902 in Yongxing County, Hunan Province. He graduated from Hunan's Third Normal School in 1920 and joined the

Communist Party of China in 1925. He led the Yongxing uprising during the Xiangnan campaign in 1928, and joined the Third Division of the CCP Red Army during the Agrarian Revolutionary War of 1927–1937.

After the Long March in 1934–1935, the Red Army arrived in North Shaanxi (Shensi). Huang Kecheng was promoted to the director of the Political and Organizational Department of the Red Army. During the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), he was appointed political commissar of the 334th Brigade, 115th Division, Eighth Route Army, in 1937. Along with Xu Haidong, he led the brigade against the Japanese troops in the regions of Shanxi (Shansi), Hebei (Hopei), and Henan (Honan) Provinces. After 1940, he became political commissar of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, he served as deputy commander and logistics commander of the Northeastern Democratic Alliance Army, later the Northeast Field Army, and the Fourth Field Army. He was elected an alternate and then formal member of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP National Congress. After the PLA's Beijing-Tianjin Campaign, Huang was appointed the party's Committee Secretary of Tianjin (Tientsin) City.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Huang Kecheng's duties included the secretary of Hunan Provincial Party Committee and commander of Hunan Provincial Military Command. Then he was transferred to Beijing (Peking) and served as deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, head of the General Logistics Department of the PLA, and vice minister of National Defense Ministry. He was made a senior general in 1955. Thereafter, Huang was promoted to secretary-general of the Central Military Commission and chief of the PLA General Staff.

Outspoken and critical, Huang Kecheng had a military career of ups and downs. In 1959, he was denounced by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP, as a member of the “antiparty clique” or the “military club” under the leadership of Peng Dehuai (P’eng Te-huai) (1898–1974). Both had questioned and criticized Mao’s policies of the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Communes. After Peng’s fall, Huang was deprived of all positions and was under investigation for a long time. He was later persecuted again during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976.

After Mao’s death in 1976, Huang Kecheng reemerged in 1977. He was appointed advisor to the Central Military Commission and executive secretary of the CCP Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline. He was elected a member of the CCP Central Committee at the National Party Congress in 1978. From 1982 to 1985, he was the second secretary-general of the Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline. Huang Kecheng died on December 28, 1986 in Beijing.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; General Departments of the PLA; Long March; National Party Congress; Peng Dehuai; Red Army.

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Hundred Regiments Campaign (1940)

The Hundred Regiments Campaign was one of the largest offensive campaigns conducted by the Eighth Route Army against Japanese forces during the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). Between August 20 and December 5, 1940, the Eighth Route Army of the coalition force of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) launched a large-scale offensive campaign against Japanese forces in northern and eastern China. Peng Dehuai (P’eng Te-huai) (1898–1974), deputy commander of the Eighth Route Army, employed 105 regiments, including 400,000 men, against the Japanese and their puppet troops at strategic points, small cities, and transportation hubs. Instead of a single battle, the hundred regiments engaged in 1,824 separate battles—large and small—over a large region across four provinces during three months. The regular troops of the Eighth Route Army also operated with the local CCP militia and underground anti-Japanese resistance. The offensive campaign was considered almost a conventional operation throughout the war initiated by the CCP, being at odds with the typical Maoist tactics that

emphasized guerrilla warfare rather than frontal attacks.

In May 1938, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP, wrote a treatise entitled *On Protracted War* that analyzed the basic characteristics of both sides of the Anti-Japanese War. He pointed out that China could not win a quick victory, but that it would surely be victorious after a long period of struggle. He stressed that the key to China's resistance was a protracted war that would pass through three stages: strategic defense, strategic stalemate, followed by a strategic counteroffensive for final victory. He particularly emphasized the importance of a "people's war," stating that "the army and the people are the foundation of victory" and "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people." Mao instructed the high command to organize extensive peasant militias through the CCP network, now a mass party. Party control and political education were also emphasized in mobilizing the peasants. Transforming illiterate peasants into capable soldiers became part of the Chinese military tradition.

By March 1938, almost all of north China fell to the Japanese forces. The GMD government of the Republic of China (ROC) suffered heavy casualties. From July 1937 to November 1938, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the ROC, lost 1 million GMD troops while eliminating 250,730 Japanese soldiers. The GMD Army withdrew to China's southwest and northwest to conserve some of their troops when Jiang moved the seat of his government from Nanjing (Nanking) to Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, in 1939. The situation in north China for the CCP by 1940 was worse than it had ever been.

In late 1939 and early 1940, Japanese forces and their puppet troops launched a

systematic pacification of China, called "cage" tactics, with the goal of crushing CCP anti-Japanese activities. The strategy was first to clear an area of resistance elements and then establish a series of interconnected strongpoints with the capability of rapidly reinforcing each other. The framework of this tactic was the major rail lines and roads that would separate Communist-controlled areas from one another and deprive them of their mobility. Of the transport lines, the most important was the Zheng-Tai railway, connecting Shijiazhuang in northern Hebei (Hopei) Province with Taiyuan in central Shanxi (Shansi) Province. These measures, as CCP General Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986) described it, were "to use the rail lines as bars, roads as chains, and strongpoints as locks." Many CCP leaders, especially the Eighth Route Army commanders, including Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), commander of the Eighth Route Army, and Peng Dehuai, conceived that some action was necessary to reverse the situation.

Under Peng's command, the Eighth Route Army planned a coordinated offensive campaign in all the areas reachable by their regiments. On August 20, 1940, the Eighth Route Army launched its largest raids of the war against Japanese troops in northern and eastern China. Japanese-held railways and roads were attacked almost simultaneously. Instead of the initial plan that deployed a mere 22 regiments (about 40,000 men), more than 400,000 men in 105 regiments ultimately took part in the operation. These additional forces had joined in spontaneously. The term "Hundred Regiments Campaign" was thus created two days later and has been used ever since.

The offensive campaign was retrospectively divided into three phases. The first phase was a surprise attack from August 20

to September 10, 1940. During this period, the Eighth Route Army forces attacked Japanese garrisons with overwhelmingly numerical superiority along the Zheng-Tai rail line. Destruction was inflicted on railways as well as roads, bridges, and military facilities. The vital Jingxing coal mines were badly damaged, and shafts were even flooded by destroyed pipes. As a result, phase one was enormously successful, and the element of surprise was achieved everywhere. The second phase concerned Japanese counterattacks and CCP defense through September 10–October 6. Initial attacks on the transportation routes caused the Japanese to reinforce key points with large numbers of troops. Thus, the bloodiest fighting of the entire campaign occurred during the second phase.

CCP forces often confronted reinforced enemy units that were equal in numbers but had much superior weapons. The Communist troops suffered heavy casualties in this phase. The third phase was the CCP retreat from October 6 to December 5. By early October, the large-scale open battle in the previous two phases was giving way to the traditional guerrilla warfare. Most of the regiments of the Eighth Route Army retreated into base areas in the mountains and forests. Throughout phase three, the CCP was largely on the defensive with merely limited engagements.

After the Hundred Regiments Campaign, the Communists claimed there were 46,000 Japanese and puppet forces killed and wounded, and 22,000 casualties of their own. The regiments of the Eighth Route

Army took over 290 Japanese posts and destroyed 900 miles of highways and 300 miles of railways. The Zheng-Tai rail line was suspended for one month, and production at the Jingxing mines could not resume until six months later. The Hundred Regiments Campaign was one of the largest conventional campaigns the CCP ever engaged in its military history.

Tao Wang

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Liu Bochong; Mao Zedong; Peng Dehuai; People's War; United Front; Zhu De.

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Ichi-go Campaign (April–December 1944)

Last major Japanese offensive in China during World War II. In spring 1944, the war was going badly for the Japanese. With Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell's (1883–1946) forces progressing in northern Burma, the Japanese launched their last offensive in China. Known as the Ichi-go Campaign (Operation Number One), it was aimed primarily at the Nationalist forces; the Japanese strategic objectives were to destroy these forces, capture air bases in southeast China, consolidate control over eastern China, and secure control of the Beijing (Peking)-Hankou (Hankow)-Guangzhou (Canton) railroad line. The Japanese also hoped to relieve some of the pressure on their forces in Burma and establish a stronger base in China from which to resist any potential Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands.

The first phase began in March and lasted until July 1944, with the offensive being mounted on a broad front across central and south China. Japanese aims were to press toward the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) capital of Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, open up direct communications with French Indochina, and capture airfields in southeast China being used by U.S. aircraft to attack Japanese ground forces and shipping. The early phase of the operation went well for the Japanese, with Nationalist forces quickly collapsing. This situation ended whatever

hope remained among Western leaders that China might play a major role in the defeat of Japan.

In northern China during April and May, the Japanese cleared the Beijing-Hankou railway and took Henan (Honan) Province, even though they had to move at night to avoid constant attacks from Major General Claire Chennault's (1893–1958) Fourteenth Air Force. Despite their air superiority, the Chinese Nationalist forces lost almost every time they met the Japanese. Some Chinese soldiers were even attacked by their own people, enraged by earlier mistreatment, and on occasion, starving peasants actually killed retreating Chinese troops and welcomed the Japanese.

Nationalist military failures exacerbated the already rocky relationship between GMD leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC), and Stilwell, as well as that between Chennault and Stilwell. Stilwell was convinced that the key to restoring China lay in reopening a land supply to Chongqing through Burma, whereas Chennault feared for the preservation of his airfields in eastern China. Jiang, realizing that the Americans were going to defeat the Japanese in due course, seemed more concerned with the threat posed to his regime by the Chinese Communists. In fall 1944, the rift led to Stilwell's dismissal.

Phase two of the Ichi-go Campaign began in July with a pincer movement by two Japanese armies, one from Wuhan and one from Guangzhou (Canton), attempting to take Guilin (Kweilin) and open a land route

between central China and Southeast Asia. By November, all of Guangxi (Kwangsi) and eastern Hunan Provinces had been overrun, and the Japanese were threatening Guiyang, capital of Guizhou (Kweichow) Province. In the process, the Japanese captured all but three of the U.S. airfields in south China. The Allies feared that if Guiyang fell, the Japanese might capture Kunming and Chongqing. But the Japanese were not able to advance farther, and in December, they attacked Guiyang but were repulsed. Ichi-go was over.

In early 1945, the Japanese began limited offensives to consolidate the gains of 1944, but these failed to accomplish much, since the threat of war with the Soviet Union forced them to transfer several divisions to defend Manchuria and the Japanese mainland. Between May and July, the Nationalist Chinese used this situation to recover Guangxi and western Guangdong (Kwangtung), but most Chinese lands captured by the Japanese during the Ichi-go Campaign remained in their hands until the end of the war. The Ichi-go offensive also greatly benefited Chinese Communist forces in China, who took advantage of the Nationalist defeats to occupy more territory and greatly expand their army.

Dr. William P. Head

See also: American Volunteer Group; Anti-Japanese War; Chennault, Claire Lee; China, Republic of; China-Burma-India Theater; Chinese Communist Party; Guomintang; Jiang Jieshi; Manchuria; Nationalist Army; Soviet Union; Stillwell, Joseph.

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Japan, Attack on Manchuria (1931)

On September 18, 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria in northeast China. This is also known as the September 18 (9-18) Incident, or the Mukden Incident. Within a few months, Japanese armed forces occupied the entire Manchuria, including Liaoning, Jilin (Kirin), and Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang) Provinces. This aggression was later considered to be the first step on the path to the Japanese invasion of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1937–1945.

In the late 1920s, Japan suffered serious economic depression. Protectionism and trade tariffs introduced by the United States to protect its own industry placed high barriers on Japanese trade. High unemployment, over-spilling population, and acute shortage of raw materials all plagued the Japanese economy. In order to solve these problems, voices for a campaign to win new colonies abroad grew in popularity in Japan. Supporters included political rightist and, in particular, a large number of army leaders. As a result, Manchuria, with its rich minerals, fertile soil, and nearly 200,000 square kilometers of land, seemed to be a proper target.

A mysterious explosion on a section of the Japanese-held rail line at Shenyang (Mukden) gave the Japanese army the excuse it sought to charge the local Chinese with sabotage and to launch an attack on Manchuria. Taking place on September 18, the attack was known as the 9-18 Incident, or the Mukden Incident. The Japanese

troops promptly occupied Mukden with ease as the Chinese defensive forces were given a nonresistance order by the central government. However, following the occupation of Mukden, the Japanese operation continued to expand to other cities and towns. After five months, the Japanese had successfully brought Manchuria into its control, creating the puppet state of Manchukuo under the dethroned Qing emperor Pu Yi, or Xuantong (Hsüan-t'ung) (1909–1911).

In order to retake Manchuria, the Chinese government appealed to the League of Nations. The Japanese government, however, denied that it had territorial designs in northeast China, and justified its invasion of Manchuria on security grounds, to ward off a possible attack from the Red Army. The League of Nations then proposed an inquiry to handle the case. A commission of inquiry led by Lord Lytton was established. After a one-year investigation, the Lytton Commission reported in October 1932, that the Japanese operations could not be regarded as measures of self-defense and should be condemned. The League Assembly eventually adopted this report in February 1933. In response to the findings, the Japanese reacted by withdrawing from the League and furthering their occupation of Jehol Province in north China.

The impact of this event was far-reaching. Japanese *de facto* seizure of Manchuria exposed a constant threat to China. In fact, with the outbreak of the Manchurian Crisis, the Japanese unleashed military and political forces that led ultimately to the full invasion of China on July 7, 1937. It was not

until August 1945, with the help of Soviet Union, that the Chinese regained control of Manchuria.

Tao Wang

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, Republic of; July 7 Incident; Marco Polo Bridge Incident; Qing Dynasty; Red Army; Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905; Sino-Japanese War; Soviet Union.

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Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975)

The most important political and military leader of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) in the twentieth century, founder of the Nanjing (Nanking) government of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1927, and founder of the GMD government in Taiwan (Formosa) in 1949. Jiang Jieshi was born in October 1887 to a salt merchant family in the coastal province of Zhejiang (Chekiang) just as the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) was crumbling. In 1908, young Jiang went to Japan to study at a military college. While Jiang was in Japan, an uprising began in the Chinese city of Wuchang involving New Army units of the

Qing dynasty. In 1911, Jiang left Japan to become a regimental commander of Chen Qimei, who had risen to the post of military governor of Shanghai.

During the Chinese Revolution of 1911, Jiang allied himself early on with Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who was briefly appointed president of the new Republic of China created after the Qing emperors' abdication in 1912. Sun realized that his new GMD party needed a military if it was going to survive let alone take control of China. The Western powers spurned Sun's request for aid, and he turned to the Soviet Union, which readily offered to help create a new military force for the GMD. Sun sent Jiang to Moscow in 1924 to train with the Soviet Red Army and returned to play a critical role in the formation of a new GMD military. The first major project for this new GMD army was the creation of a military academy. The Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy was founded on June 16, 1924, and Jiang was appointed its first commandant. Sun died on March 12, 1925, of cancer, and Jiang began his rise in the GMD independent of Sun's patronage. Jiang scored a round of victories with his new army in February and March 1925 against local warlords in the Shantou area, proving the NRA was ready for major combat action.

On July 1, 1926, Jiang took his newly created army into battle in what is known as the Northern Expedition in 1926–1927. In just a few months, Jiang defeated two northern warlord armies and enticed the other warlords to join him. Soon half of China was in GMD hands. Jiang entered Shanghai in March 1927. The next month Jiang reestablished the ROC under GMD control in nearby Nanjing with himself as president. Throughout this period, the CCP had enjoyed a privileged place within the GMD. However, with



Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) inspects high-ranking members of the Officers Training Corps at Lushan, Jiangxi Province, during World War II. (Library of Congress)

Jiang's victory in the Northern Expedition, the CCP became a political and ideological threat to his authority. On April 12, 1927, Jiang unleashed the "white terror." In GMD-controlled areas, Communists were purged and killed, and the CCP was outlawed.

Because of Jiang's successful purging of CCP members in the cities, Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) rural base evaporated, and he was forced to initiate guerrilla warfare tactics to survive with what men he could convince to join him. As Mao's reputation increased, so did support from Moscow and the rural poor of interior China. Jiang attempted five military campaigns into Communist-controlled provinces in the subsequent years, committing 1 million men during the fifth campaign. As a result of the CCP defeat, on October 10,

1934, Mao led a desperate retreat into north-west China that has become known as the "Long March."

As the CCP and GMD civil war continued through the 1930s, Japan increased its territorial expansion onto mainland China. After the July 7, 1937, Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) Incident in which Japanese forces attacked GMD troops, both Nationalist and Communist forces united to fight a war with Japan that lasted until its defeat in 1945 by the United States in World War II. Jiang suffered heavy losses during these years as the Japanese increased their territory in China. The GMD was forced to move their government several times and lost most of coastal China to the invading armies. Jiang instituted a policy of international diplomacy that had as its cornerstone an alliance with

the United States against Japan following Pearl Harbor. As the American war in the Pacific chipped away at Japanese hegemony in Asia, both the GMD and CCP forces started to see successes against a faltering Japanese war machine. Japan surrendered on August 14, 1945.

The Chinese Civil War broke out in 1946, the Communist and Nationalist armies clashed, and slowly Jiang's grip on control of China slipped away. Jiang moved from offensive operations to defensive retreat by the fall of 1948. In late 1949, Jiang removed the seat of his government from Nanjing to Taiwan after he lost the civil war to the CCP. As Mao and the PLA were planning for the final assault on Jiang and Taiwan, U.S. president Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) ordered elements of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits to act as a buffer between both Jiang and Mao two days after the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950.

With the Korean War stalemated, the new U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) decided to change Taiwan policy and began a program of “unleashing Jiang” in 1953. ROC forces were given the go-ahead to begin harassing operations against coastal China and PRC shipping to put pressure on Mao. In July 1953, the Korean War Armistice was signed after both UN and CPVF forces were unable to win a decisive victory. In the United States a political battle raged over who lost China, and as a result Jiang received a great deal of moral and material support for his nationalist cause. In December 1954, Washington and Taiwan signed the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Jiang had successfully used the Cold War climate to maneuver America into pledging its support for his government. Jiang made a calculated move during these years to shift nearly 100,000 troops to Jinmen (Quemoy). This redeployment represented

one-third of ROC military strength. The United States for its part constructed a new air base on Taiwan capable of handling large B-52 bombers and moved nuclear-capable Matador missiles to Taiwan. The United States allowed Jiang to periodically conduct military and propaganda operations against the PRC throughout the 1950s.

The dream of a return to the mainland for Jiang was, in all practical sense, over. Jiang continued to make speeches and conduct his government as if they would one day return, but over the next two decades, Jiang focused on increasing his hold on Taiwan and improving the faltering economy. With U.S. help, Taiwan shifted to a manufacturing economy. Through 1972, Taiwan grew both its GNP and per capita GNP significantly. Although Taiwan lagged behind Japan, Jiang ensured a faster growth rate than his counterparts in Beijing. Political dissent and the growth of democratic institutions were discouraged throughout Jiang's rule, and the GMD maintained a dictatorial power over Taiwan and their offshore island holdings.

Cold War politics moved America and the Western democracies away from recognizing Taipei as the sole representative of the Chinese people in the UN. President Richard Nixon's (1913–1994) trip to China in 1972 and President Jimmy Carter's (1924–) official recognition of the PRC on January 1, 1979, created a One-China policy that only recognized Beijing as the sole representative of the Chinese people. Jiang held on to power until his death on April 5, 1975.

Justin E. Burch

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Cold War; Encirclement Campaigns; Guomindang; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement; Long March; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge

Incident; National Army; New Army; Northern Expedition; People's Liberation Army; Qing Dynasty; Red Army; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958; Yuan Shikai; Warlords Period; Whampoa Military Academy; Xi'an Incident.

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Jiang Zemin (1926–)

The most important political and military leader of China at the turn of the century. Jiang was the secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in 1989–2002, president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1993–2003, and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 1989–2004. Jiang was the leader of the third generation of the Chinese Communist leadership after the PRC's founder Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) from 1949 to 1976 and reforming architect Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) from 1978 to 1989.

Jiang was born on August 17, 1926, in the city of Yangzhou (Yangchow), Jiangsu

(Kiangsu) Province. He earned an electrical engineering degree at the prestigious Shanghai Jiaotong University in 1947. During his college years, the Chinese Civil War broke out between the CCP and Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party). Jiang participated in the CCP-led student movements and joined the CCP in 1946. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, he served as an associate engineer and deputy director of a factory. In 1955, he was sent to the Soviet Union and worked at the Stalin Automobile Factory as a trainee for one year.

After his return home in 1956, he served as a deputy division head, deputy chief power engineer, director of a branch factory, and deputy director and director of factories and research institutes in Changchun, Jilin (Kirin) Province; Shanghai; and Wuhan, Hubei (Hupei) Province. Speaking some English, Russian, and Romanian, he served as deputy director and then director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the First Ministry of Machine-Building Industry in Beijing (Peking). Later Jiang became the minister of Electronics Industry.

After Deng Xiaoping launched the reform movement of 1978, Jiang became the first planner of Shenzhen, Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, China's first special economic zone (SEZ). His successful experience won him election as a member of the Twelfth CCP Central Committee in 1982 and mayor of Shanghai, China's largest city, in 1985. Jiang planned a series of key infrastructure projects using overseas capital. In 1987, he became a member of the Politburo at the First Plenary Session of the Thirteenth CCP Central Committee. In June 1989, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee, Jiang was elected a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and general secretary of the CCP Central

Committee. In November, he became chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee.

In the early 1990s, Jiang gradually shifted the party's ideology and political goals from radical communism to moderate nationalism. The party's transformation, however, did not improve the relationship between individual citizens and the Chinese government. Jiang took tougher positions on Tibet (Xizang), human rights issues, and Taiwan, even ordering Chinese forces to fire missiles near the island in 1996, creating another serious international crisis with the United States. The party elite has employed nationalism as an ideology to unite China, resulting in one more source of legitimacy for the CCP as the country's ruling party.

Jiang developed his own theoretical principles as the "Three Represents," that the CCP should represent "the development of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the Chinese people." The "Three Represents" became the most essential requirements for the officials and officers to fulfill their obligations and duties during Jiang's era from 1990 to 2004 as his legacy.

As the PLA's first civilian commander in chief, Jiang developed an institutionalized authority that enabled him to assume the top post as the CCP and CMC chairman and the country's president. While CMC chairman, Jiang made a concerted effort to befriend the PLA, leading to the military's eventual acceptance of his leadership. In the early 1990s, Jiang granted the PLA high-level autonomy so that PLA interests would be well looked after. Through the decade, Jiang campaigned vigorously for enlarging the military. The PLA was able to

act as a fairly autonomous "interest group" for the first time in its history.

Having built up his own credibility in the PLA, Jiang reshaped the Chinese military through the 1990s. From 1991 to 1995, the high command retrained all the commanders and officers at regimental levels and above with Jiang's principles. In November 1996, Jiang called for the "two transformations": from an army preparing to fight "local wars under ordinary conditions" to an army prepared to fight and win "local wars under modern high-tech conditions"; and from an army based on quantity to an army based on quality. In December 1997, the CMC made a three-step grand plan for the PLA's modernization from 1998 to 2040.

In April 1992, Jiang streamlined and restructured the PLA to consolidate the 1 million man reduction since 1985, from 4.24 million to 3.19 million men. In 1997, at the CCP Fifteenth National Congress, Jiang announced his plan to reduce the PLA by a further 500,000 men over three years. On July 28, 1998, the PLA stated that it had accomplished its reduction goal and that it would maintain the current 2.5 million troops. By that spring, the PLA had created a unified General Armaments Department alongside the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), and General Logistics Department (GLD) as a major overhaul of its command-and-control, logistics, and armament mechanisms. In the spring of 1999, the CMC concentrated resources on developing six key strategic heavy group armies as the "pockets of excellence." They completed their reorganization in 2001. By the end of the 1990s, the PLA's institutional reform included some major changes in the personnel system, organization, and sustainability system. The personnel reforms were the cornerstone of the PLA's transformation from an army based on quantity to an army

based on quality, and transformation from a peasant army to a professional one with more urban and educated recruits.

Tension also mounted in the Taiwan Strait from July 21 to 26, 1995, when the PLA conducted its first missile test in an area only 36 miles north of a ROC-held island. In March 1996, the ROC was preparing its first presidential election in Taiwan since 1949. Beijing intended to discourage the Taiwanese to vote for Lee because he had tried to separate Taiwan from China through the independence movement. Jiang again employed the military to threaten the Taiwanese voters. On March 8, the PLA conducted its third set of missile test by firing three M-9 surface-to-surface missiles just 12 miles off Taiwan's major seaport cities, Keelung (Jilong) and Kaohsiung (Gaoxiang). Over 70 percent of commercial shipping passed through the targeted ports, which were disrupted by the proximity of the missile test. Flights to Japan and trans-Pacific flights were prolonged because airplanes needed to detour away from the flight path.

In 1997–2001, the PLA sped up its modernization by developing better technology and purchasing more Russian equipment. While addressing the PLA delegation to the Tenth National People's Congress in March 2003, Jiang stated clearly that “we should energetically push forward a Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics, so as to ensure that our armed forces keep up with the current rapid development of science, technology, and RMA.” The chairman has made the PLA's information-based capability the key for China's military modernization. He also said that promoting RMA with Chinese characteristics would bring about profound changes to every aspect of the Chinese army building. After Jiang retired, Hu Jintao

became the party chairman and the country's president in 2003, and the chairman of the CMC in 2004.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; General Departments of the PLA; Guomindang; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; National People's Congress; Nationalism; Nuclear Program; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996; Tiananmen Square Events; Tibet.

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Jiangnan Arsenal

The Jiangnan Arsenal, with its technical name “Machine Manufacturing General Bureau,” was set up at Shanghai in 1865. The establishment was led primarily by Zeng Guofan (Tseng Kuo-fan) (1811–1872) and Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) (1823–1901) as part of China's Self-Strengthening

movement during the late Qing dynasty (1644–1911).

It began with machinery purchased from abroad for armament manufacturing. In 1868, the Jiangnan Arsenal made China's first steel gunboat, which was named Huiji. From 1868 to 1876, shipbuilding was highly productive; 11 ships of diverse design were built in eight years with all parts of the ships being produced in the Jiangnan Arsenal. The experience of shipbuilding made it possible for the Jiangnan Arsenal to become the leading ordnance enterprise in the Far East and one of the greatest in the world, with its science and technology superior to its chief competitor, Meiji Japan. However, because of financial difficulties, corruption among leading officials, and the lack of a compound engine, more warships for the Chinese navy were still produced in Europe, whose technological progress had been way ahead of China.

The year 1876 saw a cutback in the production of ships at the Jiangnan Arsenal. At the same time more emphasis was put on the manufacturing of modern small arms for military use. In the 1890s, the Jiangnan Arsenal became famous for its success in producing rapid-firing machine guns, which played a key role in China's safeguarding of its territorial waters.

After the Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911, despite the deficiency of leadership, the Jiangnan Arsenal made China's first ship in 1918. The ship, which had a displacement of 10,000 tons, was later exported to the United States, where it served until World War II for civil purposes.

Besides the establishment of an armament manufacturing industry, a translation department was also initiated at the Jiangnan Arsenal in 1876. The initiative was under the sponsorship of Xu Shou, Hua Fengfang,

and Xu Jianyin, classical scholars with scientific interests. Later, English missionary John Fryer joined the effort to translate Western works related to military science and technological subjects into classic Chinese. As the main source of scientific learning, the Jiangnan Arsenal's publications were well received among Qing officials and literati during the Self-Strengthening movement.

The Jiangnan Arsenal remained in operation through the 1930s during the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), and it reopened in 1953. Later, renamed Jiangnan Shipyard, it built China's first submarine, marking the beginning of manufacturing independence for the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Wanqi Huang

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Li Hongzhang; New Army; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Self-Strengthening Movement; Zeng Guofan.

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Jiangxi Soviet (1930–1934)

A Soviet-style government in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province established by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) during the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937). On September 11, 1927, Mao led armed peasants and launched the Autumn Harvest Uprising along the Hunan-Jiangxi borders. Soon the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang; the Chinese Nationalist Party) and local self-defense troops organized by the landlords, who were the target of the peasants' rebellion, counterattacked. On September 29, Mao's badly damaged force reorganized into a single regiment.

Mao survived and successfully established a military base area for the Communist revolution in 1928–1934. Under Mao's command, the surviving CCP regiment established the Jinggangshan (Ching kang Mountains) base along the Jiangxi-Hunan border. Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) and his troops from the Nanchang Uprising joined Mao at Jinggangshan on April 24, 1928. They established the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army on May 4, about 5,000 men organized into six regiments, for which they had but 2,000 rifles. Zhu was the commander, and Mao was the political commissar. Soon other Communist troops joined them at Jinggangshan, which became the "cradle" of the CCP's military revolution.

To attract peasant volunteers, the Fourth Army initiated a land reform in the mountainous area in 1928–1930. The army usually sent an officer with a couple of men to a village to help the poor peasants by reducing their rents and taxes. In many cases, the officer took land from the rich landlords and redistributed it among the poor and

landless peasants by small allotments. The land revolution movement became attractive to the peasants in this mountain region, one of the poorest areas in the country. Officers also helped the peasants to organize a peasant association, a new government, and a self-defense militia with some weapons and basic training to protect their newly received land ownership. Then the officers moved on to another village.

When all the villages in one area completed their "land revolution," the Red Army took over the town or the county to establish a Soviet-style government (administration was run by a CCP committee and enforced by the Red Army). With the Soviet government, a base area, or so-called red region (*hongqu*) or the Soviet region (*suqu*), was founded. The army received material and human resources from their base areas, and in turn they provided protection for the local Soviet-style governments to continue their land reform movement. By the summer of 1930, the Communist governments and the Fourth Army secured their base areas in Jiangxi-Hunan, including nine counties with a total population of 2 million.

Following the Jinggangshan model, other surviving units established their military bases one after another in the rural and border regions of Hunan, Fujian (Fukien), Jiangsu (Kiangsu), and Anhui (Anhwei). And finally, the Central Committee accepted Mao's way, or his "up to the mountains" approach, after its last urban uprising failed in Guangzhou in December 1927.

In June–July 1928, with the help of the Soviet Union, the CCP held its Sixth National Congress at Moscow. There were 142 representatives at the meeting representing 130,000 CCP members in China. Xiang Zhongfa (Hsiang Chung-fa) was elected the chairman of the Politburo of the Central Committee, and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai)

(1898–1976) elected one of its seven members. Moscow began to change its negative position against Mao’s rural guerrilla warfare, although Russian leader Joseph Stalin still considered it as a supplementary method to the urban-centered revolution in China. Even absent from the meeting, Mao was elected a member of the CCP Central Committee.

After May 1930, Stalin began to praise Mao’s rural guerrilla warfare during his conversations with the Chinese visitors in Moscow. Soviet support brought Mao back to the Party Center in the fall of 1930, when he resumed his alternate standing committee membership in the Politburo. On November 11, 1931, a Soviet-style central government was established in the Jiangxi region, or the “Central Soviet Region” (*zhongyang suqu*), which had several million in population and several dozen counties. As elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Mao created a government center for Chinese Communist authority across the country for the first time in CCP history. In 1932, the Party Center moved from Shanghai to the “Central Soviet Region” in Jiangxi with its Central Committee, party administration, and Russian advisors. Apparently, Mao’s military success had made him central to the Chinese Communist revolution.

In his Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic (*zhonghua suweiai gongheguo linshi zhongyang zhengfu*), Mao formed the Chinese Soviet Central Revolutionary Military Committee as the high command of the Red Army. By the end of 1931, the Red Army totaled 150,000 men and expanded its areas of operation. About 25 percent of the rank and file were CCP members. More than 4,000 young rural women joined the Red Army during this period, serving in a wide range of

combat and noncombat military roles. In May 1933, the Staff Department was changed to the General Headquarters of the Red Army, including six bureaus: operations, intelligence, communication, training, recruitment, and organization. By January 1934, the Red Army had 32 munitions factories in the “Central Soviet Region,” manufacturing rifles, hand grenades, machine guns, and mortars. Among them, the Guantian Ordnance Factory employed more than 1,000 workers.

The rapid growth of the Communist troops and expansion of their controlled regions alarmed the GMD government. ROC president Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and the high command of the GMD Army centralized their provincial campaigns into a coordinated suppression in order to round up the Red Army. From 1930 to 1934, Jiang’s central government organized five major offensive campaigns against the Communist-controlled areas and the Red Army bases in the border areas along the Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Hubei (Hupei), Jiangsu, and Shanxi (Shansi). Both Mao and Zhu were on the “most wanted” list. In the summer of 1933, Jiang concentrated 1 million GMD troops and launched his fifth suppression campaign against the Red Army. In September, 500,000 GMD troops attacked the central region. By January 1934, Mao had lost his positions in the government due to the CCP power struggle.

The total defense did not work and failed to either slow down or stop the offensives. In October, the Red Army gave up their central region campaign and retreated westward. Thereafter, the CCP and the Red Army lost contact with the Soviet Union. The Jiangxi Soviet was over. The Red Army in other provinces abandoned all of their bases and Soviet areas across the country, except two in northwest China. The survivors of the

Red Army began their Long March toward northwest China on October 10, 1934.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Encirclement Campaigns; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; National Party Congress; Red Army; Red Army College; Red Army Recruitment; Soviet Union; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area (1928–1934)

Jinggangshan (Chingkang Mountain) is one of the mountains in the middle section of

the Luoxiao (Lohsiao) Mountain range, west of Jiangxi Province, along the Jiangxi-Hunan border. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937) between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and the Guomindang (GMD, Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), a CCP leader, made the Jinggangshan his revolutionary base by forming the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army in 1928 and the Chinese Soviet Central Government in 1931. The Jinggangshan base area soon became the military center for the CCP revolutionary war against the army of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC).

After the Autumn Harvest Uprising along the Jiangxi-Hunan border in September 1927, Mao led a regiment of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army southward to join the Nanchang Uprising troops under the command of Zhu De and He Long in Guangdong. In early October, when Mao's troops reached Jinggangshan, the bad news arrived that Zhu had fled from Guangdong. The command panicked because the CCP armed revolts had failed. The leading commanders abandoned their troops, and some men followed. Mao led the remnants, about 800 men, and moved into Jinggangshan. He joined the bandits in the mountains, meeting their heads and giving them 100 rifles on October 6 and another 70 on October 27. Mao became sworn brothers with two bandit heads by drinking blood wine and marrying one of their sisters. He was soon known as the “Shandawang” (king of the mountain mobs). At that point, many CCP leaders did not believe Mao could survive since there were no resources to support the troops and no people interested in the

revolution in the mountains. Some considered Mao's move "up to the mountain" as defection from the CCP and becoming one of the bandits. In November 1927, the Central Committee terminated Mao's alternate standing committee membership in the Politburo at an emergency meeting chaired by the Soviet advisors in Shanghai.

Mao, however, survived and successfully established a military base area for the Communist revolution in 1928–1934. Under Mao's command, the surviving regiment established the Jinggangshan base along the Jiangxi-Hunan border. Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) and his troops from the Nanchang Uprising joined Mao at Jinggangshan on April 24, 1928. They established the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army on May 4, about 5,000 men organized into six regiments, for which they had only 2,000 rifles. Zhu was the commander, and Mao served as the political commissar. Soon other Communist troops joined them at Jinggangshan, which became the "cradle" of the CCP's military revolution.

The Fourth Army recognized the peasantry's importance in their military revolution. To form a Communist revolutionary army, they created a voluntary system based on the "Guideline for Military Tasks" issued by the army in April 1928. Obviously, Zhu and Mao tried to create an egalitarian society within their army, different from the warlord and GMD armies. To attract peasant volunteers, the Fourth Army initiated a land reform in the mountainous area in 1928–1930. The army usually sent an officer with a couple of men to a village to help the poor peasants by reducing their rents and taxes. In many cases, the officer took land from the rich landlords and redistributed it among the poor and landless peasants by small allotments. The land revolution movement became attractive to the peasants in this

mountain region, one of the poorest areas in the country. Officers also helped the peasants to organize a peasant association, a new government, and self-defense militia with some weapons and basic training to protect their newly received land ownership. Then the officers moved on to another village. When all the villages in one area completed their "land revolution," the army took over the town or the county to establish a Soviet-style government (administration was run by a CCP committee and enforced by the Red Army). With the Soviet government, a base area, or so-called red region (*hongqu*) or Soviet region (*suqu*), was founded. The army received material and human resources from their base areas and in turn they provided protection for the local Soviet-style governments to continue their land reform movement. By the summer of 1930, the Communist governments and the Fourth Army secured their base areas in Jiangxi-Hunan, including nine counties with a total population of 2 million.

Since the Fourth Army operated in remote, mountainous areas and away from the GMD military that occupied the major cities, a guerrilla warfare strategy worked. During the defense of the Jinggangshan region in 1928, Zhu and Mao perfected the guerrilla tactics, which they summarized as: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." During the formative period at the Jinggangshan base, Mao also established the principle of the party's absolute leadership over the army. Zhu and Mao also founded a munitions factory at Lianhua County, which had more than 800 workers by 1930, and produced 120,000 bullets and 30,000–50,000 mortar shells monthly.

Following the Jinggangshan model, other surviving units established their military

bases one after another in the rural and border regions of Hunan, Fujian (Fukien), Jiangsu (Kiangsu), and Anhui (Anhui). Finally, the Central Committee accepted Mao's way, or his "up to the mountains" approach, after its last urban uprising failed in Guangzhou (Canton) in December 1927. On May 25, 1928, the CCP Central Committee issued "CC#51: Military Task Guideline," the first systematic outline for CCP military organization, institution, and operation. The document instructed that active and brave members of the peasant uprisings be recruited into the regulars. In this document, the Central Committee incorporated all the CCP armed units into the "Red Army." For instance, Zhu-Mao's Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army became the Red Army's Fourth Army in June 1928. Praising the Fourth Army's experience in land reform to win over the peasants and its guerrilla tactics, the Central Committee ordered other armies to follow its example. Clearly, Zhu and Mao had created a model military center at Jinggangshan for the Communist revolution at that time.

After May 1930, Joseph Stalin began to praise Mao's rural guerrilla warfare during his conversations with the Chinese visitors in Moscow. Soviet support brought Mao back to the Party Center in the fall of 1930 when he resumed his alternate standing committee membership in the Politburo. On November 11, 1931, a Soviet-style central government was established in the Jiangxi region, or the Central Soviet Region (*zhongyang suqu*), which had several million in population and comprised several dozen counties. As elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Mao created a government center for Chinese Communist authority across the country for the first time in CCP history.

In 1932, the Party Center moved from Shanghai to the Central Soviet Region in Jiangxi with its Central Committee, party administration, and Russian advisors. Apparently, Mao's military success had made him central to the Chinese Communist revolution.

The rapid growth of the Communist troops and expansion of their controlled regions alarmed the GMD government. Jiang and the high command of the GMD Army centralized their provincial campaigns into a coordinated suppression to round up the Red Army. From 1930 to 1934, Jiang's central government organized five major offensive campaigns against the Communist-controlled areas and the Red Army bases in the Jiangxi-Hunan border. Although the Red Army successfully conducted four countersuppression campaigns, their total defense did not work in 1934 and failed to either slow down or stop the Fifth Offensives of Jiang's army. In October, the Red Army gave up their base areas in Jiangxi and retreated westward. The Red Army in other provinces abandoned all of their bases and Soviet areas across the country, except two in northwest China. The survivors of the Red Army began their Long March toward northwest China on October 10, 1934.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; He Long; Jiang Jieshi; Jiangxi Soviet; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; Red Army; Red Army College; Red Army Recruitment; Soviet Union; Zhu De.

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Jinmen (Quemoy or Kinmen)

A small island group, lying less than two miles off the southeastern coast of the Chinese mainland, separated from Xiamen, a major city in southeastern Fujian Province, by a narrow strip of water. The Jinmen Island is still in the hands of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government at Taiwan. Beginning in September 1954, Chinese Communist (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) coastal batteries shelled the Nationalist-held Jinmen. When the Nationalist guns fired back, the longest and heaviest artillery warfare in military history was on. The bombardment continued until 1979, when the PRC and the United States normalized their diplomatic relationship. Jinmen not only occupied a decisive position between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists in reshaping their civil struggle over the Taiwan Strait after 1949, but also played a critical role in the confrontation and communication between the PRC and

the United States during the Cold War for more than two decades.

In 1954, Jinmen and several offshore islands were at the center of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–1955. On September 3, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) employed 20 artillery battalions with more than 150 heavy artillery pieces and began heavy artillery fire upon Jinmen. In the first two hours of shelling, the PLA sank one GMD gunboat and two transportation ships, damaged seven other ships, and destroyed nine artillery positions. By the end of the day, Jinmen had been hit by some 7,000 rounds. Two American officers were killed by the heavy shelling on this first day. Several days of heavy shelling followed. Because the PLA had not yet gained air control over the Fujian coast, the durations of the shellings were limited, lasting only about an hour or so in order to give artillery units enough time to leave their positions before GMD retaliatory air raids arrived. The GMD Air Force launched more than 300 sorties attacking PLA artillery positions during the first week of the PLA shelling. Between September 22 and November 20, PLA artillery shelled Jinmen more than 70 times, and the GMD garrison suffered some 800 casualties.

The 1954 PLA shelling of Jinmen was significant because it became a model of “diplomacy through militancy” in the Taiwan Strait, a principal means for Beijing to communicate with Washington for many years to come. Washington, however, chose to communicate in its own terms with Beijing in 1954, and its reaction in support of the GMD defense of the Taiwan Strait was quick. By the morning of September 5, three carriers, a cruiser division, and three destroyer divisions of the Seventh Fleet were standing by, patrolling waters in the Strait at distances only several miles from

Jinmen. Then, on December 2, Washington signed its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, a major commitment to Taiwan's security. These 1954 Taiwan Strait events were the first of two decades of episodic uses of the PLA by Beijing to signal displeasure over the Taiwan Strait.

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis began on August 23, 1958, when the PLA shelled Jinmen again. The first rounds delivered by 459 artillery pieces sent about 2,600 shells onto the islands. In the initial 85 minutes, the PLA fired more than 30,000 shells onto Jinmen and killed some 600 GMD troops, including 3 deputy commanders. By August 25, the PLA's heavy shelling had totally stopped Taiwan's supplies and shipments to the Jinmen Islands. After 10 days of shelling, Jinmen was blocked, and the PLA tried to force the GMD troops to withdraw from the island. Its garrison was getting only a small percentage of its regular supplies through a limited and ineffective airlift and some nighttime shipping. The PLA was ready to make further moves, but Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP and the Central Military Commission (CMC), ordered shelling of Jinmen to stop for three days on September 3 in order to gauge the American response.

On September 7, American warships began escorting GMD supply ships from Taiwan to Jinmen. Mao ordered his generals to shell the GMD transit ships only, not the American ships. Since the PLA front command did not have enough time to identify the American ships, they did not shell the joint fleet that day. The next day, Taiwan sent another joint fleet to Jinmen using the successful escort pattern of the day before, with four GMD landing ships and five American ships (one cruiser and four destroyers). Mao gave the order to open fire

on the joint fleet, and the PLA artilleries fired more than 20,000 shells. The American ships turned around without returning fire, while the GMD ships suffered heavy losses. On September 11 and 13, the GMD-U.S. joint fleet tried again, but could not get to Jinmen because of fierce PLA shelling around the harbor.

Then Taiwan employed a different transport vessel, the LVT, a small and flexible amphibious vehicle that can land and unload almost anywhere, which American troops had successfully used in World War II. On September 14, the GMD sent 17 fully loaded LVTs from large transport ships outside Jinmen, and 15 of them reached Jinmen's beach. Meanwhile, U.S. planes began to escort GMD shipments to Jinmen. The United States also helped equip GMD F-86 fighters with new air-to-air missiles, their first ever introduction to combat, and these became a big headache for PLA pilots. The PLA Air Force discovered that the GMD had the missiles only on September 24 when PLA fighters were shot down by the missiles in an engagement with GMD fighters. From September 14 through October 5, GMD transport from Taiwan to Jinmen had increased to some 170 tons per day, about 40 percent of the daily needs of the island garrison but a big increase from the very low percentages of late August.

The blockade of Jinmen was becoming more and more difficult to sustain, and the PLA high command put more pressures on its field generals. On September 24, the CMC ordered the front command to improve the accuracy of its artillery so as to sink or neutralize these small-size vessels before they could reach the beach. Despite the 40 days of shelling and some new efforts and reinforcements, the PLA's blockade of Jinmen was not fully effective, and Taiwan showed no signs of withdrawing its garrison

from the island. The PLA high command had to decide on its next step. On October 5, Mao wrote to Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974), defense minister, to cease the bombardment of Jinmen.

Later in October, Mao and CMC arrived at a new decision to slow down the shelling of Jinmen and leave the offshore islands in Chiang's hands as a burden for America. They rationalized the slowdown in shelling by claiming that while the PLA could have seized Jinmen, it would have been merely a short-term victory. China would leave Jinmen linked to Taiwan to avoid giving the United States a pretext for instigating a two China plot. The nation's unification and the liberation of Taiwan were much more important over the long run than the recovery of a few offshore islands. Eventually the problem of the offshore islands would be solved along with the Taiwan problem. On October 25, Peng announced that the PLA batteries on the Fujian front would not shell Jinmen on even-numbered days, while a continued shelling on odd-numbered days would be limited by certain conditions. The PLA shelling of Jinmen continued from 1958 to January 1, 1979, the point at which the PRC and the United States normalized their diplomatic relations.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Cold War; Guomintang; Mao Zedong; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations.

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Julu, Battle of (208–207 BC)

The decisive battle for the rebellion armies to defeat the Qin Army in 208–207 BC at Julu (modern-day Xingtai), Hebei (Hopei) Province. The fight occurred between Qin forces led by Zhang Han and Chu rebels led by Xiang Yu. Xiang Yu defeated the Qin forces with a relatively small number of troops. After the battle, Qin's main force had been eliminated, which precipitated the decline of Qin's military power during the late Qin dynasty (221–206 BC).

In 208 BC, Qin general Zhang Han eliminated Xiang Liang, and he led his forces across the Yellow River (Huanghe), planning to attack the state of Zhao. After he defeated Zhao's army, Zhang ordered Wang Li and She Jian to surround Julu, in the state of Zhao. Zhang Han himself garrisoned the rest of army in the south of the city, and maintained a corridor to supply Wang Li and She Jian's forces. In response to this, King Huai of Chu separated his military forces into two parts: one part led by Song Yi and Xiang Yu marched toward Julu to help the state of Zhao; the other part led by Liu Bang planned to attack Guanzhong in the heart of the Qin dynasty. Also, King Huai promised that anyone who conquered

Guanzhong first would be the king of Guanzhong.

Song Yi, along with his troops, arrived at Anyang and stayed there for 46 days, which upset Xiang Yu. So he killed Song Yi and told his soldiers that Song Yi had betrayed King Huai of Chu. Later, King Huai named Xiang Yu general.

As Chu had fewer soldiers than Qin, Xiang Yu ordered Ying Bu to lead a force of 20,000 soldiers to cross the river. They won several skirmishes, and later, Xiang Yu commanded that all of his soldiers destroy their cooking materials. He stated that they could bring food for only three days; in addition, after crossing the river, they must destroy their boats, so that their only choices would be to win the battle or perish. The strategy succeeded, with Xiang Yu's soldiers winning every battle through their bravery. As Sima Qian said: "One Chu soldier can take on ten Qin soldiers." Not only did they destroy Qin's corridor, they also caught Wang Li alive. Before Xiang Yu started to attack Qin's armies, there were more than 10 troops formed by other states waiting outside. But they were afraid to attack until Xiang Yu had won a certain number of skirmishes. By June 207 BC, Xiang Yu had defeated Qin's armies in Yushui and Sanhujin. They won the battle of Julu after

Zhang Han, Sima Xin, and Dong Yi surrendered. A year later, the Qin dynasty collapsed. The rebels established the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD).

Yong Tong

See also: Han, Cavalry of; Han Dynasty; Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Rebellion Led by Chen Sheng.

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July 7 (7-7) Incident. See Marco Polo Bridge Incident

K

Kangxi (K'ang-hsi), Emperor (1654–1722)

The second emperor of Qing dynasty (1644–1911), who reigned from 1661 to 1722. One of China's most powerful emperors, the Kangxi emperor expelled the last of the anti-Manchu forces from south China, gained control of Taiwan, and increased China's territory in the north. Culturally, China blossomed during his reign, and if he failed to make constructive civil reforms, he nevertheless strengthened his country for the eighteenth century.

The Kangxi emperor was born on May 4, 1654, in Beijing, the third son of the Shunzhi (Shun-ch'ih) (reigned 1644–1661) emperor. His mother was Empress Xiao Kang (Hsiao Kang), the daughter of a famous Manchu general. When his father died of smallpox at age 23 in 1661, the Kangxi emperor ascended the throne above his five brothers, whose mothers were of lower birth. Because he was only seven years old, the government was administered by four conservative attendants—Sonin, Suksaha, Ebilun, and Oboi. The Kangxi emperor first married at age 11, and he eventually had three wives and more than 30 consorts who would give birth to his 56 children, 28 of whom survived childhood.

As his father had done, the Kangxi emperor attempted to take over the responsibilities of government when he was 13, but the regents refused to relinquish their power. Finally, Sonin died, Suksaha was put to death by Oboi, and Ebilun bowed out, leaving Oboi as a virtual dictator until,

with the help of his grandmother, the Kangxi emperor arrested him in 1669 on charges of dishonesty. Oboi died in prison, and the Kangxi emperor began his reign at the age of 15.

The Kangxi emperor's first task was to consolidate China under Manchu control. The Manchu people had militarily taken over their homeland of Manchuria, moved south to conquer Beijing (Peking) in 1644, and established the Qing dynasty (meaning "pure" or "clear"), which ended the period of the Ming. Three rogue generals still controlled south China, however. In 1673, one of the generals, Shang Kexi, asked the emperor if he could retire in Manchuria, prompting the other generals, Wu Sangui and Geng Jingzhong, to send similar requests. The Kangxi emperor readily agreed, but after he attempted to deprive Wu of his army, Wu renounced his allegiance to the Qing and declared the formation of his own dynasty, the Zhou, in December 1673. The resulting war became known as the War of the Three Feudatories, and the young emperor's astute military strategy proved triumphant.

The three feudatories were unable to coordinate their efforts, which proved disastrous in light of the tenacity of the Manchu warriors and the Kangxi emperor's ability to develop long-range plans for conquest. Geng surrendered to the Qing in 1676, and Shang followed the next year. Wu died of dysentery in 1678, but his grandson fought in his name for three more years before being trapped by Manchu generals. Geng, Shang, and all of Wu's followers were eventually executed. The war was over in 1681,

and all of China was brought under the Kangxi emperor's rule. New governors were sent to the rebellious provinces to assimilate them into the Qing realm, and taxes began to flow into Beijing from those areas, although they remained somewhat peripheral to China for the rest of the Kangxi emperor's reign.

The Kangxi emperor next turned his attention to Taiwan and Russia. Taiwan was ruled by the Cheng family, powerful seafarers who refused to submit to the Manchus and used the island as a trade center. With little naval power, the emperor was prevented from attacking Taiwan until July 1683, when he assembled a fleet of 300 war vessels under the command of Admiral Shi Lang. Shi delivered a crushing victory, and Taiwan surrendered three months later. The island became a prefecture of the Fujian Province and was placed under the jurisdiction of the Qing. Having secured Taiwan and south China, the Kangxi emperor then attempted to drive the Russians out of the north in 1685. Qing armies began a protracted siege on Albazin in 1686, and in 1689, the Kangxi emperor and Russia's Peter I signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which gave the Amur Valley and Manchuria to China. Kangxi also gained Outer Mongolia through an attack on the Dzungars at Dzuunmod, which became an important part of the Qing Empire.

Despite his high success rate in the areas of political unification and border consolidation, the Kangxi emperor had mixed results in civil reforms. Taxation and rural administration programs were stagnant, and life for most rural Chinese was a struggle between corrupt officials and roving bandits. His attention to the Yellow River (Huanghe) and Grand Canal was helpful to farmers, however, and their flows were stabilized to allow for better rice transit.

Culturally, China blossomed during the Kangxi emperor's reign. In 1670, he issued the Sacred Edict, 16 maxims summarizing Confucian values that ensured a wide diffusion of the emperor's views on generosity, obedience, and hard work. He continued the examination system put in place by his father, which brought only the most promising men into the civil service, and assembled groups of scholars to write dictionaries and encyclopedias. Large geographical studies were started, and creative writing flourished.

An avid reader, the Kangxi emperor was interested in new developments from Europe, which led him in the late seventeenth century to employ many Jesuit missionaries in his court. He also allowed them to practice their religion in Beijing and other provinces, though he issued an edict insisting that the Chinese rituals of ancestor worship and homage to Confucius were civil ones and thus could be practiced by Christian converts. The edict did not sit well with Catholic leaders, who felt that the mixture of Christian and Chinese rituals weakened the integrity of the Church. Pope Clement XI sent a representative to Beijing during 1705–1706 for a series of meetings with the Kangxi emperor, which resulted in two ultimatums: the Church declared that followers of the emperor's orders would be excommunicated, and the emperor declared that those who did not accept his position would be expelled from China. Most of the Jesuits signed an approval of the emperor's position, but many did not, and the split seriously encumbered the spread of Western thought in China.

The Kangxi emperor faced other problems within his own household. Anxious to end the practice of regency government until young emperors came of age, he had declared his first-born son, Yinreng, his successor soon after his birth in 1674. The boy was educated by scholars, trained in the

ways of governance, and allowed to rule Beijing while his father was away for extended periods. In 1707, however, the Kangxi emperor began to hear rumors of his son's ill behavior, and it came to light that Yinreng was a tyrant who bullied members of the household and purchased boys and girls from the south for sexual favors. The emperor withdrew Yinreng's heir-apparent status in 1708 and put him under house arrest, only to release him in 1709. The emperor rearrested his son in 1712, after learning that Yinreng planned to assassinate him. Thereafter, the Kangxi emperor's other 19 sons jostled for the throne. Disheartened, the Kangxi emperor never named another heir, and the Qing Empire faced an uncertain future.

In 1720, the Kangxi emperor made his last major stand in foreign affairs, expelling the Dzungars from Lhasa, Tibet, after they invaded the city in 1717. Tibet was incorporated into the Qing Empire, and a new Dalai Lama (Kelzang Gyatso), one loyal to the Qing, was installed. Chinese interference in the politics of Tibet thus began during the reign of the Kangxi emperor. By that time, the emperor was nearly 70 years old and increasingly depressed. After a celebration of his long reign during the Chinese New Year of 1722, he fell ill. Neglecting to name an heir, the Kangxi emperor died on December 20, 1722. His son Yongzheng became emperor after the Kangxi emperor's death, but he did little to build on the firm political and economic foundation that his father had established during his 61-year reign.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Banner System; Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Dalai Lama; Grand Canal; Li Zicheng; Manchus; Manchuria; Ming Dynasty; Nerchinsk and Kiakhta, Treaties of; Qing Dynasty; Russia, Relations with China; Tibet.

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Korean War (1950–1953)

The Korean War was a watershed conflict within the Cold War (1946–1991). The first shooting war of the Cold War, it was also the first limited war of the nuclear age. Korea was long the scene of confrontation among China, Japan, and Russia. Controlled by either China or Japan for most of its modern history, Korea was divided in half after World War II. Wartime agreements called for the United States to temporarily occupy southern Korea up to the 38th Parallel, while the Soviet Union did the same north of that line. The Cold War brought the permanent division of Korea into two states.

Efforts to establish a unified Korea failed, and in September 1947, the United States referred the issue to the United Nations (UN), which called for a unified Korean government and the withdrawal of occupation forces. In January 1948, Soviet authorities refused to permit a UN commission to oversee elections in northern Korea, but elections for an assembly proceeded in southern Korea that spring. By August 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) had officially



formed with its capital at Seoul and was headed by 70-year-old Syngman Rhee, a staunch conservative. Washington then terminated its military government and agreed to train South Korea's armed forces.

In September 1948, the Communists formed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) with its capital at Pyongyang and led by veteran Communist Kim Il-sung (1912–1994). Kim

had fought the Japanese occupation and ended World War II as a major in the Soviet army.

Both Korean governments claimed authority over the entire peninsula, but in December 1948 the UN General Assembly endorsed the ROK as the only lawfully elected government. That same month the USSR announced that it had withdrawn its forces from North Korea. The United States withdrew all its troops from South Korea by June 1949.

Starting in May 1948, sporadic fighting began along the 38th Parallel. Washington, fearful that the United States might be drawn into a civil war, purposely distanced itself from these clashes. President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) announced that fighting in Korea would not automatically lead to U.S. military intervention. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Korea from the U.S. strategic Asian defensive perimeter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) agreed with this, as did U.S. Far Eastern commander General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Such pronouncements undoubtedly encouraged Kim to believe that the United States would not fight for Korea.

For many years, North Korea, the USSR, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) maintained that the Korean War began with a South Korean attack on North Korea. This was propaganda. Beginning in late 1949, North Korea prepared for full-scale war. Its Korean Peoples Army (KPA) was well armed with Soviet weapons, including such modern offensive arms as heavy artillery, T-34 tanks, trucks, automatic weapons, and about 180 new aircraft. The KPA numbered about 135,000 men in 10 divisions.

South Korea's military situation was far different. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) lacked equipment and trained leaders because of Washington's unwillingness

to fight in Korea and because the meager U.S. defense budget would not allow it. ROKA training was incomplete and lacked heavy artillery, tanks, and antitank weapons. South Korea had no air force apart from trainers and liaison aircraft. The South Korean military numbered 95,000 men in eight divisions, only four of which were at full strength.

Washington was aware of the North Korean military buildup but believed that the Communist powers would not risk war. Limited war was still a foreign concept to U.S. planners. The U.S. military was also woefully unprepared and ill-equipped. The army numbered only nine divisions and 630,000 men.

Kim planned to use his military superiority to invade and quickly conquer South Korea. Twice he consulted Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), promising him victory in a manner of weeks, assuring him that there would be a Communist revolution in South Korea, and insisting that Washington would not intervene. Moscow and Beijing were actively preparing for the invasion as early as the spring of 1949, and Russian military advisors assisted in its planning. Stalin concluded that even if the United States decided to intervene, it would come too late.

Stalin pledged military assistance but not direct Soviet military involvement. He also insisted that Kim meet with PRC leader Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and secure his assent to the plans. In late 1949, Mao released the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 164th and 166th Divisions of Korean volunteers who had fought against the Japanese and in the Chinese Civil War, providing North Korea with 30,000–40,000 seasoned troops.

On June 25, 1950, KPA forces invaded South Korea. The UN Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire and the

withdrawal of North Korean forces, a resolution that went unchallenged because of a Soviet UN boycott. On June 27, the Security Council asked UN member states to furnish assistance to South Korea. President Harry S. Truman also extended U.S. air and naval operations to include North Korea and authorized U.S. Army troops to protect the port of Pusan. Upon General MacArthur's recommendation, President Truman committed U.S. Far Eastern ground forces to Korea on June 30.

The invasion caught both MacArthur and Washington by surprise. Yet U.S. intervention was almost certain, given the Truman Doctrine, domestic political fallout from the Communist victory in China in 1949, and the belief that success in Korea would embolden the Communists elsewhere. During the three-year conflict, no war was ever formally declared; Truman labeled it a "police action."

At the time of the invasion, the United States had four poorly trained and equipped divisions in Japan. By cannibalizing his Seventh Infantry Division, MacArthur was able to dispatch the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions and the First Cavalry Division to Korea within two weeks. Meanwhile, Seoul fell on June 28. Most of South Korea's equipment was lost when the bridges spanning the Han River were prematurely blown up.

On July 5 the first American units battled the KPA at Osan, 50 miles south of Seoul. Expected to stop a KPA division, Task Force Smith consisted of only 540 men in two rifle companies and an artillery battery. The KPA, spearheaded by T-34 tanks, easily swept it aside.

At the request of the UN Security Council, the UN set up a military command in Korea. Washington insisted on a U.S. commander, and on July 10, Truman appointed MacArthur to head the UN Command

(UNC). Seventeen nations contributed military assistance, and at peak strength UNC forces numbered about 400,000 South Korean troops, 250,000 U.S. troops, and 35,000 troops from other nations. Two British and Canadians units formed the First Commonwealth Division. Turkey provided a brigade, and there were troops from Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Other nations provided medical units.

U.S. forces were unprepared for the fighting. Difficult terrain, primitive logistics, poor communication, and refugees did as much to delay the North Korean offensive as did the defenders. In the chaotic atmosphere of the UNC retreat, both sides committed atrocities. The South Koreans executed some 2,000 political prisoners. U.S. and UNC troops shot a number of innocent civilians as the KPA infiltrated throngs of refugees and used them as human shields. North Korea committed far greater atrocities during its occupation of South Korea, however, slaying an estimated 26,000 political opponents. The KPA also executed American prisoners of war (POWs) in the fall of 1950.

By mid-July, UNC troops had been pushed back into the so-called Pusan Perimeter, an area of 30–50 miles around the vital port of Pusan on the southeastern coast of Korea. Here U.S. and ROK forces bought valuable time and ultimately held. This success was attributable to UNC artillery, control of the skies, and Eighth Army (EUSAK, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea) commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker's (1889–1950) brilliant mobile defense. The KPA also failed to employ its early manpower advantage to mount simultaneous attacks along the entire perimeter.

Even as the battle for the Pusan Perimeter raged, MacArthur (1880–1964) was planning

an amphibious assault behind enemy lines. Confident that he could hold Pusan, MacArthur deliberately weakened EUSAK to build up an invasion force. He selected Inchon as the invasion site. As Korea's second-largest port and being only 15 miles from Seoul, Inchon was close to the KPA's main supply line south. Seizing it would cut off KPA troops to the south. MacArthur also knew that he could deal North Korea a major political blow if Seoul were promptly recaptured.

The Inchon landing was a risky venture, and few besides MacArthur favored it. Inchon posed the daunting problems of a 32-foot tidal range that allowed only 6 hours in 24 for sea resupply, a narrow winding channel, and high seawalls. On September 15, Major General Edward Almond's (1892–1979) X Corps of the First Marine Division and the Seventh Infantry Division commenced the invasion. Supported by naval gunfire and air attacks, the Marines secured Inchon with relatively few casualties. UNC forces reentered Seoul on September 24.

At the same time, EUSAK broke out of the Pusan Perimeter and drove north, linking up with X Corps on September 26. Only one-quarter to one-third of the KPA escaped north of the 38th Parallel. Pyongyang ignored MacArthur's call for surrender, and on October 1, South Korean troops crossed into North Korea. On October 7, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, and two days later MacArthur ordered U.S. forces across the 38th Parallel. Pyongyang fell on October 19 as stunned KPA forces fled north.

MacArthur then divided his forces for the drive to the Yalu River. He ordered X Corps transported by sea around the Korean Peninsula to the east coast port of Wonsan. Almond would then clear northeastern

Korea. EUSAK would remain on the west coast and drive into northwest Korea. The two commands would be separated by a gap of between 20 and 50 miles. MacArthur believed, falsely as it turned out, that the north-south Taebaek Mountain range would obviate large-scale Communist operations there. The Eighth Army crossed the Chongchon River at Sinanju, and by November 1 elements of the 24th Division were only 18 miles from the Yalu. Several days earlier, a South Korean unit reached the Yalu, the only UNC unit to get there.

China now entered the war—unofficially. Alarmed over possible U.S. bases adjacent to Manchuria, Mao had issued warnings about potential Chinese military intervention. He believed that the United States would be unable to counter the Chinese numerical advantage and viewed American troops as soft and unused to night fighting. On October 2, Mao informed Stalin that China would enter the war.

Stalin agreed to move Soviet MiG-15 fighters already in China to the Korean border. In this position they could cover the Chinese military buildup and prevent U.S. air attacks on Manchuria. Soviet pilots began flying missions against UNC forces on November 1 and bore the brunt of the Communists' air war. Stalin also ordered other Soviet air units to deploy to China, train Chinese pilots, and then turn over aircraft to them.

Although Russian and Chinese sources disagree on what the Soviet leader promised Mao, Stalin clearly had no intention of using his air units for anything other than defensive purposes. China later claimed that Stalin had promised complete air support for their ground forces, but this never materialized.

On October 25, Chinese troops entered the fighting in northwestern Korea, and

Walker wisely brought the bulk of EUSAK back behind the Chongchon River. Positions then stabilized, and the Chinese offensive slackened. The Chinese also attacked in northeastern Korea before halting operations and breaking contact. On November 8, the first jet battle in history occurred when an American F-80 shot down a MiG-15 over Sinanju.

The initial Chinese incursion ended on November 7. In a meeting with President Truman at Wake Island on October 15, General MacArthur had assured the president that the war was all but won but that if the Chinese were to intervene, their forces would be slaughtered. UNC airpower, he believed, would nullify any Chinese threat. Yet from November 1, 1950 to October 1951, MiGs so dominated the Yalu River area that U.S. B-29 bombers had to cease daylight operations.

The initial Chinese intervention had consisted of 18 volunteer divisions. In early November, they moved an additional 12 divisions into Korea, totaling some 300,000 men. MacArthur responded by ordering the air force to destroy the bridges over the Yalu. Washington revoked the order, but MacArthur complained that this threatened his command. Washington gave in. On November 8, 79 B-29s and 300 fighter-bombers struck bridges and towns on either side of the Yalu. The bombing had little effect. At the time, most of the Chinese were in North Korea, and the Yalu was soon frozen.

Meanwhile, Washington debated how to proceed. The political leadership and the JCS under the chairmanship of General Omar Bradley believed that Europe was the top priority. Washington decided that while Manchuria would remain off-limits, MacArthur could take other military steps that he deemed advisable, including resumption of the offensive. The Democrats

were reluctant to show weakness in Korea, and the Republicans had gained seats in the November 1950 congressional elections.

While much was being made in the United States about the prohibitions of strikes on Manchuria, the Communist side also exercised restraint. With the exception of a few ancient biplanes that sometimes bombed UNC positions at night, Communist airpower was restricted to north of Pyongyang. No effort was made to strike Pusan, and UNC convoys traveled without fear of air attack. Nor did Communist forces attempt to disrupt Allied sea communications.

MacArthur had made X Corps dependent logistically on EUSAK instead of Japan, and Walker insisted on delaying resumption of the offensive until he could build up supplies. Weather also played a factor, with temperatures already below zero. Finally, Walker agreed to resume the offensive on November 24. To the east, X Corps was widely dispersed.

MacArthur seemed oblivious to any problems, seeing the advance as an occupation rather than an offensive. It went well on the first day, but on the night of November 25–26, the Chinese attacked the Eighth Army in force. The Americans held, but on the 26th, the South Korean II Corps disintegrated, exposing EUSAK's right flank. The Chinese poured 18 divisions into the gap, endangering the whole Eighth Army. In a brilliant delaying action at Kunuri, the U.S. Second Division bought time for the other EUSAK divisions to recross the Chongchon. MacArthur now ordered a retreat just below the 38th Parallel to protect Seoul.

Washington directed MacArthur to pull X Corps out of northeastern Korea to prevent it from being flanked. Under heavy Chinese attack, X Corps withdrew to the east coast for seaborne evacuation along with the

South Korean I Corps. The retreat of the 1st Marine Division and some army elements from the Chanjin Reservoir to the coast was one of the most masterly withdrawals in military history. X Corps was redeployed to Pusan by sea. On December 10, Wonsan was evacuated. At Hungnam through December 24, 105,000 officers and men were taken off along with about 91,000 Korean refugees who did not want to remain in North Korea.

The Korean War had entered a new phase: in effect, the UNC was now fighting China. MacArthur refused to accept a limited war and publicized his views to his supporters in the United States, making reference to “inhibitions” placed on his conduct of the war. UNC morale plummeted, especially with General Walker’s death in a jeep accident on December 22. Not until Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway (1895–1993) arrived to replace Walker did the situation improve. In the United States, Truman found himself under heavy pressure from Republicans to pursue the war vigorously. But the administration reduced its goal in Korea to restoring the status quo ante bellum.

UNC forces again had to retreat when the Chinese launched a New Year’s offensive, retaking Seoul on January 4. But the Chinese outran their supply lines, and Ridgway took the offensive. His methodical, limited advance was designed to inflict maximum punishment rather than to secure territory. Nonetheless, by the end of March, UNC forces recaptured Seoul, and by the end of April they were again north of the 38th Parallel.

On April 11, 1951, President Truman relieved MacArthur of command, appointing Ridgway in his stead. Lieutenant General James Van Fleet (1892–1992) took over EUSAK. Although widely unpopular at the time, MacArthur’s removal was fully supported by the JCS, as MacArthur had

publicly expressed his disdain of limited war. He returned home to a hero’s welcome, but much to his dismay, political support for him promptly faded.

On April 22, the Chinese counterattacked in Korea. Rather than expend his troops in a defensive stand, Van Fleet ordered a methodical withdrawal with maximum artillery and air strikes against Communist forces. The Chinese pushed the UNC south of the 38th Parallel, but the offensive was halted by May 19.

UNC forces then counterpunched, and by the end of May, the front stabilized just above the 38th Parallel. The JCS generally limited EUSAK to that line, allowing only small local advances to gain more favorable terrain.

The war was now stalemated, and a diplomatic settlement seemed expedient. On June 23, 1951, Soviet UN representative Jacob Malik proposed a cease-fire. With the Chinese expressing interest, Truman authorized Ridgway to negotiate. Meetings began on July 10 at Kaesong, although hostilities would continue until an armistice was signed.

UNC operations from this point were essentially designed to minimize friendly casualties. Each side had built deep defensive lines that would be costly to break through. In August, armistice talks broke down, and later that month the Battle of Bloody Ridge began, developing into the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge, which lasted until mid-October. In late October, negotiations resumed, this time at Panmunjom, although the fighting continued. Half of the war’s casualties occurred during the period of armistice negotiations.

On November 12, 1951, Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to cease offensive operations. Fighting now devolved into raids, local attacks, patrols, and artillery fire. In February 1953, Van Fleet was succeeded as

EUSAK commander by Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor. Meanwhile, UNC air operations intensified to choke off Communist supply lines and reduce the likelihood of Communist offensives.

In November 1952, General Dwight Eisenhower was elected president of the United States on a mandate to end the war. With U.S. casualties running 2,500 a month, the war had become a political liability. Eisenhower instructed the JCS to draw up plans to end the war militarily including the possible use of nuclear weapons, which was made known to the Communist side. More important in ending the conflict, however, was Stalin's death on March 5, 1953. As the armistice negotiations entered their final phase in May, the Chinese stepped up military action, initiating attacks in June and July to remove bulges in the line. UNC forces gave up some ground but inflicted heavy casualties.

The chief stumbling block to peace was the repatriation of POWs. The North Koreans had forced into their army many South Korean soldiers and civilians, and thousands of them had subsequently been captured by the UNC. If all KPA prisoners were repatriated, many South Koreans would be sent to North Korea. Also, many Chinese POWs sought refuge on Taiwan (Formosa) instead of returning to the PRC. Truman was determined that no prisoner be repatriated against his will. This stance prolonged the war, but some U.S. officials saw a moral and propaganda victory in the Chinese and North Korean defections. The Communist side rejected the UNC position out of hand.

Following intense UNC air strikes on North Korean hydroelectric facilities and the capital of Pyongyang, the Communists accepted a face-saving formula whereby a neutral commission would deal with prisoner repatriation. On July 27, an armistice

was signed at Panmunjom, and the guns finally fell silent.

Of 132,000 North Korean and Chinese military POWs, fewer than 90,000 chose to return home. Twenty-two Americans held by the Communists also elected not to return home. Of 10,218 Americans captured by the Communists, only 3,746 returned. The remainder were murdered or died in captivity. American losses were 142,091, of whom 33,686 were killed in action. South Korea sustained 300,000 casualties, of whom 70,000 were killed in action. Other UNC casualties came to 17,260, of whom 3,194 were killed in action. North Korean casualties are estimated at 523,400 and Chinese losses at more than a million. Perhaps 3 million Korean civilians also died during the war.

The war devastated Korea and hardened the divisions between North and South. It was also a sobering experience for the United States. After the war, the U.S. military establishment remained strong. For America, the Korean War institutionalized the Cold War national security state. It also accelerated the racial integration of the armed forces, which in turn encouraged a much wider U.S. civil rights movement.

China gained greatly from the war in that it came to be regarded as the preponderant military power in Asia. This is ironic, because the Chinese army in Korea was in many respects a primitive and inefficient force. Nonetheless, throughout the following decades, exaggeration of Chinese military strength was woven into the fabric of American foreign policy, influencing subsequent U.S. policy in Vietnam.

The Korean War effectively militarized the containment policy. Before the war, Marshall Plan aid had been almost entirely nonmilitary. U.S. aid now shifted heavily toward military rearmament. The war also marked a sustained militarization of

American foreign policy, with the Vietnam War a logical consequence.

Additionally, the Korean War solidified the role of the United States as the world's policeman and strengthened the country's relationship with its West European allies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The war facilitated the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). It also impacted Japan and was a major factor fueling that nation's economy.

Militarily, the war was interesting for the extensive use of helicopters and jet aircraft. The conflict was also a reminder that airpower alone cannot win wars, and it revealed the importance of command of the sea.

No formal peace has ever been concluded in Korea. Technically, the two Koreas remain at war, and the 38th Parallel remains one of the Cold War's lone outposts.

Dr. Spencer C. Tucker

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Cold War; Gao Gang; Korean War Armistice Agreement; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union.

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Korean War Armistice Agreement (July 27, 1953)

The cease-fire agreement that brought military combat in Korea to an end on July 27, 1953. The armistice agreement was signed by the military commanders of the three major Korean War combat forces. Kim Il-sung (1912–1994) signed as the supreme commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA, North Korean army); Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) signed as the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF, Chinese Communist army); and U.S. general Mark W. Clark (1896–1984) signed as commander in chief of the United Nations Command (UNC), consisting of combat forces from 16 United Nations (UN) states, noncombat medical forces from five other nations, and the forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). The signing took place at Panmunjom, an encampment that had been built specifically for the truce talks that led up to the armistice.

No Republic of Korea representative signed the armistice agreement, nor did any



U.S. Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr. (left table) and North Korean General Nam Il (right table) sign the Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom, ending the three-year Korean conflict on July 27, 1953. (National Archives)

representative of the 16 UN countries that contributed combat forces to the UNC. The ROK political leadership had, in fact, strenuously opposed the truce negotiations, but on July 9, 1953, after negotiations with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson and Army chief of staff J. Lawton Collins (1896–1987), ROK president Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) reluctantly agreed not to obstruct the truce. On August 7, 1953, the 16 contributing states subsequently signed a declaration supporting the armistice.

The armistice agreement had five major sections. Article I provided for the division of the two combatant forces by a military demarcation line (MDL) running generally along the line of ground contact between the two sides at the time of the cease-fire, and a demilitarized zone (DMZ) extending

for two kilometers (1.24 miles) on either side of the MDL. Each side was permitted to retain 1,000 “civil police” in the DMZ and 24 in the Han River Estuary (HRE) at any one time for “civil administration and relief.” A subsequent agreement provided that the “civil police” may be military police armed with nonautomatic weapons. Civilians who previously lived in the area that became the DMZ were permitted to return after the cease-fire, and both sides have maintained small farming villages inside the DMZ in the vicinity of Panmunjom.

Another subsequent agreement established a Military Armistice Commission Headquarters Area (MACHA) consisting of the armistice conference site, an area roughly 800 meters (875 yards) in diameter called the Joint Security Area (JSA), and a

corridor through the DMZ to provide access to the JSA. Initially, the guard forces of the two sides could move freely within the JSA, but after a fight on August 18, 1976, that resulted in the death of two UNC officers, a subsequent agreement of September 6, 1976, divided the JSA along the MDL, separating the guard forces.

Article II covered the “Concrete Arrangements for Cease-Fire and Armistice,” including the establishment of a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) to supervise the armistice inside the DMZ and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) to supervise the introduction of military personnel, weapons, and equipment into Korea and to investigate armistice violations outside the DMZ. The MAC, consisting of five members from each side, was a joint organization with no chairman that met at the call of either side to discuss armistice violation charges and other armistice-related matters. A secretariat performed administrative functions. The armistice provided for 10 Joint Observer Teams (JOTs) consisting of officers of both sides to investigate alleged armistice violations. The teams were unable to reach agreement on the circumstances of the alleged violations they investigated, and after 1967, the KPA/CPVA side refused to participate in JOT investigations. One final JOT took place in 1976 to survey and delineate a boundary within the JSA following the fatal August 18, 1976, clash between the two guard forces.

The NNSC consisted of four members from countries not involved in the Korean War: Czechoslovakia and Poland, which were nominated by the KPA/CPVA side, and Sweden and Switzerland, nominated by the UNC side. The NNSC was initially organized into 20 Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNITs). Ten operated at five ports of entry on each side, and 10 mobile

teams were available to investigate violations in other areas outside the DMZ if requested to do so by the MAC or by the senior MAC member of either side. The inspections were controversial from the beginning, and both sides found the restrictions against introducing new equipment to be unrealistic and burdensome. By 1957, the NNSC supervisory system was essentially defunct, but the commission served for many years as an informal channel of communication between the two sides and a moderating influence in the potentially volatile Panmunjom conference area. In 1993, the North refused to recognize the new Czech Republic as the successor to Czechoslovakia or to nominate a replacement, and in 1995 the North Koreans evicted the Polish delegation and severed all contact with the NNSC. As of 2009, the Swiss and Swedish NNSC delegations continue to meet weekly, and Poland sends a representative to South Korea several times a year to sign and validate NNSC documents. Representatives of the three nations also meet periodically in Europe to discuss NNSC business.

Article III dealt with the arrangements relating to prisoners of war, the thorniest of all the truce talk issues. Within 60 days of the armistice agreement being signed, all prisoners who wished to return to their home countries were to be repatriated. Those refusing repatriation were to be turned over to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) consisting of representatives of the four NNSC nations and India. Under NNRC supervision, representatives of the two sides were to be given the opportunity to persuade the nonrepatriates to return home. Once this process was completed, the NNRC was to arrange for the prisoners still refusing repatriation to go to a country of their choice or to a neutral country. After 90 days, any unresolved cases were to be

dealt with by a political conference convened in accordance with Article IV. Obstruction by both sides and coercion among the prisoners themselves prevented the process from working as intended and the political conference did not take place within the intended time period. Of the 359 UNC and 22,592 nonrepatriates, only 10 UNC and 628 Chinese and North Korean prisoners agreed to return home. The rest were returned to the control of the two sides, and the NNRC was dissolved in February 1954.

Article IV recommended that the “governments concerned on both sides” meet within three months of the signing of the armistice agreement to “settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.” In October 1953, representatives of China, the DPRK, and the United States met at Panmunjom to discuss the location and organization of the conference. The meeting was unsuccessful, but in February 1954, the foreign ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed in Berlin to convene a conference in Geneva to discuss Korea and other issues. Representatives of the armistice signatories, South Korea, and the 16 UN contributing states were invited (South Africa did not attend). The conference took place in April 1954, but there was no agreement on any of the Korean issues.

Article V provided that amendments and additions to the armistice agreement were to be mutually agreed to by the two sides and that the Agreement would remain in effect until “expressly superseded by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between the two sides.” Over the years,

various subsequent agreements were reached in accordance with this article. These covered the operation of the NNRC, the organization and conduct of JOTs, the 1976 division of the JSA, and the establishment of civilian transportation corridors through the DMZ.

In 1994, the KPA unilaterally withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission and declared the armistice defunct. Later that year, the Chinese government recalled its delegation. The North Koreans continued to maintain a negotiating organization at Panmunjom under the title “Korean People’s Army Panmunjom Mission,” and as of 2009, much of the administrative and communications work of the Military Armistice Commission continues, with talks below the plenary level still taking place from time to time.

Colonel Donald W. Boose Jr.

See also: China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese Summer Offensive in Korea; Chinese People’s Volunteer Force; Korean War; Peng Dehuai; Soviet Union.

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Kuomintang. See Guomindang (GMD)

Kublai Khan (Khubilai Khan) (1215–1294)

The grandson of Genghis Khan (Chinggis Khan or Chengiz Khan) (1162–1227), Kublai Khan firmly established the Mongol-Chinese Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) of China. As a statesman and military leader, he inherited an empire that stretched from the Adriatic Sea to China; by 1279, the empire extended to southern China.

Born in 1215, Kublai was the fourth son of Tolui, the youngest son of Genghis Khan and his wife Sorghaghtani. By all accounts, he was Genghis’s favorite grandson. As a youth, Kublai participated in campaigns along with his father until his death when Kublai was 17; however, Kublai didn’t figure in Mongol leadership until he was in his thirties. Though Genghis spelled out directions for succession, which his children followed with little trouble, his grandchildren divided the empire beyond the hope of reunification. After the death of Ogadai, a son of Genghis, his widow Toregene ruled for a short time before she was followed by her son Guyuk. After Guyuk’s death, his widow Oghul Ghaimish tried to govern as regent until Mongke, a son of Sorghaghtani and Tolui, was elected great khan. On Mongke’s death, there was a struggle among Kublai’s brothers. The youngest (designated “keeper of the hearth” to rule over the Mongol homeland) was Arigboge, who had the support of his brother Baiku of the

Golden Horde and his nephew Kaidu, who lived on the steppes to the north. The next in line for the throne was Kublai, but Arigboge’s supporters rejected Kublai’s leadership because he had become too Chinese and not sufficiently Mongol in his actions.

Yet Kublai had been Mongol enough to lead the armies of the steppes into southern China against the Song dynasty (960–1279). Using the techniques developed by Genghis and the siege engines adapted from Chinese and Muslim forces, Kublai proved as capable and successful as any Mongol general. He had seen the advantages of Chinese culture—its wealth and scientific accomplishments—and he embraced them as adjuncts to the traditions and military prowess of the Mongols. His interest in Chinese culture seemed a betrayal to the more conservative Mongols in the homelands.

In 1260, Kublai made a quick truce with the Song and then turned his forces



Kublai Khan in war chariot atop four armored elephants. (Library of Congress)

northwest toward his younger brother's base at Karakorum. Kublai captured the city and held it against Arigboge's counterattacks until, in 1264, the younger brother submitted to the older's leadership. Kublai forgave him and gave him lands of his own, but he punished his brother's advisors for urging the revolt. Kublai's nephew Kaidu, however, refused to submit and spent the next 30 years harassing China's borders.

Never to see the Mongol capital of Karakorum again, Kublai returned to China and his garden city of Shangdu, which was better known as Xanadu. He also returned to his campaign against the Song, who had violated the truce in his absence. Kublai blended traditional Mongol tactics with a new one: he depended on Chinese familiarity with past Mongol cruelties to cities that resisted and then offered peaceful terms to any that would submit willingly. That promise, coupled with benevolent treatment of refugees, won the hearts of most of the Song people, so that by 1276, the seven-year-old Song emperor surrendered to him. Kublai had to continue campaigning against Song supporters in the southeast—he captured Guangzhou and waged a naval war against the final holdouts—but with the submission of the emperor, the war was won.

Kublai's significance lies not in new military developments but in his political leadership. Many areas of Chinese life improved during the new Yuan dynasty. Public works were of prime importance, and new roads and canals were constantly constructed while he was emperor. Kublai proved to be a benevolent master to the poverty-ridden peasantry by providing the first public-assistance program in China and introducing the practice of stockpiling surplus supplies in good years for redistribution during lean times. He maintained the Chinese bureaucracy yet kept the Mongols as a separate class

in society. He sponsored intellectual pursuits by ordering the printing of many books and the construction of observatories for updating astronomical observations. The expansion of printing brought Chinese drama to heights never before experienced and spread its influence widely over the population.

Kublai was not, however, without his failings. Kublai maintained a large military, the cost of which was a severe burden on the taxpayers. He also sponsored two disastrous invasions of Japan, which cost money and thousands of Chinese lives. In order to maintain the splendor of his palaces, he collected vast sums of silver for his treasury, but he introduced printed money to the Chinese economy and overprinted it to the point of high inflation. Though he protected China from the raids of his nephew Kaidu and unified the country into a form it would basically hold to present times, the costs to the peasant taxpayers proved too much of a burden.

Though called Kublai the Wise, in actuality he laid the groundwork for the fall of his dynasty. He also oversaw, somewhat by default, the breakup of the Mongol Empire. Birkai of Russia never acknowledged his supremacy and made his portion of the empire independent; Hulegu established an independent state of the Il-Khanid dynasty in Persia. Kaidu also maintained his own independence in the northern steppes. Thus, Kublai was left with China, a nation that reached new heights under his leadership but that quickly overthrew his successors and reestablished Chinese dominance in the Ming dynasty.

Kublai died in February 1294. No other ruler of Mongol China ever rose to his stature. Thanks to Venetian traveler Marco Polo, Kublai has remained the very symbol of the Mongol potentate.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Genghis Khan; Ming Dynasty; Mongols; Mongols, Cavalry of; Russia, Relations with China; Song Dynasty; Song-Mongol War; Tributary System; Yuan Dynasty.

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L

Land Revolutionary War. *See*
Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937)

Li Desheng (1916–2011)

General of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and elected vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in August 1973 when the Tenth National Party Congress was held in Beijing. General Li Desheng became one of the top national leaders with his unique personal experience and special contribution to the party during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976.

In 1916, Li was born into a poor peasant family in Lijia'ao, Chendian Village, Xinxian County, central Henan (Honan) Province. He joined the Red Army and became a member of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in June 1931. Li served in the Eleventh Army (later changed to be the First Army) of the CCP Red Army, and became a CCP member in 1932. In 1934–1935, he participated in the Long March with the Fourth Red Army.

During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Li Desheng served in the Eighth Route Army and participated in many battles against the invading Japanese troops, especially the Hundred Regiments Campaign. From 1938, he was promoted to the company, battalion, and later on regimental commander. When the Anti-Japanese War ended in 1945, he was the commander of the Nineteenth Regiment, Seventh Brigade of the Jin-ji-lu-yu Regional Command.

During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Li participated in important battles such as the Battle of Shangdang and the Handan Campaign. His regiment moved into the Dabie Mountains under the command of Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986) and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997). In 1948, he joined the Huai-Hai Campaign. In 1949, Li became the commander of the Thirty-Fifth Division, Twelfth Army, Second Field Army of the PLA. His division participated in the offensive campaigns to cross the Yangtze River and traced the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) troops into the southwest region.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Li Desheng continued to serve in the PLA as the division commander. In 1951, he and his division went to North Korea and participated in the Chinese Fifth Offensive Campaign in April–June 1951, the Battle of Shangganling (Triangle Hill Battle) in October 1952, and the Kimsong Counteroffensive Campaign in 1953. When he returned from Korea in 1954, he became the commander of the Twelfth Army and was granted the rank of major general in 1955. From 1958 to 1960, he studied in the higher military academy. After his return to the army, Li developed new drilling methods by summarizing the “Guo Xingfu Training Techniques” which was introduced and disseminated across all corners in the PLA during the early 1960s.

During China's Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, Li Desheng was promoted from an army commander to a national military

and political leader when the PLA moved to the center of national politics. In the summer of 1966, the Cultural Revolution became a nationwide political struggle with extensive purges. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) used mass organizations such as the Red Guard youth to publicly attack, or “bomb” (*paoda*), the CCP and PRC hierarchy officials, including PRC president Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch’i) (1898–1969) and Party Secretary-General Deng Xiaoping. By the end of the year, social stability vanished. Industry, agriculture, and commerce were badly disrupted, causing widespread public resentment. As a result disturbances and conflicts increased.

Since early 1967, the situation has been worsening across the country, as the Cultural Revolution entered the phase of a “total taking-over” of authority. The Red Guards took over the government offices across all levels, jailed the officials, and administrated provincial and local affairs. But different factions within the Red Guards had contradictory political orientations and different plans, leading to violent conflicts within the Red Guards that in many places resembled a civil war. To stop the national turmoil, Mao ordered the PLA to control the situation by “three supports and two militarizations” (support leftist masses, manufacturing production, and agricultural production; and martial laws with military administration and training of civilians, “Sanzhi liangjun”). Mao employed the PLA to restore social and political order and to prevent a possible civil war in the country. Moving to center stage, the Chinese military replaced civilian governments at the provincial, district, county, and city levels through its military administration, or the “Military Administrative Committee,” from 1967 to 1972. The PLA used its officers as administrators for

schools, factories, companies, villages, and farms.

Li played an important role during the Cultural Revolution to stabilize the political and social orders in eastern Anhui (Anhui) Province. In 1967, he was the commander of the Twelfth Army, which was stationed in that province. When the situation in Anhui became too violent, Li was summoned urgently to Beijing by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), with Zhou meeting him right after he landed at the airport. Because the militant actions had spread from major cities to small towns, Li was asked to bring his troops to stop all the conflicts and the civil wars in the province. He immediately returned to his army headquarters and ordered his troops to move first into Hefei, capital city of Anhui Province. Hefei then was in the middle of the civil war. Many buildings were used as fighting bases, and the conflicting sides were shooting each other, causing huge casualties for the city residents. Once Li arrived, he deployed military vehicles to form a defense line to separate the two sides. After the shooting stopped, he began to negotiate with the leaders of both sides and persuaded them to withdraw. After he stopped the civil war in Hefei, he moved his troops to the other cities and put an end to the violence.

Due to his extraordinary contribution to the Cultural Revolution, in 1968, Li Desheng was appointed the director of the Anhui Provincial Revolutionary Committee and the deputy commander of the PLA Nanjing (Nanking) Military Region. In 1969, he became a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in Beijing. He was elected a member of the CCP Central Committee and reserve member of the Politburo of the Central Committee at the CCP Ninth National Congress on April 1–24, 1969. He was appointed the

director of the General Political Department of the PLA in April 1970 and commander of the Beijing Military Region in January 1971. At the same time, Li was also elected the first secretary of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee of the CCP.

Li was reelected a member of the CCP Central Committee, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the vice chairman of the CCP at the Tenth Party's National Congress on August 24–28, 1973. After that congress, Mao Zedong switched the commanders of eight PLA regional commands in China. At that time, Li served as the commander of the Beijing Military Region. After the switch, Li needed to exchange his commanding post with Chen Xilian (Ch'en Hsi-lian) (1915–1999), commander of the Shenyang Military Region, and report to the post within 10 days. Before this exchange, Mao met him and asked for his opinions on the switch. Li immediately responded that he had no personal opinions about it. Mao asked if he would bring some of his current staff with him. He replied, “No need to bring anyone.” Mao was satisfied with this response and did not remove Li's other concurrent posts except the directorship of the General Political Department of the PLA. From December 1973 to August 1977, Li served as the commander of the Shenyang Military Region. In January 1975, he resigned from his post as the vice chairman of the CCP.

After Mao's death and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, Li was reelected a member of the Central Military Commission in August 1977. But in November 1985, he left his commanding posts in the PLA and became the political commissar of China's Defense University. Li was reelected a member of the CCP Central Committee and a member of the Politburo at the Eleventh Party's National Congress on August 12–18, 1977. He was

reelected a member of the CCP Central Committee and a member of the Politburo at the Twelfth Party's National Congress on September 1–11, 1982. He was promoted to the rank of general in September 1988 and retired from the University of Defense in 1990. Li Desheng died on May 8, 2011. He was 96.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chen Xilian; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Fifth; Chinese Summer Offensive in Korea; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; General Departments of the PLA; Guomindang; Huai-Hai Campaign; Hundred Regiments Campaign; Korean War; Liu Bocheng; Liu Shaoqi; Long March; People's Liberation Army; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; People's Republic of China; Red Guards; Red Army; Second Field Army; Zhou Enlai.

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Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) (1823–1901)

Li Hongzhang rose to prominence in China as a brilliant general and then spent 25 years



Li Hongzhang, general and diplomatic negotiator for the Qing dynasty. (John Clark Ridpath, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

as the country's preeminent diplomatic negotiator for the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Even as his reputation suffered through association with a series of humiliating treaties, Li indefatigably sponsored projects crucial to China's modernization.

Li was born on February 15, 1823, in the city of Hefei, Anhui (Anhui) Province. He served as one of Zeng Guofan's (Tseng Kuo-fan) (1811–1872) assistants during the Taiping Rebellion in 1851–1864. That major uprising was led by utopian Christians who threatened many aspects of traditional Confucian China, not least the beliefs and property of local landlords who received no protection from the ineffective armies of the Qing dynasty government. Zeng had raised his own Xiang Army to defend his home area of Hunan, and Li served him initially in the drafting of written communications. Even

though he had willingly engaged himself to act as Zeng's subordinate, Li came to criticize Zeng's decisions. When Zeng seemed to be conducting the campaign against the Taipings too cautiously and moved to punish a subordinate who had been vanquished after defying Zeng's orders, Li abruptly resigned. Some months later, he returned to Zeng's camp and was accepted back into Zeng's private bureaucracy after he adopted a more humble attitude.

Later in the war, Zeng recommended Li for the governorship of Jiangnan (south of the Yangzi River), and once Li had recruited and trained a redoubtable local army, known as the Huai Army, Zeng invited him to join in a three-pronged final campaign against the Taipings. With the assistance of Charles George Gordon and his "Ever-Victorious Army," Li's Huai Army reclaimed Suzhou

from the rebels. Throughout that period, Li was also involved in many of the self-strengthening activities initiated by Zeng. The *zhiqiang*, or Self-Strengthening, movement called for the selective adaptation of Western learning and technology to China. During the Taiping Rebellion, most *zhiqiang* activities focused on military improvement.

In May 1865, Li was called upon to stand in for Zeng as governor-general of Jiangsu (Kiangsu), Jiangxi (Kiangsi), and Anhui (Anhui). Zeng had been commanded to suppress the Nian Rebellion in northern China, but he soon ran into trouble. The Huai Army that had been organized by Li was assigned to Zeng's command. Whereas Zeng, in building the Xiang Army, had chosen men not only for their loyalty but for their moral integrity, Li had focused on the former quality to the detriment of the latter, and his officers did not respond readily to commands issued by anyone but himself. Even after Li was called in to control the troops, however, it took him well over a year to suppress the rebellion.

During 1869 and 1870, Li resolved a number of local and national crises through his diplomatic finesse and military ability. His increasingly frequent dealings with foreigners were preparing him for the responsibilities he would bear during the subsequent three decades of Chinese humiliation at the hands of the governments of Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Throughout that period, Li acted as China's unofficial prime minister.

As superintendent of trade for the north, Li was one of a host of officials that the Qing court stationed in the treaty ports to deal with foreigners, to keep those traders in the ports, and prevent them from confronting the government in Beijing. The Qing court was predisposed to accommodation with the foreigners, and Li was reluctant to put a

nascent naval program to the test of battle, so he soon became the negotiator of choice. In resolving conflicts with foreign nations, Li consistently argued against the use of force and in favor of compromise. When the Japanese government requested in 1870 a commercial treaty like those China had already signed with Western nations, Li approved of the idea. When Japanese forces were sent to Taiwan four years later in a reprisal against aborigines who had killed Ryukyuan sailors, Li rejected a Chinese show of force. When France reacted violently to the participation of an unofficial Chinese army in a war against French colonial efforts in Annam (present-day Vietnam), Li refused to consider declaring war on a state that clearly enjoyed military superiority.

The greatest challenge Li faced was the diplomatic and military crisis that grew out of China's relations with Korea. For many centuries, Korea had sent tributary missions to China on a regular basis, with each mission renewing its acknowledgment of Chinese hegemony. But during the latter half of the nineteenth century, Koreans had begun to talk about a greater degree of autonomy. When Japan exhibited an interest in forging strong ties to Korea, China sent Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916) to Seoul to train the Korean Army and cultivate the Korean court. An attempted coup by pro-Japanese Koreans in league with Japanese troops and diplomats ended in failure in 1884, but the Japanese government capitalized on the situation by demanding an indemnity and other reparations. A preoccupied Li met with a Japanese emissary and agreed to a set of mutually binding terms.

Ten years later, a rebellion in Korea gave both China and Japan opportunities to strengthen their positions there, and when war seemed imminent, Li spent his time

sounding out potential foreign allies rather than readying a plan of war. The result of his delay and of superior Japanese military planning and equipment was a catastrophic defeat for China during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the profoundly humbling Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. The military loss would have been an even worse blow had Li not been shot in the face by a Japanese fanatic, obliging the deeply embarrassed Japanese government to relax its demands.

If Li's diplomatic career amounted to a series of setbacks for China, his career as "self-strengtheners" made him one of China's great modernizers. When Li strengthened the Huai Army, he was also strengthening his own position and support. He was subsequently involved in many other projects, however, that improved the nation apart from the modernization of the army. Because of his role in defeating the Taiping and Nian Rebellions, he was trusted by the Empress Dowager Cixi (Tz'u Hsi) (1835–1908) and was thus very influential in the late part of the century.

Li's endeavors fell into the categories of entrepreneurial and educational. He organized a new system whereby the Qing government and individual merchants worked together to aid the country's long-term development. Such ventures included the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company founded in 1872 to reduce foreign domination of China's coastal shipping; mining operations using Western techniques in Shanxi (Shansi), Zhili (Chihli), and Shandong (Shantung); the expansion of the Kaiping coal mines after 1877 to improve Chinese control over natural resources and fuel its growing navy; many railroad and telegraph lines; and textile manufactures in Shanghai in the 1880s to reduce the rising percentage of imported textiles. Li's educational reforms included sending promising students to the United States, but

this program was abandoned when U.S. officials refused to let the graduates enroll in such military academies as West Point to finish their education.

As his career drew slowly to a close, Li Hongzhang made a diplomatic trip around the globe in 1896, stopping in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Britain, and the United States, meeting with many heads of state. His final duty as a treaty negotiator was the negotiation of terms with foreign powers after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Li died on November 7, 1901.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Boxer Rebellion; Confucian-Mancian Paradigm; Ever-Victorious Army; Qing Dynasty; Self-Strengthening Movement; Shimonoseki, Treaty of; Sino-French War; Sino-Japanese War; Taiping Rebellion; Xiang Army; Yuan Shikai; Zeng Guofan.

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Li Shimin, Emperor (599–649)

Li Shimin was the Emperor Tang Taizong, the second emperor of the Tang dynasty (618–907), reigning from 626 to 649. He encouraged his father Li Yuan (Tang Gaozu, reigned 618–626) to rise against the Sui dynasty (581–618) at Taiyuan in 617. Their rebellion ended the Sui dynasty and led to the defeat of several of their most dangerous rivals. Li Shimin was ceremonially regarded as a cofounder of the Tang dynasty along with Emperor Gaozu. Li had a lifelong experience of war fighting. When he was young, he followed his father to fight against the Sui's military and defeated it, then helped his father build the Tang dynasty, which became one of the most glorious and powerful dynasties in Chinese history.

Before he helped his father to establish the Tang dynasty in 618, Li Shimin had successfully commanded four large campaigns. The first was against the Longdong army group. The Longdong army group defeated Li's military in Changwu in one of the few battles he lost. But soon, he exterminated the Longdong army group in the battle of Qianshuiyuan. The second campaign was against Liu Wuzhou, who helped the Tujue (Turks) and conquered the city of Jinyang. Li engaged him in battle for three days and killed Liu, taking the city. The third campaign was the largest and most significant one. Li Shimin fought with Wang Shichong and Dou Jiande, who had more than 200,000 soldiers. Li not only defeated the troops but also captured the two commanders. The final campaign was fought with Liu Heida, a subordinate of Dou Jiande. Liu Heida wanted to avenge Dou Jiande, but just two months later, he was defeated by Li.

After the four victories, Li Shimin's reputation was the highest of all his brothers, who were jealous and worried that Li might become the next emperor. They planned an assassination. Li, however, found out about their plot and preemptively killed his brothers and became the second emperor of the Tang dynasty after his father died. Li is considered one of the greatest, if not the greatest, emperors in Chinese history. His reign was regarded as the model against which all other emperors were measured, and his "Reign of Zhenguan" was considered a golden age of Chinese history and required study for future crown princes.

During his reign, the Tang dynasty flourished economically and militarily. For more than a century after his death, Tang China enjoyed peace and prosperity. Under Taizong, Tang was the largest and the strongest nation in the world. It covered most of the territory of present-day China, Vietnam, Mongolia, and much of central Asia and eastern Kazakhstan. It laid the foundation for Xuanzong's (Hsuan Tsung) (712–756) reign, which is considered Tang China's greatest era.

In 630, Emperor Taizong sent his general Li Jing against Eastern Tujue, to which the Tang had once submitted. Li Jing captured Jiali Khan Ashina Duobi and destroyed Eastern Tujue power. This made Tang the dominant power in east and central Asia, and Emperor Taizong subsequently took the title of Tian Kehan ("Heavenly Khan"). Emperor Taizong was, in opposition to nobility of the time, a frank rationalist, openly ridiculing superstitions and divine portents and modifying traditional rites in order to ease agricultural labor. Modern Chinese historians believe Emperor Taizong achieved greatness by accepting criticisms that others would find difficult to accept and by not abusing his absolute power, as

well as employing capable chancellors Fang Xuanling, Du Ruhui, and Wei Zheng. Emperor Taizong's wife, Empress Zhangsun, served as an able assistant as well.

Yutong Yang

See also: An-Shi, Rebellion of; Fubing; Han Dynasty; Mongols; Song Dynasty; Sui Dynasty; Sui Yangdi, Emperor; Tang Dynasty; Tang Gaozong, Emperor; Yuan Dynasty.

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Li Xiannian (1909–1992)

Vice premier during 1954–1983 and president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1983–1988. Born in Hong'an (Huang'an) County, Hubei (Hupei) Province, on June 23, 1909, Li Xiannian was trained as a carpenter, having received little

formal education. In 1927, he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and began organizing the peasantry and armed guerrilla units.

During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Li fought with Communist forces in central China, earning him command of the Central China Military Region in 1944. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, he served first as deputy commander of the Central Plains People's Liberation Army (PLA) and then political commissar of the Hubei Military District. In May 1949, Li became the chairman of the provisional government of Hubei.

After the PRC's birth in October 1949, Li was assigned to serve in Hubei, becoming mayor of Wuhan, provincial capital of Hubei, in 1952. In mid-1954, he was transferred to Beijing when he became the vice



Li Xiannian, Chinese politician and president, receiving the key to the city of Madrid at the City Hall, 1984. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

premier. In 1957 Li was also appointed minister of finance of the PRC, in which capacity he reformed the Chinese economy along Soviet lines, resulting in the disastrous failure of the Great Leap Forward in late 1959. As vice premier, he led a number of delegations abroad to nurture PRC ties with other socialist and third world nations. Despite several political purges, including the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), he retained his government positions. After the revolution ended, he took up more positions, first as vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee in 1977 and then as vice chairman of the state financial and economic commission in 1979.

In 1983, Li succeeded Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) as president of the PRC, a post he held until 1988. During this time, he devoted much attention to advancing his nation's international status. He retreated from public life in 1988 and retained only the chairmanship of the People's Political Consultative Conference, in which capacity he supported Deng's order to crack down on student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Li died on June 21, 1991, in Beijing.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Tiananmen Square Events.

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Li Zicheng (Li Tzu-ch'eng) (1605–1645)

Leader of the peasant rebellion in 1632–1644 against the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Li's rebellion army defeated the Ming army and captured the capital city Beijing (Peking). The life of Li Zicheng tells a great deal about conditions in China during the late Ming dynasty. Forced into banditry by the lack of opportunities in a province of little importance to the Ming government, Li eventually organized his followers into a dangerous opposition force. He was not the only man to engage in such activities, but his forces actually captured the Ming capital and ended the Ming dynasty, even as the dynasty's armies were fighting for its life against the Manchus in the northeast. With this action, Li forced the last great Ming general to go over to the Manchus, and this combined force then turned on Li and quickly defeated him.

Li was born on October 3, 1605, in the province of Shaanxi (Shensi) in northwestern China. As a youth, he gained a reputation for enjoying quarrels and combat and was admired for his skill in horsemanship and archery. He began his career as an employee of the Ming government, working as a postal messenger in the provincial city of Xi'an (Sian).

The era in which Li grew up was a period of economic depression and government corruption. Because the Ming officials were increasingly preoccupied with the military threats of the Manchus in the east, they tended to ignore the conditions of Shaanxi and other western provinces. This neglect

bred a lack of faith in the government, and the deepening depression in the region led to increasing numbers of bandit uprisings. Moreover, as the financial situation of the Ming court worsened, the government began to lay off employees to save money. Li lost his postal job in this way.

Li had an uncle named Gao Yingxiang (Kao Ying-hsiang), an important bandit leader who enjoyed some success in the mountainous terrain of Shaanxi during the Chinese peasant's revolts. As famine struck the province in 1628, a great gathering of bandits came together, including Li's uncle, who was given the name Daxing (Dashing) King. Li himself joined the imperial army in 1630, seeking a different way to support himself. But the Ming officials could not provide the army with any supplies, and a general mutiny took place.

By 1631, in the two provinces of Shaanxi and Shanxi (Shansi), there were more than 36 bands of outlaws that comprised some 200,000 men. Li joined his uncle and received the name Daxing General. In 1633, their band was almost captured by a skilled Ming general, but the men managed to escape to the province of Henan (Honan). After that, Li and his uncle remained on the move, traveling from one area to another. At one point, they raided the burial grounds of the Ming emperors, which lay outside Beijing. The response of the reigning Ming emperor Chongzhen (Ch'ung-cheng) (1628–1644) was to emerge in mourning dress to apologize to his ancestors for this great affront.

Kao was captured and beheaded in 1636, at which point Li assumed command of his forces and moved into the province of Sichuan (Szechwan). He suffered a defeat two years later and remained inactive briefly. By 1639, however, a serious drought in Henan had created such terrible social conditions that thousands of followers began

to sign up with Li. The situation in Henan (Honan) was so bad that even scholars joined his band, and these men counseled Li to act in a compassionate way toward the people and try to encourage them with kindness.

Though Li had not developed any sort of philosophy to guide his actions, with the advice of his new followers, he began to speak of freeing the people from the taxes of the oppressive Ming. (Taxes had increased many times to pay for the war against the Manchu.) People suffering from drought and pestilence were looking for a different way to live, or a way to escape their barren circumstances. In 1641, Li killed the prince of Fu, one of the members of the Ming family who might have had a claim to the throne. Li distributed Fu's riches among his hungriest followers, and his reputation grew not only as a rebel against the Ming but as a popular leader.

Throughout the 1630s and early 1640s, the Ming armies remained preoccupied in the northeast and did not deal with the growing bandit problems or popular uprisings in any serious way. By 1643, Li had decided to take advantage of the situation and attempt to overthrow the Ming government itself. He assigned himself the new rank of generalissimo and reorganized his followers to prepare to march on Beijing (Peking). Promising a new era of peace and prosperity, Li and his hundreds of thousands of followers moved north across China.

The Ming army had not provided for adequate defense of their capital, and as Li approached, courtiers and royal family members fled the city and went to their substantial estates in the countryside. Li and his forces entered Beijing on April 25, 1644, without a fight. Emperor Chongzhen rang the bell to summon his ministers for their advice on how to deal with the situation, but none of the ministers responded. Chongzhen then

walked to the imperial garden and hung himself from a tree.

At the time, Ming forces led by Wu Sangui were in the northeast trying to resist the Manchus, and Li soon left Beijing to go there and defeat or win over the great Ming commander. Yet Wu, weighing his own and China's future, made the decision that the Manchus might make better rulers than the bandit Li. So he allied with the Manchus and turned to fight against the rebel Li.

A month later, Li and his 200,000 troops were defeated by Wu's forces, and he retreated back to Beijing. While there, he melted down all the silver he could find into ingots and on June 3, set fire to palaces and defense towers and continued his retreat back to the west. By early 1645, the forces of the Manchus, now enthroned as the Qing dynasty, were in pursuit. They occupied the only pass into Shaanxi, and Li was forced into constant retreat, moving into the southeastern part of Hebei (Hopei).

Li died sometime in June or July 1645, though the actual cause of his death remains something of a mystery. Some historians believe he was killed by villagers as he was attempting to steal food. Others say he escaped to a monastery, and still others that he committed suicide. Ironically, because he ended his life fighting against the Qing, surviving members of the Ming family came to think of him as a hero. The prince of Chu named him Loyal Heart after hearing of his death, and immortalized his dwindling forces as the Loyal and True Battalion.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Banner System; Kangxi, Emperor; Ming Dynasty; Manchus; Qing Dynasty.

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Liao-Shen Campaign (September–November 1948)

The Liao-Shen or Liaoxi-Shenyang (western Liaoning Province and Shenyang) Campaign was the first of three large campaigns that effectively destroyed the Nationalist army in mainland China during the Chinese Civil War or Liberation War of 1946–1949. The battle took place from September to November 1948 in modern-day Liaoning Province, primarily around the city of Jinzhou (Kin-chow) and the countryside west of Shenyang (Mukden). The main Communist element, the Northeast Field Army (NFA) under Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), engaged and destroyed a combined Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) force of almost half a million men. This was an unprecedented victory for the Chinese Communists (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and would be the beginning of the end for the Nationalist regime in mainland China.

By the summer of 1948, the NFA had compressed Wei Lihuang's Northeast Bandit Suppression General Headquarters into a narrow corridor around the railroads and

anchored by Changchun, Jilin (Kirin) Province, in the north, Jinzhou in the southwest and Shenyang in the southeast, Liaoning Province. Lin and his staff wanted to first capture Changchun, but Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and the Secretariat, the political-military high command of the CCP, argued for an attack against Jinzhou. By seizing this city and severing Wei's link with Beiping (Peking, now Beijing), Mao believed the Nationalists would have to leave their defenses and engage the NFA in the countryside, where Lin's army could ambush and destroy it piecemeal. Furthermore, the Secretariat was concerned about Wei's army escaping and tipping the balance in other theaters like north China or the central plains.

The Secretariat's plan promised great rewards, but it also came with a lion's share of risks. The most obvious issue was that it exposed the NFA to a conventional battle with Nationalist forces deep behind enemy lines. Logistics was also a problem as Lin's army only had enough fuel for a one-way trip to Jinzhou. Defeat or stalemate would cripple the NFA and allow the Nationalists to recapture the initiative. However, the Secretariat's overriding concern was preventing Wei's army from escaping intact to bolster the defenses in other regions. In the end, they allowed Lin to try and capture Changchun, but his failure at the end of the summer settled the debate in the Secretariat's favor.

Forced to accept the Secretariat's strategy, the NFA initiated the Liao-Shen Campaign on September 12. The main effort was against Jinzhou, which was defended by eight Nationalist divisions. After seizing this objective, the Communists planned to destroy a relief column from Shenyang, when and if it appeared. In the meantime, a smaller force further south was set to block

any reinforcements from Beiping, and a similar force was left behind to maintain the siege on Changchun.

In response to these movements, Nationalist commander in chief Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) ordered Wei to lift the siege by dispatching a force from Shenyang. Both Wei and his leading subordinate Liao Yaoxiang balked at this, having anticipated a Communist ambush. However, Jiang persisted and Liao departed Shenyang on October 1 at the head of the West army, which consisted of four corps and three cavalry divisions. In the meantime, Jiang ordered 11 divisions to form the East army at Huludao. By using sea transport to assemble this army, the Nationalists effectively circumvented the Communist blocking force at Shanhaiguan. Jiang envisioned the East and West armies trapping the NFA in a massive, double pincer movement outside of Jinzhou.

On the evening of October 2, Lin received intelligence reports about the East army of the GMD forces. Because he had not anticipated such a large enemy force so close to Jinzhou, he panicked and called off the operation. Lin sent a telegram to this effect to the Secretariat without informing his staff. However, cooler heads prevailed—namely the NFA's political commissar Luo Ronghuan (Lo Jung-huan) (1902–1963)—and Lin retracted his original message before incurring the full wrath of Mao and the Secretariat. The crisis abated in the early hours of October 4. The NFA would continue with the plan: either Jinzhou fell or the Communists would be stuck in a trap of their own making.

The fate of the NFA now hinged on the Four Column's ability to hold off the East army. Lin committed five columns and the majority of his armor and artillery against Jinzhou, a total of 250,000 men, in an effort

to capture it as quickly as possible. The ambush force Lin had positioned near Shenyang now assumed a blocking function, since the West army was too large for the Communists to contain or destroy. By October 10, the West army had pushed Lin out of his headquarters at Zhangwu, and the East army had begun attacking the Fourth Column defenses at Tashan.

Combat at Tashan was especially fierce, with some fighting positions changing hands 10 times or more. With its flanks collapsing, the NFA launched an all-out assault on Jinzhou on October 14. After nearly 24 hours of fighting, they captured the city and inflicted 90,000 casualties—most of them prisoners of war that would soon be integrated into the Communist ranks—while they suffered 24,000 of their own.

At this point, the GMD defenses began to unravel with alarming speed. On October 19, the Changchun garrison surrendered. Despite this, Jiang insisted that the East and West armies continue on their course and recapture Jinzhou. He believed they could still destroy the NFA in the field while the Communists were disorganized and weakened after the fight for Jinzhou. In the meantime, Wei, now virtually defenseless in Shenyang, ordered his remaining forces to recapture the port at Yingkou and begin evacuation operations.

In response to Jiang's plan, Lin reinforced the defenses at Tashan and took the rest of the army north to intercept the West army. By October 23, the Communists had hemmed Liao's army into a 120-square-kilometer perimeter. With NFA units piling on, the weight of numbers proved decisive, and the Communists prevailed on October 28. Flush with victory, the NFA swept over Shenyang, capturing what remained of its garrison on November 1. The Communists continued

their pursuit to Yingkou, capturing the town just as the last Nationalist troop ship departed. A week later, the West army, having never broken through the defenses at Tashan, retreated to Huludao and boarded ships for Tianjin.

By all accounts, the Liao-Shen Campaign was a crushing strategic and tactical defeat for the GMD. Official PLA records cite 472,000 GMD casualties, which included 109,000 defections and 306,200 prisoners of war.

Dr. Christopher Lew

See also: Beiping-Tianjin Campaign; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Fourth Field Army; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Lin Biao; Luo Ronghuan; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Nationalist Army; People's Liberation Army.

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Liberation War of Chinese People.

See Chinese Civil War (1946–1949)

Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971)

One of the most brilliant military leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), marshal and defense minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC), but accused of leading an anti-CCP clique against Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) in 1971.

Lin Biao was born as Lin Yu-rong to a small landlord family in Huanggang County, Hubei (Hopei) Province, on November 1, 1906. At 14, he enrolled in the Wutai Middle School at Wuchang, capital city of Hubei, and joined the Chinese Socialist Youth League in 1923. Lin was accepted by the Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy in



Lin Biao, one of the top Chinese Communist leaders and a marshal of the People's Liberation Army, reads a copy of Mao Zedong's "Little Red Book" in Beijing in 1971. Lin Biao was defense minister of the People's Republic of China in 1959–1971. (AFP/Getty Images)

1925 and joined the CCP the same year. Soon the young cadet became close to Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), CCP leader and director of the Political Task Department, and General Vasily Blyukher, Soviet military advisor at Whampoa.

Lin began his military career in 1926 when his class was ordered to join the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) Revolutionary Army and participated in Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) Northern Expedition against the warlords. He served as deputy platoon leader, platoon leader, captain, and battalion commander, and became a colonel in 1927. After the collapse of the CCP-GMD coalition, Lin participated in the Nanchang Uprising against the Jiang government and joined the CCP's armed force. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War of 1927–1937, he served as a battalion, regiment, and division commander in the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army. Skillful in mountain skirmishes and familiar with guerrilla tactics, Lin became one of the best commanding officers in the Red Army. He rose quickly through the ranks because of his success in combat and loyalty to Mao Zedong, political commissar of the Fourth Army. At the age of 25, he became commander of the Fourth Army and then the president of the Red Army University. In 1932, Lin was the commander of the First Army Corps of the Red Army. During the Long March of 1934–1935, Lin supported Mao's rise as the top leader of the CCP and the Red Army.

When Japan invaded China by attacking Shanghai and Nanjing (Nanking) in August 1937, the GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP on joint resistance through another political and military coalition. As part of this agreement for the

Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, the main force of the CCP's Red Army became the Eighth Route Army of the Nationalist army in 1937. Lin Biao commanded the Eighth Route Army's 115th Division, which had two brigades and two regiments, totaling 15,500 men. The division crossed the Yellow River (Huanghe) eastward and moved into the countryside and mountainous areas. As the Red Army did in the Jinggangshan Chinglang Mountains) Revolutionary Base area in 1928–1934, Lin conducted a guerrilla campaign in the mountains behind the Japanese lines. From there they could easily attack Japanese supply lines and small garrisons. In September 1937, the 115th Division ambushed the Japanese troops at Pingxingguan, Shanxi (Shansi) Province, killing 1,000 Japanese and capturing a large amount of supplies and ammunition. This was the first Eighth Route Army victory. After the Battle of Pingxingguan, Lin was severely injured by one of the GMD sharpshooters by mistake. He was then appointed the president of the CCP's Anti-Japanese Military and Political University at Yan'an. Starting in 1939, he spent three years in Moscow to further his recovery. After returning to Yan'an in 1942, Lin continued to serve on the Central Military Commission (CMC) and was involved in strategic planning and officer training.

At the beginning of the civil war, the CCP Central Committee planned to take over northeast China during the withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army. Lin was appointed commander and political commissar of all the CCP forces in the northeast to fight against Jiang's arriving armies. From 1946 to 1947, Lin reorganized his troops into the Northeast Field Army (NFA) and employed Mao's strategy of guerrilla warfare, receiving peasant support in the countryside. In September–November 1948, following the

Central Committee's orders, Lin launched the Liao-Shen Campaign, the first of three large campaigns that destroyed the main strength of the Nationalist army in the civil war. In this decisive battle for the northeast, Lin first encircled northern Changchun in September, and then southern Jinzhou to entrap the GMD troops in between. In early October, Jiang Jieshi tried to rescue Jinzhou by ordering 11 divisions from the east and 4 army corps from Shenyang in the west to counterattack Lin's troops. On October 14, Lin committed 250,000 men and the majority of his armor and artillery to the attack at Jinzhou. After two days of fighting, Lin captured the city and inflicted 90,000 GMD casualties while the NFA suffered 24,000 of their own. On October 19, the GMD Changchun garrison surrendered. Shenyang was subsequently captured by the NFA on November 1. By all accounts, the Liao-Shen Campaign was a crushing strategic defeat for the GMD. The CCP official records cite 472,000 GMD casualties.

In November 1948, the CCP reorganized its troops into the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), and established four field armies. Lin Biao became the commander of the Fourth Field Army, totaling 800,000 troops. From October 1948 to January 1949, Lin's Fourth Field Army participated in the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign (or Ping-Jin Campaign) with the First Field Army (North China Field Army). On November 23, the Fourth Field Army seized Shanghaiguan and severed the Beiping-Tianjin railroad. On December 19, Lin's Second and Third Armies proceeded to destroy the GMD's Thirty-Fifth Army Corps and captured Zhangjiakou. Lin then transferred his armies east to reinforce the sieges of Beiping and Tianjin. On January 15, 1949, the PLA captured the city and inflicted 130,000 casualties to the GMD garrison. Fu Zuoyi, commander of the GMD forces in north China, was trapped in Beiping

and began secret negotiations with the Communist representatives for surrender. On January 22, Fu left Beijing and his armies, about 250,000 GMD troops, which were integrated into the PLA according to the agreement for a peaceful path. Jiang Jieshi lost approximately 520,000 troops. After the Ping-Jin Campaign, the Fourth Field Army advanced southward from 1949 to 1950 to carry on civil war battles all the way to the southernmost point, Hainan Island, which was captured by the Fourth Field Army in April 1950. The Fourth Field Army was regarded as the best of the four field armies. Lin's successful campaigns against the GMD forces brought about an early victory for the CCP in the civil war and made him one of the top CCP leaders.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, however, Lin had a low profile in the CCP leadership due to his ill health. He declined Mao's request in 1950 that he be the commander in chief of the Chinese forces in the Korean War against the UN and U.S. forces. Instead, he went to the Soviet Union for his medical treatment during the Korean War. Lin became one of the 10 marshals in the PLA in 1955. Mao brought him back to the Party Center at the CCP's Lushan Conference, where Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Tehuai) (1898–1974) was purged when he questioned Mao's Great Leap Forward movement.

After Peng's fall, Lin became China's defense minister in 1959–1971, vice premier in 1965–1971, and vice chairman of the CMC in 1960–1971. Lin emphasized the politics in command, promoted Mao's personality cult, and carried out a so-called Leftist policy for the PLA. In May 1964, he organized the compilation of *Quotations from Chairman Mao*, known worldwide as the "Little Red Book," guiding the soldiers and later the Chinese people to participate

in the Cultural Revolution. Soon the whole nation was fired up to imitate the PLA's unconditional dedication to Mao. A large number of PLA officers and soldiers were dispatched to the villages and towns to promote the study of Mao's thoughts. Lin brought the people's army back by emphasizing the people's war principle and military-civilian integration. He published his book in 1966, *Long Live the Victory of People's War*, which emphasized the PLA's guerrilla warfare experience. During the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, the PLA moved into the center of domestic politics. Marshal Lin Biao became the second most powerful leader in the country, next to Mao, who made Lin his successor in 1969.

In 1970, the Cultural Revolution took a sudden unexpected turn. A new political struggle between Mao and Lin erupted, a struggle that would rip a great hole in a political arena already gasping for breath from the battering it had endured. Lin and Mao differed in strategy, foreign policy, and domestic politics. For instance, when Mao proposed that the PRC Constitution be amended to eliminate the post of the head of state, Lin made a counterproposal that Mao should assume the presidency. In Mao's eyes, what Lin proposed was not a simple political opinion, but his ambitions. Angry and disappointed, Mao considered Lin's ambitions and personal influence in the military to be dangerous. Mao had never expected Lin to challenge his authority and openly stand up against him as an equal. Mao decided to deal with Lin. Lin and his family realized that Mao was directing the spearhead of his political struggle against them. Just like Peng, Lin would be the next victim of Mao's brutal political movement. Lin's son planned to assassinate Mao on his way back from Shanghai. Mao learned of the plot and returned to Beijing early from

Hangzhou on September 12. The plot failed. Lin had taken a fatal step from which there was no return. On September 13, 1971, at the urging of his wife and his son, Lin fled. He commandeered a plane at the Shanhai-guan Airport. They flew north, heading for the Soviet Union. For some unknown reasons, the plane crashed in Mongolia. Lin, his family, crew members, and others on board, eight in total, were killed in the crash.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese Military and Political University; Anti-Japanese War; Beiping-Tianjin Campaign; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; Guomindang; Guerrilla Warfare; Jiang Jieshi; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Korean War; Liao-Shen Campaign; Nationalist Army; Northern Expedition; North China Field Army; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; People's War; Pingxingguan, Battle of; Soviet Union; Whampoa Military Academy; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Lin Zexu (Lin Tse-hsu) (1785–1850)

Official of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and one of the Chinese military and political leaders who fought against Great Britain in the First Opium War (1840–1842). Through righteousness, shrewdness, and persistence, Lin Zexu expelled from Guangzhou (Canton) the British merchants who had been smuggling opium into China and destroyed their illegal cargo. This action constituted one of imperial China's last victories against foreign imperialism even as it contributed to the Opium War from 1840 to 1842, which would constitute the Qing dynasty's first major defeat.

Lin was born on August 30, 1785, in the south Chinese coastal city of Fuzhou (Fochow) in Fujian (Fukien) Province. He was the son of a poor scholar, Lin Binri, who supported his wife, Chen Zhi, and children on the slim salary he made as a teacher. Lin Binri had won the lowest degree in the prestigious civil service examinations but like the three generations of Lins before him, had failed to pass the higher examination that would have permitted him to become a government official.

It is said that on the night of Lin Zexu's birth, his father dreamed of seeing a

fenghuang in flight. (The *fenghuang* is a mythological Chinese bird often likened to the phoenix.) Such an auspicious portent was welcome to the poor family, and as the child matured, he indeed proved an able scholar. Lin succeeded in the lowest civil examination at the age of 12, passed the provincial examination six years later, and by the age of 25, had passed the metropolitan and palace examinations in Beijing. After holding a number of increasingly important governmental positions, Lin was named governor-general of Hubei (Hopei) and Hunan Provinces in 1837.

During his tenure in these centrally located provinces, Lin initiated a campaign against the sale and use of opium, part of a national effort to stem the flow of silver out of China. While some opium was grown in China, the vast majority of the opium smoked by the growing population of addicts entered the country through Guangzhou on foreign ships. British merchants in particular used opium grown under their supervision in India as the means to offset the imbalance in trade caused by huge exports of tea from China to the United Kingdom.

So remarkable were Lin's successes in combating opium consumption in Hubei and Hunan through the treatment of addicts, the destruction of drug paraphernalia, and the pursuit of dealers that he was summoned to Beijing (Peking) in late 1838 for an extraordinary series of eight audiences with the Daoguang emperor (reigned 1821–1850). Not only did the emperor authorize all of the opium-fighting measures advocated by Lin, but he promptly assigned him the most crucial and sensitive role in the crusade: he made him high commissioner, with plenipotentiary powers, and directed him to travel promptly to Guangzhou to suppress the opium trade at its source.

On March 10, 1839, Lin arrived in Guangzhou, and the following day, leapt into action. Over the next week, Lin issued a series of bulletins, warning the Chinese inhabitants of Guangzhou that he would tolerate no further collusion with foreigners involved in the opium trade and that the use of opium would be severely punished. Then, on March 18, Lin confronted the foreign merchants in earnest. Thanks to a set of carefully cultivated contacts, Lin had been able to keep track of the movements and machinations of the British merchants, and he did not mince words. They were to surrender all of their opium within three days.

Ten days passed. Finally, the representative of the British opium merchants, Captain Charles Elliot, informed Lin that the merchants were prepared to hand over 20,283 chests of opium; each chest contained 120 pounds of opium. (Lin eventually received 19,179 chests and 2,119 bags of opium, in addition to eight chests that he sent to the capital.) The better part of the month of June was spent destroying the opium by liquefying it, mixing it with lime, and pouring it into the Guangzhou estuary (after duly propitiating the Spirit of the Sea). While the emperor and Lin may have felt that this firm action had put an end to the smuggling of opium and demonstrated Chinese sovereignty to the British, nothing could have been further from the truth.

On July 7, 1839, a Chinese peasant was beaten by a group of drunken British sailors and subsequently died from his wounds. When he heard of the murder, Lin immediately demanded that Elliot hand over the culprit for punishment. This initiated a struggle, at the heart of which was a conflict between the British idea of “extraterritoriality,” according to which British citizens in China were governed not by Chinese but by British law, and the Chinese conviction that

China should remain sovereign on its own lands. Elliot steadfastly refused to hand over a British subject to the Chinese authorities. Ultimately, this led to a skirmish in Hong Kong Harbor on September 4, 1839, in which British sailors were killed.

By late June of the following year, Lin was spending much of his time tending to military preparations, and soon British warships appeared on the Chinese coast. To Lin's disappointment, however, the warships did not attack and test the defenses he had worked so hard to prepare. Instead, the British left four ships to blockade the mouth of the harbor, then sailed north. The Qing court designated a Manchu named Qishan to enter into negotiations with the British. In September 1840, Lin received a communication from Emperor Daoguang sharply upbraiding him for standing idle while the opium trade was again in full swing, and by October, Lin had been sacked. In May, he left Guangzhou for Hangzhou, and in July, as the Opium War entered its most dramatic phase, he learned that he had been exiled to Yili, Xinjiang (Hsin-kiang), on China's northwest frontier. Though his journey to Yili was interrupted by a directive sending him to Henan to assist in rebuilding dams, he soon continued to his western exile and stayed in Yili for three years.

Exile was not an unusual punishment for high Chinese officials who had earned the emperor's displeasure, but the period of such punishments was often brief, and it is not surprising that while in Yili, Lin was given important local assignments, that he was recalled to Beijing in 1845, and that he distinguished himself in a series of provincial posts. At the time of his death on November 22, 1850, he was on his way to confront the Taiping rebels in Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Hong Kong; Manchus; Nanjing, Treaty of; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Sino-French War; Taiping Rebellion.

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Liu Bei (161–223)

Warlord and the founder of the State of Shu in the Three Kingdoms Period (220–280). During the latter part of the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), eunuchs and empresses' relatives took turns in the enjoyment of supreme power; they openly traded in official ranks and extorted money from the people. Many peasants, having lost their land and other means of subsistence, drifted into refugees. Among many peasant uprisings was the Yellow Turban Rebellion (184–191), which exploded on a nationwide scale. The storm started by the Yellow Turbans ended the Han regime in all but name. In the process of trying to suppress them, local officials and powerful landlords recruited or expanded armies of their own, and quickly they developed into territorial magnates,

over whom the central government had no control.

These territorial warlords fought among themselves to gain more territory and population at each other's expense. Finally, Cao Cao (155–220) gained control over the Yellow River (Huanghe) valley, Liu Bei (161–223) the province of Sichuan (Szechwan), and Sun Quan (182–252) the middle and lower Yangzi (Yangtze) River.

Liu Bei was born into a poor peasant family in 161. When he grew up, he ran a small shop selling straw sandals in his hometown. At the age of 24, Liu's hometown was attacked by the Yellow Turban Rebellion army. Liu Bei joined the local volunteer force and later the army of the Han dynasty to suppress the rebellion. During the war, Liu became the provincial commander and gained more military power by collecting military and political elite under his command.

After the Yellow Turban Rebellion was over, to further develop his military and political power, Liu Bei approached other warlords for alliance or engaged against one at the time. In 196, Lu Bu, one of the northern warlords, was incited to fight against Liu. Liu had insufficient power to defeat him, so he retreated and went to seek refuge with Cao Cao. In 199, Liu borrowed 80,000 soldiers from Yuan Shao and helped him defeat another warlord Yuan Shu. Then he conquered Xu Province again and fought against Cao Cao. In 200, Cao Cao led his army to reconquer Xu Province. Liu escaped to Yuan Shao's region for a while, and then he sought refuge with Liu Biao, the lord of Jing Province. In 207, Liu invited Zhuge Liang to be his military counselor. In 208, Liu made an alliance with Sun Quan, the king of Wu State. Through this alliance, they defeated Cao Cao's main force in the Battle of Chibi (Red Cliffs). In 209, Liu became the lord of Jing and married Sun Quan's

sister. In 211, he conquered Sichuan Province and then Yi in 214. In 215, the alliance between Liu Bei and Sun Quan was broken, Sun's army attacked Jing Province, but they faced off for months without a decisive result. Then Liu and Sun made a treaty to share the Jing Province. In 219, Liu conquered Hanzhong.

After the Battle of Chibi, Liu kept some of Wu's western territories that he was entrusted with under Sun Quan's service and expanded into southwestern China. In 220, Liu claimed the founding of the state of Shu with the capital at Chengdu and himself as emperor. He paid particular attention to farming as well. Liu Bei efficiently maintained the irrigation works centered on the Dujiang Dam, and encouraged and promoted rice farming and agricultural development among the minorities in southern Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou (Kweichow) Provinces. In 222, Sun Quan killed Guan Yu, who was the supreme commander and the best friend of Liu. This precipitated Liu bringing almost all his military against Sun Quan. Liu Bei died in 223 and left his trusted advisor Zhuge Liang as regent of his 17-year-old son, Liu Chan. When Zhuge Liang died in 234, Liu Chan proved to be incapable at both administration and warfare. He surrendered without resistance to the Jin in 263.

Yutong Yang

See also: Cao Cao; Chibi, Battle of; Guandu, Battle of; Han Dynasty; Han, Cavalry of; Han Wudi, Emperor; Northern-Southern Dynasties; Sui Dynasty; Three Kingdoms.

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Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng, 1892–1986)

One of the most experienced Chinese Communist military leaders, modern military strategist, and theoretician of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Liu was one of the founding members of the armed forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). He served as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP and president of the China Academy of Military Science (CAMS). He is also known as the "Chinese Mars" and the "one-eyed dragon."

Born into a poor peasant family in Kai County of southwestern Sichuan (Szechwan) Province in December 1892, Liu joined the army when he was very young and served in it his whole life. After the 1911 Revolution, influenced by Sun Yat-sen's (1866–1925) revolutionary theories, he participated in military campaigns against the local warlords to protect the

newly founded republic. In 1914, Liu joined the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) under Sun's leadership. He became a company commander, chief of a brigade staff, and then a colonel in the Sichuan army. During a 1916 battle against the warlords, Liu was struck by two bullets in the head and lost his right eye, becoming known as the "one-eyed general." In 1923, he was promoted to the commander of the Eastern Route Army and later commanding general in Sichuan.

Liu met some CCP members in Sichuan and stayed there from 1923 to 1925. Having learned the theories and policies of the CCP, he accepted the Communist ideology and joined the CCP in May 1926. During the CCP-GMD coalition in 1925–1927, Liu became the military commissioner of Chongqing, the largest city in Sichuan. In 1927, he was appointed army corps commander of the Fifteenth National Revolutionary Army. In that spring, the GMD government in Nanjing terminated the CCP-GMD coalition to contain the increasing Soviet influence and left-wing activities in the GMD and the Nationalist army. The GMD outlawed the CCP and purged Communists in the government and military. Liu left the Nationalist army to maintain his CCP membership.

To fight against the GMD and save the CCP movement, on August 1, 1927, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), He Long (Ho Lung) (1896–1969), and Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), Liu participated in the Nanchang Uprising, an armed rebellion against the GMD. The rebels created the CCP's own armed force in the city of Nanchang, central Jiangxi Province. Liu served as chief staff of the front committee in the Nanchang Uprising. After the military failure at Nanchang, Liu was sent by the CCP to the Soviet Union to study the Soviet military and modern

technology for two years. In December 1927, he enrolled at a military academy in Moscow. In early 1928, he was transferred to the more prestigious Frunze Military Academy to study military strategies and tactics. He became a master of the Russian language and the first translator of Russian military theoretic works.

On his return to China in the summer of 1930, Liu was appointed commissioner and chief staff of the Central Military Commission of the CCP and participated in the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937). In 1932, he became president and political commissar of the Red Army College in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province. During the Long March of 1934–1935, Liu was appointed chief of the General Staff of the Red Army and commander of Central Column, which traveled with the Central Committee of the CCP. At the Zunyi Conference in January 1935, Liu showed his support for Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), who thereafter became the top leader both of the party and the army. After the Long March, Liu maintained his support for Mao and stayed the Red Army's chief of staff.

In December 1936, the GMD government agreed to establish the coalition with the CCP for the second time against the Japanese invasion of China. After the CCP-GMD united front was formed, the main force of the Red Army, then numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army (Balujun) of the Nationalist army in August 1937, with Zhu as commander, including three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th. Liu served as the commander of the 129th Division, which crossed the Yellow River (Huanghe) eastward in 1937 until it reached east and north China. Liu followed Mao's strategy and conducted guerrilla warfare in the mountainous areas behind the Japanese lines. During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, he worked with

Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), then political commissar of the 129th Division. They set up CCP bases in parts of Shanxi (Shansi), Hebei (Hopei), and Henan (Honan) Provinces after their successful battles against the Japanese troops. Liu integrated regular operations with guerrilla tactics and defended CCP bases effectively. The 129th Division increased from 12,000 men in 1937 to 60,000 troops in 1939 and 100,000 men in 1940. In 1940, Liu and the 129th participated in the Hundred Regiments Campaign, a major offensive campaign led by Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974), deputy commander of the Eighth Route Army, to break the Japanese blockage on CCP base areas. In 1945, Liu attended the Seventh National Congress of the CCP and became one of the top military leaders of the Chinese Communists.

After the CCP-GMD coalition collapsed by the end of the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese Civil War began in the summer of 1946. The GMD army launched an all-out offensive campaign against CCP bases. The GMD leaders believed that if they could squeeze the CCP forces out of their bases in three to six months, they could win the civil war. But Mao and the Communist forces defeated the GMD offensives. When the GMD offensive slowed down, a CCP strategic offensive began. The main battlefields had by this time moved to the GMD-controlled areas. In early 1947, Mao ordered Liu and Deng to lead their armies from their northern China bases to south China. Liu launched the southern campaigns and led 120,000 troops across the Yellow River, breaking through the GMD's line and bringing the GMD offensive to an end in central China. In 1948, the CCP reorganized its troops into field armies. The high command called all of the troops the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and Liu and Deng's troops

became the Second Field Army, including 900,000 men, with Liu as its commander and Deng as political commissar. Then the PLA launched nationwide offensive campaigns against the GMD in mainland China.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Liu became the vice chairman of the CMC, chairman of the Southwest Military and Political Committee, and vice chairman of the National People's Congress. He was one of China's top military experts both in theory and in practice with few equals at home or abroad. He taught Sunzi's *The Art of War* at China Academy of Military Science when he served as its president. Deng praised Liu, stating that he had made a great contribution to the shaping and development of Mao Zedong's thinking on military matters, which was true. In 1955, Liu became one of the 10 marshals of the PLA.

In the 1950s, Liu stressed Chinese experience, proposed the Chinese ways to build a modern and regular army, and opposed entirely copying the Soviet model. He questioned the copying of the Soviet model and suggested that the PLA treasure the Chinese experience and not lose sight of the "people's war" doctrine. From December 7, 1953, to January 26, 1954, however, an unprecedented meeting was held in Beijing. Among the 123 participants were all the PLA's top commanders, CMC standing members, and academy presidents. Marshals Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Chen Yi (Ch'en Yi) (1901–1972), Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986), Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch'en) (1899–1992), He Long, and other top military leaders engaged in the debate on the PLA's reform. With Mao on his side, Peng silenced any dissenting opinions and signaled the beginning of the Soviet-style military reform. The meeting set new principles for the PLA's modernization over the next decade by

agreeing that they must learn advanced military science and technology from the Soviets. Thereafter, Peng also instructed the CMC in March 1956 to launch a political movement against its own president Liu's "dogmatism" (*jiaotiao zhuyi*). Despite valid explanations, Liu was criticized and forced to confess his "mistakes" and wrong ideas under the political pressure. Soon Liu was replaced by Marshal Ye as CMC president and political commissar. Then Marshal Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) launched an "antidogmatist movement" across the PLA. The 1958 Antidogmatist Campaign criticized some of the officers and followed by a top-down purge. Deng simply put it, "that was unfair." The political campaigns undermined unity and promoted grievances and rivalry in the military.

After 1959, Liu lived in half seclusion. He did not participate much in politics, even though he was elected a member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, vice chairman of the National People's Congress, and vice chairman of the CMC. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, he had become completely blind and survived the political purge. He supported his longtime friend Deng's return to power in 1978 and his power struggle against the Gang of Four. He also advocated Deng's economic reform and opening up to the outside world. Liu died in Beijing on October 7, 1986, at the age of 94.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; *Art of War, The*; China, People's Republic of; Chen Yi; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Gang of Four; Guomindang; He Long; Hundred Regiments Campaign; Lin Biao; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; National Party Congress; National

People's Congress; Nationalist Army; Nie Rongzhen; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; People's War; Red Army; Red Army College; Second Field Army; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; Sun Zi; United Front; Ye Jianying; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969)

General-secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) during 1949–1968 and president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) during 1959–

1968. Liu Shaoqi was purged and dismissed from all of his governmental and party positions by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) in 1968 during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976. Liu died in jail in 1969.

Born in Ningxiang County, Hunan Province, on November 24, 1898, Liu Shaoqi enrolled in Moscow's communist University of Toilers of the East and joined the CCP in 1921. He returned to China in 1922 and was assigned to organize the labor movement, becoming chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor in 1931. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War of 1927–1937, Liu stayed in the urban areas and organized Communist movements among manufacturing workers, students, business owners, and poor urban residents against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government in the cities.

Throughout the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945 and the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Liu served successively as head of the north, central plains, and central China Bureaus, engaging in underground and organizational works and helping to ensure eventual victory in both wars. After the PRC's birth in October 1949, Liu became the second vice chairman of the state and concurrently the general secretary of the CCP. In April 1959, he succeeded Mao Zedong as the PRC's president.

During Liu's presidency, the Sino-Soviet split became increasingly irreconcilable, taking on a heavy ideological tone. Liu viciously attacked the Soviets' revisionism and rapprochement with the West, insisting that permanent revolution should be the ultimate goal of the Communist bloc. Meanwhile, Liu became active in diplomacy as he tried to enhance the PRC's international status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In 1963, he toured noncommunist nations in Asia, becoming the first PRC president to visit countries outside the Communist bloc.

Liu's pro-Maoist position, however, did not save him from the ultraleftist Cultural Revolution. Indeed, his growing influence and power ultimately aroused Mao's suspicion. In October 1968 Liu was relieved of all his posts, and his position as the second to Mao was passed on to the defense minister, Marshal Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), in 1969. Liu died in prison in Kaifeng, Henan (Honan) Province, of medically neglected diabetes on November 12, 1969.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Guomindang; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Soviet Union.

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Local War Doctrine of the PLA.

See Jiang Zemin; National Defense White Paper (1998)

Long March (1934–1935)

The Long March was an action taken by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976)



Soldiers fighting for Mao Zedong and the Communist Party march across China in October 1934, in an attempt to escape the Chinese Nationalist Party armies of Chiang Kai-shek. Fewer than 10,000 of the 85,000 Communists who embarked on the 6,000-mile trek survived the entire journey. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

and his Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in an attempt to flee from Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) forces during from 1934 to 1935.

In 1927, tensions between the CCP and the GMD reached a boiling point. After the success of the Northern Expedition in getting rid of the warlords and uniting China, Jiang wished to create a government free of Communist influences. Although the Communists and GMD had collaborated before and during the Northern Expedition, Jiang nevertheless began to carry out his operation to purge the country of Communists.

Oppression by the GMD led to the expulsion of Communists from many of the urban cities and caused a flight to rural China. One main Communist stronghold was the central province of Jiangxi, which Jiang attempted to take over several times. All these efforts ended in failure thanks in part to the leadership of Mao Zedong, who helped in repulsing the attacks. By 1933, however, the GMD successfully surrounded the Jiangxi Soviet government.

Faced with these threats from GMD forces, Mao and the Red Army retreated from their stronghold of Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province on October 16, 1934. After numerous defeats, the Communists undertook a march from the region in an attempt to salvage what was left of the Red Army as they journeyed to northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. Communist forces ascertained that the surest route to breaking out was through the southwest portion of the encirclement where GMD forces were weakest, and prepared for this in September 1934. Food and supplies were packed, and the leadership took care of important CCP documents by either taking them with them or destroying them. Behind the bulk of the military units were the members of the Central Committee, intelligence units, and an anti-aircraft battery. Traveling along with them were the field medical personnel, support units, equipment for making arms small arms and ammunition, and printing supplies for making propaganda pamphlets.

The trek lasted from October 16, 1934, to October 20, 1935, and involved marching over 6,000 miles of dangerous country. The members of the Long March consisted of many of the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) coordinated the breakout, with the forward troops of the withdrawal commanded by experienced veterans of the

Northern Expedition. The Red Army was split into two columns, the First Army Corps numbering 15,000 combat troops and the Third Army Corps, numbering 13,000. Other, smaller army corps helped defend the flanks, and in total the number of those on the Long March would number roughly 80,000 personnel. Mao's pregnant wife He Zizhen, along with 35 other women, traveled with the First Army Corps. Two Communist army corps broke through the southwest perimeter of the GMD defensive line and made a rush for the north of Guangdong (Canton) Province. By the middle of December, the Communist forces faced severe odds. GMD forces were fast catching up to them, many of their baggage carriers deserted them, and the roads were almost nonexistent. In order to adapt, the participants in the Long March took over several market towns in Guizhou (Kweichow) Province, where they resupplied themselves and got rid of their heavy artillery, as they no longer had the ammunition for it.

On January 7, 1935, Communist forces entered the city of Zunyi, a rich merchant town. Resting there, Communist leaders decided to transform the town into a socialist example. Beginning by dispersing land to the peasants, they also distributed goods as well as forming revolutionary committees among them. A conference was later held in the city from January 15 to 18, and 18 important Communist leaders attended. This group argued over the reasons for their defeat at Jiangxi and came up with resolutions stating these reasons. These reasons were shared by Mao Zedong and helped his rise in the Communist Party. After the conference, Mao was named a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and chief assistant to Zhou Enlai for the purpose of military planning.

Mao would take this opportunity to rise further in the ranks, eventually taking over

complete military leadership from Zhou Enlai. The participants of the Long March then began their dangerous trek across the snowy mountainous regions near Tibet (Xizang), where Mao caught malaria several times and had to be carried by his men. By June 12, 1935, the troops of the Red Army were reduced to 40,000. Mao later met with Zhang Guotao, commander of the Fourth Army Corps, who added another 50,000 men to the Long March. They then disagreed over how best to proceed, with Mao arguing that they needed to drive to Shaanxi or Ningxia (Ningsia), while Zhang wanted to settle and defend the area in the Sichuan (Szechwan)-Xikang border region. Unable to reach a compromise, the two groups split once more and carried on their separate ways. Mao traveled across the Qinghai (Tsinghai)-Gansu (Kansu) border and regrouped with Shaanxi Communists.

Over the course of the march, many Chinese suffered from the ill effects of the journey, and Mao's forces suffered especially. From exhaustion to lack of supplies, and little sleep to disease, many faced death on this hazardous trip. By the time they reached Shaanxi, only one-tenth of the original 80,000 troops survived. After the Long March, Mao and the CCP established their headquarters at Yan'an, Shaanxi, from 1935 to 1945.

Michael Molina

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Chinese Communist Party; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Jiangxi Soviet; Mao Zedong; Red Army; Northern Expedition; Tibet; Yan'an; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Lord Shang (or Shang Yang) (390–338 BC)

A government official in the State of Qin whose reforming efforts helped Qin to unify China and ended the Warring States Period (475–221 BC). Originally named Gongsun Yang, or Shang Yang, Lord Shang was a prince of the small state of Wei. Although the reform named after him may not be the first, Shang is one of the early reformers in Chinese history. In the official history of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Shang's reform not only marks the beginning of the so-called feudal system in Chinese history but also lays the foundation of Qin's unification of China.

According to the *Historical Record*, authored by historian Sima Qian during the Han dynasty, when Shang was very young, he was fond of legalist studies and became an assistant to Gongshuzuo, the prime minister of the state of Wei. Fully aware of Shang's talent, the prime minister recommended him to the king of Wei. After the king refused, Gongshuzuo suggested that if the king did not want to promote Shang, the king should kill him to prevent him from leaving Wei and serving an enemy state.

When Shang heard about the story, he did not worry about his life, stating: “If the king [of Wei] does not want to promote me, how can he kill me?” Just as Shang had foreseen, while the king of Wei verbally agreed with Gongshuzuo, he told his close servants afterwards that he would not follow the paradoxical suggestion to kill Shang.

In 361 BC, Duke Qinxiao became the new ruler of the state of Qin, a less civilized and peripheral state in western China. To make Qin a stronger and more influential state, Qinxiao, still only 21 years old, was determined to reform the state. In a public notice, he called on all capable persons to come to Qin. He stated how Zhao, Wei, and Han had taken the territories of his ancestors west of the Yellow River (Huanghe), an intolerable humiliation. He considered the intentions of his father and appealed to his people that if they conceived of any proposals to make Qin strong, he would appoint them with official positions and share his power with them. As soon as Shang heard about the notice, he went to Qin and talked to Duke Qinxiao about his ideas. With the support of Duke Qinxiao, Lord Shang unleashed his reform policies in 359 BC.

The reform was centered on four aspects. First, Shang wanted to strengthen the power of the ruler. To attain that goal, he created a system of counties and divided Qin into 31 counties. Each county would have a magistrate, but all magistrates had to be appointed by the ruler. He also imposed collective punishment and encouraged people to expose the crimes of their neighbors. He ordered every 5 families be reorganized into a unit called *wu* (five) and 10 families into *shi* (ten). The purpose of those units was to ensure mutual supervision among neighbors. If anyone violated the law or tried to harbor the criminals,

his neighbors were to make a report to the local government. Failing to do so would result in severe punishment of all his neighbors.

Second, he tried to build a strong army. He deprived the nobility of their hereditary privileges and based promotions and benefits in the military on merits. A common soldier who could fight bravely in the battle would thus be granted promotion. But any soldier who betrayed or fled in the battle would be harshly punished.

Third, he abolished the relatively egalitarian well-field system and allowed the trade of land. He also encouraged men to till land and women to weave clothes.

Fourth, he adopted the “rule of law” and harsh punishment. He argued that law should be equally applied to the nobility and commoners. No one, except the ruler, was above the law. In his words, Lord Shang used the term “one punishment,” or “punishment regardless of rankings.” From ministers and generals to lower-ranked officials and commoners, anyone “who has violated the state law, broken state taboos, and infringed state system will be executed without pardon.” People who had received rewards previously would still be punished if they violated the law. He also suggested that punishment should be harsh but reward should be light. With severe punishment, people would be scared of violating the law. Therefore, harsh punishment would not be used. Light reward would encourage people to work harder and fight more audaciously as a big reward for small merit would dampen people’s ardor for merits.

To make sure that people in the Qin would follow the new measures of the reform, Shang ordered a long pole be erected near the south gate of the capital and said that whoever could move the pole to the north gate would be given 50 ounces of gold.

At first, no one believed it because of the big reward and small task. When finally a man did it, Shang gave him the reward as he promised. By then, people began trusting the new laws.

About a year after the reform, the heir apparent violated the law. Shang noted the reason the law could not be implemented effectively was that the people at the top often violated it. Because the heir apparent was the successor of the ruler, he could not be punished. But Shang ordered both teachers of the heir apparent to be mutilated as a warning to other nobles. After that, few in the country dared to break the law.

Aside from initiating reform in Qin, Lord Shang also had tremendous military achievements. He told Duke Qinxiao about the importance of attacking Wei because of its proximity to Qin. "Once Wei is defeated and forced to move to the east," Shang argued, "Qin will be able to enjoy stable natural defense at home and attack states in the east to establish an empire." Appointed general, he began inflicting assaults on the Wei. He lured and captured the commander of the Wei army in a meeting and defeated the Wei army. After losing several battles to Shang's army, the king of Wei regretted that he had not followed the advice of Gongshuzuo and killed Shang. The king of Wei fled to the east and left those territories in the west to the Qin. As a reward for his reform policies and military accomplishments, Duke Qinxiao granted Shang the title of "Lord" and rewarded him with 15 counties.

Having been the prime minister of the Qin for 10 years, Shang had many enemies among the Qin nobles due mostly to his harsh laws. As long as Duke Qinxiao was in power, Shang felt no danger and thus no sense of a need to change some of his unpopular policies.

In 338 BC, Duke Qinxiao died, and his son King Huiwen, whose teachers had been mutilated by Lord Shang in the early years of the reform, succeeded him. When some persons accused him of attempting to rebel, Shang escaped to the state of Wei, but he was turned away because of his previous attacks. Shang and his adherents fled to his own fief. The Qin army waged assaults on him and killed him. Shang's fate did not end after his death. Due to his intense animosity toward Shang, King Huiwen had his corpse torn apart by chariots.

Although he died, his biggest legacy was reform. Despite repeated attacks on his reform, Shang remains as one of the important reformers in the history. His reform paved the way for Qin's strength and unification of China. Many of his policies, good or bad, including "equality before the law," "collective punishment," and "neighboring reports" were continuously adopted in the late periods.

Qiang Fang

See also: China, People's Republic of; Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Rebellion Led by Chen Sheng; Terra-Cotta Army; Warring States Period; Zhou Dynasty.

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Luo Ronghuan (Lo Jung-huan, 1902–1963)

Military and political leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and marshal of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Luo Ronghuan was born in Hengshan County, Hunan Province, on November 26, 1902. He joined the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in April 1927. During the Nanchang Uprising, he joined the Red Army as a political officer. His first position was as special political representative to the First Regiment of the First Division. After the failed Autumn Harvest Uprising, he joined Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) at Jinggangshan (Chingkang Mountains) Revolutionary Base Area against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government during the CCP Agrarian Revolutionary War of 1927–1937.

While in Jinggangshan, Luo started as a battalion political officer and moved steadily up the ranks. During the Jiangxi Soviet period, he became an army-level political officer, most notably for the Eighth Army, which was destroyed during the GMD's Fifth Encirclement Campaign.

During the Long March of 1934–1935, Luo served as deputy director of the Political Department of Mao's First Front Army.

Upon arriving in Yan'an with the rest of the survivors of Mao's army, Luo served as director of the Political Department of the Red Army's Rear Command. After the formation of the Second United Front with the Nationalists in 1937, Luo became director of the Political Department of the 115th Division, which at the time featured future marshals of the PLA Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) as commander and Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch'en) (1899–1992) as political commissar. By the end of 1938, Luo replaced Nie, who had been promoted to command the new Shanxi (Shansi)-Chahar-Hebei (Hopei) Military Region.

During World War II, Luo was in the forefront of expanding Communist territory east and eventually took command of the Shandong (Shantung) Military Sub-district in addition to his duties with the 115th Division. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Luo coordinated large-scale efforts in Shandong to seize cities and railroads, as well as disarming Wang Jingwei's (Wang Chingwei) (1883–1944) regime and Japanese troops. In September, when the CCP sought to seize Manchuria, Luo's command provided the bulk of the forces for the expedition. A few months later, Luo himself transferred to northeast China to serve as Lin Biao's political commissar for both the Northeast Bureau and the Northeast Field Army.

Luo's contribution to the struggle in Manchuria during the Chinese Civil War or Liberation War of 1946–1949 has often been overlooked. He has been remembered as a calm, steady figure, often in contrast to Lin's reputation as a moody and somewhat erratic military genius. Luo has been remembered, perhaps in a somewhat idealized fashion, as

the model political commissar who cared about his troops and strictly enforced party discipline.

As the liberation war progressed, Luo played a major role in some of the key campaigns and strategic decisions in northeast China. For instance, during the Liao-Shen Campaign in the fall of 1948, when Lin's will faltered upon hearing about unanticipated Nationalist forces, Luo convinced the general to stay the course. During the Ping-Jin Campaign in early 1949, he and Nie advocated negotiations with the Nationalist defenders to both save lives and prevent the destruction of Beijing (Peking, now Beijing). As the Northeast Field Army moved south and became the Fourth Field Army, Luo retained his position as political commissar, first with the Central China Committee prior to the crossing of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, and then with the South Central China Military District.

After the war and the founding of the People's Republic of China, Luo became the director of the General Political Department (GPD) of the newly formed Central Military Commission (CMC). However, the workload exacerbated his poor health, which included high blood pressure and coronary heart disease. His health had always been an issue, as seen in his treatment at Dalian by Soviet doctors during the Liberation War. In 1954, he left the CMC to become president of the PLA Political Academy and a year later he was elevated to one of the 10 marshals of the PLA. Luo went into semiretirement in 1961 due to failing health.

As the political atmosphere in the PRC grew more divisive in the wake of the Great Leap Forward, one of Luo's last acts was to question the military policies of Lin Biao, who had replaced Peng Dehuai as minister of defense. Specifically, he disagreed with Lin's slavish devotion to Mao Zedong's military principles and emphasizing being

"red" over military proficiency. However, Luo died on December 16, 1963 in Beijing, thus sparing him the backlash that might well have come his way during the Cultural Revolution. Luo was buried with full state honors, and his funeral was attended by the highest figures in the party including Mao and Lin.

Dr. Christopher Lew

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; Encirclement Campaigns; Fourth Field Army; Guomindang; Jiangxi Soviet; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Liao-Shen Campaign; Lin Biao; Long March; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; Nationalist Army; Nie Rongzhen; North China Field Army; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Beiping-Tianjin Campaign; Red Army; Soviet Union; United Front; Yan'an; Zhu De.

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Luo Ruiqing (Luo Rui-ch'ing) (1906–1978)

High-ranking general in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and leading figure in

military affairs, education, and national defense. Luo was in charge of the homeland security as well as the security of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and other top Chinese leaders in Beijing after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Born in Nanchong, Sichuan (Szechwan) Province and trained at the Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy, Luo entered the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in 1926 and Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in October 1928. After a brief period of underground party work, he became a branch Communist Party representative in the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army. Luo's subsequent ranks and positions included column political department chairman, division political committee member, army political committee member, and army group political security bureau chief. During the Long March of 1934–1935, he served as chief of staff of the Red Army advance column. He became head of the Political Security Bureau of the First Front Red Army after arriving in northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. With the reestablishment of the Red Army College on June 1, 1936, Luo also became an instructor, and later director of studies, with the approval of Mao Zedong.

Following the December 1936 Xi'an (Sian) Incident, Luo traveled from Yan'an (Yenan) with Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986), Qin Bangxian, and Li Kenong to participate in negotiations with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975). Following Luo's return to military instruction, the Red Army College was renamed the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, and Luo participated in the training of a new cohort of Eighth Route Army officers

while drawing on Whampoa Military Academy ties to foster “united front” work between Communist and Nationalist forces. In 1938, Luo, supposedly guided by Mao, wrote a lengthy tract titled *Political Work among the Anti-Japanese Military Forces* (also known as *Wartime Political Work*), which became a canonical text on the issue and structure of party-military relations. He continued to write extensively during the Anti-Japanese War (or the War of Resistance against Japan, 1937–1945) period, and played a key role in the Communist Party-directed “inspection movement” within the military and cadre education system during early 1939. In July of that year, Luo was involved in the creation of a new network of military recruitment and training institutions in north China, behind Japanese lines. He was promoted to political director of the Eighth Route Army in May 1940, and was transferred to the Taihang base area. Luo's notable contributions during this period included his writings on “anti-enemy work,” or psychological warfare, conducted by north China guerrilla units in their encounters with Japanese and Chinese “puppet” military forces.

During the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) period, Luo occupied several overlapping positions within the vital Jin-Cha-Ji military region, including CCP Jin-Cha-Ji Central Bureau deputy secretary, Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region's Political Department director, a member of the Jin-Cha-Ji Field Army Political Committee, and ultimately director of the North China Military Region Political Department. In the waning years of the Communist-Nationalist conflict on the Chinese mainland, Luo also became a figurehead in the realm of public security work (*gong'an*).

Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1,

1949, he became minister of Public Security, vice chair of the CCP Central Committee's Political-Legal Committee, chair of the State Council Political-Legal Office, and head of the Beijing Public Security Bureau. Luo was famously demonized in the pages of *Life* magazine, and presided over a series of campaigns against counterrevolutionary organizations and enemies of the state, real and imagined, through which "New China" was consolidated internally during the early 1950s. Luo was awarded the rank of grand general, the highest rank of general in the PLA, in 1955.

By 1959, Luo had risen to many of the highest public positions related to PRC state security. He was made a vice premier of China, vice minister of National Defense, secretary of the Central Military Commission, and chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) of the PLA. Following the Chinese Communist Party's Eighth Congress, held in 1956, Luo became a member of the Central Committee and secretary in the Central Secretariat. He presided over the professionalization and modernization of the PRC's national defense industries, including the successful manufacture and detonation of China's first nuclear bomb on October 16, 1964. Luo, along with Yang Chengwu, was also responsible for implementing Mao's vision of creating a hinterland "third front," or strategic rear base, in preparation for possible war with the United States and the Soviet Union following exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet split in 1963.

The nadir of Luo's distinguished career came on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, when Mao removed him from his military posts during the December 8–15, 1965, expanded meeting of the CCP Politburo in Shanghai. Criticized by Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) and other high-ranking generals for fomenting an "anti-

Communist Party plot" within the military, he flung himself from the third-story window of his home on March 18, 1966, in protest, breaking both legs. Along with Peng Zhen (P'eng Ch'en) (1902–1997), Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun (Yang Shang-kun) (1907–1998), Luo was one of the most senior Communist Party members to be accused of opposing Mao Zedong as the Cultural Revolution unfolded. These accusations were overturned following the CCP's Eleventh Congress, held in August 1977, and Luo was once again made a member of the Central Committee and secretary of the Central Military Commission (CMC). He died unexpectedly on August 3, 1978, in West Germany (FRG), while receiving medical treatment.

Dr. Matthew David Johnson

See also: Anti-Japanese Military and Political College; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; General Departments of the PLA; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Long March; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; Nationalist Army; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Red Army College; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Soviet Union; United Front; Whampoa Military Academy; Xi'an Incident; Yan'an; Yang Shangkun; Ye Jianying; Zhou Enlai.

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Lushan Conference (1959)

The Lushan Conference was officially the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) Eighth National Congress. It began on July 2 and ended on August 16, 1959. The conference's name is derived from the meeting place, a resort on Mount Lushan in southeastern Jiangxi (Kiangsu) Province. The original objective of the conference was to review the developments in China during 1958 and solve some practical issues brought forth by those developments. When the CCP elites gathered at the conference, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP, also intended to use the conference to contain the “leftist tendency” elements in the Great Leap Forward.

During the meeting, on July 14, Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974), defense minister of the PRC, wrote his well-known long letter to Mao to emphasize the problems that had appeared during the “Three Red Banners” movement. Peng maintained that the leftist mistakes were rooted in a “petty bourgeois fanaticism.” The Party Center was too slow to realize the severity of the problems in 1958, and it was wrong to continue the Great Leap Forward in 1959. Peng asserted that the problems were not only economic but also “political.” For instance, the relationship between workers and peasants was undermined. Despite his criticism, Peng

apparently tried to disconnect Mao from these problems.

Worrying about Peng's disloyalty and his military power, Mao launched a major assault on Peng, whose criticism probably would have been tolerated if it had been raised by another military leader. Mao addressed the whole conference on July 23, rebuking Peng and his letter. Mao equated Peng and his supporters with the rightists in 1957 and accused him of being the leader of a “military club” and dividing “civil-military collaboration.” Mao told Peng at the July 23 meeting that: “All [I] ask of you was not to set up [your own] center this time.” At the Politburo Standing Committee meeting at Lushan on July 31, Mao summarized his historical relationship with Peng: “It was said at the Second Meeting of the Eighth Party Congress that [we should] be ready to deal with a split. It had specific meaning. It meant you [Peng]. . . . Yesterday we were friends, and today, enemies. . . .” Mao considered him a potential threat and wanted him removed.

After being dismissed from all of his positions in the party and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Peng lived under virtual house arrest. Marshal Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) replaced Peng as new defense minister. Peng wrote many long, personal letters to Mao and the CCP Central Committee appealing for suspension of his disgrace. These letters brought even more criticism and troubles for him in the 1960s.

The Lushan Conference marked a key point of departure in Mao's rule. Criticism of party actions and policies became equated with criticism of Mao. Mao's speech at Lushan was incredibly passionate and belligerent. He defended himself by saying that he, like all of the great writers, Confucius, Karl Marx, and Lenin had made mistakes and that focusing on them would not help the situation. Moreover, he insisted that not one

commune had collapsed yet. His personal victory over Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference led Mao to proceed with the Great Leap Forward. More than 3 million officials within the party were indicted, and “class struggle” was brought for the first time into the upper echelon of the party apparatus.

Yutong Yang

See also: China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Cultural Revolution; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; Peng Dehuai; People’s Liberation Army.

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M

Maguan, Treaty of. *See* Shimonoseki, Treaty of; Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)

Manchuria

Manchuria is China's northeastern region, which includes Liaoning, Jilin (Kirin), and Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang) Provinces and the eastern part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Manchuria is Romanization of Manzhou to designate the region after the Manchu conquest of China in the seventeenth century. Historically, the northeast had been long known as Liaodong (east of the Liao River), or Guandong (east of the Shanhai Pass), or Guanwai (outside the Shanhai Pass). During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), it was also termed “Dongsan-sheng” (the three eastern provinces). After the World War II, the Chinese deliberately dubbed it *Dongbei* (Northeast) to avoid confusion with the Japanese puppet state Manzhouguo (Manchukuo).

According to Chinese historical annals, the Yan kingdom during the Warring States Period (475–221 BC) conquered Manchuria. The Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) established military garrisons, and the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) further consolidated power there. After the Wei dynasties (220–265 and 386–357), Manchuria was a crossroad for various ethnic regimes, such as Former Yan, Late Yan, and Gaogouli (Koguryo, modern-day Korea). The Sui dynasty (581–618) waged an unsuccessful war against Gaogouli. During the Tang dynasty (618–907),

the Chinese controlled South Manchuria, but North Manchuria was dominated by Bohai Kingdom. After the Tang, several ethnic groups alternatively ruled over Manchuria, such as Qidan (Khitans) Liao dynasty (907–1125), Nuzhen (Jurchen) Jin dynasty (1115–1234), and Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). The constant regime changes made Manchuria a battlefield for various rival powers.

During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), Manchuria was under Chinese jurisdiction, but Jurchen tribes enjoyed autonomy in their domains. As the Ming declined, the Jurchens, under the leadership of Nurhaci, rose as a power. In 1635, the title of Jurchen was changed to Manchu, from which the region gained its name.

Through political maneuver and military combat, the Manchus conquered China in 1644 and established the Qing dynasty. The Manchus deemed Manchuria as their homeland into which Chinese immigration was officially prohibited. For about two centuries, the Qing only stationed Manchu troops led by military generals. Only by the late nineteenth century did the Qing start to open some parts of Manchuria to Chinese settlement. However, the rich natural resources attracted Russian and Japanese expansionists. Russia annexed a huge chunk of land beyond the Heilong (Amur) and Wusuli (Ussuri) Rivers by signing the Treaty of Aihui in 1858 and the Treaty of Beijing (Peking) in 1860. During the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Qing troops were routed in South Manchuria. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese acquired



Russian soldiers pass through the gates of Mukden in the province of Manchuria (with its own history of Chinese rule alternating with Japanese rule) during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Russia lost ground in Manchuria and was forced to evacuate the disputed territory as part of the Peace of Portsmouth that ended the war in 1905. (Library of Congress)

South Manchuria but relinquished it under pressure from Russia, Germany, and France.

In 1900, Russia dispatched troops to occupy Manchuria in the name of suppressing the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Russian refusal to withdraw prompted Japan to launch a preemptive attack, and it beat Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. After this war, Russia maintained its influence on North Manchuria, while Japan gradually established its sphere of influence in South Manchuria.

The invasion of the neighboring countries compelled the Qing to open all of Manchuria

in 1904 to Chinese immigration and settlement as a part of the policy of border defense. In the following decades, many millions of Chinese farmers from north China (particularly Shandong) flowed into the region. In 1907, the Qing established the provincial governments in Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang and assigned civilian governors as administrators.

In 1931, Japan launched a war against China and rapidly occupied Manchuria. The next year, the last Qing emperor Henry Puyi, Xuantong (Hsüan-t'ung) (1909–1912), was installed as the head of the puppet state of Manchukuo, which collapsed in 1945 when the Soviet Union declared war against Japan and occupied Manchuria. The Soviets acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over the region and recognized the regime of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), but secretly allowed Chinese Communist forces to enter to establish effective control over strategic locations before their withdrawal in 1946.

During the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), Manchuria was a battlefield between Mao Zedong's Communists and Jiang Jieshi's Nationalists. Through the Liao-Shen Campaign in 1948, the Communists took over Manchuria and turned it into a stronghold for their final victory in 1949. During the Maoist era, Manchuria became an industrial base and a granary. Today, over 100 million people (Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui, Xibo, Korean and others) live in Manchuria as it continues to be one of the most important regions in the People's Republic.

Dr. Patrick Fuliang Shan

See also: Banner System, Boxer Rebellion; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Damansky Island; Han Dynasty; Japanese, Attack on Manchuria; Liao-Shen Campaign; Lin Biao; Manchus; Mao Zedong; Ming Dynasty; Mongols; Nationalist Army; Nerchinski

and Kiakhta, Treaties of; Qin Dynasty; Qing Dynasty; Russo-Japanese War; Shimonoseki, Treaty of; Sino-Japanese War; Soviet Union; Sui Dynasty; Tang Dynasty; Unequal Treaties; Warring States Period; Yuan Dynasty.

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Manchus

The Manchus are an ethnic group of about 11 million in China, especially in the northeast (Manchuria). They are a Tungusic people, a branch of the Altaic family. In Chinese history, the Manchus and their ancestors built two dynasties: the Jin (1115–1234) and the Qing (1644–1912).

Some scholars trace the origin of the Manchus to the Sushen people who lived in the northeast during the Zhou dynasty (1066–221 BC), but this is challenged as groundless. However, scholars agree that Sushen during the Zhou, Yilou during the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), Wuji during the Wei dynasties (220–265 and 386–557), and Mohe during the Tang dynasty (618–

907) were all related to the Tungusic peoples, including the Manchus.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), the Jurchens (Nuzhen), the ancestors of the Manchus, rose to power as Wanyan Aguda established the Jin dynasty in the northeast. The Jin launched a series of wars to unify the Tungusic tribes, to conquer the Liao dynasty in 1125, and to expand its domain into north China. The Jin was subjugated by the Mongols in 1234.

During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the Jurchens were divided into three main tribes (Jianzhou, Yeren, and Haixi) and were under Ming control. As the Ming declined, Jianzhou chief Nurhaci (1559–1626) unified the Jurchens and built Late Jin in 1616. He modified Mongolian script into the Manchu written language and established the banner system to turn the Jurchens into a fighting force. In 1635, Huangtaiji changed the name of Jurchen to Manchu, a permanent name for this ethnic group.

The origin of the term “Manchu” is still shrouded in mystery as at least six interpretations were offered on its original meaning: the Chinese title for the old Jurchen regime, an honorable and respected designation among the Jurchens, a Buddhist term meaning “wonderful luck,” Nurhaci’s ancestor’s given name, a title of a small Jurchen tribe, and the name of a small river.

In 1636, the Manchus established the Qing dynasty with Mukden (Shenyang) as its capital. Through two decades of wars, the Manchus conquered all of China and even expanded Qing territory into central Asia, Tibet, and Taiwan. Traditionally, the year 1644 is seen as the beginning of the Qing, because that year the Manchus relocated their capital to Beijing.

The Manchu population was only about 1 percent of the Chinese population when they conquered China. The factors leading

to their success include the effective Manchu banner system, Chinese military collaboration, Chinese intellectual cooperation, and internal Chinese strife. The small number of Manchus maintained their rule over China for almost three centuries, a phenomenon vividly interpreted by historians as a strange fusion of a Manchu head implanted on the huge Chinese body. In fact, the Manchu population roughly equated to the number of Ming ruling elites. Living among the larger Chinese population, this small ethnic group had to share power with the Chinese, as each province was run by two governors: one Chinese civilian governor and one Manchu military governor.

During the Qing, the Manchus, as a hereditary military ruling caste, were scattered through the empire. Over 100 garrisons were built in major cities and were ordered to safeguard their military tradition. However, the Manchus soon lost this tradition as they enjoyed a new life among the Chinese. Sinification took place as the Manchus adopted Chinese language and culture, validating the statement that the conquerors were conquered by the conquered.

Around 1900, the Manchus were seen as barbaric aliens by the revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen. During the Chinese Revolution of 1911, some Manchus were killed; however, most were not attacked but had to embark on a painful transition from warriors to urban laborers or rural farmers. Soon after the establishment of the Republic of China, the Manchus were recognized as one of the five great Chinese ethnic groups (Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans) and would continue to be treated as such until the present day.

In fact, today's Manchus include a set of various peoples. For example, Han Chinese banner men and their descendants are also recognized as Manchus. Even though the

Manchus lost their language, many of them still observe Manchu customs, such as the prohibition of eating dog meat because Nurhaci was once saved by his dog. In terms of other dietary habits, the Manchu "fire pot" (*huoguo*) and "whole sheep banquet" (*quanyang xi*) are renowned among all Chinese.

In the 1980s and the 1990s, over 10 Manchu autonomous counties were established in Liaoning, Jilin (Kirin), and Hebei (Hopei) Provinces. Manchu autonomous townships were created throughout northeast China and China proper. Today, the Manchu population is around 11 million, among whom nearly 10 percent live in Liaoning Province.

Dr. Patrick Fuliang Shan

See also: Banner System; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Great Wall; Manchuria; Han Dynasty; Ming Dynasty; Mongols; Qing Dynasty; Song Dynasty; Sui Dynasty; Sun Yat-sen; Tang Dynasty; Tibet; Zhou Dynasty.

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Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976)

The most important Chinese Communist leader in the twentieth century as chairman and cofounder of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), founder and president of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and chairman of the Central Military Commission. Born in Shaoshan, Hunan Province, on November 19, 1893, Mao Zedong graduated from the Hunan First Normal School in 1918. He then went to Beijing (Peking) to work in the Beijing University Library, where he learned Marxist ideology and developed his revolutionary plan to save China. Mao helped found the CCP in Shanghai in 1921. In 1924,



Mao Zedong with his wife Jiang Qiang. An ardent supporter of Mao, Jiang Qiang was a powerful force during the Cultural Revolution. (Library of Congress)

following the Comintern's (Communist International Congress, Moscow, Soviet Union) instructions, Mao joined the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party), forming the first United Front aimed at Chinese national unification. In so doing, he bought time for the infant CCP to grow under the GMD shield. However, the United Front broke down in mid-1927 when GMD leader Jiang Jieshi decided to purge the Chinese Communists, thereby beginning the CCP-GMD power struggle that lasted for two decades.

Following the breakdown of the United Front, Mao and other frustrated Chinese Communists worked on their own to develop a unique Chinese path to carry out the socialist revolution. In January 1935, Mao became the CCP chairman, a post he held until his death. His ascension to power is attributed to his ideological and tactical pragmatism, which rejected the rigid application of Soviet orthodox thinking and instead emphasized the uniqueness of Chinese history and culture. After expelling Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) GMD government from the mainland, Mao proclaimed the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, officially ending the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949. Mao's reign can be divided into three periods: 1949–1957, 1958–1965, and 1966–1976.

The first period was characterized by imitation of the Soviet model in reconstructing China and consolidating the CCP's power. On foreign policy matters, Mao coined the three principles of "make another stove, clean the house and then invite the guests, and lean to one side." According to the first two principles, Mao was determined to start anew by pursuing an anticolonial and anti-imperialist policy to eliminate China's century-old semicolonial status, imposed by imperial powers since the mid-nineteenth

century. Because the PRC's birth coincided with the Cold War, Mao's policy of lean to one side signaled a pro-Soviet and anti-American stance. His first foreign policy initiative was a visit to Moscow in December 1949, culminating in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950.

The PRC's anti-American stance was vividly showcased around the question of Taiwan, where Jiang's GMD government still retained power, as well as in the Korean War, the Geneva Conference, the first and second Taiwan Strait crises, and the Bandung Conference, at which Mao attacked America for its "imperialist" designs in the Taiwan Strait.

Domestically, Mao selectively transplanted the Soviet model. Politically, he preferred a democratic dictatorship, along the principles of democratic centralism and coexistence with other revolutionary parties and noncommunist classes, to the Soviets' proletarian dictatorship. Mao wished to avoid the Soviet political purges of the 1930s. Yet he ensured that real power and leadership rested in the hands of the CCP, as the terms "dictatorship" and "centralism" suggested.

In economic matters, Mao strictly adhered to the Soviet model, with Soviet technical and material assistance. In early 1950, he ushered in land reform, which involved government confiscation and the redistribution of agrarian land to peasants. This stage was completed in late 1953 and was succeeded by collectivization aimed at boosting agricultural production. In 1953, Mao launched the First Five-Year Plan, which strove to develop heavy industries and was completed a year ahead of schedule.

To consolidate his control over the country, Mao adopted mass socialization by encouraging the formation of numerous mass organizations in the early 1950s to

mobilize the population to participate in such movements as the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign, the Three-Anti movement to combat corruption and wasteful bureaucracy, and the Five-Anti movement against bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of government property, and leaking of state economic secrets.

The second period of Mao's rule demonstrated his determination to establish a unique brand of Chinese socialism, designed to wean China from Soviet aid. The year 1958 began with the Second Five-Year Plan, which was much more ambitious than the first. To accelerate China's industrialization, Mao launched the three-year Great Leap Forward program at year's end, a radical measure designed to catch up with and surpass British industrial output. To this end, he ordered the establishment of nationwide People's Communes, which was also an essential step in facilitating the socialist transformation of China.

The Great Leap Forward, however, was doomed to failure, as the PRC was not ready for such a radical transformation. The results were measured in massive manpower and property losses. Another adverse impact was the growing division within the PRC leadership. Realizing his miscalculation and hoping to avoid becoming the scapegoat for further losses, Mao gave up his PRC chairmanship to Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969) in April 1959 while retaining the chairmanship of the CCP. In September 1959, Mao relieved Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) of his post as defense minister because of Peng's opposition to the Great Leap Forward. The failure of the Great Leap Forward convinced moderate leaders such as Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) that socialization should be slowed down, a view that

made both men targets of the Cultural Revolution in later years. To compensate for the economic dislocation and destruction of the Great Leap Forward, Mao reluctantly agreed to relax economic socialization by dismantling the communes and using material incentives to revive the Chinese economy, cures proposed by Liu and Deng. By the mid-1960s, China's economy had been restored to its 1957 level.

Mao's drive for independence also resulted in the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance. His insistence on proceeding with the radical Great Leap Forward alarmed Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), who decided to stop assisting the PRC's national reconstruction in 1958. This forced Mao to pursue a lone course in implementing both the Second Five-Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward.

Mao's unilateral initiation of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in September 1958 prompted Khrushchev to withhold nuclear information. The Sino-Soviet split became official after Mao passed the chairmanship to Liu, who intensified the ideological attack against Soviet revisionism and Khrushchev's advocacy of de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence with the West. By 1963, Sino-Soviet unity had all but disappeared. To compensate for the loss of Soviet aid, Mao promoted closer PRC ties with Asian and African countries. His success in this enabled the PRC to become an influential leader in the developing world, transforming the bipolar Cold War world into a tripolar one.

The decade-long Cultural Revolution constituted the third period of Mao's era, during which the PRC experienced violent chaos and disorder. Determined to reassert his personal authority and monolithic leadership over the country, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 through his

wife Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914–1991). By reviving the class struggle and Marxist-Leninist teachings, he purged all potential opponents, including old comrades, from both the government and the CCP. To ensure his personal control, Mao packed the party and the government with his supporters, such as his wife and Hua Guofeng (1921–2008), both of whom were made Politburo members. Outside the government, Mao incited the Red Guards, radical youths indoctrinated with Maoism, to criticize old customs and practices by employing such means as violence, public trials, and mass rallies. The Red Guards were also sent into the countryside to encourage the so-called cult of Mao. This 10-year period constituted the darkest days of the PRC's history, characterized by a reign of red terror that badly damaged Mao's revolutionary legacy.

The Cultural Revolution also had a direct bearing on the PRC's foreign policy. On the one hand, the revolution aroused grave hostility and suspicion from the PRC's allies, who either severed diplomatic relations with the PRC or recalled their foreign service delegations. Combined with the Sino-Soviet split, the Cultural Revolution almost completely isolated the PRC within the international community. On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution made possible the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations because of their mutual desire to enhance each other's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In February 1972, Mao received U.S. president Richard M. Nixon in Beijing, which culminated in American diplomatic recognition of the PRC in 1979. This rapprochement marked the end of China's diplomatic isolation.

Mao died in Beijing on September 9, 1976. Shortly after his death, in October 1976, Hua, now the premier, seized power and ended the

Maoist era by officially terminating the Cultural Revolution and arresting the Gang of Four.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cold War; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Gang of Four; Gao Gang; Guomindang; Guerrilla Warfare; Hua Guofeng; Jiang Jieshi; Korean War; Lin Biao; Liu Shaoqi; Long March; Peng Dehuai; Mao Zedong, Revolutionary War of; Red Guards; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; Soviet Union; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958; United Front; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations.

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Mao Zedong, Revolutionary War of (1927–1949)

Chinese Communist military doctrine and war strategy developed by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), cofounder of

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and its armed forces, and founder of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Mao's revolutionary war experience included the CCP's Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1936), Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), and the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949, the Liberation War of Chinese People, or the Third Revolutionary Civil War).

The revolutionary movement in China during the 1920s, including the establishment of the CCP in 1921, provided the most important Communist military leaders, such as Mao—individuals who thought eclectically about social and military issues. As one of the first generation of the Communist leaders, his political and social concerns, unprecedented for military leaders in previous periods of Chinese history, were inspired not only by a heightened awareness of ideas transmitted to China via Russia, France, and Japan, but also by robust local traditions dating back many centuries. Moreover, his visions and insights also grew out of his active participation in the political and military campaigns of the period, often as an organizer in the 1920s. The Chinese Communist military began during the CCP-GMD political coalition against the warlords in 1924–1927, and eventually the Communist forces took over the country in 1949.

After the collapse of the CCP-GMD coalition in the spring of 1927, Mao led the peasants' Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan and Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Provinces. In late August, Mao organized the First Division of the "Chinese Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants" (CRAWP, 1927–1928) with three regiments and 5,000 men. Zhu and his troops joined Mao at Jinggangshan on April 24, 1928. They established the CRAWP's Fourth Army on May 4, about 5,000 men organized into six regiments, for

which they had but 2,000 rifles. Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) was the commander, and Mao was the political commissar. Soon other Communist troops joined them at Jinggangshan, which became the “cradle” of the CCP’s military revolution. Mao called their war against the Guomindang (GMD, or Nationalist) government, warlords, and landowners the Agrarian Revolutionary War (or Land Revolutionary War). The Fourth Army recognized the peasantry’s importance in their military revolution. To form a Communist revolutionary army, created a voluntary system based on the “Guideline for Military Tasks” issued by the army in April 1928.

To attract peasant volunteers, the Fourth Army initiated a land reform in the mountainous area in 1928–1930. The land revolution movement became attractive to the peasants in this mountain area, one of the poorest areas in the country. Officers also helped the peasants organize a peasant association, a new government, and self-defense militia with some weapons and basic training to protect their newly received land ownership. Then the officers moved on to another village. When all the villages in one area completed their “land revolution,” the army took over the town or the county to establish a Soviet-style government (administration was run by a CCP committee and enforced by the Red Army). With the Soviet government, a base area, or so-called red region (*hongqu*) or Soviet region (*suqu*), was founded. The army received material and human resources from their base areas, and in turn they provided protection for the local Soviet-style governments to continue their land reform movement. By the summer of 1930, the Communist governments and the Fourth Army secured their base areas in Jiangxi-Hunan, including nine counties with a total population of 2 million.

During this formative period, Mao and Zhu also laid some groundwork for the Communist army. They set up three tasks for the Fourth Army: fighting, raising money for the revolutionary cause (later changed to production), and work of the masses. To win battles, Mao developed guerrilla tactics during these formative years. Since the Fourth Army operated in remote, mountainous areas and away from the GMD military, which occupied the major cities, a guerrilla warfare strategy worked. During the defense of the Jinggangshan region in 1928, Mao perfected the guerrilla tactics, which he summarized as: “the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.” During the formative period at the Jinggangshan base, Mao also established the principle of the party’s absolute leadership over the army. Mao inserted the party representation through the Red Army down to the company level. Mao had them top to bottom at all the levels. In 1929, the CCP representatives in the Red Army renamed political commissars (*zhengwei*). By the end of 1931, the Red Army totaled 150,000 men and expanded its areas of operation. About 25 percent of the rank and file were CCP members.

As part of this agreement, the main force of the Red Army, then located in the northwest and numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army (Balujun) of the National Army in August 1937, with Zhu as commander, Peng Dehuai (P’eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) as deputy commander, and Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) as chief of staff. They commanded three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, and crossed the Yellow River (Huanghe) eastward until it reached north China. Most of their units moved into the mountainous areas. As Mao did in Jinggangshan (Chingkang

Mountains) Revolutionary Base Area, they conducted a guerrilla campaign in the mountains behind the Japanese lines. In the south, the Red guerrilla troops were reorganized into the New Fourth Army (Xinsijun) of the National Army, totaling 10,300 men, including four field columns (divisions). Each field column had two to four regiments. Ye Ting (Yeh Ting) (1896–1946) commanded the New Fourth Army. When Jiang lost some of his best troops in the war against the Japanese invasion, Mao's successful guerrillas recruited a large number of peasants into his forces. The units of the Eighth Route Army marched to the enemy-occupied territories, where they carried out guerrilla operations and established military and political bases. The Eighth Route Army increased from 46,000 men in 1937, to 220,000 men in 1939, and to 500,000 men in 1940.

In May 1938, Mao wrote a treatise entitled *On Protracted War* that analyzed the basic characteristics of both sides of the Anti-Japanese War. Having defined the Anti-Japanese War as a revolutionary war, he pointed out that China could not win a quick victory but would surely be victorious after a long period of struggle. He stressed that China's resistance was a protracted war that would pass through the three stages: strategic defense, strategic stalemate, followed by a strategic counteroffensive for final victory. Particularly, he emphasized the paramount importance of a "people's war." He said that "the army and the people are the foundation of victory," and "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people." Mao instructed the high command to organize extensive peasant militias through the CCP network, now a mass party. Party control and political education were also emphasized in mobilizing the peasants. Transforming illiterate peasants into capable soldiers became part of

the Chinese military tradition. In 1943–1944, the "liberated areas" under CCP control launched partial counteroffensives and won important victories against Japan. By the spring of 1945, the nation had 19 "liberated areas" with a total population of 95 million. By the fall of 1945, the CCP's regular army had grown to 1,270,000 men, supported by militias numbering another 2.68 million. The Eighth Route Army increased from 3 divisions in August 1937 to more than 40 divisions in August 1945.

After World War II (WWII) ended in August 1945, the Chinese Communist and Nationalist armed forces began a full-scale war against each other for supremacy of the country in 1946. The focus of their struggle was in the northeast, where lay China's heavy industry, coal, oil, and chemistry sources, established by the Japanese. Japan's surrender, along with the Russian Red Army's withdrawal, created a power vacuum in that strategic region and invited GMD-CCP competition over its cities, industrial and commercial centers, and key points of transportation. Jiang reinforced a large number of his best troops to the northeast in early 1946. The PLA's strategy was to maintain and concentrate a superior force in order to destroy the GMD effective strength. Holding or seizing cities or other places was not its main objective. That same year, it adopted a new strategy: offense in the north; defense in the south. The CCP also strove to form a united front among all the people for opposition to "U.S. imperialism" and Jiang. China's spiraling inflation, government corruption, and factional struggles within the GMD made elimination of the Communist forces impossible. Exploiting widespread complaints and desires for peace after WWII, the CCP organized a second front against Jiang in major cities through student-led, antigovernment, and

antiwar movements to isolate the GMD politically.

Between June and September 1947, the PLA launched some offensive operations and the main battlefields had by this time moved to the GMD-controlled areas. From August 1948 to October 1949, the PLA launched large-scale offensives from the rural areas against GMD defenses in urban areas, including three of the most important PLA campaigns in the war: the Liao-Shen Campaign (northeast China), Beiping-Tianjin Campaign (Ping-Jin Campaign), and Huai-Hai Campaign (east China). The three campaigns lasted altogether 142 days, during which 1.54 million GMD troops were killed, wounded, and captured. In terms of scale, or the number of enemies destroyed, the three campaigns were unprecedented in Chinese military history. As a result, all of northeast, most of north, and central areas north of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River were liberated. Nearly all of Jiang Jieshi's best troops were wiped out. On October 1, 1949, Mao declared the birth of the PRC and the new republic's alliance with the Soviet Union. After 22 years of military struggle on the road to power, the CCP and the PLA had acquired the experience, vision, and self-confidence to create a new Communist state in the world.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; Beiping-Tianjin Campaign; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Eighth Route Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Huai-Hai Campaign; Jiang Jieshi; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Liao-Shen Campaign; Mao Zedong; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; Peng Dehuai; People's War; Soviet Union; Ye Jianying; Ye Ting; Zhu De.

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Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 1937)

Armed clash between Japanese and Chinese troops in north China at Lugouqiao (Lukou-ch'iao) that sparked full-scale warfare between the two countries. From at least 1931, when Japan seized China's north-eastern Manchurian region, establishing the puppet state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) the following year, Japan and China had poor diplomatic relations. Japan sought to increase its influence in north China, holding Hebei (Hopei) Province, administering much of the Shandong (Shantung) Peninsula as a virtual protectorate, and claiming special rights over various strategic railway lines.



Members of the Chinese 29th Army defend the city behind a hastily constructed sandbag barricade on the Marco Polo Bridge against Japanese attacks on July 7, 1937, a clash between the two countries that led to the second Sino-Japanese War. (AP/Wide World Photos)

During the mid-1930s, Chinese resentment of Japanese incursions grew dramatically. In 1935, troops commanded by Marshal Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsüeh-liang) (1901–2001), a leading Manchurian warlord who had sworn allegiance to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), the president of China, defied the latter's orders to launch another campaign against the Chinese Communists. Jiang was head of the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT). They contended that all Chinese political factions should unite against the Japanese invaders, not fight each other.

In December 1936, Zhang kidnapped Jiang at a spa in Xi'an (Sian) in China's far west Shaanxi Province, not releasing him until he agreed to an anti-Japanese rapprochement

with Communist leaders. In all probability, Jiang also agreed to take a harsher line toward future Japanese incursions.

On July 7, 1937, a skirmish took place between Chinese and Japanese troops stationed near the historic Lugouqiao Marco Polo Bridge 10 miles outside Beijing (Peking) in Hebei, a landmark that stood next to a strategically significant railroad bridge. Japanese forces on night maneuvers fired blank cartridges, prompting nearby Chinese soldiers to retaliate with live fire, though without injuring anyone. At the next day's roll call, one Japanese soldier was missing, and his commander assumed he had been taken captive by Chinese units based in nearby Wangping (Wangp'ing). On July 8, the Chinese commander refused entry to Japanese forces seeking the missing soldier,

whereupon the Japanese unsuccessfully attacked the town. The missing soldier, who apparently had never been in Chinese custody, reappeared the following day, and both sides began negotiations intended to resolve the dispute, which involved only 135 Japanese troops at that point.

Although Japanese officials undoubtedly sought to increase their influence in Wangping and the neighboring Lugouqiao area, the initial incident was, in all probability, a spontaneous accident, not a premeditated effort to provoke a broader crisis. Such minor incidents were not uncommon. In this case, however, officials in both governments seized on the event as a pretext to demand a broader, comprehensive settlement of outstanding issues dividing Japan and China. Japanese military commanders in Manzhouguo and north China sought extensive concessions from China, whereas Jiang feared that further acquiescence in Japanese demands would irretrievably damage his political standing.

On July 20, Jiang sent several Chinese divisions to reinforce north China, and Japanese forces quickly seized control of the entire Beijing-Tianjin (Tientsin) area, transferring 15 additional divisions there and killing several thousand Chinese. Japan sought outright control of north China, whereas Jiang insisted on maintaining full Chinese sovereignty there. Both Chinese and Japanese policies hardened until no compromise was possible, although neither side formally declared war. On August 7, however, Jiang and his advisors decided to wage a full-scale war of resistance against Japan, beginning eight years of bitter and brutal warfare between the two countries that ended only when Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies in August 1945.

Dr. Priscilla Mary Roberts

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Guomindang; Japan, Attack on Manchuria; Jiang Jieshi; Manchuria; Zhang Xueliang.

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Marshall Mission to China (1945–1947)

During December 1945–January 1947, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall (1880–1959) traveled to China as a special U.S. emissary on the instructions of President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972). Marshall's mission was to mediate a truce between the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and the insurgent Communist forces of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), thereby establishing peace and forming a workable government comprised of both parties, which had been intermittently engaged in a civil war since 1927. Marshall's efforts were not motivated by humanitarian peacemaking



General Marshall visits U.S. Marines in China. Left to right are Col. Litzenberg (partly shown), Col. Collier, Gen. Marshall, Major Gen. Howard, Brigadier Gen. Noble, and Brigadier Gen. Sanderson on November 23, 1946. (National Archives)

alone. They aimed to avert further civil war that might culminate in a Communist victory and thereby obviate the need for U.S. military intervention by establishing a stable government to prevent Soviet intervention in China. Yet neither the Nationalists nor the Communists turned out to be sufficiently committed to the success of Marshall's efforts.

Their long-term goals simply did not embrace mutual accommodation, and in the short term, they each used the cover of the Marshall mission to their advantage. Marshall arrived in China on December 20, 1945, and initially achieved impressive results, as a cease-fire was established on January 10, 1946. That same month, a Political Consultative Council, with representatives from all of China's warring parties, agreed to the outlines of a new, more democratic political

system that would be discussed further via the National Assembly. Finally, in February, the Communists agreed to merge their military with the Nationalist army on the condition that military and political reorganization proceeded simultaneously.

The fly in the ointment, however, turned out to be north China and Manchuria. U.S. policy was to transport Jiang's troops there to take over from the defeated Japanese and establish order. Understandably, Mao viewed this with considerable suspicion. Moreover, Soviet forces had entered Manchuria to fight the Japanese in August 1945 but had withdrawn in April 1946, leaving behind a vacuum into which the warring factions expanded. When the Communists captured Changchun on April 18, 1946, Jiang expanded the conflict, and despite Marshall's efforts to secure a cease-fire,

China was once again engaged in civil war. Early victories against the Communists emboldened Jiang, and he laid down unacceptable political terms as the price for reestablishing the cease-fire. A brief lull in June offered some hope, but by July, Marshall had concluded that Jiang was not interested in a long-term cease-fire; rather, he was set on wiping out the Communists.

Marshall sought to rescue the mission from complete collapse with the assistance of U.S. ambassador to China John Leighton Stuart, who was trusted by the Communists, and by cutting off U.S. arms shipments to Jiang. Simultaneously, President Truman called for progress, without which U.S. policy toward China might change. On September 30, 1946, however, Jiang announced an attack on Kalgan, a town in Inner Mongolia held by the Communists. Nationalist forces captured it in October, conceding to a cease-fire a month later. On his own terms, Jiang also summoned the National Assembly. The Communists, understandably, stayed away.

By October, Marshall had concluded that a political solution was impossible. He had also concluded that U.S. military intervention was not a viable solution. American diplomacy in China had reached the end of the road. Marshall returned to the United States in January 1947 as the Chinese Civil War continued.

Dr. Paul Wingrove

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Soviet Union.

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Martial Arts

Almost all peoples in the world have developed special methods, techniques, weapons, and strategies for fighting. Compared to Chinese martial arts only a few fighting systems have generated worldwide interest. The fact that Chinese martial arts has evolved into a global brand is due to its special features.

Over several centuries, Chinese martial arts has evolved into a phenomenon of high cultural complexity based on styles, weapons, techniques, religious notions, philosophical views, medical concepts, aesthetic ideas, elements of sport, and ways of self-cultivation.

As a result, martial arts could be used for civil self defense, military combat, competitive sport, mass sport, health care, spirituality, and as an individual way of life.

According to Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties (1644–1912) sources, the increasing complexity of Chinese martial arts began with the quantitative increase of styles, techniques, and information. During the seventeenth century, complex systems

of martial arts, such as Shaolinquan, Taijiquan, Baguaquan, and Xingyiquan, emerged that exceeded the former styles which were often connected with special techniques and individuals.

With the modernization process that had been occurring in China since the nineteenth century came a corollary and at times overpowering process of Westernization. As a result, martial arts were used as a way of asserting China's own unique cultural tradition. Martial arts also served to strengthen China's confidence in itself as a nation, in which the integration of traditional practices such as martial arts played a vital role.

In the past the practice of martial arts was not the privilege of special groups in Chinese society. Tenants, craftsmen, merchants, and monks, as well as soldiers, members of the nobility, and scholars practiced martial arts. Despite the fact that Chinese society was patriarchal, one can also find numerous examples of female fighters skilled in different forms of martial arts.

The military practice of martial arts differed from other forms practiced by monks, artists, and scholars. In his military handbook *Lianbing shiji (Practical Experience in Troop Training)*, the famous Ming general Qi Jiguang (1528–1588) described martial arts as the way for the soldier to defend his life, to kill enemies, and to establish his merit. In order to comply with military needs martial arts were reduced to basic techniques that were efficient and easy to learn. Although Chinese martial arts provided an extensive repertoire of weapons, only a few were used in the military. They had to be powerful in order to be able to penetrate shields and armor.

Despite many differences to other forms of martial arts outside the military realm, there was a continuous exchange between "civil" and "military" forms of martial arts.

For example, the iron flail, a rustic weapon, was also used by the military. In the reverse case, the sword was a military weapon in ancient China but later replaced by the more effective saber. However, scholars and artists favored the sword because it was difficult to wield and had symbolic power.

Martial arts were an important part of the military examination first established in 702. According to various levels, the candidates had to prove their skills in riding, archery, and the mastery of different weapons. Oddly enough, even though modern firearms were introduced to China, the training of the traditional weapon remained part of the military examination until its abolition in 1901.

Dr. Kai Filipiak

See also: Boxer Rebellion; Ming Dynasty; New Army; Qing Dynasty; Song Dynasty; Tang Dynasty.

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McMahon Line

A disputed border line between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India, where many border conflicts occurred and the Sino-Indian Border War broke out in 1962. China and India share a long land border over 1,200 miles. The Indian government had maintained that the eastern section of the boundary was along the McMahon Line until 1950 when the government of the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) questioned the McMahon Line after the founding of the PRC in October 1949.

The McMahon Line, the eastern Sino-Indian border, was based on a 1914 British-Tibetan agreement. During October 13, 1913, through July 3, 1914, British foreign secretary Henry McMahon (1862–1949) attended the Simla (Shimla) International Conference in northern India to support the sovereignty of Tibet. Representatives from British India, the Republic of China (ROC) (newly established after the 1911 Revolution against the Qing dynasty [1644–1912]), and local authorities from Tibet attended the conference. As a result, Secretary McMahon drew a line along the eastern boundary between China/Tibet and India. Then the conference produced a treaty including the McMahon Line, which made Secretary McMahon well known.

When the PRC government refused to accept the McMahon Line in 1950, the Indian government began to deploy troops along the disputed border and establish border outposts. From early 1951 on, Indian troops took advantage of the fact that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had not yet reached and consolidated all parts of its borders, and advanced north, occupying the eastern section of the border area, but not crossing the McMahon Line. In 1953, Indian troops pushed forward from their position, called the "line of actual control," to the McMahon Line. In 1959, the central government of the PRC accused the Buddhist spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama (1935–), of organizing a separatist movement in Tibet. The PLA troops suppressed the rebellion. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama escaped into India.

As a result, Chinese-Indian relations reached the lowest point since the founding

of the PRC. Afterwards, the Indian government granted sanctuary to the Dalai Lama, who denounced China's "aggression" in Tibet and continued to be "active in exile." Armed clashes escalated during the summer of 1959. On August 25, a small group of Indian troops crossed into the Longju area north of the McMahon Line and exchanged fire with a Chinese border patrol. On October 21, there was another small-scale incident along the border of the western sector at Kongka Pass. Both sides claimed that the other fired first. Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), China's premier, suggested a "mutual withdrawal" along the border to 12.4 miles behind the McMahon line. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and the Indian government did not respond and expanded their armed forces and reinforced the border areas to pressure the Chinese through this "forward policy." Nehru also turned to the Soviet Union for more economic aid and military support.

On October 22, 1962, Marshal Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), PRC defense ministry, announced that the PLA operation would not be limited by the "illegal McMahon Line." By the 28th, the PLA's Tibet regiments wiped out 43 strongpoints on the Indian side of the McMahon Line. The Indian troops, ill prepared and poorly supplied, fell back under the PLA assaults. The Nehru administration, however, did not give up. While requesting military aid from the West, including the United States, Nehru reinforced the border areas with an additional 30,000 men in November. His defense effort still focused on the east. In early November, the Indian troops launched their own counteroffensive along the eastern borders.

By mid-November, the PLA had reinforced eight infantry and three artillery regiments along the eastern borders; four regiments at the middle section of the

eastern borders; and one regiment in the west, totaling 56,000 troops. The troops in the east encircled the Indian troops and cut their supply lines by November 17. The next day, the eastern troops launched an all-out attack on the Indian troops. By the 21st, the PLA eliminated the Indian presence along the eastern borders.

The Sino-Indian border war ended on December 1, 1962. From 1972 to 1981, there were negotiations over the disputed borders between China and India, but no agreement on the McMahon Line has been reached. The McMahon Line is still considered by India a legal national border. The Dalai Lama's government-in-exile also accepts it.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Dalai Lama; People's Liberation Army; Qing Dynasty; Sino-Indian Border War; Soviet Union; Tibet; Zhou Enlai.

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Miles, Milton E. (1900–1960)

U.S. naval officer who was a notable supporter of Sino-U.S. intelligence and military collaboration during the Anti-Japanese War (or the Resistant War against Japan) (1937–1945). Born in Jerome, Arizona, Miles (nicknamed “Mary”) was a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and Columbia University, and trained as an electrical officer and engineer before being promoted to the rank of lieutenant commander in 1937. In 1942, following two tours of duty in the U.S. Pacific and Asiatic fleets, and three years as a member of the Navy Department Interior Control Board, he was promoted again to commander and captain, and dispatched to Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, as U.S. naval observer.

The arrival of Miles to China coincided almost exactly with a low point in the career of Jiang Jieshi's military intelligence and counterespionage chief, Dai Li (Tai Li) (1897–1946), whose intelligence apparatus was discovered to have been thoroughly infiltrated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in early 1942. Dai's disputes with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) had also led him to seek support from U.S. governmental agencies in reforming Chinese intelligence and counterespionage operations under his control. While initial attempts to gain cooperation from U.S. Army Signal Corps and G-2 went nowhere, Dai's emissary Xiao Bo was successful in establishing connections with Colonel William Donovan's Coordinator of Information (COI, forerunner to the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS)

and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Miles, as a navy officer with interest in experience in China, was drawn into this larger effort to create a mutually beneficial intelligence partnership between the United States and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975).

From the perspective of the U.S. Navy, Dai's overture provided a crucial opportunity to elevate the quality of intelligence above that provided by the British, U.S. Army, and Donovan's COI. The Dai-Miles relationship thus also stands as an emblem of a "turf war" for information and geopolitical position that arose between Britain and the United States, as well as between competing U.S. military branches, within Pacific War-era East Asia. Originally set up under the chief of naval operations, the relationship's first stage was a "friendship project" intended to provide U.S. assistance to China in the areas of naval mine warfare, radio intelligence, weather reporting, information, and sabotage. In exchange, the U.S. Navy and Washington hoped to capitalize on extensive knowledge concerning the Japanese military and occupied areas of China that Dai supposedly possessed, and that were deemed indispensable for winning the war. As additional agencies, like Donovan's OSS, pressed to take advantage of the Dai-Miles project, Miles became a crucial link to Dai's National Military Council Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, and ultimately to the secret intelligence and special operations activities being conducted by Jiang Jieshi's government of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party). After September 19, 1942, Miles was made Chief of OSS for the Far East, thus establishing a functional partnership between U.S. Navy and OSS intelligence operations in Chongqing.

Despite this auspicious beginning to China-U.S. cooperation in the areas of anti-

Japanese intelligence, espionage, and counterespionage, relations between Miles and Dai were frequently troubled by the changing nature of U.S. activities in China. Under the terms of the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement (SACO), signed by representatives of the Republic of China (ROC) and the United States on April 15, 1943, Dai was to be given full authority over joint operations in the areas of secret intelligence and special operations; Miles was SACO's deputy director and second in command, though both shared veto power. However, Donovan's OSS continued to operate as a de facto independent entity with respect to the agreement, having secured the support of China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater commander General Joseph W. Stilwell and, later, the Fourteenth Air Force under Lieutenant General Claire Lee Chennault. While OSS influence within China grew, relations between OSS and Dai Li worsened, in part because Donovan's ultimate goal was to run secret OSS projects within China unbeknownst to those involved in the SACO enterprise. In January 1945, Miles, who supported a cooperative and equal venture spearheaded by the U.S. Navy, thrust himself into the politics of the growing OSS-Dai dispute. Informing U.S. ambassador Major General Patrick Hurley (1883–1963) of joint OSS, U.S. Army, and State Department plans to circumvent the terms of the SACO agreement by establishing cooperative relations with the Chinese Communist Party in Yan'an (Yenan), Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, Miles thus played a role in making the "Dixie Mission," as the U.S.-CCP arrangement was later known, a contentious issue in American debates over the extent to which China's future should lie with the Nationalist or Communist parties.

Among the lasting legacies of the Dai-Miles partnership, and SACO, was a brief

period during which Chinese and American soldiers, officers, and operatives trained and worked together to create a sprawling intelligence and special operations network whose members would later claim to have played a significant role in turning the tide of the Pacific War against Japan. Miles, commander of Naval Group China (the U.S. Navy's intelligence agency in Chongqing) by war's end, was appointed rear admiral in 1945 and promoted to vice admiral upon his retirement in 1958.

Dr. Matthew David Johnson

See also: American Volunteer Group; Anti-Japanese War; Chennault, Claire Lee; China-Burma-India Theater; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Dixie Mission; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Nationalist Army; Stilwell, Joseph; Yan'an.

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Military Ranks, People's Liberation Army

Since its organization by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in November 1948, one year before the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has experienced major changes in its ranking and promotion systems. Originally the Chinese military did not have ranks in order to maintain its tradition of equality among the soldiers and commanders during and after the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949. China's alliance with the Soviet Union and North Korea pulled the country into a war in Korea that bolstered PLA modernization in accordance with the Russian military model.

In 1955, Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Tehuai) (1898–1974), vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and defense minister, reorganized the PLA into a Soviet structure and system of military ranks. It included six levels with 19 ranks. Despite some political opposition, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP and CMC, approved the reforms and awarded for the first and only time in PLA history the rank of marshal to 10 commanders in September 1955. (In May 1992, the last marshal, Nie Rongzhen, died. Currently, the highest military rank in China is general.) In the same year, the PLA also created 10 grand generals, 57 full generals (currently the highest rank), 175 lieutenant generals, 800 major generals, and 32,000 colonels and majors. The ranking system survived after Mao removed Peng in 1959 for allegedly having pro-Soviet political positions. Before 1965, an additional 5 generals, 2 lieutenant generals, and 560 more major generals were promoted within the services.

At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the new defense minister, Marshal Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), criticized and abolished Peng's system as part of the "Soviet revisionist military structure." Lin blamed the military ranks for having changed the PLA tradition of equality among soldiers and officers. In 1970, the Cultural Revolution took a sudden unexpected turn. A new political struggle between Mao and Lin erupted, a struggle that would rip a great hole in a political arena already gasping for breath from the battering it had endured. Although Lin's military doctrine was abandoned after he and his family were killed in their plane crash in September 1971 and his top commanders were purged in the early 1970s, a ranking and promotion system remained absent until 1988.

In June 1981, Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) replaced Hua Guofeng (1921–2008) as chairman of the CMC and chief of the PLA General Staff and launched large-scale military reforms. As the second generation of the CCP leadership, in 1982, Deng established a "Military System Reform Leading Group" in the CMC. He downsized the PLA forces by 1 million troops in 1985–1987 and focused on technological improvements. By the late 1980s, the PLA reduced its size to about 3 million and reintroduced the ranking system. In July 1988, the Second Plenary of the Seventh National People's Congress passed the new military ranking system, including three levels with 11 ranks. In 1994, the Seventh Plenary of the Eighth National People's Congress modified the system to three levels with 10 ranks.

In the early 1990s, Jiang Zemin (1926–), the new chairman of both the CCP and CMC, launched a new military reform known as the "two transformations." This effort at comprehensive reform and modernization

appears to be cutting across every facet of PLA activity, particularly organizational structures and personnel appointments. As the third generation of the CCP leadership, Jiang paid close attention to personnel policy and promoted more than 50 officers to the rank of full general after personally reviewing files down to the level of division commander. During this decade, Jiang also emphasized regulation and standardization of PLA ranking and promotion. The Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress revised the existing Regulations on Active-Service Officers of the PLA. In December 2000, Jiang issued the Active-Service Officers Law of the PRC. The new law requires training prior to promotion at every level rather than the previous requirement of every three command levels: company, regimental, and army.

The CMC has established a series of more uniform and standardized procedures for officer promotion evaluations. According to the Regulations on Appointments and Removals of Military Officers on Active Service, an officer should be evaluated by superior officers, peer reviews, and unit party committees. Despite efforts to increasingly promote officers based on skills and merit, political reliability—meaning loyalty to the Communist Party and strong revolutionary ideals—remains an important factor in assessing an officer's promotion.

The selection and promotion processes of noncommissioned officers are more regularized and merit-based. According to new regulations formed in 1999 and 2001, noncommissioned officers are selected through an application process, followed by a "grass-roots unit" (battalion and below) recommendation. A military committee evaluates the application and recommendation, and following approval, the candidate receives an examination. Selection is based on training

and skills, with priority given to personnel holding state-issued certifications for professional qualifications. Six grades exist within the non-commissioned officer corps, with increases in pay and benefits accompanying promotions. The PLA General Staff Department (GSD) is responsible for managing noncommissioned officers in all military units. As the PLA transitions from a labor-intensive to an expertise-intensive force, the officer corps, NCO corps, and enlisted troops will be challenged and will have to overcome the intellectual leap involved in transforming the military into one founded on quality, starting with the current officers' ranking and promotion system.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; General Departments of the PLA; Hua Guofeng; Jiang Zemin; Korean War; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; National People's Congress; Nie Rongzhen; People's Liberation Army; Peng Dehuai; Soviet Union.

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Militia

The militia system began to appear in China around the sixth century. To prevent invasion from nomadic tribes of central Asia in the frontier, the Chinese government established the militia (*fubing*). Many peasants were armed, trained, and *organized* into armed companies. The Tang dynasty (618–907) continued this system and made it part of the tax services required of all healthy peasants. The system began to decline after the Song dynasty (960–1279) and finally collapsed during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Communist Party of China) revived the militia in the 1930s during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945 and developed this system after taking over mainland China and founding the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The militia (*minbing*) thus became a nationwide civilian mass organization of politically reliable and physically fit men and women under the dual leadership of the CCP and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

The role of the militia changed under the Chinese Communist Party. Before 1949, the militia served primarily as a support force of the PLA. After 1949, the militia was structured along military lines and was one element of the triad of forces (main forces, local forces, and militia). In general, there were two aspects of the militia's role: civilian and military. In times of peace, the militia's primary responsibility was to work in production. Individual militiamen and

militiawomen took the lead in production by acting as model laborers in their industrial or agricultural work units. Militia units were from time to time mobilized to carry urgent, labor-intensive production tasks, such as planting and harvesting crops during the growing season, and farmland maintenance during winter times, such as construction and repair of dikes and irrigation works, well-digging, stonework for terraced fields, and road repair. Militiamen and militia-women also guarded factories, warehouses, mines, bridges, and railways, in addition to insuring the safety of their own worksites.

In times of war, militia units would conduct conventional and guerrilla operations in coordination with and support of the regular forces. Militia missions would cover a wide spectrum of combat support. Militia units would construct obstacles and fortifications, collect intelligence, direct the PLA units, vacate the wounded to the rear and ship ammunition and supplies forward, transmit messages, safeguard prisoners, provide security for rear areas and lines of communication, and provide anti-aircraft defense for cities. More importantly, militia units would serve as combat substitutes for the PLA.

The Chinese militia was divided into two general categories: ordinary militia and basic militia. Although organized along military lines, the ordinary militia essentially was no more than a massive labor force. The ordinary militia included men and women aged 18 to 35 who met the criteria for military service. They received some basic military training but generally were unarmed. In a strictly military sense, they would be of limited value in a time of war. The basic militia was a carefully selected group. Basic militia units were made up of men and women aged 18 to 28 who had served or were expected to serve in the

PLA. Unlike ordinary militia, basic militia often received military training from several days to about two weeks yearly. Based on the basic militia, the armed basic militia was created as the elite of the militia. These armed militia units were the hard core of militia and normally received several weeks' training each year.

The degree of PLA control over the militia and the militia's role changed during the past 70 years. After 1949, the Communists consolidated control over the country and gradually used the militia to maintain order and to help the PLA with the defense of borders and coast, especially during the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s. The militia's military training was reemphasized in the early 1960s. In the 1970s, the militia was rebuilt and redirected to support the PLA. After Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) death in 1976, the Gang of Four attempted to build up an urban militia as an alternative to the PLA, but their plan failed because the moderate military leaders deposed them. The militia played an important role in its logistical support of the PLA in the Sino-Vietnamese Border War in 1979.

In the 1980s the Chinese leaders improved the militia's military capabilities by reducing its size and its economic tasks. By 1986, militia training bases had been established in over half the counties and cities. In 1987, the militia was controlled by the PLA at the military district level and by people's armed forces departments, which devolved to civilian control at the county and city levels as part of the reduction of forces. The Chinese militia has become a smaller force than it was in the 1960s. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, there are 4 million reserve militia and 6 million regular militia in China in the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Fubing; Gang of Four; Ming Dynasty; People's Liberation Army; Mao Zedong; Sino-Vietnamese Border War; Song Dynasty; Tang Dynasty.

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Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)

The Ming dynasty ruled China from 1368 to 1644 after the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) under the Mongols. For nearly 100 years, China had been ruled by the Mongols, a foreign power that established extensive contacts with the West. When a group called the Red Turbans attacked the Mongols in the mid-1300s, it began a peasant rebellion that ultimately overthrew the Mongols, or Yuan dynasty. The leader of that rebellion and the first emperor of the newly established Ming dynasty was Zhu Yuanzhang, a former Buddhist novice.

Zhu began his ascent to power by establishing himself as a military leader who held his forces together by ties of loyalty extending from him through his individual commanders and so on to each soldier. Throughout the

1350s and 1360s, Zhu battled the other two major regimes in the Yangzi (Yangtze) River area and its tributaries on both land and water, with his final victory realized in October 1367. With this consolidation, Zhu immediately turned his attention to the Yuan in November 1367 with the subsequent shift of warfare from the rivers and valleys of south China to the plains of north China and the steppe and deserts of Mongolia, forcing the Ming dynasty to face the demands of a completely new style of warfare.

Zhu, called the Hongwu (Hung-wu Ti) (1368–1398) emperor, established the capital of the new dynasty at Nanjing (Nanking) in January 1368. Despite his early Buddhist training, he was a ruthless emperor who strove to reestablish Chinese traditions in the wake of Mongol rule. He also set about reestablishing China's sovereignty over its neighbors. Within 10 years, the Chinese court was receiving tribute from Okinawa, Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, Java, and the Indian coast, and it had set up trade contacts with those countries plus Japan and the Near East.

The Ming military was used mainly to protect the borders and enforce the will of the emperor on their subjects. The Hongwu emperor persecuted the remaining Mongols in China and forced them to marry Chinese people rather than their own. He would not allow purely foreign groups to exist and create trouble from within. After total control was established, arts and culture once again began to flourish, financed by the income from the far-flung Chinese traders. The famous Ming porcelains were developed in this era, and the construction of palaces in Nanjing, and later Beijing (Peking), reflected the Ming desire to reassert Chinese culture. Science and technology had few advances, but literature and philosophy experienced a renaissance.

The Ming emperor also eliminated a number of government positions in order to assume a more central position in the decision-making process. This included the dissemination of military control to a multitude of commissions in the hopes that each group of officials would keep the others in check. This splintering of power meant that military initiative had to come directly from the top and reflected the desires of the monarch in control. As a result, the political system became truncated at the top, and the dynasty's monarchs came to rely more on personal advisors than on the civil administrators.

The second Ming emperor after Hongwu was Jianwen (Chien-wen) (1399–1402). The emperor of note was the Yongle (Yung-lo) (1403–1424) emperor, who not only maintained China's military position but also extended the empire's strength to include a powerful navy. Between 1405 and 1433, the admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho) (1371–1435), a eunuch of Muslim descent, led seven expeditions that reached as far as Persia, Arabia, and eastern Africa. The fleet grew to 62 ships and as many as 28,000 men, and it was a feared organization throughout the China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The captains demonstrated organizational and navigational skills not matched until the arrival of the Portuguese in the 1500s. While Yongle's son later ordered such journeys discontinued and eliminated the eunuchs' prestigious positions, his grandson then restored his eunuchs' prominence, arranging for their education and once again appointing them to important military commands.

The later Ming rulers proved less and less capable. The growing power of the Jurchen and Manchu tribes in the northeast threatened those frontiers, while peasant uprisings in the northwest kept the army busy in that sector. A Japanese invasion of Korea in the 1590s brought Chinese armies into

Manchuria, where they were weakened in a victorious war that forced a Japanese withdrawal. The Manchus now had the impetus to conquer Korea, and with their rear protected, make war against the Ming. However, the Ming could no longer afford to pay for the war because the peasant taxpayers were in revolt, so Ming power slipped.

Because the Ming officials were increasingly preoccupied with the military threats of the Manchus in the east, they tended to ignore the conditions of Shaanxi (Shensi) and other western provinces. This neglect bred a lack of faith in the government, and the deepening depression in the region led to increasing numbers of bandit uprisings. Moreover, as the financial situation of the Ming court worsened, the government began to lay off employees to save money. By 1631, in the two provinces of Shaanxi and Shanxi (Shansi), there were more than 36 bands of outlaws that comprised some 200,000 men. Li Zicheng (Li Tzu-ch'eng) (1605–1645) became the leader of the peasant rebellion army.

Throughout the 1630s and early 1640s, the Ming armies remained preoccupied in the northeast and did not deal with the growing bandit problems or popular uprisings in any serious way. By 1643, Li Zicheng had decided to take advantage of the situation and attempt to overthrow the Ming government itself. He assigned himself the new rank of generalissimo and reorganized his followers to prepare to march on Beijing. Promising a new era of peace and prosperity, Li and his hundreds of thousands of followers moved north across China.

The Ming army had not provided for adequate defense of their capital, and as Li approached, courtiers and royal family members fled the city and went to their substantial estates in the countryside. Li and his

forces entered Beijing on April 25, 1644, without a fight. The last Ming emperor, Chongzhen (Ch'ung-cheng) (1628–1644), rang the bell to summon his ministers for their advice on how to deal with the situation, but none of the ministers responded. Chongzhen then walked to the imperial garden and hung himself from a tree. After Li and his army failed, the Manchus entered the Great Wall and established the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Eunuchs; Great Wall; Korea; Li Zicheng; Manchuria; Manchu; Mongols; Mongols, Cavalry of; Qing Dynasty; Yuan Dynasty; Zhu Yuanzhang.

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Mongols

The Mongols were a nomadic people of Altaic stock who first appear in Chinese texts of the eleventh century and who in the thirteenth came to rule an empire embracing most of Asia. For several decades after the 1230s, they were Latin Christendom's most formidable eastern neighbor.

At a tribal assembly around the year 1206, the Mongol leader Temujin, who had reduced the neighboring tribes of the eastern Asian steppe, was proclaimed ruler of all the tent-dwelling peoples under the title of Genghis (Chinggis or Chengiz) (1162–1227) Khan (universal ruler).

Genghis Khan began the conquest of north China (1211), which was then ruled by the Jin dynasty; reduced the seminomadic Qara-Khitai Empire in central Asia (1215–1218); and in the course of a seven-year campaign (1218–1224) to the west accomplished the destruction of the Muslim empire of Khwarazm in what is now Iran and Turkmenistan. Why the Mongols came to be known as Tatars (the name of an enemy tribe crushed by Genghis Khan in 1202) is unclear; in Latin Europe, the term was corrupted to Tartars, reinforcing the West's association of the Mongols with the hell (Latin *Tartarus*) of classical mythology. In any case, by the time they reached Europe, the majority of the Mongols' nomadic troops were of Turkic stock.

At both the administrative and the ideological level, the Mongol Empire represented a significant advance on earlier steppe confederacies. Their early conquests had brought the Mongols into contact with



Illustration from the nineteenth century depicting Mongols crossing the Don River (part of present-day Russia) by night. Mongols under the leadership of Batu, grandson of Genghis Khan, conquered much of Kievan Rus during 1238–1241. (John Clark Ridpath, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

other tribes, such as the Naiman and the Kereyid, which had been in the process of attaining statehood, and with the semisedentary Turkic Uighurs, who had possessed literate traditions of government for some centuries and whose script Genghis Khan adopted for the written Mongolian of his chancery. It was probably also through the Uighurs, and other Turks whom they incorporated into their war machine, that the Mongols had access to long-established notions of imperial rule. At what stage they developed the idea that Heaven (Mong. *Tenggeri*) had conferred on them rulership of the entire world, we cannot be sure. It may postdate the flight of certain of their nomadic enemies into sedentary territories; conceivably, it belongs to the era of Genghis Khan's successor. The notion is articulated

in the ultimatums that the Mongols sent out to rulers who had not yet submitted: formulaic documents that demanded from those rulers acknowledgment of their place in the Mongol world empire and threatened them with attack should they refuse. The earliest of such documents to survive dates from 1237.

Various reasons have been put forward to explain the phenomenal pace of the Mongol conquests. Like those of other steppe nomadic peoples, their forces were highly mobile and maneuverable, which gave them an advantage over the armies of their sedentary opponents: each Mongol warrior, whose main weapon was the composite bow, traveled with several spare horses. However, their decimal chain of command was not an innovation, and their proverbial discipline

is unlikely to have exceeded that of the Chinese troops they encountered. What particularly distinguished them from their enemies was their cohesiveness. Genghis Khan had eliminated the ruling elites of those peoples who resisted him, and divided them up into new military units under trusted officers; even tribes that cooperated, and were therefore permitted to remain intact, were entrusted to new commanders from different tribal backgrounds. The imperial guard, his own creation, numbering 10,000 men and drawn from a wide range of peoples, served as the nursery of an officer class that owed allegiance to Genghis Khan and his dynasty alone. In this fashion the conqueror surmounted the centrifugal effects of the old clan and tribal affiliations, forging a more homogeneous structure than had been available to the Mongols' precursors. This cohesiveness contrasted sharply with the disunity of many of their opponents. During the early stages of the war in northern China, the conquerors benefited from the assistance of several elements that resented Jin rule and saw the Mongols as a means of deliverance. In central Asia, Genghis Khan's generals won the support of the Muslims, who had been persecuted by the last Qara-Khitai sovereign, and thereby incidentally undermined the ability of the shah of Khwarazm to portray his own struggle with them as a holy war.

Territorial expansion continued under Genghis Khan's immediate successors, who, with the title of *qaghan* (great khan), reigned from their principal base at Karakorum in Mongolia. Genghis Khan's son Ogdai (1229–1241) presided over the final destruction of the Jin Empire (1234), inaugurated the long-drawn-out war against the Song in south China (from 1235), and dispatched fresh forces to eliminate the vestiges of Kharazmian resistance in Iran

(1229); these troops reduced Georgia and Greater Armenia to tributary status (1236–1239) and shattered the Seljuk sultanate of Rum at Kosedagh (1243).

From 1236, the great khan's senior nephew Batu commanded a major expedition that completed the subjugation of the steppe and forest peoples of western Asia, notably the Volga Bulgars (1237) and the Cumans or Qipchaq (1237–1239), and overwhelmed the fragmented principalities of Russia (1237–1240).

Batu's campaigns mark the foundation of the Mongol power known as the Golden Horde in the southern Russian steppe. Following the enthronement of another of Genghis Khan's grandsons, Mongke (1251–1259), the conflict with the Song was resumed in earnest, and the new sovereign's brother Hulegu headed a campaign to southwest Asia, overthrowing in turn the Ismailite Assassins of northern Persia (1256) and the Abbasid caliphate at Baghdad (1258).

By 1260, the Mongol Empire extended from the Siberian forests to the western Punjab and from the Yellow Sea to the eastern Mediterranean coast. But Mongke's death was followed by a civil war in Mongolia between his brothers Kublai and Arigh Boke, in which members of the imperial dynasty took opposing sides. In the west, Hulegu favored Kublai, while the ruler of the Golden Horde, Batu's brother Berke, supported Arigh Boke. With the outbreak of conflict among Genghis Khan's descendants, the unitary empire dissolved into a number of independent, and usually hostile, khanates: the Golden Horde, with its center at Sarai on the lower Volga; a polity in central Asia ruled by the descendants of Genghis Khan's second son Chaghadai; the Il-Khanid dynasty in Persia and Iraq, governed by Hulegu and his line; and the great khan's own territory in the Far East.

The Mongol dominions continued to expand only in the Far East, where the conquest of the Song dynasty (960–1279) was completed in 1279, though seaborne invasions of Japan and Java failed. Kublai reigned as a Chinese emperor rather than simply as a Mongol great khan: he abandoned Karakorum for Ta-tu (Mong. *Khanbaligh*, “the khan’s city”) close to modern Beijing, and adopted for his dynasty the Chinese name of Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). The Yuan were expelled from China in 1368, and the Il-Khanid dynasty collapsed after 1335, but the other two Mongol states survived for significantly longer: the Golden Horde until 1502 (and its successor state in the Crimea until 1783) and the Chaghadayid khanate until 1678.

The Mongols menaced Latin Christendom on two fronts: in Eastern Europe and in Outremer. The first reports of the attack on the Khwarazmian Empire, reaching Egypt in 1221, prompted the commanders of the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) to identify the newcomers with the long-awaited forces of the great Eastern king Prester John, though news of the defeat of the Cumans and their Russian allies on the Kalka River (1223) was less encouraging. The Mongols attacked the Latin world only after the sack of Kiev (December 1240). While Batu himself and three separate armies entered Hungary, two divisions protected his flank by ravaging Poland, where they crushed Duke Henry II of Silesia and his allies near Liegnitz (mod. Legnica, Poland) on April 9, 1241; ravaging the borders of Saxony and Bohemia, they then passed through Moravia into Hungary. Here King Bela IV was overwhelmed at Mohi near the Sajo River on April 11 and fled toward the Adriatic coast while the Mongols devastated his kingdom east of the Danube. In January 1242, they crossed the frozen river and harassed the

western provinces before retiring into the steppes north of the Black Sea. In the Near East, the general Baiju sent a division into northern Syria in the summer of 1244: various Ayyubid Muslim rulers promised tribute, but Prince Bohemond V of Antioch defiantly rejected an ultimatum. One important consequence of this advance was that several thousand Khwarazmian horsemen, displaced from northern Iraq, moved south and sacked Jerusalem in August 1244 before joining forces with the Egyptian sultan and crushing the Franks and their Muslim allies at La Forbie in October.

The Mongol attacks of the 1240s threw into relief the disharmony and unpreparedness of the West, where the Mongol menace had perhaps not been taken sufficiently seriously. Pope Gregory IX and the emperor Frederick II were unwilling to sink their differences in order to cooperate against the Mongols, and a crusade mustered in Germany in 1241 dissolved before it could make contact with the invaders. Not until the pontificate of Innocent IV (1243–1254) did the Curia endeavor to negotiate with the enemy. Innocent dispatched three separate embassies—two, comprising Dominican friars, to the Near East and a third, composed of Franciscans, through the Russian steppes—with letters protesting the attacks on Christian nations and urging the Mongols to accept the Christian faith. The reports submitted by these friars in 1247 furnished the papacy with its first full dossier of information on the enemy, and they are among our most important Western sources, particularly that of the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini, who visited the court of the great khan Guyuk. But this aside, they achieved little more than espionage, merely bringing back ultimatums that required the pope’s submission. When in 1248 the general Eljigidei, who had superseded Baiju in

northwestern Persia, sent a cordial message to the French king Louis IX in Cyprus, its moderate tone occasioned great excitement in the West; but most probably its aim was merely to deflect Louis's crusading army from territories on which the Mongols had immediate designs. At this time, the Mongols had no allies, only subjects—or enemies awaiting annihilation.

Following the cataclysm of 1241 to 1242, King Bela IV of Hungary made efforts to prepare for the next assault, instigating the construction of stone castles on his eastern frontiers and entering into marriage alliances with several of his neighbors, including a Cuman chief whose daughter married his son and heir Stephen (later Stephen V); he also recruited Cumans as auxiliaries. In 1259, Berke's forces attacked Poland, sacking Sandomir and Krakow, but the splintering of the empire during 1261–1262 prevented the Mongols from following up this campaign. The Golden Horde remained content with exacting tribute and military assistance from the Russian princes and adjudicating their succession disputes. The khans were in any event probably more interested in operations south of the Caucasus at the expense of the Il-Khans than in either Russia or, by extension, Hungary and Poland.

Nevertheless, the Golden Horde remained a hostile power on the frontiers of Latin Christendom. In the Baltic region, the Mongols tended to act through their Russian satellites and the pagan Lithuanians, who paid them tribute intermittently, against external enemies such as the Teutonic Order. Further south the Golden Horde threatened for a time to draw into its orbit further non-Latin polities that might otherwise have succumbed to Latin pressure, such as Bulgaria and the Byzantine Empire. During the heyday of Noghai, a member of the dynasty

who was virtually coruler in the western regions of the Pontic steppe, Mongol influence extended deep into the Balkans. However, Noghai's amicable relations with Byzantium did not outlast him, and in the early fourteenth century the khans launched a series of invasions of Thrace. As late as 1341, when the emperor Andronicus III Palaeologus bought off a Mongol attack, the Golden Horde may still have constituted a greater menace than did the nascent Ottoman polity.

The Mongols dealt with Hungary and Poland more directly. Although there were no further campaigns on the scale of those from 1241 to 1242 or 1259, there were frequent raids and also substantial attacks on both countries in the 1280s. The extinction of the client Russian princes of Galicia and Volhynia in 1323 provoked fresh tensions, which were resolved when the new ruler, the Polish prince Boleslaw of Mazovia, maintained payment of tribute. But after his death (1340), the Mongols reacted sharply to the occupation of Galicia by Casimir III of Poland with a series of attacks, and during the middle decades of the fourteenth century, the khan appears to have recruited Lithuanian assistance against him. If Polish appeals to successive popes elicited little or no military aid, they did at least secure the crusading grant rather more readily than did the simultaneous pleas of the Hungarian crown. Around 1360, however, the Golden Horde, already badly hit by the Black Death, succumbed to a prolonged phase of internecine conflict, and the attacks of the conqueror Timur (Tamerlane) in the 1390s dealt its commercial centers a severe blow. The khans were powerless to impede the rise of Lithuania and its appropriation of Russian territory, and by the early fifteenth century, they had sunk to being merely auxiliaries in the conflicts of their western neighbors: a

Mongol contingent fought at the Battle of Tannenberg (1410) alongside the Poles and Lithuanians against the Teutonic Order.

When Hulegu entered Syria early in 1260, King Hetum I of Cilicia, who had been subject to the Mongols since 1246, joined forces with him and induced his son-in-law Bohemond VI of Antioch to become tributary to the conquerors and accept a Mongol resident in Antioch, for which the prince was excommunicated by the papal legate at Acre. Hulegu left in March for Azerbaijan with the bulk of his army, leaving his general Kitbuqa, at the head of a rump force, to receive the surrender of Damascus and to confront the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The government at Acre rejected demands for submission, and the Mongols sacked Sidon in August 1260 in reprisal for a Frankish raid on the interior. When the Mamluk sultan Quuz advanced against the Mongols, the Franks gave the Egyptian army safe-conduct and furnished it with provisions. The Egyptian defeat of Kitbuqa at Ayn Jalut on September 3 relieved the kingdom of the Mongol threat, although Quuz was murdered soon after, and the new Mamluk sultan, Baybars I, who was not bound by any agreement with the Franks, embarked on the piecemeal reduction of the Latin states of Outremer.

Like the sudden retreat from Hungary in 1242, which has usually been linked with the death of the Great Khan Ogadai, Hulegu's withdrawal from Syria in 1260 has been ascribed to the fortuitous demise of Mongke in the Far East, since both events would have required the Mongol princes and generals to assemble and elect a successor. It is at least as likely, however, that both the Hungarian and the Syrian campaigns were abandoned on logistical grounds, given the inadequacy of the available pasturage for the Mongols' vast numbers of horses and livestock. The

same circumstance perhaps underlay the Il-Khans' efforts, from 1262 onward, to secure Western military collaboration against the Mamluks. In part this was a response to the internecine conflicts following Mongke's death: Menaced by the Golden Horde and other hostile kinsmen to their rear, and without access to the resources of the unitary Mongol Empire, the Il-Khans were compelled to seek external allies if they were to prosecute the dynasty's traditional mission of expansion. But just as in China, where ecological problems obliged the nomadic Mongols to rely on Chinese infantry in large numbers, so in Palestine they proposed to recruit the assistance of Frankish troops, who were more accustomed to the terrain and the summer heat.

The Il-Khans corresponded with successive popes and the kings of France and England, sometimes also with those of Aragon and Sicily. The Mongol ambassadors, who stressed their masters' favor toward Christians and Christianity, were frequently expatriate Italians who had entered the Il-Khans' service; on occasion, the ambassadors were Nestorian Christians like the monk Rabban Sawma, who during 1287–1288 visited Naples, Rome, and Paris, and met King Edward I of England at Bordeaux. In the event, these exchanges, which persisted until 1307 (or possibly later), bore no fruit, despite the fact that the Mamluks posed a growing threat to the Latin states and eliminated them in 1291.

In his crusading treatise, written in 1307 at the behest of Pope Clement V, the Armenian prince Hetum (a nephew of King Hetum I), strongly advocated Latin-Mongol collaboration, which he saw as offering his native country the best hope of avoiding a Mamluk conquest. Their past record, however, rendered the Mongols an object of

widespread distrust, and the papacy was reluctant to enter into firm commitments until the Il-Khan had accepted baptism. On crusade in 1271, prior to his accession, Edward of England tried unsuccessfully to coordinate his activities with the forces of the Il-Khan Abaqa (Abagha); but otherwise, the few instances of military cooperation involved the Franks of Outremer and Cyprus. Some Hospitalers from Margat may have reinforced Abaqa's army when it invaded northern Syria in 1281; and after Abaqa's grandson, the Il-Khan Mahmud Ghazan (1295–1304), launched his first attack on the Mamluks during 1299–1300, defeating the sultan and overrunning the whole of Syria and Palestine, King Henry II of Cyprus and Jerusalem and the Templars tried to anticipate his return by occupying the island of Ruad (mod. Arwad, Syria), off the coast near Tortosa. Ghazan's later, and less impressive, Syrian campaigns, in 1301 and 1303, did without Frankish assistance altogether.

Ghazan and his brother and successor, Oljeitu (1304–1316), the last Il-Khan to invade Syria, were both Muslim converts. Yet it was seemingly the obstacles to a successful war with Egypt, rather than religious considerations, that led Oljeitu's young son Abu Said (1316–1335) to make peace with the Mamluk regime (1323).

The union of much of Asia under a single government (until 1261) facilitated long-distance commerce; the Mongol sovereigns themselves, moreover, far from passively presiding over the growth of trade, actively fostered it. Western merchants who were already active in the eastern Mediterranean traveled east in quest of high-value, low-bulk commodities such as silk, spices, pepper, and precious stones. There was a Venetian presence in the Persian city of Tabriz by 1263, and within a few years, the

Genoese had bases at Caffa (modern-day Feodosiya, Ukraine) in the Crimea and Tana on the Sea of Azov. The Italians did not always enjoy friendly relations with the Golden Horde khans, who resented Genoese attempts to assert their own sovereignty within Caffa: the Mongols attacked the town in 1298, in 1308, and during 1345–1346, when Pope Clement VI sought to launch a crusade in its defense.

At what point Western traders penetrated as far as China is uncertain. Although Marco Polo and his father and uncle were in China from around 1275, Polo's book suggests that all three were in Kublai's service; we do not know to what extent they engaged in commerce on their own account. The heyday of the Western mercantile presence in the Far East, for which physical evidence has survived in the form of two Latin tombstones in the city of Yang-chou (dated 1342 and 1344), was relatively short-lived, from 1300 to 1350. The Black Death probably dealt a severe blow to Latin residents in China and central Asia, while further west the Mamluks seized Ayas (mod. Yumurtalik, Turkey) in Cilicia (1337), one of the termini of the trans-Asiatic routes, and in Persia the turbulence that followed the collapse of the Il-Khanid dynasty made conditions for trade less propitious.

Latin missionaries frequently accompanied Latin traders. The Mongol Empire and the khanates that superseded it were characterized by religious pluralism; and although certain taboos in Mongol customary law fell particularly heavily on the adherents of one or another faith (e.g., the prohibition of the Islamic method of slaughtering animals for food), generally speaking each of the various confessional groups was permitted to practice its faith in its accustomed fashion. In return for praying for the imperial family, Christian and Buddhist monks and priests

and Muslim scholars enjoyed exemption from certain taxes, military service, and forced labor. For Christians in lands that had formerly been subject to Islamic rule, the new regime represented a marked amelioration in their condition; Western missionaries too were now able to preach uninhibitedly.

The earliest known Latin missionary in Mongol Asia was the Franciscan William of Rubruck (1253–1255), though the lack of an adequate interpreter and the fact that he was mistaken for an envoy of King Louis IX of France caused him considerable difficulty. By the 1280s, however, Franciscans and Dominicans were established in the territories of the Golden Horde and the Il-Khanid dynasty. The Franciscan John of Montecorvino was the first Western missionary to enter China, in about 1294. Pope Clement V subsequently placed him at the head of a new archdiocese of Khanbaligh (1307), with jurisdiction over all the Mongol dominions, and sent out a group of friars to act as his suffragans. In 1318, Pope John XXII withdrew Persia and India from Khanbaligh's authority, creating a second archiepiscopal see at Takht-i Sulayman, one of the Il-Khan's residences.

The Latin missionary effort flourished for a few decades, though in China the friars seem to have made no impact on the indigenous Han population; conversions for the most part involved Nestorians and other eastern Christians, like the Orthodox Alans, transported from their home in the Caucasus to form a corps of the imperial guard. Reports of high-ranking conversions, designed in part to secure reinforcements, were often also grounded in misapprehensions about the Mongol rulers' attitude toward religious matters. With the definitive conversion to Islam of the Il-Khanid dynasty (1295), the khans of the Golden Horde

(1313), and the Chaghadayid khans (c. 1338), Christian proselytism grew increasingly hazardous, and several friars were martyred from the 1320s through the 1340s. The route to China seems to have been abandoned, and when the Jesuits entered China in 1583, the earlier missions had fallen completely into oblivion.

Dr. Peter Jackson

See also: Genghis Khan; Kublai Khan; Ming Dynasty; Mongols, Cavalry of; Song Dynasty; Song, Fortified Cities; Song-Mongol War; Xiongnu; Yuan Dynasty.

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Mongols, Cavalry of (1200–1400)

The Mongol army, the most powerful army in the world in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, occupied nearly all of continental Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe. The cavalry of the Mongols was the major part of their army, made up of soldiers trained to fight on horseback. The

cavalry had tremendous stamina and speed used to overcome their opponents. The Mongol horsemen could travel 70 miles a day, or even 120 miles a day if needed.

Of every 10 Mongol troopers, 6 were light cavalry horse archers, and 4 were more heavily armored and armed lancers. Their light cavalry was able to accomplish tactics and maneuvers that would have been unworkable for heavier units. Heavier cavalry with lances was used for close fighting after the archers had brought the enemy into panic. They did not need a supply line but hunted and plundered as they advanced. If the men failed to find food, they could temporarily open the jugular vein of their horses' necks and drink the blood for survival.

The Mongolian cavalry often astonished their enemies, who had assumed that the Mongolians would come weeks or even months later, instead of days. The Mongolian army was able to travel at a fast pace for days without bringing to a halt or exhausting the horses because each Mongol warrior normally kept three or four horses and shifted horses from time to time. When a horse was exhausted, it would be replaced with a fresh horse. Mongolian horses were comparatively small and would fail in short-distance races with bigger and stronger horses, but the Mongols carried much lighter armors so they could still outrun most enemy cavalry in fighting. Additionally, Mongolian horses were extremely long-lasting and strong. This advantage allowed the Mongols to travel over a long distance rapidly.

The Mongolian horses were well protected and equipped, being coated with lamellar armor. Horse armor was divided into five pieces to safeguard every part of the horse. The piece to protect the forehead had a specially crafted plate that was fixed on each side of the horse's neck. All horses

had stirrups, a flat-bottomed metal ring hanging from a strap on each side of a horse's saddle to provide support for a rider's foot. The stirrups also helped the Mongol archers turn their upper body and shoot in all directions. Mongol soldiers were able to calculate the loosing of an arrow to the moment when a fast-running horse would have all four feet off the ground, a skill that would guarantee a stable, well-aimed shot.

Mongol warriors frequently performed horsemanship, archery, and unit tactics, such as formations and rotations. This training was maintained by a hard discipline. One unique training method that the Mongols used were huge hunting excursions organized annually on the steppe. Mongols would make a great circle and drive all manner of animals to the center. This way of learning dynamic maneuvers was highly useful on a battlefield, contributing to their success.

The Mongolian cavalry archer's bow was the finest in the world for accuracy, force, and reach in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It was made of composite materials—wood, horn, and sinew—and would be fired in any direction from horseback. Quivers that could hold up to 60 arrows were tied to the backs of the cavalrymen. The Mongols were so competent with the bows that they could shoot birds on the wings. Mongol warriors generally carried scimitars (a sword with a curved blade that broadens out as it nears the point) as well. Mongolian swords were easier to use on horseback and more powerful for slashing attacks than for stabbing and thrusting.

Mongolian armies maintained superior mobility. They were able to live off the land and in extreme situations off their animals, which would make them far less dependent on the traditional logistical apparatus of agrarian armies. The Mongol armies traveled lightly. Their equipment, including fish

hooks and other tools, suggested that each warrior was independent of any fixed supply source. Their most common travel food was dried and ground meat, which was so light that it was easily transported and cooked. Since most of the Mongols' mounts were mares, they could live on their horses' milk. Heavier equipment was carried by wagons and carts. The soldiers, together with their families, could survive a whole month by drinking only mare's milk combined with mare's blood. With such mobility, Mongols were able to successfully scout, collect intelligence about routes, and search for terrain good for the favored battle tactics of the Mongols.

Mongols used different tactics when fighting. The Mongols used psychological warfare successfully in many of their battles, especially in terms of spreading terror and fear to towns and cities. The Mongols used deception exceedingly well in their wars. For example, they would let the prisoners and civilians ride their horses before the skirmish because each Mongol soldier had more than one horse. Thus, the numbers of their soldiers were increased, which helped scare their enemies. The Mongols also used "human shields" of a crowd of local residents or soldiers surrendered from previous battles. They drove them forward in battles or used them to breach city walls in sieges, which helped protect the warriors. Mongol rulers also appropriated peasants' horses for military purposes. In 1279, the Mongols destroyed the Chinese army and put an end to the Song dynasty (960–1279). The Mongol leaders then established the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). During the Yuan dynasty, many Chinese peasants in the north, after losing their land, became serfs to the Mongols.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: Genghis Khan; Kublai Khan; Mongols; Song Dynasty; Song, Fortified Cities; Song-Mongol War; Yue Fei; Yuan Dynasty.

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Movement to Resist America and Aid Korea. *See* Chinese Intervention in the Korean War

Movement to Resist America and Aid Vietnam (1964–1973)

China's efforts during the Vietnam War to support North Vietnam, or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), to fight the war against the United States and South Vietnam, or the Republic of Vietnam (ROV). The nationwide movement included military intervention, economic aid, political campaigns, and diplomatic efforts made by the People's Republic of China (PRC) for North Vietnam. As a Communist state bordering

with Vietnam, China actively supported Ho Chi Minh's (1890–1969) war against America in the 1960s. The major concern of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in that region was to secure its southwestern border by preventing Vietnam from being conquered or controlled by a Western power like France. The military assistance of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) to Vietnam had maintained Beijing's (Peking) brooding influence in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

China supported North Vietnam through four major channels in 1964–1973. The first channel was public statements and political propaganda of the Chinese government through mass media. On August 6, 1964, the Chinese government issued a statement on armed U.S. aggression in Vietnam, pointing out that “this was the first step made by the United States in extending the war in Indochina,” a step that had gone over the “brink of war.” On January 13, 1965, the Chinese government issued a statement condemning the U.S. plot to involve South Korean troops in its aggressive war in South Vietnam. The statement pointed out that if the United States continued to prosecute its scheme for expanding its aggressive war in South Vietnam and even internationalize the war, “the Chinese people would have to give further consideration to the duties incumbent upon them for the defense of peace in this area.” On June 18, 1965, the PRC Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning the U.S. government for ordering U.S. troops into direct participation in combat operations in South Vietnam. The statement said that China would unhesitatingly respond to and support the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation's just stand of “calling, when necessary, on the troops of North Vietnam and of friendly countries to volunteer to come to South

Vietnam to fight against U.S. aggression.” It maintained that upon receiving the call of the Vietnamese people, China would promptly send volunteers to Vietnam to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese armed forces and people until the U.S. aggressors were driven out of Vietnam.

The second channel of the movement was an all-out political campaign of “supporting the Vietnamese people and resisting the Americans.” During the second week of August 1964, the government organized 20 million people to have public parades, a mass rally, and public meetings to send the signal. The Third National People's Congress adopted a resolution supporting the appeal of the Vietnamese National Assembly. It declared that China would continue to do everything in its power to give resolute and unreserved support to the Vietnamese people. On July 22, 1966, PRC president Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969) issued a statement expressing China's firm support for Ho's appeal to the people of the whole country. It declared that the Chinese people were prepared to undertake the greatest national sacrifice in supporting the Vietnamese people in their war of resistance against the United States. “The 700 million Chinese people provide a powerful backing for the Vietnamese people and China's vast territory is the reliable rear area of the Vietnam. The friendship and unity between the two countries are the most reliable guarantee of defeating the U.S. aggressors,” the statement concluded.

The third channel consisted of diplomatic efforts including messages through third parties and Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw. On April 2, 1965, when Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), China's premier, visited Pakistan, he asked President Mohammad Ayub Khan to pass the message to the U.S. president Lyndon

B. Johnson (1908–1973) that “China is prepared. If the United States forces a war on China, it doesn’t matter how many American soldiers sent over, what kind of weapons they have, including the nuclear weapons, it is for sure to say that they can come in, but can’t go back.”

The fourth channel, and the most effective one, was the military intervention in the Vietnam War. Coupled with the political campaigns and diplomatic efforts, the military operations in Vietnam were partially initiated to draw attention from Washington. It was the use of armed forces to demonstrate Beijing’s determination and assessment to a restrain on Washington. In June 1965, the Chinese troops began to enter North Vietnam. The Chinese troops included surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery, railroad, engineering, mine-sweeping, and logistic units. The Chinese forces in North Vietnam operated antiaircraft guns; built and repaired roads, bridges, and railroads; and assembled factories. These forces between 1965 and 1968 totaled 23 divisions, including 95 regiments comprised of 320,000 troops. The peak year was 1967 when 170,000 Chinese soldiers were present. In July 1970, the PLA withdrew all of its antiaircraft artillery troops from Vietnam. At that moment, none of them had ever dreamed of coming back eight years later as an invading force in the Sino-Vietnamese Border War (1979). When the last Chinese officer withdrew from Vietnam in August 1973, 1,100 Chinese soldiers had lost their lives and 4,200 had been wounded.

On April 17, 1965, Zhou instructed the Central Military Commission (CMC) to establish the “Chinese Volunteer Forces for Aiding Vietnam and Resisting America.” Following the CMC orders, the PLA General Staff organized three forces of the Chinese Volunteer Forces in late April. Among the others were the “Chinese

People’s Volunteer Engineering Force” (CPVEF), which had six divisions, including the PLA’s railway engineering, combat engineering, and communication divisions. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions of the CPVEF were all comprised of road construction engineering troops, including 16 regiments with 80,000 men. The combat engineering volunteer force had two divisions at that time, the Second and Third Divisions.

At 8:30 P.M. on June 9, 1965, the first wave of the Chinese troops entered Vietnam, the vanguard troops of the Second Division. They were combat engineering regiments, wearing not PLA uniforms but blue worker uniforms, no Chinese badges, no Red Star cap insignia, using no PLA rankings or Chinese names during their mission. Despite its name change, the Chinese People’s Volunteer Engineering Force was simply the same the Chinese regular troops assigned to Vietnam. The CPVEF command was actually the PLA’s front command. By using the term “volunteers” in the army’s name, Beijing hoped to convince the world that the CPVEF was organized by Chinese volunteers, not the Chinese government itself, and thereby avoid open war with the United States and the South Vietnamese government.

By December 23, 1965, the divisions had completed reconstruction of 363 kilometers of two rail lines by spending 757,500 work-days. The reconstruction significantly increased shipping capacity. The Hanoi-Youyiguan Line, for example, almost doubled its annual transport capacity, an increase from 1.4 million tons to 2.8 million tons. From 1965 to 1974, China had transported 630,000 tons of military aid into Vietnam for the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.

On August 1, the PLA Sixty-first Anti-aircraft Artillery Division entered North Vietnam from Yunnan Province to defend

the Hanoi-La Cai railway lines in the northwest. In the meantime, the Sixty-third Division entered Vietnam from Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province to protect the critical Hanoi-Youyiguan railway lines and to provide cover for the Chinese engineering troops. By March 1969, the PLA had sent 16 divisions, including 63 regiments, 150,000 troops, of its antiaircraft artillery force. By 1969, the Chinese air defense troops had had 2,153 engagements in North Vietnam.

The Chinese forces in North Vietnam enabled Ho to send more People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, or NVA) troops to the South to fight American ground forces. And, most important, Beijing's strong commitment and continuous support played a role in deterring further American expansion of the Vietnam War into the North. It is therefore fair to say that, although Beijing's support may have been short of Hanoi's expectations, if it had not been provided, the course, and even the outcome, of the Vietnam War might have been different.

With improved transportation and air defense in North Vietnam, Beijing increased its military aid to Hanoi. From 1964 to 1966, China shipped to Vietnam 270,000 guns, 540 artillery pieces, 900,000 artillery shells, 200 million bullets, 700 tons of dynamites, and other military supplies. From 1966 to 1973, China provided all the military aid, totaling \$1.4 billion, including guns, ammunition, tanks, naval vessels, armored vehicles, trucks, airplanes, medicine, medical instruments, and other war materials. The Chinese doubled or even tripled their annual military aid through the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, China provided 80,500 guns in 1964, 141,531 in 1966, 219,899 in 1968, and 233,600 in 1973, almost three times more than the total of 1964. The heavy artillery guns shipped in totaled 1,205 pieces in 1964, 3,362 in 1966, 7,087 in 1968, and

9,912 in 1973. The artillery pieces had an increase of nine times between 1964 and 1973. The artillery shells were 335,000 shells in 1964, 1.06 million in 1966, 2.08 million in 1968, and 2.2 million in 1973. Tanks and vehicles totaled 41 in 1964, 96 in 1966, 462 in 1968, and 8,978 in 1972. The deliveries of the tanks and vehicles jumped up 200 times from 1964 to 1972.

From 1964 to 1969, China also provided \$180 million financial aid to North Vietnam. However, the perk years of Chinese military and economic aid were from 1971 to 1973, totaling more than \$3 billion. From 1965 to 1976, China provided military aid to North Vietnam with about \$1.5 billion, including arms and ammunition enough to arm 2 million men.

By 1974, China itself had sent to Vietnam by railways 2.14 million rifles and automatic guns, 1.2 billion bullets, 70,000 artillery pieces, 18.1 million artillery shells, 170 airplanes, 176 gunboats, 552 tanks, 320 armored vehicles, 16,000 trucks, 18,240 tons of dynamite, 11.2 million set of uniforms, and fuel, food, medicine, and many other items. Between 1971 and 1972, China also shipped into Vietnam 180 Chinese made Hongqi-02 land-air missiles and all the control equipment, radar, and communication facilities for three missile battalions. Thus, during the Vietnam War, China had provided North Vietnam with a total aid of \$20 billion. Chinese support, particularly Chinese transportation of their war materials, and Soviet military aid to Vietnam largely guaranteed the success of North Vietnam's battle initiatives in South Vietnam.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Liu Shaoqi; National People's Congress; People's Liberation Army; Second Artillery Corps; Sino-Vietnam War; Zhou Enlai.

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Muye, Battle of (1027 BC)

A decisive battle fought between the state of Zhou (Chou) and the Shang dynasty in 1027 BC. The Zhou king defeated the Shang army at Muye and took over the capital. The Battle of Muye led to the end of the Shang and the beginning of the Zhou dynasty (1027–256 BC).

During the late Shang, the dynasty declined because of continuous military expeditions, aristocrat factions and corruption, and hard punishments. Many slaves fought in battles. Many bodies of both aristocrats and humble followers were buried

with the rulers, and there were other forms of human sacrifice, usually in multiples of 10 and sometimes hundreds at a time. More and more areas became ruled by vassal or even rival states, and the effective area under Shang control grew fairly small. The Shang emperor Zhao Wang also gave power to unscrupulous officials, which caused chaos among the kings of Shang's subsidiary states.

As the Shang declined, the state of Zhou, one of the subsidiary states in the west (modern Shaanxi Province), was rising rapidly in terms of economy, military, and population. When the Shang emperor Zhao Wang asked the Zhou to join an eastern campaign, King Wu of the Zhou saw an opportunity to end the Shang dynasty. King Wu united other states such as the Shu, Lu, Qiang, and Yong, after which he called for a rebellion against the Shang.

In early 1027 BC, King Wu, leading 45,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry troops, and 300 wagons, marched east toward Chaoge, Shang's capital. When the Zhou army crossed the Yellow River (Huanghe), many anti-Shang troops joined them along the way. The Zhou army traveled more than 20 miles every day. On February 4 the Zhou's troops arrived at Muye, a small town about 30 miles south of Chaoge.

Since the Zhou army arrived so soon, the main strength of the Shang army was still far away from the capital on their way back from a southeastern expedition. The Shang emperor Zhao Wang hurried to organize a defense force with 170,000 troops, most of them slave soldiers. Although their morale was low, Zhao Wang hoped that a large number of slave troops would slow down, if not stop, the attack, and buy him some time for the reinforcement.

The next morning, Shang emperor deployed his defense force at Muye with the elite troops in the center and slave troops

on both sides. He thought that the Zhou army would attack the slave troops first on either side as the weakest link. King Wu, however, attacked the Shang's center first, the elite aristocratic troops, with the Zhou's main strength. When the Shang elite troops could not hold the line and fell back, most of the slave soldiers dropped their weapons and ran away. Some of them even turned around and joined the Zhou to fight against the Shang army. The Shang emperor fled Muye that evening.

When the Shang emperor realized he could no longer save himself, he committed suicide in his palace. After the Battle of Muye, King Wu ended the Shang dynasty and established a new dynasty of Zhou, which lasted more than 700 years.

Yong Tong

See also: Qin Dynasty; Shang Dynasty; Warring States Period; Zhou Dynasty.

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N

Nanchang Uprising (August 1, 1927)

The armed revolt led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in the Guomindang (GMD, Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army at Nanchang, Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province, on August 1, 1927. It marked the beginning of the armed rebellion of the CCP against the Nationalist government. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) described the importance of an independent armed force in the Chinese Communist revolution on August 7, 1927 as: “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” August 1 is celebrated as the birthday of the Chinese armed forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It is also the beginning of the CCP Agrarian Revolutionary War (or Lang Revolutionary War) in 1927–1937.

The leadership of the CCP learned that the Communist movement in China needed its own armed forces when the first CCP-GMD coalition ended in April 1927. But, after Jiang Jieshi’s (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) Nationalist government had declared the CCP as antigovernment, illegal, and a capital crime to be affiliated with, most of the party members had either been killed or left the CCP. The Central Committee had hope in CCP members in the Nationalist army, who had survived the “white terror.” In mid-July 1927, the Central Committee held an emergency meeting that terminated the leadership of Chen Duxiu (Ch’en Tu-hsiu) (1879–1942) and set up a

five-member temporary standing committee in order to save the party.

To save the CCP-controlled troops in the Nationalist army, the Central Committee planned an uprising within the Second Group Army of the Nationalist army in Nanchang, the capital city of Jiangxi. In late July, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) arrived at Nanchang and established a CCP frontal committee. Zhou, He Long (Ho Lung), Ye Ting (Yeh Ting) (1896–1946), Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch’eng) (1892–1986), and Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch’en) (1899–1992) worked with the commanders and the CCP members in the GMD Second Group Army around the area, including the Twentieth Army; the Tenth and Twenty-fourth Divisions of the Eleventh Army; the Twenty-fifth Division of the Fourth Army; the Officer Corps of the Third Army; and the metro armed police force.

On August 1, 1927, Zhou, He, Ye, Zhu, and Liu launched the Nanchang Uprising (Nanchang qiyi) against the GMD government, with more than 24,000 troops in the Second Army Group joining the CCP-led revolt. After a fierce battle, the insurgents eliminated more than 3,000 GMD garrison troops and managed to take control of the city. The committee decided that all the revolting troops keep their former formation, ranks, and order of battle, even though they were under the CCP command. Several days later, He Long, former commander of the Twentieth Army, resumed his position as commander of the Second Group Army.

Ye became the commander of the Eleventh Army, Second Group Army, with Nie as the party representative. Zhu was deputy commander of the Ninth Army. As the first Chinese Communist army, the Second Group Army totaled 23,000 men. Most of the insurgent GMD officers joined the CCP.

The Nanchang Uprising shocked the GMD government. The GMD high command sent a large force to Nanchang against the Second Group Army. To save the CCP's only army, He and Zhu moved the rebel army southward from Jiangxi in late August and attempted to return to Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, a former revolutionary base. The GMD troops in Guangdong, however, advanced north and stopped the rebels' southern movement with a strong defense. In September, the army engaged in several fierce battles against the GMD garrisons and lost half of their troops by October. The army was not able to launch another southern offensive. Many of the rebels surrendered, deserted, or returned to the GMD forces. Only 2,000 survivors out of 23,000 men and officers at the Nanchang Uprising moved into Hunan under the command of Zhu as the Twenty-Eighth Regiment, and later joined with Mao's forces in April 1928.

Although the Nanchang Uprising failed to defend the city and establish an urban base, it marked the beginning of armed revolution independently led by the CCP. It represented the Communist revolutionary army's first shot against the GMD and Jiang's government. Zhu and Mao established the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army's (CWPR) Fourth Army on May 4, 1928, numbering around 5,000 men organized into six regiments, for which they had but 2,000 rifles. Zhu was the commander, and Mao served as the political commissar. Soon other Communist troops joined them at Jinggangshan (Chingkang Mountains), which became the

"cradle" of the CCP's military revolution. The military became absolutely necessary for the CCP's survival. The Red Army protected the Communist base areas and eventually seized state power for the party by defeating the GMD Army on the mainland.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; China, People's Republic of; Jiang Jieshi; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Guomindang; He Long; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Liu Bocheng; Mao Zedong; Nationalist Army; Nie Rongzhen; Ye Ting; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Nanjing, Rape of (December 13, 1937–January 22, 1938)

Six-week period of atrocities and terrorism after Japanese troops captured the Chinese



Japanese Imperial Army soldiers prepare to behead a Chinese man in Nanjing in 1937 during the Japanese occupation of the city. One of the worst atrocities committed by the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945, the occupation of Nanjing resulted in the rape and murder of thousands of Chinese civilians. (AFP/Getty Images)

capital of Nanjing (Nanking) in Jiangsu Province. In July 1937, outright war began between Japan and China after the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao, or Lukou-ch'iao) Incident. Chinese Nationalist forces under Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) president Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) initially offered strong resistance to the Japanese invasion, holding out at Shanghai—the country's greatest port city and the site of a major international settlement—from August 13 to November 9, 1937.

The Nationalist troops then fell back, moving inland in a near rout on the Nationalist capital of Nanjing, a symbolic location

home to more than 1 million Chinese. Jiang was not prepared to abandon it without a fight, but no defense or evacuation plans had been made. Another of Jiang's objectives in defending both Shanghai and Nanjing, home to numerous foreign embassies, was to attract worldwide attention and win foreign support for China's Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945).

In early December, Japanese troops converged on Nanjing. After Chinese troops rejected Japanese demands to surrender, on December 9, the Japanese opened a massive assault. Three days later, the Chinese defenders fell back across the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, and the following day the Sixth, Ninth, and 116th Divisions of the Japanese army entered the city as two Japanese navy flotillas arrived up the Yangzi River. During the ensuing six weeks, the Japanese occupiers deliberately instituted a reign of terror, apparently designed to cow China's population into submission to Japanese invasion. Frustration over Jiang's refusal to surrender, which Japanese leaders had expected him to do before the end of 1937, might have been another factor contributing to the reign of terror.

Entering the city on December 13, Japanese forces fired on streets crowded with refugees, wounded soldiers, and civilians. They also fired on many thousands of refugees who were attempting to escape by swimming the river. The occupying forces used machine guns, swords, bayonets, fire, live burial, and poison gas to massacre captured Chinese soldiers and any young men suspected of being such. Scattered atrocities and murders, often marked by great brutality, continued throughout the city for six weeks, as did heavy looting. Counts of how many soldiers and civilians died in the Nanjing Massacre vary widely, ranging from 42,000 to 300,000. During this period,

Japanese soldiers raped an estimated 20,000 women, most of whom were then killed.

The Nanjing Massacre shocked the West and generated extensive international sympathy for China, although this did not necessarily translate into tangible support and assistance. It was an early example of the use of organized brutality to cow and terrorize civilian population characteristic of many World War II military occupations. As the twenty-first century began, memories of the Nanjing Massacre remained bitter in China; a major museum commemorating the event exists in Nanjing. In contrast, Japanese officials sought for many decades to deny that the episode ever took place, or at least to minimize its scale, and it was omitted from official Japanese accounts of the war. In the late 1990s, however, several Japanese journalists and academics who investigated the subject mounted dedicated efforts to bring the event to the attention of the Japanese people.

Dr. Priscilla Mary Roberts

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Guomindang; Japan, Attack on Manchuria; Jiang Jieshi; Manchuria; Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

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Nanjing, Treaty of (August 1842)

The Treaty of Nanjing was signed between the Empire of the Great Qing and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at Nanjing on August 29, 1842, marking the end of the First Opium War (1839–1842).

Following China's military defeat in the war, the Qing government was forced to negotiate with the British and finally signed the accord. It was also considered the first of the unequal treaties signed by China with a foreign power. The agreement abolished the exclusive right of Hong merchants on foreign trade, and five treaty ports were opened for trade: Guangzhou (Canton), Xiamen (Amoy), Fuzhou (Foochow), Ningbo (Ningpo), and Shanghai. British merchants, who had previously been allowed to trade exclusively with the Hong merchants, could now trade with whoever they pleased, at all ports where they resided. Under the settlement, the Qing government also paid the British 21 million silver dollars for compensation, ceded Hong Kong Island, and agreed to establish a "fair and regular" tariff. In return, the British agreed to withdraw all their troops from Nanjing and the Grand Canal after the emperor of China gave his approval of the treaty.

The arrangement only contained general and brief articles, so it was then followed by the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue, signed on October 8, 1843, which exempted British citizens from local law in China and further granted that Britain would enjoy any privilege granted to other powers. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Nanjing created a new framework for China's foreign relations and compelled it to be open for foreign trade. China's sovereignty and international status were degraded by being subject to a fixed tariff, extraterritoriality, and most favored nation provisions, which resulted in

similar treaties that China would conclude with other foreign powers.

Tao Wang

See also: Banner System; Grand Canal; Hong Kong; Lin Zexu; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Unequal Treaties.

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Nanniwan Experiment (1942–1945)

Nanniwan is a hilly area of 365 square kilometers about 32 kilometers southeast of Yan'an (Yenan) in northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. Yan'an was the capital of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) from 1937 to 1948. More than 83 percent of the area is covered by grass, bushes, and forests, and the terrain is good for rice and other grain production. The Fen River, one of the major rivers in northwestern China, also crosses through Nanniwan.

In 1937, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP, moved the seat of the Party Center and military high command to Yan'an, setting up a Soviet-

style government and staying there for 12 years. Yan'an became the command center for the Chinese Communist revolution through the Anti-Japanese War in 1937–1945. During the Anti-Japanese War, Chinese Communist forces continued their pattern of securing the loyalty of the peasants in areas they controlled while engaging in small-scale attacks against the Japanese. In 1941–1942, the Japanese command concentrated 64 percent of its troops in China to launch “mopping-up operations” against the CCP bases behind its line. Its policy was known as “Three Alls”: “kill all, burn all, and loot all.” Slowly and gradually, they wanted to stop the guerrillas in their rear area of operations by eliminating their human and economic resources. To overcome the shortage of food and supplies, the Chinese officers and soldiers devoted themselves to increasing production. Many of them participated in the opening up of wilderness for crop cultivation, the raising of hogs, and the making of cloth.

After Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), commander in chief of the Eighth Route Army, returned to Yan'an from the front line, he and his army faced the Japanese strategy to “put the Eighth Route Army to death by stranding and hunger” and by serious economic pressures. At that time, the CCP-occupied areas had small numbers of people living in a vast area with poor land. There were only 1.4 million people in the areas to support the daily necessities of tens of thousands of CCP soldiers, officials, staff, and students. It was difficult, as Mao Zedong expressed, because they had almost no oil to cook, no paper to write on, no vegetables to eat, and no shoes and socks to wear. Zhu De went to search the mountains and hills more than 100 miles around the Yan'an area for farming land. He was happy to find that the grass grew to more than the

height of a person due to its fertile soil in Nanniwan. Zhu De had experts do surveys of the land, water, and forestry resources in the area. Zhu reported to Mao in favor of cultivation of Nanniwan to increase production of grains, and suggested that the 359th Brigade, 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, should lead this movement to open the wasteland for farming. Mao was excited to see the report and added that not only would the 359th Brigade engage in farming there, but the officials and staff members from the Party Center, military high command, governmental offices, mass organizations, local schools, and the reserved troops would rotate themselves to farm at Nanniwan too.

In March 1943, the 359th Brigade, led by the brigade commander Wang Zhen, started the new “Mass Production movement” in Nanniwan, also known as the Nanniwan Experiment. Several thousand soldiers made this place a source of military farming and an example of the self-supporting efforts by CCP forces. By 1942, the self-sufficiency rate reached 61.5 percent in Yan’an, and by 1943, it was up to 100 percent. By 1944, the 359th Brigade had cultivated 26,100 acres of land, produced 3.7 million liters of grain, and raised 56.2 million pigs. In February 1943, Mao named the 359th Brigade the “Pioneers for Economic Development.”

During the Mass Production movement, Mao, Zhu, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), and many other top CCP leaders went to Nanniwan to work on the land, create cloth, raise their own livestock, playing a model role in this movement. Furthermore, the peasants, who became war refugees from other areas in China during the Anti-Japanese War, were encouraged to join the effort and open the wasteland. Many peasants moved into the Nanniwan area, grew agricultural products, and settled down with their families. Thus, Nanniwan became

the birthplace of the CCP-organized agricultural base, and also developed a “Yan’an spirit,” or self-sufficiency.

Today, Nanniwan is a major revolutionary tourist site, showcasing the essence of the “Yan’an spirit,” which exemplifies reliance on one’s own labor and production. In September 1989, Jiang Zemin (1926–), president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the leader of the third generation of the CCP, visited Nanniwan and saw the newly explored oil field. The major tourist sites include Mao’s working room during his trips to Nanniwan, the headquarters of the 359th Brigade, the Nanniwan Cultivation Government office, and a museum of the Nanniwan Mass Production movement.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Jiang Zemin; Long March; Mao Zedong; Yan’an; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Nansha Islands. See Spratly and Paracel Islands

National Defense White Paper (1998)

In 1998, the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) began to publish the biannual *China's National Defense White Paper*. The Information Bureau of the PRC State Council published white papers that explained China's policies, intentions, and guiding principles on national defense strategy and the development of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). As an initial step, the white paper issued in July 1998 for the first time revealed the overall picture of China's national defense, ranging from the security environment and defense policy to defense expenditure and arms control.

The 1998 document states that the guideline for China's military strategy is the active defense that aims at safeguarding the nation's sovereignty and security as well as its territorial unity. In the document, President Jiang Zemin (1926–), the third generation of military leaders, launched another round of military reforms known as the “two transformations.” First, the PLA would be changed from an army prepared for “local wars under ordinary conditions” to an army prepared to fight and win “local wars under modern high-tech conditions.” Second, the PLA would become an army based on quantity rather than on quality. Jiang's doctrine of fighting “local wars under modern high-tech conditions” became the new guideline for the PLA's institutional reform under the third generation high

command. This comprehensive reform and modernization effort cut across every facet of PLA activity.

The paper clearly indicates Beijing's view of the importance assigned to economy compared to military improvement. To support the position, the paper reviews two decades of China's defense costs, concluding that the expenditure and the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) it represents remained much lower than those of other major powers. On issues of regional security, the statement pays attention to China's peripheral environment, revealing Beijing's concern that it needs regional stability to maintain economic growth. It asserts China's role as a permanent power for regional security in the Asia-Pacific area by means of, for example, pledging its long-standing principle of “no first use of nuclear power.” In the end, the document declares Chinese forces would be reduced by a further 500,000 from 1997 to 2000, which would bring the total PLA strength to 2.5 million.

The 1998 white paper, though short on specifics about equipment and technology, was the first and most critical step during the process of transparency on Chinese military affairs, and it projected a new image of China, one that would indicate a responsible and reasonable nation, fully involved in global issues and ready to provide help.

Tao Wang

See also: China, People's Republic of; Four Modernizations; Jiang Zemin; Nuclear Program; People's Liberation Army; People's War under Modern Conditions.

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National Party Congress (CCP)

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, the Communist Party of China) holds its national congress every five years. According to the 1997 CCP Constitution, the functions and powers of National Party Congress are to hear and examine the report of the Central Committee and the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection, discuss and decide on major issues of the party, revise the party constitution, and elect the Central Committee and the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection. A plenary session of the Central Committee is held at least once a year by the Politburo of the Central Committee. When the National Party Congress is not in session, the Central Committee implements the resolutions of the National Congress, leads all the works of the party, and represents the CCP outside the party.

In 1921, the CCP was founded and convened its First National Party Congress in July in Shanghai. Thirteen delegates attended, including Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), representing about

50 Communist Party members across the country. Soviet advisor Hendricus Sneevliet Maring (1883–1942), first official representative from the Executive Committee of the Comintern (Communist International Congress in Moscow), instructed the CCP to focus its effort on labor movement. The congress passed the CCP's first constitution and set up its prime goal to organize the working class. Chen Duxiu (Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (1879–1942) was elected the Secretary-General of the CCP Central Committee.

In July 1922, the CCP convened its Second National Party Congress in Shanghai, with 12 delegates representing only 195 party members. At the meeting, Maring suggested the CCP cooperate with Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and his Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party). In September, the first group of CCP members joined the GMD, including Mao. In June 1923, the CCP held its Third National Party Congress in Guangzhou (Canton). Thirty delegates represented approximately 420 party members. The congress accepted the CCP-GMD coalition against the warlords and encouraged the CCP members to join the GMD as individuals. On January 11–22, 1925, the CCP Fourth Party National Congress convened at Shanghai. Twenty representatives attended the meeting representing 994 party members. The meeting established the Central Bureau of the Central Executive Committee with Chen as elected secretary-general of the Central Bureau. When the CCP held the Fifth National Party Congress in April–May 1927, 80 representatives attended the meeting and represented 57,900 members.

In June–July 1928, with the help of the Soviet Union, the CCP held its Sixth National Congress at Moscow because of the “white terror” against the CCP after Jiang terminated the CCP-GMD coalition

in China. There were 142 representatives attending the meeting, representing 130,000 CCP members in China. Xiang Zhongfa (Hsiang Chung-fa) (1880–1931) was elected the chairman of the Politburo of the Central Committee, and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) was elected as one of its seven members. The CCP convened in Yan'an (Yenan), Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, its Seventh National Congress on April 23–June 11, 1945. Attending the congress were 752 delegates and alternates representing 1.21 million party members across the country. Eventually, the CCP became a mass party in China during the Anti-Japanese War in 1937–1945.

On October 1, 1949, Mao declared the birth of the PRC and the new republic's alliance with the Soviet Union. After 22 years of military struggle on the road to power, the CCP had acquired the experience and self-confidence to create a new communist state in the world. The CCP membership increased from 2.7 million in 1947, to 6.1 million in 1953, and up to 10.7 million in 1956, when the CCP Eighth National Congress was held in Beijing on September 15–27. Mao was again elected chairman of the Central Committee, with Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969), Zhou Enlai, Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), and Chen Yun (1905–1995) as vice chairmen and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) as the secretary-general by the 1,026 delegates.

At the CCP Ninth National Congress on April 1–24, 1969, the Central Committee and the 1,512 delegates recognized Marshal Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), defense minister, as Mao's "close comrade in arms and successor." The entire party with a total of 22 million members engaged in the Cultural Revolution. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved to the central stage of

politics and had a strong influence on the CCP. PRC president Liu Shaoqi was arrested in 1966, and he and Deng Xiaoping were labeled "traitorous scabs and renegades" at the congress. The CCP Tenth National Congress was held on August 24–28, 1973, and again elected Mao as the party chairman. The party, with 28 million members, was under the control of Maoist leaders, including Mao's wife Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914–1991).

After Mao died on September 9, 1976, the Third Plenum of the CCP Tenth Central Committee supported Hua Guofeng's (1921–2008) leadership and purge of the Gang of Four and the Maoists including Jiang Qing. On August 12–18, 1977, the CCP Eleventh National Party Congress was held, and the 1,510 delegates elected Hua as chairman. In 1981, Hu Yaobang (1915–1989) replaced Hua as chairman of the CCP Central Committee. On September 1–11, 1982, the CCP held its Twelfth National Party Congress, which created the CCP Central Advisory Commission and Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and abolished the party chairman position. Hu became the secretary-general of the party, which had almost 40 million members.

On October 25–November 1, 1987, the CCP held its Thirteenth National Congress in Beijing. When the new leaders were elected as the Politburo Standing Committee members, Deng Xiaoping and all other second-generation leaders retired from active positions in the party. The 1,936 delegates represented 46 million party members. The CCP Fourteenth National Congress was held in Beijing on October 12–18, 1992. The 1,989 delegates ratified Jiang Zemin's (1926–) position as the secretary-general and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP. Jiang became the head of the third-generation leadership

of the party, which had 51 million members. On September 12–18, 1997, the CCP held its Fifteenth National Congress in Beijing. This was the National Party Congress after the death of Deng on February 28, 1997 and the return of Hong Kong from Britain to China on July 1, 1997. Jiang forced the old guard to retire from the Politburo by including Deng's reform philosophy in the party constitution. The 2,074 delegates represented nearly 60 million party members.

The CCP Sixteenth National Congress was held in Beijing on October 12–18, 1992. Hu Jintao (1942–) was elected secretary-general of the Central Committee as the head of the fourth-generation leadership of the CCP, which had 66 million members at the time. On October 15–21, 2007, the CCP held its Seventeenth National Congress in Beijing. The 2,217 delegates representing 73.4 million party members supported Hu's "Scientific Development Concept" and entrenched it in the party's constitution as an official guiding ideology. The last supporter of Jiang retired from the Politburo. The PLA supported the Hu leadership by showing its loyalty to the Party Center. Its high command promoted social harmony in various ways, and the rank and file also valued social harmony and shared the new policy.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Gang of Four; Guomindang; Hua Guofeng; Lin Biao; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; Tiananmen Square Events; Zhou Enlai.

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National People's Congress (NPC)

The highest state body and only legislative house in the national government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). According to the Chinese Constitution, the National People's Congress (NPC) is the main national legislative body (a unicameral parliament); it works with the State Council as the executive body and with the Supreme People's Court and procurates as the judicial branch. The Standing Committee of the NPC is its permanent office of the government.

The constitution explains that the NPC and its Standing Committee exercise the legislative power of the State. It is composed of representatives elected from the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government, and special administrative regions, and of deputies elected from the People's Liberation Army (PLA), China's armed forces. Election of representatives and deputies to the

NPC is conducted by the Standing Committee. The number and procedure of their election are prescribed by law. The NPC is elected for a term of five years. At the election of the county's people's congress (about 2,861 counties and county-level administrations in 2004), a maximum of 130 candidates were allowed per 100 seats.

Following the approval of the county's Party Committee, each elected representative could serve a five-year term and enter as a candidate at the district election. After the district level, the next one was the provincial election. At this level, the ratio was 120 candidates per 100 seats. Delegates who were reelected by the provincial people's congresses could then enter the election for the NPC. At this highest level, the ratio decreased again to only 110 candidates per 100 seats. This tiered electoral structure made it impossible for a candidate to become a member of a higher legislative body without party approval. In 2000, 3,000 delegates attended the NPC.

The NPC exercises many functions and powers, including amending the constitution, electing the president and the vice president of China, deciding on the choice of the premier and vice premier of the State, electing the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), electing the president of the Supreme People's Court, and deciding on questions of war and peace. The NPC also has power to remove the president, vice president, premier, and other state leaders from their offices.

The NPC exercised most of its power on a day-to-day basis through the Standing Committee in Beijing. Due to its overwhelming majority in the Congress, the CCP had total control over the composition of this committee. Until the late 1980s, the NPC and its Standing Committee played only a symbolic role as a powerless rubber-stamp legislature.

They followed the Party Center's instructions and made sure to pass all of the party's decisions at the congressional meetings. All the local governments at the provincial, district, county, city, and town level served as the agents of the central government in Beijing. During the 1990s, the NPC and people's congresses at local levels began to play a new role, discussing their issues, making their decisions, and departing from the Party Center's agenda.

On September 20, 1954, the First NPC passed the first formal constitution by secret ballot and promulgated the Chinese Constitution. This document included a preamble and was divided into 106 articles in four chapters, much like the Soviet Union's constitution of 1936. The 1954 constitution authorized the Standing Committee of the NPC to select, appoint, and dismiss judges, procuratorates, and judicial personnel at the national level. On September 27, 1954, the First NPC elected Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) as the PRC's president, Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) vice president, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) premier, and Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969) chairman of the NPC.

In April 1959, the Second NPC elected Liu Shaoqi as the PRC's president. On December 20, 1963–January 4, 1964, the Third NPC holds and reelects Liu as president and Zhou as premier. The Fourth NPC promulgated the second constitution on January 13, 1975. The new constitution minimized or completely eliminated the courts and procurates, and did not retain individual rights such as those of freedom of speech and press. The 1975 constitution was replaced with a new one in 1978 as the next generation of CCP leadership took control. On March 5, 1978, the Fifth NPC promulgated the third constitution. In order to

start his reform movement, Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), as the new leader of the second generation of the CCP leadership, urged the NPC to work on a new constitution. At the Plenary Session of the Fifth NPC on March 5, 1978, the third PRC constitution was promulgated. It doubled the number of articles from 30 to 60, and contained a new preamble.

On December 4, 1982, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth NPC adopted the new document by secret ballot. The 1982 constitution was the longest document in PRC history, including 138 articles. It was a mix of continuity and change over the previous versions. Many sections of the current document were adapted directly from the 1978 constitution while some new concepts and articles were added. It placed economic development and improvement of people's living standard as the top priority.

On June 6–21, 1983, the Sixth NPC held in Beijing, and 2,978 delegates attended the National Congress. They elected Li Xiannian (1909–1992) as the PRC president, Peng Zhen (P'eng Ch'en) (1902–1997) chairman of the NPC, Zhao Ziyang (1919–2005) premier, and Deng Xiaoping chairman of the Central Military Commission. On March 25–April 13, 1988, the Seventh NPC was held in Beijing, and 2,978 delegates attended. They elected Yang Shangkun (Yang Shang-kun) (1907–1998) as the PRC president, Wan Li chairman of the NPC, Li Peng premier, and Deng Xiaoping chairman of the Central Military Commission.

On March 15–31, 1993, the Eighth NPC was held in Beijing, and 2,978 delegates attended the National Congress. They elected Jiang Zemin (1926–) as the PRC president and chairman of the Central Military Commission, Rong Yiren vice president, Qiao Shi chairman of the NPC, and Li Peng premier. On March 5–19, 1998, the Ninth NPC

held in Beijing, and 2,979 delegates attended. They reelected Jiang Zemin (1926–) as the PRC president and chairman of the Central Military Commission, Hu Jintao (1942–) vice president, Li Peng chairman of the NPC, and Zhu Rongji premier.

On March 5, 2003, the Tenth NPC was held in Beijing, and 2,985 delegates attended the National Congress. They elected Hu Jintao (1942–) as the PRC president, Jiang Zemin (1926–) chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zeng Qinghong vice president, Wu Bangguo chairman of the NPC, and Wen Jiabao premier. According to an official report, in 2003, the Central Committee of the CCP proposed amendments to the constitution, including the phrase: "The state respects and guarantees human rights." On March 14, 2004, the Second Session of the Tenth National People's Congress adopted and published 14 important amendments to the constitution. On March 5–15, 2008, the Eleventh NPC was held in Beijing, and 2,987 delegates attended. They reelected Hu Jintao (1942–) as the PRC president and elected him chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping vice president, Jia Qinglin chairman of the NPC, and Wen Jiabao premier.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Gang of Four; Jiang Zemin; Li Xiannian; Lin Biao; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Yang Shangkun; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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National Revolutionary Army (1925–1928)

A regular army established by the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) with Soviet aid and a coalition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) to fight against the Chinese warlords during the Warlord Period (1916–1927). After the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen's (1887–1925) struggles for democracy, or his “second revolution,” against the warlords failed every time. Sun wanted to establish a modern armed force under his and GMD command. While most Western powers rejected or ignored his idea, the Soviet Union was willing to help him to build a revolutionary army. The Soviets, however, requested that the GMD allow the Chinese Communist Party members to join the GMD as individuals. In exchange, the Soviet government would help Sun and the GMD with their military establishment and officer training.

On January 26, 1923, Adolph A. Joffe, a top Soviet diplomat, and Sun issued their “Joint Manifesto” to pledge Soviet support for China. In August, Sun sent his delegation, led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), to Russia to study Soviet military and political institutions. On June 16,

1924, the Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy (the West Point of China) was founded with the assistance of the Soviet Union, with Jiang Jieshi as the commandant. Thereafter, Sun and Jiang began to build a military center in Guangzhou (Canton) with the sources including GMD and CCP members, college students, and warlord officers and soldiers who had revolted. The Soviet Union provided 100,000 rubles for Whampoa. On October 7, 1924, the first Russian ship arrived in Guangzhou with weapons for Whampoa and the GMD.

The Whampoa Military Academy faced three competing systems: German, Japanese, and Soviet models. The Qing dynasty's (1644–1912) New Army had been trained by German officers and adopted the German military system. After the 1911 Revolution, many German instructors stayed in China, training the warlord troops and helping them to get new arms from European countries. The German instructors favored a large infantry army with a well-educated officer corps. The better-trained units could be used as cadres or instructors to train other units in order to prepare a large army for war in a short period of time. They also paid special attention to artillery firepower, telegraphic communication, and railway transportation. After Germany lost World War I (WWI) in 1918, the German military influence declined due to the end of the official exchanges. Nevertheless, Jiang and his office corps still carried on some of the German doctrine through the 1930s. By 1937, the Nationalist army had 10 German-trained infantry divisions.

In the meantime, Japan became the center for the Chinese Nationalist Republican movement before the 1911 Revolution. The modernization of the Japanese military between 1868 and 1912 attracted many Chinese officers like Jiang, who studied in

a military academy in Japan in 1908–1910. After WWI, however, Japan’s attempt to obtain German and Russian colonial and territorial occupations in east and northeast China threatened China’s sovereignty and independence. Nationwide anti-Japanese movements arose in the 1910s and 1920s, making the adoption of the Japanese military system impossible.

The Soviet Union offered not only military training, but also financial aid and political consultation. Therefore, the Soviet system was accepted in 1924 at the Whampoa Military Academy as a model to establish the new national army. The Russian model put political instruction at the center by emphasizing political control. China’s acceptance of Soviet financial aid left the academy no choice but to accept the Soviet Red Army advisors and their military curriculum. Sun sent Jiang and a military delegation to Moscow in 1924 to study the Soviet military system for four months before Jiang became the first superintendent of the Whampoa Military Academy. In 1925, over 1,000 Russian military advisors in China trained GMD-CCP officer corps. The Russian advisors, like Michael Borodin and General V. K. Blykher (or Blucher, later one of the first five Soviet marshals), worked closely with both the GMD and the CCP at Whampoa.

By 1927, a total of 10,000 cadets had graduated in six classes from the academy. Many of them later became the leading commanders of Jiang’s military hierarchy. Among them, about 3,000 officers, one-third of the graduated cadets, were members of the CCP.

On July 1, 1925, three-and-a-half months after Sun died in Beijing, the Nationalist government (Guomin Zhengfu) formally came into existence in Guangzhou under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. In July, Wang

Jingwei (Wang Ch’ing-wei) (1883–1944) was elected as chairman and Borodin as senior advisor in the Nationalist government.

On August 26, 1925, Jiang organized all the military units under the National Government into the National Revolutionary Army (NRA, Guomin Gemingjun) with Jiang as its commander in chief. At that time, the National Revolutionary Army had five armies. The student soldiers of the Whampoa Military Academy became the First Army. A GMD party representative/political commissar and a political department established at army, divisional, and regimental levels following the Soviet model. Some CCP members were appointed as party representatives, responsible for political work in the various units.

In 1926, the National Revolutionary Army formed three more armies, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Armies. It had a “3–3 formation”: each infantry army had three divisions; each division had three regiments (totaling 5,500 men); each regiment had three battalions; and each battalion had three companies. Each company had 99 soldiers and nine officers, totaling 108 men. The CCP controlled the Fourth Army’s Independent Regiment, 2,100 men, under the command of Ye Ting. Ye and many officers in the regiment were CCP members.

On July 1, 1926, Commander General Jiang Jieshi issued a “Declaration on the Northern Expedition” and so launched the punitive expedition against the warlords, including Wu Peifu (Wu P’ei-fu) and Sun Chuanfang (Sun Ch’uan-fang), two of the five major warlords in China. Jiang renamed the NRA the Northern Expeditionary Army (NEA), which had eight infantry armies, approximately 100,000 men. On July 9, the NEA left Guangzhou on three separate routes. The main battlefields of Jiang’s Northern Expedition were Hunan and Hubei

(Hupei) Provinces. The Northern Expeditionary Army quickly took Changsha, the capital city of Hunan, and Yuezhou, and destroyed Wu Peifu's main forces in Hunan.

In September–October, Jiang captured the triple city of Wuhan/Wuchang, the capital city of Hubei, and won decisively the battle of the Northern Expedition (1926–1927). Then the NEA troops moving along the other two routes occupied Nanchang, Anqing, and Nanjing (Nanking). Thus, in less than six months, the NEA overthrew the two most powerful warlords, Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang. The others either surrendered or joined Jiang's forces, which increased from 8 armies, 100,000 men in 1926 to 40 armies, 700,000 men in 1927. The Nationalist territory expanded from the southwestern coast to the Yangzi (Yangtze) valley along the eastern coast, covering half of China. In mid-December, the GMD National government and the Central Executive Committee moved from Guangzhou to Wuhan, central China.

In April 1927, Jiang established his new National Government of the Republic of China (ROC) under GMD control in Nanjing, starting the Republic Period of 1927–1937, or the “Nanjing Decade.” However, the Communist movement's rapid growth across the country and its increasing influence in the GMD worried the right wing and conservatives, who controlled the GMD Executive Central Committee. They wanted to terminate the GMD-CCP coalition and put more pressure on Jiang, who did not intend to challenge the right wing, see a party split, or share the national power with the CCP. To secure his military victory and national leadership, on April 12, Jiang and the right-wing government in Shanghai began to purge CCP members in order to contain the increasing Soviet influence and left-wing activities in the GMD party and

the National Revolutionary Army. In April, the Soviet Embassy compound in Beijing was raided. Many CCP leaders were arrested and executed. In June, Wang Jingwei dismissed Borodin and all 140 Soviet military and political advisors from their posts in the Nationalist government. The CCP membership declined rapidly from 60,000 in April to 10,000 in October 1927.

At the time of the completion of the Northern Expedition, the National Revolutionary Army had 2.2 million men in uniform. On July 5–11, 1928, Jiang began to demobilize and reorganize the National Revolutionary Army into the National Army of the ROC, or the Nationalist army. By January 1929, his implementation of military professionalism was completed with 65 divisions of the Nationalist army.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Nationalist Army; New Army; Northern Expedition; Qing Dynasty; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; Wang Jingwei; Warlord Period; Whampoa Military Academy; White Terrors; Ye Ting.

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Nationalist Army

Armed forces of the Republic of China (ROC) under the leadership of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) since 1928. On August 26, 1925, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), leader of the GMD, organized all the military units under the Nationalist government into the National Revolutionary Army (NRA, Guomin Gemingjun) with Jiang as its commander in chief.

On July 1, 1926, Commander General Jiang launched the Northern Expedition against the warlords in China. He renamed the NRA the Northern Expeditionary Army (NEA), which had eight infantry armies, approximately 100,000 men. On July 9, the NEA left Guangzhou (Canton) on three separate routes. The main battlefields of Jiang's Northern Expedition were Hunan and Hubei (Hupei) Provinces. In January 1927, the NEA overthrew the two most powerful warlords. The others either surrendered or joined Jiang's forces, which increased from 8 armies, 100,000 men in 1926 to 40 armies, 700,000 men in 1927. The Nationalist territory expanded from the southwestern coast to the Yangzi (Yangtze) valley along the eastern coast, covering half of China. In mid-December, the GMD National Government and the Central Executive Committee moved from Guangzhou to Wuhan, central China. In April 1927, Jiang established his new Nationalist Government of the Republic of China under GMD control in Nanjing (Nanking), starting the Republic Period of 1927–1937, or the "Nanjing Decade." When the Northern Expedition was completed, the Northern Expeditionary Army had 2.2 million men in uniform.

On July 5–11, 1928, Jiang began to demobilize the NEA and reorganized it into the Nationalist army, or the National Army of

the Republic of China. Jiang became the generalissimo of the Nationalist army, which was the armed forces of the ROC, including army, navy, and air force. Its army had 65 divisions, totaling 1.4 million troops by 1929. Its air force was established on July 10, 1934, with American aid. And its navy had three fleets, including 53 vessels by 1936.

The first task the Nationalist army faced was the 1930–1935 suppression campaigns against the Red Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). In September 1934, 500,000 GMD troops attacked the CCP Jiangxi Soviet. The Red Army failed, and Jiang's troops marched into the central region through his "blockhouse" strategy. In October, the Red Army gave up their defense and retreated westward. Thereafter, the CCP and the Red Army lost contact with the Soviet Union. The Red Army in other provinces abandoned all of their bases and Soviet areas across the country, except two in northwest China. The survivors of the Red Army began their Long March toward northwest China on October 10, 1934. The Nationalist army won the victory in their fifth encirclement campaign.

In 1937–1945, the Nationalist army was put on the most crucial task ever to defend the country against the Japanese invasion. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army attacked the GMD troops at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao), located southwest of Beijing. This event, known as the "Lugouqiao Incident," marked the beginning of Japan's all-out aggression against China and of China's War of Resistance against Japan. On August 13, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai and threatened Nanjing. The GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP on joint resistance. As part of this agreement, the main force of



Nationalist troops march for the final time in Guangzhou, China, on October 19, 1949. (Bettmann/Corbis)

the Red Army, then located in the northwest and numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army (Balujun) of the Nationalist army in August 1937. In the south, the Red guerrilla troops were reorganized into the New Fourth Army (Xinsijun) of the Nationalist army, totaling 10,300 men, including four field columns (divisions).

In August 1937, the Japanese occupied Beijing and Tianjin. In November, Japan concentrated 220,000 troops and began an offensive campaign against Nanjing and Shanghai. Jiang and the high command of the Nationalist army deployed nearly 700,000 troops to defend the Nanjing-Shanghai region. On November 7, the Japanese Tenth Army successfully landed at the Hangzhou (Hangchow) Bay. In December, they seized Nanjing. After the fall of Nanjing, the Nationalist army defended Xuzhou (Hsu-chow), and the Japanese army suffered heavy casualties at the

Battle of Xuzhou and the Battle of Taierzhuang (Taierhchuang). From July 1937 to November 1938, Jiang lost 1 million troops of the Nationalist army while eliminating 250,730 Japanese soldiers. The Nationalist army withdrew to China's southwest and northwest to conserve some of their troops when Jiang removed the seat of his government from Nanjing to Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, in 1939.

When Jiang lost some of his best troops in the war against the Japanese invasion, successful guerrilla warfare of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, recruited a large number of peasants into his forces. The units of the Eighth Route Army marched to the enemy-occupied territories, where they carried out guerrilla operations and established military and political bases. The Eighth Route Army increased from 46,000 men in

1937, to 220,000 men in 1939, and to 500,000 men in 1940. In 1941–1942, the Japanese command concentrated 64 percent of its troops in China to launch “mopping-up operations” against the CCP bases behind its line. Its policy was known as “Three Alls”: “kill all, burn all, and loot all.” Slowly and gradually, they wanted to stop the guerrillas in their rear area of operations by eliminating their human and economic resources. To overcome the shortage of food and supplies, the CCP officers and soldiers devoted themselves to increase production like that of the Nanniwan Experiment.

In the wake of the Allied forces’ campaign against the fascists and militarism across the globe, Jiang and his GMD army received direct America’s aid and military training. With strong support from the United States, the Nationalist army throughout the war recruited 4.3 million regulars, in 370 standard divisions, 46 new divisions, 12 cavalry divisions, 8 new cavalry divisions, 66 temporary divisions, and 13 reserve divisions, for a grand total of 515 divisions. The new divisions were created to replace standard divisions lost early in the war. The average GMD division had 5,000–6,000 troops; an average army had 10,000–15,000 troops, the equivalent of a Japanese division.

By 1941, the Nationalist army had 246 front-line divisions and 70 divisions assigned to rear areas, totaling 3.8 million troops. At that time, at least 40 Chinese divisions had been equipped with European- or American-made weapons and trained by American or Soviet advisors. In 1944, some of the elite armies had an armored regiment or battalion equipped with Sherman tanks. On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and its Red Army attacked the Japanese in China’s northeastern provinces.

On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally. On September 2, it signed

the instrument of surrender. The Chinese people, after eight years of bitter struggle, finally won victory in the Anti-Japanese War. The price in Chinese lives for resisting Japanese aggression was very high. The total of military deaths of the Nationalist army was 3.23 million men, and the Communist forces were 600,000 men. Civilian deaths were estimated at more than 10 million lives. But China was able to tie down 1.3 million Japanese troops who might have been employed elsewhere in the world.

After Japan’s sudden surrender, Jiang found himself far away from the country’s economic and population centers and facing an unprecedented challenge from Mao. At that time, the GMD had a total of 4.3 million troops and controlled three-quarters of the country with three-quarters of the population, more than 300 million people. They occupied all of the large cities and controlled most of the railroads, highways, sea-ports, and transportation hubs. To save the GMD-CCP coalition, U.S. president Harry Truman (1884–1972) dispatched General George Marshall (1880–1959), secretary of state, as his envoy to China in December for further mediation. Though Jiang and Mao signed the cease-fire agreement in Chongqing, they made no political compromises and refused to cooperate with each other.

In June 1946, full-scale civil war broke out in China between the GMD and CCP. Marshall announced the failure of his mission in January 1947. The first phase of the civil war began on June 26, 1946, when Jiang launched an all-out offensive campaign against Mao’s “liberated regions” (*jiefangqu*) with a major attack in central China and other offensive campaigns from south to north. The CCP’s strategy was to maintain and concentrate a superior force in order to destroy the GMD’s effective

strength. The Central Committee transferred 110,000 troops with 20,000 party cadres to the northeast, Manchuria, for the first time in its history, to transform its military from a regional level to a national level in 1947. The northeast thereafter became its strategic base, which secured communications and transportation between the Soviet Union and the CCP. Soon after, the CCP offensive campaign started in the north and then swept into the south. Through 1946, Mao successfully saved most of his troops and stayed in their “liberated areas” during Jiang’s all-out offensive campaign.

In the second phase from March 1947 to August 1948, Jiang changed from broad assaults to attacking key targets. Jiang concentrated his forces on two points: the CCP-controlled areas in Shandong (Shantung) and Shaanxi (Shensi) Provinces, where the CCP Central Committee and its high command had been since 1935. Jiang failed again. When the GMD offensive slowed down, a CCP strategic offensive began. Between June and September 1947, the CCP armed forces launched some offensive operations, and the main battlefields had by this time moved to the GMD-controlled areas.

The third phase, from August 1948 to October 1949, was a CCP offensive from the rural areas against GMD defenses in urban areas, including three of the most important PLA campaigns in the war: the Liao-Shen Campaign (northeast China), Ping-Jin Campaign (Beijing-Tianjin region), and Huai-Hai Campaign (east China). The three campaigns lasted altogether 142 days, during which 1.54 million GMD troops were killed, wounded, and captured. As a result, all of northeast, most of north, and central areas north of the Yangzi River were liberated. In the spring of 1949, the CCP’s armed forces, or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), had a total of 17 army groups,

including 58 infantry armies, numbering 4 million men. The PLA then ordered 1 million troops to cross the Yangzi River on April 21. Two days later, Nanjing, the capital of the ROC, fell, and Jiang and the Nationalist army retreated to Taiwan with 800,000 troops. The PLA pressed on in its drive into northwest, southwest, and central China. By September, the PLA occupied most of the country except for Tibet, Taiwan, and various offshore islands.

On October 1, 1949, Mao proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the PLA took over the mainland. On December 8, 1949, Jiang Jieshi removed the seat of his government to Taiwan. At Taipei, the new capital city of the ROC, Jiang prepared for the final showdown with Mao in the last battle of the Chinese Civil War. He concentrated his troops on four major islands: 200,000 men on the Taiwan Island, 100,000 on the Hainan Island, 120,000 on the Zhoushan Island Group, and 60,000 on Jinmen. Mao showed extra caution from this point on, and launched no major attack on Taiwan after June 1950 when Truman announced that the U.S. Seventh Fleet would be deployed in the Taiwan Strait to “neutralize” the area. In 1954–1955, the PLA attacked several small offshore islands along the Zhejiang (Chekiang) coast. In 1958, the PLA bombed Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) Islands off the Fujian (Fukien) coast.

Truman’s order of 1950 became the turning point in the U.S. Taiwan policy and had a strong impact on the future of the Chinese Nationalist army. On February 16, 1951, Truman approved the Defense Department’s request for a financial package of \$67.1 million as military aid to Taiwan and Thailand, \$50 million of which was for Taiwan. In May, the Truman administration provided \$21 million in military aid to Taiwan’s naval

and air force improvement. On May 1, the U.S. “Military Advisory Assistant Group” (MAAG) was established in Taiwan. To ensure the island’s safety, the American advisors became actively involved in improving the combat effectiveness of GMD forces, including reorganizing Jiang’s troops into 31 infantry divisions. In August, General William Chase, leading advisor of the American group in Taiwan, reported to Washington that he and his advisory group had planned to aid and train a total of 600,000 Chinese Nationalist troops. In 1952, U.S. aid to Taiwan totaled \$81.5 million. In 1953, the U.S. annual aid increased to \$105 million. Until the 1970s, the mission of the Nationalist army was to retake the mainland from the CCP. Following the lifting of martial law in 1988, the mission of the ROC armed forces has been the defense of Taiwan and other ROC-held islands.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People’s Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Encirclement Campaigns; Guomindang; Huai-Hai Campaign; Japan, Attack on Manchuria; Jiang Jieshi; Jiangxi Soviet; Liao-Shen Campaign; Long March; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge Incident; Nanniwan Experiment; National Revolutionary Army; Northern Expedition; Beiping-Tianjin Campaign; Red Army; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958; Taierzhuang, Battle of; Tibet; Warlord Period; Xuzhou, Battle of.

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Nerchinsk and Kiakhta, Treaties of (1689 and 1727)

China and Russia share a land border over 4,150 miles long. It starts from China’s northeastern Heilongjiang Province to northwestern Xinjiang (Hsin-kiang). The two countries have a long history of border disputes. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Chinese and Russian governments negotiated and signed several treaties

to end their border conflicts. Among these were the Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed between the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and the Russian government on August 27, 1689, was the first treaty between the two disputing nations. The treaty was discussed and completed in only three sessions. Russia had established forts at Albazin and Kamarskai-Arstrog, and in consequence the Chinese, believing this was an invasion of their territory, attacked both the forts, demolishing the one at Albazin. Through the treaty, the Russians released the areas north of the Amur River (Heilongjiang) and the area east of the mouth of the Argun River, but Russia held onto the area between the Argun River and Lake Baikal. The treaty also called for reciprocity and the right to travel between the two nations with passports. The main purpose of the treaty was to restrict Russia from moving into Manchuria.

On October 21, 1727, the Treaty of Kiakhta, or the “Treaty of the Frontier,” was signed by China’s Qing dynasty and Russian government. The treaty defined the boundaries at and near Kiakhta. This opened up frontier trade and also regulated the settlement of jurisdictional disputes in the process. A Russian embassy was established in Beijing, as was a program to send four youths and two adults to study the Chinese language, and four priests to practice to pursue their religious studies at any one time. An amendment to the Treaty of Kiakhta came in 1768, further regulating frontier trading and criminal boundaries. The treaty was again amended in 1792 to regulate commerce on the border. The Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta ultimately did not open up China at all and were merely a step in recognizing the nations as two separate Eastern and Western powers and their common frontiers for purposes of trade.

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See also: Manchus; Qing Dynasty; Russia, Relations with China; Unequal Treaties.

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New Army (1894–1912)

A Western-style army established by the Qing (1644–1912) government in the late nineteenth century. The New Army (Xinjun), different from the traditional Manchu banner military system, was organized in a Western pattern, equipped with European weapons, and trained by German or British instructors. The army, however, failed to defend Beijing (Peking), the capital city of the Qing dynasty, against the Eight Foreign Armies’ invasion of China during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Moreover, many of its officers and soldiers joined the anti-Qing movement, the Chinese Revolution of 1911, which eventually ended the Qing Empire.

In 1894, China lost its war with Japan, and thereby lost its central position in Asia. To survive, the Qing dynasty established a “Self-Strengthening Army” (*zhiqiangjun*), which marked major changes in the Qing Empire’s military organization, institution,

and technology. In April 1894, the dynasty began to organize, equip, and train a new infantry unit at Xiaozhan (Hsiao-ch'an), a small town about 20 miles south of Tianjin (Tientsin), northern Hebei (Hopei) Province. By November, the unit had 3,000 infantrymen, 1,000 artillery men, 250 cavalry, and 500 engineering troops. In November 1895, Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916) took over the training programs. In the meantime, Governor Zhang Zhidong (Chang Chih-tung) (1837–1909) began to train his Self-Strengthening Army in central Hubei (Hupei) Province in early 1895. The Hubei Army had 13 battalions which were organized along European patterns and trained by a team of 35 German officers. Zhang then opened a new military academy in Nanjing in 1896.

In 1897, Yuan Shikai named his Hebei unit as the New Army. He hired German instructors and purchased modern firearms from Germany and other European countries. By 1899, Yuan's New Army totaled 14,000 men, including 16 infantry battalions, 2 artillery battalions, and 2 cavalry battalions. During the Boxer Rebellion, eight foreign powers landed 2,000 allied forces at Dagu (Tagu) on June 10, 1900, to fight against the Chinese Boxers and protect Western missionaries. On July 14, the allied forces captured Tianjin. Then Yuan sent 3,000 troops of his New Army to defend Beijing. In early August, most of his troops were eliminated by the allied forces, which occupied Beijing on August 14.

The foreign invasion of 1900 and continued Chinese military failure shocked the Qing government. In 1902, the Qing centralized the New Army as a national force. Yuan's army became the "Beiyang" (Northern) Army. In 1903, the Qing government established the "Central Training Headquarters" in Beijing. In November 1906, the Department

of Army was established to command all the units of the New Army, totaling 200,000 men. Yuan had the best army of all, consisting of six infantry divisions, totaling 80,000 troops. Yuan also created five officer training schools and military academies in Baoding and Tianjin. Military education and formal training were promoted by both European instructors and new technology in the New Army. In 1908, the Qing Empire sent more than 1,000 officers to study military practices overseas.

Nevertheless, the New Army did not save the empire because the Manchu rulers refused to carry on the reform into military institutions and organization besides buying Western weapons and hiring European instructors. Manchu grandees' refusal of further reform and brutal suppression of the reformers also alienated the rank and file of the New Army and undermined their loyalty to the emperor himself. When Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of Republican China, organized the anti-Qing Tongmenghui (or *T'ung-meng Hui*, the United League) in Japan in 1905, many patriotic young Chinese officers joined Sun's secret society. They spread their revolutionary ideas and organization from Japan to China by establishing many branches in 17 of the 24 provinces. Thousands and thousands of Chinese, including many New Army officers and soldiers, joined the Tongmenghui by participating in multiple anti-Manchu activities and accepting Sun's "Three Principles of the People" (*Sanmin zhuyi*).

On October 10, 1911, amidst an anti-Qing plot in Wuchang, some New Army officers revolted. The success of the Wuchang uprising led many officers of the New Army to join the Revolution of 1911. In the next two months, 15 provinces proclaimed their independence from the Qing Empire. The rebellious provinces and Tongmenghui

joined forces, setting up a provisional government at Nanjing (Nanking). The provisional government elected Sun president of the government, and he was inaugurated on January 1, 1912, at Nanjing. As a great breakthrough in the Chinese history, it ended 2,000 years of monarchy and built the first republic in Asian history.

The Qing court's hopes rested with Marshal Yuan Shikai, commander of the New Army. In an attempt to avoid civil war, Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries negotiated with Yuan and offered him the presidency of the new republic. On February 12, 1912, Yuan forced the last emperor, only six at the time, to step down, thus ending the Qing dynasty. Then Sun resigned as president. On February 14, Marshal Yuan was elected by the provisional government the president of the Republic of China. Yuan reorganized the New Army into the Chinese Revolutionary Army in 1913.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Beiyang Army; Boxer Rebellion; China, Republic of; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Eight Foreign Armies' Invasion of China; Manchus; Qing Dynasty; Self-Strengthening Movement; Sino-Japanese War; Sun Yat-sen; Yuan Shikai.

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New Fourth Army (1937–1945)

A Chinese Communist army fought against the Japanese forces during the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). Although the New Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army were two units of the Chinese Nationalist army of the Republic of China (ROC), they were always under the command of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). On July 7, 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army attacked the Chinese Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) Army at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao), located southwest of Beijing (Peking). This event, known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, marked the beginning of Japan's all-out aggression against China and the Second Sino-Japanese War. On August 13, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai and threatened Nanjing (Nanking), capital city of the ROC. The GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP on joint resistance through a political and military coalition.

In 1937, as part of this alliance agreement, the main force of the CCP's Red Army troops in the south were reorganized into the New Fourth Army (Xinsijun) of the Nationalist army, totaling 10,300 men, including four field columns (divisions). Each field column had two to four regiments. Ye Ting (Yeh Ting) (1896–1946) commanded the New Fourth Army, and Chen Yi (Ch'en Yi) (1901–1972) was vice political commissar. As Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) did in Jinggangshan (Chingkang Mountains), they conducted a guerrilla campaign in the mountains behind the Japanese lines.

When Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the ROC, lost some of his best troops in the war against

the Japanese invasion, Mao's successful guerrillas recruited a large number of peasants into his forces. The units of the New Fourth Army marched to the enemy-occupied territories, where they carried out guerrilla operations and established military and political bases. The New Fourth Army moved north and south of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River and established bases in southern Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province and also north of the river. Further to the south, the Dongjiang and Qiongya bases were established in Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province. In each of the bases, the CCP established a government, reduced the peasants' rents and interest, returned land to poor peasants, and armed the masses. During these years, many peasants as well as urban residents joined the CCP troops. In Jiangsu, the CCP troops numbered 90,000 men in 1940, and increased to 270,000 men in 1945.

In 1939, the New Fourth Army followed the CCP's strategy and expanded into the areas between Nanjing (Nanking) and Shanghai. In October 1940, Chen Yi and Su Yu (1907–1984) commanded the Battle of Huangqiao, a major southern campaign coordinated with the Eighth Route Army in the north. In November, a joint headquarters for the New Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army was established with Chen as its deputy commander in chief. In order to establish a grassroots united front behind the Japanese lines, the CCP modified their land reform policy, supporting small landlords and wealthy peasants, and cooperating with Jiang's troops in guerrilla warfare, in a more nationalistic rather than Communist policy.

Many college students joined the CCP rather than GMD because the CCP developed its underground network in schools in the Japanese-occupied cities. The CCP underground mobilization and recruitment

became accessible for many students who wanted to take part in the ongoing war against Japan. Some of the artists, writers, and actors also joined the CCP movements through their underground network. Mao's wife, Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914–1991), was one of the actors who traveled all the way from Shanghai to Yan'an (Yenan) during the war.

On January 6–13, 1940, the New Fourth Army was reportedly attacked by the Nationalist army in Jiangsu. The New Fourth Army suffered 7,000 casualties. It was known as the Wanan Incident, or the New Fourth Army Incident. After the incident, Chen Yi was ordered by the CCP Central Committee to reestablish the New Fourth Army Command and served as its acting commander. Under his command, the New Fourth Army increased from four divisions to seven in 1945. In 1944–1945, the southern "liberated areas" under CCP control launched partial counteroffensives and won important victories against Japan.

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and its Red Army attacked the Japanese in China's north-eastern provinces. On August 14, Japan surrendered unconditionally. On September 2, it signed the instrument of surrender. The Chinese people, after eight years of bitter struggle, finally won victory in the Anti-Japanese War. Following the end of the Anti-Japanese War, the New Fourth Army was incorporated into the new People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949).

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chen Yi; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Guomindang; Guerrilla Warfare; Jiang Jieshi; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Areas; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge Incident;

Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army Incident; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Soviet Union; Su Yu; United Front; Ye Ting; United Front; Yan'an.

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New Fourth Army Incident (January 1941)

Also known as the “Wannan Incident,” or the Southern Anhui (Anhui) Incident, a military clash between Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) forces during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945. The Anti-Japanese United Front was established between the two parties in 1937. As part of this alliance agreement, the main force of the CCP's Red Army troops in the south were reorganized into the New Fourth Army (Xinsijun) of the Nationalist army,

totaling 10,300 men, including four field columns (divisions). Each field column had two to four regiments.

The CCP New Fourth Army had enlarged its area of operations in the Yangzi (Yangtze) River delta, including the areas south of the river. GMD generals feared that the Communists would try to politicize the peasants as the Eighth Route Army had done in north China. The GMD commands sought to force the New Fourth Army and also part of the CCP Eighth Route Army, driven by the Japanese south of the Yangzi River, back north of the river.

In response to pressure from the Nationalist generals, GMD officials issued a directive on December 9, 1940, demanding that the Communists withdraw their forces north of the Yangzi River by December 31, 1940. The Communists delayed executing this movement. Indeed, they attempted to win mass support to remain south of the river. On January 4, 1941, seven Nationalist divisions surrounded and attacked the headquarters force of some 9,000 New Fourth Army troops near Maolin in Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province. During heavy fighting from January 7–13, 1941, Nationalist forces killed about 3,000 New Fourth Army troops and captured the remainder. Among the dead was New Fourth Army General Xiang Ying (Hsiang Ying). General Ye Ting (Yeh T'ing) (1896–1946) was captured and imprisoned. On January 17, 1941, the government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) dissolved the New Fourth Army and closed CCP military liaison offices in many GMD-held cities.

Although this incident dealt a serious blow to the Communist effort in central China, it was also an advantage to the revolutionary cause. First, Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969), a member of the CCP Central Committee, was appointed

political commissar of a revitalized New Fourth Army, and he promptly created a “post-Incident” line that urged mobilization of the masses. Then Chen Yi (Ch’ en Yi) (1901–1972) became the acting commander of the New Fourth Army. Despite brutal Japanese pacification campaigns in the region between 1941 and 1945, the New Fourth Army survived into the postwar period when it profited from its long familiarity with the region. Under the new command, the New Fourth Army increased from four divisions to seven divisions in 1945.

Also, the New Fourth Army Incident provided the Communists with a powerful propaganda tool by which they could present themselves as martyred patriots. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) proclaimed that key elements in Chongqing (Chungking) wanted to substitute civil war for the War of Resistance against Japan. No single event during the entire Anti-Japanese War did more to elicit sympathy for the CCP and establish its patriotic credentials both at home and abroad than the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941.

Dr. Errol MacGregor Clauss

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chen Yi; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; Red Army; United Front; Ye Ting.

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Nian Rebellion (1851–1868)

The Nian Rebellion, which began in 1851 and lasted until 1868, was one in a series of uprisings that rocked the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to its foundations. Although ultimately suppressed, the rebellion contributed to the ongoing process of an increased militarization of Chinese society and the burgeoning power of the provinces.

Groups known by the name “Nian,” a term that possibly refers to a small group of peasant outlaws, were active in the border areas of Shandong (Shantung), Henan (Honan), Anhui (Anhwei), and Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Provinces as early as the 1790s. Those groups had little in the way of unifying ideology, goals, or organization; some were salt smugglers, while others were associated with the White Lotus or Triad secret societies. Most were merely rootless men, some of whom were unable to marry and settle down due to the gender imbalance that resulted from the widespread practice of female infanticide.

The ranks of the Nian swelled in the early 1850s when a series of floods, culminating in the devastating 1855 flood of the Yellow River (Huanghe), increased poverty in the region. During that period, some coordination

between Nian groups appeared as many accepted the leadership of a local landlord, Zhang Luoxing. Proclaiming Zhang to be Lord of the Alliance and, more ominously for the Qing government, Great Han Prince with the Heavenly Mandate, tens of thousands of Nian created secure bases and rode their horses across the region to plunder, pillage, and extort protection money from the local populace.

The military implications of the Nian Rebellion were severe for the Qing government. Unlike past uprisings by the Nian and other bands, Zhang had imposed on them a “banner system” of organization, wherein various Nian families and factions would be grouped under a colored flag representing their clan. Each banner—yellow, blue, white, red, and black—was a loose, rudimentary formation that suited the nomadic raiders perfectly and enabled them to conduct raids against the enemy across the length and breadth of northwestern China. The 50,000 Nian were splendid horsemen and ferocious fighters, and Zhang personally defeated several large imperial forces sent to oppose him. The mobile, guerrilla techniques of the Nian were a tremendous challenge to the traditional armies of the Qing dynasty.

Troubled by the Nian activities, which obstructed efforts to suppress the larger Taiping Rebellion to the south, the Qing government appointed Mongol general Senggelinqin to destroy the Nian in 1860. Leading a joint Mongol-Manchu cavalry force, he was successful in trapping and killing Zhang in 1863. However, appointing new leaders, the Nian continued their resistance and refined their tactics. They were able to surround and kill Senggelinqin in 1865.

The Qing then appointed the hero of the Taiping campaign, Zeng Guofan, to put down the Nian. Zeng’s strategy of

surrounding the Nian with a series of bases was moderately successful but suffered from local opposition and a lack of troops. Zeng eventually acceded to his protégé, Li Hongzhang, whose larger Huai Army was better suited to suppress the Nian.

Li and his forces chased the rebels across northern China and eventually triumphed in a war of attrition. Using modern rifles and gunboats, Li’s well-paid, well-trained troops destroyed the main Nian forces by 1868. Over the next three decades, Li would subsequently rise to become one of the most prominent and powerful officials of the Qing dynasty.

Although suppressed, the Nian Rebellion effected significant change in late Qing China. The activities of the Nian rebels and the attempts of local towns and villages to increase their security increased the general level of militarization of China. Moreover, the Qing’s reliance on Zeng and Li to suppress the rebels was an indication of how power was shifting away from the center to the provinces.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Banner System; Guerrilla Warfare; Han Dynasty; Li Hongzhang; Manchu; Mongols; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Small Sword Society; Taiping Rebellion; White Lotus Rebellion; Zeng Guofan.

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Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch'en) (1899–1992)

As one of the top Chinese Communist leaders and military commanders, Marshal Nie Rongzhen served as vice premier, acting chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). Born in Jiangjin County, Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, in 1899, Nie joined the CCP in 1922 and was sent to the Soviet Union to study the military and defense industry in 1924–1925. He became a deputy director of the Red Army's Political Department in the late 1920s and political commissar of its First Army Group in the Long March of 1934–1935.

During the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945), Nie served as commander and political commissar of the North China Military Region. He worked with Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) closely on a daily basis after the CCP leadership moved from Yan'an (Yenan) to north China during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). Nie protected CCP headquarters by defeating the Nationalist attacks and personally saved Mao's life once in an air raid, and he became one of Mao's closest working colleagues and trusted generals. When Mao founded the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Nie was appointed mayor of Beijing (Peking) and deputy chief of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD). He ran the General Staff because Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), as its chief, was preoccupied as the PRC's premier and foreign

minister. In 1950, Nie became acting chief of the General Staff and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

In January 1950, Nie met the North Korean military delegation and agreed that all the Korean national soldiers in the Chinese army would be transferred to the Korean People's Army (KPA, North Korea). After the Korean War broke out in June, Nie paid special attention to the intelligence work. In July, the General Staff Department sent more than 100 Chinese intelligence officers to North Korea with Col. Chai Chengwei. Nie utilized every possible means to obtain timely information on all aspects of the front. During the Korean War, as Mao's senior aide in Beijing, Nie shared the responsibility of war preparation, training, and mobilization. After the CCP leadership made the decision to send the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF, Chinese Army) to the Korean War in early October, Mao asked Nie and the General Staff to focus on the CPVF operations. Meeting Mao on a daily basis, Nie took part in high command decision making, planned major operations, and shared the responsibility of mobilization, transportation, rotation, and logistics. In 1951, the General Staff began to rotate the PLA units. By the end of the war, about 73 percent of the Chinese infantry troops were rotated into Korea (25 of 34 armies, or 79 of 109 infantry divisions). More than 55 percent of the tank units, 67 percent of the artillery divisions, and 100 percent of the combat engineering divisions had also been sent to Korea.

From 1951 to 1953, Nie faced big problems in the logistics of the CPVF which consumed an unprecedented amount of war materiel. During the first two offensives, the CPVF only met 25 percent of the food needs of its front-line troops. Nearly half of the CPVF troops did not have weapons and

ammunition. In January 1951, Nie went to Manchuria, chaired the meetings, visited the logistics depots, and solved some of the problems. In May, the CPVF established its Logistics Department in Korea. That month, Nie and the General Staff made a purchase plan to buy weapons and equipment from the Soviet Union to arm 60 Chinese infantry divisions to meet wartime demand. After the negotiations, the Soviet Union delivered the arms and equipment for 10 divisions in 1951, 16 divisions in 1952, and 40 divisions in 1953. The Soviets also shared technology for the production of rifles, machine guns, and artillery pieces, improving the CPVF supplies in the war. More than 6 million tons of supplies were shipped into Korea during the war. Between 1950 and 1953, China's military spending represented 41 percent, 43 percent, 33 percent, and 34 percent of its total government annual budget.

After 1954, Nie was one of the party's top 11 leaders as a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo. In 1955, he became one of the 10 marshals in China. In 1958, when the Chinese leadership decided to build their own atomic bombs, Nie then headed China's nuclear and missile programs as director of the National Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense from 1958 to 1967. Then he served as chairman of the National Defense Science and Technology Committee and director of the CCP Central Committee's Science Commission. He also served as vice premier from 1959 to 1966. Nie died in Beijing in 1992.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Offensive Campaigns in Korea; Chinese People's Volunteer Army; Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense; General

Departments of the People's Liberation Army; Korean War; Long March; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Nuclear Program; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Soviet Union; Yan'an; Zhou Enlai.

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North China Field Army (1947–1948)

One of the main forces of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) reorganized its military forces after the collapse of the

CCP-Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) military coalition during the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). Abandoning the designations that the CCP adopted after joining the GMD forces during the United Front, the CCP high command combined the Eighth Route Army with provincial military forces to assemble conventional forces into the standing field armies that were supported by militia and guerrilla elements.

In May 1948, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei and Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Districts merged to become the North China Military District. Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch'ên) (1899–1992) served as commander and Bo Yibo was the political commissar. Unlike other military districts, the North China Military District never officially organized a standing field army, but its forces were unofficially known as the North China Field Army. In the fall of 1948, the Military District consisted of three armies, two independent columns, and seven subdistricts composed mainly of militia, irregulars, and other support personnel. The First Army was commanded by Xu Xiangqian, the Second Army by Yang Dezhi, and the Third Army by Yang Chengwu.

The North China Field Army's main action of note was during the Beiping-Tianjin (Ping-Jin) Campaign. The Second and Third Army sealed off the west escape route of Fu Zuoyi (Fu Tso-yi) (1895–1974), commander of the GMD forces in north China, and destroyed some of his best formations, while Lin Biao's (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) Northeast Field Army infiltrated south to isolate Beiping (now Beijing) and Tianjin (Tientsin). During this time, the First Army, which was besieging Yan Xishan's (Yen Hsi-shan) (1883–1960) army in Taiyuan, the capital city of Shanxi (Shansi)

Province, scaled back its operations to confuse Fu Zuoyi and convince him to stay in place. After the Communist victory in Pingjin, Xu Xiangqian captured Taiyuan in the spring of 1949, thus clearing the final GMD army from the north China plain.

After these victories, the three armies were redesignated the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Armies respectively, and their formal association with north China was eliminated. The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Army Groups moved to northwest China, while the Twentieth Army Group remained in the capital region to guard Beijing.

In November 1948, the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP decided to reorganize its troops and called all the CCP forces the “Chinese People's Liberation Army” (PLA). In January 1949, the CMC established four field armies, including the First Field Army (*diyì yezhanjun*) in the northwest, the Second (*dier yezhanjun*) in central China, the Third (*disan yezhanjun*) in eastern China, and the Fourth (*disi yezhanjun*) in the northeast. Each field army had two to four army groups, and each army group had two to four armies.

To continue the CCP victory of the Chinese Civil War in northwest China, the CMC reinforced more armies into the First Field Army. The Eighteenth Army Group under the command of Zhou Shidi, including the Sixtieth, Sixty-First, and Sixty-Second Armies, joined the First Field Army in the spring of 1949. Then the Nineteenth Army Group under the command of Yang Dezhi, including the Sixty-Third, Sixty-Fourth, and Sixty-Fifth Armies, joined the First Field Army during that summer. By this time, the total number of the First Field Army had reached 344,000 troops.

Dr. Christopher Lew

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Beiping-Tianjin Campaign; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; First Field Army; Fu Zuoyi; Guomindang; Lin Biao; Nie Rongzhen; People's Liberation Army; United Front; Xu Xiangqian.

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Northeast Democratic United Army (1945–1948). See Fourth Field Army

Northern and Southern Dynasties (420–581)

The period of more than 160 years of the Northern and Southern dynasties was a time of division in Chinese history. During that time, China was separated into two parts: northern and southern. It began with Liu Yu's usurping of the Eastern Jin dynasty (317–420) and the establishment of the Southern Song in 420, and ended with Sui's overturning Southern Chen in 589.

After the Southern Song dynasty (420–479), there were three successive dynasties in south China: the Qi dynasty (479–502), Liang dynasty (502–557), and Chen dynasty (557–589), which are known as Southern dynasties.

The Northern dynasties consisted of five separate dynasties: the Northern Wei dynasty (386–534), Eastern Wei dynasty (534–550), Western Wei dynasty (535–557), Northern Qi dynasty (550–577), and Northern Zhou dynasty (557–581).

Emperor Wu Liu Song was a general of the Eastern Jin dynasty that deposed his emperor and established the Southern Song dynasty. After his death two years later, his son Shao took control. Shao was later deemed unfit to lead and was deposed, with his younger brother Wen taking control in 424. Emperor Wen's reign was marked by increasing prosperity, though that prosperity was shaken when he began to attack the Northern Wei dynasty. After his inability to conquer his rival, the Song dynasty was left in a weakened position.

Due to its weakened state and the frequent political infighting that occurred in the Song dynasty, Xiao Daocheng took control, declaring himself Emperor Qi and establishing the Southern Qi dynasty (479–502). Lasting for only 23 years, the dynasty was plagued with severe infighting. Rebellions ensued and the Qi dynasty was eventually overthrown, replaced by the Southern Liang dynasty. The first leader of the dynasty, Emperor Wu, provided an era of prosperity for his people. However, many of his officials became corrupt, and several rebellions were brought against him. Chen Baxian eventually defeated the Liang dynasty and established the Chen dynasty. After years of infighting, the economy of the nation was badly damaged, and local separatists fought constantly with Chen. Finally, in 589, the Sui dynasty from the north occupied the Chen capital of Jiankang, putting an end to the regime and ending the division of China.

In 386, Tuoba Gui founded the Northern Wei dynasty. Buddhism became firmly

established within the dynasty. The Northern Wei defeated the other Xianbei clans in 439 and unified northern China. Emperor Xiaowen, son of a Chinese mother and Xianbei father, desired to bring together Chinese and Xianbei and initiated a program to increase Chinese cultural influence. During the late period of Northern Wei, the government experienced severe corruption. After several uprisings, the dynasty was split into Eastern Wei and Western Wei. These were later replaced by Northern Qi and Northern Zhou. Northern Zhou conquered Northern Qi in 577, and in 581 Yang Jian seized power from Emperor Jing, creating the Sui dynasty (581–618). The Sui dynasty conquered Southern Chen, reuniting the north and south in 589.

Yong Tong

See also: Fei River, Battle of; Sui Dynasty; Tang Dynasty; Tang Gaozong, Emperor; Three Kingdoms; Zhou Dynasty.

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Northern Expedition (1926–1928)

The Northern Expedition was a military campaign led by the National Revolutionary Army under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)

(1887–1975) lasting from 1926 to 1928. The Nationalist forces were split into left-wing Communist and Right-wing Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; Chinese Nationalist Party), whose goal was to put an end to warlord rule in mainland China and unite them under the Nationalist banner. Jiang led his troops in a three-pronged attack: one up the Guangzhou (Canton)-Wuhan railway or along the Xiang River to Changsha, one up the Gan River into Jiangxi (Kiangsi), and one up the east coast into Fujian (Fukien) Province to end the Warlord Period (1916–1927) in China.

Jiang would attempt to make treaties with the warlords he came across and, if successful, incorporated their armed forces into the military of the GMD. Jiang's National Revolution Army (NRA) numbered over 100,000 and were better trained than their warlord counterparts. They were also armed with superior Russian and German weapons. At the start of the operation, Communist (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) and GMD party members moved ahead of the military and organized local peasants and urban workers to disrupt warlord forces in preparation for the assault. Railroad workers were also recruited to disrupt transportation services in the enemy-held territory. Many peasants were utilized as porters to carry the vast amounts of supplies that would be needed for the expedition.

Several warlord commanders began feuding amongst each other, and one Hunan commander began to express sympathy for the Northern Expedition. This commander agreed to integrate his troops into the Guomindang army, and Jiang Jieshi decided that the time was ripe to begin the attack. The mobilization order was given on July 1, 1926, and the Nationalist troops began to head out. The troops under Jiang pressed forward from Guangzhou, with the Hunan

troops fighting through Changsha, the capital city of Hunan Province. By the end of August, Nationalist forces seized many bridgeheads that guarded the approaches to Wuhan, and more warlord forces began joining Jiang's army. On the approach to Wuchang, the warlord who controlled the city put up strong resistance. Attempting to hold out against the Nationalists, the warlord instituted severe punishment of those he deemed sympathetic to the enemy. After rounding up the suspects, he began beheading them and displayed the severed heads in the surrounding lake cities of Jiujiang and Nanchang in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province. After a prolonged siege, however, the populace was on the brink of starvation. The warlord finally relented on October 10 and allowed Nationalist troops to take the city.

By late 1926, GMD and Communist forces consolidated their control over Wuhan and began to turn their attention toward Jiangxi. The Nationalist armies proved equally successful in these future attacks, and by December 1926, they controlled Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei (Hopei), Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangxi (Kwangsi), and Guizhou (Kweichow). The successes of the Northern Expedition led to diplomatic recognition of the Guomindang government by the British, who sent a minister to China to hold talks with the Nationalist foreign minister.

Nationalist forces next began to turn their attention toward Shanghai, and at the beginning of 1927, arguments broke out among the various commanders on how to approach the city. Labor unions, who were hostile to the local warlord, made strong headway in Shanghai during this time. In February 1927, these labor unions organized a general strike to support the Nationalist forces, but were put down by warlord forces, who beheaded

the leaders and put an end their meetings. This produced a backlash, with many Shanghai city leaders meeting in secret with Jiang Jieshi and offering him their support. On March 21, 1927, workers once again launched a strike and also began an armed insurrection against their warlord. With strict orders not to harm foreigners, Nationalist troops marched into the city and took control of it.

In April 1927, Jiang consolidated the national government of the Republic of China (ROC) and carried out a purge of Communists from his Nationalist forces. The massacre of several thousand Communists caused a rift between the GMD and CCP. The leftist leaders in Wuhan maintained their loyalty to the CCP and condemned the actions of the GMD.

In July, Jiang's military was badly defeated by warlord armies at a battle near the railroad junction of Xuzhou (Hsu-chow). This, coupled with other hostilities with Wuhan leaders, forced Jiang to surrender control over his posts. After a series of political maneuvers, however, he was proclaimed commander in chief in January 1928. Fighting intensified in March of that year in an effort to wrest control of Beijing from its warlord ruler. Deciding to flee, the warlord leader, Zhang Zuolin, made his way out of the city, and the Nationalist forces successfully occupied Beijing. After the Northern Expedition concluded, Nationalist forces controlled much of China. By the end of 1928, the Warlord Period came to an end, and the GMD brought an era of stability to China.

Michael Molina

See also: China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; National Revolutionary Army; Soviet Union; United Front; Warlord Period; Whampoa Military Academy.

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Nuclear Program

A research and development program of the People's Republic of China (PRC) created in the mid-1950s to use atomic bombs as strategic weapons system. The possibility of an American nuclear attack on China during the 1950–1953 Korean War and the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait crisis posed new challenges to the Chinese military and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Washington's threat of using atomic weapons against Chinese troops in North Korea and northeast China was of immediate concern to Beijing (Peking) in 1952–1953. With no strategic weapons, China had to depend on “nuclear protection” from the Soviet Union, which had developed atomic weapons in the late 1940s.

After Stalin, Soviet Cold War policy changed by calling for a relaxation of international tensions and peaceful coexistence between the “communist camp” and the free world. During the 1954–1955 Taiwan

Strait crisis, Moscow complained about the aggressive Chinese actions and expressed its unwillingness to use atomic weapons in case the United States retaliated over the PLA's invasion of Taiwan. Beijing felt nuclear pressures from both superpowers: an increasing nuclear threat from the United States and a decreasing protection from the Soviet Union's “nuclear umbrella.” By 1955, it became apparent to Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), president of the PRC and chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), that China could not ensure its own national defense nor avoid international humiliations, nor effect the “liberation of Taiwan” without its own nuclear weapons. The PRC could be bullied or even invaded by any Western power equipped with an atomic bomb. A great country like China needed its own nuclear weapons to demonstrate its abilities, achievements, and prosperity, and to enhance its rising power status on the world stage.

Thus, the Chinese leaders believed that their country was vulnerable to nuclear coercion or blackmail and concluded that it needed its own bomb. In early January 1955, Mao called an enlarged meeting of the CCP Central Secretariat to discuss starting China's nuclear weapons program. On January 14, before the Central Secretariat meeting, Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) held an “unusual seminar” in his office that included leading scientists. At the conclusion of the meeting, Zhou invited them to brief Mao and other top leaders the next day. During a question and answer session, Mao stated that it was definitely time for the party and government to work seriously on this matter. The meeting approved China's first nuclear weapons plan, Project 02. It reflected the Chinese recognition of the superpowers' concept that nuclear weapons would remain



Nuclear power station in Lianyungang, China. (Shutterstock)

a central feature of international affairs and were convinced that nuclear development would play an important role in China's military-security concerns.

In the spring of 1955, China's nuclear program began to "acquire content and direction," and the most important organizational decisions followed that summer. In July, the Politburo appointed three of its members, Chen Yun (1905–1995), Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch'en) (1899–1992), and Bo Yibo, as national leaders for nuclear research and development. This group consisted of both civil and military leaders: Chen, the PRC financial chief, and Bo, known for his managerial talent, were vice premiers; and Nie was vice chairman of the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC) and acting chief of the General Staff Department (GSD). In 1955, this Three-Member Group established a new ministry under the State Council, the Second Ministry of Machine Building and the Fifth

Academy. The Second Ministry was in charge of atomic and hydrogen bomb development, and the Fifth Academy in charge of missile and space technology. As China's NASA, the Fifth Academy later changed to the Seventh Ministries of Machine Building in the 1960s and the Space and Navigation Ministry in the 1980s. On November 4, 1955, the Three-Member Group drafted China's first plan for its nuclear program entitled Proposal for the Atomic Energy Cause. Thereafter, November 4 became the national anniversary of the Chinese nuclear and strategic weapon industry. In that year, the Three-Member Group also formed the Third Bureau, Bureau of Architecture and Technology, and other officers in the central government to organize and supervise the nuclear industry. China's budget for research and technology rose from about US\$15 million in 1955 to US\$100 million in 1956.

Among the three men, Nie was appointed to head the nation's nuclear research and

development organization. In 1956, he worked with the China Academy of Science (CAS) to establish the Nuclear Research Institute in charge of theoretical analysis, scientific experiments, research design, and solving problems sent in by the industrial ministries. The PLA sent military representatives to the CAS research institutes, labs, and manufacturing facilities for security, inspection, and quality control.

After a long wait, the Soviets finally agreed to discuss their technology and material assistance to China's nuclear weapons program in the fall of 1956. In August, when Nie approached Soviet representatives in Beijing and asked for missile technology training, the Soviets agreed to train some Chinese officials for executive management for a future Chinese nuclear research institute. Fifty Chinese were accepted for administrative training for a year in Russia. On August 17, the two governments signed an agreement that the Soviets would aid the Chinese in building their nuclear industries and research facilities. On December 19, the Soviets agreed to assist China's independent management of its uranium surveys. In July 1957, Nie visited V. A. Arkhipov, Soviet chief advisor for advanced technology in Beijing. The Chinese marshal requested more Soviet aid in nuclear and missile technology. On July 20, Nie received word that the Soviet government was willing to negotiate with the Chinese government in Moscow. In September, Nie led a delegation to Moscow, including Senior Generals Chen Geng and Song Renqiong, and attended 35 days of meetings. On October 15, the Chinese and Soviets signed the "New Defense Technical Accord" for Soviet aid in nuclear research, missile development, and aviation technology. Thereafter, the Soviet Union supplied China with a prototype atomic bomb and sold industrial equipment for the processing

and enrichment of uranium. Meanwhile, Chinese nuclear scientists studied and worked at the Soviet labs.

Soviet aid and Sino-Soviet cooperation were substantial for China to start its nuclear and missile programs. In December 1957, China sent its science and technology delegation, headed by CAS president Guo Moruo (Kuo Mo-jo) (1892–1978), to Moscow. The Chinese delegation signed an agreement for more science and technology aid. According to this agreement, the Soviet Union would assist 122 joint and cooperative research projects, including 58 defense industrial enterprises and three strategic weapons research institutes that were nuclear and missile technology related. After these agreements, from 1957 to 1959, the Soviets provided the Chinese with atomic testing data, missile designs and samples, and other research information. In December 1957, a Soviet-made P-2 surface-to-surface short-range missile arrived in Beijing. In early 1958, Russian nuclear and missile experts began to arrive in Beijing, and the Fifth Academy began to copy the Soviet model. As part of the 1950s military reform, the Soviet Union greatly influenced China's nuclear and missile weapons program from its inception, although the Soviets refused to offer data on their nuclear-powered submarines and other weapons systems. In 1958, with Soviet help, China completed its first nuclear reactor near Beijing.

In January 1958, the Defense Ministry sent 40,000 engineering troops to northwest China to construct a nuclear testing ground. The first site was selected in Gansu (Kansu) Province, about 100 miles northwest of Dunhuang. The second site was at the Lop Nur marshes, much farther west in the desert of Xinjiang (Hsin-kiang). The CMC decided on Lop Nur, an area of nearly 100,000 square miles, as the nuclear testing ground.

In March 1958, the Twentieth Army Group of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF) returned from North Korea to China, and the Defense Ministry transferred them to Inner Mongolia to construct a missile testing ground. Thus, by the late 1950s, China's nuclear, missile, and space programs were fully under way.

In June 1959, the Soviet Union met at Geneva with the United States and Britain on partially banning the use of nuclear weapons. On June 20, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party informed the CCP Central Committee that in order to achieve an agreement to partially ban nuclear tests, the Soviet Union had to terminate the Sino-Soviet agreement on cooperation of nuclear development. On July 16, the Soviet government informed the Chinese government that it would withdraw all of its nuclear scientists and experts. By August 13, 1960, all of the 12,000 Soviet experts left China with their blueprints and designs. Among them were more than 200 working on the nuclear research and development programs. The Soviets also stopped shipments of the equipment and materials that the Chinese nuclear program desperately needed. The end of the Soviet aid in technology and materials almost scuttled China's four-year-old nuclear and missile programs. The Central Committee agreed that China should continue its nuclear research and development without any interruption due to the Soviet withdrawal. The meeting named the new proposal "Project 596," which symbolized the time, June 1959, when the Soviets withdrew all technology and personnel. Project 596 planned to develop China's own nuclear bomb within eight years.

China had its first successful nuclear test on October 16, 1964, with an estimated yield of over 22 kilotons of TNT, about twice the power of the Hiroshima bomb.

The direct expenses up to that date (from 1955 to 1964) were estimated at \$1 billion for nuclear bomb research, development, manufacturing, and testing. Through the decade, the annual cost of the nuclear R&D was \$100 million a year, about 5 percent of China's annual defense budget. The indirect expenses of China's first nuclear bomb were estimated at more than \$2.6 billion, since its development and manufacturing involved 900 research institutes, universities, civil industrial factories, and transportation and communication enterprises across the country. The total cost was about \$3.6 billion.

After the third nuclear test on May 9, 1966, China began to test rockets carrying warheads. The first carrier rocket (delivery system) was successfully tested on June 29. On October 25, 1966, the first combined test, a missile carrying a nuclear warhead, was conducted at Lop Nur, followed by another test on December 28, which yielded an estimated 3.3 megatons of TNT. Nie supervised both tests and stayed at the testing range for three months. On June 17, 1967, China tested its first hydrogen bomb.

On September 23, 1969, China conducted its first underground nuclear test. In that year, the first group of operational nuclear warheads and missiles were delivered to the Second Artillery Corps. Thereafter, the Chinese military possessed nuclear and strategic weapons. By the 1970s, China had become an independent nuclear weapons producer and continued to develop and build more advanced strategic weapons. In 1980, it tested its first intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM), and two years later, its first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The PLA officials, however, admitted the shortcomings of their missile force, but expressed little doubt that missile technology remained one area in which China hoped to make great strides with new

military reforms during the late 1970s to 1980s.


China's nuclear weapons are responsible for establishing a "minimal nuclear deterrent." It has more than 300 nuclear warheads with 20 ICBMs and one ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). China stated for the first time in its 2008 *White Papers of China's National Defense* that it "holds that all nuclear-weapon states should make an unequivocal commitment to the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, undertake to stop research into and development of new types of nuclear weapons, and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policy."

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See also: Chen Geng; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry of National Defense; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Nie Rongzhen; People's Liberation Army; Second Artillery Corps; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Soviet Union; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958; Zhou Enlai.

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Open Door Policy

A foreign policy framework based largely on commerce and trade that stipulates that all nations should have equal trade and commercial opportunities in a given area. Although the genesis of the Open Door Policy can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, it gained renewed interest at the turn of the twentieth century and is most associated with U.S. secretary of state John Hay (1838–1905) vis-à-vis the great-power rivalry in China.

The British first conceptualized and enunciated an open door policy in the aftermath of the First Opium War (1839–1842), a conflict fought largely over issues of trading rights. In a series of treaties negotiated between the British government and Chinese officials, both sides agreed—in principle at least—that China should be open to trade and that the Chinese government should not promulgate policies antithetical to that goal. This era was the commencement of Western imperial interests in China, and Great Britain was determined to keep the fabled China market open to Western interests. During the 1885 Berlin Conference, European leaders tacitly recognized the principle of the open door when they concluded that no African colonial power should erect trade barriers in the Congo. In retrospect, the conference did little to suppress the mad dash for African colonies, but it did institute measures to prevent great-power economic rivalry in the region.

The American enunciation of the Open Door policy came chiefly as a result of the

Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines and Guam, which for the first time made the United States an East Asian colonial power. Several factors compelled the William McKinley (1843–1901) administration (1897–1901) to embrace the Open Door Policy. First, as imperial competition and economic rivalry in China heated up, American policy makers feared that a China divided into competing spheres of influence would be disastrous for U.S. territorial and colonial interests in the Far East. Second, many U.S. policy makers viewed the opening of markets in China as key to American economic prosperity, although the power of the China market in this era was greatly exaggerated. Third, even though the United States had a credible naval deterrent in the Western Hemisphere, it did not have the ability to effectively project its military power in Asia at the turn of the century. Thus, the Open Door Policy was seen as a substitute for U.S. military hegemony in China.

Beginning in September 1899, Secretary of State Hay sent a series of diplomatic dispatches (subsequently called the Open Door Notes) to the major colonial powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Japan. The thrust of his dispatches was a plea that all nations have equal access to trade and commerce in China. The British, who had already applied the Open Door Policy in their own affairs, affirmed their commitment to the policy in China. The five other nations, however, were studiously noncommittal to the proposal. In November 1899, the Boxer Rebellion began in

China as Chinese nationalists sought to rid the country of foreigners and foreign influences. The unrest alarmed nations that had significant interests in China, especially since the moribund Qing dynasty (1644–1911) was all but powerless to stop the rebellion. The unrest seemed poised to spur even more imperial rivalry in China as the Japanese and European nations threatened to tighten their grip on the country. All of this prompted Hay to send another letter to the six nations in July 1900. In it he implored all nations involved to respect China's territorial integrity and to keep trade there open and unfettered. This time, the United States received generally supportive—although still vague—replies to Hay's initiative. Be that as it may, the McKinley administration seized on this apparent success and declared that all of the involved powers had agreed—in principle—to maintaining an open door in China. As it turned out, this was mere rhetorical window dressing, because most of the major imperial powers continued to erect miniature empires in China. For the United States, at least, the Open Door Policy guided U.S. policy toward China for nearly 50 years, until the Chinese Communists (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) took power there in the autumn of 1949. Interestingly enough, the idea of an American commitment to a free and open China for many years fed the perception that the Americans had a special relationship with the Chinese.

Although the Open Door Policy was something of an illusion, McKinley's successor, Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919), invoked it in 1902 upon Russian usurpations in Manchuria. After the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, American and Japanese officials promised mutual cooperation in Manchuria. Again invoking the Open Door Policy in 1909, the United States sponsored

a multinational financing consortium through which all loans to Chinese railroads would be processed. By 1917, however, U.S.-Japanese policies such as the 1917 Lansing-Ishii Agreement, in which the United States recognized Japanese spheres of influence in China, had called into question America's commitment to the principle of free trade in China. By the mid-1920s, the concept of an open door in China was mere fantasy, and by 1931, it was a dead issue when Japan seized Manchuria and annexed it.

In the aftermath of World War II, the principles of the Open Door Policy gained new life on a global scale as Western democracies championed free trade. Believing that economic autarky and spheres of influence had helped ignite World War II, Western policy makers engaged in a number of institutional mechanisms to foster free and unfettered trade. These included the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the European Economic Community (ECC). The idea was to prevent economic rivalry from driving a wedge between nations, which would thereby lessen the likelihood of war. Policy makers also recognized that major trading partners were much less likely to go to war with a nation with which they enjoyed significant trade. Finally, most believed that free trade would help generate general prosperity among all nations and would serve to stabilize national economies in times of economic uncertainty.

Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Boxer Rebellion; Chinese Communist Party; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Russo-Japanese War; Sino-Japanese War; Unequal Treaties.

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
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Opium War, First (1839–1842)

Military conflict between China and Britain over trade and opium trafficking during the first half of the nineteenth century. The Qing

Dynasty (1644–1912) was defeated and signed the Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking), which opened China to British trade. Other Western powers followed Britain and signed similar treaties as the first group of the “unequal treaties.” The First Opium War was the most significant single event in the history of modern China.

In the eighteenth century, the Qing leadership limited contact with the West to trade, with no diplomatic relationship. Foreign trade had to go through the “Cohong” (government agency) at Guangzhou (Canton), the only city open to all Western trade. China maintained a surplus by exporting tea and silk through the port of Guangzhou, while the Westerners had to pay hard currency for the Chinese goods. British merchants, who enjoyed a worldwide economic expansion and were the majority of the Westerners at Guangzhou, particularly suffered a deficit in China trade, comprising



British ships bombard Canton Harbor during the First Opium War, which started because the British were intent on smuggling opium into China—despite that country's ban on importation and cultivation. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

three-quarters of British imports. After the collapse of the British East India Company's trade monopoly in East Asia in the 1820s, London sent government officials to Guangzhou in 1834 to oversee the British commercial activities and improve its China trade. The Qing's Manchu rulers' closed-door policy made China more passive on the whole. Tension began when the Chinese local officials refused time after time to communicate with the British superintendent of trade in China or accept the British suggestion for negotiating a trade agreement. As the British officials looked for cooperative opportunities between the two governments, the Cohong stopped British trade. When the Cohong system no longer controlled trade, British and Chinese merchants began to smuggle and trade outside of Guangzhou.

Another major reason for tension between Britain and China was the opium trade. A British opium trade began in the eighteenth century when opium smoking became popular in Britain. The annual smuggled opium from India to China, estimated at 1,000 chests (133 pounds per chest) in 1790, increased to 4,500 chests in 1821 and totaled 40,000 chests in 1838. The opium addiction corrupted politicians, undermined military morale, and caused many social and health problems. Most importantly, the opium trade resulted in millions of dollars in silver being shipped out of China. By the middle of the 1820s, the balance of trade was reversed and China had a trade deficit. This subsequent loss of revenue led to inflation and endangered domestic trade. In response, the Qing emperors took steps to ban the opium smoking and trade by issuing imperial orders repeatedly in the early 1800s. But the Western suppliers, Chinese dealers, and opium users ignored Beijing's prohibition since the local officials did not enforce imperial orders.

Emperor Daoguang (Tao-kuang) (reigned 1821–1850) decided to adopt a tougher policy to suppress the opium trade and maintain the traditional tribute system of foreign relations. The emperor appointed Governor Lin Zexu (Lin Tse-hsu) (1785–1850) as a special commissioner to stop the trade. After arriving at Guangzhou on March 10, 1839, Commissioner Lin Zexu launched an aggressive campaign against opium smoking and smuggling. Within a couple of weeks, many of the Chinese dealers and addicts were jailed, and some of them were executed. The Western merchants, however, ignored Lin's order to hand over their opium holdings. Lin detained the entire Western community of about 350 men, including British officials, in the foreign factories in Guangzhou on March 24 to force the foreigners to surrender their opium supplies. These foreigners spent six weeks in detention until Charles Elliot, British superintendent of trade, promised the Western merchants that the British government would compensate their loss. After the British merchants delivered 21,306 chests of their opium stocks by May 18, Lin released the foreigners. The entire British community moved to Macao on May 24 and waited there for British action. In June, Lin publicly destroyed all the British opium at Humen, a waterfront town outside Guangzhou. In August, he ordered the expulsion of all British residents from Macao. After a series of skirmishes between the Chinese and British, Commissioner Lin banned all British trade in China on December 6. Lin became a major Chinese hero in this first effort to resist Western aggression.

To protect its merchants and expand its trading rights to the Chinese market, the British government declared war on China on January 31, 1840. In February, the British dispatched 16 warships mounting 540 guns,

28 transports, and more than 4,000 troops to China under the command of Rear Admiral George Elliot. Thus, the First Opium War began. In June, British troops arrived at Guangzhou and noticed that Commissioner Lin and his garrison were well prepared for defense. On June 30, Elliot ordered his troops to sail north along the coast and bombard the Qing army's positions at Xiamen (Amoy), Fujian (Fukien) Province. Then the British troops continued to move north along the coast. On July 6, the British attacked Dinghai (Tinghai), Zhejiang (Chekiang) province and took over the city. On July 28, eight British warships sailed further north and on August 9 arrived at Dagu (Tagu), near Tianjin (Tientsin), less than 80 miles from Beijing (Peking). Under the threat of big guns, the Qing government began to waver. It relieved Lin Zexu of his duties and ordered him to be investigated and punished. The emperor asked the British army to return to Guangzhou and sent Qishan (Ch'i-shan), a leading capitulationist, to negotiate peace with the British.

In November 1840, the British troops concentrated around the Guangzhou area. To gain a better position in the peace negotiation, the British attacked Humen with 1,461 men on January 7, 1841. After several hours of fierce fighting, the Qing army lost two fire positions at Humen and suffered 600 casualties in its first formal defense. The British had more than 100 casualties. With the military victory, the British demanded that Qishan sign the draft Convention of Chuanbi (Ch'uan-pi) in January, whereby China ceded Hong Kong to Britain and opened Guangzhou as a trading port. The Qing government, regarding the cession of territories and the payment of indemnities as an insult to the imperial authority, declared war on Britain on January 27. At that moment, the emperor commanded a

diversified army of nearly one million men, including the Manchu banner forces, regional armies, local militias, and a small naval force. In February, the Qing army sent 8,000 troops to reinforce Guangzhou. On February 26, the British attacked again and took over Humen. On March 2, Guangzhou was under siege by 3,000 British troops. To save the city, the Qing army launched a counterattack on May 21–22, but it failed, resulting in the burning of 71 vessels and the destruction of more than 60 heavy artillery pieces. The British attacked Guangzhou on May 24 with 2,754 troops against the Qing garrison of 49,000 men. The British took over the high points of the city that evening, and the Qing generals raised white flags and surrendered the next day.

Upon receiving the draft Convention of Chuanbi, the British government was unhappy with its terms, which it believed were too lenient toward the Chinese. Instead of ratifying the treaty, it ordered Henry Pottinger, who had replaced Elliot in August and commanded 26 warships and 3,500 men, to carry on the fighting. The British troops took over Xiamen in August and Dinghai in October. Later that year, China also lost Zhenhai and Ningbo, Zhejiang province. In June 1842, the British attacked Wusong at the mouth of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, and then captured Shanghai. Great Britain defeated the Qing army in all the battles. In August, British warships appeared on the Yangzi River outside of Nanjing. The Qing government then sent an imperial commissioner to a British warship to sign the Sino-British Treaty on August 29, 1842. The First Opium War was over.

The Treaty of Nanjing, which was the first treaty signed by China with the Western powers, stipulated that China open five seaports for trade, cede Hong Kong to the British, and pay an indemnity of 21 million

silver dollars. The next year, the Qing government signed two more documents supplementary to the Treaty of Nanjing. They stipulated that Chinese tariffs on British goods be limited to 5 percent, and that the British be given the right to rent land and build houses in the five trading ports. The latter provision paved the way for the so-called concessions in the trading port cities. Additionally, the British acquired the right of consular jurisdiction and most-favored-nation treatment. In 1844, the United States and France signed the Sino-American Treaty of Wangxia (Wanghsia) and the Sino-French Treaty of Huangpu (Whampoa) respectively. Through these two treaties, the United States and France acquired all the privileges provided in the Treaty of Nanjing and its supplementary documents except the war indemnities. In addition, the Americans also gained the special privileges of sending warships to Chinese ports for protection of U.S. commerce and of building churches and hospitals in the five port cities. Meanwhile, the French had succeeded in convincing the Chinese government to lift the ban against missionary activities on the part of Roman Catholics, who, from then on, could propagate their faith as they wished. The Protestant missionaries soon gained the same privilege.

The First Opium War of 1839–1842 had a long-term traumatic effect on China and changed the nature of its foreign relations for the worse. The war was a humiliating defeat for the Chinese Empire. The Qing fought the British in the war with outdated weapons and no cohesive plan or military structure. The Chinese military was exposed to the world as limited in its ability to protect its borders and defend its people. After the war, China was open to Western influence and imperialist exploitation. The

treaties meant that China had lost its rights as a sovereign nation. The inflow of foreign goods into China without restriction caused the slow but sure disintegration of the native economy. Thereafter, step by step, China was transformed from an isolated traditional society into a semicolonial country. The great Qing Empire was gradually losing the central position and powerful status established by the Han Dynasty and increased by its early emperors. The war marked the beginning of the end for the Qing Dynasty.

After the First Opium War, the Manchu rulers retreated further into tradition and continued to reject Western ideas. The once dominant power was fractured between Qing elites and the Han population, which became stronger in the late nineteenth century. Between 1841 and 1850, more than 100 peasant uprisings were recorded by the Qing court. The weakening of the Manchu rulers would lead to a series of conflicts both internal and external throughout the century. China would later experience wars with Britain and France (the Second Opium War of 1856–1857), Japan (1894–1895), and eight different Western powers (Boxer Rebellion of 1900) that would end the Chinese tributary system. The domestic troubles went hand in hand with foreign wars as the century advanced; they included the Taiping Rebellion of 1850–1864 and the Republican Revolution, which eventually ended the Qing Dynasty in 1911.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Banner System; Boxer Rebellion; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Eight Foreign Armies' Invasion of China; Hong Kong; Lin Zexu; Manchus; Nanjing, Treaty of; Qing Dynasty; Self-Strengthening Movement; Sino-French War; Sino-Japanese War; Taiping Rebellion; Tianjin, Treaty of; Tributary System; Unequal Treaties; Wangxia, Treaty of.

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P

Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974)

People's Republic of China (PRC) general and commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF) during the Korean War of 1950–1953. Born in Xiangtan county, Hunan province, on October 24, 1898, Peng Dehuai ran away from home as a child and supported himself by means of manual labor. In 1919 he joined the army of the warlords and in 1920 became a lieutenant. He was then involved in an assassination attempt of Fu Liangzao, governor of Hunan, and was arrested. Nothing is known of the terms of his imprisonment.

In 1926, Peng joined the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist) army with the rank of major and took part in the Northern Expedition. He secretly joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in early 1928. During the Long March (1934–1935) he became one of the closest lieutenants of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), second only after Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971). Peng was appointed deputy commander of the Eighth Route Army under Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) in April 1937 during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945.

Peng's record as a military commander up until the end of the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) was spotty. Of 29 battles he personally directed until 1949, he had 15 victories and 14 defeats. He fought best when fighting defensively for survival. He was less

successful fighting offensively, but he was an effective tactician and campaigner.

During the Chinese Civil War, Peng did not build a group of loyal supporters. He commanded the Eighth Route Army from 1937 to 1946, but had no troops under his direct command. At the time of the outbreak of the Korean War, Peng was in northwest China (Shaanxi and Xinjiang provinces) consolidating CCP control. During the war he retained his posts as the deputy commander in chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and commander of the First Field Army.

Peng commanded Chinese forces intervening in Korea from October 1950 to September 5, 1954. He arrived in northeast China on September 4, 1950, to lead the intervention forces. He was officially named commander and political commissar on October 8, the same day the CPVF was ordered "to march speedily to Korea."

On October 10, 1950, Peng cabled Mao Zedong informing him that, contrary to Peng's original plan to send only two armies and two artillery divisions across the Yalu River, he now intended "to mass all forces south of the Yalu in case bridges are blown." Mao agreed with this plan, and on October 13, the Central Military Commission (CMC) formally sanctioned sending Chinese troops into Korea.

Peng's forces began crossing the Yalu River on October 19, and on October 25 the CPVF had its first exchange of fire with UN/U.S. forces. From October 1950 to June 1951, the Chinese fought five major

offensive campaigns under Peng's direction, albeit with detailed guidance from the General Staff Department and Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch'en) (1899–1992), Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), and Mao in Beijing. Zhou provided detailed guidance of all logistics operations and daily operations.

Peng initially attacked along the whole front in a series of three offensive campaigns: October 25 to November 1, 1950; mid-November 1950 to December 12, 1950; and December 30, 1950, to January 11, 1951. During late November or early December 1950, Mao Zedong's only son, Mao Anying (1922–1950), who served as a Russian-language interpreter, died during a U.S. air attack on Peng's headquarters. Peng, who had been entrusted to protect Anying, blamed himself for his death.

During the Fourth Offensive Campaign, January 25 to March 1951, the Chinese offensive broke down south and southeast of Seoul, and Li Tianyu was forced to evacuate Seoul on March 14. On April 22, Peng launched the Fifth Campaign with the aim of retaking Seoul, but U.S. forces under Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet (1892–1992) broke the Chinese offensive north of Seoul. By May 21, 1951, the front line was at a standstill.

In July 1951, armistice negotiations began at Kaesong. Between May and July 1953, Peng launched a series of offensives against Old Baldy and Pork Chop Hill. On July 11, 1953, Chinese and North Korean forces launched a massive five-corps offensive against the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army Corps. The U.S. Third Division counterattacked, ending major Communist forces' hostilities for the remainder of the war. Peng then concentrated on building elaborate defensive positions for what he later styled an "active defense in positional warfare."

On July 27, 1953, Peng signed the Armistice Agreement worked out at Panmunjom.

Kim Il-sung awarded him the National Flag Order of Merit, First Class, and conferred on him the title "Hero of the Korean Democratic People's Republic" on July 31, 1953. Peng left North Korea on August 11, 1953, returning to a hero's welcome in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. He resigned as the CPVF commander on September 5, 1954. Yang Dezhi of the North China Field Army succeeded him.

Peng viewed the Korean War more as a strategic than an operational success. In his memoirs he wrote, "signing the armistice, I thought that the war had set a precedent for many years to come—something the people could rejoice in." But Peng continued, "tactically the war revealed to the PLA's leaders just how weak their forces were and just how thin the line that separated success from failure. The victory had been nearly pyrrhic in nature."

The Korean War experience convinced Peng that the PLA needed to modernize its forces for conventional warfare. He placed priority on military training over politics and stressed the importance of modern equipment, professionalism, and new technology to support modern warfare. Following Korea, Peng turned to the Soviet Union to provide a model for modernization and professionalism.

Appointed minister of defense at the First National People's Congress on September 28, 1954, on October 1 Peng initiated a program for modernization of the PLA when he issued Order No. 1, which required the PLA to study the Soviet models, grasp modern warfare, obey orders, and honor discipline. He initiated further reforms (the Four Great Systems) in 1955. On September 27, 1955, Peng was named one of 10 marshals of the PLA.

Mao Zedong dismissed Peng from all posts on September 17, 1959, accusing him of leading an "anti-Party clique." At the

beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Peng was arrested and brought to Beijing, where he was publicly criticized between January and February 1967. He was imprisoned in April 1967 and later tortured. In 1974, when he fell seriously ill, Mao ordered that Peng receive no medical care. He died on November 29, 1974. Peng was posthumously rehabilitated as “a great revolutionary fighter and loyal member of the Party” at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP National Congress in 1978.

Lieutenant Colonel Susan M. Puska

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese Offensive in Korea, First; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Second; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Third; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Fourth; Chinese Offensive in Korea, Fifth; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Chinese Summer Offensive in Korea; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; First Field Army; Guomindang; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement; Long March; Lushan Conference; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; National People's Congress; Nie Rongzhen; North China Field Army; Northern Expedition; People's Liberation Army; Warlord Period; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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People's Liberation Army

During the Cold War, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China was the largest standing army in the world. It took on both external and internal roles. In 1929, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the predecessor of the PLA, numbered 300,000. It was reduced to a mere 25,000 by the mid-1930s following its defeat in the last of five Encirclement Campaigns by the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist) forces. After growing to more than 1.2 million by 1945 after World War II and the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945 and 5.2 million at the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the PLA's active troop strength stood at 4.2 million in 1982 and 3 million in 1992.

In the external sphere, Chinese forces fought in the Korean War (1950–1953), skirmished over offshore islands with the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) during the 1950s, waged the 1962 Sino-Indian War, clashed with Russia in the 1969 Sino-Soviet border dispute, and saw battle in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. In addition, the PRC threatened to employ the PLA on



Poster showing heroic fighter of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, wounded in the head in battle, charging the enemy "in defense of Chairman Mao and the motherland," ca. 1970. (Library of Congress)

several occasions against India during the India-Pakistan Wars of 1965 and 1971.

Internally, the PLA helped consolidate the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) hold over the country during the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) and the 1951 Tibet occupation. It also oversaw infrastructure development in far-flung areas of China and restored order during the chaotic periods of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident.

During the Cold War, the PLA's defense strategy had two main aspects: "people's war" and "people's war under modern conditions." While the former was employed extensively during the period prior to 1949, PLA forces found recourse in the latter in certain wars after 1949. The "early war, major war and all-out nuclear war" slogan of the 1960s gave way to "peace and development" by the

end of the Cold War, when the Soviets withdrew nearly 50 divisions from China's northeastern border with the Soviet Union as a part of the thaw in Sino-Soviet relations.

Soon after the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the PLA was engulfed in the Korean War under the guise of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF). The CPVF was in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) from October 1950 until October 1958. At the time of the intervention, CPVF forces were primarily infantry units drawn from the Fourth Field Army of the PLA. Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) commanded the CPVF. In the fighting in Korea, the PLA encountered the most powerful and technologically advanced military in the world. While it sustained casualties estimated at more than one million, with half of these killed, the PLA achieved its objective of

preserving the North Korean government. Other wars were less successful, although the PLA achieved certain limited military objectives such as driving back Indian forces from its borders in 1962 and punishing Vietnam in 1979. In the latter conflict, the PLA learned the need for modernization.

Organizationally, the PLA generally followed Soviet practices. Four large general departments oversaw staffing, logistics, and political duties. They are the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armaments Department (GAD). The PLA controlled a vast military-industrial complex of machine-building industries, ordnance and aircraft factories, and shipyards. Ranks mirrored those of the Soviet Union, as did training manuals.

The Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP is at the top of the PLA's organization, although a similar and parallel non-party structure was established at the state level in the 1980s. China was divided into military regions (which were reduced from 13 to 11 to the current 7 beginning in 1985), 29 provincial military districts (one for each of China's 29 provinces), one independent military district, and three garrisons. During the modernization drive that began in the mid-1980s, field armies were transformed into 21 army groups on the Western concept of military organization. To enhance professionalism, the PLA established a number of military academies, colleges, and schools, with the highest military educational institution being the National Defense University, established in 1985. As the PLA modernized and professionalized, it also downsized. Eight demobilization campaigns of soldiers and officers in the Cold War period brought down the PLA's troop numbers significantly.

During the Cold War, China amassed formidable military capabilities in ground, naval, air, and strategic weapons, although by the end of the Cold War most of the military assets lagged behind newer Western technologies. Initially, many PLA weapons were captured from Nationalist forces, who had been supplied by the United States and other Western nations. The February 1950 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union ensured a constant flow of military equipment, which was considered to be advanced given the low technology levels of PLA forces at the time. This ended, as did military technology transfers, with the Sino-Soviet split of 1959–1960.

Of the 156 state-run industries created with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, nearly 40 were devoted to military needs. The PRC thus produced an array of military equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, aircraft, engines, submarines, destroyers, frigates, and fast-attack craft. Much of the Chinese Army's equipment was supplied by the Soviets up to 1960. This included JS-2, T-34, and T-54 tanks and 152-mm and 203-mm artillery. The Chinese also manufactured the T-59 (their version of the Soviet T-54) and the T-60 (PT-76) amphibious tank.

Numbers of army personnel continued to increase for much of the Cold War. In 1965, army strength was estimated at 2.25 million men in 115 divisions (including 4 armored and 1–2 airborne divisions). By 1974 army strength had grown to 2.5 million men in 120 infantry divisions, 5 armored divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 2 airborne divisions. In 1991, at the end of the Cold War, the Chinese Army had been slightly reduced in size, with perhaps 2.3 million men in 84 infantry divisions and 10 armored divisions. In 1991 the Chinese operated some 7,500–8,000 main battle tanks (the bulk of them

T-54/T-59s, along with several hundred T-69, T-79, and T-80s reported), some 2,000 light tanks, 2,800 armored personnel carriers, and 14,500 towed artillery pieces.

In addition to conventional deterrence, the PLA pursued nuclear deterrence. In 1964, China exploded its first nuclear weapon, and by the early 1960s, the PRC was one of five countries with long-range missile capabilities. In general, these various weapons served the country well. But the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in which Chinese-supplied Iraqi military equipment was easily destroyed by coalition forces, showed the glaring technological deficiencies of many PLA weapons systems. Troop enhancements, modernization drives, and equipment acquisitions meant increasing budgetary outlays, which stood at an estimated 2.8 billion yuan (US\$340 million) in 1950 and had increased to about 39.5 billion yuan (US\$7.56 billion) by 1991.

The first three decades of the Cold War were turbulent ones for the PRC defense forces. The PLA saw the construction of a U.S.-led military alliance system in East Asia—including U.S. troops in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)—and the 1954 mutual defense pact with the ROC as distinct threats. This eased after 1971 with the normalization of Sino-American relations, although Chinese window-shopping in Western arms markets largely came to naught. Institutional linkages and mutual visits among Chinese and Western militaries increased in the 1980s, with enhanced prospects for arms sales under several programs. However, the 1989 Tiananmen Square events brought to an end any significant flow of military technology or hardware from Western nations.

China sent arms abroad both to assist in wars of national liberation, often in opposition to one of the two superpowers, or as straight

commercial/political transactions. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) was a major recipient of Chinese weaponry during both the Indochina War of 1946–1954 and the Vietnam War of 1963–1975. Other groups receiving Chinese arms included the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Pathet Lao in Laos, and the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia procured Chinese intermediate-range Dong Feng-3 missiles (NATO-designation CSS-3). Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and Burma (Myanmar) also purchased Chinese arms, sometimes in defiance of international non-proliferation controls.

Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese Military Advisory Group; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Cultural Revolution; Encirclement Campaigns; Fourth Field Army; General Departments of the PLA; Guomintang; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Military Ranks, People's Liberation Army; Movement to Resist America and Aid Vietnam; Nuclear Program; Peng Dehuai; People's War; People's War under Modern Condition; Sino-Indian Border War; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; Sino-Vietnamese Border War; Soviet Union; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996; Tiananmen Square Events; Tibet; Zhu De.

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People's Republic of China. *See* China, People's Republic of

People's War

The term "people's war," a military-political strategy, refers to the Maoist military doctrine. According to Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), the Red Army, established by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Communist Party of China) in 1927, had won the support of the majority of the Chinese peasantry. They would use their advantages against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government, which had a large, well-equipped, and well-trained army.

The people's war doctrine suggested that a tiny force of a few dozen soldiers should avoid strategically decisive battles with a powerful army because it would be easily suppressed in an all-out confrontation with the GMD government.

The people's war doctrine included a three-stage strategy of protracted warfare, with carefully chosen battles that could realistically be won. In stage one, a revolutionary force would conduct the people's war in remote areas with mountainous or otherwise difficult terrain where the enemy was weak. The revolutionary force needed to establish a local stronghold, known as a revolutionary base area. As this revolutionary base expanded in power, it entered stage two. The revolutionary force would then establish more revolutionary base areas and spread their influence through the surrounding countryside, where it would become the governing power and gain popular support through such programs as land reform. Eventually, in stage three, the revolutionary movement would have enough strength to encircle and capture small cities, then larger ones, until finally it overthrew the central government in the entire country.

Mao summarized the principles and experiences of the people's war in his three books written between December 1936 and May 1938: *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War* (1936), *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan* (1938), and *On Protracted War* (1938). In these writings, Mao summed up the experiences gained by the Chinese Communists in the counterencirclement campaigns against Nationalist forces in the early 1930s and in the months following the outbreak of war with Japan in July 1937. In his three books, Mao tried to promote the principles of the people's war against Japanese imperialism during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945.

Mao asserted that the Chinese Red Army, small in number and poorly armed, was able to establish many revolutionary bases in south China and pose a threat to the GMD government before 1934 because the Chinese Communists mobilized hundreds of thousands of peasants and used these them to fight against the powerful Nationalist armies and defeat them. Mao claimed that the Chinese workers and peasants, under Chinese Communist leadership, would be mobilized and armed in defense of the state, and that although the Chinese Communists' armies and militia were small in number, poorly equipped, and not well trained, they would hold the key to victory in a prolonged war against a technologically superior Japanese enemy.

After the Chinese Communists, under the leadership of Mao, defeated the GMD forces during the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949 and founded the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the doctrine of the people's war has been the officially proclaimed cornerstone of the Chinese Communists' strategy for the defense of China's frontiers. The basic concept behind the people's war was to maintain the support of the Chinese population and to draw the powerful, well-equipped enemy deep into the interior, where the Chinese would bleed them dry through a mix of mobile and guerrilla warfare. Since then, the peoples' militia has been a nationwide mass civilian organization of politically reliable and physically fit men and women under the double leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

The most explicit exposition of this doctrine was made in 1964 by Lin Bao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), vice chairman of the CCP, vice premier, and minister of National Defense of the PRC. Lin's tendentious and bellicose article "Long Live the Victory of People's War," a commemoration of the

twentieth anniversary of victory in the Chinese people's war of resistance against Japan, was not only to celebrate the victory of the Chinese people over aggressive Japanese imperialism, but also to present the Chinese Communist line, formulated by Party Chairman Mao, on the strategy and tactics of people's wars or so-called wars of national liberation. By that time, the doctrine of the people's war was well developed by the Chinese Communist Party. Lin claimed that men—especially men armed with Mao's thought, not weaponry—was the decisive factor in combat against imperialism in China. Its central operational principle was to lure the enemy deep into their territory, trading space for time. According to this principle, enemy forces would gradually be worn down and weakened, and a combination of regular forces and militia would wage a campaign of mobile and guerrilla warfare to annihilate the enemy. Thus, China would win a war against the invading powers. As a result, the Chinese militia was expanded in number and received more military training so as to wage a people's war in the event of foreign invasions, such as from the Soviet Union or United States.

After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping came to power. By early summer 1977, the long-festering debate over China's defensive strategy started again. In August 1978, Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-ch'ian) (1901–1990) in an article asserted that China not only needed the people's war but also a military modernization in China's national defense and military strategy in the future. After the Sino-Vietnamese Border War in 1979, the Chinese military modernizers claimed that times had changed and that strategy had to be changed accordingly. Furthermore, if the Chinese treated and executed a modern war in their old way as they did in the 1930s and 1940s, they would be met with a serious defeat. The

Chinese leaders began to realize the need to retain the essence of Maoist doctrine while adapting its specific operation principles to the realities of the modern battlefield. The Chinese government thereafter made a great effort to promote significant military modernizations while developing the governing principles of the people's war under modern conditions.

In 1981, Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) became the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP and, in 1982, the chief of the PLA General Staff. He believed that a new world war was not inevitable and a nuclear war no longer seemed imminent. His remarks outlined a major change in China's strategic thinking and worldview. He explained to the Chinese military that peace and development were the two leading trends in international affairs. The PLA needed to contemplate a new and different international environment and must participate in China's ongoing reforms. In 1985, Deng explained his new strategic thoughts to the high-ranking commanders. First, the Chinese armed forces should expect a "local war" or a "limited war" rather than a "total war" or a "nuclear war" in the future. Second, the next local war or limited war needed a professional army with modern technology. This was another strategic transition from Mao's people's war doctrine to a new "people's war under modern conditions" doctrine. The mid-1980s reform then followed Deng's new doctrine of fighting "limited, local war" and emphasized the development and employment of new technology and improvement in PLA weaponry. Deng downsized the PLA forces by 1 million troops over the next two years. Theoretically, the money saved from the troop reduction would be available for upgrading defense technology.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; General Departments of the People's Liberation Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; Militia; People's Liberation Army; People's War under Modern Conditions; Red Army; Sino-Vietnamese Border War; Soviet Union; Xu Xiangqian.

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People's War under Modern Conditions (1985–1995)

Chinese military doctrine designed by Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), second-generation leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist

Party of China) in the mid-1980s. As the first generation of the CCP leadership, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) wrote a treatise entitled *On Protracted War* in 1938 to analyze the basic characteristics of both sides of the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945. He emphasized the paramount importance of a “people’s war,” saying that “the army and the people are the foundation of victory” and “the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.” Mao instructed the high command of the Communist armed forces, including the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, to organize extensive peasant militias through the CCP network, now a mass party. Party control and political education were also emphasized in mobilizing the peasants. Transforming illiterate peasants into capable soldier became part of the Chinese military tradition. In 1943–1944, the “liberated areas” under CCP control launched partial counteroffensives and won important victories against Japan. By the spring of 1945, the nation had 19 “liberated areas” with a total population of 95 million. By the fall of 1945, the CCP’s regular army had grown to 1,270,000 men, supported by militias numbering another 2.68 million. The people’s war doctrine became Mao’s legacy of military struggle, which helped the CCP to win the Chinese Civil War against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army, take over China, and establish the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

After Mao’s death in 1976 and on his third return, Deng Xiaoping launched an unprecedented reform in 1978 and opened China to the outside world in order to bring the four modernizations, including the defense modernization, to the country. He became chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP in 1981

and chief of the PLA General Staff in 1982. During the 1978–1988 reforms, the PLA viewed Deng’s economic reforms as favorable and necessary for military restructuring. A growing national economy needed a strong national defense, and a strong national economy can support and contribute to a strong military. From May 23 to June 6, 1985, the CMC held a landmark conference that became the starting point of Deng’s 1980s military reform. Like Deng’s efforts in the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s reform was not aimed at fighting a foreign invasion or a world war, but instead targeted the problems within the PLA through downsizing its troops and command system.

In order to reduce the PLA, Deng, then chairman of the CMC, argued that a new world war was not inevitable and a nuclear war no longer seemed imminent. His remarks outlined a major change in China’s strategic thinking and worldview. He told the Chinese military that peace and development were the two leading trends in international affairs. The PLA needed to contemplate a new and different international environment and must participate in China’s ongoing reforms. In 1985, Deng explained his new strategic thoughts to the high-ranking commanders. First, the Chinese armed forces should expect a “local war” or a “limited war” rather than a “total war” or a “nuclear war” in the future. Second, the next local war or limited war needed a professional army with modern technology. This was another strategic transition from Mao’s people’s war doctrine to a new people’s war under modern conditions doctrine. The mid-1980s reform then followed Deng’s new doctrine of fighting limited, local war and emphasized the development and employment of new technology and improvement in PLA weaponry. Deng downsized the PLA forces by

1 million troops over the next two years. Theoretically, the money saved from the troop reduction would be available for upgrading defense technology.

Deng proved that market economy and new technology worked in China and that Chinese people needed a better material life. His reform, however, succeeded at the high cost of losing political control by the party, decentralizing the government, increasing stratification and inequalities in the society, and declining status of the military. The PLA believed that they had sacrificed for Deng's reform more than what they had gained from it in 1978–1995, especially during the Tiananmen Square event of 1989. The nationwide prodemocracy demonstration in the summer of 1989 and the military suppression of the student-led movement were major setbacks to China's reform movement. With their loyalty and patience, the military waited for their turn as Deng promised. After Deng Xiaoping, they were expecting a change in military reform by Jiang Zemin (1926–), the third generation of the Chinese Communist leadership. In the mid-1990s, Jiang launched another round of military reforms known as the Two Transformations to replace Deng's people's war under modern conditions.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; Four Modernizations; Guomindang; Jiang Zemin; Mao Zedong; Mao Zedong, Revolutionary War of; New Fourth Army; People's War; Tiananmen Square Events.

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Ping-Jin Campaign. *See* Beiping-Tianjin Campaign

Pingxingguan, Battle of (September 1937)

The first victory of the armed force of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) against the Japanese invading troops in China after the establishment of the Eighth Route Army. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army attacked the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) troops at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao), located southwest of Beijing

(Peking). This event, known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, or the “Lugouqiao Incident,” marked the beginning of Japan’s all-out aggression against China and of China’s War of Resistance against Japan. On August 13, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai and threatened Nanjing (Nanking), the capital city of the Republic of China (ROC). The GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP on joint resistance.

As part of this agreement, the main force of the CCP Red Army, then located in the northwest and numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army (Balujun) of the Nationalist army in August 1937, with Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) as commander, Peng Dehuai (P’eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) as deputy commander, and Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) as chief of staff. They commanded three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th. After the establishment of the Eighth Route Army, all three divisions crossed the Yellow River (Huanghe) eastward until they reached north China. Even though the Eighth Route Army was part of the Nationalist army, it was always under the command of the CCP Party Center at Yan’an (Yenan).

The 115th Division, commanded by Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) with Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch’en) (1899–1992) as deputy commander and Zhou Kun as chief of staff, had two brigades and two regiments, totaling 15,500 men. In August 1937, most units of the 115th Division moved into the mountainous areas in north China. As Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) did in Jinggangshan (Chingkang Mountains) in the 1920s, they conducted a guerrilla campaign in the mountains behind the Japanese lines.

In September 1937, Japanese forces advanced along the Beiping (Peking, or Beijing)-Suiyuan railway into Inner Mongolia. The Japanese Fifth Division under the

command of Itagaki Seishiro moved out from Beiping and advanced westward on Huaili, Chahar. By the time they reached the Shanxi (Shansi) provincial border, Lin Biao’s 115th Division was in place at Pingxingguan, Shanxi, on September 24 to ambush the Japanese army.

Around 10:00 A.M. on September 25, the Japanese supply troops of the Twenty-First Regiment, Fifth Division, traveled along the road into the ambush set by Lin’s 115th Division. The Japanese column included 70 horse-drawn vehicles filled with clothes, food, and ammunition. In the meantime, another supply column of Japanese troops, including 80 trucks, also entered into the ambush set by the 115th at Pingxingguan.

Lin ordered his troops to attack the two columns of mainly transportation and supply units from the hill. In a few hours, the 115th Division almost annihilated the trapped Japanese troops along the road. A relief force consisting of the Third Battalion of the Twenty-First Regiment was stopped by Chinese troops.

After the ambush, the 115th Division withdrew from Pingxingguan. Lin Biao’s troops killed 3,000 Japanese soldiers at the Battle of Pingxingguan. The 115th Division had a total of 500 Chinese casualties. The victory brought the Chinese 80 trucks loaded with supplies, ammunition, and weapons. This was the first CCP military victory over the Japanese forces in the Anti-Japanese War. The battle gave the Chinese Communists a major boost in morale and credence to the Communists in the eyes of the Chinese people.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge Incident; Nationalist Army; Nie Rongzhen; New Fourth

Army; Peng Dehuai; Red Army; Yan'an; Ye Jianying; Zhu De.

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Qian Xuesen (Tsien Hsue-shen) (1911–2009)

A scientist who became one of the founding members of the missile and space programs of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the 1950s–1980s, and also made a contribution to the missile program in the United States in the 1940s and early 1950s. Qian was born on December 11, 1911, in Hangzhou (Hangchow), Zhejiang (Chekiang) Province. He received his college degree in mechanical engineering, with an emphasis on railroad administration. He took an internship position at Nanchang Air Force Base, Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province, of the Nationalist, or Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT) army.

In August 1935, Qian Xuesen left China for the United States on a Boxer Rebellion Scholarship to study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He received his MS degree from MIT in 1936. He then went to the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) to study applied mechanics, including jet propulsion and engineering control theories on the referral of Theodore von Karman (1881–1963). He earned his doctorate degree from Caltech in 1939 with a thesis on slender body theory at high speeds.

After he obtained his PhD, Qian worked with the U.S. military intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program (the Titan) as a designer and then served as director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California in 1939. After World War II (WWII), he served in the U.S. Army as a lieutenant colonel and was sent to Germany

as part of the team that examined captured German V-2 rockets. In 1947, he married Jiang Ying, the daughter of General Jiang Baili, one of Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) leading military strategists. The married couple lived in Pasadena. During these years, Qian designed an intercontinental space plane. His work would inspire the X-20 Dyna-Soar, which would later influence the development of the American Space Shuttle. In 1949, Qian became the first director of the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Jet Propulsion Center at Caltech.

Soon after Qian became a U.S. citizen in 1950, the FBI made allegations that he was a Communist and revoked his security clearance. It became a major turning point in his life since he found himself unable to pursue his career. Within two weeks, he announced plans to return to mainland China (the PRC). The U.S. government wavered between deporting him and refusing to allow his departure due to his knowledge. He lost his freedom under constant surveillance in a state of house arrest for five years. In 1954, the U.S. government negotiated with the Chinese government at the Geneva Conference to release Qian in exchange for the repatriation of 12 American pilots captured by the Chinese army during the Korean War. After the Sino-U.S. Ambassador Talks reached an agreement at the Geneva Conference, he was released by the U.S. government in 1955. Qian, his wife, and their two American-born children left America for China via Hong Kong on September 17, 1955.

After arrival in China, Qian Xuesen became the head of Chinese missile development as

the director of the Institute of Mechanics Engineering, China Academy of Sciences (CAS), in Beijing. On February 17, 1956, Qian submitted a proposal to the CCP Central Committee requesting to establish a ballistic missile program. On March 14, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), vice chairman of both the Central Committee and Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired a CMC meeting that approved Qian’s proposal. To implement the missile program, the Party Center established the State Commission of Aviation Industry on April 13, including Premier Zhou, Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch’en) (1899–1992), and Qian as the leading members. On February 18, 1957, Qian became director of the Fifth Institute under the Ministry of Defense and helped reverse-engineer the Soviet P-2 missile, an improved version of the German V-2 rocket. In that year, Qian was made a lieutenant general in the PLA. In 1959, Qian joined the CCP. (He was not a communist in the United States in the early 1950s.)

In 1960, Qian began to work on the Chinese-made short-range missile Dongfeng-01, based on the Soviet P-2 model. In 1964, the first Chinese-designed medium-range missile, Dongfeng-02, had a successful test, just prior to China’s first successful nuclear weapons test. He also designed and developed the widespread Silkworm missile. In 1965, Qian became vice minister of the Seventh Industrial Ministry, then vice chairman of the State Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense in 1970, and chairman of the China Association for Science and Technology. As one of the pioneers of China’s space science, he became the “Father of Chinese Missiles,” or “King of Rocketry.” Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) met Qian on several occasions. As the chief designer and one of the major leaders, Qian played a key role in the

research, testing, and manufacture of carrier rockets, guided missiles, satellites, and aerospace programs.

Qian made important contributions to China’s state of higher education. He established the Institute of Mechanics Engineering and trained Chinese engineers in the techniques he had learned in the United States. He started a library and taught people how to research aeronautics. He was the first chairman of the Department of Mechanics at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC). In 1979, Caltech awarded Qian the “Distinguished Alumni Award,” but he did not make the trip to California for his award ceremony. In the early 1980s, AIAA invited him again to visit the U.S., but he declined the invitation. He wanted a formal apology for his detainment in the early 1950s. He retired in 1991 and maintained a low public profile in Beijing. In 2008, Qian was named *Aviation Week and Space Technology* “Person of the Year.” In the same year, China Central Television named Qian as one of the 11 most inspiring people in China. He died on October 31, 2009, in Beijing.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Boxer Rebellion; China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense; Guomindang; Hong Kong; Jiang Jieshi; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Nationalist Army; Nie Rongzhen; Nuclear Program; People’s Liberation Army; People’s Republic of China; Second Artillery Corps; Zhou Enlai.

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Qianlong (Ch'ien-lung), Emperor (1711–1799)

The long reign of the Qianlong emperor was a watershed in the history of China, easily the most wealthy and populous nation in the world in the late eighteenth century. The Qianlong emperor of the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912) was an intelligent ruler who combined military virtues with Confucian scholarship in the pursuit of his imperial ideals. His most impressive accomplishment was the settlement of borders and the incorporation of extensive territories into western China, which brought China to its greatest extent ever. Yet the very growth and prosperity of the Qianlong emperor's tenure introduced new social pressures, and by the final years of his reign, the signs of decline were becoming ever more obvious.

The Qianlong emperor was born with the name Hongli on September 25, 1711. He was the fourth son of the Yongzheng (Yung-cheng) (reigned 1723–1735) emperor and the favorite grandson of the previous Kangxi (K'ang-hsi) (1661–1722) emperor. His mother, Xiao Sheng, was from a noble Manchu family. The Manchus had come out of the north during the seventeenth

century to defeat the forces of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and had founded the Qing dynasty, which ruled over the majority of the Chinese population.

Though the Qianlong emperor was a fourth son, his personal qualities were noted early by both his father and grandfather, who arranged elaborate education and training for him. During a hunting trip when the future emperor was only eight years old, he demonstrated immense bravery when the horse he was riding was attacked by a bear. His father, who had once fought bitterly to defend his own title to the throne, secretly designated the Qianlong emperor as his heir early in his life. By the time he made the formal declaration that the Qianlong emperor would be the heir apparent, his other sons were dead. The Qianlong



The long reign of the Qianlong emperor was a watershed in the history of China, easily the wealthiest and most populous nation in the world in the late eighteenth century. (Réunion des Musées Nationaux/Art Resource, NY)

emperor ascended the Qing throne peacefully on October 18, 1735, at the age of 24.

The first 40 years of his reign were a time of great success as the new emperor basked in the achievements of his predecessors and concentrated on expansion abroad and magnificence at home. In addition to the Confucian ethics and Manchu military arts that the young emperor had been taught, he had been strictly schooled in the skills deemed necessary to lead the country. He was familiar not only with historical emperors but also with the example of his grandfather whom he very much admired.

The Qianlong emperor ensured continuity by retaining some of his father's most important ministers. Yet he gradually altered the practices of his predecessors and transformed the small, secretive Office of Military Finance into a Grand Council that held great power. As the center for all the government memorials that passed between the emperor and his officials, however, the Grand Council abandoned the secret communication that had allowed previous emperors to have private "eyes and ears" in the government. The important councillors were backed up by a secretarial staff of over 250 men, some of whom were always at work, keeping the offices open around the clock.

After the death of his father's ministers, the Qianlong emperor began to develop his own imperial style. Like his grandfather, he made elaborate tours of the country, which required extensive preparations. Those tours were splendid affairs that cost a great deal and established a habit of luxury among China's nobles. Yet the emperor did not lead a dissolute life. Every day he rose at 6:00 A.M., ate only two meals—at 8:00 A.M. in the morning and at 2:00 P.M. in the afternoon—and worked steadily at official business in the mornings. He was devoted

to his first wife, Xiao Xian, and made a public display of his filial piety by worshipping his ancestors, especially his father and grandfather.

The Qianlong emperor's armies brought Tibet under military control in 1751. He held the religious figures of Tibetan Buddhism in high esteem, however, and arranged many favors for the lama. He also saw to it that the Tibetans' texts were translated into Manchu and Mongolian. Always seeking to improve the cosmopolitan nature of his court, the emperor would later have official documents translated into Turkish, Arabic, and Tibetan scripts. He also promoted the production of multilingual dictionaries.

In 1756 and 1757, Chinese armies under the leadership of the Manchu general Zhaohui swept through Central Asia. A huge amount of western territory, later known as Xinjian (Hsin-kiang, the New Territories), was incorporated in China. Those conquests not only solved certain border troubles but also doubled the territorial extent of China. Most of the new territories were administered by military governments, which, along with the cost of invasion, was a very expensive undertaking. By 1759, many other surrounding states—Korea, Nepal, Burma (now Myanmar), Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines—recognized the dominance of the Chinese and paid tribute to the Qianlong emperor's government.

While the Qianlong emperor considered the conquests his most important accomplishments, he devoted considerable time and attention to scholarship and patronage of the arts. The emperor also commissioned many architectural splendors, including a replica of the Potola Temple, one of the most sacred buildings in Tibet. He also engaged the Jesuits at his court, whom he tolerated because of their scientific knowledge, to design a summer palace for him that combined Chinese

and European architectural styles. Giuseppe Castiglione was the principal architect for the latter project.

During the Qianlong emperor's reign, agriculture and the population both grew at a rapid rate. In 1741, official figures recorded the number of Chinese at 163 million, and by 1762, there were 200 million. The introduction of new food sources from the Americas (sweet potatoes, peanuts, sorghum), new varieties of rice seed, and improved irrigation technology allowed for an increased food supply. The population expanded rapidly and enjoyed unusual prosperity for a time. By the late eighteenth century, however, land shortages brought an end to the expansion. The need to farm new areas led Chinese and Manchus to try to colonize minority areas that had been conquered earlier. That exploitation was greatly resented and led to a series of uprisings in the emperor's later years. Those rebellions were put down without difficulty by the imperial armies, but the underlying causes were never addressed and would resurface in the nineteenth century.

In a similar way, China's commercial success laid the foundation for future difficulties. The production of luxury goods and export crops like tea greatly increased during this period, due to the demand in European markets. (Tea became the British national drink as British imports increased 50-fold in 80 years.) Yet China was self-sufficient and uninterested in any European trade goods. A British trade mission under George Macartney as the envoy of George III sought to interest the Qianlong emperor in the establishment of trade privileges to British merchants and diplomatic representation in his court. The court absorbed British gifts as tribute and sent Macartney away without seriously considering his

proposals. Thus, Europeans continued to pay in silver for Chinese goods. Between 1760 and 1780 alone, the net drain of silver from Europe to China had increased from 3 million to 16 million ounces. (Most of the silver originally came from Spain's American colonies.) It was that unfavorable trade balance that provoked the British to organize the production of opium in their Indian colonies and to introduce the addictive drug into China in order to create a new market for a commodity they could control. That, too, would create great problems in the nineteenth century.

As those dangers were developing in the Qianlong emperor's final years, his own attention wandered. Though he remained in very good physical condition, his judgment began to fail, and he came under the influence of an attractive and unscrupulous young courtier named Heshen, who dominated the emperor's last years. As the emperor granted Heshen further privileges and authority, the latter was able to permanently undermine the foundations of government in China and allow the spread of corruption on a vast scale. The drain of imperial resources through graft and favoritism was also accelerated by the emperor's foreign adventures, as his armies invaded Nepal and Vietnam in his final years.

In 1795, the Qianlong emperor abdicated the throne because he thought it improper to rule longer than the 61 years of his grandfather's reign. He remained the power behind the throne, however, and dominated the decisions of his son, the Jiajing emperor, until his death on February 7, 1799.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Banner System; Confucian-Manchian Paradigm; Dalai Lama; Kangxi, Emperor; Manchus; Manchuria; Ming Dynasty; Mongols; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Tibet; Tributary System.

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Qin Dynasty (221–206 BC)

The first unified Chinese dynasty, which created a highly centralized imperial institution lasted for 2,000 years in China. During the late Zhou dynasty (1066–221 BC), the central government declined. China was divided among seven states and entered the Warring States Period (475–221 BC). Many years of ferocious warfare aimed at expansion and annexation among the seven states.

Among the seven states, King of Qin (Ch'in) embarked on a dramatic conquest of the ancient China of separate kingdoms. Having drafted a massive infantry army, he had an efficient military machine under strong commanders. Instead of using chariots, his army possessed cavalry, superior iron weapons, and crossbow, all comparatively new developments at the time. His attacks on the kingdoms, especially siege battles, became much more forceful and merciless.

In 221 BC., Qin King's effort's were crowned with success when China was unified under Qin (or Chin, where China got its name in the West: Chin-a). The unification

of China was followed by the establishment of a highly centralized regime, Qin dynasty, the first of its kind in Chinese history. The Warring States Period was over, and imperial China began. Having concentrated all power in his own hands, Qin Shi Huangdi (the first emperor of Qin, reigned 221–210 BC) proceeded with the establishment of a huge bureaucracy. This central monarch system, or imperial system, lasted for more than 2,000 years without significant changes.

The Qin Emperor wanted to have a huge army in order to secure his centrality by creating a political authority and critical mass at his capital. A large number of peasants were drafted through a centralized taxation system. The empire was based on two main social groups, tax-paying peasants and rich landowners. Qin terminated the separated city-state system and completed a transformation of landownership from dynastic families, relatives, and lords to private owners. The tax-paying peasants and landowners supported the entire empire and imperial system. The peasant paid onerous corvee and taxation. Regular taxes alone constituted two-thirds of his harvest. Besides, he was also required to spend a month every year in local work on roads, canals, palaces, imperial tombs, and military duties. If he failed to pay the tax, he had to extend his service in the army. The total number of peasants Qin Shi Huangdi recruited to build the Efang Palace and the Great Wall and those recruited as soldiers for the defense of the frontier exceeded 2 million.

The Great Wall served two purposes, or two ways, for the empire. Externally, it was built for defense against the “northern barbarians,” including the nomadic Xiongnu, Turks, Khitan, Mongols, Xianbei, Jurchen, and Manchu. Internally, it walled the Chinese society and created a political centripetal force toward the emperor. The construction

of the Great Wall began in the western desert and ended in the eastern coast, stretching for 2,000 miles. Qin Shi Huangdi did not have difficulty mobilizing large manpower, while China's population reached 54 million by the end of Qin, and at that time, the population of Roman Empire was no more than 46 million.

In Qin's draft system, all male peasants were required to register at the age of 21. Many of them served for two years between 23 and 56 years old. The imperial bureaucracy carried out recruitment at different levels. Reporting late military duties was a capital offense. Through Qin Shi Huangdi's sponsoring of Legalism he influenced the whole future Chinese conception of law. The law in imperial China created a hierarchy in its function as a general scale of worthiness and unworthiness, merit and demerit.

Before long, the Chinese people began to complain about the Qin's heavy taxes, drafting system, and hard punishment. In the seven lunar months of 209 BC, Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, together with 900 other peasants, staged an armed uprising at Daze, Henan (Honan) Province. Chen and Wu announced the establishment of a new regime called "Zhangchu," of which Chen was the king and Wu the military commander. They called on all the peasants in China to revolt against the Qin regime. It was this kind of violence, spearheaded by peasants whose only weapons were hoes and clubs, that eventually toppled the Qin dynasty. After the death of Chen and Wu, Liu Bang (256–195 BC), one of the peasant leaders, eventually overthrew Qin and established the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD). This change began a cycle of dynasties in China that would continue for the next 2,000 years.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Great Wall; Han Dynasty; Manchus; Mongols; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Rebellion Led by Chen Sheng; Terra-Cotta Army; Warring States Period; Xiongnu; Zhou Dynasty.

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Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor (259–210 BC)

The first emperor of the Qin (Ch'in) dynasty (221–206 BC), who established the first unified government and ended the Warring States Period (475–221 BC). The Qin was a state that existed almost as early as 897 BC. But half a millennium had to pass before it really began its march toward universal rule around the middle of the fourth century.

The Qin had long been regarded as a peripheral state that was less civilized than the states of Lu, Song, and Zheng and less powerful than the states of Jin, Chu, and Qi. Qin's position was significantly improved after Gongsun Yang, a prince of the state of Wei, persuaded Duke Qinqiao to reform. The reform, which lasted from 359 to 350 BC, included several

measures such as military promotions based on achievements and not on family, and harsh punishments on deserters and traitors that greatly enhanced the capability of Qin's army. By the time Qin Shi Huangdi was enthroned, Qin was already the most powerful state and was poised to conquer its peers.

In 238 BC, Qin Shi Huangdi seized power by smashing his political opponents and began his ambitious unification wars. The key strategy of the unification war was to conquer each of the remaining states. Qin Shi Huangdi continued his predecessors' policy of "befriend the far and attack the near (*yuanjiao jingong*)" by pacifying his ally—the state of Qi on the one hand and attacking states adjacent to Qin such as Han, Wei, and Zhao on the other.

Han was the weakest among the seven remaining states. But its strategic location was very important as Qin had to pass through Han territory before it could wage wars against other states in the east. Thus, long before Qin's unification war, Qin had fought consecutive wars that had greatly weakened Han and forced them to become Qin's vassal state. In 230 BC, to clear the path for the final conquest of states in the east, Qin Shi Huangdi sent Interior Minister Teng to lead the Qin army. The army conquered the capital of Han and captured Han's king An.

Zhao was the next target of Qin Shi Huangdi. Unlike Han, Zhao had a strong army and able generals such as Lian Po, Zhao She, and Li Mu. Before Qin's war of conquest, Qin had successfully stirred up disputes and conflicts between Zhao and its neighbor Yan. In 236 BC, while Zhao was invading Yan, a Qin army led by general Wang Jian attacked Zhao with the pretext of assisting Yan. As a result, Wang Jian conquered the strategic territory of Yanyu and deprived Zhao's capital Handan of its

natural protection. In the meantime, another Qin army led by general Huan Yi stormed the city of Anyang. After taking Anyang, Qin's army was separated from Handan only by the Zhang River and a few towns. However, Zhao's army managed to hold their front line and successfully stalled the advance of the Qin army. Two years later, Huan Yi's army launched a major offensive and defeated the Zhao army in Pingyang, southeast of Handan. The king of Zhao sent highly talented general Li Mu to replace the general killed by the Qin army. Li Mu beat Huan Yi at Yi'an and almost exterminated Huan's army.

Qin conducted another invasion of Zhao in 232 BC but failed due to Li Mu's effective defense. However, Zhao was weakened after years of wars with Qin. In 230 BC, taking advantage of Zhao's drought, the Qin army attacked Zhao again but only found it was engaging in a seesaw battle with commander Li Mu. Qin then bribed Guo Kai, a favorite minister of the king of Zhao, sowing discord between the king and Li Mu, resulting in the latter's demotion and execution. General Zhao Cong substituted for Li Mu and became the new commander of the Zhao army, but Zhao Cong was not as able as Li Mu and was quickly defeated and killed by general Wang Jian of Qin. Having lost most of its army and best generals, Zhao's king Qian had no choice but to surrender.

In 227 BC, when Qin Shi Huangdi was deciding which state would be the next target for annexation, Yan Dan, the prince of Yan, sent an assassin, Jing Ke, to kill Qin Shi Huangdi as a preemptive measure to save his own kingdom. Jing Ke failed in his mission, and an infuriated Qin Shi Huangdi decided to invade Yan. In 226 BC, Wang Jian's army destroyed Yan's army at Yishui and took Ji, the capital of Yan, forcing king Xi of Yan to flee to the northeast. King Xi

killed prince Dan and sent Dan's head to Qin Shi Huangdi, begging for peace. However, at this time, Qin Shi Huangdi had shifted his attention to Wei. Like Han, Wei's military strength had been diminished due to wars with Qin. Long before its final fall, Wei had lost much territory to the Qin, and it was not difficult for Qin to conquer Wei. In 225 BC, Wang Ben led the Qin army to Wei and brought an end to the state in three months. King Jia of Wei was killed by Wang Ben after his surrender and Qin established Dang County and Sishui County in the conquered land of Wei.

Throughout the Warring States Period, Chu had been one of the most powerful states. Despite several defeats by Qin, Chu was still a large state whose territory included most of southern China. After annexing Han, Zhao, and Wei, Qin Shi Huangdi turned to Chu. Qin Shi Huangdi asked both generals Li Xin, the young general who had conquered Yan, and Wang Jian, the old famed general, about the number of men each of them needed to conquer Chu. Compared to Wang Jian's 600,000, Qin Shi Huangdi was more inclined to Li Xin's 200,000. In 225 BC, Li Xin and general Meng Tian waged a two-pronged attack on Chu. After initial fights, Li Xin successfully occupied Pingyu while Meng Tian took Qincheng. Assuming that Chu had no capability to defend, both Li and Meng proceeded deeper into Chu. Meanwhile, General Xiang Yan of Chu led the main force of the army following the Qin armies and defeated Li Xin. Thanks to Meng's timely assistance, Li Xin barely escaped being captured by Xiang Yan. The failure of Li Xin prompted Qin Shi Huangdi to make a personal visit to Wang Jian and agreed to his request of 600,000 troops, then almost the whole military strength of Qin.

Wang Jian adopted different tactics from Li Xin by strengthening strongholds around

the territories such as Pingyu and Shangcai conquered by Qin. Being aware of Qin's superior force and able general Wang Jian, Xiang Yan was cautious and chose not to attack the Qin force directly. But the king of Chu suspected that Xiang Yan was too timid to fight Qin and pressed Xiang to launch an offensive. When Qin and Chu met and fought, Xiang Yan lost the battle and was killed. Wang Jian marched to Shouchun, the capital of Chu and conquered it in 224 BC.

While Qin was conquering other states, Qi largely remained neutral and refused to provide assistance to the other states when they were facing destruction by the Qin one after another. The truth was that Qin had bribed Hou Sheng, the prime minister of Qi and asked him to persuade king Jian to submit to the Qin. In addition, King Jian of Qi thought that Qi was relatively safe because it had no common border with Qin. Hence, Qi had no intention of upgrading its army and building military fortifications. However, the situation was completely changed after Qin conquered the rest of the states and Qi became the last state that still survived. In 222 BC, the Qin army, led by Wang Ben, crushed the last resistance of Yan to the north of Qi and seized the remnant of Yan. The next year, Wang Ben, to Qi's surprise, suddenly attacked Qi from the north. Despite its sheer military size and over 70 towns, Qi could not find an able army to defend the state. Due to a long period of peace and insufficient military preparation, Qi was quickly conquered, and King Jian was captured by Wang Ben. Qin starved King Jian to death in the middle of a palm tree and a cypress, and no one from Qi was sympathetic toward King Jian's death. By this time, Qin Shi Huangdi had for the first time in Chinese history unified China. From the Qin onward, no matter

how many times China was divided, the unification of all China remained a dream of most Chinese conquerors and peoples.

There are several reasons for Qin's final unification of China. First, after Gongsun Yang's reform, the Qin army emerged as the most powerful among states, and Qin contained many great strategists and talented generals such as Bai Qi, Wang Jian, Wang Ben, and Meng Tian. Second, Qin was situated in the west with Xiao Mountain as its natural defense from invasion from the east. Third, having seen centuries of bloody wars among states, most Chinese people had wished to live in peace. Unification of China was thought as a way to attain that dream. Finally, the other six states failed to form an effective alliance and were thus easily smashed by Qin.

The unification of China was not the end of Qin Shi Huangdi's war. In fact, right after Qin had annexed all six states, Qin Shi Huangdi sent Weitusui and 500,000 troops to attack states in south China, including Vietnam. In 214 BC, Qin Shi Huangdi established counties such as Guilin, Nanhai, and Xiangjun in the newly conquered regions in the south. In 215 BC, Meng Tian, the general who had attacked Chu during the previous unification war, led a 300,000-man army to the north, trying to eliminate the threat of the Huns, a northern nomadic minority who had long invaded Chinese states from the north. To better protect China proper from its northern enemy, Qin Shi Huangdi decided to build the Great Wall, which took almost 10 years to be completed.

Qiang Fang

See also: Great Wall; Han Dynasty; Han, Cavalry of; Han Wudi, Emperor; Qin Dynasty; Rebellion Led by Chen Sheng; Terra-Cotta Army.

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Qing Dynasty (1644–1912)

The Qing was the last imperial dynasty in Chinese history under Manchu political control with their banner military system. The dynasty was established after the collapse of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and replaced by the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912. Toward the end of the Ming, government corruption went from bad to worse as eunuchs and court officials competed with one another for more power and privileges. The emperors maintained 2 million central, provincial border troops as well as village militia (*xiangbing*). The government became more bureaucratic and chaotic. In 1627, northern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province experienced a severe drought, and not one kernel of grain was harvested. Yet the government continued to demand peasant taxes. As thousands of peasants starved, the survivors began to foment rebellion. From Shaanxi and Gansu (Kansu) Provinces, peasant leaders emerged such as Li

Zicheng (Li Tzu-ch'eng) (1605–1645) and others who commanded dozens of insurgent armies jointly. The insurgent army quickly snowballed to hundreds of thousands. In 1644, Li's troops moved toward Beijing and met little resistance. Having no place to flee, Chongzhen (Ch'ung-chen) (1628–1644), the last Ming emperor, committed suicide by hanging himself at the Coal Hill behind the Forbidden City. Li led the grand army into Beijing, and the Ming dynasty came to an end.

In June 1644, however, Manchu troops entered the Great Wall from the north, defeating the peasant army and establishing the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty. The Manchu state, which occupied northeast China (Manchuria), has been fighting the Ming army over the territory along the Great Wall for decades. The Manchu leaders saw that the collapse of the Ming weakened Li's military leadership. They decided to take the opportunity and rule China. From the late seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, the Manchu emperors commanded a diversified army of more than 1 million men, including the Manchu banner forces, regional armies, and local militia (*xiangyong* or *tuanlian*). The Qing's population reached 432 million in 1851, one-third of the world total. The Qing army improved Ming's fire-arms technology and established a small naval force.

The Qing dynasty's early emperors such as Kangxi (K'ang-his) (reigned 1662–1722) and Qianlong (Ch'ien-lung) (1736–1795) regained China's central position in Asia, which was established by the Han (206 BC–220 AD) and Tang (618–907) dynasties. In 1681–1683, Kangxi defeated three feudal princes' rebellion. In those same years, Qing recovered Taiwan from the European powers. Then the Qing government took over Tibet (Xizang). In 1690–1757, the Qing army

ended the rebellion of Zhunger. Then, in 1758–1759, the rebellion of Zhuohe was defeated. Further uprisings include one in 1796–1804, the uprising of “White Lotus” (Bailianjiao).

At the time of the Qing, capitalism and industrialization rose dynamically in the Western world. Many countries expanded their empires by encroaching on Chinese territory. Owing to the Manchu rulers' closed-door policy, China's policies became more and more passive on the whole. In the 1840 Opium War, Great Britain defeated the Qing army and partially opened China's market. The Qing fought the British with outdated weapons and no cohesive plan or military structure. This allowed the British to maintain the initiative their entire war. The Qing army also failed to take advantage of their superiority in numbers over the British. The Opium War changed the views and practice of the Chinese military in three ways. First, China learned the Western forces were prepared to use force to gain trade concessions. Second, China came to understand its military forces were incapable of waging decisive warfare against determined resistance. And, third, the ruling Manchu minority lost power and prestige to the Han majority. After the First Opium War, China fought the Second Opium War against England and France in 1856–1860. Then, in 1883–1885, the Qing fought the French-Chinese War. Again, the Qing government lost all these foreign wars.

Western beliefs and ideology, especially Christianity, were introduced to China and inspired another large-scale Chinese peasant revolt: the Taiping Tianguo (Heavenly Peace Kingdom) Rebellion in 1851–1864. The Taiping army began its military expedition from southwestern Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province against the Qing. Many peasants joined the Taiping when the peasant army

defeated the Qing army from the west to the east along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River and took over half of the country. The Taiping army occupied Nanjing (Nanking) and renamed it “Tianjing” (Heavenly Capital). From 1853, the Taiping army, nearly 1 million strong, launched northern expeditions in order to protect Tianjing and enlarge the regime’s territory. In 1856, the Taiping army defeated the two Qing forces sent to control the insurgents’ capital by blocking the northern and southern approaches to Tianjing. Militarily, the Taiping regime had reached its highest point. At least 25 million people died during the Taiping Rebellion, making it the most destructive civil war in Chinese history.

In the late nineteenth century, frequent peasant rebellions, foreign invasions, and anti-Manchu movements undermined the Qing dynasty’s power. In 1895, China was defeated by Japan and thus lost its central position in Asia. The turn of the century marked major changes in Qing military organization, institution, and technology. To survive, the Qing dynasty established a “new army” (*xinjun*) in 1897, hiring German instructors and purchasing modern firearms from European countries. By 1906, the New Army consisted of five infantry divisions, totaling 50,000 men. It also established five officer training schools and military academies. Unfortunately, the New Army did not save the empire because the Manchu rulers refused to reform military institutions besides purchasing Western weapons. New recruits were soon disillusioned by the government’s corruption, mismanagement, and, worst of all, its failure against European and Japanese forces during the 1900 Boxer Rebellion. Meanwhile, the foreign concessions in the treaty ports and foreign nations all gave shelter to

Chinese rebels. The anti-Manchu movement found its revolutionary center overseas. Sun Yat-sen, one of its leaders, made Japan his revolutionary base.

In 1905, Sun, the founding father of Republican China, organized the Tongmenghui (or T’ung-meng Hui, the United League) in Japan. Among the 1,000 early members were liberal students, Christian merchants, and New Army officers trained in Japan. Sun and his secret society spread their revolutionary ideas and organization from Japan to the world by establishing offices in San Francisco, Honolulu, Brussels, Singapore, and many branches in 17 of the 24 provinces of China. Tens of thousands Chinese, including many New Army officers, joined the Tongmenghui and participated in multiple anti-Manchu activities, accepting Sun’s Three Principles of the People (Sanmin zhuyi), including “nationalism” (both anti-Manchu and anti-imperialism), “democracy” (a constitution with people’s rights), and “people’s livelihood” (a classic term for social equality).

On October 10, 1911, amidst an anti-Qing plot in Wuchang, provincial capital of Hubei (Hupei), some New Army officers revolted (October 10, or “Double Tens,” became the National Day for the Republic of China). The success of the Wuchang uprising led many officers to join the revolution. In the next two months, 15 provinces proclaimed their independence from the Qing Empire. The rebellious provinces and Tongmenghui joined forces, setting up a provisional government at Nanjing. Sun was inaugurated as provisional president of the Republic of China (ROC) on January 1, 1912, at Nanjing. A great breakthrough in Chinese history, it ended 2,000 years of monarchy and built the first Asian republic. The Qing court’s hopes rested with Marshal Yuan

Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916), commander of the New Army. Sun and the revolutionary leaders never had control of the army. In an attempt to avoid civil war, Sun and other revolutionaries negotiated with Yuan and offered him the presidency of the new republic. On February 12, 1912, Yuan forced the last emperor, only six at the time, to step down, thus ending the Qing dynasty.

Yutong Yang

See also: Banner System; Beiyang Army; Boxer Rebellion; China, Republic of; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Great Wall; Kangxi, Emperor; Li Hongzhang; Li Zicheng; Manchuria; Manchus; Ming Dynasty; New Army; Nian Rebellion; Opium War, First; Qianlong, Emperor; Self-Strengthening Movement; Sino-French War; Sino-Japanese War; Song Dynasty; Sun Yat-sen; Taiping Rebellion; Unequal Treaties; Xiang Army; Yuan Shikai; Zeng Guofan; Zuo Zongtang.

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Rebellion Led by Chen Sheng (209–208 BC)

A Chinese peasant rebellion led by Chen Sheng (Ch'en Sheng) and Wu Guang (Wu Kuang) against the Qin (Ch'in) dynasty (221–206 BC). It became a nationwide rebellion that ended the first Chinese dynasty. In 221 BC, China was unified under the state of Qin after it defeated six other states during the Warring States Period (475–221 BC). The unification of China was followed by the establishment of a highly centralized regime, the Qin dynasty, the first of its kind in Chinese history. The period of ancient China was over, and imperial China began. Having concentrated all power in his own hands, Qin Shi Huangdi (the first emperor of Qin, reigned 221–210 BC) proceeded with the establishment of a large bureaucracy.

The Qin emperor wanted to secure his centrality by creating a political authority at his capital. This required a large army, and a large number of peasants were drafted through a centralized taxation system. The peasant paid onerous corvee and taxation. Regular taxes alone constituted two-thirds of his harvest. He was also required to spend a month every year in local work on roads, canals, palaces, imperial tombs, and military duties. If he failed to pay the tax, he had to extend his service in the army. The total number of peasants Qin Shi Huangdi recruited to build the Efang Palace and the Great Wall and those recruited as soldiers for the defense of the frontier exceeded 2 million.

In Qin's draft system, all male peasants were required to register at the age of 21. Many of them served for two years between 23 and 56 years old. The imperial bureaucracy carried out recruitment at different levels. Reporting late for military duties was a capital offense. Through his sponsoring of Legalism, the emperor influenced the whole future Chinese conception of law. The law in imperial China created a hierarchy in its function as a general scale of worthiness and unworthiness, merit and demerit.

In the seven lunar months of 209 BC, Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, together with nine hundred other peasants, were drafted and sent to Yuyang (today's Miyun County, Beijing) to perform military duties. When they passed through Daze (southwest of today's Suxian, Anhui Province), there was a sudden downpour, and they could not arrive in time. Since, according to Qin law, late arrival for military duties was punishable by death, they decided that they might as well start a rebellion. They staged an armed uprising at Daze and quickly occupied Chenxian (Huaiyang), Henan Province. Chen and Wu announced the establishment of a new regime called "Zhangchu," of which Chen was the king and Wu the military commander. They called on all the peasants in China to revolt against the Qin regime. It was this kind of violence, spearheaded by peasants using only hoes and clubs as weapons, that eventually toppled the Qin dynasty.

After the death of Chen and Wu, Liu Bang (256–195 BC), one of the peasant leaders, eventually overthrew the Qin and

established the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD). This change began a cycle of dynasties in China that would continue for the next 2,000 years.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Great Wall; Han Dynasty; Han, Cavalry of; Han Wudi, Emperor; Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Terra-Cotta Army; Warring States Period.

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Red Army (1928–1937)

Armed forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) during the CCP's Agrarian Revolutionary War of 1927–1937 against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government. In 1927, the CCP began to organize its independent armed force after the end of the CCP-GMD coalition of 1925–1927. The CCP called its army the “Chinese Red Army” after the Soviet Red Army.

On August 1, 1927, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), then secretary of CCP

Field Committee, along with He Long (Ho Lung) (1896–1969), Ye Ting (Yeh Ting) (1896–1946), Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976), and Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986), organized the CCP members in the Nationalist Twentieth Army at Nanchang, Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province, to revolt against the GMD. This event was known as the Nanchang Uprising. Also in August, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) led the peasants' Autumn Harvest Uprising in central Hunan Province, and organized the First Division of the Chinese Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants (CRAWP, 1927–1930) with three regiments. Zhu De reorganized his revolting GMD troops from the Nanchang Uprising into the CRAWP on January 13, 1928, and joined Mao at Jinggangshan (Chingkang Mountains) on April 24.

They established the Fourth Army on May 4, 1928, about 5,000 men organized into six regiments, for which they had only 2,000 rifles. Zhu was the commander, and Mao was the political commissar. Soon other Communist troops joined them at Jinggangshan, which became the “cradle” of the CCP's military revolution against Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC) and GMD government. During this formative period, Mao and Zhu also laid some groundwork for the Communist armed force. They set up three tasks for the Fourth Army: fighting, raising money for the revolutionary cause (later changed to production), and work of the masses. To win battles, Zhu and Mao developed guerrilla tactics as a new strategy.

On May 25, 1928, the CCP Central Committee incorporated all the CRAWP units into the “Red Army.” Zhu-Mao's Fourth Army of the CRAWP became the Red Army's Fourth Army in June 1928. Praising the Fourth

Army's experience in land reform to win over the peasants and its guerrilla tactics, the Central Committee ordered other armies to follow its example. From 1928 to 1930, the Red Army engaged in many battles against the GMD and warlords' armies and successfully defended their military bases, forming 10 armies, about 70,000 men, plus 30,000 local self-defense militias. The Soviet Union increased its annual aid to the Jiangxi base areas to 600,000 yuan (silver dollars, approximately \$120,000 at that time). The weaponry and tactics improved. The Red Army experienced a new period of rural-centered development in more than 20 base regions across the country. In May 1930, the Central Committee secretly held a national representative meeting of the Red Army and renamed the Red Army the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army. By the end of 1931, the Red Army totaled 150,000 men and expanded its areas of operation.

The rapid growth of the Communist troops and expansion of their controlled regions alarmed the GMD government. President Jiang Jieshi and the high command of the Nationalist army centralized their provincial campaigns into a coordinated suppression in order to round up the Red Army. From 1930 to 1934, Jiang's central government organized five major offensive campaigns against the Communist-controlled areas and the Red Army bases in the border areas along the Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Hubei (Hupei), Jiangsu, and Shanxi (Shansi). After the Red Army failed during Jiang's fifth campaign, Mao and Zhu began the Long March toward northwest China in October 1934. The Long March was an attempt to save the Red Army by moving its main strength away from the GMD-controlled central region and to develop a new strategic initiative in a remote region.

The Red Army suffered heavy casualties during its western movement and shrank to 30,000 men in late 1934.

In October 1935, the First Front Army of the Red Army and the Central Committee arrived at a CCP-controlled area in northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. In July 1936, Moscow resumed telegraphy communication with the Chinese high command, which had made Yan'an (Yenan), Shaanxi, its new base area. Stalin increased Soviet financial aid to the CCP Party Center from \$200,000 in 1936 to \$800,000 in 1937.

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese Army attacked the GMD troops at the Marco Polo Bridge, located southwest of Beijing. This event, known as the "Lugouqiao Incident," marked the beginning of Japan's all-out aggression against China and of China's Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). On August 13, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai and threatened Nanjing (Nanking). The GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP on joint resistance. As part of this agreement, the main force of the Red Army, then located in the northwest and numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army of the National Army in August 1937. In the south, the Red Army guerrilla troops were reorganized into the New Fourth Army, totaling 10,300 men, including four field columns (divisions).

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; Jiang Jieshi; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Jiangxi Soviet; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; United Front; Yan'an; Zhu De.

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Red Army College (1933–1936)

Principal Chinese Communist institution for military, political, and logistical education. Establishment on November 7, 1933 marked a new period of regularization within the cadre and officer training system of the Soviet areas controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). The college, located in Ruijin, was first headed by He Changgong. Students were drawn from among the existing ranks of the Red Army. The college's first class consisted of between 600 and 700 experienced officers and political cadres. Education was primarily in the areas of military command, politics, and planning, with additional teams established for officer training, antiaircraft defense, and survey work.

The “Draft Resolution on the Question of the Red Army,” produced at the November 1931 Soviet Region First Party Congress, directed that political education within the army be militarized, sovietized, and internationalized in order to place the Red

Army more firmly under the control of the Communist Party and Soviet Region authorities. According to He's recollections, first circulated in 1941, the fundamental goals of the college were to provide Communist Party–guided education based on an internationalist model proposed by Stalin during his February 25, 1928, speech commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Soviet Red Army. Ideologically, this meant that instruction emphasized the role of the military in protecting the workers of the world and striving for world peace, and many instructional materials were of Soviet origin, translated by former president and political commissar Liu Bocheng. In practice, the Red Army College remained under the direct control of The Jiangxi Soviet (CCP) Central Bureau.

The creation of the Red Army College was also part of a larger military effort to centralize control over the guerrilla groups and warlord army units that remained part of the Red Army structure into the 1930s. At the end of the Long March, the Red Army College was renamed the China Soviet Republic Northwest Anti-Japanese Red Army University, and began recruiting a new crop of students in February 1936.

Dr. Matthew David Johnson

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; Anti-Japanese Military and Political College; Chinese Communist Party; Jiangxi Soviet; Liu Bocheng; Long March; Red Army; Soviet Union.

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Red Army Recruitment (1927–1934)

In late August 1927, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) organized the First Division of the Chinese Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants with 5,000 men. Soon the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) and local self-defense troops organized by the landlords, who were the target of the peasants' rebellion, counterattacked. On September 29, the badly damaged division reorganized into a single regiment with 1,000 men at Sanwan, Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province. Mao, however, survived and successfully established a military base area for the Communist revolution in 1928 lasting until 1934. Under Mao's command, the surviving regiment of the Red Army established the Jinggangshan base along the Jiangxi-Hunan border. Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) and his troops from the Nanchang Uprising joined Mao at Jinggangshan on April 24, 1928. They established the Red Army's Fourth Army on May 4, about 5,000 men in six regiments, with 2,000 rifles. Zhu was the commander, and Mao served as the political commissar. Soon other Communist troops joined them at Jinggangshan (Ching kang Mountains), which became the "cradle" of the CCP's military revolution.

To form a Communist revolutionary army, the Fourth Army created a voluntary system based on the "Guideline for Military Tasks" issued by the army in April 1928.

The guidelines stated that all the new recruits should be volunteers in order to prevent any risk of professionalizing the Red Army, and that the army should not pay any man or officer for his service, but would provide for all needs with some pocket cash for its men. Obviously, Zhu and Mao tried to create an egalitarian society within their army, different from the warlord and GMD armies.

To attract peasant volunteers, the Fourth Army initiated land reform in the mountainous area from 1928 to 1930. The army usually sent an officer with a couple of men to a village helping the poor peasants by reducing their rents and taxes. The land revolution movement became attractive to the peasants in this mountain area, one of the poorest areas in the country. The army received material and human resources from their base areas and in turn provided protection for the local Soviet-style governments to continue their land reform movement. By the summer of 1930, the Communist governments and the Fourth Army secured their base areas in Jiangxi-Hunan, including nine counties with a total population of 2 million. During this formative period, Mao and Zhu also laid some groundwork for the Communist army. They set up three tasks for the Fourth Army: fighting, raising money for the revolutionary cause (later changed to production), and work of the masses.

Following the Jinggangshan model, other surviving units established their military bases one after another in the rural and border regions of Hunan, Fujian (Fukien), Jiangsu (Kiangsu), and Anhui (Anhui) Provinces. Clearly, Zhu and Mao had created an exemplary military center at Jinggangshan for the Communist revolution at that time. From 1928 to 1930, the Red Army engaged in many battles against the GMD and warlords' armies and successfully

defended their military bases, forming 10 armies, about 70,000 men, plus 30,000 local self-defense militias. In May 1930, the Central Committee secretly held a national representative meeting of the Red Army and renamed the Red Army the “Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army” (Zhongguo Gongnong Hongjun). The Shanghai meeting became a turning point in the Red Army’s development, transforming scattered guerrilla operations into a more organized, central operation.

After May 1930, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) began to praise Mao’s rural guerrilla warfare during his conversations with the Chinese visitors in Moscow. By the end of 1931, the Red Army totaled 150,000 men and expanded its areas of operation. As elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Mao created a government center for Chinese Communist authority across the country for the first time in CCP history. In 1932, the Party Center moved from Shanghai to the “Central Soviet Region” in Jiangxi with its Central Committee, party administration, and Russian advisors. Mao’s military success had made him central to the Chinese Communist revolution.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Autumn Harvest Uprising; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Guomindang; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Jiangxi Soviet; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; Red Army; Soviet Union; Zhu De.

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Red Guards (1966–1968)

Mass organizations of Chinese civilians, especially students, during the early years of the Cultural Revolution, a nationwide political struggle accompanied by extensive purges. In 1966, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) mobilized the young people by encouraging them to join the “Red Guards” (Hongweibing) and launched a disastrous, prolonged movement against the leader’s own political rivals. The Chinese people paid a terrible price for the Cultural Revolution.

In the summer of 1966, the Cultural Revolution became a nationwide political struggle. The students organized the Red Guards as the driving force for the movement. The masses were urged to be guided by Mao’s Thought instead of law. Mao used the Red Guard youth to publicly attack, or “bomb” (*paoda*), the CCP and PRC hierarchy officials. The Red Guards, mostly college, high school, and middle school students, were empowered by Mao and called for “bombing the headquarters,” “rebellion is justified,” and “learning revolution by making revolution.” From June to August 1966, all high schools and colleges dismissed classes and allowed the students to participate in the new revolution. There were three months of the “red terror,” or “great chaos under the

heaven” as Mao said. The Cultural Revolution was conceived from top to bottom.

On August 18, Mao attended a mass meeting celebrating the Cultural Revolution with 1 million of the Red Guards at Tiananmen Square. It became the first of eight mass rallies at Tiananmen Square, where Mao met 11 million of the Red Guards from all over the country in the fall of 1966. They marched into the center of capital city Beijing, singing “The Great Helmsman” in praise of Mao and carrying the *Little Red Book* of Mao’s quotations, which Lin had used to politicize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Red Guard demonstrations were televised all over the world, showing crowds of young people waving copies of the *Little Red Book*.

On August 20, Red Guards in Beijing took the lead in an unprecedented assault against the “Four Olds.” It was estimated that there were more than 16,000 Red Guard groups in the city of Beijing alone. It quickly swept the country. The Red Guards became the “soldiers” of the Cultural Revolution. Violent and lawless, they soon blanketed the land in a “revolutionary Red Terror.” Instigated by the “Cultural Revolution Leading Group,” it degenerated into a wild spree of home searches, property destruction, free-for-all fights, and even murders. These “bad elements” of society suffered physical and psychological attacks. In October 1966, an official report recorded that the Red Guards had already arrested 22,000 “counterrevolutionaries” in Beijing. The Red Guards espoused Mao’s slogans “Revolution should be violent” and “Rebellion is justified.”

By the end of the year, social stability vanished. Industry, agriculture, and commerce were badly disrupted, causing widespread public resentment. Disturbances and conflicts increased. At the same time, since

understanding and concepts varied among the numerous Red Guard organizations, they developed serious factional differences, and constantly argued and debated heatedly among themselves. China’s vast land rumbled and seethed. It had indeed reached the “ideal” stage of Mao’s “great chaos under the heavens” so earnestly sought by the revolutionary seer.

In October, Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch’i) (1898–1969), president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC); Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), vice premier; and many high-ranking government officials in the State Council, ministries, and offices of the central government in Beijing were publicly criticized and purged. One of the Red Guard groups attacked and looted the Ministry of Public Security (China’s FBI) six times in the fall. Most of the ministers and important government officials were detained by the Red Guards, and some were tortured and killed. From the summer to the fall of 1966, the Chinese students moved into the center of domestic politics during the Cultural Revolution. By late 1967, Mao had achieved his political objectives.

In early 1967, the movement had begun to overthrow provincial, county, and metropolitan governments across the country. The Red Guard movement began to take over the local governments. The first such power seizure took place in Shanghai, when the Red Guards and Workers Revolutionary General Headquarters joined forces and forced their way into the city hall. They organized a “revolutionary committee” as the new authority to replace the municipal government and party committee. This power seizure was called the “Shanghai Spring” and followed the Red Guards all over the country. The Red Guards took over the government offices at all levels, jailed the officials, and

administrated provincial and local affairs through their newly established “revolutionary committees.”

Since the summer of 1967, the situation worsened across the country, as the Cultural Revolution entered the phase of a “total taking-over” of the authorities. But different factions within the Red Guards had contradictory political orientations and different plans, leading to violent conflicts within the Red Guards in many places resembling a civil war. The Red Guard movement continued and became more violent, and did greater damage not only to the government and the people, but this time to themselves. The Red Guards began to splinter into zealous factions, based on the schools they had attended, the political status of their families, and rivalry among their leaders. Each group claimed to be the “true” representative of the Thought of Mao. The resulting chaos led to the civil wars between the different Red Guard organizations, and anarchy paralyzed the urban economy.

To stop the national turmoil, Mao employed the PLA to restore social and political order and to prevent a possible civil war in the country. In 1967, the PLA forcibly suppressed the more radical Red Guard groups in Sichuan (Szechwan), Anhui (Anhui), Hunan, Fujian (Fukien), and Hubei (Hupei) Provinces. In these regions, students were also ordered to return to school, and student radicalism was branded “counterrevolutionary” and banned. This was the beginning of the end of the Red Guard movement. However, in the spring, there was a wide backlash against the suppressions, including student attacks on the PLA units.

Following Mao’s order, the military violently put down the national Red Guard movement in late 1967 and early 1968. The suppressions were often brutal. For example,

a radical alliance of Red Guard groups in Hunan, Mao’s home province, refused to give up their weapons. When the PLA sent local units (like the National Guards in the United States) to the area searching for the illegal weapons, the soldiers were ambushed by the armed Red Guards. Then the PLA sent in a field army with tanks and heavy artillery pieces to the area to attack the Red Guards. It was reported that more than 8,000 Red Guards were killed during the conflicts. At the same time, in Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province, the PLA carried out mass executions of Red Guards in order to stop their armed clashes against the PLA units.

On July 28, 1968, Mao and the CCP leaders met with Red Guard leaders in Beijing. The chairman criticized their armed struggle, and officially abolished the Red Guards. In December, Mao called the young people for a new movement, “going to the countryside and learning from the peasants.” Thereafter, millions of the students were sent away from the cities to the remote rural or border areas to do agricultural labor. Many of them never completed their secondary education or college education. Colleges and universities remained closed until the fall of 1970. Hundreds of thousands of Red Guards were killed, beaten, or injured from 1966 to 1968. Some of them were overcome in battle, but most became part of China’s “lost generation of youth.”

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Lin Biao; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong; People’s Liberation Army.

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Republic of China (ROC).

See China, Republic of

Russia, Relations with China

The beginning of Sino-Russian relation can be traced to the seventeenth century, when the interaction between the Tsarist and Qing (1644–1912) Empires was mainly based on foreign trade. In this phase the two states concluded a series of treaties such as the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727), which fixed a common border and other trade regulations. By the nineteenth century, however, encouraged by the success of Britain and France in extorting concessions from China during the First (1839–1842) and Second (1856–1857) Opium Wars, Russia became fully involved in Chinese affairs. The Tsar pressed Qing China to sign the Treaty of Aigun (1858) and the Treaty of Beijing (Peking) (1860), by which the Chinese territory on the northern shore of the Amur, together with that between the Ussuri River and the sea, were placed under Russia's control.

It was not until the 1950s, after World War II, that the two nations became deeply connected again. Nearly a decade after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) drove Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) onto Taiwan, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed in October 1949.

Due to a common fealty to Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union became China's closest ally through most of the 1950s during the Cold War. Soviet technology, equipment, and advisors flowed to China and helped support the latter's Five Year Plan with success. Meanwhile, the two communist regimes built a military alliance through the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1950), which in fact heightened China's dependence on the Soviet Union for economic support and nuclear protection.

After the death of Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), a major political conflict emerged that made the Soviet Union and China bitter rivals in the Communist world for three decades. In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev's (1894–1971) speech denounced some of Stalin's policies and practices. Soon after, Soviet leaders held a summit meeting with the U.S. president, showing a conciliatory gesture toward the United States, which was viewed by their Chinese comrades as a betrayal of revolutionary responsibilities in the third world.

National interests then supplanted ideological schism. That the Soviets were unwilling to share nuclear technology while at the same time refusing to back China in its border disputes with India finally enraged Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the CCP. The Chinese ideological machine rapidly started, denouncing Khrushchev as a "revisionist" and, even

worse, as imperialism's "running dog." In response, the Soviet Union recalled thousands of technical experts from China and openly criticized the CCP at the congress of the Romanian Communist Party.

The war of words then gave the way to armed conflicts. During 1968, Moscow began to place its 25 divisions, 1,200 aircrafts, and 120 missiles along the Chinese border. In March 1969, the tension had reached a fever pitch when two shootouts broke out on Damansky (also known as Zhenbao) Island near the Chinese bank of the Ussuri. But after that, it seemed both sides had drawn back from the brink of war. China soon sought reconciliation with the United States to confront the Soviets, which eventually ended the worst time of confrontation.

As the ideological potshots became passé, Sino-Russian relations were starting to get better. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev (1931–) reduced military forces along the border and restored normal relations with China. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, China further tightened its relation with Russia, partially due to its concern about possible U.S. intervention in Taiwan Strait. In 1993, the two nations concluded an agreement that officially closed all their border disputes. In 1996, a loose alliance encompassing Russia, China, and the Central Asian republics was created. As a result, Sino-Russian relations have entered a new stage.

Tao Wang

See also: China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Damansky Island; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Korean War; Nerchinsk and Kiakhta, Treaties of; Nuclear Program; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; Soviet Union.

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Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)

The Russo-Japanese War was a major conflict in the Pacific that occurred when forces of the Russian Empire engaged the Japanese Empire in a bid for supremacy in East Asia. The subsequent defeat of Russia would do much to bolster the international standing of Japan as a global power, as they had successfully taken on a major European nation. The event also aided in discrediting the Tsarist government, which would soon find itself in the throes of revolution.

The lead-up to the war represented a tumultuous struggle by Japan to realize its ambitions of becoming a world power. From 1894 to 1895, Japan engaged in a war with China, eventually gaining the island of Taiwan and the warm-water harbor of Port Arthur. Russia had its own plans for the region and convinced France and Germany



A Japanese poster depicts victory over the Russians. The Russo-Japanese War was fought in 1904–1905 between Japan and the Russian Empire over competing territorial claims in northern China. (Library of Congress)

to apply diplomatic pressure on Japan, forcing them to turn control of Port Arthur back to the Chinese. Russia in turn leased the port from China, and maintained control over the surrounding area. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, European powers, including Russia, intervened and stationed troops in China. Russia subsequently stationed a military force in Manchuria and began to eye further expansion in the surrounding area, including Korea. Japan saw its sphere of influence threatened, as it maintained considerable influence over Korea, and considered Russian expansionistic aims to be dangerous to their goals.

With the threat of war mounting, Russia and Japan entered into negotiations over

the issue in 1901. These negotiations deadlocked, so in an effort to bolster their position, Japan signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with Great Britain. Under the terms of the treaty, if Japan entered into a war in the Far East and a third party attacked Japan, Britain would go to war on the side of Japan. Russia continued on with the negotiations, and did not suspect that Japan would escalate the conflict further.

On February 9, 1904, however, Japan's navy attacked Russian forces at Port Arthur. A declaration of war had been sent to the Russian government, but it was delivered three hours after the attack. Tsar Nicholas II did not believe the Japanese would attack, and the Russian forces were taken completely off guard by the maneuver. Under the command of Heihachiro Togo, the Japanese Navy inflicted damage to several Russian cruisers. Russian forces were able to stave off a complete defeat, though the battle itself served as a distraction from the Japanese land invasion at Inchon. The Japanese army, under the command of Kuroki Tamemoto, marched on Seoul and solidified its control over all of Korea. Japan commenced a blockade of Port Arthur and turned back attempts by the Russians to break out.

Russian Far East general Aleksey Kuropatkin attempted to stall Japanese advancement into Manchuria. He was under orders to delay them in time for reinforcements to arrive via the Trans-Siberian Railway and to hold the Japanese at the Yalu River. On May 1, 1904, the Japanese army crossed the Yalu River and assaulted the entrenched Russians. The Japanese suffered heavy losses, but with support from other troops landing in Manchuria, they were able to drive Russian forces further back.

In December 1904, Japan took a strategic hill near Port Arthur and began to shell the

Russian fleet. This had a devastating effect as all Russian ships were either destroyed or forced to scuttle. Major General Anatoly Stessel, commander of the garrison at Port Arthur, became dismayed after the loss of the Russian fleet. Although he had enough food and ammunition to last through a siege, and was able to inflict disproportionate casualties on the Japanese every time they attempted to take the port, he nevertheless surrendered on January 2, 1905.

In February 1905, Japan threatened Russian forces near Mukden. The Russian general, Aleksey Kuropatkin, put up a defense of the area utilizing artillery. The Japanese pressed on, and the two forces engaged in fierce and bloody fighting. The Battle of Mukden was one of the largest land battles waged prior to World War I, and lasted from February 20 to March 10, 1905. The Russian army strength was over 200,000 men, with the Japanese army boasting a similar number. Japanese troops were under the command of Prince Oyama Iwao, a field marshal in the army. The superior Japanese tactics allowed them to encircle the Russian forces, and General Kuropatkin gave the call to retreat. Russian forces suffered roughly 90,000 casualties, with the Japanese suffering 70,000. Although the cost was high for Japan, the battle proved to be a resounding success for them, as they had successfully smashed the major Russian army in the region. No further significant land battles would take place for the rest of the war.

The Russian Empire mobilized elements of its Baltic Fleet to sail around the world to confront the Japanese navy. This battle group, renamed the Second Pacific Fleet and under the command of Admiral Zinovy Petrovich Rozhdestvensky, consisted of eight battleships and several other smaller cruisers and destroyers. The fleet set out for the Pacific coast in October 1904. The Russian

fleet finally arrived in late May 1905 and attempted to sneak undetected into the port at Vladivostok through the strait between Korea and Japan known as Tsushima Strait. The fleet was sighted by the Japanese navy, and battle commenced from May 27 to 28. The Japanese fleet consisted of four battleships, but they outnumbered the Russians in destroyers and cruisers as well as possessing a significant number of torpedo boats. The Russian fleet was almost completely destroyed, losing all eight of its battleships among other smaller vessels, and over 5,000 men. The Japanese by comparison lost only several torpedo boats and a little over 100 men. Japanese forces then occupied the Sakhalin Islands and forced the Russians to sue for peace.

U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919) stepped in as a mediator between the two sides and helped them negotiate peace terms. The Treaty of Portsmouth was eventually signed in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard near Portsmouth, New Hampshire in the United States on September 5, 1905, putting an end to the Russo-Japanese War. The treaty ceded Manchuria back to China and allowed Japan to keep half of Sakhalin Island. According to a prior treaty negotiated earlier in the year, the Japanese were also able to have total control of Korea. By the end of the war, the Japanese were seen as a new global power, having successfully taken on a Western power and won, and having been able to project its ambitions for imperialist domination to other regions.

Michael Molina

See also: Boxer Rebellion; Japan, Attack on Manchuria; Manchuria; Manchus; Qing Dynasty; Russia, Relations with China; Sino-Japanese War.

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Second Artillery Corps (Strategic Rocket Force)

The strategic force of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in the summer of 1966 as one of the four services along with the army, navy, and air force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The corps commands 120,000–150,000 troops with its headquarters in Beijing. It controls and operates the third-largest nuclear weapon system in the world after China launched its nuclear and missile programs in the 1950s.

As suggested by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and president of the PRC, Chinese leaders began their nuclear program in 1955 and requested the technology assistance from the Soviet Union. In December 1957, a Soviet-made P-2 surface-to-surface short-range missile arrived in Beijing. In early 1958, Russian nuclear and missile experts began to arrive in Beijing. As part of the 1950s military reform of the PLA, the Soviet Union greatly influenced China's nuclear and missile weapon programs from its inception, although the Soviets refused to offer data on their nuclear-powered submarines and other weapon systems. In 1958, with Soviet help, China completed its first nuclear reactor near Beijing. At that time, the PLA established its first surface-to-surface missile battalion as a strategic force. In late 1958, the PLA Air Force established three surface-to-air missile battalions; on May 21, 1959, it opened its surface-to-air missile training

center, and in March 1964, it established the first surface-to-air missile division.

In 1958–1960, 40,000 special engineering troops of the PLA moved into Lop Nur, the nuclear testing ground, to begin construction of the site. They established a huge testing ground with launch sites, an airport, a railroad, and warehouse facilities. On September 9, 1960, the first Chinese missile, modeled on Soviet P-2, was launched successfully in Inner Mongolia, though it was short range and not suitable for carrying a nuclear warhead. On November 5 and December 6 and 16, China tested three missiles of its own design, C-1059; two of them were surface-to-surface missiles. In June–July, 1964, there were three successful medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missile tests of China's own models. China had its first successful nuclear test on October 16, 1964, which had an estimated yield of over 22 kilotons of TNT, about twice the power of the Hiroshima bomb. In December, China began to manufacture its surface-to-air missiles, "Hongqi-01" (Red Flag No. 1). After the third nuclear test on May 9, 1966, China began to test rockets carrying warheads. The first carrier rocket (delivery system) was successfully tested on June 29. On October 25, 1966, the first combined test, a missile carrying a nuclear warhead, was conducted at Lop Nur, followed by another test on December 28 that yielded an estimated 3.3 megatons of TNT. On June 17, 1967, China tested its first hydrogen bomb.

In the summer of 1965, Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) visited the nuclear test site at Lop Nur to inspect a

missile launch experiment. After his return to Beijing, Zhou held the Special Commission's meeting on August 9–11 to discuss the combination of nuclear warheads and missiles in order to produce strategic nuclear weapons. A week after the meeting, Zhou, Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch'en) (1899–1992), and others began to organize China's strategic missile force, the Second Artillery Corps (*dier paobing*). At the next commission meeting on December 29–31, participants discussed tactical nuclear weapons, surface-to-air missile production, and strategic and tactical missiles. Commission members named 1966 the “missile year” (*daodannian*). The meeting also started initial plans for nuclear submarines, satellites, and an antimissile defense system.

On June 6, 1966, General Wu Kehua was appointed as commander of the Second Artillery Corps, China's strategic missile force. From the beginning, the corps maintained the arsenal for both conventional and nuclear-armed missiles. In 1968, Second Artillery regiments were divided into short-, intermediate-, long-range, and intercontinental units. On September 23, 1969, China conducted its first underground nuclear test.

In 1966, the first group of operational nuclear warhead and missiles were delivered to the Second Artillery Corps. In the 1970s, China began to develop and deploy its short-range (SRBM), medium-range (MRBM), and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), and named them “Dong Feng-01” (East Wind No. 1), “Dong Feng-02” (East Wind No. 2), and “Dong Feng-03” (East Wind No. 3). Then the corps tested and commenced the deployment of “Dong Feng-04” (East Wind No. 4), limited-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). In 1980, China successfully tested “Dong Feng-05” (East Wind No. 5), a full-range ICBM, launching in western China and reaching the

western Pacific. By the 1980s, the Second Artillery Corps became a nuclear deterrent force since its nuclear warhead could reach both western Russia and the United States.

The Second Artillery Corps retains operational control of China's land, air, and sea-based nuclear missiles today. Political control over the nuclear forces is exercised by the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The corps comes under the operational control of the military supreme command or General Staff Department (GSD). It has more than 300 nuclear warheads, including 180 deployed, with 20 ICBMs and 1 ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Chinese ballistic missiles submarines fall under the PLA Navy, but are discussed here as part of China's nuclear deterrent, which is generally the responsibility of the Second Artillery Corps. The corps has also completed a transformation of mobility to ensure the deterrence. Before 2000, the force relied upon a vulnerable liquid model. In 2006, it developed a new solid-fuel and road-mobile “Dong Feng 31A” (East Wind No. 31A) ICBM system in order to increase the survivability of its nuclear deterrent. The new ICBMs will be combat ready faster than the liquid-fueled missile, and more quickly launched and easier to hide. The corps has deployed 18 “Dong Feng 31A.” Moreover, the Second Artillery Corps has more than 1,300 “Dong Feng 11” (East Wind No. 11), and 15 (East Wind No. 15) short-range ballistic missiles along the coastal areas. It is expected to continue to expand its ICBM capabilities and improve upon its land attack cruise missile and antiship missile arsenals.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; General Departments of the People's Liberation Army; Mao

Zedong; Nie Rongzhen; Nuclear Program; People's Liberation Army; Qian Xuesen; Soviet Union; Zhou Enlai.

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Second Field Army (1948–1950)

One of the main forces of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949. When the Anti-Japanese War ended in 1945, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) decided to form a regular army in each strategic region across the country. On August 20, 1945, the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Central Committee started the formation of field armies by reorganizing the existing forces to change the war fighting from the guerrilla warfare to a conventional warfare.

Following this decision, Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986) and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997)

reorganized part of the Eighth Route Army in Taihang, Taiyuan, Jinan, and Ji-Lu-Yu regions into regular armies, totaling 290,000 men. In June 1946, full-scale civil war broke out between the CCP and Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party). Between July and October, Liu and Deng engaged in continuous battles, and their troops had reached 420,000 men.

In 1947, the CMC formed the Central China (*Zhongyuan*) Field Army with Liu as its commander and Deng the political commissar. The army successfully carried out several counterattack campaigns, and their main battlefields had by this time moved to the GMD-controlled areas.

When the GMD offensive slowed down, a CCP strategic offensive began. Deng led 120,000 troops of the Central China Field Army across the Yellow River (Huanghe) and brought the GMD offensive to an end in central China. In October 1947, the CCP high command issued a manifesto that called on the Chinese people to “overthrow Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and liberate all China.” The last phase of the Chinese Civil War, from August 1948 to October 1949, was a CCP offensive from rural areas against GMD defenses in urban areas. The Central China Field Army participated in the Huai-Hai Campaign from November 1948 to January 1949, which annihilated more than 555,000 GMD troops.

In November 1948, the CMC decided to reorganize its troops by renaming all the troops the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In January 1949, the CMC established four field army groups, including the First Field Army Group in the northwest, the Second in central China, the Third in east China, and the Fourth in the northeast.

On February 5, 1949, the Central China Field Army was changed to the Second

Field Army of the PLA. Liu was the commander and Deng the political commissar. The Second Field Army commanded the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Army Group, including nine armies. On April 20, the Second Field Army followed the CMC order to cross the Yangzi (Yangtze) River from the north to the south. In that summer, they liberated the southeastern provinces of Anhui (Anhui), Fujian (Fukien), Zhejiang (Chekiang), and Jiangxi (Kiangsu). Then the Second Field Army marched into the southwestern provinces of Sichuan (Szechwan) and Guizhou (Kweichow) in November. By early April 1950, the Second Field Army occupied all of southwest China except Tibet (Xizang).

On February 22, 1950, the CMC formed the Southwest China Military Regional Command to replace the headquarters of the Second Field Army. He Long (Ho Lung) (1896–1969) was the commander and Deng the political commissar. In May 1950, the Second Field Army merged into Southwest China Command, and the field army system was abolished.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chen Yi; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; First Field Army; Fourth Field Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; He Long; Huai-Hai Campaign; Jiang Jieshi; Li Xiannian; Liu Bocheng; People's Liberation Army; Third Field Army; Tibet.

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Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). See Anti-Japanese War

Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1911)

The term “Self-Strengthening,” also known as *Ziqiang* in Chinese, was a movement to save the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) from being destroyed by domestic rebellions and imperialist aggression and also to embrace appropriate strategies to revitalize the Chinese empire, strengthen the nation, and regenerate its distressed economy. The movement also focused on the modernization of the Qing army and navy in the later nineteenth century.

The strategy was an attempt to learn the superior techniques of the barbarians in order to control them: to adopt Western practices and learn to better defend China against the West. The enlightened ruling elite—such as Prince Gong, Wenxiang, Zeng Guofan (Tseng Kuo-fan) (1811–1872), Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) (1823–1901), and Zuo Zongtang (Tso Tsung-t'ang) (1812–1885)—believed that in order to strengthen China against the West, China had to learn Western techniques of manufacturing ships and guns, and the scientific knowledge behind that military technology. They also believed that since the intelligence and wisdom of the Chinese were superior to those of Western “barbarians,” China would first

learn from foreigners, then line up with them, and finally surpass them.

The movement was divided into three phases. The first phase, from 1861 to 1872, emphasized the adoption of Western firearms, machines, scientific knowledge and training of technical and diplomatic personnel through the establishment of a diplomatic office and a college. To promote educational modernization, the Chinese government established a foreign-language school in Beijing (Peking) in 1862 designed for teaching both Western and Chinese languages as China needed to train its interpreters. Later, similar kinds of schools were established in Shanghai, Guangzhou (Canton), Fuzhou (Fu-chow), and other cities. Such subjects as mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and international law were added to the curriculum at these schools, marking the beginning of Western education in China. The most important achievement of this phase was the development of military industries, especially the construction of military arsenals and of shipbuilding dockyards to strengthen the Chinese navy. For example, the Jiangnan Arsenal and Shipyard in Shanghai was established in 1865. The Nanjing (Nanking) Jinling Arsenal was founded in the same year. The Fuzhou Naval Dockyard was built in 1866.

During the second phase, from 1872 to 1885, commerce, industry, and agriculture received increasing attention in order to strengthen the country. The development of profit-oriented industries, such as shipping, railways, mining, and telegraphy, was becoming a new venture for the Chinese government. The government sanctioned what was known as “government-supervised merchant undertakings.” These were profit-oriented enterprises operated by merchants, but they were controlled and directed by

government officials. Capital for these enterprises came from private sources, but the government managed them and provided subsidies in some cases. Examples of such government-supervised merchant undertakings include the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company, Kaiping Coal Mines, the Shanghai Cotton Mill, and the Imperial Telegraph Administration.

During the third phase, from 1885 to 1895, such industries as textiles and cotton-weaving developed rapidly. For example, the Hubei Textile Company was established in 1894. Like all other newly sprouted enterprises of this kind, they were very weak and represented only a small fraction of the total investment in industry. New types of enterprises that appeared at this time were joint government and merchant enterprises or private enterprises. The Chinese government traditionally discriminated against private merchants, but it changed its attitude because it was only interested in getting capital from private enterprises. The government, however, was still not ready to let them take an active role in economic development. Thus, the private enterprises failed to expand significantly.

Eventually, the Self-Strengthening movement failed. The movement did not strengthen China to meet Western challenges independently. From 1870 to 1914, the imperialist powers were strengthened. The old imperialist powers, such as Britain, France, and Russia, established their sphere of influence in China, supporting local warlords to promote and protect their interests within their sphere of influence. The new imperialist powers, such as Germany and Japan, were rising after their unification movements and promoting industrialization. After achieving their industry and military modernization, they became more aggressive in China. Since China had lost a golden opportunity

to modernize itself, it had to face the more powerful imperialist powers. China's defeat in the French-Chinese War of 1884–1885 and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 indicated the failure of the Self-Strengthening movement.

The Self-Strengthening movement failed, but it was successful in some aspects. In the political sphere, during the movement, the Qing government was successful in suppressing peasants' rebellions because it had established arms and ammunition industries and purchased new modern weapons from the Western countries. Thus, the Qing Empire was able to survive two or three more decades and did not collapse immediately. However, it was finally overthrown in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. In addition, this movement contributed to the beginning of industrialization in China and paved the way for industrial and military modernizations in the following decades. Those arsenals, dockyards, schools, and factories that were established became the foundation of modern industries and education institutions in China, and the cities where modern enterprises were built eventually developed into the richest cities in China.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: Beiyang Army; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Jiangnan Arsenal; Li Hongzhang; New Army; Qing Dynasty; Sino-French War; Sino-Japanese War; Zeng Guofan; Zuo Zongtang.

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September 18 (9-18) Incident (1931). See Japan, Attack on Manchuria

Shang Dynasty (1766–1027 BC)

The Shang dynasty, which lasted from around 1766 to around 1027 BC, is the earliest Chinese dynasty supported by archaeological and documentary evidence. Long thought to be only a legendary dynasty, the Shang ruled over a large area centered in China's north plain. Shang society was highly stratified with a divine-right king and a closely knit aristocracy ruling over large numbers of commoners. The Shang religious practice centered on reverence for one's ancestors and animal spirits. The Shang also developed a system of writing that was the foundation of the written Chinese language.

The Shang dynasty succeeded the Xia dynasty around 1766 BC. It had many different capitals until around the fourteenth century BC, when Anyang became the city from which the last 11 kings ruled. Shang China was a largely agricultural civilization, but the Shang also had some cities, which were both administrative and religious centers of society. The Shang kings, who ruled



from a walled palace, used a small number of aristocrats—allied to the throne through marriages—to act as governors over the Shang states during times of peace and as military generals during times of wars. The basis of the Shang economy was agriculture, and the vast majority of the population engaged in farming land controlled by the king and the nobility. The king frequently conscripted commoners to fight wars, and he coerced them to work on such large-scale state construction projects as city walls. On some occasions, a few commoners were called on to serve as human sacrifices. Remains of such incidents have been unearthed in many Shang royal burial pits.

One of the richest sources of evidence of the Shang dynasty comes from the ceremonial bronze work and oracle bones excavated from tombs, storage pits, and houses. The designs on the highly crafted bronze work reveal aspects of Shang religion wherein animal and other nature spirits, along with the spirits of family ancestors, determined the future. The ability to divine the will of the spirits was a great power. Generally, the king or a high-ranking advisor would write a question on an animal bone or a tortoise shell—often a query about the weather, travel, or war plans—and place it over a fire to make it crack; he then “read” the cracks to divine the answer from the

ancestors. The inscriptions on bronze work and oracle bones display the Shang contributions to the characters that eventually constituted the written Chinese language.

The Shang dynasty ended when the Zhou kingdom from the west defeated the last Shang king in the Battle of Muye and sacked the capital, Anyang, perhaps around 1027 BC but maybe as early as 1050 BC. The Zhou dynasty (1066–221 BC) did not dismantle the Shang administration but ruled in its early years with the help of former Shang officials. The Zhou and future dynasties also benefited from the advances made during the centuries of Shang rule, including advanced bronze work, a complex writing system, and multifunctional urban centers. Many Shang-era archaeological sites continue to yield new information for historians.

Kevin Marsh

See also: Muye, Battle of; Qin Dynasty; Xia Dynasty; Warring States Period; Zhou Dynasty.

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Shanghai Communiqué (1972)

The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), also known as the Shanghai Communiqué, was an important diplomatic

document issued by both governments on February 27, 1972, when U.S. president Richard Nixon (1913–1994) was visiting China. Nixon became the first U.S. president to travel to the People’s Republic, which was nominally a political enemy of the United States. During the groundbreaking trip, President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), the supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), and both leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

The main objective of the communiqué was to facilitate both countries to work together to improve their relations for the good of the American and Chinese people. There were essential differences between China and the United States in their political, social, and economic systems as well as foreign policies, but the two parties agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on a series of principles. These principles were: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Both sides agreed that international disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. Both would apply these principles to their mutual relations and agreed that neither they nor any other power should “seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Both governments agreed that they would stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Beijing (Peking) periodically for consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and to continue to exchange views on issues

of common interest. Both sides hoped that the gains achieved during the U.S. president's visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries and that the normalization of relations between the two countries was not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also would contribute to the relaxation of tensions in Asia and the world.

On the subject of the political status of Taiwan, in the communiqué, Beijing claimed that the government of the People's Republic of China was the sole legal government of China and that Taiwan was a province of China. Washington acknowledged the One-China policy and affirmed the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. The United States claimed that it would progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminished.

Both parties regarded bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit could be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit were in the best interest of both nations. They had the same opinion of smoothing the progress of the progressive development of trade between the two countries.

The Shanghai Communiqué was important in the history of the Sino-U.S. relationship because it helped end hostility between the two that lasted from 1949 to 1971 and contributed to Sino-U.S. normalization when both countries established a formal official relationship on January 1, 1979.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Mao Zedong; Movement to Resist America and Aid Vietnam; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations; Zhou Enlai.

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Shimonoseki, Treaty of (1895)

The Treaty of Shimonoseki (or Maguan) was a diplomatic convention between the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) of China and Japan that marked the close of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The war ended in a clear victory for Japan, and the Qing government was obliged to negotiate with the Japanese and finally signed the accord on April 17, 1895.

Under the treaty, China granted the independence of Korea which was traditionally under Chinese suzerainty. The Pescadores Islands, Taiwan, and the Liaodong Peninsula, including Port Arthur, were ceded to Japan according to the settlement. In addition to the five treaty ports of the

Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking), the agreement confirmed the opening of another four ports: Shashi, Chongqing (Chungking), Suzhou (Su-chow), and Hangzhou (Hang-chow) as well as several rivers for Japanese trade. In that manner, Japan also enjoyed a fixed tariff, most favored nation treatment. According to the treaty, China paid Japan a large war indemnity of 200,000,000 Kuping taels of silver equivalent to two-and-a-half years' revenue of the Japanese government. In return, Japan agreed to withdraw most of their troops from China but continued a temporary occupation of Weihaiwei in order to guarantee "the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act."

The conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki shocked the Western world. As a response, the Triple Intervention (1895) of Russia, France and Germany subsequently forced Japan to retrocede the Liaodong Peninsula to China in exchange for an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels. Much to Japan's surprise, however, following the withdrawal of Japanese forces, Russia moved almost immediately to occupy the entire Liaodong Peninsula, including the strategic Port Arthur. In China, the treaty was considered a national humiliation by the public. It aroused nationalist sentiment and stimulated the demands for radical reforms of the political system, as well as encouraged calls for revolution and overthrow of the Qing dynasty.

Tao Wang

See also: Li Hongzhang; Nanjing, Treaty of; Qing Dynasty; Russo-Japanese War; Sino-Japanese War; Unequal Treaties.

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Silk Road

A land trading route from ancient Chinese capital city Chang'an (modern day Xi'an) in the east reaching the west through Gansu (Kansu) and Xinjiang (Hsin-kiang) Provinces to central and western Asia. It connected the different countries around Mediterranean in the west as early as 202 BC to 8 AD during the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD).

In 138 BC, the Han Emperor Wudi sent his representative Zhang Qian to explore the west and established official relations with the countries in Xinjiang and central Asia. Zhang Qian and his delegation returned after 12 years in 126 BC and brought back important information and connection with the West. In 119 BC, Emperor Han Wudi sent Zhang Qian and 300 delegates to the west for the second time. After Zhang Qian's adventure to the western region, commercial activities between China and central Asia as well as Europe started to blossom and increased dramatically. Chinese silk was popular in central Asia and Europe, and it became a precious commodity. Due to the heavy trade of silk products, the route was called the Silk Road.

Along this 7,000-kilometer route, the silk and porcelain products were the symbols of East Asian culture and civilization. The silk



Caravan crossing the Silk Road. Detail of the map of Asia from the Catalan Atlas, Spain, Majorca, fourteenth century AD. (Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz / Art Resource, NY)

was not only a luxury consumer good but also an effective political tool for the different Chinese dynasties. Friendship ambassadors of China like Zhang Qian always used the silk products to show the friendship between China and other countries when visiting as messenger to the western Asian countries and even farther. The silk and porcelain products enhanced the Chinese image in the Westerners' minds. Due to the high prices of such products in their countries, the people there would imagine that China was a very rich region with abundant natural resources and social wealth. The kings and noble families in those countries used Chinese silk dyed with Phoenician red and interior decoration with Chinese porcelain to show their prestige and nobility. At the same time, China also imported a variety of foodstuffs such as grapes, walnuts, carrots, peppers, beans, spinach, cucumbers, and

pomegranates. In addition, Asian and European merchants brought to China rare animals, birds, plants, furs, medicines, spices, and all kinds of jewelry.

The exploration of the Silk Road is also a great adventure of human civilization as well as the longest international transportation route between the east and the west in the ancient times. It was the creation of many different ethnic groups living along the route. It greatly strengthened the economic and cultural exchange between the east and the west and played an important role in the rising influence and power of the Chinese Han dynasty.

The other important role played by the Silk Road was the dissemination of religions. In 100–200 AD, the Silk Road became famous for helping to spread Buddhism from India to China. Many merchants from central Asia were Buddhists who took Buddhist monks

with them on their trading trips to China. Some of the Indian monks stayed in Chinese cities like Chang'an and worked on translating Buddhist teachings into Chinese. Eventually, during the Han dynasty, Buddhism became recognized in China and assimilated into Chinese culture. Buddhism continued to disseminate from China farther east to Korea, Japan, and other Asian countries.

During the medieval age, more European merchants traveled along the Silk Road from the west to China because of Mongol domination over Eastern Europe and central Asia, which had made such a Euro-Asian journey profitable. Over the Silk Road, many Europeans reached China, and a few left accounts of their travels. Marco Polo (1254–1324) was only one of many. Young Marco began his trip in 1271 with his father and uncle as Italian traders. They left Venice, Italy, traveling east to the Black Sea, South Russia, central Asian oases, and into China. Then Marco Polo spent 17 years in China from 1275 to 1292. He engaged in trade and also worked in the local government during the Mongols' Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). Marco Polo returned to Italy in 1295 and published a book, *Description of the World*, in 1298–1299. No other European traveler has ever given such a detailed account as Marco Polo did of the geography, economic life, and governments along the Silk Road.

In the nineteenth century, a German geologist, F. von Richthofen, began his research on the Silk Road. Another German, Juan Patterson, wrote a book, *Silk Road*, based on his many years of research and study. From then on, the name Silk Road was formally accepted by the world. This route was of great importance to world history as a communication artery between Asian and European continents and the bridge connecting three ancient cultures: Chinese, Greek, and Indian. The Silk Road

has new value in today's world. The ancient route has been replaced by a much faster railway of 10,900 kilometers from Lianyungang, China, to Amsterdam, Netherlands, across the Asian and European continents.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Han Dynasty; Han, Cavalry of; Han Wudi, Emperor; Qin Dynasty; Mongols; Song Dynasty; Song-Mongol War; Xiongnu; Yuan Dynasty.

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Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO)

Joint intelligence and special operations project established between the Republic of

China (ROC) and the United States on April 15, 1943, with the joint signing of the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Agreement. Also known as the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), or the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization, SACO's purpose was to advance the Allied war against Japanese forces by creating an umbrella organization uniting the U.S. Navy, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and Chinese intelligence and espionage organizations under the command of Lieutenant General Dai Li (Tai Li) (1897–1946). While Dai was the head of SACO, U.S. Navy commander Milton E. “Mary” Miles served as deputy director with overall command over the naval and OSS intelligence contingents, with the approval of the U.S. Joints Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater commander General Joseph W. Stilwell (1883–1946).

The initial Outline of the Working Plan of SACO, agreed to by Dai and Miles on August 15, 1943, detailed 34 areas of planned secret intelligence and special operations cooperation. The organization replaced previous efforts by U.S. agencies, such as the OSS and Board of Economic Warfare, to establish their own independent operations within China. For Dai Li, SACO also represented an important opportunity to regulate Sino-U.S. intelligence operations in China and exclude both British forces and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) from future endeavors.

Dai Li, as head of the National Military Council Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (Juntong), was thereafter accorded full U.S. Navy support in creating a joint force of more than 50,000 guerrillas, to which was later added personnel from the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. At its height,

SACO consisted of 14 camps for training in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, intelligence, weather reporting, mining, air crash rescue, demolition, amphibious warfare, and other tactics for combating Japanese forces. Chinese participants in the training programs later returned to both regular and commando units, while others served in the Loyal and Patriotic Army under Dai's personal command. The most notorious SACO camp, Unit Nine, was located a dozen miles from Chongqing and served as the primary site of Dai's own Special Police Officer Training Unit and prison for the detention, torture, and execution of the political enemies of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the ROC and chairman of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party). This SACO-run “FBI school” and concentration camp elicited concern from U.S. China Theater command that American personnel and equipment were being used against Communist agents rather than Japanese soldiers. However, Unit Nine continued to operate until November 27, 1949, when it was burned as Nationalist forces retreated before the advancing People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Under the direction of Dai Li and Milton Miles, SACO helped to create the basis for the contemporary Taiwan's Military Intelligence Bureau of the ROC Ministry of Defense. Yet the organization was never an effective curb on the conduct of independent OSS secret intelligence activities, which were carried out with the support of Lieutenant General Claire Lee Chennault (1893–1958) and his Fourteenth Air Force, and the U.S. Army. Nor was British command ever driven out of the CBI Theater, as Dai Li appears to have hoped. Miles's own accounts of SACO have portrayed it as a highly effective anti-Japanese fighting force, and the exploits of

the “rice paddy navy,” as members of the U.S. Naval Group China have referred to their organization, represented an important episode in the history of Sino-U.S. relations.

Dr. Matthew David Johnson

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, Republic of; Chennault, Claire Lee; China-Burma-India Theater; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; People’s Liberation Army; Stillwell, Joseph.

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Sino-French War (August 1884–April 1885)

Brief war between France and China during August 1884–April 1885 that grew out of the Black Flag/Tonkin Wars of 1882–1885. French gains in Tonkin in northern Vietnam

alarmed China, for Vietnam was still its tributary state, and the Chinese were concerned about the increasing French presence along their southwestern border. When Nguyen dynasty emperor Tu Duc appealed to the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) in China for assistance, the Chinese responded by sending troops to assist the Black Flags or Chinese pirates already fighting the French.

In December 1883, some 600 French troops captured the Black Flag base of Son Tay, whereupon the Chinese reinforced Bac Ninh, presumed to be the next French target. On March 12, 1884, however, they abandoned Bac Ninh to the French after only minimal resistance. Two months later, the Chinese agreed to withdraw entirely from Tonkin.

Fighting should have ended at this point, but in June 1884, the French sent troops to occupy Lang Son, the closest major Tonkinese town to the Chinese frontier. At Bac Le, 30 miles short of their goal, the French encountered Chinese troops. Accounts differ over the cause of the clash, but fighting broke out and the French were repulsed at a cost of 22 French dead and 60 wounded.

French premier Jules Ferry (1883–1885) was determined to secure Tonkin, and the French made their major military effort in Tonkin, where in the spring of 1884 they had 9,000 men. By the summer of 1885, this force had grown to 40,000 men. Under aggressive generals Louis-Alexandre Brière de l’Isle and François de Négrier, the French spent most of the spring and summer of 1884 clearing the Red River Delta. In relatively easy fighting they managed to push deep into the northwest highlands.

The Black Flags and Chinese regulars enjoyed the advantage of superior numbers and, for the most part, better infantry weapons. They had Remington, Spencer, Martini-Henry, and Winchester repeating rifles,

whereas the French carried only the single-shot 1874 model Gras rifle. Both the Black Flags and Chinese preferred to fight defensively, and they built strong forts, although these tended to be badly sited. While courageous and well disciplined, the Chinese were often badly led. They had artillery but they seldom used it, and they were very poor marksmen, preferring not to fire their rifles from the shoulder in aimed fire. In the end, French offensive tactics usually carried the day. Led by aggressive officers, the French employed both light artillery and dynamite to blast holes in their enemies' bamboo palisades, and, although usually outnumbered by four or even five to one, their bayonet charges usually routed the defenders. But because the French lacked sufficient manpower to surround the fortresses, most of the defenders escaped to fight again. Both sides gave little quarter. The Chinese dug up French corpses to cut off the heads and place them on lances or flag poles. This practice led the French to kill their prisoners. Nonetheless, the French won a series of relatively easy victories, which led to a false sense of confidence, underestimation of their enemy, and overextension of resources.

In early autumn 1884, Chinese regulars from southwestern Yunnan Province joined the Black Flags, led by Liu Yongfu (Liu Yung-fu), in surrounding the French garrison town of Tuyen Quang on the Clear River northwest of Hanoi. The siege of that place is one of the glorious chapters in the history of the French Foreign Legion. Although vastly outnumbered, the French held out from November 24, 1884, until they were relieved on March 3, 1885.

On February 13, 1885, 12 French battalions totaling some 9,000 men took the city of Lang Son in far northeastern Tonkin, and on February 23, they forced the Chinese from Dong Dang, 10 miles to the north, next

to the Chinese border. The Chinese fled across the border. General Brière de l'Isle then marched south again to relieve the Tuyen Quang. Departing Lang Son on February 16, he defeated a Chinese force at Hoa Mac in what turned out to be the bloodiest battle for the French in Tonkin since their 1883 invasion. His men then relieved Tuyen Quang on March 3.

A series of French reversals followed. In late March, seemingly on the brink of defeat a month earlier, the Chinese went on the offensive. Convinced that the French were going to invade southwestern Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province, they struck in force. On March 29, the Chinese retook Lang Son and then began to organize thousands of Vietnamese volunteers. Already the Tonkin campaign of 1884–1885 was one of the more controversial episodes in the history of the Third Republic, and Premier Ferry's opponents used the defeat at Long Son to drive him from office. Georges Clemenceau, himself premier during a most difficult military test for France, accused Ferry of "treason" for bogging France down in Vietnam.

An armistice was declared in April 1885, before Chinese forces could capitalize on their success at Lang Son. This was largely as a consequence of French naval operations against China proper. In 1884, at the start of fighting, Paris had ordered Admiral Amédée Anatole Courbet to threaten the Chinese naval base at Fuzhou (Foochow) and to occupy the coal-mining port of Jilong (Keelung) in Taiwan (also known as Formosa). In October 1884, Courbet dispatched to Keelung the ironclad *La Galissonnière*, cruiser *Villars*, and a gunboat. The French bombarded the port and sent troops ashore, but this force was soon reembarked.

Courbet then moved against Fuzhou on the Min River. Passage to the base was protected by two strongly fortified narrows,

and Courbet was unable to use his two armored cruisers because of their draught. Flying his flag in the cruiser *Volta*, Courbet had five unarmored cruisers, three gunboats, and two small torpedo craft. Chinese defenses included shore batteries and 11 ships (2 of them cruisers) as well as junks and fire ships, but the Chinese warships were vastly inferior to those of the French, whose most powerful ships were ironclads. On the afternoon of August 23, Courbet sent in the torpedo boats *No. 45* and *No. 46* against the Chinese flagship and other cruiser. The flagship *Yangwu* was sunk by a spar torpedo from *No. 46*. The battle then became general, and within an hour all the Chinese ships were either sunk or on fire and drifting. Courbet estimated Chinese casualties at 2,000–3,000 men and put his own “cruel losses” at 10 dead and 48 wounded.

After blowing up the docks and shelling the arsenal, the French steamed for the open sea. In three days, they methodically destroyed the Chinese barrier forts. Courbet then took his squadron to Keelung to avenge the earlier repulse there. At Keelung the French sank a Chinese frigate and sent ashore only 1,800 men. They occupied the port and a neighboring harbor, but even with reinforcements their numbers were completely inadequate.

In early February 1885, Courbet sent part of his squadron from Keelung to confront an effort by the Chinese Nanyang Fleet (Southern Seas Fleet) to break the naval blockade of Taiwan. On February 11, near Shipu Bay, the French ships encountered the relatively modern Chinese cruisers *Kaiji*, *Nanchen*, and *Nanrui*, accompanied by the frigate *Yuyuan* and the composite sloop *Dengching*. The Chinese ships fled on spotting the French, but the French succeeded in trapping the *Yuyuan* and *Dengching* in Shipu Bay. There on the night of February 14, the

French destroyed both Chinese ships in a torpedo boat attack. On March 1, Courbet located the three cruisers, which had taken refuge with four other Chinese warships in Zhenhai Bay, near Ningbo. Courbet settled for a blockade of the entrance of the bay, but on that same day, there was a brief exchange of fire between the French cruiser *Nielly* and the Chinese shore batteries, which the Chinese claimed as a major victory. With the Chinese unable to break the French naval interdiction of the seaborne rice trade between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, however, they decided to seek peace.

On June 9, 1885, France and China signed the Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin). It had tremendous consequences for Vietnam, for under its terms China renounced its suzerainty over Vietnam and recognized the French protectorate. Both Chinese regular troops and Black Flags retired behind the Chinese border. In 1887, Paris formed its conquests into French Indochina. Laos was added in 1893, after the Siamese had been bluffed into withdrawing their outposts on the left bank of the Mekong and the French had offered protection to the king of Luang Prabang.

Dr. Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Self-Strengthening Movement; Tianjin, Treaty of.

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Sino-Indian Border War (1962)

The Chinese-Indian War arose over a border dispute along the Himalayan Mountains in Ladakh and Aksai Chin in the west and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in the east. The small-scale border conflicts began in August 1962, and in October, China launched a large-scale offensive campaign against the Indian garrison. By late November, when China declared a cease-fire, both sides had engaged more than 100,000 troops with a total of 11,100 casualties and losses.

Part of the border dispute in the east concerned the McMahon Line, a border based on a 1914 British-Tibetan agreement. Tibet had served as a buffer zone between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India since 1949, when Beijing (Peking) recognized the autonomy of the Tibetan government. In 1951, the central government negotiated with Tibet and signed the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet on May 23, 1951. Then the Chinese government sent the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to Tibet to safeguard its borders with India and Nepal. The agreement affirmed Tibet's political autonomy, social system, and religious freedom. In 1959, however, the central government accused the Buddhist spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, of organizing a separatist movement in Tibet. The PLA troops suppressed the rebellion. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama escaped into India.

As a result, Chinese-Indian relations reached the lowest point since the founding

of the PRC. Afterwards, the Indian government granted sanctuary to the Dalai Lama, who denounced China's "aggression" in Tibet and continued to be "active in exile." Armed clashes escalated during the summer of 1959. On August 25, a small group of Indian troops crossed into the Longju area north of the McMahon Line and exchanged fire with a Chinese border patrol. On October 21, there was another incident along the border of the western sector at Kongka Pass. Both sides claimed that the other fired first, and both prepared an escalation of the border conflict. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and the Indian government reinforced the border areas to pressure the Chinese through this "forward policy." Nehru also turned to the Soviet Union for more economic aid and military support. In Beijing, the Central Committee and Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) instructed the PLA to mobilize the frontier troops and plan a "counter-offensive campaign." The PLA employed four regiments in Tibet, about 13,000 men, and two regiments in Xinjiang, about 7,000 men, as combat troops. The Chinese high command also deployed a large number of transportation and communication troops across Tibet since their large-scale offensive campaign took place at altitudes of over 14,000 feet, which posed enormous logistics problems.

China's large-scale attacks began on October 20 against the Indian garrisons in Ladakh/Aksai Chin and the NEFA. In the east, the PLA troops crossed the border and destroyed defense points of the Indian Army. On the 22nd, the PRC Defense Ministry announced that the PLA operation would not be limited by the "illegal McMahon Line." By the 28th, the PLA's Tibet regiments wiped out 43 strongpoints on the

Indian side of the McMahon Line. In the west, the Xinjiang's regiment crossed the border and took over 37 Indian strongpoints by traveling over 1,000 kilometers along the borders. The Indian troops, ill prepared and poorly supplied, fell back under the PLA assaults. The Nehru administration, however, did not give up. While requesting military aid from the West, including the United States, Nehru reinforced the border areas with an additional 30,000 men in November. His defense effort still focused on the east. In early November, the Indian troops launched their own counteroffensive along the eastern borders.

Facing the Indian attacks, the CMC deployed more troops to the borders. By mid-November, the PLA had reinforced eight infantry and three artillery regiments along the eastern borders; four regiments at the middle section of the eastern borders; and one regiment in the west, totaling 56,000 troops. The troops in the east encircled the Indian troops and cut their supply lines by November 17. The next day, the eastern troops launched an all-out attack on the Indian troops. By the 21st, the PLA eliminated the Indian presence along the eastern borders. In the west, the PLA also attacked the Indians. By November 21, the PLA accomplished its goal. On the 22nd, the Chinese government announced a cease-fire along the Chinese-Indian borders. After December 1, Chinese forces began pulling out of Indian territories and returned to the old boundary, or "traditional border." According to the Chinese reports, between October 20 and November 21, India lost 8,700 troops, including 4,800 killed and 3,900 captured. Total PLA casualties were 2,400 dead and wounded.

The 1962 Sino-Indian War "validated" the PLA war fighting doctrine and their basic principles of war, including "discipline,

surprise, flexibility, mass, and maneuver." But no Tibetan people's war existed at this time. The PLA faced new social and political issues such as religion, minority, geopolitics, and independence movements in Tibet and Xinjiang. Unlike their wars in the 1930s and 1940s, the Chinese troops fought in the middle of a hostile population—Tibetans. The Tibetans had the same religions, ethnic tradition, close political connection, and similar languages as the Indian troops. Unlike the North Koreans in the Korean War, the local Tibetan and Uygur (Uighur) people did not provide much support, even moral support, to the Chinese troops. The few Tibetan and Uygur soldiers in the PLA could not bridge the social, cultural, and political gaps between the Chinese troops and local people. The PLA's warfighting experience in India demonstrated that the Chinese troops were much better prepared for a foreign war than they were in Korea 10 years earlier. The improved logistics supply, communication and transportation, and chain of command all reflected positive results of Peng Dehuai's (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) reform efforts. The technology and professionalism achieved in the mid-1950s was maintained to some extent after the fall of Peng in 1959 and the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Dalai Lama; Korean War; Lin Biao; McMahon Line; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Soviet Union; Tibet.

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Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)


The Sino-Japanese War between 1894 and 1895 was a conflict between China and Japan primarily over control of Korea. After the Japanese Shogunate government collapsed in 1868, the Meiji government (1868–1912) dispatched Japanese students to Europe and the United States to study Western technology and science to strengthen Japan's power to compete equally with the Western powers. In just 30 years, Japan was transformed from a divided state to an industrialized country and had become the most powerful state in Asia by the end of the nineteenth century. As a newly rising power, Japan began to adopt an aggressive foreign policy, promoting overseas territorial expansion to protect its own interests and security as well as to expand its overseas trade. Korea naturally became the first target of Japanese expansionism.

For many centuries, Korea had been a tributary state to imperial China, which exerted great influence over the conservative Korean officials who gathered around the royal family. After the First Opium War of 1839–1842 between the Imperial Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and the British Empire,

and the French-Chinese War of 1884–1885, China had become weak and was unable to resist political intervention and territorial intrusion by Western imperialist powers. The decline of imperial China provided the Japanese an opportunity to replace Chinese influence in Korea with its own power.

The Japanese believed that Japan had to occupy Korea because Korea's coal and iron ore deposits would help Japan promote its industrialization. In addition, the Chinese military presence on the Korean Peninsula would pose a serious threat to Japanese national security and interests. For these two reasons, Japan was determined to terminate the centuries-old Chinese suzerainty over Korea.

In Korea, public opinion was divided. Conservative Koreans still tried to maintain the traditional obedient relationship with Imperial China, while the new, young reformists advocated the creation of a closer relationship with Japan and Western powers in the face of the decay of the colossal empire. In 1882, a severe drought broke out across the Korean Peninsula, which resulted in food shortages, causing much suffering and conflict among the Korean people. Korean society was at the edge of starvation, and the government was in danger of bankruptcy because the government was unable to pay its debts, particularly to its armies. Profound anger was rising amongst the soldiers of the Korean army because they had not been paid for months. As a result, a group of pro-Japanese reformers overthrew the pro-Chinese conservative government of Korea in 1884. In spite of this successful coup, the pro-Chinese Korean armies, with the support of the Chinese troops, were successful in defeating the pro-Japanese reformers and in regaining control of the Korean government in a bloody counter-coup. These coup d'états led to not only the



The Japanese Navy sinks a Chinese ship during a battle on the Yalu River (the boundary between China and Korea) on September 17, 1894. In this decisive engagement of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japanese warships sank five Chinese vessels, and nearly 1,000 Chinese sailors drowned. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

deaths of many pro-Japanese reformers, but also the burning of the Japanese embassy and the deaths of several Japanese security guards and citizens. This incident contributed to a conflict between Japan and Chinese governments, but the Sino-Japanese Convention of Tianjin (Tientsin) of 1885 helped put down their differences. According to the convention, both Japan and China agreed to withdraw their expeditionary troops from Korea at the same time, send no more military advisors to train the Korean armies, and inform the other side in advance if one party resolved to send armies to the Korean Peninsula. The agreement gave the Japanese a status that almost equaled that of China in Korea, but the Japanese were still irritated by the Chinese government, which was determined to maintain its power and

influence in the Korean Peninsula to stop Japanese expansion there.

The Korean situation increasingly deteriorated and the conflict between China and Japan was becoming intensified. In 1894, to answer the call of the Korean emperor, the Chinese government dispatched troops to Korea to put down the Dongxue Rebellion. The Chinese government notified the Japanese government of its plan to send an expeditionary force of nearly 3,000 troops to the Korean Peninsula according to the terms of the Convention of Tianjin. The Japanese believed that the Chinese expeditionary force to Korea would violate the convention and decided to send 8,000 troops to Korea. The Japanese troops afterward captured the emperor, occupied the imperial house in the capital of Seoul, and established a new

pro-Japanese government on June 8, 1894. The new pro-Japanese Korean government authorized Japan to force all Chinese armies out of Korea and to dispatch more Japanese troops to the Korean Peninsula. Since the Qing government refused to recognize the new Korean government, a conflict over Korea between China and Japan seemed unavoidable. By that time, the Japanese military had been ready for a war against the Chinese.

During the era of the Meiji Restoration, the Meiji emperor began to build an effective modern national army and navy. In 1873, national conscription was imposed and a professional army was established, while military schools and arsenals were created. The Meiji government then sent many Japanese military officials to European countries to study the strengths, strategies, and tactics of European armies and navies. By the 1890s, Japan had developed a modern, professional, well-trained army. Well equipped and supplied, Japan's imperial army of 120,000 troops was divided into two armies and five divisions.

In the meantime, the modern Japanese navy was established with the help of the British Royal Navy, the leading naval power in the world in the nineteenth century. The British sent the naval advisors to Japan to teach and train the Japanese imperial Navy. Meanwhile, the Meiji government sent Japanese students to Great Britain to learn and survey the British navy. The Japanese soon created their own modern warships, such as cruisers and torpedo boats.

In contrast, the Chinese military was not modernized, poorly trained, and inadequately equipped. After suppressing the Taiping Rebellion of 1851–1864, the Chinese army had been divided into Manchu, Mongol, Hui (Muslim) and Han Chinese armies under the leadership of the

local independent warlords. The Huai and Xiang armies made up the larger Beiyang Army, which was the most powerful army at that time. The divided Chinese armies did not have much strength due to regional rivalry. The Beiyang Fleet was one of the four major Chinese navies in the late Qing Dynasty. Li Hongzhang, the viceroy of Zhili, supported the navies greatly, and the Beiyang Fleet was the leading navy in East Asia before the first Sino-Japanese War. However, the corrupt Qing government spent much money on building the Summer Palace in Beijing while stopping purchase of any modern weapons, arms, and ammunitions after 1891. The Beiyang force (Beiyang Army and Beiyang Fleet) was the best equipped and best trained, standing for the new, modernized military of China, but the Beiyang Fleet did not obtain any new warships after it was founded in 1888. Warships were not maintained correctly, and disorderliness was widespread among the Chinese navy. The morale of the Chinese armies was usually very low by reason of lack of pay and prestige. To make things worse, many in the Chinese armies were using opium and became opium addicts, which significantly reduced the strength of the military.

The Chinese tried to use Korea to restrain the more imperialist encroachment of Japan in East Asia, but their weak military helped contribute to Japanese aggression in Korea. The Sino-Japanese War was officially declared on August 1, 1894, although some naval skirmishing had already occurred. In July 1894, the Chinese had 3,500 troops in the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese army defeated the Chinese in a series of battles around Seoul and Pyongyang. After Pyongyang fell to the hands of the Japanese army, the Chinese retreated from northern Korea and then took up defensive positions in fortresses along their side of the Yalu River, a

river between the Korean Peninsula and China. The powerful Japanese army began to invade Manchuria after defeating the Qing army in October.

The modern Japanese navy defeated China's Beiyang Fleet at the mouth of the Yalu River at the Battle of Yalu on September 17, 1894. The Chinese navy, after losing 8 out of 10 warships, was forced to retreat behind the fortifications of the Weihaiwei naval base, and Japan's domination of the sea was secured. The Japanese lost no time in launching a sudden land attack across the Liaodong Peninsula and smashed the rest of the Beiyang Fleet at the naval base with intense shelling from the heavy cannons on land. After Weihaiwei, Shandong (Shantung) Province, fell to the Japanese on February 2, 1895, the Japanese quickly occupied Manchuria.

After defeating the Chinese army and navy, on March 23, 1895, the Japanese military invaded the Pescadores Islands off the west coast of Taiwan. In a short military campaign without any bloodshed, the Japanese overcame the islands defended by the Qing force and took over the major town of Makung. This successful campaign prohibited the Chinese forces in Taiwan from being strengthened and gave the Japanese government an opportunity to force the Qing government to surrender Taiwan to Japan in the negotiation thereafter. Poor preparation, inadequate training, and a great disparity between weapons and munitions were the major reasons for China's defeat in the war. In addition, the war was fought largely with Li Hongzhang's forces without any support from other Chinese.

Faced with these repeated defeats, the Qing government under great pressure was compelled to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. Under this treaty, the Qing government recognized the entire

independence of Korea and surrendered the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands to Japan. The Treaty provided that China pay Japan 200 million taels as reparation and that China have to conclude a commercial treaty with Japan to allow Japanese ships to operate on the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, to establish factories in treaty ports, and to open four more ports to foreign trade. Japan forced the Chinese government to sign the treaty, but some European powers, especially Germany, Russia, and France, did not want to allow the Japanese to establish a colony on the Liaodong Peninsula in mainland China. As a result, Japan, under great pressure from the European powers, was compelled to stop colonization of the Liaodong Peninsula in exchange for another 30 million taels as indemnity on April 23, 1895.

The first Sino-Japanese War helped prove the supremacy of Japanese military tactics and training as a result of the acceptance of a Western-style military. The Japanese triumph in the war was also the consequence of the successful modernization and industrialization in Japan from 1868 to 1894. The defeat of China helped cement Japan as a regional power, if not a great power on equal terms with the Western powers, and a dominant power in Asia. As the Japanese reputation was rising, Japan began to challenge the Western powers' interest in East Asia. One of the results of the challenge was the Russo-Japanese War between 1904 and 1905 when the Japanese military tried to force Russia out of northeast China.

The consequence of the first Sino-Japanese War indicated that the military strength and sovereignty of the Qing dynasty had been severely weakened. The defeat of imperial China with 400 million in population by a small island state of Japan was a great insult to the Chinese. The result of this war also underlined the failure of the Self-

Strengthening movement in China from 1861 to the 1890s to strengthen the Chinese state and modernize the Chinese military. The outcome of the war revealed the Qing government's incompetence and serious corruption. Thereafter, many Chinese intellectuals demanded political and social reform in China, which resulted in the Hundred Days Reform of 1898 under the leadership of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. The reform movement failed, but it paved the way for the 1911 Revolution, which finally overthrew the Qing dynasty and established a republic in China in 1912.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: Chinese Revolution of 1911; Beiyang Army; Li Hongzhang; Manchuria; Manchus; Mongols; New Army; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Russo-Japanese War; Self-Strengthening Movement; Shimonoseki, Treaty of; Sino-French War; Xiang Army.

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Sino-Soviet Conflict (1969–1971)

Border war between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. Border

disputes between China and Russia have a long history, dating back to the eighteenth century. Following China's Communist alliance with the Soviet Union in 1949, both countries accepted the territorial status quo along their 4,150-mile-long border, and signed the 1951 Border Rivers Navigation Agreement.

With the emerging Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the border issue resurfaced. China claimed some border territories as its own and sent the troops of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into these areas. Soviet forces expelled the Chinese, and fighting was usually avoided until the late 1960s. The Soviet Union increased its troops by the end of 1968 from 17 divisions to 27 along the Sino-Soviet border. In 1968–1969, the PLA was apparently under tremendous pressure and felt directly threatened by the Soviet Union.

In October 1968, Marshal Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971), China's defense minister, warned the army and the country that Soviet forces would invade China soon. Thereafter, the country became militarized and was prepared for an invasion. While planning to defeat the invading troops by a "people's war," Lin instructed the PLA to confront the Soviets wherever an invasion occurred. Beginning in March 1969, small-scale border skirmishes erupted at the Zhenbao (Damansky) and Bacha Islands in Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang), northeast China; and at Taskti and Tieliekti in Xinjiang (Hsin-kiang), northwest China.

In the first clash on March 2, 40 Chinese soldiers patrolled Zhenbao Island, one of the small disputed uninhabited islands (0.74 square mile) in the middle of the Ussuri River. The Soviets dispatched 70 border troops to the island, but the Chinese refused to leave. Both sides blamed the other for opening fire at 9:00 A.M. With 200 reinforcements, the Chinese attacked and killed

30 Soviet soldiers, losing only 6 of their own. After a 12-day stand-off, on March 15, over 100 Soviet troops and six tanks counterattacked. Heavy artillery pieces shelled both shores. More than 40 Chinese soldiers were killed. The Soviets lost eight men and one T-62 tank, which sank in the river when artillery fire shattered the two-meter-thick ice cover.

For the rest of the year, sporadic fighting continued in many places along their borders, and both nations stood on the brink of war, with the Soviets threatening nuclear retaliation. Among the border incidents, on June 10, 50 Soviet soldiers attacked the Chinese in Taskti, Xinjiang. On July 8, the fighting in Heilongjiang extended to the Bacha Island along the Amur River. On August 13, more than 300 Soviet troops supported by 20 tanks and two helicopters engaged in Tieliekti, Xinjiang, and annihilated all the Chinese troops in the battle. The border conflicts did not escalate into a total war between the two Communist countries. Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) met Soviet president of the Ministers Council Aleksei Kosygin (1904–1980) in Beijing (Peking) on September 11, 1969. But the border clashes continued along the Chinese-Russian borders until the late 1970s. Reportedly, Moscow's leaders considered using a "preemptive nuclear strike" against China.

By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had deployed up to 48 divisions, constituting nearly 1 million troops along the Russian-Chinese border. China prepared for total war, including possible Russian nuclear attacks. As a result of its frequent engagements, the PLA increased to more than 6 million men, the highest point in its history. Beijing demanded a reduction in the number of Soviet troops on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders as one of the three conditions for a normalization of

relations with Moscow. Mao also intended to undermine the rising power of the Soviets in Asia by playing the "American card" and opening a new relationship with the United States. The Soviet threat and conflicts pushed the Chinese leaders to improve their relations with the United States. Their strategic needs eventually led to the normalization of the Sino-American relationship in the early 1970s, when U.S. president Richard Nixon (1913–1994) visited Beijing in February 1972.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Damansky Island; Lin Biao; People's Liberation Army; People's War; Sino-Soviet Split; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; Soviet Union; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations.

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Sino-Soviet Split (1956–1966)

The collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance marked the transformation of the Cold War world from bipolarity to multipolarity. Superficially an ideological partnership between the world's two largest communist countries, the Sino-Soviet alliance began on February 14, 1950, with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. From its inception, the seemingly monolithic union was fraught with constantly shifting expectations about its precise place in the socialist world, subjected to American attempts to split it, and afflicted by the progressively ideological radicalism of People's Republic of China (PRC) President Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976).

Although Sino-Soviet disagreements over Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's (1894–1971) 1956 de-Stalinization campaign remained hidden for a time, the advanced state of the alliance's disintegration became known to the outside world by the early 1960s. Because Mao exploited ideological conflict for domestic purposes, the final breakdown of the Sino-Soviet partnership in mid-1966 coincided with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), launched both to purge the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, the Communist Party of China) of alleged ideological revisionists and to create a communist utopia.

Viewing any alliance with a great power solely as a temporary means to help restore past Chinese glory and power, the Chinese Communists by the late 1940s had decided to lean toward the Soviet Union. Surprised by Mao's request in late 1949 for an economic and military alliance, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) first hesitated but then agreed for utilitarian reasons to conclude a Friendship and Alliance Treaty that provided the Soviet Union access to

railroads, warm-water ports, and important raw materials deposits in Manchuria and Xinjiang (Hsin-kiang) in exchange for Soviet military and economic aid. Stalin's limited support of the PRC during the Korean War (1950–1953), however, revealed the limits of the military aspects of the alliance. After the Soviet dictator's 1953 death, the end of the Korean War, and Khrushchev's ascendancy to power, the focus of the Sino-Soviet relationship gradually shifted toward assistance in economic development and improved party relations.

Khrushchev's "secret speech" of February 25, 1956, charging Stalin with arbitrary and criminal rule, undermined Mao's growing personality cult in China but strengthened his hand in his relations with the Soviet leaders. After increasing his influence in the socialist world through diplomatic mediation during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Mao concluded that although he considered Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin unfair and imbalanced, it had nevertheless revealed the need to preempt internal dissent in China in order to prevent a crisis similar to the Hungarian Revolution. The PRC's Hundred Flowers campaign in the spring of 1957 was designed to allow party members and intellectuals to vent their pent-up frustrations in a highly controlled framework but threatened within only a few weeks to undermine the Chinese communist regime. While Beijing launched the Anti-Rightist campaign in the summer of 1957 to stamp out internal dissent, Khrushchev survived the so-called Anti-Party Incident, which the remaining Stalinists in the party leadership staged with the goal of reversing de-Stalinization. Both events proved to be crucial for the further development of the Sino-Soviet relationship, since they put the PRC and the Soviet Union on two conflicting political, ideological, and economic paths.

As modest liberalization continued in the Soviet Union in 1958, Mao, following the Anti-Rightist campaign, radicalized the domestic political discourse in the run-up to the Great Leap Forward, which was supposed to propel the PRC into full-fledged communism. These internal changes led to a more aggressive and anti-American foreign policy before and during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (August–September 1958). Mao's willingness, stated to Soviet foreign minister Andrey Gromyko in early September, to trigger a nuclear war over a series of small, disputed islands in the Taiwan Strait placed the first significant strains on the Sino-Soviet relationship.

Faced with widespread famine as a result of the misguided economic policies of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP leadership undertook internal discussions in mid-1959 about economic reforms aimed at averting further disaster. Fearing challenges to his leadership, Mao was able both to purge his opponents within the party and to relaunch an unreformed Great Leap Forward in late 1959 in order to save his vision of a communist utopia. The economic catastrophes resulting from the Great Leap Forward, however, shocked the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Mao's radical anti-American stance also clashed with Khrushchev's rapprochement policies.

The unexpected April 1960 Chinese publication of the so-called Lenin Polemics—three articles released on the occasion of Vladimir I. Lenin's ninetieth birthday that promoted ideologically radical positions diametrically opposed to Soviet viewpoints—revealed the brewing Sino-Soviet tensions to the world. After ideological clashes between the Soviet and CCP delegations during the Third Romanian Party Congress in late June 1960, the Soviet Union decided to punish the PRC by withdrawing all of its advisors from the PRC in July 1960.

Although the Great Leap Forward had caused the complete collapse of China's economy and had brought Sino-Soviet trade to a virtual standstill, Beijing used the withdrawal to blame Moscow for its economic problems. Until the mid-1960s, the PRC shifted much of its foreign trade away from the Soviet Union toward Japan and Western Europe. Because of China's pressing economic problems and the failure of Khrushchev's rapprochement with U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) after the May 1960 U-2 Crisis, however, both sides realized the necessity of an ideological truce, which they formally reached at the Moscow Conference of the world's communist parties in late 1960.

Shunted aside from domestic decision making because of his close association with the failed Great Leap Forward, Mao used the 1961 Soviet-Albanian conflict as a tool to rebuild his political fortunes at home. Subsequent anti-Soviet propaganda in the PRC triggered conflicts between Soviet citizens and ethnic central Asians living in Xinjiang (Hsin-kiang) on the one side and the local Chinese administration on the other. The mass flight of 67,000 people to Soviet Kyrgyzstan in the late spring of 1962 caused Beijing to abrogate its consular treaty with Moscow on the basis of alleged Soviet subversive activities in western China. Mao used these developments to restore his standing in the CCP leadership and to push for more anti-Soviet policies in the second half of 1962. Khrushchev's nuclear provocation and sudden retreat under U.S. pressure during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis provided Mao with an unexpected opportunity to attack the Soviet leadership publicly for ideological inconsistency and political unreliability.

The United States had been intent on splitting the Sino-Soviet alliance since

1950, but only in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis was it able to use the Soviet-British-American negotiations on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) to deepen the Sino-Soviet rift. Aware of the problems between Beijing and Moscow, Washington played on Soviet fears about China's nuclear weapons program and Khrushchev's dissatisfaction with Mao's ideological warfare. Despite the fact that the PTBT (initialed on July 25, 1963) did not infringe on China's nuclear program, the signing of the treaty by almost all countries of the world within five months isolated the PRC internationally.

The period from mid-1963 to mid-1966 witnessed the final collapse of Sino-Soviet party and military relations. Convinced that the Sino-Soviet pact had fulfilled its usefulness, Mao fanned and exploited ideological conflict and territorial disputes with his Soviet comrades for domestic purposes. Because the launching of the Cultural Revolution required a prior break with what Mao termed Soviet "revisionists, traitors of Marxism-Leninism, and fascists," he eventually broke party relations in early 1966 by his refusal to send a delegation to the Twenty-Third Soviet Party Congress. Simultaneously, his radical ideological stances precluded the invocation of Sino-Soviet Treaty obligations in support of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) during the Vietnam War (1964–1973). By the mid-1960s, the military alliance between Beijing and Moscow factually ceased to exist, although the treaty did not officially expire until February 14, 1980. Until the rapprochement initiated by Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev (1931–) in the late 1980s, for nearly 25 years Sino-Soviet relations consisted only of low-level cultural relations and limited trade links.

Dr. Lorenz M. Lüthi

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Korean War; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Movement to Resist America and Aid Vietnam; Russia, Relations with China; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; Soviet Union; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.

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Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (February 1950)

A treaty signed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Soviet Union to guarantee



The Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on February 14, 1950. Soviet foreign prosecutor Andrei Vishinsky is seated at the table. Standing directly behind are Premier Joseph Stalin (left) and Mao Zedong (right). (Bettmann/Corbis)

Soviet military and economic aid to the newly established Chinese Communist government. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), declared the birth of the PRC and the new republic's alliance with the Soviet Union. After 22 years of military struggle on the road to power, the CCP created a new communist state in Asia. In his “lean-to-one-side” policy, Mao stated the new republic would favor the Soviet Union and join the socialist and communist camp in the post–World War II world.

Mao paid a state visit to the Soviet Union on December 16, 1949, hopefully to get what the new China desperately needed through an alliance treaty between the PRC and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), however, was never an easy person, not even to his next-door communist comrades. Mao was frustrated after two fruitless meetings in December, and became irritated since he hadn't had a chance to meet Stalin for more than three weeks in January 1950. Nevertheless, during his long stay in Moscow, a total of 65 days, Mao had a better understanding of Stalin's intention. Among other things, the Soviet leader wanted to convince

Mao that the Soviet Union had its own difficulties; that there would be no “free ride” for China; and that China should share the responsibility of the worldwide communist movement. Stalin made it clear that China should support the international communist movements in Asian countries. During their second meeting on December 24, Stalin did not mention the treaty at all, and instead mainly discussed with Mao the activities of the Communist Parties in Asian countries such as Vietnam, Japan, and India. Stalin, preoccupied by European affairs, needed China to help with the ongoing Asian Communist revolutions like the First Indochina War in Vietnam. In early February 1950, Stalin told Mao in his office that “the victory of the Chinese revolution proved that China has become the center for the Asian revolution. We believe that it's better for China to take the major responsibility” in supporting and helping the Asian Communist tasks. Mao understood Stalin's intention and agreed to share “the international responsibility.”

Finally, on February 14, 1950, the “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance” was signed between the Chinese and Soviet leaders in Moscow. The treaty greatly enhanced the PRC's national

security, economic reconstruction, and international relations. The alliance also allowed the CCP to expand its capacity to promote the post-victory revolution at home. With the backing of the Soviet Union, Mao and the CCP occupied a more powerful position to wipe out the political, economic, social, and cultural legacies of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) government.

The Sino-Soviet treaty made the lean-to-one-side approach the cornerstone of China's external relations and military modernization. After signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Mao and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) signed a huge naval order with Stalin for the amphibious operation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to attack the GMD on Taiwan. The Soviet Union agreed to arm a new Chinese naval force with gunships and equipment worth \$150 million, half of the total loan package Stalin granted through the treaty. A year later, Stalin helped Mao to establish the Chinese air force. The Soviet Union also rearmed 60 infantry divisions for the PLA in 1951–1954. Thereafter, Chinese weaponry was standardized. The Soviets also shared technology for the production of rifles, machine guns, and artillery pieces. Soviet support in economy, government, education, and international affairs was critical for the new regime's political consolidation and economic development. If it was the Soviet model that had shaped the revolutionary and communist nature of the new China, it was the Russian aid and military technology that helped the Chinese military with its transformation in the early 1950s from a peasant, rebellion army into a professional, regular force. The alliance between Beijing and Moscow was essential for the Communist international alliance system in the 1950s. China began to move

onto the central stage of the global Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States and the two contending camps headed by the two superpowers.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Military Advisory Group; Guomindang; Korean War; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Zhou Enlai.

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Sino-Vietnamese Border War (1979)

Officially named in China the “Self-Defensive Counterattack against Vietnam,” emphasizing Vietnam's invasion of China's border area and Vietnam's mistreatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam as China's justifications for launching the war. A more important cause of the war was Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute and attack on Cambodia in 1978. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's (Deng



Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) conversations with foreign leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew and Jimmy Carter (1924–) shortly before the war showed clearly that for the Chinese leaders, it was a punitive war against Vietnam for what were perceived to be Vietnam's betrayals of China.

The rise of pragmatist Deng caused a policy shift from world revolution to domestic development, which made China cut its aid to Vietnam. It has been suggested that a war against Vietnam would help Deng solidify his power and push for his new policies in several ways: It would give him an upper hand in his struggle with Mao's designated successor Hua Guofeng (1921–2008), who had little military experience and would have to rely on Deng to conduct the war; it would also help consolidate China's alliance with the United States, Vietnam's archenemy, which was perceived to be an important source of investment and financial and technological aid for Deng's modernization program.

The war broke out at 5:00 A.M. on February 17, 1979, when over 200,000 Chinese troops (or over 600,000 according to Vietnamese estimates) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) stationed in Guangxi (Kwangsi) and Yunnan Province in southern China attacked Vietnam's northern frontier (from Quang Ninh Province in the east to Lai Chau Province in the west) and invaded Vietnam. By February 26, Chinese troops had attacked and taken Muong Khuong, Thanh Thuy, Lao Cai, Dong Dang, Cao Bang, Ha Giang, Mong Cai, Loc Binh, Cam Duon, Sa Pa, Lang Son, and other places in northern Vietnam. In early March, Vietnamese troops launched a counterattack and forced the Chinese out of Lang Son.

Fierce fighting did not end until March 4 when Chinese forces retook Lang Son, which was considered the most strategic place among all the cities taken by the Chinese troops. The next day, the Chinese government declared that it had achieved

the goal of defending China's border area and would start to withdraw Chinese troops from Vietnam. On March 16, China affirmed that all Chinese troops had retreated and the war was over. Though the war was mainly fought on the ground, the air force and navy of both countries were also involved.

Neither China nor Vietnam has released official numbers of casualties. One Chinese source reports that nearly 7,000 Chinese soldiers and militias were killed and nearly 15,000 were wounded. It also reports that about 52,000 Vietnamese troops were killed. Another Chinese source lists 8,531 killed and over 21,000 wounded. A Vietnamese source estimates that 20,000 Chinese soldiers were killed and 60,000 were wounded. An independent source reported 26,000 killed and 37,000 wounded for the Chinese side and 30,000 killed and 32,000 wounded for the Vietnamese side.

International reactions had substantial impact on the course of the war. Vietnam's allies, including the Soviet Union, socialist countries in Eastern Europe, and Cuba, severely condemned China's invasion of Vietnam and called for the immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops. The Soviet Union sent arms and a military delegation to Vietnam and dispatched warships to patrol the South China Sea. It has been widely speculated that China's worry about a possible attack from the Soviet Union served to end the war as quickly as it did. In Asia, Laos and India took Vietnam's side, whereas China's allies such as North Korea, Burma (now Myanmar), and Democratic Kampuchea supported China's attack on Vietnam. The United States, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, some European countries, and Japan took a neutral stance. Both China and Vietnam claimed victory after the war.

For China, the brief invasion caused heavy casualties, and it revealed serious

problems in its military. China's military maneuvers during the war were severely handicapped by its poor logistical system and the lack of fighting experience on the part of Chinese troops. More importantly, the war failed to resolve the disputes between the two countries. In fact, the war itself became another serious problem between the two countries, pushing them further apart. Although China withdrew its troops from Vietnam a month after the outbreak of the war, military conflicts lingered on along the border for over a decade.

Dr. Xiaorong Han

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Military Advisory Group; Deng Xiaoping; Hua Guofeng; Movement to Resist America and Aid Vietnam; People's Liberation Army; Sino-Soviet Conflicts; Sino-Soviet Split; Soviet Union; Spratly Islands.

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Small Sword Society (1853–1855)

The Small Sword Society (Xiaodaohui), an underground antigovernment organization,

led an armed uprising in the city of Shanghai against the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). The society took over the city and established its own government. The movement became part of the nationwide Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) during the same time period.

The Small Sword Society was one of the branches of the Heaven and Earth Society (Tiandihui), a secret underground organization helping the urban residents against the Manchu rulers and city officials. The Heaven and Earth Society was made up of new residents that migrated from southern Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, including Miao Bang, Tangqiao Bang, Bailonghui (Hundred Dragon Society), and Luohanhui (Rohan Society). The Small Sword Society in Shanghai mainly included migrants from southeastern Fujian (Fukien) Province, and some of the industrial and commercial business owners. Beginning in 1850, the Taiping movement in southwestern Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province launched a nationwide armed rebellion against the Qing dynasty. Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiu-ch'uan) (1814–1864), leader of the Taiping Rebellion, declared the existence of the “Taiping Tianguo” (Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace) in 1851 and led a military expedition from the south to the east across the country. The Taiping army began a string of military victories over towns along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River toward Nanjing (Nanking) and Shanghai in 1851–1852.

In 1852, inspired by the Taiping's victories over the Qing army, Zhou Lichun, a member of the Heaven and Earth Society, led an uprising in Shanghai's Qingpu County. He refused to surrender the county's agricultural products to the city government for defense of the area against the Taiping army. Later on, other counties such as Nanhui, Huating (now Songjiang), and Shanghai followed Zhou's lead and joined the uprising to

alleviate the burdens on the impoverished residents. Xu Yao, a member of the Luohan Society, led the Jiading's uprising just outside Shanghai. Such uprisings were coordinated through these secret groups. In March 1853, the Taiping army captured Nanjing. They renamed the city Heavenly Capital (Tianjing) and launched a northern expedition in an effort to take the Manchu capital of Beijing (Peking).

In the summer of 1853, under the influence of the Taiping Rebellion, the secret groups in Shanghai united into a uniformed organization and renamed it the Small Sword Society with Liu Lichuan as its leader. Liu and fellow member Gang Guangdong then began to prepare for a citywide armed uprising. On September 5, Zhou Lichun and Xu Yao started the armed uprising in Qingpu and occupied Jiading County. On September 7, Liu Lichuan and Chen Aling started uprisings in Shanghai County and occupied the county government. The uprising troops quickly defeated the Qing's troops in the city and occupied Baoshan, Nanhui, Chunsha, and Qingpu Counties.

After their takeover of Shanghai, the Small Sword Society established a new city government, initially under the title of “Da Ming Guo” (Great Ming Country), but soon changed to the Taiping Tianguo. During the establishment of their government, Liu Lichuan wrote to Hong Xiuquan to accept his leadership and join the Taiping Rebellion. After their government was in place, the leaders of the Small Sword Society announced their policy: no taxation on the city residents and no submittal of grain for three years. During their control of Shanghai, the Small Sword Society also started to make new currency, develop trade, assure the food supply, and suppress the usury. All of these were strongly supported by the Shanghai people.

After the Small Sword Society took over Shanghai, the Qing government immediately transferred some of the troops from their engagement against the Taiping army in the Nanjing area to Shanghai in order to put down the mass uprisings in the city. The Qing troops were under the command of Xu Naizhao, Jiangsu's provincial governor. On September 22, 1853, the Qing troops attacked the garrison of the Small Sword Society at Jiading County. The Qing army defeated the rebelling troops and killed Zhou Lichun during the attack. Then the rebellion troops under the command of Zhou Xiuying and Xu Yao withdrew into Shanghai and continued their defense. By the end of the month, the surrounding counties continued to be taken by the Qing troops one after another. The Small Sword Society continued their defense with the support of the people of Shanghai through 1853–1854.

At the beginning of the Small Sword Society uprising, foreign troops in Shanghai from Great Britain, the United States, and France declared their neutrality in the civil war around Shanghai. In July 1854, the Qing government appointed Jierhanga to be the new Jiangsu governor. Jierhanga then sent Wu Jianzhang, commissioner of Suzhou (Su-chow) and Songjiang (Song-kiang), to Shanghai to negotiate with the British, American, and French representatives. The Qing offered the Western powers a joint foreign administration of the Shanghai customs and the sovereignty of their concessions for their support to deal with the Small Sword Society rebellion. The Western powers agreed. Thereafter, the Shanghai Customs started a tri-control of the Tax Affairs Department, composed of the representatives from Great Britain, the United States, and France. In Shanghai's Concessions, these Western countries also established a joint foreign administrative organization independent

from the Chinese administrative and legal system. It meant that the Chinese city government had no administrative, judicial, and legislative power over the foreign concession areas, including foreign business and residents. The Western powers established a "foreign city" inside the city of Shanghai with their own security force.

Having accepted the Qing's offerings, the foreign forces began their cooperation with the Qing troops in Shanghai. The Western forces and the Qing army built a high wall along the north side of Shanghai to separate the Small Sword Society rebellion troops from the other part of the city. Then, on January 6, 1855, the French naval fleet assisted the Qing troops to attack the Small Sword Society garrison at the North Gate of Shanghai County. During their defense, the uprising troops fought furiously against both the French and Qing troops. Because of French casualties, the foreign forces finally had the excuse to operate with the Qing troops to blockade and cut off food and arms supplies to the rebelling troops in Shanghai.

On February 17, the uprising troops were forced to abandon Shanghai and attempted to fight their way out. During their breakout, Liu Lichuan, Zhou Xiuying, Xu Yao, and other leaders were killed. Some remnant troops followed Pan Liang and entered the area under the Taiping army's control. Then they joined the Taiping army. Other remaining groups of the Small Sword Society left Shanghai, and moved into the countryside to continue their fight against the Qing rulers. Thus, by March 1855, the Small Sword Society uprisings ended in Shanghai.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Ever-Victorious Army; Hong Xiuquan; Ming Dynasty; Manchus; Martial Arts; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Taiping Rebellion.

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Song Dynasty (960–1279)

The Song (Sung) dynasty reigned from the late tenth through thirteenth centuries and had a far-reaching impact economically, culturally, and socially. The period is divided into two parts: the Northern Song (960–1127) and the Southern Song (1127–1279). Economically, commerce, trade, and manufacturing grew exponentially; culturally, Confucianism witnessed new life as it undergirded the growth of the Chinese middle class; and socially, a revision of the Chinese civil service examination widened government representation. The Song dynasty was the renaissance of China.

In 960, Chinese military general Zhao Kuangyin, who had been the dominant military power during the late Zhou dynasty, usurped the throne and began the Song dynasty. After taking over the throne, Zhao Kuangyin became known as Emperor Taizu (T'ai-tsu) (reigned 960–976), and his rule was called the Northern Song dynasty.



The founder of the Song dynasty, Taizu reigned from 960 to 976 AD. Through war and diplomacy, Taizu united most of the competing regimes of China, defusing the power of regional military commanders and bringing an end to the militarism that had plagued China since the mid-ninth century. (Instructional Resources Corporation)

Encroaching invaders in the north, including the Khitans, the Jurchens, and later the Mongols, gave impetus to a heightened military buildup, and Taizu created a professional army that was loyal to his dynasty. Taizu effectively nationalized the military by creating a palace army that he rewarded with sizable military pensions. In addition to sheer numerical dominance, technological innovations strengthened the forces; they included the manufacture of stronger steel arrow tips, devices that launched fire and thrown bombs, and the use of gunpowder.

Taizu established the capital of the Song dynasty in the northern city of Kaifeng. However, success in the north would prove to be short lived. The Jurchens took over the northern territory of the Song dynasty

in 1125, establishing the center of their new-found Jin dynasty at Kaifeng.

The Song dynasty represented a period of busy economic development, particularly in manufacturing and commerce. The period included advancements in iron and steel production used for agriculture and also for the construction of suspended bridges. New-found innovations in metallurgy resulted in a cohort of some of the most advanced shipbuilders in the world. The Song dynasty was the first to create air-tight compartments and rudders beyond the stern of the ship, and it also was able to navigate with a south-pointing compass. As cities began to expand, commerce and trade advanced. Widespread coinage of money, aided by the development of new waterways, proved to be a boon to Song trade.

The Song dynasty also made advances in the education and the arts. Though invented much earlier by the Chinese, wood blocking for printing became popular during the Song dynasty. As a result, book printing became much easier and more widespread. The availability of inexpensive texts increased literacy, thus creating a new middle class in China. Chinese glazed pottery and advances in music, especially sung poetry, also made Song a culturally rich time in history.

The civil service system was revised during the Song dynasty. Exams were altered to remove bias, and they incorporated lengthy sections on classic Confucian texts. Those changes resulted in a more diverse body of civil service employees. The Mongols, who had succeeded in toppling both the Jin dynasty and the Liao dynasty in the north, ended the Southern Song dynasty in 1279.

Kim Draggo

See also: Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Mongols; Northern and Southern Dynasties; Song,

Fortified Cities; Song-Mongol War; Yuan Dynasty.

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Song, Fortified Cities (1127–1279)

After the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127) lost in their war with the Jin dynasty (1115–1234) in 1127, the newly established Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) built fortified defense works around cities against attacks by the Jin first and then the Mongols. The fortified defense allowed the Southern Song to remain unconquered for some 150 years despite numerous attempts by their neighbors to subjugate them. It in large part succeeded due to a willingness to endure sieges, effective use of natural barriers and terrain, and an affinity for new or neglected technology such as early gunpowder weapons as well as explosives.

In 1211, the Mongols attacked the Jin dynasty, the Jurchens, who controlled North China. In the 1220s, the Mongols negotiated with the Southern Song to attack the Jin together, with the Mongols attacking from the north and the Song invading from the south. The Mongols promised to return the territories south of the Yellow River

(Huanghe) back to the Song after their victory. In 1234, the Jin dynasty was defeated by a joint attack of the Mongols and Southern Song. When the Southern Song tried to claim the territories in the north, the Song-Mongol War (1234–1279) began.

In 1251, the Mongol army launched an offensive campaign against the Southern Song dynasty in three directions from the north. The Southern Song made effective use of terrain and fortifications around the cities. Their defense suggests that the Song well understood both the weaknesses and advantages of their enemies. The Mongols with their vast cavalry armies were not only ineffective at conducting sieges, but also required significant resources to stay in the field for any period of time due in part to the difficulty of feeding horses adequately. Given the edge provided by mountain fortresses and controlled waterways, the Song military forces did not need to be nearly as strong as those of the invaders. The invading Mongol armies withdrew to the north in 1258–1259.

In the 1260s, the Mongols attacked the Southern Song again. The Chinese became more proficient with their city walls, primarily because the defense was operated traditionally. The Song court also did much to encourage the development and upgrading of city walls. The new walls were constructed of brick rather than earth and stone, and several innovative defensive features were added to these walls. Sometimes the mountain fortresses, water bastions, and walled cities were linked together, and the Song took full advantage of the natural defensive characteristics of the rugged terrain as they built this network. As a result, a defensive system that both made it difficult for invading forces to penetrate the interior and forced them into costly and untenable

sieges allowed the Southern Song to hold out for decades.

The defensive-minded nature of the Southern Song is amply illustrated in the time, effort, and expense the empire invested in the development of defense fortifications, and the degree to which regional prefects and military leaders, particularly in the border regions, involved their local populations in the construction of a strategic defensive framework, and the participation of the general population in defensive operation. Such defensive measures were not purely military, but required a great deal of coordination between civil and military entities. Not only did the construction of a fortress network require a great deal of manpower, but evacuating civilians into those fortresses and maintaining order during sieges was by no means a purely military operation. Civilian entities had to cooperate and work with military authorities for such systems to work, and that is perhaps one of the primary hallmarks of the Song system.

In 1275, the Mongol army launched a new offensive campaign against the Southern Song dynasty. The Song army may have been able to effectively defend for a long period of time, but when removed from that environment, it was a weak force indeed. Thus when their defensive structures could be broken through or bypassed in strength, the Southern Song military was not nearly as capable as the Mongol forces and had no effective way to repel them. In 1276, the Mongols took over Linan, the capital city of the Southern Song dynasty. Eventually, the defensive strategies of the Southern Song were not enough to keep the Mongol invaders out, and the regime fell in 1279.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Kublai Khan; Mongols; Mongols, Cavalry of; Song Dynasty; Song-Mongol

War; Yancheng, Battle of; Yuan Dynasty; Yue Fei.

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Song-Mongol War (1234–1279)

The Song-Mongol struggle lasted remarkably for decades with the Mongol invasion of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) and their defense during the medieval age. In 1125, the northern Jin dynasty (1115–1234), the Jurchens, began to attack the Song dynasty (960–1279), and the Song emperor lost the war in 1127. When the Jurchens captured the Song emperor in the north, the anti-Jin Chinese supported the emperor's brother to move the throne to the south. Historically, the Song dynasty is divided into the Northern Song dynasty from 960 to 1127 and Southern Song dynasty from 1127 to 1279.

The Southern Song was a dynasty in exile to some extent, having been pushed out of the north by the Jurchens. The Southern Song never entirely gave up hope of recapturing their former territory and reestablishing the first Song Empire of Taizu (T'ai-tsu)

(960–976). Indeed, on the occasions that they felt capable of launching assaults against the Jin dynasty into the north, they did so, despite the disappointing results. This dream of reconquest, whether or not it was widely felt among the aristocracy, was largely academic without a strong army and strong military leaders to organize successful campaigns. Thus the defensive posture often seen as typifying the Southern Song was forced on them by circumstances, a military strategy that allowed their dynasty to be preserved despite the limited military resources at their disposal.

In 1211, the Mongols attacked the Jin dynasty, which controlled north China, including the Hebei (Hopei) and Shandong (Shantung) Provinces. In the 1220s, the Mongols negotiated with the Southern Song to attack the Jin together, with the Mongols attacking from the north, and the Song invading from the south. The Mongols promised to return the territories south of the Yellow River (Huanghe) back to the Song after their victory. In 1234, the Jin dynasty was defeated by a joint attack of the Mongols and Southern Song.

When the Southern Song army tried to return to north China in 1234, they were attacked by the Mongol army. The Song-Mongol War began. The Southern Song army failed to recover the northern territories, and the Mongols occupied northern China. The Southern Song army withdrew back to the south for several reasons. Since the Southern Song had a completely defensive mindset, they did not frequently engage in offensive campaigns. Although it also took what might be considered extreme steps to prevent the rise of powerful military leaders, they did put into place fairly effective offensive measures.

In 1251, the Mongol army launched new offensive campaigns against the Southern

Song dynasty in three directions from the north. The Southern Song army built fortified defense works around cities and on hills to defend the south effectively, which should not be too surprising, given the precarious nature of such a comprehensive defensive system. The prime merit of such a course was that an effective defensive posture amplified the force of the military. Given the edge provided by mountain fortresses and controlled waterways, the Song military forces did not need to be nearly as strong as those of the invaders. The Mongol armies withdrew to the north in 1258–1259.

In 1260, Kublai Khan (Khubilai Khan) (1215–1294) became the Mongol leader. In 1271, he was proclaimed the emperor of Yuan, formally establishing the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368). The Yuan capital was moved to Dadu (Beijing or Peking) in 1272.

In 1275, the Mongol army launched a new offensive campaign against the Southern Song dynasty. In 1276, the Mongols took over Linan, the capital city of the Southern Song dynasty. The Song generals continued their resistance across the country. The Song army may have been able to effectively defend for a long period of time, but when removed from that environment, it was a weak force indeed. Thus, when their defensive structures could be broken through or bypassed in strength, the Southern Song military was not nearly as capable as the Mongol forces and had no effective way to repel them. An important characteristic of the Southern Song military policy thus became evident. While it may have effectively enacted a defensive strategy for many years—a defensive strategy that did not call for highly skilled and powerful military leaders but rather could be overseen largely by the civilian government—it inherently lacked the strength to wage open warfare without a defensive framework.

Eventually, the defensive strategies of the Southern Song were not enough to keep the Mongol invaders out, and the regime fell in 1279. The Southern Song strategy was thus self-defeating in the long run, for it institutionalized a weak army, preferring to rely on relatively static defenses. The obvious weakness was revealed when Kublai broke through those defenses and conquered the Southern Song. The Yuan dynasty took over China under the Mongols in 1279–1368.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Genghis Khan; Kublai Khan; Mongols; Mongols, Cavalry of; Song Dynasty; Song, Fortified Cities; Yuan Dynasty; Yancheng, Battle of; Yue Fei.

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Soviet Union (1922–1991)

A large, ethnically diverse Eurasian nation slightly less than 2.5 times the size of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, Soviet Union) was formed in 1922 and dissolved in 1991. In 1940, it was divided into 15 constituent or union republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia,

Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). The Soviet Union abutted 12 nations, 6 in Asia and 6 in Europe. To the south, its Asian neighbors were the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), the People's Republic of China (PRC), Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. To the west, Soviet European neighbors included Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, and Finland. To the north, the Soviet Union bordered on the Arctic Ocean, and to the east it bordered on the North Pacific Ocean. Its population in 1945 was 145–150 million people.

As the world's leading communist power during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the principal antagonist and opponent of the United States. Tensions between the two powers dated back to the revolution and civil war that led to the creation of the Soviet Union. It was not until 1933 that the U.S. government extended diplomatic recognition, and relations remained chilly until 1941, when the two powers found themselves on the same side of the war against Germany. As World War II drew to a close, however, lingering mistrust between the two reappeared and, combined with fundamental ideological differences, led to the Cold War.

The principal postwar goal of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin was national security. Stalin sought to acquire territorial buffer zones that would provide physical defense against first Germany and then any possible Western attack. Soviet leaders believed that this, along with reparations to restore the shattered economy and society of the Soviet Union, was the least they deserved for their role in defeating Germany. At the same time, they hoped to secure and expand the future of communist ideology by surrounding the Soviet

Union with like-minded regimes. Although his policies appear to have been fundamentally motivated by practical concerns of national security, Stalin was also a committed socialist who saw the future in Marxian terms as a struggle between capitalism and communism.

Stalin's initial pragmatic approach led him to withdraw Soviet forces from northern Iran in 1946, to disassociate himself from the communist rebellion in Greece, and to try to rein in the Chinese communists. The Soviets' inability to reach an acceptable agreement regarding the future of Germany, however, gradually drove Stalin to take a harder ideological line.

Stalin avoided any blatant displays of disagreement over Germany until the spring of 1947, when the announcement of the Marshall Plan apparently convinced him that the United States was trying to build an industrial base in Western Europe for future attacks against communism. The Soviet response was to blockade Berlin, which lay deep within the Soviet zone. The Soviets hoped to win support by providing food and energy to the population and to force the Allies from the city, which they could then use as a bargaining chip. British and American resolve, manifested in the Berlin Airlift and a counterblockade of the Soviet zone, forced Stalin to admit defeat in May 1949.

Even before that, however, the Soviets had subtly abandoned their policy of accommodation. In September 1947, Stalin orchestrated the creation of the Communist Informational Bureau (Cominform), a renewal of the Communist International that had been abandoned during World War II as a gesture of goodwill. During 1948–1949, the carefully balanced and “democratic” governments of states within the Soviet sphere were purged of any potential opposition to Soviet control, even by native communists. The new loyal regimes

assented to the formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the Soviet substitute for the Marshall Plan, in January 1949.

Even as the Iron Curtain rang down in Europe, the Soviet Union faced a new challenge in Asia. In 1949, the Chinese communists led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) emerged triumphant in the long struggle for power in China, establishing the People's Republic of China in October 1949. Although the Soviet Union publicly welcomed the arrival of a second communist power and championed Mao's regime in the United Nations (UN), Stalin was less than delighted. Not only had he failed in his attempt to subjugate the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), but Mao's ideology challenged the hegemony of Soviet communism in the international arena. When Mao visited Moscow in the winter of 1949–1950, Stalin initially refused to meet with him. The fear that China might emerge as the leader of Asian communism not only led Stalin to relent in January 1950 but also influenced his decision to support the national ambitions of Kim Il-sung, the communist leader of North Korea. Meanwhile, in August 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb.

With substantial Soviet military assistance and the support of the PRC, in June 1950, North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). The Soviets' absence from the UN General Assembly (in protest over the refusal to allow Mao's regime to assume the Chinese seat) allowed the United States to marshal international support in what was the UN's first war. In October, the PRC entered the war. The Soviet Union provided air defense for China proper, but Mao was angry that this did not include

air support for Chinese forces within Korea, which he believed he had been promised.

While Stalin's maneuvers preserved at least the appearance of Soviet ideological leadership and communist solidarity, the costs were significant. Fearing monolithic communist power bent on world domination, the Western Allies rallied together. They opened negotiations to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and bring it into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to defend against any communist aggression in Europe. The United States also signed a separate peace treaty with Japan, pairing it with a defense treaty that not only denied the Soviet Union *de jure* recognition of its territorial acquisitions in Asia but also provided military bases to support the American strategy of containment. Although Stalin attempted to regain the initiative by proposing a united, neutral Germany in March 1952, there was little hope of this being accepted. When the Soviet dictator died in March 1953, the Cold War was at its peak, with a proxy war going on in Korea and both sides racing to build up their armaments in case a hot war should break out.

In the uncertainty that followed, Stalin's successors moved quickly to lessen tensions both domestically and internationally. Although both Vyacheslav Molotov, Stalin's notoriously hard-line foreign minister, and Lavrenty Beria, the infamous head of the Soviet secret police, were in the initial group that succeeded the dictator, it was Georgy Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) who really directed policy. Both men favored pragmatic politics and better relations with the West. They lowered food prices and shifted somewhat the focus of the Soviet economy from industrial goods to consumer products. The purge already in progress, the so-called Doctors' Plot, was

curtailed, and the accused were released. Thousands of other inmates from Stalin's camps also received their freedom. Beria himself, however, was arrested, tried in secret, and executed.

The thaw in the ideological battle also extended to foreign affairs. In July 1955, Khrushchev met with Western leaders in Geneva in an attempt to mitigate tensions. Then, in February 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin's policies and methods in his famed "secret speech" to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Similar criticisms of Stalinist policy immediately after the dictator's death had led to an uprising in East Germany on June 16–17, 1953. The new accusations caused rebellions first in Poland and then in Hungary. Popular protests against the Soviet occupation forced the Red Army to withdraw from Budapest. When protracted negotiations failed to produce a solution and Imre Nagy announced that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, however, in November 1956, Khrushchev ordered in the Soviet Army, which suppressed the rebellion in bloody street fighting.

The rest of the world, however, was in contention. Khrushchev's adopted philosophy of peaceful coexistence held that war between the superpowers was neither inevitable nor desirable but that competition was allowed. He and other members of the Soviet leadership accordingly traveled extensively, offering friendship and Soviet aid. In 1955, Khrushchev and President Nikolai Bulganin had visited India, Burma, and Afghanistan. When Fidel Castro's revolutionary movement gained power in Cuba in 1959, Khrushchev was quick to recognize the regime as an ally and proffer assistance. A new Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact extended large-scale technical and

financial aid to China in 1959 as well. Khrushchev's largest and best-known venture in this regard, however, was to subsidize construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, extending Soviet influence into the Middle East.

The Soviet leader was so confident of success that he allowed an exhibit of the American way of life in Moscow in 1959, where he engaged U.S. vice president Richard Nixon (1913–1994) in the famed Kitchen Debate on the merits of the two economic systems. In September of that year, Khrushchev became the first Soviet leader to visit the United States.

Although Khrushchev had his successes, most notably in space (which he had aggressively promoted) with the launch of *Sputnik I* in 1957 and Yuri Gagarin's orbiting of Earth in 1960, the Soviet Union made little progress economically. Khrushchev's highly touted Virgin Lands program to vastly expand the cultivated areas of Soviet central Asia was a failure. His rapprochement with the United States angered the Chinese, who accused the Soviets of revisionism. Mao argued in 1960 that even nuclear war would be preferable to peaceful dealings with the United States.

U.S.-Soviet relations remained tense throughout the period, though, thanks largely to Khrushchev's habit of fomenting crisis as a matter of policy. The Soviets produced their own hydrogen bomb in August 1953, and four years later, they successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering such weapons to the U.S. mainland. Khrushchev used the missile threat liberally, convincing many Western analysts that the Soviet Union had in fact surpassed the United States in that area. He also revisited the issue of Berlin in November 1958, threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with East

Germany if the Allies did not sign a treaty recognizing the existence of two Germanys and “the free city of West Berlin.” The Soviet leader intended to use the city as a lever to open talks with the United States that he believed would lead to a European settlement and perhaps even the end of the Cold War. Although no progress was made even on smaller issues, a 1959 meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) was cordial enough and seemed to bode well for the future.

It did not help Khrushchev’s cause, however, when the Soviets shot down a U.S. U-2 spy plane on May 1, 1960. The event scuttled a second summit with Eisenhower, and when Khrushchev did meet with President John F. Kennedy in June 1961, progress was limited by the Soviet leader’s condescending attitude. The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, in combination with renewed Soviet nuclear testing, also helped curtail any realistic chance for an understanding with the United States.

The final blow to Khrushchev’s aspirations, however, came with the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent the arrival of additional weaponry. After a period where the world held its breath while Soviet cargo ships approached the Caribbean and nuclear war seemed imminent, Khrushchev backed down. The Soviet ships bearing the weapons and their support systems returned to the Soviet Union. This humiliation, combined with the failure of several domestic economic reforms in the early 1960s, finally convinced the other members of the Soviet Presidium that Khrushchev had to go, and he was duly removed in October 1964.

In Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, new economic systems emphasizing market mechanisms instead of centralized

control came into effect by 1968. Alexander Dubček, who became leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) in January 1968, boldly permitted political reforms as well.

Like Khrushchev, Dubček miscalculated the effect of his policy. The new Soviet leadership headed by Leonid Brezhnev was not prepared to tolerate such developments. Soviet tanks rolled into Prague on the night of August 20–21, 1968, bringing an end to the so-called Prague Spring and to most hopes of reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the Soviet Union allowed Poland to raise loans in the West to facilitate economic expansion in 1970, the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 emphatically restated the principle of 1956 that Soviet influence remained supreme in that sphere.

Although that statement of policy went unchallenged by the West, it stirred dissent among other communist states. Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia all condemned the Soviet action. Only 61 of 75 nations attending a June 1969 meeting in Moscow agreed to sign the main protocol. China denounced the Soviet Union in strident terms, and skirmishes along the Siberian border between the two powers raised the possibility of open warfare between the two communist giants.

On all other fronts, however, Brezhnev and his cronies were more successful in pursuing Khrushchev’s foreign policy than Khrushchev himself had been. Soviet friendship with Cuba remained warm, and the Soviet Union pursued close ties with India and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. Relations with West Germany also improved, and a treaty recognizing both German states was signed in 1970. While Soviet-supported Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) forces wore down U.S. and Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam)

forces in South Vietnam, Brezhnev repeatedly trumpeted the Soviet Union's support for national liberation movements everywhere. The Soviet Union joined Cuba in sending aid to liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique.

Whatever goodwill existed in the 1970s, however, dissipated in the wake of the Soviet decision to send troops into Afghanistan in December 1979. U.S. president Jimmy Carter ordered an immediate increase in defense spending, and détente collapsed. The ideological divide between the two superpowers deepened when Ronald Reagan won the presidency in November 1980 and again when the Soviet Union approved the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. Even Brezhnev's death in November 1982 and another transition period failed to halt the Cold War.

President Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) responded by announcing the funding of research on a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the so-called Star Wars system for space defenses against any missile attack, in March 1983. Any chances of further progress were forestalled by Andropov's declining health and death in February 1984 and then by the illness and incompetence of his successor, Konstantin Chernenko, an octogenarian who suffered from emphysema and lived only until March 1985.

The man who succeeded Chernenko, however, moved with speed great enough to make up for both his predecessors. A protégé of Andropov, Mikhail Gorbachev (1931–) was known as a reformer, a practical intellectual, and an ambitious man of action. Gorbachev was, however, a committed socialist. He believed that vigorous reforms would prove the viability of the system and that Soviet communism and capitalism could coexist peacefully even as they competed economically.

Gorbachev's initial moves thus came in domestic policy with attempts to revitalize Soviet agriculture and manufacturing through a program of acceleration (*uskorenie*) and openness (*glasnost*). These soon gave way to a general restructuring (*perestroika*) that included foreign affairs and especially Eastern Europe. As Andropov had, Gorbachev sought on the one hand a respite from the arms race and from international distractions. On the other hand, he also believed that a reformed and reenergized Soviet socialist economy could deal with the challenges of the United States and world capitalism. If the United States would not negotiate, he would act unilaterally.

Gorbachev stated his intention to reverse the long-standing Soviet policy of controlling internal developments in the states of Central and Eastern Europe at a meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in March 1985 and initiated plans to extricate the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in October. He had cordial meetings with President Reagan in Geneva in November 1985 and in Reykjavík, Iceland, in October 1986. At the second meeting, he briefly won Reagan's agreement that all nuclear weapons on both sides should be destroyed within a decade before U.S. advisors effectively vetoed the accord. Negotiations continued, however, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty stipulating the destruction of all ground-based nuclear weapons of a particular range was signed in December 1987. In April 1988, the Soviet Union pledged to withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year, and Gorbachev later announced a 10 percent reduction in the size of the Soviet Army that would coincide with the recall of six Soviet divisions from Eastern Europe.

By the middle of 1989, the movement for independence and democracy had spread to

Eastern Europe. Poland held free, if limited, elections in June 1989 that the opposition won handily. In September, the Hungarian government dismantled its fortified frontier with Austria and permitted free movement across the border. Thousands of East Germans exploited this loophole to escape to the West, while thousands of others demonstrated in the streets of Leipzig and other East German cities. Erich Honecker resigned as chairman of the East German Council of State in October 1989. The Berlin Wall, long a symbol of the divided world of the Cold War, came down the next month. The communist leaders of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia stepped down, and Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown and executed.

The Soviet Union did nothing. Within 18 months, it too would cease to exist, unable to either reform or sustain the communist system that had existed since 1918. And with that, the Cold War, the ideological divide that had held the world in thrall for nearly 50 years, came to a close.

Dr. Timothy C. Dowling

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Korean War; Korean War Armistice Agreement; Lin Biao; Mao Zedong; Nuclear Program; Russia, Relations with China; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Sino-Soviet Split; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.

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Spratly and Paracel Islands

Two island groups in the South China Sea; their Vietnamese names are Quan Dao Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) and Quan Dao Truong Sa (Spratly Islands). The Paracels, which the Chinese call Xisha, are located about 170 nautical miles from Da Nang and from the Chinese island of Hainan, between 15°45" and 17°05" north latitude and 111°00" and 113°00" east longitude. This archipelago comprises about 15 to 30 islands, depending on the way they are counted.

The Spratlys, which the Chinese call Nansha and the Filipinos call Kalayaan, lie about 250 nautical miles from Cam Ranh Bay, between 6°50" and 12°00" north latitude and 111°30" and 117°20" east longitude. This archipelago is made up of about 100 large and small islands and covers an area of 61,775 square miles; the center of the archipelago is approximately midway between Vietnam and the Philippines.

Several nations of Southeast Asia, China, and Taiwan currently dispute the sovereignty of these islands. After two decades of occupation by troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese army), in 1974, the Paracels were seized by force by People's Liberation

Army (PLA) troops. The Spratlys have been claimed not only by Vietnam, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC), but also by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Reasons given for the disputes over these islands were, among others, the strategic position of both the Paracels and Spratlys and possible nearby offshore oil deposits. From the Paracels, a naval power could control navigation in the northern part of the South China Sea, and from the Spratlys it could follow all ship traffic within Southeast Asia between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.

In these disputes, Vietnam and China claim all the islands. China bases its argument on the rights of discovery, while Vietnam emphasizes its continuous occupation since the seventeenth century. The Philippines and Malaysia emphasize the Spratlys' proximity to their own territory.

Pham Cao Duong

See also: China, People's Republic; China, Republic of; People's Liberation Army; Xisha Islands Defensive Campaign.

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Stilwell, Joseph Warren (1883–1946)

U.S. Army general, commander of all U.S. Army forces in the China-Burma-India Theater, while also serving as chief of staff to Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) leader Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) in 1942–1944 during China's Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945).

Joseph Stilwell was born on March 19, 1883, near Palatka, Florida. He was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry on graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1904. Promoted to temporary major in August 1917, Stilwell served with British



Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell in 1942. Stilwell led an infantry troop that fought in Burma and helped to train the Chinese troops and keep China involved in World War II. Stilwell was a successful combat leader, but his gruff personality made him unsuitable for coalition warfare. (Library of Congress)

and French forces before his assignment to the U.S. Army IV Corps of the American Expeditionary Forces in France during World War I (1914–1918).

After the war, Stilwell studied Chinese and spent several years in China, serving with American units stationed there and as attaché to China and Siam (Thailand). He was promoted to colonel in August 1935. Stilwell earned his nickname “Vinegar Joe” as a result of his direct and critical manner while an instructor at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Promoted to temporary major general in October 1940, by July 1941, Stilwell was commanding III Corps at Monterey, California.

In February 1942, Stilwell, promoted to temporary lieutenant general, received command of all U.S. Army forces in the China-Burma-India Theater, while also serving as chief of staff to Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi. Charged with coordinating the efforts of Britain, China, and the United States against Japan, Stilwell was also responsible for preparing China for the planned Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands. When the Japanese captured Burma in the spring of 1942, Stilwell personally led an Allied column on a 140-mile march through the Burmese jungle to avoid capture. To prevent the collapse of China, Stilwell continued to resupply Jiang’s forces, but the loss of the Burma Road forced the Americans to fly the needed materiel over the Himalayas, known as “the Hump.”

Stilwell’s belief that China’s best hope for recapturing its territory from the Japanese was through the employment of Western-trained and equipped Chinese armed forces brought him into direct conflict both with Jiang and Major General Claire Lee Chennault (1893–1958), former commander of the American Volunteer Group (“Flying Tigers”). As commander of the Fourteenth

Army Air Force and a firm proponent of airpower, Chennault believed his air force capable of defeating the Japanese without the assistance of significant ground forces; he continually argued that he should receive the bulk of supplies coming over the Himalayas. Jiang, worried that any forces used against the Japanese would not be available for his anticipated postwar conflict with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), was more than willing to support Chennault’s position.

Throughout 1943 and 1944, tensions among Stilwell, Chennault, and Jiang mounted. Despite the demonstration of the potential of Chinese forces against the Japanese and the gains in Burma, highlighted by the capture of Myitkyina in August 1944, Stilwell was unable to convince Jiang to reform his army. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) urged Jiang to place Stilwell (who had been promoted to temporary general in August 1944) in command of all Chinese forces, Jiang refused and then demanded Stilwell’s relief. Unwilling to alienate Jiang, Roosevelt ordered Stilwell’s return. On October 18, 1944, Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan replaced him.

After his relief, Stilwell received command of the Tenth Army, a command slated for the planned invasion of Japan. Following Japan’s surrender and the inactivation of the Tenth Army, Stilwell returned to the United States and took command of the Sixth Army. Suffering from advanced stomach cancer, Stilwell died at the Presidio in San Francisco, California, on October 12, 1946.

David M. Toczek

See also: American Volunteer Group; Anti-Japanese War; China-Burma-India Theater; Chennault, Claire Lee; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Ichi-go Campaign; Jiang Jieshi.

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Su Yu (1907–1984)

One of the Chinese Communist military leaders, grand general, and chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He was one of the most experienced commanders of the PLA after Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) and Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986).

Su Yu was born on August 10, 1907 in Huitong County, Hunan Province, to a minority family. He joined the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in 1926 and became a Communist Party member in June 1926. On August 1, 1927, he participated in the Nanchang Uprising and joined the CCP Red Army. He followed Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) and Chen Yi (Ch'en Yi) (1901–1972) to fight many battles against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang,

KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army during the Agrarian Revolutionary War of 1927–1937. In 1930, his head was hit by a piece of shrapnel, which remained there for the rest of his life.

During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Su Yu led his division to establish the CCP military base in Anhui (Anhui) and Jiangxi (Kiangsu) Provinces. During a battle in July 1937, he was wounded again in the right arm. The bullet wasn't taken out until 20 years later in 1959.

From 1946, he fought in the Chinese Civil War as the deputy commander of the East China Command in 1947 and then the Third Field Army in 1948–1949. The Central Jiangsu Campaign was the first of many brilliant works that defined his legacy. The successes of the battle persuaded Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) to change his military strategy of the Chinese Civil War from traditional guerrilla warfare to a new mobile and conventional approach.

After June 1946, when the GMD troops launched a general offensive campaign against the CCP military bases, the CPC accepted Su Yu's suggestions and changed the plan. The Party Center had planned to defend the CCP-occupied areas in three locations along the Taihang Mountains, Shandong (Shantung) Province, and central China to protect the CCP territories. Su Yu suggested not to defend each area at home, but to take the fight outside of the CCP-occupied areas in the central region of Jiangsu Province by concentrating all the forces in one as the Central Field Army. So Su Yu led the 30,000-man main force and more than 100,000 militiamen to fight against 120,000 GMD attacking troops equipped with better weapons and heavy artilleries. His plan worked and his forces defeated the GMD troops in Jiangsu and Shandong.

In January 1947, he was promoted as deputy commander of the East China Field Army. He was the CCP commander in the famous Menglianggu Campaign, in which the elite GMD Seventy-fourth Division was completely destroyed after Su Yu succeeded in encircling the unit. In both January and April 1948, Su Yu suggested the major columns postpone their plan to move south and to integrate and concentrate in the area of the Yellow River (Huanghe) and the Huai River for a decisive battle against the Nationalist army. Su Yu was the key commander of the Huai-Hai Campaign in 1948–1949. It was his suggestion on January 22, 1948, that the two armies of Liu Bocheng and Su Yu follow a sudden-disperse strategy that led to this decisive victory in late 1948, with the destruction of five Nationalist armies and the killing or capture of 550,000 Nationalist soldiers. Su Yu's army alone destroyed four Nationalist armies.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (ROC) in October 1949, the Korean War broke out in June 1950. In July, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission (CMC) appointed Su Yu as the commander of the Northeast Border Defense Army (NEBDA), which became the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF) and entered the Korean War in October 1950. Because of his illness and hospitalization in the Soviet Union, Su Yu was unable to command the Chinese force in the Korean War. In October, Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) was appointed as the commander in chief of the Chinese forces in the Korean War in 1950–1953.

Su Yu was made a grand general in 1955. He served in numerous positions including the chief of the General Staff of the PLA in the 1950s. In 1958, he was wrongfully criticized by Marshal Peng Dehuai and mistreated for a long time. In the same year, he

was appointed the vice defense minister as well as vice president of China Academy of Military Science. In 1972, he was the first political commissar of the Academy of Military Science. During the Cultural Revolution, he was in charge of railway, transportation, postal and telecommunication, port construction, and ship building in China. He was a member of the First, Second, and Third National Defense Commission; the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; the First and Second National People's Congress; and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. He was the vice chairman of the Fifth National People's Congress. He was also a member of the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Standing Committee of the CCP and the Twelfth Standing Committee of the Central Advisory Commission. He died in Beijing in 1984.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; Chen Yi; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Cultural Revolution; General Departments of the People's Liberation Army; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Huai-Hai Campaign; Korean War; Lin Biao; Liu Bocheng; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; National People's Congress; Nationalist Army; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Third Field Army; Zhu De.

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Su Zhenhua (1912–1979)

General of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), an experienced and dedicated military leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), and one of the founders of the Chinese Navy. He was born Su Qisheng in Pingjiang County, Hunan Province, in 1912, and changed his name to Su Zhenhua. He joined the CCP Red Army during the Pingjiang Uprising in 1928 and the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in 1929. Su became a CCP member in 1930.

Showing bravery in combat, Su became a platoon leader and company political instructor of the Third Regiment, First Division, Third Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army during the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937). He later became regimental and divisional political commissar. Su participated in the Long March and many important battles in 1934–1935. After arriving in Yan'an, he became one of the first group of Red Army

commanders, who studied at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in April 1936.

During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Su served as the department chair of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College and the president of Pingyuan Party School of the CCP Central China Bureau. In May 1941, he was appointed political commissar of the 343rd Brigade, 115th Division, Eighth Route Army, and later the newly established Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Military Command. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Su served as the political commissar of the First Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army and then political commissar of the Fifth Army Group of the Second Field Army.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Su Zhenhua became the commander and political commissar of the PLA Guizhou (Kweichow) Provincial Command and secretary-general of the CCP Guizhou Provincial Committee. In April 1954, he became the deputy political commissar of the PLA Navy and the director of the Political Department of the Navy. He was promoted to general in 1955.

In 1958, Su Zhenhua led the delegation to the Soviet Union to procure and import equipment and new technology for the Chinese navy. Later on, he established infrastructure for naval research and new systems for the warship building industry. Su also established six specific research institutes for the naval technology and maritime science. Under his leadership, China built an integrated and dynamic system of combining military scientific research, industrial production, and training utilization. This enabled the Chinese Navy to become an effective force with modern operational capability. When Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) met him, Mao held Su's hand and said, "The

management of the navy relies on you. You must build a strong navy of which our enemy is afraid.” From 1959, Su was elected a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and then the deputy secretary-general of the CMC.

During the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, Su Zhenhua was accused of forming a military club in the party and army by Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) and radical Maoists and dismissed from all his military positions. When he returned to service in 1972, he was appointed the first deputy commander of the Chinese navy. Su continued his special contribution to the improvement of the PLA navy, especially by preparing the Ten Year Development Plan of the Chinese Navy for the CMC. The report gave detailed plans in seven fields, such as the guiding principle of naval operations, policy for battleship construction, equipment production, and the formation of a modern fleet including submarines and long- and mid-range guided-missile destroyers. In 1976, Su Zhenhua was appointed director of the Xinhua News Agency, in charge of all national broadcasting stations, TV stations, newspapers, magazines, and other propaganda entities in Beijing. During the political struggle against the Gang of Four and the Maoist leaders in the fall of 1976, he was appointed the first party secretary-general of Shanghai to control the political and social situation there. In February 1979, Su Zhenhua died of a heart attack at the age of 67.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese Military and Political College; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army; Cultural Revolution; Gang of Four; Lin Biao; Long March; Mao Zedong; People’s

Liberation Army; People’s Republic of China; Red Army; Second Field Army; Soviet Union; Yan’an.

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Sui Dynasty (581–618)

During its reign, the Sui unified China and worked to further consolidate Chinese government and strengthen the country’s defenses. Despite its short reign, the Sui dynasty was an important part of Chinese history.

The Sui dynasty was founded in 581 by Wendi (Wen-ti) (581–604), an official from the previous Zhou dynasty. When the Zhou dynasty was reduced to various plots of murder and mayhem, Wendi installed himself as the emperor after taking control of northern China. During his rule, Wendi created the Kaihuang Code, which combined the laws of the northern and southern parts of China. Wendi also sought to improve the governing body of China through the creation of a simplified organization. He reduced the

three-tier governing body to two tiers and chose his officials based on intellectual merit rather than class. He held regular examinations for their selection, which allowed him to remove those he felt were more easily corruptible.

The Sui produced large-scale breakthroughs in the country's infrastructure and defense. The Da Yunhe (Grand Canal) was extended north from the city of Hangzhou (Hangchow) across the Yangzi (Yangtze) River to Yangzhou. It was then extended northwest into the Louyang region. That project brought water and irrigation to a wider area of China. In addition, the sections of the Great Wall of China along the northern borders with Mongolia were strengthened. Wendi also reconstructed two capital cities along the Yellow River (Huanghe) and worked on a third at Yangzhou. The main capital of the Sui dynasty was at Chang'an, a city six times larger than the current city of Xi'an (Sian) now found on its site.

Emperor Wendi provided relief to China's farmers by distributing land plots based on the number of people in a given household. That system was known as the "equal field" system. He also lowered the taxes on the farmers, which caused China's economy to grow.

In addition, the Sui dynasty began expensive military campaigns in order to extend its borders. The campaigns to the south were successful, but the Sui encountered strong resistance in Korea. After four failed attacks on Korea, the eastern Turks managed to surround the emperor, and Wendi was forced to escape. In response to fear of the emperor's weakness, local independent governments began to revolt, which divided China into smaller states once more.

The Sui dynasty ended in 618. It had only two emperors of consequence, Wendi and his son, Sui Yangdi (Yang-ti) (605–617). The downfall of the dynasty reportedly

stemmed from Emperor Yangdi's abuses of power and exhaustion of resources. A rebellion ultimately caused Yangdi to flee the capital, and he was murdered by one of his aides. He was briefly succeeded by Gong Di, who reigned for a year as a puppet prince. Eventually, the general Gao Zu took control of the Sui throne and declared himself emperor of the new Tang dynasty (618–907).

Kim Draggoo

See also: Grand Canal; Great Wall; Mongols; Northern and Southern Dynasties; Sui Yangdi, Emperor; Tang Dynasty; Zhou Dynasty.

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Sui Yangdi (569–618), Emperor

Sui Yangdi (Yang-ti) (reigned 605–617) was the Emperor Yang of the Sui dynasty (581–618). Yangdi was the second son of Emperor Wendi (Wen-ti) (581–604) and the second and last emperor of the Sui dynasty. Emperor Yangdi's original name was Yang Ying, but he was renamed by his father to Yang Guang after consultation with oracles.

Yang Guang was made the Prince of Jin after Emperor Wendi established the Sui

dynasty in 581. In 588, he was put in charge as commander of the five army groups sent to invade and conquer the southern Chen dynasty. He was later widely praised for the success of this campaign. In 590, he repressed the rebellion of Gao Zhihui, and 10 years later, he repulsed the invasion of Tujue and killed their chief commander. At the age of 20, Yang Guang conquered all the feudal lords and warlords of the country and helped his father to unify China and build a solid foundation for later dynasties. Yang Guan managed to bring accusations against his older brother Yang Yong and, coupled with his military achievements, was able to become the crown prince in 600 after Emperor Wen believed in the allegations against Yang Yong. After the death of his father in 604, a death that some traditional historians believed to be a murder ordered by Yang Guang despite a lack of direct evidence, Yang Guang ascended to the throne as Emperor Yang.

Emperor Yangdi ruled from 604 to 618 and committed himself to several large construction projects during his rule. The most notable one was the completion of the Grand Canal, which connected the southern and northern parts of China and remains in use in China today. He began reconstruction of the Great Wall, a project that employed nearly 6 million laborers. Also, he cleared the path through the Silk Road again and enlarged his territory to present-day Uzbekistan. He ordered several military expeditions that brought Sui to its greatest territorial extent, one of which, the conquest of Champa in what is now central and southern Vietnam, caused the death of thousands of Sui soldiers through malaria. These expeditions, along with a series of disastrous campaigns against Goguryeo (one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea), left the empire bankrupt and the people in revolt. With

northern China in turmoil, Emperor Yang spent his last days in Jiangdu, where he was eventually strangled in a coup led Yuwen Huaji, one of his generals.

Emperor Yang committed almost 8 million people to the construction of roads, palaces, the Grand Canal, the Great Wall, and ships. The redesigning of Luoyang alone, designated as the eastern capital, consumed a quarter of that amount, and the building of the Grand Canal took up to 2 million men. Equally consuming of manpower were the three expeditions against Goguryeo, each one requiring around a million men.

Yang Guang remains a controversial emperor. Despite his accomplishments, he has been considered by some traditional historians to be one of the worst tyrants in Chinese history and the reason for the Sui dynasty's relatively short rule. Alternatively, other historians consider him one of the greatest emperors in Chinese history. The reason why his valuations are so negative is that he was the last emperor of Sui, and after his death there was no historiographer of Sui to portray him in a positive light. Because of his impractical nature and desire for success, he made blunders in ruling. However, his achievements remain impressive.

Yutong Yang

See also: Grand Canal; Great Wall; Manchuria; Silk Road; Sui Dynasty; Tang Dynasty.

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Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925)

In the early twentieth century, Sun Yat-sen was China's most important revolutionary leader during the fall of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and the following decade when the nation's political turmoil inspired many Chinese to examine and debate the possibilities for progress. Determined to oust foreigners from China but at the same time attracted to many Western ideas, Sun is considered by many the father of modern China. He led nationalists into an alliance with communists based on their shared hopes for the lasting reunification and reform of their vast nation.

Sun was born into a poor peasant family on November 12, 1866, in Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province. At first he obtained a traditional Confucian education, but in 1879, his brother brought him to Honolulu. There, he attended a British missionary school and then the U.S.-run Oahu College. Western science and philosophy attracted him, as did Christianity.

In 1883, Sun returned to Guangzhou (Canton), where he was heavily criticized for his Westernization. He then moved to Hong Kong, where Western influences were more accepted. In 1884, he began studying at the Diocesan Home before transferring the next year to the Government Central School. Around that time, a U.S. missionary baptized him, and he married Lu Mu-chen, who had been chosen by his parents to be his wife. He enrolled in the Canton Hospital Medical School, followed by the College of Medicine for Chinese, located in Hong

Kong. Graduating in 1892, he tried to begin his medical practice at Macau, a Portuguese colony. However, the Portuguese denied him a license, and Sun returned to Hong Kong, where he began a brief career as a doctor.

China was then ruled by the Qing dynasty. Along with many Chinese, especially the younger, educated groups, Sun condemned his country's technological backwardness that allowed outside powers to dominate. He criticized the foreign nations that had humiliated the dynasty and the nation by carving China into spheres of influence. He tried to get the Chinese authorities to listen to his pleas for reform, but when he got only rejection, he gave up his medical practice and dedicated himself to radical revolutionary change. In 1894, he went back to Hawaii and formed the Revive China Society, a secret revolutionary organization. After China suffered more humiliation with its loss to Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Sun journeyed to Hong Kong, where he plotted an uprising to be staged in Canton. The Chinese government uncovered his revolutionary group, however, and executed several of its members. Sun fled to Japan, where he found new stimuli, for many Chinese exiles gathered there to discuss and plan great changes.

Sun traveled extensively and spread his belief that revolution must ensue and sought monetary contributions from Chinese living overseas. He visited the United States and then the United Kingdom. In July 1897, Sun arrived back in Japan and obtained financial assistance from several influential Japanese. Sun's ideology never assumed the importance of his actions, which he himself considered the marrow of revolutionary activity. In 1900, he sponsored an uprising in Huizhou, but it collapsed after just 12 days. Then Sun received assistance from Liang Qichao, a Qing official who had fled

to Japan and begun a Chinese press that attacked the various Qing practices and praised Sun. That widely read publication boosted Sun's following. In 1905, he and several other radicals formed the Tongmenghui (United League, or Revolutionary Alliance) in Tokyo. Sun then went to Hanoi, where he put together several uprisings in southern China. Those revolts also failed, and Sun lost supporters and financial backing.

The Qing dynasty continued to struggle, however, as its attempts at reform pleased nobody. On October 10, 1911, a rebellion the Chinese call the Double Tenth, broke out in Wuhan, and the rebels, led by army units sympathetic to the Tongmenghui, overthrew the provincial government. Several provinces in central, south, and northwest China declared their independence from the Qing. At the time, Sun was traveling in the United States to raise money. He departed quickly for China, and revolutionary delegates gathered in Nanjing (Nanking) elected him president of a provisional government. On January 1, 1912, Sun proclaimed a new nation: the Republic of China (ROC). He also formed a new political party, the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party).

Sun, however, lacked the military support he needed to extend his power throughout China, where local leaders had always tested the control of central government. In Beijing, Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916), an official in the Qing government and a political boss in northern China with military backing, stepped in and expressed his support for Sun and his desire to mediate a settlement between Sun and the government. In February 1912, the Qing dynasty agreed to abdicate, and as part of the arrangement, Sun relinquished his presidency in favor of Yuan, who was inaugurated at Beijing, the new

capital of the provisional government. Sun became director of railroad development and formulated plans to modernize China's transportation. At the same time, Yuan amassed power for himself and undermined the Kuomintang-dominated legislature.

Sun benefited from events during World War I (1914–1918), when Japanese incursions spurred Chinese nationalism. Amid those developments, Sun rebelled against Yuan, but he was forced to flee in failure to Japan. Sun then took a series of actions that alienated many revolutionaries: he promised concessions to the Japanese in a fruitless attempt to get their backing; he required his supporters to take an oath of allegiance to him personally; and he married his secretary without officially divorcing his first wife. Meanwhile, Yuan died in June 1916.

As strong local leaders began to compete for power, China entered into the Warlord Period (1916–1927). In 1917, Sun formed a military government in Canton allied with a southern warlord. That government collapsed in 1918. By that time, many factions of Chinese society were increasingly aware of the need for unification and reform in order for the nation to become strong. In 1919, the May Fourth movement developed in Beijing (Peking) as students held a mass demonstration at the Tiananmen gate to protest Japan's intrusions and call for nationalist and socialist goals. That movement stirred an intellectual ferment that strengthened the Marxist beliefs of many educated Chinese.

Sun supported the student movement and continued his fight for power. In 1921, he headed a new regime based in Guangzhou. Once again, however, he was frustrated in his attempts to create a nationwide movement. When he allied with northern Chinese warlords to expand his power, he met resistance from his major military supporter in the south, Chen Jiongming.

Sun then took his struggle into a new phase and accepted help from the Russian Communists. Sun admired the Russians for having led a successful revolution in their own country, and he joined with a Russian agent, Adolf Joffe, to collaborate in China. In 1923, Sun sent his chief lieutenant and brother-in-law, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), to Moscow for training. Later that year and into 1924, the Guomindang allied itself with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), which helped Sun to develop a tighter party organization, centralize it, and put it in control of all civilian and military activities. Sun gained a lifetime appointment as party director, but his alliance with the communists alienated some conservatives within the Guomindang.

During 1923, Sun maneuvered himself to gain control of a military government in Canton and renewed his drive to link with the north and unite China. In 1924, he went to Beijing and met with the warlord who controlled that city, but the negotiations failed. While still in Beijing, cancer overtook Sun, and he died on March 12, 1925.

Dr. Neil A. Hamilton

See also: China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Guomindang; Hong Kong; Jiang Jieshi; Manchus; Qing Dynasty; Sino-Japanese War; Soviet Union; United Front; Warlord Period; Whampoa Military Academy; Yuan Shikai.

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Sun Zi (Sun-tzu, 535–496 BC)

Sun Zi was an ancient Chinese military strategist and author of *The Art of War* (Sunzi Bingfa), which became the most renowned and influential military classic in Chinese history. Sun Zi was born Sun Wu in 535 BC, in the state of Qi (southeast China) during the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BC). These periods had many years of ferocious warfare aimed at expansion and annexation among the seven states. The disorder continuing social chaos and endless warfare that all the Chinese rulers had to face required solutions through these two periods. Many schools of philosophy and strategy flourished, giving rise to the concept of “a hundred schools contended.”

Sun Zi read military texts from his youth and learned from the war experiences of previous dynasties. In 517, he left Qi and went to the southern state of Wu, present-day Suzhou (Su-chow), Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, where he farmed and wrote *The Art of War*. In 515 BC, a new king, Heliu, was

crowned in the state of Wu. Supporting the king's plan to reunify the country, Sun Zi presented King Heliu with a copy of *The Art of War*. Although the king was impressed by the strategy, warfighting tactics, military organization, and civil-military relations, described in the book, he wanted to test Sun Zi's theories by commanding him to train the palace guards. According to historical sources, Sun Zi became a heroic general for the king of Wu, rescuing the neighboring state of Chu in 506 BC by defeating invading troops.

After his retirement, Sun Zi revised and improved *The Art of War* based on his war experience and tested expertise. His strategies dominate the book's 13 chapters, always keeping in mind the goal of winning the battle. *The Art of War* is the first important work on strategy and theory in world military history. Considered as a product of Daoist (Taoist) thinking, the book has had a significant impact on Chinese and Asian history and culture. After his death, Sun Zi's son Sun Ming was granted the title Lord of Fuchun. His descendant, Sun Bin, also

became a military strategist and wrote a treatise on military tactics.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: *Art of War, The*; Guerrilla Warfare; Qin Dynasty; Warring States Period; Zhou Dynasty.

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Taierzhuang (T'ai-erh-chuang), Battle of (March–April 1938)

The Battle of Taierzhuang was one of the numerous military confrontations in the Xuzhou (Hsu-chow) Campaign (or Battle of Xuzhou) during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945. It was one of the major victories registered by the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army under the command of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC), since the total war erupted between China and Japan in July 1937. It is memorable in China's War of Resistance against Japan's invasion for the courage and determination displayed by Chinese GMD military officers and soldiers, perhaps more importantly, it destroyed the myth of Japanese invincibility. It was morally significant for the Anti-Japanese War. This battle was also perhaps the most impressive of the few Chinese military victories during the war.

Taierzhuang is located on the north bank of the Great Canal and 13 miles to the northeast of Xuzhou, Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province. It is strategically significant to the defense of Xuzhou. The small town itself was a terminus of a local rail line from Lincheng. On March 29, 1938, the Battle of Taierzhuang began when the Japanese Fifth Division attacked the city under the command of Itagaki Seishiro. The Chinese troops that defended Taierzhuang were under the supreme commander of the Fifth War Zone, Li Zongren (Li Tsung-jen). General Li planned an encirclement to trap the Japanese

division. Many peasants who were mobilized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) through the United Front cut off Japanese communication lines and supplies. By the end of the month, Japanese troops only received their supplies from airplane drops, which were insufficient.

Then Japan's Tenth Division under the command of Isogai Rensuke arrived as reinforcement at Taierzhuang. In early April, the Japanese divisions, totaling 30,000–50,000 troops, launched several frontal attacks with tanks and heavy artillery pieces. The Chinese commanders were determined to stop the Japanese northern movement by eliminating these two Japanese divisions. Li Zongren combined flexibility and strict military discipline to direct the regional armies, totaling 100,000–300,000 troops, that were concentrated to fight the technologically advanced Japanese with their primitive weapons like small arms and hand grenades. The GMD armies engaged in the Battle of Taierzhuang were commanded by Generals Zhang Zizhong, Tang Enbo, Sun Lianzhong, and Chi Fengcheng, who all made their name nationally known in this campaign. On the other hand, overconfidence that came from the rapid victories in north China and the Lower Yangzi (Yangtze) River region in 1937 and early 1938 led the Japanese commanders to underestimate the fighting power of the Chinese armies, which were over three times larger than the Japanese armies. The Japanese commanders' arrogance also led them to underestimate Chinese civilians' willingness to aid the Chinese war.

On April 5, Li ordered a general attack on the encircled Japanese divisions, who overconfidently attacked frontally and failed to consider the greater number of Chinese soldiers. The Chinese troops were very effective fighting at night, when their generals could best utilize their numerical superiority. Night fighting was a big factor in the Chinese victory. The successful attack ended with Chinese reclamation of Taierzhuang and Japanese retreat. But heavy casualties and limited mobility kept Chinese from pursuing the retreating Japanese units.

The battle lasted for two weeks from March 24 to April 7, 1938. Both sides committed a significant number of soldiers to the fighting, which was merciless. Sometimes, Chinese and Japanese armies were engaged in brutal bayonet fighting in the lanes and streets within the walls of Taierzhuang. The Japanese army lost 11,000 soldiers in the battle, which was a major loss since the open war began. The Chinese army paid a heavy price for the short-lived victory with casualties of 20,000. During the battle, an estimated 30,000 wounded soldiers were sent to Zhengzhou for treatment. Most of these soldiers were wounded in the head, arms, or legs as a result of lane-to-lane and wall-to-wall battles.

The war brought total destruction to Taierzhuang. During the conflict, the whole of Taierzhuang was caught up in the fighting. The greatest destruction came from Japanese bombing. The Japanese had complete control in the air. Many residents fled before the open fire, and others were killed by bombing from the air. The terror and trauma brought by the war was almost unimaginable.

The Battle of Taierzhuang was the first major victory that the Chinese Army achieved since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937. The victory had major

symbolic import for the Chinese because it shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility. This battle provided hope to Chinese resisters after repeated defeats and humiliation, thus it figured prominently in Chinese newspapers and journals. It was celebrated as a major demonstration of Chinese determination and potential to set up effective defense and even offense in a time of national despair.

Dr. Dewen Zhang

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Marco Polo Bridge Incident; Nanjing, Rape of; Nationalist Army; United Front; Xuzhou, Battle of.

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Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864)

The Taiping Rebellion, a major uprising in mid-nineteenth-century China, came close to overthrowing the government of the Qing



Corpses litter the interior of Taku Fort after its capture during the Taiping Rebellion in August 1860. The rebellion, which nearly overthrew the Qing dynasty, was a major uprising in mid-nineteenth-century China. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

dynasty (1644–1912). The uprising lasted more than 14 years and devastated 17 Chinese provinces. Estimates of the rebellion’s death toll range from 20 million to 30 million people.

The Taiping Rebellion began in the province of Guangxi (Kwangsi) in southern China among the members of the God Worshipers’ Society (Bai Shangdi Hui), organized by the millenarian Christian leader Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiu-ch’uan) (1814–1864). Hong believed himself to be the younger brother of Jesus Christ and revealed to his followers a mixture of Christian and communalist ideals that were to lead to a new Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace, or “Taiping Tianguo.” The first step in Hong’s plan to create a utopian society was to overthrow

the Manchus, who had established the Qing dynasty in 1644.

Beginning in June 1850, after a number of clashes between his group and the local self-defense corps, Hong assembled the members of the society he had organized to initiate the Taiping Rebellion. Hong’s forces may have numbered some 30,000 men and women but also possessed a carefully drilled military force of 10,000. The dwindling resources of the area compelled Hong to move his base, and the Taipings marched to Jiangkou, which they took in January 1851. Hong then declared the existence of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace and appointed himself Heavenly King (Tianwang).

The Taipings began a string of military victories over towns along the Yangzi

(Yangtze) River that climaxed with the capture of Nanjing (Nanking) in March 1853. They renamed the city Heavenly Capital (Tianjing) and launched a northern expedition in an effort to take the Manchu capital of Beijing (Peking). The Taiping forces initially made rapid progress in their push north, but they were repulsed before they could reach the capital city. A second expedition, which traveled west to secure territory in the central Yangzi valley, was more successful.

In the areas under their control, the Taipings embraced communal property and gender equality and prohibited such activities as opium or tobacco smoking, alcohol drinking, gambling, ancestor worship, prostitution, and polygamy. Those ideals were difficult to put into practice, however, since the Taipings had to maintain themselves on a wartime footing.

During the late 1850s, the power of the Taipings waned as infighting led Hong to kill several Taiping leaders, including Yang Xiuqing, who had been the commander of the Taiping armies since 1850. Even more devastating for the Taipings was Hong's decision to retreat from an active political and administrative role and concentrate on more spiritual and sensual pursuits. A good portion of Hong's time was spent meditating, rewriting the Bible, and entertaining his 86 consorts.

Meanwhile, the Chinese military, led by Zeng Guofan (Tseng Kuo-fan) (1811–1872) and Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) (1823–1901), had recouped its strength, and the resurgent Green Standard Army helped turn the tide in favor of the Manchus. Zeng's army of 120,000 soldiers included his younger brother Zeng Guoquan, who led the successful siege of Anqing, Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province, which marked the beginning of the end for the Taipings. In the early 1860s,

Chinese government forces retook most of the areas conquered by Taiping troops and encircled the Heavenly Capital by 1862.

Following a two-year siege, Chinese forces burst into Nanjing on July 19, 1864. Hong is believed to have committed suicide, and the rest of the Taiping forces in the city were massacred. The recapture of Nanjing brought the rebellion to a violent end, although pockets of Taiping resistance battled against the Manchus for a few more years.

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See also: Ever-Victorious Army; Hong Xiuquan; Li Hongzhang; Manchus; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Small Sword Society; Xiang Army; Zeng Guofan.

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Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958

Artillery bombardment of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait from August 23 to October 25, 1958, initiated by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Unlike the



A house destroyed by Red Chinese shelling, October 1, 1958, Quemoy, Taiwan. The conflict took place between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) governments in which the PRC shelled the islands of Matsu and Quemoy. (John Dominis/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955), the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis may be attributed to PRC president Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) desire to enhance his country's international standing in view of its growing diplomatic isolation. This isolation was chiefly a result of poor relations with the United States and a deteriorating rapport with its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. Sino-American ambassadorial talks following the Bandung Conference and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis had been suspended in late 1957 because of irreconcilable positions over Taiwan. By mid-1958, after Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's (1894–1971) Beijing (Peking) visit and his advocacy of peaceful coexistence with the West, Mao realized that the Soviet Union could not be counted on to lead the Communist bloc. Mao was thus emboldened to pursue his own independent course in hopes of

establishing himself as the true leader of the socialist world.

International events during July 1958 provided Mao with the perfect opportunity to test his mettle. The United States sent troops to intervene in Lebanon's civil disorder, and Britain deployed troops to quell uprisings in Jordan. Meanwhile, Taiwanese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC), ordered his military on alert, which the PRC perceived as provocation. In response, on August 23, 1958 Mao ordered the shelling of Jinmen, known to Westerners as Quemoy and Matsu, two island groupings 8 miles off mainland China's southeastern coast. Mao rationalized his actions as providing moral support to the Middle East's "anti-imperialist struggles." Several days after the bombing began, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a resolution

requesting the withdrawal of Anglo-American troops from the Middle East. Mao played this up by publicly denouncing “continuing U.S. imperialism” in the Taiwan Strait. He also restated the PRC’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and its offshore islands. At the same time, he momentarily drew closer to the Soviet Union when Khrushchev gave his full support to the PRC’s claims over the offshore islands.

Soviet support, as it turned out, was half-hearted. Disturbed by Mao’s seemingly irrational and independent conduct, Khrushchev decided to rescind his earlier promise of sharing nuclear secrets with the PRC. Unlike in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States was fully prepared to defend Taiwan and the offshore islands. In a show of force, the United States deployed additional air and naval forces to protect the Taiwan Strait, and as a result, American and Chinese forces exchanged fire. The United States and the PRC appeared to be headed for a full-fledged conflict, which was not what Mao had intended. He had only wanted to keep the Taiwan question in play by applying what he called his “noose strategy.” He viewed the Jinmen as nooses constraining the United States, with Taiwan as another more distant noose. He reasoned that America, by committing itself to the defense of these three areas, had put a rope around its neck by trapping itself in the Taiwan Strait. This, he thought, would not only stretch U.S. resources but would also provide the PRC with the upper hand in the region.

Having successfully hooked the United States on the nooses, Mao decided to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait. On September 6, 1958, the PRC proposed the resumption of the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, which finally reconvened at year’s end. On October 5, 1958, the PRC issued

the “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan,” in the name of Peng Dehuai (P’eng Te-huai) (1898–1974), China’s defense minister, restating the PRC’s claim to sovereignty over the Taiwan Strait and its willingness to settle the crisis by peaceful means. On October 25, 1958, the PRC issued the “Second Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan,” from Defense Minister Peng, announcing that the shelling of the Jinmen would be restricted to odd-numbered days and would be limited by certain conditions, which helped defuse the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Periodic bombardment continued until January 9, 1959, when Mao lifted the shelling orders.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Jiang Jieshi; Mao Zedong; Peng Dehuai; People’s Liberation Army; Soviet Union.

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Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996

Tension mounted in the Taiwan Strait between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) in 1995–1996, causing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) on the mainland to launch missiles against the island. The military action led to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, which involved U.S. armed forces in the area. The crisis did not evolve into a war in the Taiwan Strait.

The crisis began when ROC president Li Denghui (Lee Teng-hui) (1923–) made a trip to Cornell University in the United States in June 1995. Jiang Zemin (1926–), PRC president and chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), had tried to isolate Taiwan and oppose the U.S. State Department's approval for Li's visit. General Chi Haotian, China's defense minister, convinced Jiang that a show of force was necessary to condemn the United States for ruining Sino-American relations. From July 21 to 26, the PLA conducted its first missile test in an area only 36 miles north of a ROC-held island.

At the same time, the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP also concentrated a large force in Fujian (Fukien) Province. In mid-August, the PLA conducted another set of missile firings, accompanied by live ammunition exercises. The CMC also ordered naval exercises in the same month. In the fall, the high command launched one

wave after another of military exercises, including a joint amphibious landing exercise in November. Even though there were military activities along the strait in the past, this was the first time in many years that they were announced publicly. Beijing's military aggression not only reversed what some observers had called a period of significant rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait but also created the most serious international crisis since Beijing and Taipei (Taipei) engaged in military conflict over the islands of Jinmen and Mazu in the 1950s.

During the short period of crisis, cross-strait tensions rose drastically, as if war were imminent. Taipei was on high alert and declared that it had made all necessary preparations to deal with a possible invasion. To respond to the PLA activities, the Clinton administration sent the U.S. aircraft carrier the *Nimitz* to pass through the Taiwan Strait in December 1995. Between January and February, the PLA concentrated 100,000 troops along the coast across the strait from Taiwan in order to send a stronger signal to both Taipei and Washington. The tension mounted in the Taiwan Strait even though the Clinton administration and the Pentagon believed that Beijing would not attack Taiwan and other offshore islands in the winter of 1995–1996.

In March, the ROC was preparing its first presidential election in Taiwan since 1949, and Li ran on the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) ticket. Beijing intended to discourage the Taiwanese to vote for Li because he had tried to separate Taiwan from China through the independence movement. Jiang again employed the military to threaten the Taiwanese voters. On March 8, the PLA conducted its third set of missile tests by firing three M-9 surface-to-surface missiles just 12 miles off Taiwan's major seaport

cities, Keelung and Kaohsiung. Over 70 percent of commercial shipping passed through the targeted ports, which were disrupted by the proximity of the missile test. Flights to Japan and trans-Pacific flights were prolonged because airplanes needed to detour away from their flight path.

On March 8, the United States announced that it was deploying the *Independence* carrier battle group to international waters near Taiwan. To respond to the U.S. naval deployment, China announced more live-fire exercises to be conducted near Penghu on March 12–20, deploying 150,000 troops, 300 airplanes, guided-missile destroyers, and submarines. On March 11, the United States deployed the *Nimitz* carrier battle group to the Taiwan area. The *Nimitz* steamed at high speed from the Persian Gulf to the Taiwan Strait to join the *Independence* carrier battle group to monitor Chinese military actions. This was the largest U.S. naval movement in the Asia-Pacific region since the Vietnam War, and the first transit by U.S. warships in the area since 1976. China and the United States seemed at the brink of war again in the Taiwan Strait. By sending two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, the United States showed its readiness to fight over the issue of Taiwan.

Fortunately, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis did not evolve into a war between China and the United States when Li Denghui was elected as Taiwan's president on March 23, 1996. Actually, China's intimidation was counterproductive and aroused more anger than fear in Taiwan. According to a Taiwanese survey, China's missile test in March boosted Li 5 percent in the polls, earning him a majority of the voters. The PLA offensive activities in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis also strengthened the argument for further U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and led to the strengthening of military ties

between the U.S. and Japan. The high command in Beijing had learned an important lesson from the 1995–1996 crisis, that the United States would not watch a PLA attack on Taiwan with folded hands. The PLA has to be prepared to deal with a major U.S. military intervention in the Taiwan Strait.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Chi Haotian; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Jiang Zemin; Jinmen; Guomindang; People's Liberation Army; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.

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Tang Dynasty (618–907)

With the dissolution of the Sui dynasty in the early 600s, the Tang dynasty, one of several rival factions struggling for power, finally rose to the top in 618. At the height of the Tang dynasty, China expanded as far as Korea, Turkistan, the Persian frontier,



and the borders of Vietnam. The Tang spread Chinese culture, maintained trade relations with the West, and acted as a bulwark against Islamic expansion. The Tang line of emperors ruled China until 907.

The first in the Tang line was Gaozu (Kao-Tsu) (reigned 618–626). His son Li Shimin was his chief general and did most of the conquering for the Tang. Li Shimin captured the capital city of Luoyang and destroyed the Sui palace to prove that that dynasty had indeed come to an end; he then pensioned the Sui survivors. Li Shimin went on to establish control over eastern China and to pacify the north and south. After Li Shimin killed his brothers, Gaozu abdicated in 626 so Li Shimin could rule.

After taking the throne from his father, Li Shimin became known by the royal name Taizong (T'ai-Tsung) (627–649). Regarded as one of the greatest of all Chinese emperors, Taizong expanded China's borders far westward. He fought Turkic nomads in the west and defeated those in the east. In addition, the emperor cultivated Chinese relations with Tibet ca. 634. After initiating talks, the Tibetan head of state requested a Chinese bride to seal their relationship, and the Tibetans began to adopt Chinese culture. The emperor also began to establish sovereignty over western kingdoms along the Silk Road. Taizong's only reversal came in Korea. A usurper in the Korean palace refused to recognize the Tang line, so the

Chinese invaded Korea in 645. The invasion ended in a disastrous Chinese retreat.

Nevertheless, Taizong was as good an administrator as he was a military leader. He lowered taxes, instituted a fair civil service, and set the example for his government to follow. As a Confucian, he believed that it was necessary for a leader to promote the harmony of his people by personal excellence.

Taizong's successor, Gaozong (Kao-Tsung) (650–683), came to power in 649. He married one of his father's concubines, an extremely ambitious woman who came to be known as Empress Wuhou. She was the power behind the throne, and when Gaozong died in 683, she seized power (684–704) openly—one of the only women ever to do so in Chinese history. She ruled with an iron hand and with some success in foreign policy. Wu chose military leaders herself, and between 655 and 675, China conquered Korea.

After Wu's death in 705 at age 80, a succession of poor leaders followed. Border wars continued against the Tibetans in the west and the Khitan Mongols in the north. In the middle and latter part of the eighth century, the Chinese depended more and more on Turkic mercenaries, who proved to be able soldiers for the Chinese; at the same time, Turkistan received Chinese aid to keep the Muslims at bay.

The constant warfare took its toll on Chinese society. A golden age of poetry and art early in the 700s gave way to rebellions and a weakening imperial government in the second half of the eighth century. Provincial warlords and generals struggled for dominance over the next century. The Tang dynasty stayed in power, at least in name, until 907, when the final emperor conceded power to one of his generals.

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See also: Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Mongols; Silk Road; Sui Dynasty; Tang Gaozong, Emperor; Tibet; Tributary System.

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Tang Gaozong, Emperor (628–683)

Tang Gaozong (Kao-Tsung, or Li Zhi) was the third emperor of the Tang dynasty (618–907) ruling from 649 to 683, although after January 665, much of the governance was in the hands of his second wife, Empress Wu, who was later known as Wu Zetian, the only empress in Chinese history. Emperor Gaozong was the son of Emperor Taizong (T'ai-Tsung) (627–649) and Empress Zhangsun.

Emperor Gaozong was aided in his rule by Empress Wu during the later years of his reign after a series of strokes left him incapacitated. Emperor Gaozong delegated all matters of state to his wife, and after he died in 683, power fell completely into her hands. After his death, he was interred at the Qianling Mausoleum along with Wu Zetian. Historians have generally viewed Emperor Gaozong as a weak ruler, inattentive to affairs

of state and leaving such business to his powerful wife. During the first part of his reign, Tang territorial gains, which started with his father, Emperor Taizong, continued, including the conquest of Baekje, Goguryeo, and Western Tujue, but throughout the 670s, much of those gains were lost to Tufan, Silla, Khitan, and Balhae. Further, territory previously conquered that belonged to both Eastern and Western Tujue were subjected to repeated rebellions.

In 650, Gaozong's general Gaokan defeated Tujue's invasion and captured their king, forcing the Tujue to surrender to the Tang dynasty. In 651, under the leadership of King Heliu, the western Tujue invaded the Tang. Gaozong's military defeated them also just one year later. In 660, Gaozong's general Fashen Qiudao led the Tang army to conquer Paekche. In 661, Gaozong established a department called "Protectorate General to Pacify the West" in order to maintain the security of western Tang. In 662, Paekche fell to invaders once again, and Gaozong's army reconquered it. In 663, Japan sent a military force to take Paekche. Gaozong's General Shun Renshi and Liu Rengui led the Tang army and defeated Japan's military, killing around 80 percent of the enemy troops and forcing the rest to retreat to Japan. In 666, Tang Gaozong ordered Li Ji to lead an expedition to Korea. In 668, the Tang army conquered Pyongyang and the king of Korea surrendered.

In 670, the Tibetan military defeated Tang's army and conquered the Tughun. In 672, Tang general Gaokan defeated the Silla Army at Hengshui. In 675, Liu Rengui conquered the Shilla, forcing their king to surrender. In 676, the Tibetan military continued to invade Tang and conquered four provinces. In 677, the Tibetan army conquered Fu Province, forcing the Tang to

concentrate their army to defend the kingdom. In 678, General Li Jingxian was defeated by the Tibetan army. In 680, Tujue invaded Tang again, and General Pei Xingjian achieved victory at Heishan. Tang Gaozong died in December 683.

Yutong Yang

See also: An-Shi, Rebellion of; Li Shimin, Emperor; Tang Dynasty; Tibet; Tributary System.

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Terra-Cotta Army

The emperor who commissioned the building of the Terra-cotta Army was Qin Shi Huangdi, the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC). Qin Shi Huangdi ruled from 221 BC to 210 BC and was the first emperor of a united China. The predominant theory about why this "army" was created is that it was intended to defend the emperor in his afterlife.

The discovery of the Terra-cotta Army in 1974 in a field outside of the village Xiyang, Lintong County, northwestern Shaanxi



Terra-cotta soldiers fill the mausoleum of Qin dynasty emperor Shi Huangdi. Uncovered in 1974 in China's Shanxi Province, the emperor's tomb, filled with life-size statues of soldiers and horses, is a monument to the military strength of the Qin dynasty. (Corel)

Province, remains one of the greatest finds of the century. The discovery occurred when a group of six farmers started to dig a well 1.6 kilometers east of the first emperor Qin's burial mound. After digging four meters down, the farmers struck what they believed was a brick. After clearing away the earth around the hard object, they saw a human figure, complete with a face. Upon further inspection of the area in the hole, they found a bronze arrowhead as well; this location today is pit one. The farmers notified the Cultural Relics Bureau of the local government about the metal and stone fragments they discovered, and the bureau sent out an archeologist to investigate the findings. After one day, the archeologist reported to the bureau that a full survey would be necessary on the fields surrounding the tomb.

After excavation, the archeologists took notice that the warriors had different hair-styles, costumes, and facial features.

Each figure appears to have been hand sculpted, but in actuality, the artists took a small repertoire of body parts such as arms, legs, and torsos that they adjoined to other parts in different combinations, after which the finer details of the facial region and armor were done by hand. Although each warrior was different, they do not appear to be actual portraits of individual warriors. Most of the warriors have stamped inscriptions that appear to be a "unit" or an overseer of a work group's name. This is an early form of quality control designed to follow which groups were making certain statues. In addition, this allows for the number of figures in production to be traceable as

well as letting the overseers of the project know if one group was doing poor work. The figures then would have been painted and placed in their spot in the pit. The method was repeated until the project was complete which the best estimates place at a 36-year period. The pit containing the warriors is 25,000 square meters. This pit not only contained foot soldiers but also chariots, horses, and commanders of the army. Current estimates for the total army size are around 8,000 sculptures including 400 chariot-pulling horses and 300 cavalry horses.

This was not the only pit around the burial complex containing terra-cotta figures. Acrobats, musicians, and birds are in surrounding pits as well. In addition, there are supplemental buildings under the ground; for example, the stable pit found southeast of the mound. The damage to some of the statues occurred soon after the burial of the emperor. Archaeologists believe that raids on the pits for weapons by marauders caused some destruction, while the biggest destroyer of the statues was fire, which roared through some of the pits. The fire left behind evidence of itself by charring one of the pit walls as well as burning the wood supports holding the roof up. The destruction of the supports forced the roof to fall in on some of the pits, causing major damage to many of the statues.

The first excavation of the site lasted six years from 1978 to 1984. The excavation exposed over 1,000 statues in the largest of the three pits. The second excavation took place over the span of just a year in 1985, but failed due to technological issues. The third excavation, led by Liu Zancheng, began 24 years later in June of 2009. Liu's goals for the excavation include finding an overall commander of the entire army. In addition, Liu hopes to devise a system to

save the ornate colors with which the warriors were painted, as previous excavations showed the statues quickly oxidized to a shade of gray. In 1987, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declared the site a world heritage site.

Matthew Leeper Jr.

See also: Great Wall; Han Dynasty; Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Rebellion Led by Chen Sheng; Warring States Period.

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Third Field Army (1948–1954)

The Third Field Army was the final iteration of the force that had originally been known as the New Fourth Army (1937–1946) during China's Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945 and the East China Field Army (1947–1948) during the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949. As one of the main forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), the field army primarily operated in eastern and southeastern

Shandong (Shantung), Anhui (Anhwei), and Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Provinces.

On March 3–5, 1949, during the Second Plenum of the CCP Seventh National Congress, the CCP's armed force, more than 5 million men, was officially designated the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In the meantime, the East China Field Army became the Third Field Army, totaling more than 1 million troops. This event marked a significant turning point in the history of the Communist armed forces, transforming them from armies based in specific regions to professional units of a standing army. This change was also a symbolic recognition of the fact that these field armies were now about to engage the Nationalists in enemy territory.

The Third Field Army's commander and political commissar was Chen Yi (Ch'en Yi) (1901–1972), future marshal of the PLA and foreign minister of the PRC. By this time, Chen's attentions were drawn more toward political endeavors and consequently his talented and humble deputy commander Su Yu (1907–1984) basically ran operations for the army. Other notable figures who would go on to play prominent political roles in the PRC included first deputy political commissar Tan Zhenlin and chief of staff Zhang Zhen.

The Third Field Army consisted of four subordinate army groups, the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Army Groups. Each army group uniformly consisted of four armies. Each army in turn was composed of three divisions. Their first battle would be an assault river crossing against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT: the Chinese Nationalist Party) defense line on the south bank of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River. By this time, the Nationalists' best formations had been smashed in north China, and their leader, Jiang Jieshi

(Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), had resigned in the face of an inevitable defeat. This left Li Zongren to bear the brunt of the Communist offensive into south China.

For the crossing of the Yangzi River, the Communists formed the General Front Committee consisting of Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986), Chen Yi, Su Yu, Tan Zhenlin, and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), who also functioned as secretary. The original plan was to attack in early April, but this was postponed due to the peace talks. After negotiations failed, Deng launched the attack on April 20, quickly establishing a bridgehead and sending the defenders into a headlong retreat. The Nationalist defenses in the Third Field Army's sector, the so-called Nanjing (Nanking)-Shanghai-Hangzhou (Hangchow) regional command under Tang Enbo consisted of almost half a million men, but this figure was largely illusionary as by this time their morale was all but broken.

On April 23, the Third Field Army captured Nanjing, and by the beginning of May, they had penetrated southward into both Zhejiang (Chekiang) and Fujian (Fukien) Provinces. The Fourth Field Army's rapid progress on their flank in Hubei (Hupei) Province subsequently allowed Su to deploy almost the entirety of the Third Field Army against Tang's 200,000-man garrison in Shanghai. This operation was the bloodiest of the entire Yangzi River Crossing Campaign, costing the Third Field Army 17,000 casualties. This stands in stark contrast to the rest of the operation, which had only cost the Communists a total of 7,000 casualties. The fall of Shanghai brought the Yangzi River Crossing Campaign to a close.

The Third Field Army's final action during the civil war would be the Zhejiang-Fujian Campaign, in which the Tenth Army under Ye Fei engaged the remaining

Nationalist forces on the southeast coast of mainland China—an estimated 80,000 men. During this time, Chen Yi devoted his efforts to restoring business and normal life in Shanghai as mayor, while Su Yu began planning for the invasion of Taiwan. Ye captured Fuzhou (Fu-chow) on August 17 and Zhangzhou eight days later. On October 17, the Tenth Army captured Xiamen (Amoy) but failed in a follow-on effort to seize Jinmen (Quemoy). This failure, combined with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, convinced the Communists to postpone their attack on Taiwan indefinitely.

In September 1954, during a major PLA reorganization, the Third Field Army designation disappeared, and its constituent units were dispersed across three military regions, the majority being allocated to the Nanjing Military Region, which at the time encompassed Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui (Anhui) Provinces.

Dr. Christopher Lew

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chen Yi; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; Fourth Field Army; Jinmen; Korean War; Liu Bocheng; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; People's Liberation Army; Su Yu.

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Three Kingdoms (220–280)

A historical period in ancient China between the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) and Northern-Southern Dynasties (317–582) when the country was divided among three kingdoms. A history novel, *Sanguo Yanyi* (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), describes the era's conflicts, relations, leaders, and military events in detail. The book became exceedingly popular not only in China but worldwide, and made the Three Kingdoms Period one of the most romanticized eras in Chinese history.

The decline and fall of the Han dynasty is attributed to a variety of factors, generally deriving from government overspending, heavy taxes, and service drafting. The military expeditions and territorial expansion convinced the Han emperors that they were superior in civilization and institution. To secure its central position in Asia, Han emperors maintained a large army of over 1 million men. The conscription system, however, did not meet the extraordinary demands of frequent wars. These measures failed to stop the decline of the dynasty, because its efforts to create an Asian powerhouse had drained its resources and did not provide any significant economic return. As a result, border generals developed personally accountable mercenary military troops, and large landowners established private armies to protect their holdings. Desperate peasants turned to rebellions such as the Yellow Turbans. The Han efforts to put

down the rebellions left the generals in effective control of large territories backed by personally loyal troops. In 220, the last Han emperor was deposed by such dissenting generals, bringing the dynasty to a close and plunging China into the Three Kingdoms period.

Three powerful military leaders established their kingdoms separately and developed into territorial magnates. Among them were Cao Cao (155–220), who gained control over northern China; Liu Bei (161–223), who claimed the provinces in the southwest; and Sun Quan (182–252), who controlled the central and southeastern parts of the country along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River. The Three Kingdoms they established were known, respectively, as Wei (220–265) in the north with its capital at Luoyang; Shu (221–263) in the southwest with its capital at Chengdu; and Wu (229–280) in the southeast with its capital at Nanjing (Nanking). Each kingdom waged war against the others over territory, population, and economic resources.

Wei was the most powerful state during the Three Kingdoms Period. Cao Cao solidified his reputation by combating the Yellow Turbans as a cavalry commander for the Han. He defeated Yuan Shao (?–202) at the Battle of Guandu, obtaining the Yellow plains. By 220, Wei encompassed central, northwest, and northeast China. To assure adequate food supply, Cao Cao established military farms along the Yellow River (Huanghe), and repaired and constructed irrigation networks to bring water to the wheat and corn fields. As a result, agricultural production in north China recovered quickly and progressed. When Cao Cao died in 220, he still considered himself to be a servant of the Han and allowed Han Emperor Xian to stay on the throne. Cao's eldest son, Cao Pi, was not so kind and forced Emperor Xian to abdicate, officially

ending the Han dynasty and proclaiming himself emperor.

Shu was the shortest-lived of the three competing states during the Three Kingdoms Period. Established by Liu Bei, a very distant relative of the Han imperial line, Shu survived from 214 to 264. Liu took the advice of Zhuge Liang (181–234), an outstanding statesman and military strategist, and achieved a great victory against Cao Cao at the Battle of Chi Bi (Red Cliffs) in 208. After that battle, Liu kept some of Wu's western territories that he was entrusted with under Sun Quan's service and expanded into southwestern China. In 220, Liu Bei claimed the restoration of the Han, with himself as emperor under the false impression that Cao Pi had murdered Emperor Xian. Liu paid particular attention to farming as well. He efficiently maintained the irrigation works centered on the Dujiang Dam, and encouraged and promoted rice farming and agricultural development among the minorities in southern Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou Provinces. Liu Bei died in 223, and left his trusted advisor, Zhuge Liang, as regent of his 17-year-old son Liu Chan. When Zhuge Liang died in 234, Liu Chan proved to be incapable at both administration and warfare. He surrendered without resistance to the Jin in 263.

Wu was the longest-lived state during the Three Kingdoms Period. Sun Quan secured a strong military, and the state was never successfully invaded; in fact, it was expanded under his leadership. Sun promoted not only agricultural production, but also the shipbuilding industry and the maritime trade along China's southeastern coast. Some of the ships built were more than 200 feet in length. In 223, Sun Quan took the title of emperor. In 230, he dispatched a fleet with 10,000 men, which sailed to Taiwan. Their undertaking helped establish a close

relationship between the mainland and Taiwan. After Sun died in 252, his sons could not continue his feats, and Wu was eventually conquered by the Jin in 280.

After its reunification of China in 280, the Jin dynasty (265–420) was challenged by another long period of division and civil wars in 304. It was not until the Sui dynasty (581–618) that the country was reunified again. During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), historian Luo Guanzhong wrote the famous history novel, *Sanguo Yanyi* (Romance of the Three Kingdoms). The heroes and villains it featured remain favorites in modern Chinese society and the cultures of many other countries. The work reached the heights of popular Chinese culture and became the first long novel to be translated for Western audiences. Several video games in America also based their stories on this era, including *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, and *Dynasty Warriors*.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Cao Cao; Chibi, Battle of; Guandu, Battle of; Han Dynasty; Han Wudi, Emperor; Liu Bei; Ming Dynasty; Sui Dynasty.

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Tiananmen Square Events (April–June 1989)

A large public plaza in Beijing (Peking), capital of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Tiananmen Square, literally meaning “Gate of Heavenly Peace,” has been the site of student movements since the 1919 May Fourth movement. The Tiananmen Square protests of April 15–June 4, 1989, were of the utmost importance both domestically and internationally.

The protests began on April 15 when Beijing’s students gathered in the square, mourning the death of Hu Yaobang (1915–1989), former secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) during 1980–1987. That Hu was ousted from office in January 1987 because of his sympathetic stance toward the prodemocracy student movement of 1986 helped transform mourning activities into a series of nationwide student demonstrations. Students renewed their calls for immediate democratization and demanded direct dialogues with senior leaders. The movement employed mass sit-ins, boycotts of classes, public forums, bicycle demonstrations, and hunger strikes.

On May 4, 1989, organized prodemocracy demonstrations occurred in 51 Chinese cities. Other sectors also expressed their discontent with the CCP. Coincident with the visit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev



A Chinese man stands in front of tanks heading down Chang'an Boulevard, past the Beijing Hotel, near Tiananmen Square, China, June 5, 1989. The tanks stopped their advance momentarily as he cried and pleaded for an end to the killing in China's capital. The man was pulled away by bystanders, and the tanks continued. (AP/Wide World Photos)

(1931–) in mid-May, the protests received global media coverage.

The worldwide attention and escalation of the student movement irritated PRC leaders. The handling of students' demands renewed the factional struggles between the liberal reformers and the conservatives, whose origins dated to 1979, when the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) introduced a market economy and open-door policy to modernize China. This time, the struggle was personalized by the liberal reformist CCP secretary-general Zhao Ziyang (1919–2005) and the conservative hard-liner Premier Li Peng (1928–). Zhao preferred a conciliatory stance, arguing that the protest was of a patriotic nature and that political reform should be accelerated to facilitate economic modernization. Li, by contrast, insisted on

clear-cut coercive measures to disperse the demonstrators and restore stability.

Although away from the front line since the early 1980s, Deng remained highly influential as the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Fearing that his economic program would be jeopardized, he supported Zhao's soft-line, accommodating posture. The government's dialogues with students, however, proved fruitless. With no sign that the protests would soon end, Deng's patience was exhausted, and he decided to adopt Li's hard-line approach.

On May 20, 1989, Li declared martial law in Beijing, ordering the troops of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to clear Tiananmen Square on the condition that no bloodshed occur. Owing to the students' blockade, the army stopped on the outskirts of Beijing city, resulting in a stalemate for

the rest of the month. Meanwhile, the government was preoccupied with two issues: preparing a change in leadership to end the factional struggles and regaining Tiananmen Square to end the protests. On May 28, Zhao was placed under house arrest and was replaced by Jiang Zemin (1926–), the party secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee, whose decisive action in closing down a newspaper for reporting the Tiananmen Square protests drew the conservatives' attention.

After consulting retired elder statesmen such as Li Xiannian (1909–1992), Bo Yibo, and PRC president Yang Shang-kun (Yang Shang-kun) (1907–1998), Deng finally agreed on more forceful means to end the standoff, implying the clearance of the square at all costs. On June 2, Yang ordered a military crackdown on the student demonstrators and the clearance of Tiananmen Square on the grounds that an alleged counterrevolutionary riot was fermenting and that continued instability would retard economic reform. On June 4 at midnight, the PLA marched into the square, and by dawn it had fulfilled its orders, thereby ending the seven-week-long protests. Because of a press blackout, the estimated deaths and injuries on that night vary wildly from 240 to 10,000.

To prevent a recurrence, on June 9, the government ordered the arrest of all student leaders and activists. Some leaders, such as Wang Dan, were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms, while others such as Chai Ling and Wuer Kaixi fled abroad. On June 10, the PRC claimed that a total of 468 “troublemakers” had been arrested and that calm had been restored in Beijing.

The PRC's use of the PLA to suppress the student demonstrations stunned the world. Some contemporaries labeled the

incident the Tiananmen Massacre. Foreign condemnations, including those from the Soviet bloc, flooded in, followed by a number of punitive sanctions, including the suspension of arms sale to China, the linking of human rights issues to the PRC's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and economic embargoes. From a broader perspective, the legacy of the Tiananmen Square protests was twofold. In the PRC, the protests enabled the conservatives to gain the upper hand. In November 1989, Deng relinquished his remaining post to Jiang, passing the ruling power to the third generation, and his economic modernization was slowed down. In the Cold War (1946–1991) context, there is a consensus that the Tiananmen Square protests in some ways inspired the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet control, precipitating the Cold War's end.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; Jiang Zemin; Li Xiannian; People's Liberation Army; Soviet Union; Yang Shang-kun.

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Tianjin (Tientsin), Treaty of (June 9, 1885)

Treaty ending the French-Chinese War of 1884–1885. Following the French naval victory at Fouzhou (Fou-chow) in August 1884 and subsequent naval operations that cut off the seaborne rice trade from Taiwan (then known as Formosa) to the Chinese mainland, the Chinese were prepared to make peace. France also suffered a major defeat on land at Langson on February 13, 1885, that brought the fall of Premier Jules Ferry's government and made the French side amenable to a peace settlement, which nonetheless secured the major French war aims.

On June 9, 1885, the French and the Qing court concluded the Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin). The treaty is an important milestone in Vietnamese history, for under it China renounced its long suzerainty over Vietnam and recognized the French protectorate over Tonkin and Annam. Both Chinese regulars and the Black Flags, guerilla troops of Chinese peasants, were to retire behind the Chinese border. The treaty also permitted French traders in southern China, granted the French favored status over the other European powers in Yunnan Province, and permitted the French to build a railroad line from Hanoi to Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan.

In 1887, Paris formed its conquests into French Indo-China. Laos was added in 1893, after the Siamese had been bluffed into withdrawing their outposts on the left bank of the Mekong and the French had



Two treaties were signed in Tianjin between China and Western powers in 1858 and 1885. The painting shows the signing of the first Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 by representatives of China, Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States, ending the Arrow War. The second conflict of the Opium Wars, the Arrow War raged between Great Britain, France, and China during 1856–1858. (Library of Congress)

offered protection to the king of Luang Prabang.

Dr. Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Qing Dynasty; Opium War, First; Self-Strengthening Movement; Sino-French War.

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Tibet (Xizang)

A provincial-level administrative region of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1951, officially known as the Xizang Autonomous Region, with the capital at Lhasa. Tibet covers an area of 461,700 square miles and is located in southwestern China. It is bordered on the south by Burma (now Myanmar), India, Bhutan, and Nepal; on the west by India; and on the east and north by the PRC. It has a population of some 2.7 million people in the 2010s.

With the introduction of Indian Buddhism in the seventh century, Tibet grew into an independent theocracy. In the seventeenth century, the Yellow Hat sect gained supremacy and practiced Lamaism, a hierarchical organization of Tibetan Buddhist monks



A Chinese soldier keeps watch in a village in Tibet. China has occupied the remote Buddhist region in the Himalayas since 1950. (Corel)

(lamas). Atop the hierarchy was the Dalai Lama, both the spiritual and political head of Tibetans. Just below him was the Panchen Lama.

Isolated Tibet was forced to open itself to the world in 1904 by the British, who sought to secure a trade route to China and erect a buffer against Russian expansion into British India, bordering on the south of Tibet. In 1907, Britain, Russia, and China agreed on Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and pledged noninterference in Tibetan affairs. Tibet declared its independence in late 1911 after the overthrow of China's ruling Qing dynasty. Although the two post-Qing successors—the Republic of China (ROC) under the Guomintang (GMD, or Kuomintang,

KMT; the Nationalist Chinese Party) (1912–1949) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) since 1949—refused to acknowledge Tibetan independence, Tibet’s resumption of Lamaism remained undisturbed, strengthening Tibetans’ visions of lasting independence.

A year after the PRC’s birth in October 1949, Chinese Communist leaders sent 80,000 troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into Tibet in October 1950. Unable to defend his people, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama unsuccessfully appealed to the United Nations (UN), the United States, Britain, and India for assistance. In May 1951, the Tibetan government reluctantly accepted the PRC’s 17–Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, which instituted a joint Chinese-Tibetan authority. This promised Tibetans apparent autonomy.

To modernize and continue the socialist revolution, during the early 1950s, PRC officials implemented a number of measures that brought Tibetan autonomy into question. These modernization efforts included land reform, heavy industrialization, the introduction of secular education, the opening of Tibet through construction of nationwide communication networks, and a purge of anti-PRC officials. Tibetans found these measures antithetical to their traditional practices of feudalism and socioeconomic simplicity and threatening to Tibetan homogeneity. Tibetans, who considered themselves a unique race, responded with a series of anti-Chinese revolts, transforming the Tibet question into an interethnic dispute between Tibetans and the Han Chinese.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) capitalized on Tibetan dissatisfaction to advance American strategic interests. In early 1956, the CIA began to

provide military training to Tibetan rebels. In autumn 1957, the CIA launched a covert operation by air-dropping into Tibet U.S.-trained Tibetan rebels along with American-made weapons and radios. This Tibetan-CIA operation led to a full-scale rebellion in Lhasa in March 1959. Chinese leaders deployed 40,000 troops to put down the rebellion, resulting in nearly 8,700 Tibetan deaths and the exile of the Dalai Lama to India. To resolve the Tibet question, the PRC named the tenth Panchen Lama as Tibet’s acting head while concurrently preparing Tibet as an autonomous administrative region. In 1965, the PRC replaced Tibet’s theocracy with a Chinese Communist administration, making it an Autonomous Region.

With CIA assistance, the Dalai Lama and 80,000 followers settled in northern India, where they founded the Government of Tibet in Exile at Dharamsala. The Dalai Lama internationalized the Tibet question by appealing to the UN, successfully securing two Tibet resolutions in 1961 and 1965 denouncing the PRC’s violation of human rights in the March 1959 rebellion. Since then, the Dalai Lama has pursued an active posture in international affairs, championing Tibet’s independence and self-determination, human rights, and peace and freedom.

After 1959, the United States reversed its previous indifference to the Tibet question and publicly supported Tibetan independence. The CIA remained active in Tibet, chiefly in intelligence gathering, especially concerning the PRC’s nuclear program in the neighboring Xinjiang (Hsin-kiang) Province. In Tibet, the anti-Chinese movement continued after the 1959 rebellion, and the PRC has responded with periodic crackdowns. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) marked the low point of the Tibetan-Chinese relationship, during which religious

practices were condemned, monasteries were destroyed, and monks and nuns were persecuted. This triggered a massive exodus of Tibetans to India, Nepal, and Bhutan.

Two breakthroughs regarding the Tibet question occurred in the 1970s. First, to facilitate the Sino-American rapprochement, the CIA diminished its assistance to Tibetan rebels beginning in 1969. This ended altogether in 1974. Shortly before the establishment of formal Sino-American diplomatic relations, in 1978, the U.S. government recognized Tibet as part of China, thus reducing the issue to an internal Chinese affair. Second, PRC leaders moderated their policy toward Tibet after 1976. On the one hand, the government implemented a number of reforms to modernize Tibet, intending to win Tibetans' approval by raising their living standards. To curb Tibetan rebels, the PRC allowed a certain degree of religious freedom while also relocating huge numbers of Han Chinese to Tibet, intending to keep Tibetans under control through assimilation. The Tibetan cause attracted support and publicity from a number of international celebrities, such as the American movie star Richard Gere. In the 1990s, a dramatic dispute over which of two young boys was the rightful candidate to succeed as Panchen Lama, the second most influential Tibetan Buddhist figure, damaged Sino-Tibetan relations.

On the other hand, the PRC signaled its willingness to resolve the Tibet question with the Tibetan government-in-exile. Negotiations between the PRC and the Dalai Lama's exiled government began in 1979 but broke off in 1988 due to irreconcilable differences. Beijing continues to force denunciation of the Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader, a human rights fighter, and the peace envoy. He was described as an ex-leader of Tibetan Buddhism under the wing

of the anti-China forces in the West, and his government-in-exile illegal since it has gone far to betray China and the Tibetan people.

The Chinese government has accused the Dalai Lama of being the linchpin of alleged plots to separate Tibet from China. In June 2003, Chinese authorities arrested three Tibetans in the region's capital, Lhasa, for alleged separatist activities. Two of them were junior students at Tibet University. They were accused of involvement in "activities to split the motherland." Many believed the arrests came amidst tighter restrictions on civil liberties put in place leading up to the Dalai Lama's birthday, as happens every year. The 2003 circular warned residents against burning incense, hanging prayer flags, and visiting temples or monasteries. In early 2007, seven Tibetan teenagers (ages between 14 and 16) were arrested because they wrote "anti-governmental" slogans on the walls of a village police station. Their slogans included calling for the return of the Dalai Lama and a free Tibet. The government views Tibetan Buddhism as complicit in these efforts.

In Tibet, authorities continue to control Buddhist activities in an effort to quash alleged "separatism." The overall level of repression of religious freedom in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) remains high. Many Tibetan Buddhists have been arrested, detained without public trial, and tortured for expressing their views or organizing activities without government permission. On September 30, 2006, Chinese border patrol troops opened fire on 70 Tibetans who tried to cross the border into Nepal. A 17-year-old Buddhist nun, Kelsang Nmtso, died, and several others were wounded.

In March 2008, a large-scale Buddhist demonstration began in Tibet and several surrounding provinces on the 49th anniversary

of the 1959 uprising in Tibet against the central government. On March 14, the protest in Lhasa turned violent between Tibetans and non-Tibetan groups and between protesters and police. By March 17, the TAR governor announced that 16 people had been confirmed dead and 200 were injured from the violence. On March 28, the government confirmed 28 civilians and one police officer dead, and 325 civilians were injured, 58 of whom were critically wounded. In addition, 241 police officers were injured. According to the India-based Tibetan government-in-exile, more than 220 Tibetans were killed in the crackdown after March 14, and the Chinese government arrested over 7,000 Tibetans from various parts of Tibet.

The riots spread outside of the TAR for the first time. More than 5,000 demonstrators, mostly ethnic Tibetans and Buddhist monks, marched down the streets in Gansu Province on March 15. Police used tear gas and force to break up the demonstrations. By March 18, according to the Tibetan government-in-exile, 19 Tibetan demonstrators were shot dead by police. The demonstrations also took places in the northwestern province of Qinghai and the western province of Sichuan. On March 16, Tibetan monks and police clashed in Ngawa County, Sichuan, and there are claims that police shot between 13 and 20 protesters and at least one policeman was killed.

The “3-14 Riots” and the crackdown on Tibet shocked the international community, including the athletes who were ready to come to Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games in August. Some Western countries and international organizations called for a boycott of the event. The Dalai Lama reiterated that he was against any boycott because Chinese people should not be blamed for the situation in his homeland. The Olympic

torch was lit in Greece on March 24, 2008, but the torch relay faced Tibet protestors throughout its journey across the globe. On April 29, the Lhasa Intermediate Court sentenced 30 Tibetans to three years to life in prison for their participations in the 3-14 Riots. In 2009, the Chinese government executed four Tibetans in connection with their involvement with the 3-14 Riots. On December 28, 2009, authorities in the northwestern province of Qinghai sentenced Dhondup Wangchen, a Tibetan filmmaker, six years in prison. The director and producer of a documentary of the 3-14 Riots, *Leaving Fear Behind*, he was charged with “splitting the motherland.” In the early twenty-first century, the Tibet question remained unresolved.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: China, People’s Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Dalai Lama; Qing Dynasty; People’s Liberation Army; Sino-Indian Border War; Soviet Union; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations.

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Tributary System

The tributary system was a form for conducting diplomatic and trade relations between imperial China and other states from the first century to the nineteenth century. Under this system, exchanges of gifts between foreign rulers and the Chinese emperor were carried out. Foreigners had to send their representatives to the Chinese capital to present their tributes (exotic luxury goods, local special products, or people) to the Chinese emperors, and, in return, they were rewarded with gifts from the Chinese emperor, such as priceless porcelain and silk.

The tributary system indicated that the Chinese emperor and the Middle Kingdom were superior to their trading partners. Under this system, the Chinese emperor recognized foreigners' authority and sovereignty. He confirmed them in office legitimately, and the foreign rulers, adopting a posture of subjugation, recognized the supremacy of Chinese civilization.

The system helped not only to establish the diplomatic relationship between China and other countries but also to promote large-scale commerce and trade between Chinese and foreign nations. The term "tribute" is different from the term "gift." The former, known as *gong*, has important implications. The Chinese emperors made sure that the gifts they paid to other states were known as mere gifts, not tributes, while what foreigners contributed to the Chinese emperor was tribute. Therefore, all diplomatic and trade missions were construed in the context of a tributary relationship.

The Chinese regarded the tributary system as equivalent to the familial relation of sons looking after their parents by devoting part of their wealth, assets, or goods to them, an integral part of Confucian philosophy. There were many tribute states to the Chinese-established empires throughout Chinese history, including neighboring countries, such as Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Borneo, Indonesia, South Asia, and central Asia. Under such a system, a position hierarchy was clear, in which Korea and Vietnam were placed higher than others, including Japan, the Ryukyus, Siam, the Burmese kingdoms, and others.

Imperial China began to receive tribute from the kingdoms under the influence of Confucian civilization. During the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), the various tribes of Japan had already established the tributary relationships with China by the first century. The southern Xiongnu in western China entered the tributary system established by the Han emperors when they resettled along with large numbers of Chinese immigrants in frontier regions. Economically reliant on the Han people, they were obliged to provide military forces at the frontiers under a rigid tributary system with greater direct imperial administration. The tributary relationship between Korea and China was established during the age of the Three Kingdoms of Korea in the fourth and fifth centuries. This relationship did not come to an end until the Chinese were defeated by the Japanese in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Slaves from tributary countries were sent to Tang China (618–907) by various groups, the Cambodians sent albinos, the Uighurs (Uyghurs) sent Turkic Karluks, the Japanese sent Ainu, and Turkish and Tibetan girls were also sent to China. During the Song

dynasty (960–1279), the Song court received more than 300 tribute missions from other countries. Under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), countries that attempted to establish political, economic, and cultural relationships with the powerful Chinese empire had to enter the tribute system. Thus, tribute was often paid for practical objectives, instead of only as a sign of devotion to the Chinese emperor. Many tributes paid consisted of native products, such as elephants from Siam (Thailand) and eunuchs and virgin girls from Korea, Annam, or the Ryukyu Islands. To increase the number of tributary states, the Ming emperors authorized Zheng He's (Cheng Ho) (1371–1435) overseas expeditions carrying goods to build tribute relationships between the Ming dynasty and newly discovered kingdoms in Southeast Asia, south Asia, and eastern Africa in the fifteenth century.

The Chinese tributary system, with its burdensome, ritualistic mannerisms, continued until the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) when European merchants began arriving. Because the Confucian culture placed a greater reward on noneconomic functions rather than extra profit, the Chinese preferred to continue their ancient customs even when the Western merchants began to arrive at the China coast to trade with China. Since Westerners were used to the free market and free trade system, and the imperial Chinese customs to control trade were not productive and were noneconomic, the Europeans complained that they could not

trade with Chinese merchants in such a way. The Europeans were not pleased with the Chinese tributary system, and the Chinese government refused to compromise with the Europeans because the Chinese were not interested in trading with other people. Thus, Sino-Western trade was limited in the nineteenth century. Finally, the Europeans used military means to force the Qing government to open China's door to trade with the West in the First Opium War of 1839–1842.

Dr. Guangqiu Xu

See also: Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Han Dynasty; Ming Dynasty; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Silk Route; Sino-Japanese War; Song Dynasty; Tang Dynasty; Tibet; Xiongnu.

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U

U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations (1972–1979)

The normalization of U.S.-PRC relations involved the ongoing efforts of the United States (U.S) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to improve diplomatic ties between their two nations. These attempts occurred when U.S. president Richard Nixon (1913–1994) reached out to Communist China in an effort to gain their support against the Soviet Union (USSR). After decades of Cold War mistrust and resentment, the two sides eventually came together to form a common bond against the USSR and formally established diplomatic and trade relations with each other.

Following the surrender of Japan after World War II, China was thrust into a bitter civil war. The two warring factions were the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), and the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) forces led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC). The United States supported Jiang Jieshi during the Chinese Civil War in 1946–1949 and lent considerable assistance to the Nationalist government. The Communists eventually defeated Jiang and forced the GMD to retreat to the island of Taiwan. Afterwards, the United States refused to recognize the newly established communist PRC and instead only kept diplomatic

relations with the ROC government in Taiwan. Chinese military confrontations against the United States during the Korean War, and the ensuing Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954–1955 and 1958, exacerbated the relationship between the United States and the PRC, and diplomatic contact continued to deteriorate.

After the United States entered into the Vietnam War in the 1960s, a chance appeared for thawing its frosty relationship with the PRC. China and the Soviet Union began vying for influence on the North Vietnamese side, and eventually North Vietnam chose to accept help from the Soviet Union rather than the Chinese. This furthered a rift that had been growing between the PRC and the USSR. Earlier in the 1950s, the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) undertook de-Stalinization and reformist actions that ran counter to the PRC's practices. This caused China to denounce the Soviet Union's policies and, coupled with the rejection of Chinese aid in Vietnam in favor of Soviet aid, caused the two Communist powers to grow further apart. In 1969, tensions between the USSR and PRC reached an all-time high as they engaged in a series of clashes along China's northern border. War seemed imminent between the two nuclear powers for a time, and Mao began to worry about his country's future security. The Asian Communist nation, also in the midst of its tumultuous Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically, with few major friends in the international arena. Compounding the situation, China increasingly

faced a major threat from the Soviet Union, formerly their strongest supporter. The PRC began to take steps to shore up its own position internationally, and by the late 1960s appeared open to approaching its old bitter enemy, the United States.

Under previous U.S. administrations, a uniform foreign policy was in place to deal with Communist nations, under the theory that all Communist states were the same. This theory proved to be untrue, as the split between the PRC and USSR illustrated. Under the Nixon administration, National Security Advisor and future secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–) proposed the idea that the United States could deal with China differently, using the relationship as an opportunity to unbalance its key enemy, the Soviet Union.

With tensions rising between the two major Communist powers, Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), under blessings from Mao Zedong, agreed to speak with his American counterparts in an effort to negotiate a better relationship. A period known as *Rapprochement* began, with both sides considering the possibilities of establishing bilateral relations with one another. Relations continued to improve with the accidental actions of an American ping-pong player and his rival team from the PRC.

In April 1971, Japan played host to an international ping-pong tournament. The Chinese, in an effort to engage other nations of the world, participated in the sporting event. Glen Cowan, a member of the American ping-pong team, was practicing in Nagoya and inadvertently stepped onto the Chinese team's bus when practices were over. One of the Chinese players, Zhuang Zedong, realized Glen's mistake and helped him to get back to his own team. The American player was treated with hospitality during his

ride with the opposing players, and he formed a friendship with them. The Chinese team invited him to visit the PRC as a token of goodwill, and when the Communist government got wind of this, they used it as a diplomatic maneuver and extended an official invitation to the American team to tour China. With relations becoming increasingly amicable, the time was rapidly approaching for an official diplomatic visit between the two nations.

In July 1971, U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger was on a diplomatic trip to Pakistan. During the night, he slipped out on a secret mission to the PRC. The mission was actually an attempt to open relations between the two governments, and Kissinger engaged in discussions with his Chinese counterpart, Premier Zhou Enlai. The two came to an agreement, and on July 15, President Nixon stated that he had been formally invited to the PRC.

On February 21, 1972, Nixon, accompanied by Kissinger and several other advisors, made his way to China and held high-level meetings with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The meetings were fruitful, and on February 28, the two parties released the Shanghai Communiqué. This communiqué, authored by both the United States and the PRC, endorsed further contact between the two nations in the form of diplomatic and cultural exchanges, with both sides disavowing the pursuit of hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region. The PRC also outlined several of its positions in the communiqué: namely, the reinforcement of the One-China policy, stating that Taiwan was a province of China, the government of the PRC was the sole government of China, the question of the liberation of Taiwan was an internal affair of China and should not be interfered with, and all U.S. military installations and forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The United

States responded to this in the communiqué by saying that a peaceful settlement between Taiwan and China must be reached by the Chinese themselves, and affirmed its commitment to reduction and eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan. Both sides expressed interest in conducting bilateral trade and remained committed to keeping in contact with each other via the sending of officials.

Relations continued to improve between the two nations, with an official liaison office set up in both the United States and the PRC in 1973. In 1978, on the advice of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter (1924–) sought full diplomatic relations with the PRC. A joint communiqué was released on December 15, 1978, whereby the United States and the PRC agreed to formally recognize each other on January 1, 1979, and establish formal diplomatic relations. The U.S. also agreed to recognize the Communist government as the sole government of China, and formally adopted the One-China policy. Additionally, both sides reaffirmed their belief that the normalization of relations between the two countries would be in the best interests of both the Chinese and American peoples, and would lead to peace in Asia and the world.

On January 1, 1979, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) went to Washington, DC, to attend a special ceremony where the government of the United States officially recognized the PRC. What followed was an unprecedented increase in trade relations and further diplomatic contact between the two nations. The strategy of rapprochement appeared successful, and the USSR became agitated over the two enemies coming together. The Soviets then engaged the United States in several treaties, namely the SALT (Strategic

Arms Limitation Treaty) treaties, to encourage peaceful limitations and disarmament of strategic weapons in an effort to reduce military tensions. Overtures to the PRC also had an impact on the Republic of China when, in 1971, the United Nations decided to revoke Taiwan's membership in favor of the PRC. Relations between the United States and the PRC improved throughout the 1980s but encountered a serious problem in 1989 with Deng Xiaoping's heavy-handed response to the Tiananmen Square protests. In 1991, the USSR collapsed, and relations changed to a more cautious approach. With no single enemy to unite against, and with the PRC emerging as a major economic power, relations between the United States and China continue to play an important part of global foreign policy.

Michael Molina

See also: China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Jinmen; Korea War; Mao Zedong; Movement to Resist America and Aid Vietnam; People's Liberation Army; Shanghai Communiqué; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Sino-Soviet Split; Soviet Union; Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958; Tiananmen Square Events; Zhou Enlai.

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Unequal Treaties

The unequal treaties were a series of agreements signed between Western imperialist powers (and later Japan) with the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912) of China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The earliest use of the term was by the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) in the 1920s. The treaties greatly diminished the Republic of China's (ROC) influence and power within its own borders. Because of the unequal status of the two sides who signed the treaty, the agreement would often do much harm to the sovereignty and national interest of China. The usual content of the unequal treaties included ceding territory, paying indemnities, concessions, extraterritoriality (consular jurisdiction), doing business and opening trading ports, providing most favored nation status, negotiating tariffs, and designating spheres of influence.

Because of the failure of the First Opium War (1839–1842), China signed the first of the unequal treaties, the Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking), with Great Britain, symbolizing the beginning of China's semicolonial status. The treaties signed due to the First Opium War also included the Treaty of Bogue (1843, with Great Britain), the Treaty of Wangxia (Wangshia) (1844, with the

United States), and the Treaty of Huangpu (Whampoa) (1844, with France).

Then in the Second Opium War (1856–1860), China was again forced to sign several unequal treaties with the West: the Treaty of Aigun (1858, with Russia), the Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin) (1858, with France, United Kingdom, Russia, and United States respectively), and the Convention of Beijing (1860, with United Kingdom, France, and Russia respectively). The signing of the unequal treaties was considered an attempt by the West to open China to its exports, thereby expanding Western markets.

From 1860 to the early 1900s, Qing China underwent the Self-Strengthening movement in an attempt to increase China's power to compete with Western nations. The attempt failed and imperialist countries continued to take away sovereignty from China through wars and unequal treaties. The French-Chinese War (1884–1885), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), and the Eight foreign armies' invasion of China brought another Treaty of Tianjin (1885, with France), the Treaty of Shimonoseki (or Maguan) (1895, with Japan), and the Boxer Protocol (1901, with 11 countries), and other unequal treaties.

From 1919 to 1949, China endured a series of large strikes and assemblies. The May Fourth movement (1919) was an eruption of the Chinese people's nationalism and democratic resolution, and this resulted in the refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. After the GMD government of the Republic of China was established in Nanjing in 1927, movements to regain sovereignty and revise treaties were carried out continually.

During World War II, some Western countries abolished the existing unequal treaties and abandoned their priorities in China voluntarily. By 1949, the government

of the People's Republic of China (PRC) officially announced that they would abrogate all treaties signed by the previous governments, putting an end to the unequal treaties.

Jing Wang

See also: Boxer Rebellion; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Eight Foreign Armies Invasion of China; Guomindang; Li Hongzhang; Nanjing, Treaty of; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Self-Strengthening Movement; Shimonoseki, Treaty of; Sino-French War; Sino-Japanese War; Taiping Rebellion; Tianjin, Treaty of; Wangxia, Treaty of.

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United Front

A military and political coalition between the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945. It was the second time for the GMD-CCP coalition

after their first cooperation took place in 1925–1927 in the Northern Expedition against the warlords.

On September 18, 1931, the Japanese army in northeast China seized Shenyang (Mukden). The incident began Japan's aggression in four provinces of northeast China. In the mid-1930s, Japan showed its intention of penetrating south of the Great Wall and invading central and east China, which posed a direct menace to Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) rule as the president of the Republic of China (ROC). On December 12, 1936, the Xi'an Incident (Xi'an shibian) occurred, and Jiang was arrested by a couple of his generals and their troops at Xi'an. On December 24, Jiang was released. Two days later, on his way back to Nanjing (Nanking), Jiang issued a public statement at Luoyang, Henan (Honan) Province, promising to form a united front including the CCP.

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese imperial army attacked the GMD troops at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao), southwest of Beijing. This event, known as the "Lugouqiao Incident," marked the beginning of Japan's all-out aggression against China and of China's War of Resistance against Japan. On August 13, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai and threatened Nanjing. The GMD government came to an agreement with the CCP on joint resistance.

As part of this agreement, the main force of the CCP's Red Army, then located in the northwest and numbering 46,000 men, became the Eighth Route Army (Balujun) of the National army in August 1937, with Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) as commander, Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) as deputy commander, and Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) as chief of staff. They commanded three divisions, the 115th, 120th, and 129th, and crossed the Yellow

River (Huanghe) eastward until it reached north China. Most of their units moved into the mountainous areas. As Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) did in Jinggangshan (Ching kang Mountains), they conducted a guerrilla campaign in the mountains behind the Japanese lines. In the south, the Red Army's guerrilla troops were reorganized into the New Fourth Army (Xinsijun) of the National Army, totaling 10,300 men, including four field columns (divisions). Each field column had two to four regiments. Ye Ting (Yeh Ting) (1896–1946) commanded the New Fourth Army.

In August 1937, the Japanese occupied Beijing and Tianjin (Tientsin). In November, Japan concentrated 220,000 troops and began an offensive campaign against Nanjing and Shanghai. Jiang and the GMD high command deployed nearly 700,000 troops to defend the Nanjing-Shanghai region. On November 7, the Japanese Tenth Army successfully landed at Hangzhou (Hang-chow) Bay. In December, they seized Nanjing. By March 1938, almost all of north China fell into the enemy's hands. In October, Guangzhou (Canton) and Wuhan also fell. The GMD government was forced to move its capital to Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province. Jiang's troops suffered heavy casualties. From July 1937 to November 1938, Jiang lost 1 million GMD troops while eliminating 250,730 Japanese soldiers. The GMD Army withdrew to China's southwest and northwest to conserve some of their troops when Chiang removed the seat of his government from Nanjing to Chongqing, Sichuan, in 1939–1940. By 1941, the GMD had lost the coastal and other port cities that once had been their bases of power.

When Jiang lost some of his best troops in the war against the Japanese invasion, Mao's successful guerrillas recruited a large

number of peasants into his forces. The units of the Eighth Route Army marched to the enemy-occupied territories, where they carried out guerrilla operations and established military and political bases. The Eighth Route Army increased from 46,000 men in 1937, to 220,000 men in 1939, and to 500,000 men in 1940. In south China, the New Fourth Army moved north and south of the Yangtze and established bases in southern Jiangsu and also north of the river. In order to establish a grassroots united front behind the Japanese lines, the CCP modified their land reform policy, supporting small landlords and wealthy peasants, and cooperating with Chiang's troops in guerrilla warfare, in a more nationalistic rather than Communist policy.

In 1941–1942, the Japanese command concentrated 64 percent of its troops in China to launch “mopping-up operations” against the CCP bases behind its line. Its policy was known as “Three Alls”: kill all, burn all, and loot all. Slowly and gradually, they wanted to stop the guerrillas in their rear area of operations by eliminating their human and economic resources. To overcome the shortage of food and supply, the Chinese officers and soldiers devoted themselves to increasing production. Many of them participated in the opening up of wilderness for crop cultivation, the raising of hogs, and the making of cloth.

In the wake of the Allied Forces' campaign against the fascists and militarism across the globe in 1941–1945, Jiang and his GMD government also engaged in the Allied Forces' China-Burma-India Theater operations and sent the elite GMD troops to India and Burma. The new command included the small prewar U.S. military advisory group and Major General Claire Lee Chennault's (1893–1958) American Volunteer Group (AVG, known as the Flying Tigers), later a part of the Tenth Army Air

Force. Designed to improve Allied military operations in the region, the new command structure did not achieve that end. Conflicts and different goals remained, with Jiang being the chief problem in Allied cooperation. But the British and Americans also had different priorities. The British were mainly concerned with the defense of India and preventing the Japanese military from exerting an influence on growing Indian nationalism. London saw defeating the Japanese in Burma as the chief means to bring about that end, rather than as a means to channel supplies to China. British military efforts in Burma would thus ebb and flow. The United States was primarily interested in building up China's military strength, and Burma would be a chief route for these supplies to reach China; indeed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) saw China taking its rightful place as a major world power at war's end. U.S. military planners also saw China as a potential location for heavy bombers to be used in the strategic bombing of Japan. These conflicting views were exacerbated by the personalities involved. Meanwhile, Jiang refused to yield operational command of the growing Chinese military establishment to General Joseph Stilwell (1883–1946).

On August 14, Japan surrendered unconditionally. On September 2, it signed the instrument of surrender. The Chinese people, after eight years of bitter struggle under the leadership of the united front, finally won victory in the Anti-Japanese War. The price in Chinese lives for resisting Japanese aggression was very high. Total military deaths of the GMD Army were 2.4 million men, and that of the Communist forces were 600,000 men. Civilian deaths were estimated more than 10 million lives.

In August 1945, Jiang invited Mao Zedong, chairman of the CCP, for peace

talks in Chongqing. Mao accepted the invitation and headed a delegation that included Zhou and Wang Ruofei. On August 28, U.S. ambassador Patrick Hurley personally escorted Mao from Yan'an to Chongqing for negotiations with Jiang to avoid a collapse of the CCP-GMD coalition. The Chongqing Talks lasted 43 days, but agreement was never reached on the basic issues of the national government and army. Since both sides had different political agendas, the negotiations failed, and the two parties resumed their military conflicts in China. After the United Front collapsed in late 1945, the Chinese Civil War broke out in June 1946.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: American Volunteer Group; Anti-Japanese War; Chennault, Claire Lee; China, Republic of; China-Burma-India Theater; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Great Wall; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomindang; Hong Kong; Hundred Regiments Campaign; Ichi-go Campaign; Japan, Attack on Manchuria; Jiang Jieshi; Manchuria; Mao Zedong; Marco Polo Bridge Incident; Nationalist Army; New Fourth Army; New Fourth Army Incident; Stilwell, Joseph; Taierzhuang, Battle of; Xi'an Incident; Xuzhou, Battle of; Yan'an.

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V

Vietnam, China's Self-Defense Counterattack against (1979).

See Sino-Vietnamese Border War

W

Wang Dongxing (1916–)

Military and political leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Communist Party of China). Wang was a general of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), vice chairman of the CCP, and a Standing Committee member of the Politburo of the Central Committee.

Wang Dongxing was born into a poor peasant family in Yiyang County, central Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province, in 1916. He joined the Red Army of the CCP and became a party member in 1932. He participated in the Long March of 1934–1935 and later became the political commissar of the field hospital of the Second Red Army. During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, he was deputy director of the Political Division of the Public Health Department of the Eighth Route Army. Then he became the political commissar of the Bethune International Peace Hospital. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Wang was the deputy chief of staff of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee.

In 1947, Wang became the principal bodyguard of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) at Yan'an (Yenan). Wang also served as the deputy director of the General Office of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the chief of the Security Department of the Central Committee. He participated in several battles during the CCP defense against the Guomindang's (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalists) offensive campaign in northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. He

made evacuation plans and relocated the top CCP leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), and Ren Bishi during the CCP defense. His security operation and combat command guaranteed the CCP leaders' safety and enabled the Party Center to stay in Shaanxi and achieve its military and political success throughout the Chinese Civil War.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Wang was appointed chief of the Security Department of the PRC State Council, deputy director of the Eighth Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security, and vice minister of Public Security. In the early 1950s, he also served as lieutenant governor of Jiangxi Province, director general of the General Office of the Central Committee, director of the Security Department of the Central Committee, and director of the Security Department of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD). In 1955, he was promoted to major general.

After 1955, Wang Dongxing began to command the security force inside Zhongnanhai (the "Middle and Southern Seas," a palace of the emperors and empresses within the Forbidden City in the center of Beijing which became the home of Mao, Zhou, and other top CCP leaders. Most of the important top CCP, PRC, and PLA meetings, such as the Politburo, were and still are held there). During the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, Wang was also the commander of the 8341 troops, an elite force of the Beijing Military Region. Wang had absolute responsibility for Mao's daily activities and

all trips. He was elected representative of the Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth National People's Congress.

After Mao's death in September 1976, Wang Dongxing supported Hua Guofeng (1921–2008) and Ye Jianying's (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) decision to arrest the Gang of Four, including Mao's wife Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914–1991). Wang played a critical role in their arrests as the director of the Security Bureau of the Central Committee and the director of the General Office of the Central Committee. Wang encouraged Hua and Ye to make the final decision to arrest the Gang of Four, which turned around China's fortunes. Without Wang's help and efforts, China might have languished further under the rigid centrally planned economic and political system. In August 1977, at the Eleventh National Conference of the CCP, he was elected member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and Vice Chairman of the CCP, reaching the peak of his political life.

Due to his Maoist views as well as many concurrent positions he held, Wang Dongxing was criticized at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee. He was released from the director's position in the General Office of the Central Committee. In February 1980, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee accepted his resignation as member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and vice chairman of the CCP. Then in September 1982, Wang was elected as a reserved member of the Central Committee at the Twelfth National Party Conference of the CCP. In September 1985, he was elected a member of the Advisory Commission of the Central Committee, and again in November 1987, he was reelected for the same position at the Thirteenth National Party Conference.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; Gang of Four; General Departments of the People's Liberation Army; Guomindang; Hua Guofeng; Long March; Mao Zedong; National Party Conference; National People's Congress; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Yan'an; Ye Jianying; Zhou Enlai.

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Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei) (1883–1944)

Chinese politician who became head of a puppet government of Japan in Nanjing (Nanking) in 1940 during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945. Born in Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, on May 4, 1883, Wang Jingwei studied law in Tokyo in his youth, but his avocation was politics. An early ally of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), he quickly rose to a prominent position in Sun's revolutionary movement devoted to overthrowing the ruling Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912). Imprisoned for participating in a plot to assassinate the

regent Prince Qun (Ch'un) in 1910, Wang was released after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912. He then spent the period from 1912 to 1917 in exile after Sun's movement collapsed.

Wang's revolutionary credentials and his role in rebuilding the Nationalist Party—the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party)—made him the logical candidate to succeed Sun after the latter's death in 1925, but he was pushed aside by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), who controlled the Nationalist army. Wang attempted to form his own government, but he failed and eventually mended fences with Jiang in a show of unity following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

Appointed titular head of the Nationalist government in 1932, Wang was forced to bear the onus of appeasing the Japanese while Jiang led the army in a campaign to exterminate the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). Disillusioned, he resigned and left China in 1935 to recover from an assassination attempt. He returned following the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War in 1937, but he quickly grew pessimistic about China's military prospects. After failing to persuade Jiang to make peace with Japan (which led Nationalist agents to make another attempt on his life), Wang fled to Japanese-occupied China. In March 1940, the Japanese army installed him as head of the puppet Reorganized Nationalist government in Nanjing.

Wang's hopes of presenting himself as a credible alternative to Jiang were ultimately doomed by the harsh reality of Japanese military domination. He died in Nagoya, Japan, on November 10, 1944, while undergoing medical treatment.

Dr. John M. Jennings

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Encirclement Campaigns; Guomindang; Japan, Attack on Manchuria; Jiang Jieshi; Manchuria; Nationalist Army; Northern Expedition; Qing Dynasty; Sun Yat-sen; Warlord Period.

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Wangxia, Treaty of (1844)

The Treaty of Wangxia was a diplomatic agreement between the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912) of China and the United States, signed on July 3, 1844 at a temple in the village of Wangxia (Wanghia). Following the close of the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the successful negotiation of the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) between the United Kingdom and China, the government of the United States appointed Caleb Cushing as the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to China in order to assert and maintain the

privileges and interests of America on terms as favorable as those enjoyed by the British.

Similar to the Nanjing Treaty, the treaty between the United States and China allowed U.S. citizens and vessels to enter either of the five treaty ports including Guangzhou (Canton), Xiamen (Amoy), Fuzhou (Fuo-chow), Ningbo, and Shanghai. Although the opium trade was interdicted on behalf of China and violators would be subject to Chinese law without any protection from the United States, the accord was yet considered one of the unequal treaties signed by China with foreign powers.

Under the settlement, U.S. citizens were free to trade with other merchants, to construct hospitals and churches, and in particular to learn Chinese from local people, which was previously forbidden for foreigners. In like manner, Americans enjoyed a fixed tariff, extraterritoriality, and most favored nation provisions by which the United States was entitled to secure additional advantages or privileges yielded by China to any other nations. Above all, the Wangxia Treaty contained an article (Article XXXIII) allowing renegotiation of the convention at its expiration 12 years later, which later led to disputes between China and foreign powers, and finally caused the outbreak of the Second Opium War in 1856.

Tao Wang

See also: Nanjing, Treaty of; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Unequal Treaties.

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Wannan Incident. *See* New Fourth Army Incident

War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945). *See* Anti-Japanese War

Ward, Frederick Townsend (1831–1862)

A Yankee adventurer from Salem, Massachusetts, United States, whom popular accounts credited with singlehandedly saving Shanghai (1860–1862) from the terror of the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864). That heroic view derived from turn-of-the-century biographies that glorified Ward as an agent of the emergent American empire, until imperialism itself became suspect. Somewhere in the frequent retelling of Ward's story, legends came to obscure the facts of his life.

At 16, Ward sailed with relatives to Hong Kong, and then spent a year in military school in Vermont. Ward sailed with his father to San Francisco, and then returned to Hong Kong on the clipper *Black Warrior* in January 1860. He proceeded to Shanghai

three months later. He served on the paddle-wheel steamtug *Confucius* under “Admiral” Gough, whom the Chinese commissioned to suppress pirates. There, Ward met a fellow American sailor, North Carolina-born Henry Andreas Burgevine, who had previously worked as a page in the U.S. Senate and as a reporter for a New York paper.

That same spring of 1860, the Taiping rebels broke the siege of Nanjing (Nanking) and swarmed eastward toward Shanghai. The city’s Mandarin officials (like *Taotai* Wu-Hsu) and Chinese merchants (like Yang-Fang, aka banker Takee) contracted with Ward and Burgevine to form a mercenary force to wrest Songjing (Sungkiang) from Taiping control, in exchange for high salaries and lucrative bonuses. The Americans’ first band of rowdy Europeans failed to recover Songjing, but their second surprise attack using 83 Filipino sailors from the *Confucius* successfully reclaimed the walled city from 4,000 rebels on July 4, 1860. Shanghai’s Europeans were initially unaware of the Americans’ victory at Songjing, but later they decried it as antagonizing the rebels into attacking their settlements. Nevertheless, the two Americans immediately attempted to duplicate their success at the nearby rebel stronghold of Qingpu (Tsingpu), but the Europeans and their Foreign-Rifle Corps were repulsed while mounting the city walls. Ward was shot through the roof of his mouth and spent over six months recuperating. While Ward was debilitated, Burgevine originated the idea of using Western officers to train a corps of Chinese soldiers.

The spring of 1861 was perhaps the most misunderstood period of Ward in China due to deliberate misrepresentations made by Edward Forrester, who joined Ward and Burgevine as their third-in-command. In April, acting on the orders of Vice Admiral

Sir James Hope, Commander Hire arrested and held Ward aboard HMS *Urgent* for inducing British sailors to desert, luring them away with high wages to train the Chinese. Usually it claimed that Ward evaded a trial before the U.S. Consul at Shanghai by disavowing his American citizenship and claiming to be a Chinese national. In fact, exactly the opposite happened; Ward was released because an American official stripped him of his nationality (for soldiering with Walker in Mexico). Meanwhile, his patron *Taotai* Wu explicitly asserted that Ward was not a Chinese citizen.

In May, Ward was again supposedly arrested and imprisoned by Admiral Hope aboard his flagship HMS *Chesapeake*. In one of his most celebrated adventures, under cover of darkness, Ward allegedly jumped from the warship’s window into the Shanghai River and escaped. That entire story, however, was fabricated by Forrester since Hope was in Japan at the time, and the *Chesapeake* was in Hong Kong. Ward’s ship-jump had become confused with the arrest of Burgevine, who was subsequently released by the U.S. Consul for insufficient evidence. For the remainder of 1861, Ward and Burgevine ceased “crimping” Western officers for their Chinese Foreign Legion and concentrated instead on training their native recruits. Ward’s troops were issued blue uniforms in the French suave-style and green turbans, which inspired the name “Green-Headed Army,” used by the Chinese to ridicule them as “foreign devils.” Eventually, the impasse between Ward and Hope was resolved, and Hope agreed to limited assistance in their campaigns against the Taiping.

In January 1862, Ward’s disciplined Chinese blocked the Taiping expansion north of Shanghai near the juncture of the Huangpu River and the Yangzi (Yangtze)

River at Wusong (Woosung). In early February, they took many rebel stockades at Dongguao east of Shanghai, and then returned to Songjing to recover Kwanfulin. By February 21, with some artillery support from the British and French navies, Ward and Burgevine next achieved a major victory by recapturing the rebel headquarters at Kajow on the Pudong Peninsula. For those three conquests the Emperor conferred on Ward's force the lofty name of the Ever-Victorious Army (Ch'ang-sheng-chun), and the emperor promoted both Ward and Burgevine to the fourth of eight ranks of military Mandarins.

The very next week they retook Xiaotang (Hsiaotang), but Burgevine was seriously wounded by a shot through his pelvis, which sidelined him for several months. For this additional accomplishment, again both Americans were promoted to third military rank. During early March, flush with victories and wealthy from his economic ventures, Ward married banker Takee's daughter Changmei. But almost immediately, on March 13, Ward was obliged to rescue the local Green Banner General from a snare at Zhejing (Chekiang), for which Ward alone was promoted to the second military rank. One key to their victories was the use of a mosquito fleet of small steamships like *Willamette* and *Kajow* that could rapidly navigate the inland creeks and canals. Takee and Ward even jointly owned *Tahwah*, which, when not on campaign, was available for commercial hire. Ward next joined in a British and French plan to clear the rebels from within a 30-mile radius of Shanghai, with victories at Chipoo (April 4), Soochin (April 5), and Tsipow (May 16). At Lungchu-an (April 4), Admiral Hope was wounded in the leg; and at Nanjow (May 16) French rear admiral Protet was killed. In April, the new viceroy, Li Hongzhang, arrived in the

region with his Xiang (Hunan) Army. Futai Li was jealous of Ward's Ever-Victorious Army and suspicious of both of its sponsors Takee and Wu. Throughout the summer's heat, Ward campaigned with victories at Jiading (May 1), Qingpu (May 12), Kinsanwai (July 16) and Tsepoo (August 12). Once the 30-mile radius was pacified, Li ordered Ward to Zhejiang Province to quell the Taiping disturbance there. Ward campaigned near Ningpo with British commander Roderick Dew at Yuyao and Fungwha, until Ward was struck by a bullet at Tzeki and died (September 22, 1862). Forrester now saw his golden opportunity: he stole Ward's account book showing how much the Chinese owed Ward, and he sold those records to Wu and Takee just before he left China. Ward was ceremoniously buried at his headquarters in Songjing; later a temple was erected in his honor. However, because Forrester had stolen Ward's account book and because Ward's brother Henry had taken Chinese money to build war-steamers in America that he never delivered, the disputes about the Ward estate were not resolved until the Boxer Indemnity of 1901.

Dr. Gordon W. Knight

See also: Boxer Rebellion; Ever-Victorious Army; Hong Kong; Li Hongzhang; Qing Dynasty; Small Sword Society; Taiping Rebellion.

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Warlord Period (1916–1927)

A historic period in the Republic of China (ROC) when some military commanders of the army controlled a province or region and the central government lost control of the country. After the Chinese Revolution of 1911 against the Manchu's Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912), the provisional government elected Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) president of the government and inaugurated him on January 1, 1912, at Nanjing (Nanking). It was a great breakthrough in Chinese history, ended 2,000 years of monarchy and building the first republic in Asian history. The Qing court's hopes rested with Marshal Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916), commander of the New Army. In an attempt to avoid civil war, Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries negotiated with Yuan and offered him the presidency of the new republic. On February 12, 1912, Yuan forced the last emperor, only six at the time, to step down, thus ending the Qing dynasty. Sun resigned as president, and on February 14, the provisional government elected Yuan as president of the ROC. Yuan, however, tried to establish his own dictatorship through his personal network in the New Army. As the father of the Chinese warlords, Yuan's monarchy confronted the revolutionaries until his death in 1916. Thereafter, the central government collapsed completely.

Sun Yat-sen and his political party, Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party), never had control of the New Army or any armed force. After Yuan's death, from 1916 to 1927, the country entered the Warlord Period, in which military commanders of different armies controlled one or two provinces or regions. Among them, seven or eight major warlord armies divided the country and waged wars against each other. They

exercised autonomous political power by virtue of their personal control of their military force. Hoping to seize control of the whole country, warlord armies competed for human resources by drafting young peasants into their own army. An estimated 500,000 men served in the warlord armies in 1916. The total increased to 1 million by 1918 and about 1.5 million by 1924. The Warlord Period demonstrated that the 1911 Revolution failed to turn China into a truly independent and democratic country.

In 1922–1923, Sun Yat-sen and the GMD instituted a major policy change in favor of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). After the termination of the 1911 Revolution, Sun's struggle for democracy, or his "second revolution," against the warlords failed each time. Sun wanted to establish a modern armed force under his and GMD command. While most Western powers rejected or ignored his idea, the Soviet Union was willing to help him build a revolutionary army. In December 1921, Hendricus Sneevliet Maring (1883–1942), representative of the Soviet Union, secretly met Sun in Guilin (Kweilin), southwestern Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province. The Soviets, however, requested that the GMD allow the CCP members to join the GMD as individuals. The CCP, meanwhile, would maintain its own independence, politically and ideologically. In exchange, the Soviet government would help Sun and the GMD with their military establishment and officer training. Sun was interested since he was preparing a northern expedition against the warlords at Guangzhou (Canton), the capital city of southern Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, to unify the Republic of China. In August 1922, Sun met Adolph A. Joffe, a top Soviet diplomat, who finalized financial aid and military training for the GMD.

In January 1924, Sun convened in Guangzhou the First GMD National Congress. The party congress enacted a new constitution and agreed that Communists could join the GMD as individuals. On June 16, the Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy (the West Point of China) was founded in Guangzhou with the assistance of the Soviet Union and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) as the commandant. On July 1, 1925, three-and-a-half months after Sun died in Beijing, the GMD government formally came into existence in Guangzhou under the leadership of Jiang. On August 26, 1925, the Nationalist Revolution Army was established with five armies and Jiang as its commander in chief. In 1926, it formed three more armies. A GMD party representative/political commissar and a political department were established at army, divisional, and regimental levels following the Soviet model. Some CCP members were appointed as party representatives, responsible for political work in the various units.

On July 1, 1926, Jiang issued a “Declaration on the Northern Expedition” and so launched the punitive expedition against the warlords, including Wu Peifu (Wu P’ei-fu) (1874–1939) and Sun Chuanfang (Sun Ch’uan-fang), two of the seven major warlords. Jiang renamed the National Revolutionary Army the Northern Expeditionary Army (NEA), which had eight infantry armies with approximately 100,000 men. On July 9, the NEA left Guangzhou on three separate routes. The main battlefields of Jiang’s Northern Expedition were Hunan and Hubei. They quickly took Changsha and Yuezhou, and destroyed Wu’s main forces in Hunan. In September–October, Jiang captured the triple city of Wuhan/Wuchang, the capital city of Hubei (Hupei) Province, and decisively won the battle of Hunan and Hubei. Then the

NEA troops moved along the other two routes, occupying Nanchang, Anqing, and Nanjing (Nanking). In less than six months, the NEA overthrew the two most powerful warlords. The others either surrendered or joined Jiang’s forces, which increased from 8 eight armies, 100,000 men in 1926 to 40 armies, 700,000 men in 1927. The Nationalist territory expanded from the southwestern coast to the Yangtze valley along the eastern coast, covering half of China. In mid-December, the GMD National Government and the Central Executive Committee moved from Guangzhou to Wuhan, central Hubei Province. In April 1927, Jiang established his new National Government of the Republic of China under GMD control in Nanjing, ending the Warlord Period and starting the Republic Period of 1927–1937, or the “Nanjing Decade.”

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Beiyang Army; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Guomintang; Jiang Jieshi; Manchus; National Revolutionary Army; New Army; Northern Expedition; Qing Dynasty; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; Whampoa Military Academy; Yuan Shikai.

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Warring States Period (475–221 BC)

A historic period in ancient China during the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BC) when the country was divided and experienced many years of ferocious warfare aimed at expansion and annexation among the states. During the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BC) of the Eastern Zhou dynasty, the newly emerged landlord class took over power in the various states and established the feudal system. After a long period of civil wars, only seven states survived the Warring States Period. The seven states that checked and balanced one another were Qi, Chu, Yan, Han, Zhao, Wei, and Qin.

Continuing social disorder and endless warfare required solutions during the Warring States Period. To cope with the situation and win the civil wars, each state initiated its own set of reforms. The earliest reform was carried out in the state of Wei by Li Kui to improve farming by constructing a new irrigation system. Ximen Bao of Wei, channeling the water of the Zhang River for irrigation, helped agricultural production in his state. Other states developed their domestic trade, which promoted the handcrafting industry and urban development noticeably. Cities became more and more prosperous such as Linzi in the state of Qi, Handan in the state of Zhao, Luoyang in

the state of Zhou, Ying in the state of Chu, and Ji in the state of Yan. They were all populous and famous cities during the Warring States Period. In Linzi, capital of Qi, there were royal palaces, markets, and commercial streets crowded with wagons, horses, and pedestrians. The city, covering an area of eight square miles, had, among other things, six iron-melting factories, nine copper-making factories, and factories making bone articles. Metal coins were used for trade and exchanges, and each of the states had its own currency.

During the Warring States Period, many schools of philosophy flourished, such as Confucianism, Moism (Mohism), Legalism, and Daoism (Taoism). Each school presented its own writings, propagating its own beliefs while criticizing the beliefs of others. Together they created a situation in which “a hundred schools contended.” Mohism was pioneered by Mo Zi (478–392 BC) whose real name was Mo Di. A native of the state of Lu, he advocated “universal love” and “honoring of the virtuous,” all of which reflected the wish of small landowners and farmers at that time. The representative works of Daoism are Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi. The former is known as *Daode Jing* (Way of Daoism), which developed elementary dialectics. Mencius (372–289 BC) was a principal representative of Confucianism during the Warring States Period. He considered himself the master’s ideological descendant and advocated “the kingly way” and “the policy of benevolence,” advising all rulers to win the hearts of their subjects so as to secure their own rule. Han Fei (280–233 BC) was a native of Han, and his ideas could be found in a book entitled *Han Fei Zi*. He opposed such concepts as the heavenly mandate and questioned the existence of spirits. He had no use for “returning to the old” and opposed

retrogression as a matter of principle. He advocated the concentration of all power in the hands of the sovereign and rule by law, and was a representative of the Legalist school. As for the school of military science, its principal representatives were Sun Wu and Su Bin during this period. The former wrote *Military Science of Sun Zi* and the latter *Military Science of Sun Bin*. Both expressed thoughts on military strategy and tactics that were contained in their elements of dialectics.

Among the seven states during the Warring States Period, the King of Qin (Ch'in) adopted Legalism as the ruling ideology and accepted the proposals of Lord Shang Yang for political, economic, and military reforms. The Qin government abolished the well-field system and legally recognized private ownership of land, which could be bought or sold. It promoted tilling and weaving so as to increase the production of essentials. It also abolished privileges enjoyed by hereditary aristocrats, and granted land and titles to those who had distinguished themselves on the battlefield. It also stated that all officials must be appointed by the central government. As a result of carrying out such reforms, the Qin state became rich and strong, and it became possible for Qin to unify the country.

Upon his ascension to the throne, Ying Zheng (246–210 BC), king of Qin, embarked on a dramatic conquest of other kingdoms. Having drafted a massive infantry army, he had an efficient military machine led by strong commanders. Instead of using chariots, his army possessed cavalry, superior iron weapons, and crossbows, all comparatively new developments at the time. His attacks on others, especially siege battles, became much more forceful and merciless. He successively annexed and terminated Han, Zhao, Wei, Chu, Yan, and Qi.

In 221 B.C., his effort was crowned with success when China was unified under Qin (or Chin, where China got its name in the West: Chin-a). The unification of China was followed by the establishment of a highly centralized regime, the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC), the first of its kind in Chinese history. Ancient China was over, and imperial China began. Having concentrated all power in his own hands, Qin Shi Huangdi (the first emperor of Qin, reigned 221–210 BC) proceeded with the establishment of a huge bureaucracy. This central monarch system, or imperial system, lasted for more than 2,000 years without significant changes.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: *Art of War, The*; Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Lord Shang; Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Sun Zi; Terra-Cotta Army; Zhou Dynasty.

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Western Han (206 BC–23 AD)

The Han was the second imperial dynasty of China from 206 BC to 220 AD. The dynasty is historically divided into two periods: the Western Han with the capital city of Chang'an (Xi'an, or Sian) in the west from 206 BC to 23 AD, and the Eastern Han with the capital city of Luoyang in the east from 25–220. The Han dynasty replaced the Qin (Ch'in) dynasty (221–206 BC), which was China's first imperial dynasty.

After conquering six other states, Qin Shi Huangdi (the first Qin emperor, reigned 221–210 BC) established a huge bureaucracy and a large army to create a center of political gravity at his capital. The entire imperial system was supported by peasants and landowners, who suffered onerous corvée, taxation, and military duties. Qin's brutal oppression and ruthless exploitation gave the peasants no choice but to resist. In 209 BC, a large-scale peasant rebellion began in northern China and soon became a nationwide revolt against the Qin dynasty. Liu Bang, one of the peasant leaders, eventually unified the country and established the Han regime in 206 BC. The capital of the new regime was Chang'an (northwest of modern Xi'an), Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, and the regime has been referred to by historians as Western Han.

As the first Western Han emperor, Liu Bang is known by his imperial appellation Emperor Gaozu (Kao-tsu) (206–195 BC) of Han. As for governmental structure, the new regime followed the example of its predecessor Qin by adopting the system of "Three Dukes and Nine Secretaries of State" for the central government and the system of prefectures and counties for the country as a whole. Even its laws were similar to those of the Qin regime; it awarded many with the titles of dukes or princes, who received fiefs for support. In due course, these dukedoms

and principalities became powerful in their own right; they were virtually independent kingdoms. In 154 BC, seven of them openly revolted. During the reign of Emperor Wudi (Wu-ti, Martial Emperor) (140–87 BC), more than 100 hereditary domains were abolished, and the country was then divided into 13 provinces, each of which was headed by a governor appointed by the central government. The governor, in turn, supervised the work of district magistrates under his jurisdiction. Salt making, iron smelting, and coinage were declared governmental monopolies, and the concentration of power in the hands of the central government was further strengthened.

Meanwhile, the Western Han began to conquer the territory outside the Great Wall. In 111 BC, Han Wudi destroyed and annexed the semisinicized state of Nanyue (Vietnam) and started 1,000 years of Chinese rule over northern Vietnam. He conquered Korea in 108 BC, and a Chinese command remained at Pyongyang until 313 AD. The Han emperors maintained a large expeditionary army for China's new central position in Asia, and also improved weaponry and equipment. The Chinese soldiers began to wear armor made of lamellar in which overlapping leather or metal plates were sewn onto a cloth. Light and flexible, the armor provided better protection during the frequent offensive campaigns.

The successful military expeditions and territorial expansion convinced the Western Han emperors and the people that they were superior in civilization and institution. The Han dynasty became the first glorious dynasty in Chinese history, and the Chinese people began to call themselves the "Han people" (*Hanzu*, Han nationals, the majority, 90 percent of the current population). The Western Han emperors believed that China, or "Zhongguo" in Chinese, was the Central

Kingdom, superior to any other people and nation “under the heaven” and that it thus occupies a “central” position in the known universe. This perception combined with a moral cosmology elevated the Chinese emperor as the “Son of the Heaven,” who possessed supreme power and heavenly missions, or the “Mandate of Heaven.” It justified Han Wudi’s military invasions that incorporated the “barbarian” people into the Chinese civilizations through a continuous process of acculturation. Han’s success forced many later rulers to look back and compare themselves with the glorious age of antiquity in terms of territory and geopolitics.

During the later period of the Western Han, aristocrats, high officials, and big landowners competed with one another in seizing more and more land for themselves. As they took over much of the rich farmland, the peasants were left with very little. The landless either became homeless refugees or sold themselves as slaves. As social contradiction deepened, peasant uprisings became more frequent. The Western Han regime itself was endangered as a result. In 6 AD, Wang Mang, a relative of the royal house, usurped power and replaced Emperor Pingdi (P’ing-ti) (1 BC–5 AD) as sovereign. He formally announced the establishment of a new dynasty from 9–23. The new regime did not solve the social conflicts between the rich and poor. All this merely increased the people’s sense of insecurity and the instability of society as a whole. As social crisis was built up to a climax, peasant uprisings of major proportions erupted. In 25 AD, Liu Xiu (5 BC–57 AD), a powerful landlord who had wormed his way into the ranks of the peasant insurgents declared himself emperor and reestablished the Han regime. Since the capital of the reestablished regime, Luoyang, was located to the east of

Chang’an, historians refer to the new regime as the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220). Thus, the Western Han was over by 25.

Yutong Yang

See also: Great Wall; Han Dynasty; Han Wudi, Emperor; Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Rebellion Led by Chen Sheng; Terra-Cotta Army; Warring States Period.

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Western Views of Chinese Warfare

Military experts and scholars in Europe and America have studied the 2,500-year history of Chinese warfare and military theory from Sun Zi’s (Sun Tzu) (544–496 BC) classic *The Art of War*, from around 500 BC, to Mao Zedong’s (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) guerrilla warfare in the twentieth century. The Warring States Period (474–221 BC) undeniably served as an impetus to a golden age of Chinese military writing. Some of these writings were unfortunately lost to the unrelenting march of time.

Therefore, modern historians may have an incomplete record of the military traditions of China. Nevertheless, this has not stopped scholars from speculating and formulating theories concerning Chinese warfare and the unique characteristics that define them. In the early nineteenth century, Europeans wrote of and analyzed China's warfare. Although China has a long tradition of writing about war, most works of military history are about councils of war and are written by civilian officials and Confucian scholars. Westerners have divergent views of Chinese warfare.

John K. Fairbank identifies a general "Chinese Way of War" based on three factors: a preference for nonviolent means, a preference for defensive warfare, and a "tie-in" between the civilian and military components of Chinese society whereby the goals of the bureaucracy are more important than commercial enterprises. The concept of the nonviolent resolution of affairs is based on Confucianism, which considers use of military force a failure of leadership in an ideal society. This approach to warfare stands in contrast to the Western view that warfare and the military are an important and integral part of society. The Chinese orientation to defensive warfare was principally a matter of geography. Whereas the frontiers of the West were essentially the seas and oceans surrounding Europe and America, China's frontier was Inner Asia. The military aim of China throughout most of its history was the prevention of incursions from the northern continent from groups such as the Mongols and Manchus. The third element of the Chinese Way of Warfare centers on the establishment of a bureaucratic-based society where the bureaucrats generally held sway over the military.

John Keegan considers the Oriental form of war contrary to the West because it was

characterized by caution, delay, and avoidance of direct conflict. Alastair Iain Johnston explores the various Chinese approaches and concepts of war. Within his analysis is the fact that much of Chinese military history has been lost and that what remains is fragmentary at best. He states that there were two strategic cultures in Chinese military history, one being based on a "Confucius-Mencian paradigm" and the other being what he calls a "para bellum paradigm." The Confucian paradigm tended to be less violent and thus emphasized the defensive more than offensive. The "para bellum paradigm" favored the offensive strategies more than did Confucianism, and stressed being prepared for war.

Both Victor Davis Hanson and Geoffrey Parker conclude that there may be a Non-Western Way of War since they attempt to prove that there is a Western Way of War by focusing on what they see as a primarily "Western" phenomenon to explain why the West has triumphed over the rest. For Parker, the tools necessary for Western ascendancy lie in what he calls five principal foundations, including a combination of superior technology, discipline, total victory via unconditional surrender, innovation, and finance. Hanson seeks to place the context of the Western Way of War with internal cultural factors. While agreeing with Parker's overall thesis regarding the inevitable rise of the Western military, Hanson is suspicious of what he sees as technological determinism. For Hanson, the superiority of Western war technology has never been a constant and therefore should not be seen as such. What has been a constant, if at times just barely so, is the Western concept of freedom, individualism, and civic militarism.

Recent scholarship began to question these views when more and more Chinese

military writings became available. They state that, while a comprehensive and holistic set of Chinese principles exist to deal with war, they do not describe a separate, distinct, and mutually exclusive “way of war” as defined by Hanson. They contend that the Chinese invented or adopted many of the supposed Western ways of warfare—particularly in the areas of weaponry, discipline, and the organization for war. Like Westerners, the Chinese placed emphasis on strict discipline to include the publication of drill manuals and related instructions. The debate continues to receive attention among scholars.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: *Art of War, The*; Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Guerrilla Warfare; Manchus; Mongols; Mao Zedong; Sun Zi; Warring States Period.

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Whampoa Military Academy (1924–1928)

The Army Officer Academy of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) on the island of Whampoa (Huangpu), six miles east of Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province. Popularly known as Whampoa Military Academy, it marked the commencement of the Nationalist army as well as modern Chinese defense forces. It produced many prestigious commanders of the GMD and became the cradle of the elite officers of the GMD and personal network of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975).

After the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen’s struggles for democracy, or his “second revolution,” against the warlords failed each time. Sun wanted to establish a modern armed force under his and GMD command. While most Western powers rejected or ignored his idea, the Soviet Union was willing to help him build a revolutionary army. The Soviets, however, requested that the GMD allow the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) members to join the GMD as individuals. The CCP, meanwhile, would maintain its own independence, politically and ideologically. In exchange, the Soviet government would help Sun and the GMD with their military establishment and officer training.

On January 26, 1923, Adolph A. Joffe, a top Soviet diplomat, and Sun issued their “Joint Manifesto” to pledge Soviet support for China. In January 1924, Sun convened

in Guangzhou the First GMD National Congress. The party congress enacted a new constitution and agreed that Communists might join the GMD as individuals. The CCP supported Sun's political center at Guangzhou. The coalition government received both political and military advisors from the Soviet Union. After the congress, the Soviet military advisors suggested to Sun that a military academy and a revolutionary armed force be established.

On June 16, 1924, Whampoa Military Academy was founded with the assistance of the Soviet Union with Jiang Jieshi as the commandant. Thereafter, Sun and Jiang began to build a military center in Guangzhou with the cadets including GMD and CCP members, college students, and revolted warlord officers and soldiers. From the beginning, Whampoa's curriculum emphasized political training and ideological education in order to train an officer corps loyal to the GMD. Obviously, Jiang intended to establish a party army. He also adopted a dual commanding system, or commander-political commissar system, from the Russian Red Army. The Soviet Union provided 100,000 rubles for HMA. On October 7, 1924, the first Russian ship arrived in Guangzhou with weapons and training equipment for Whampoa's first class of cadets.

Whampoa Military Academy faced three competing systems: German, Japanese, and Soviet models. The New Army of the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912) had been trained by German officers and adopted the German military system. After the 1911 Revolution, many German instructors stayed in China, training the warlord troops and helping them get new arms from European countries. The German instructors favored a large infantry army with a well-educated officer corps. The better-trained units could

be used as cadres or instructors to train other units in order to prepare a large army for war in a short period of time. They also paid special attention to artillery firepower, telegraphic communication, and railway transportation. After Germany lost World War I (WWI) in 1918, the German military influence declined due to the end of the official exchanges.

In the meantime, Japan became the center for the Chinese Nationalist Republican movement before the 1911 Revolution. The modernization of the Japanese military between 1868 and 1912 attracted many Chinese officers like Jiang, who studied in a military academy in Japan in 1908–1910. After World War I, however, Japan's attempt to obtain German and Russian colonial and territorial occupations in east and northeast China threatened China's sovereignty and independence. Nationwide anti-Japanese movements arose in the 1910s and 1920s, making the adoption of the Japanese military system impossible.

The Soviet Union offered not only military training, but also financial aid and political consultation. Therefore, the Soviet system was accepted in 1924 at Whampoa as a model to establish the new Nationalist army. The Russian model put political instruction at the center by emphasizing political control. China's acceptance of Soviet financial aid left the academy no choice but to accept the Soviet Red Army advisors and their military curriculum. Sun sent Jiang and a military delegation to Moscow in 1924 to study the Soviet military system for four months before Jiang became the first superintendent of Whampoa Military Academy. In 1925, over 1,000 Russian military advisors in China trained GMD-CCP officer corps. The Russian advisors, like Michael Borodin and General V. K. Blykher (or Blucher, later one of the first five Soviet

marshals), worked closely with both the GMD and the CCP at Whampoa.

Though different in ideological and political agendas from the GMD, the CCP successfully implemented their policies and trained Communist officers from 1924 to 1927 at Whampoa Military Academy. The CCP cadets studied the Russian military curriculum side by side with the GMD cadets. They thought their friendship would last forever. By 1927, a total of 10,000 cadets had graduated in six classes from the academy. Many of them later became the leading commanders of Jiang's military hierarchy. Among them, about 3,000 officers, one-third of the graduated cadets, were members of the CCP.

On July 1, 1925, three-and-a-half months after Sun died in Beijing (Peking), the Nationalist government (Guomin Zhengfu) formally came into existence in Guangzhou under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. In July, Wang Jingwei (Wang Ch'ing-wei) (1883–1944) was elected as chair and Borodin as senior advisor in the new government. On August 26, Jiang reorganized all the military units under the national government into the National Revolutionary Army (NRA, Guomin Geming Jun) with Jiang as its commander in chief.

Finally, Jiang and the GMD had their own armed force. At that time, he had five armies, and the student soldiers of Whampoa Military Academy became the First Army. On July 1, 1926, Commander General Jiang Jieshi issued a "Declaration on the Northern Expedition" and so launched the punitive expedition against the northern warlords, including Wu Peifu (Wu P'ei-fu) and Sun Chuanfang (Sun Ch'uan-fang), two of the five major warlords. Chiang renamed the NRA the "Northern Expeditionary Army" (NEA), which had eight infantry armies, approximately 100,000 men. Thus, in less

than six months, the NEA overthrew the two most powerful warlords, Wu and Sun Chuanfang. The others either surrendered or joined Jiang's forces, which increased from 8 armies, 100,000 men in 1926 to 40 armies, 700,000 men in 1927. After the completion of the Northern Expedition, the Army Officer Academy moved to Nanjing (Nanking), the capital city of the Republic of China, in 1928.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; National Revolutionary Army; Nationalist Army; New Army; Northern Expedition; Qing Dynasty; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; United Front; Warlord Period.

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White Lotus Rebellion (1796–1804)

The White Lotus Rebellion, one of the largest peasant rebellions during the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912), occurred in China during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Famine, population pressures, and the harassment of government

officials led to a series of uprisings during this period. The White Lotus Rebellion was notable, however, both for the long-standing cult that promoted it and because it took place in central China rather than among the minority populations of outlying provinces.

The origins of the White Lotus Society (Pai-lien chiao) lay with a Buddhist cult of the thirteenth century. Members of the White Lotus never resigned themselves to Manchu rule under the Qing dynasty (established in the seventeenth century), but it was not until the 1770s that an organized uprising took place during the reigns of Qianlong (Ch'ien-lung, reigned 1736–1795) and Jiaqing (Chia-ch'ing, 1796–1820). In 1774, a martial arts and herbal healing expert named Wang Lun led a group of rebels against the Qing dynasty. Wang Lun drew from the peasant population of Shandong (Shantung) Province, to the south of Beijing (Peking). Other participants in his forces included barge-pullers, coolies, and other urban people who worked along the Grand Canal that connected Nanjing (Nanking) and Beijing.

Wang Lun called on the “Eternal Venerable Mother” goddess, an important deity in traditional folk Buddhism. His ideology was millenarian, calling attention to catastrophe on earth rather than advocating such political goals as land reform or help for the poor. He was able to convince his followers that he was immune to Qing reprisals, however, and in the early days of his revolt, it seemed true. His forces captured several cities, including Linqing, an important city on the Grand Canal. A massive response from the imperial Qing armies soon crushed Wang Lun’s following, however, slaughtering them along with their families.

Because the government did not do anything about the underlying causes of the discontent, Wang Lun’s defeat did not put an end to disorder in Shandong. Again in

1796, White Lotus rebels rose up. For the most part, the rebellion consisted of sporadic anti-Qing violence by roving bands using guerrilla tactics. Yet by this time, the government forces had become riddled with corruption and could not defeat the movement, which lasted until 1804.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Banner System; Grand Canal; Kangxi, Emperor; Manchus; Ming Dynasty; Qianlong, Emperor; Qing Dynasty.

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White Terrors (1927 and 1947)

“White terrors” are based on the Guomindang’s (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) political and military campaigns under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) during the period of the national government in China. White terrors came into effect to quell mass movements by wiping out and purging radical leaders from the mainland and Taiwan. With Jiang Jieshi effectively controlling the government of the Republic of China (ROC) by 1927 by becoming the generalissimo (equivalent to president of the Republic of China), he ruled with an iron fist, eradicating all of his opponents by instilling



Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the precommunist leader of China. Jiang and his Nationalist Party supporters were forced to flee the mainland for Taiwan in 1949 when the Communists came to power under Mao Zedong. Jiang ruled Taiwan until his death in 1975. (Library of Congress)

fear into his enemies when he led the Northern Expedition to unify the country under one ruler.

Jiang’s aim was not focused on settlements or warlords in China, but rather his “allies,” the Communists, with whom he was allied with his army on his march in Shanghai in 1927, where he betrayed them. On April 12, 1927, Jiang began his purge of the members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) from the Shanghai Guomindang. He armed gangsters, suiting them up in Guomindang uniforms and launching a surprise attack on the worker’s militia that was on strike. By Jiang’s order, machine guns were pointed at 100,000 workers in the streets, killing nearly 5,000 people, in an incident known as the “Shanghai massacre of 1927.” These incidents of large-scale killings in Shanghai led to the period of white terror, in which 12,000 Communists were killed within three weeks. Based in Shanghai, the white terror purged and exterminated the Communist Party into near extinction in China by reducing the CCP’s numbers from 60,000 to 10,000. The greatest amount of killing happened in the countryside of China, taking millions of lives in villages among the rural regions.

The white terror continued through the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), which not only killed Communists, but also leftists and democrats. On February 28, 1947, the “228 Incident” happened, in which the antigovernment protest in Taiwan surged and the white terror of the Guomindang violently suppressed the uprising by killing 10,000 to 30,000 of the protestors. This incident marked the white terror period in Taiwan.

After the relocation of the white terror Guomindang government to Taiwan, it imposed martial law and a strict one-party dictatorship in 1949, and in subsequent years


imprisoned, tortured, and killed political opponents such as Communists, who refused to repent their deeds and beliefs. The martial law of the white terror lasted from May 19, 1949, to July 15, 1987, a little over 38 years. During this time, approximately 140,000 Taiwanese were incarcerated and/or executed for their opposition to the Guomintang, whether their beliefs were true or perceived. Many of the victims of the white terror in Taiwan were Chinese who often came unaccompanied to the island; they were considered more disposable than the local Taiwanese. Until the lifting of martial law, discussing the white terror and other incidents such as the “228 Incident” was not tolerated. Eventually, in 1995, an official apology by ROC president Lee Teng-hui (1923–) was presented, and an official public memorial was constructed.

Daniel Mason Linsenbarth

See also: China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Guomintang; Jiang Jieshi; Northern Expedition.

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Xia Dynasty (Hsia) (2205–1766 BC)

The Xia dynasty was a quasi-legendary Chinese dynasty reputedly founded by Yu in about the twenty-second century BC. The Xia was originally thought to have been a purely mythological dynasty that survived only through oral history. However, excavations at the city of Yanshi in China have uncovered remains of what may have been the Xia capital.

The legendary prehistory of China goes as follows: Human beings were parasites on the body of the creator, Pangu (P'an-ku). When Pangu died, there were a series of rulers who taught the Chinese people important ideas. The first ruler, Fu Xi (Fu Hsi), taught the Chinese people about marriage and how to domesticate animals. The second ruler, Shen Nong, taught them about trade, agriculture, and medicine. Huangdi, as the third ruler, helped invent the calendar, the written language, and ceramics. The fourth ruler, Emperor Yao, instigated flood control. More importantly, Yao passed his rule to Shun, who was a commoner. Eventually, Shun passed his ruling power to Yu, the founder of the Xia dynasty, the first of the three dynasties of ancient China. The others are the Shang dynasty (1766–1122 BC) and the Zhou dynasty (1027–221 BC).

Yu was the faithful minister to Shun. According to legend, Yu was known for his removal of the water that covered China during a great flood. He was also the first Chinese ruler to make his rule hereditary; in that way, he created the first Chinese

dynasty. With the foundation of the Xia dynasty, China's mythic prehistory and traditional history started to merge.

The dynasty supposedly had 17 kings over 14 generations. Allegedly, the end of the Xia dynasty came when the last ruler, Jie, instituted a violent rule at the behest of his cruel wife. That misrule prompted a rebellion led by Tang, who went on to found the Shang dynasty.

The center of the Xia dynasty was supposedly located near present-day Yanshi. In 1959, excavations at Erlitou in the city of Yanshi found evidence to suggest that it was indeed the capital of the Xia dynasty. The excavation uncovered remains of a palace, tombs, and pottery that suggested the Xia may have stemmed from the Neolithic Longshan culture. Bronze weapons and many other artifacts were also found at the site.


Traditional dates for the Xia dynasty are from ca. 2200 to ca. 1750 BC. Scientific dating of the objects found at the Yanshi site corroborates those dates. Nevertheless, the Xia has not been universally accepted as a historical dynasty.

Kim Draggoo

See also: Shang Dynasty; Zhou Dynasty.

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Xi'an (Sian) Incident (December 12, 1936)

Coup d'état staged by two Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) generals against their leader, resulting in China's united war resistance against Japan. The undeclared Second Sino-Japanese War began after the Shenyang (Mukden) Incident of September 1931 in Liaoning, one of the three northeastern provinces that comprised Manchuria; the other two were Jilin (Kirin) and Heilongjiang

(Heilungkiang). Preoccupied with exterminating the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in order to consolidate his rule over the whole country, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC), devised the policy of “internal pacification before resistance against external aggression,” which frustrated many nationalistic Chinese, including some of his military generals.

By the end of 1935, Jiang's lack of resistance enabled the Japanese to occupy Manchuria and Rehe (Jehol) (an old province made up of parts of today's northeast Hebei, southwest Liaoning, and southeast Inner Mongolia). The Japanese were about to

advance into Chaha'er (Chahar, an old province west of Rehe comprising the northern part of today's Hebei) and Suiyuan (a defunct province west of Chaha'er comprising the central part of current Inner Mongolia). Under steadily mounting pressure, Jiang stubbornly refused to declare war on Japan. This stance led some leaders to conclude that coercion was the only way to force him to reverse his stance, precipitating the Xi'an (Sian) Incident of December 1936 in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province.

On December 4, 1936, Jiang flew to Xi'an to discuss with Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang) and Yang Hucheng (Yang Huch'eng), commanders of the northeastern and northwestern Armies, respectively, the last "extermination campaign" against the Chinese Communists, who had settled in Yan'an (Yenan), north of Xi'an, a year earlier after the 1934–1935 Long March. Zhang seized this opportunity to try to persuade Jiang to cooperate with the Chinese Communists in establishing a united front against the Japanese. Unable to convince Jiang, Zhang and Yang decided to stage a coup.

In the early morning of December 12, Zhang marched his army to Lintong (Lint'ung), west of Xi'an, where Jiang's villa was located, and kidnapped Jiang, while Yang seized all Jiang's establishments and personnel in Xi'an. Zhang took Jiang back to Xi'an, where he was held in detention, and then invited the Chinese Communists to visit to negotiate for a united front against the Japanese. The Chinese Communist delegation included Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), Li Kenong (Li K'o-nung), and Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986). Madam Jiang Soong Meiling traveled from Nanjing (Nanking), Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, to represent her husband in negotiations with Zhou. Their discussion was based on Zhang's proposal for ending the civil war

and forming a united front to resist the Japanese invasion, to which Jiang finally gave his verbal agreement on Christmas Eve. On December 25, Jiang was released, and he flew back to Nanjing, immediately beginning work on a united front for the forthcoming Anti-Japanese War.

Zhang, who accompanied Jiang back to Nanjing, was arrested by Jiang's agents, tried on charges of insubordination, and sentenced by a military court to a 10-year prison term. On January 4, 1937, Jiang granted him amnesty and placed him under the National Military Council's close surveillance, a face-saving measure. The next day, Jiang relieved Yang of all his military posts, and he still held him in detention at year's end. Despite the sacrifice by the individuals involved in the coup, their action was widely appreciated as a pivotal point in the bitter anti-Japanese resistance effort of the Chinese.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Japan, Attack on Manchuria; Jiang Jieshi; Long March; Manchuria; Nationalist Army; United Front; Yan'an; Ye Jianying; Zhang Xueliang; Zhou Enlai.

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Xiang Army

The Xiang army was a standing army in southern Hunan (or called Xiang) Province during the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912). The army was locally organized by Zeng Guofan (Tseng Kuo-fan) (1811–1872), a Qing official, and centered in the Yangzi (Yangtze) River valley. It encompassed much of south and central China in the 1850s–1860s to fight against the Taiping Rebellion.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Western beliefs and ideology, especially Christianity, were introduced to China and inspired a large-scale Chinese peasant revolt: the Taiping Tianguo (Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace) Rebellion in 1851–1864. The Taiping army began its military expedition from southwestern Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province against the Qing. Many peasants joined the Taiping when the peasant army defeated the Qing army from the west to the east along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River and took over half of the country. The Taiping army occupied Nanjing (Nanking) and renamed it “Tianjing” (Heavenly Capital). From 1853, the Taiping army, nearly 1 million strong, launched northern expeditions in order to protect Tianjing and enlarge the regime’s territory. In 1856, the Taiping army defeated the two Qing forces sent to control the insurgents’ capital by blocking the northern and southern approaches to Tianjing. Militarily, the Taiping regime had reached its highest point.

An acute awareness of the corruption and lack of discipline that had crippled Qing’s imperial armies convinced Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and other officials that locally recruited and locally subsidized troops led

by members of the provincial gentry would confront the Taiping forces far more effectively than had the Qing banner armies and Green Standard Army. Recent successes by such gentry-led local troops against the Taipings showed the system could work. Yet because regional armies had challenged the imperial state so often in the past, Zeng was reluctant to communicate to the emperor the scope of his recruiting and training operations once they were in full swing. Covertly, then, he built up a Hunanese army led by local degree-holders chosen for their ability and loyalty, and he saw to it that their first battles were waged not against the seasoned Taipings but against the local bandits who posed a constant problem in imperial China. As he instilled discipline in his troops, Zeng also instilled Confucian ideology to counter the Taiping ideology.

Though Zeng’s Hunanese troops met with defeat in their first clashes with the Taipings, victories soon followed. On October 14, 1854, the Xiang army, commanded by Lo Zenan and Jiang Zhongyuan, recaptured the city of Wuchang (in Hubei Province), a strategically important port city on the Yangzi (Yangtze) River that imperial troops had failed to take. In May 1860, Zeng was made governor-general of Jiangnan and Jiangxi (Kiangsi) and imperial commissioner for the suppression of the Taipings in south China. Never before had a Chinese official been trusted by a Manchu emperor with such far-reaching military powers. Zeng controlled an army of 120,000 soldiers, led by experienced commanders hand-picked by Zeng. Among those commanders was Zeng Guoquan, Guofan’s younger brother, who led the successful siege of Anqing, which marked the beginning of the end for the Taipings.

Appalling internal strife had decimated the Taiping leadership holed up in Nanjing. Meanwhile, Zeng’s organization had never

been stronger, and inexorably his three armies (one led by Li Hongzhang, one by Zuo Zongtang, and one by Zeng Guofan himself) closed around Nanjing from different directions, eradicating Taiping resistance along the way. After a siege that lasted more than two years, Nanjing was taken in July 1864 and virtually all of its defenders slaughtered. Though it took two more years to eradicate the remaining Taiping resistance, the rebellion was truly terminated with the recapture of Nanjing. The Xiang army became one of the main strengths of the Qing military thereafter.

Yutong Yang

See also: Ever-Victorious Army; Hong Xiuquan; Li Hongzhang; Manchus; Qing Dynasty; Small Sword Society; Taiping Rebellion; Ward, Frederick Townsend; Zeng Guofan; Zuo Zongtang.

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Xiao Jinguang (Hsiao Ch'in-kuang) (1903–1989)

Grand general of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), one of the most experienced

and dedicated Chinese Communist military political leaders, and the founder of the Chinese navy. Xiao Jinguang was born on January 4, 1903, in Changsha, provincial capital of Hunan. He joined the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) in 1920 and went to the Soviet Union to study military science and technology in 1921. He became a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Communist Party of China) in 1922.

On his return to China in 1924, Xiao Jinguang participated in the Northern Expedition in 1926–1927 as the CCP representative in the Sixth Division, Second Army, National Revolutionary Army. After the Northern Expedition, he went to the Soviet Union again and studied at the Leningrad Military Political University. When he returned in 1930, Xiao was appointed chief of staff of the Twelfth Red Army, president of the Central Military Political Academy, and political commissar of the Fifth Red Army. From 1933, he became the commander and political commissar of the Eleventh Red Army and then the Seventh Red Army. He also served as an instructor at the Red Army College and director of the Political Department of the college.

Xiao Jinguang participated in the Long March of 1934–1935 and fought many battles against the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) forces. During the Long March, in January 1935, he became the chief of staff of the Third Red Army. After Red Army forces arrived in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, he was appointed commander of the Twenty-Ninth Army. During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Xiao served as commander of the Garrison Force of the Eighth Route Army in Shaanxi Province. In 1945, he became the deputy commander and chief of staff of the Northeast Democratic United Army

(CCP forces in northeast China, or Manchuria). Later in 1945, he was elected the reserved member of the Central Committee at the Seventh CCP National Party Congress. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Xiao was deputy commander of the Northeast Democratic Army and chief of staff of Nanman Regional Command. In May 1948, he became the commander of the First Column under the Northeast Field Command. In 1949, he was the commander of the Twelfth Army Group under the command of the Northeast Field Army, and then commander of the Hunan Provincial Command.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) appointed Xiao Jinguang the first commander of the PLA's new navy in 1949 and president of the First Navy Academy. In 1950, Xiao held meetings and set a detailed guideline for naval construction. His plan was to build a light model naval force with a robust capability of modern defense and offence. He also designed the organizational structure for the naval establishment to absorb many young intellectuals and technicians, employ former GMD naval personnel, and transform the PLA infantry units into the navy. This three-year construction plan worked successfully for the Chinese Navy. In 1954, Xiang was vice minister of the Ministry of Defense. In 1955, he was promoted to grand general. He was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Eighth CCP National Party Congress in 1956. He was elected vice chairman of the Fifth National People's Congress in 1979, and also later elected a member of the Advisory Commission of the Central Committee at the Twelfth CCP National Party Congress in 1982. Xiao Jinguang died on March 29, 1989, in Beijing.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Fourth Field Army; Guomindang; Long March; Mao Zedong; National Party Congress; National People's Congress; National Revolutionary Army; Northern Expedition; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Red Army College; Soviet Union.

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Xiongnu

The Xiongnu (Hsiung-nu) were nomadic people who roamed over a large area of central Asia, including western Manchuria and much of present-day Siberia and Mongolia, from around the fifth century BC to the fifth century AD. The highly mobile Xiongnu mounted warriors posed a serious threat to the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) and the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), which undertook major military campaigns and elaborate defensive measures to secure their borders. Although the Xiongnu ceased to be a

significant power by the fourth century AD, they compelled the Chinese to build the Great Wall and to expand their foreign relations and trade routes.

The Xiongnu had a nomadic, horse-based culture organized around loosely connected tribes. In 209 BC, a Xiongnu leader named Maodun formed a confederacy of at least 24 scattered tribes. Through that confederacy, Xiongnu rulers could coordinate hundreds of thousands of mounted warriors over a 1,500-mile frontier they shared with China. In response to repeated Xiongnu invasions during the Qin dynasty, from 221 to 206 BC, the Chinese built much of the Great Wall. The wall only slowed the Xiongnu down, and they continued their destructive invasions.

Around the end of the second century BC, after unsuccessful military campaigns to end the Xiongnu incursions, the rulers of the Han dynasty tried appeasement by offering gifts, pacts, and even marriage to princesses from the Han line. That policy of “harmonious kinship” did not work. The Han emperor Wudi (Wu-ti), who ruled from 141 to 87, adopted an aggressive two-pronged strategy to deal with them: he sent envoys beyond China’s borders to find nomadic allies to fight against the Xiongnu, and he launched several large-scale campaigns into Xiongnu territory. The Chinese could find few allies to help fight the Xiongnu, and the massive military expeditions, along with the money and manpower used to build and defend new walls, gates, and watch-towers, put a strain on the Han treasury. Even though the Chinese often overwhelmingly outnumbered the Xiongnu forces in battle, the nomads’ skill on horseback and their lack of dependence on long, tenuous supply lines made decisive Chinese victories almost impossible.

The power of the Xiongnu was eventually destroyed, not by military defeat but by

internal conflicts. Tribal rulers often fought among themselves, and ca. 55 BC, the Xiongnu split into several warring factions. One large group went west, and another large faction, whose leader submitted to the Han as a vassal, settled in China. The Xiongnu posed little threat to the Chinese over the next few hundred years. However, in 304 AD, a Xiongnu general, Liu Yuan, took advantage of the chaos in China after the fall of the Han and attempted to establish a new dynasty, the Zhao. He was toppled in 320.

After the fifth century, references to the Xiongnu in Chinese history end, but their influence on China had been profound. Largely due to the threat the Xiongnu posed, the Great Wall was improved and expanded throughout the Qin and Han dynasties. The Han expeditions to find allies to fight the Xiongnu expanded Chinese knowledge of the world to the north and, more importantly, to the west. Information about other civilizations and riches to accrue in the west spurred the Silk Road, a booming trade route that stretched from China into the Mediterranean world.

Kevin Marsh

See also: Great Wall; Han Dynasty; Han Wudi, Emperor; Manchuria; Mongols; Qin Dynasty; Silk Road.

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Xisha Islands Defensive Campaign (1974)

Naval battles between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Vietnam (ROV, South Vietnam, 1955–1975) over the Xisha Islands (or Paracel Islands) in the South China Sea. The Xisha Islands are composed of Xuande, Yongle, and 30 other islands located 330 kilometers southeast of China's Hainan Island. These islands occupy an ocean surface of 15,000 square kilometers. Many of these islets are sandbanks and reefs. Yongxing Island is the major island of 1.6 square kilometers, where the Hainan Provincial Government of the PRC has an administrative office. The provincial office administers Xisha, Dongsha, and Nansha Islands.

The South Vietnamese government had occupied some of the islands in the South China Sea before the military conflict with China. In September 1973, the South Vietnamese government declared Nanwei and Taiping along with 10 other islands as part of their country's territory, aiming to secure the abundant oil resources in the area. On January 11, 1974, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC issued an official statement declaring China's sovereign power over Nansha, Xisha, Zhongsha, and Dongsha Islands, with all their natural resources belonging to the PRC.

On January 15, 1974, the South Vietnamese navy sent one of their destroyers to the waters around Xisha Yongle Island. On January 16, the destroyer shelled Ganquan Island, driving Chinese fishing boats out of the area. On January 17, the Vietnamese sent another destroyer to transport some soldiers to occupy the Ganquan and Jinyin Islands and to remove the Chinese national flag on the island. Marshal Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying)

(1897–1986), China's defense minister and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the PRC, instructed the navy of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be on alert and ready for the Xisha Island Defensive Campaign.

In order to maintain sovereignty and protect fishing production, the Chinese government took measures to deal with the situation. The fishing boats in the area continued their fishing business but paid close attention to the South Vietnamese activities; at the same time, the Chinese navy deployed two hunting submarines, No. 271 and No. 274, to Yongle Island for protection of the Chinese fishermen and militias, and two Chinese minesweepers also transported fresh water and other supplies to the militias on the island. The Chinese strategy was not to fire the first shot, but if the South Vietnam fired first, the Chinese retaliation would be furious. Wei Mingsen, deputy commander of the Yulin PLA Naval Base, was appointed commander for the Xisha Island Defense Campaign.

On January 17, the two Chinese hunting submarines transported some militias to Jinqin and Chenhang Islands. When they arrived at the area, they found that the South Vietnamese destroyers No. 4 and No. 16 were firing on the Chinese fishing boats. The Chinese navy warned the Vietnamese immediately, causing them to leave. On January 18, the two Vietnamese destroyers returned and fired on the Chinese fishing boats eight times, destroying one of the boats at the north side of Lingyang Reef. In the evening, the South Vietnamese added destroyer No. 5 and frigate No. 10 to the waters of Yongle Island. There were four Vietnamese battleships in the conflict zone. Then the Chinese navy also added two more submarines, No. 281 and No. 282, to Yongxing Island.

On January 18, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), China's premier and vice chairman of the CMC, called for a special meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Communist Party of China) to form a five-person-group led by Ye Jianying, including Wang Hongwen (1935–1992), Zhang Chunqiao (1917–2005), Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), and Chen Xilian (Ch'en Hsi-lian) (1915–1999) to deal with the crisis. Su Zhenhua (1912–1979), deputy commander of the Chinese Navy, briefed the meeting and proposed a retaliation plan. The CMC immediately issued the "Guideline to Fight against the South Vietnamese Destroyers at Yongle Islands." Based on this guideline, the Chinese navy was prepared for the campaign.

At 4:10 P.M. on January 18, the three Vietnamese destroyers formed a wedge formation to approach the anchorage of the two Chinese hunting submarines No. 271 and No. 274. The submarines weighed anchor to meet the South Vietnamese ships with full speed. The Vietnamese ships turned around when they saw the Chinese were prepared. At 7:00 A.M. on January 19, the Vietnamese ships No. 4 and No. 5 landed more than 40 soldiers on Chenhang and Guangjin Islands. After the landing, both sides began to fire. One Vietnamese soldier died, and three were wounded. Around 10:22 A.M., four Vietnamese ships shelled the Chinese ships, and the Chinese shelled back. In the first round, the Chinese destroyed the navigation radar antenna on Vietnamese ship No. 4. Vietnamese ship No. 16 was hit by a Chinese minesweeper and fled the area quickly. The Chinese ships then concentrated their fire on Vietnamese ship No. 10.

Having fought for one hour and 37 minutes, the Vietnamese ships left behind

the heavily damaged destroyer No. 10. The destroyer tried to move to the Lingyang Reef, but failed. Two Chinese hunting submarines No. 281 and No. 282 sank the Vietnamese destroyer. At this time, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Su Zhenhua reported to Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), suggesting that China should regain control of the islands occupied by the South Vietnamese, and Mao agreed. After the successful naval campaign at sea, the Chinese army successfully landed on Ganquan, Shanhu, and Jinyin Islands and occupied them. During the Xisha Island Defensive Campaign, more than 100 South Vietnamese officers and soldiers were killed or wounded and 49 captured. During the campaign, 67 Chinese soldiers were wounded and 18 killed.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Chen Xilian; China, People's Republic; Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; Gang of Four; Mao Zedong; People's Liberation Army; Spratly Islands; Su Zhenhua; Ye Jianying; Zhou Enlai.

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Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsung-ch'ien) (1901–1990)

Military and political leader of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and marshal of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Born in Wutai (Wut'ai), Shanxi (Shansi) Province, to a small landowning family on November 8, 1901, Xu Xiangqian followed in his father's footsteps and became a teacher. In 1924, he went to Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, where he joined the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) and enrolled at the newly opened Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy, commanded by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975).

After graduation from Whampoa in 1925, Xu took part in the First Eastern Expedition against Guangdong warlord Chen Jiongming (Ch'en Chiung-ming). During the Northern Expedition of 1926–1927, Xu was sent to Henan (Honan) Province as a political officer in the GMD's National Revolutionary Army as a result of an agreement between the GMD and warlord Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yuhsiang). Xu campaigned in several north China provinces against warlords Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin) and Yan Xishan (Yen Hsi-shan). Because of illness, he joined the Northern Expedition belatedly in the fall of 1926, arriving in the GMD Left stronghold of Wuhan in Hubei (Hupeh) to become an instructor at the Central Political and Military Academy (essentially a branch of Whampoa Military Academy). There he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China).

After the split between the GMD and the CCP in 1927, the CCP assigned Xu to work in the labor movement in Quanzhou. When the Quanzhou Commune was destroyed and driven from the city GMD, Xu was

among those who created the ill-fated Fourth Division of the Red Army, which was annihilated in the GMD assault on the Hailufeng (Hai-lu-feng) Soviet in early 1928. Xu fled to the city of Shanghai and then to a Communist guerrilla base in rural Hubei. He was one of the earliest Communist military men to arrive at the base, which was soon to grow into the Eyuwan (O-yu-wan) Soviet along the borders of Hubei, Henan, and Anhui (Anhui) Provinces and which came to be second only to the base formed by Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) and Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) as the Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Soviet.

In the face of Jiang's Encirclement Campaigns in 1930–1934, Xu's Fourth Front Red Army reeled across western China during the Long March until it arrived in northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province in mid-1937, just before the Second Sino-Japanese War (or the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945) began. The Communists immediately reorganized its units into the Eighth Route Army. In the spring of 1938, Xu advanced into south Hebei (Hopeh), where he established contact with Communist guerrillas and opened communications with anti-Japanese forces in Shandong (Shantung). The following year, Xu was sent into Shandong to coordinate the activities of several guerrilla units, which became known as the First Column.

Because of poor health, Xu left the front lines in 1941 and for the next year was without an assignment. From 1942 to 1946, he was in Yan'an (Yenan) in Shaanxi as a deputy commander. He is also reported to have been president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in 1945.

During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Xu led Communist forces in combat against GMD troops in Shanxi. As commander

of the First Army Group of the North China Military Region, later the North China Field Army. He scored a notable victory at Taiyuan over the forces of General Yan Xishan and several thousand Japanese “volunteers.” Again, chronic ill health sidelined him for the next several years. But during the 1950s and 1960s, he reemerged as a prominent political figure and became one of the 10 marshals of the People’s Republic in 1955. Xu retired in 1985 and died in Beijing (Peking) on September 21, 1990.

Dr. Errol MacGregor Clauss

See also: Anti-Japanese Military and Political College; Anti-Japanese War; China, People’s Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Eighth Route Army; Encirclement Campaigns; Guerrilla Warfare; Guomintang; Jiang Jieshi; Jiangxi Soviet; Long March; Mao Zedong; North China Field Army; North Expedition; People’s Liberation Army; Red Army; Whampoa Military Academy; Yan’an; Zhu De.

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Xuzhou, Battle of (January–May 1938)

The Battle of Xuzhou is also known as the Xuzhou Campaign, a series of hard-fought battles by the Guomintang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army against the invading Japanese troops in 1938 along the Jin-Pu (Tianjin-Pu Kou, Nanjing) and Long-Hai (Xi’an-Wei Hai) railway lines. The Chinese troops achieved a couple of battle victories during the campaign.

At the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, the Japanese, armed with modern technology and superior naval and air forces, had by the end of 1937 occupied northern China and the lower Yangzi (Yangtze) River region with an alarming speed. The GMD army, on the other hand, was weakened by inner factions and poor coordination, which only worsened the military disasters by late 1937. The capital city of Nanjing (Nanking) fell into Japanese hands in December 1937, only days after Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and the Nationalist government evacuated the city and relocated to Wuhan, capital city of central Hubei Province. The infamous Nanjing Massacre followed the fall of the city and lasted for almost seven weeks. Terror and destruction reigned in the city, convincing civilians that the Japanese had launched a race war against China and they would be killed simply because they were Chinese.

Xuzhou had been a strategic city in China’s long imperial history. It is located on the borderland of Jiangsu (Kiangsu), Anhui (Anhwei), Henan (Honan), and Shandong (Shantung) Provinces, at the juncture of the east-west Long-Hai and north-south

Jin-Pu railway lines. Traditionally this region witnessed over 200 battles, and residents of Xuzhou knew only too well the price of war. Xuzhou was crucial to Japanese strategic planning. The Japanese army relied heavily on railways to transport troops and ammunition to advance the war. Occupying Xuzhou would enable them to control Jin-Pu and Long-Hai railways. After the seizure of Nanjing, the Japanese planned to connect northern China with the lower Yangzi region through Jin-Pu railway line in preparation for the westward advancement to Wuhan and Zhengzhou. The Japanese were determined to encircle Xuzhou with a coordinated attack from north and south. The Japanese North China Army was under the command of Generals Itagaki Seishiro, Nishio Toshizo, and Isogai Rensuke. The Japanese southern troops were the Central China Expeditionary Army under the command of General Hata Shunroku.

On the Chinese side, the defense of Xuzhou was closely connected with the defense of Wuhan. Recognizing the strategic importance of Xuzhou, the GMD high command rapidly coordinated in a new fashion with great determination to resist the seemingly unstoppable Japanese. The GMD military leadership court-martialed and executed General Han Fuqu, who gave up Shandong Province without a shot and further abandoned his army, an act making the defense of Nanjing impossible. The collective decision to execute Han was widely believed to be deciding factor for a coordinated resistance on the high military level. In early January 1938, the GMD concentrated large units of troops in defensive positions along the east-west Long-Hai railway line. General Li Zongren, former military leader of Guangxi Province, was appointed as the field commander in charge. Other GMD commanders, such as Zhang Zizhong, Tang

Enbo, Sun Lianzhong, Bai Chongxi and Wang Mingzhang, were all stationed in important positions.

The preparation of the Xuzhou campaign gained broad support from Chinese civilians, including students, college professors, journalists, writers, and farmers. Chinese women were also seen in the front. Xie Bingying and Hu Lanqi, veterans of the Northern Expedition (1926–1927), organized Women's Service Corps to offer auxiliary support for the Nationalist army. Their presence was a great boost to Chinese patriotism, and was widely reported in the wartime China press.

Chinese and Japanese armies fought fiercely for villages and towns in north and northeast Xuzhou, with both sides claiming victories. In March, it seemed that the situation was favorable to the Chinese army, especially with the victory at Taierzhuang, a village 13 miles northeast of Xuzhou. In this battle, three Japanese divisions were beaten and forced to retreat with casualties of 20,000. The Japanese seized Taierzhuang and Xuzhou eventually by the end of May, but in the process, they lost valuable time and their morale was shaken.

The Battle of Xuzhou was an important one in the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). Chinese effectiveness and success proved that the enemy was not invincible as the Japanese had claimed. It also demonstrated Chinese determination for a collected action of resistance, which was a great boost to the Chinese defense of Wuhan in the following months. Strategically, it tied down the Japanese army and delayed their plan to attack Wuhan and Taiyuan.

The Xuzhou campaign was a brutal example of human sufferings caused by modern warfare. Soldiers and civilians were equal victims of war. This is particularly true for Chinese peasant soldiers and the Chinese

poor. The Nationalist army only had very limited military medical service available when the open hostilities broke out in July 1937 and relied almost completely on the understaffed China Red Cross for medical care. Lacking proper training and often inexperienced, medical personnel were unable to meet the huge needs generated from the brutal wars. It usually took four to six days to transport the wounded to a surgery table in the field hospital located in Zhengzhou. There was no reason to be optimistic about the survival chances of wounded soldiers in the front. Many died painful deaths on the battleground or on the transportation route. Much terror and destruction was brought on to the populations during the war. First, a huge number of ordinary civilians were forced to flee their homes. Many were the poorest, without any source of livelihood. Those who chose to stay were bombed indiscriminately by Japanese air forces. After the retreat of the Nationalist army, the Japanese launched retaliatory massacres against local residents. Men were killed, and an unknown number of women were raped and murdered.

The battle finally ended with a controversial event. The Chinese Nationalist army broke the dikes of the Yellow River hoping to stop the march of the Japanese army. As an immediate result of this desperate action,

millions of Chinese lost their homes and became refugees. Even today, the number of people who died from the manmade disaster remains unknown. The breaking of the dike succeeded in forcing the Japanese army to change their plans, but it only delayed the attack. Wuhan fell in October 1938 after a fierce battle on the part of Chinese defensive troops. The Nationalist government was once again forced to relocate to Chongqing (Chungking), which remained the wartime capital until the end of the war in August 1945.

Dr. Dewen Zhang

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Nanjing, Rape of; Nationalist Army; Northern Expedition; Taierzhuang, Battle of.

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Y

Yan'an (Yenan)

A small city in Shaanxi Province that served as the capital of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) from 1937 to 1948. On October 19, 1935, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976), the CCP Central Committee, and the First Front Red Army completed the Long March when they arrived at the CCP-controlled area in the Shaanxi (Shensi)-Gansu (Kansu) (Shaan-Gan) region. In November, the Red Army defeated the Guomindang's (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) offensive and consolidated a new base along the Shaan-Gan border with Bao'an as the base center. By July 1936, Moscow eventually located the CCP Central Committee in Shaanxi and resumed their telegraph communication, which they had lost since October 1934 at the beginning of the Long March.

In 1937, Mao removed the seat of the Party Center and military high command from Bao'an to Yan'an, setting up a Soviet-style government and staying there for 12 years. Yan'an became the command center for the Chinese Communist revolution through the Anti-Japanese War in 1937–1945 and the Chinese Civil War in 1946–1949. The CCP established the political and military coalition, or the United Front, with the GMD in December 1936 and reorganized the Red Army into the National Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, totaling 60,000 troops, to fight the Japanese invading forces. The CCP high command reorganized its forces into the People's Liberation Army (PLA), totaling 4 million troops in 1949,

and won the Chinese Civil War. After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the CCP celebrated Yan'an as the birthplace of the Communist revolution.

In January 1937, the CCP established the Anti-Japanese Military Political College (Kangda) at Yan'an with Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) as its president and Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-ch'eng) (1892–1986) as vice president. Mao and other leaders visited the university frequently and gave lectures to the officer-students. By 1939, the university had 10 branch campuses all over the base regions. Some European and American journalists and doctors also arrived at Yan'an, including Anna Louise Strong and Edgar Snow. The latter interviewed Mao and wrote a book about the CCP and Yan'an entitled *Red Star over China*.

In 1941–1942, the Japanese command concentrated 64 percent of its troops in China to launch “mopping-up operations” against the CCP bases behind its line. To overcome the shortage of food and supplies, the Chinese officers and soldiers devoted themselves to increasing production. Many of them participated in the opening up of wilderness for crop cultivation, the raising of hogs, and the making of cloth at Yan'an. The most difficult logistical problems for the bases were resolved by 1943, after which these areas continued to expand. On July 22, 1944, the first team of the “American Observation Group” arrived in Yan'an. This was a joint military and civilian mission from 1944 to 1947, also known as the Dixie Mission, to establish official ties between

Washington and Yan'an for cooperation against the Japanese.

By the spring of 1945, Yan'an had 19 CCP-controlled regions, or the "liberated areas," with a total population of 95 million. To win final victory over Japan and to prepare for the decisive victory of the Chinese revolution, the CCP convened in Yan'an its Seventh National Congress on April 23–June 11, 1945. Attending the congress were 752 delegates and alternates representing 1.21 million party members across the country. By the fall of 1945, the CCP's regular army had grown to 1,270,000 men, supported by militias numbering another 2.68 million. On August 14, Japan surrendered unconditionally.

Before WWII ended, to avoid a collapse of the CCP-GMD coalition, U.S. ambassador Patrick Hurley (1883–1963) visited Yan'an and proposed a joint postwar government in 1944. In August 1945, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC), invited Mao for peace talks in Chongqing for 43 days. Since both sides had a different political agenda, the negotiations failed, and the two parties resumed their military conflicts in north China.

In the Chinese Civil War, from March 1947 to August 1948, Jiang changed his war strategy from broad assaults to attacking key targets. Jiang concentrated his forces on two points: the CCP-controlled areas in Shandong and Yan'an, where the CCP Central Committee and its high command had been since 1937. Jiang's attacks failed, and Mao and the CCP Party Center survived. When the GMD offensive slowed down, a CCP strategic offensive began from August 1948 to October 1949. After the PLA's victories in north and northeast China, Mao moved the seat of the Party Center and the high command from Yan'an to Xibaipo, Pingshan

County, northern Hebei Province, on March 21, 1948. On March 23, 1949, Mao and the Party Center left Xibaipo for Beijing, the new capital of the CCP, where he proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese Military Political College; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Dixie Mission; Eighth Route Army; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanniwan Experiment; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Soviet Union; United Front.

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Yancheng, Battle of (1139)

A battle that took place at Yancheng, modern-day Henan (Honan) Province, between the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) and the northern Jin dynasty (1115–1234). Under the command of Yue Fei (1103–1142), the Southern Song army won the decisive battle.

The northern Jin dynasty, the Jurchens, began to attack the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127) in 1125. The Song emperor lost the war in 1127, and the Northern Song dynasty collapsed. The anti-Jin Chinese

supported the emperor's brother to move the throne to the south and established the Southern Song dynasty from 1127 to 1279.

In May 1139, the Jin army under the command of Wanyan Zongbi (known as Wu Shu), invaded the south. Soon, the Jin army occupied Henan and Shanxi (Shansi) Provinces. The Jin's next step was to attack Huainan. Emperor Gaozong (Kao-tsung) (1127–1162) of the Southern Song ordered Yue Fei to defend the strategic point of Huainan. Wanyan Zongbi, however, did not attack Huainan, but retreated to Kaifeng. Emperor Gaozong asked Yue Fei not to attack the Jurchens.

Yue Fei thought the best chance to destroy Jin's army was at that moment. So he ignored the emperor's order and marched north toward Kaifeng. He ordered his infantry troops to attack the Jin's garrison at Zhongyuan and occupied Zhengzhou. Then Yue Fei ordered Liang Xing to cross the Yellow River (Huanghe), to assemble peasants loyal to the emperor and attack Beizhou County. Noticing that Yue Fei's forces were scattered, Wanyan Zongbi launched a surprise attack at Yancheng, where only a few Song troops were stationed.

On July 8, 1139, Wanyan Zongbi and Wanyan Zongxian (known as King Gaitian) led 15,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry troops to the north of Yancheng. Yue Fei ordered his son Yue Yun, who commanded light-horsemen, to attack the enemy center. The central troops were the Jin's most experienced troops, called Iron Soldiers because they wore iron armor. In addition, on both sides of the Iron Soldiers were the Jin's cavalry. Yue Fei knew that, although the Iron Soldiers were well equipped from head to toe, they were not flexible. Thus, Yue Fei ordered his Beiwei and Youyi cavalry units to attack the enemy cavalry followed by the infantry, who were equipped with Mazha

swords and axes. His ingenious idea worked. Thousands of Jin soldiers were killed in the battle, leaving their bodies littering the ground. The Battle of Yancheng was a great victory for the Southern Song army.

Following his defeat at Yancheng, 14 days later, the Jin army attacked Yingchang Fu. Yue Fei again ordered his son Yue Yun to lead the Beiwei cavalry with its supporting infantry to aid the local commander Wang Gui at Yingchang Fu. At the subsequent Battle of Yingchang, the Song troops gained another victory by using similar tactics. Yue Fei's army recaptured Zhengzhou and Luoyang in Henan.

After the Battle of Yancheng, the Jin army withdrew to Kaifeng. Emperor Gaozong of Song was looking for a peace negotiation and unwilling to allow Yue Fei to press on his advance. Thus, the emperor sent out 12 gold (most urgent) orders recalling the troops under the command of Yue Fei. When his army retreated back to the south, Yue Fei was jailed and then poisoned in 1142. That year, the Song emperor signed a peace treaty, the Shaoxing Peace Accord, with the Jin dynasty.

Yong Tong

See also: Song Dynasty; Song, Fortified Cities; Song-Mongol War; Yuan Dynasty; Yue Fei.

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Yang Shangkun (Yang Shang-kun) (1907–1998)

Military and political leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1988–1993, general of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and vice chairman of the Central Committee and Central Military Commission of the CCP.

Yang was born in July 1907 in Shuangjiang, Tongnan County, Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province. In 1925, he joined the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) and became a member of the Communist Party the next year. In spring 1926, he went to Shanghai and prepared the first and second armed uprisings among the manufacturing workers to cooperate with the GMD-led Northern Expedition against the local warlords. In November 1929, he was sent to study in Moscow.

On his return in 1931, Yang Shangkun started his military career in the Chinese Red Army. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War of 1927–1937, he was appointed director of the Political Department in the First Red Army and moved around different battle areas under the command of Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976) and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976). In January 1934, he was appointed political commissar of the



Yang Shangkun was one of the most influential Communist leaders in China during the 1980s and 1990s, serving as president of China and commanding the People's Liberation Army. (AFP/Getty Images)

Third Red Army, which was one of the main forces of Chinese Red Army. He and Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974) led their Third Army as the vanguard of the Red Army's Long March of 1934–1935. The Third Army started the Long March on October 17, 1934, from Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Soviet. In January 1935, Yang Shangkun attended the Zunyi Conference and supported Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) leadership and strategy. That August, he was promoted to deputy director of the General Political Department (GPD) of the Red Army.

In the political crisis of the Red Army during the Long March, Mao and Zhang Guotao (Ch'ang Kuo-tao) (1897–1979), commissar general of the Red Army, split and headed in two different directions. Mao led 11,000 troops to march north toward

Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, while Zhang led 8,000 men to return to southwest Sichuan Province. Although Yang was under Zhang's command, he defected to Mao's side. After Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986) fled Zhang's headquarters to Mao's camp with all the maps and code books, Yang and another officer also fled from Zhang's headquarters with some important documents. They had to hide during the day and travel at night in order to escape Zhang's search cavalry. Eventually, they made it to Mao's headquarters with these important documents from Zhang's headquarters. Mao's trust in Yang was further strengthened.

During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Yang Shangkun was deputy secretary of the CCP North China Bureau and worked with Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969) behind the Japanese lines. In January 1939, Yang became secretary of the North China Bureau and worked with Zhu De and Peng Dehuai to cooperate with the military operations of the Eighth Route Army, including the Hundred Regiments Campaign in 1940–1941. In 1941, Yang returned to Yan'an and worked at the Party Center and high command. In 1945, he became the secretary-general of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP.

During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Yang was commander of the Central Security Force to protect the Party Center and the high command during the attacks launched by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army against Yan'an in 1946–1947. In 1948, he arranged the relocation of the Party Center from Yan'an to Xibaipo, Hebei (Hopei) Province. That year, he became the deputy secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP and director of the General Office of the CMC, working with Zhou Enlai

to run the high-command offices and deal with daily routines.

After the founding of the PRC in October 1949 until the mid-1960s, Yang Shangkun was one of a handful of leaders who worked closely with Mao Zedong at Zhongnanhai. As the director of the Central Committee General Office, he oversaw most important party activities and military affairs. By 1966, as the Cultural Revolution began, Yang, with his longtime comrade Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997), fell from the Party Center. He lost Mao's favor when he voiced his opposition to Mao's policy and supported Liu Shaoqi and Deng in their attempt to salvage China from the depths of the Great Leap Forward movement. As a result, Yang Shangkun was demoted during the Cultural Revolution and criticized by the Red Guards. Yang was accused of planting a covert listening device to spy on Mao. He was branded a counter-revolutionary and spent 12 years in prison.

In 1978, Yang Shangkun returned to power. In the next few years, he was put in charge of shrinking and modernizing the huge, backward PLA. He was given the rank of general. In 1982, he was appointed to the party's powerful Politburo of the Central Committee. This experience only strengthened Yang's support for Chinese economic reform as well as his friendship with Deng Xiaoping. But in comparison to other reformers, Yang was far less enthusiastic about political reform. However, his attitude of aggressive support for Chinese economic reform and conservative stand against political reform at the same time fit perfectly with Deng's view and earned Deng's further trust.

In 1988, Yang Shangkun was appointed the president of the People's Republic of China. Under the constitutional conventions of the 1982 constitution, the president's role was largely symbolic, with formal executive

power wielded by the general secretary of the Communist Party and the premier. In practice, the state and party leaders still deferred to paramount leader Deng. In October 1992 and March 1993, Yang Shangkun followed Deng's call to eliminate the party leaders' lifelong tenure. He withdrew from his position in the Politburo, vice chairman of the CMS, and president of China. Yang died on September 14, 1998, in Beijing.

Xiaoxiao Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; Guomindang; Hundred Regiments Campaign; Jiang Jieshi; Jiangxi Soviet; Long March; Northern Expedition; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Red Guards; Soviet Union; Yan'an; Ye Jianying; Zhang Guotao; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986)

Military and political leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist

Party of China), marshal of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and defense minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Ye played an instrumental role in the political and military affairs of both the party and government. Most notably, he facilitated both Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) and Deng Xiaoping (Deng Hsiao-ping) (1904–1997) in their respective ascent to supreme leadership of the CCP. Ye is the only member of the CCP political-military elite officially identified as a member of the Hakka minority group.

Ye Jianying was born on April 28, 1897, in Meizhou County, Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province. After graduating from the Yunnan Military Academy in 1920, Ye joined Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party). During warlord Chen Jiongming's (Ch'en Chiung-ming) revolt against the Nationalists in 1922, Ye personally helped guard Sun. In 1924, after the Nationalists had defeated Chen and formed an alliance with the CCP, Ye became assistant director of the Teaching Department at the Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy. During Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) Northern Expedition, he assumed command of the Second Division and rose to become chief of staff of the Fourth Army.

In July 1927, Ye joined the CCP and provided intelligence to Ye Ting (Yeh Ting) (1896–1946) and He Long (Ho Lung) (1896–1969) to facilitate the Nanchang Uprising and the founding of what would become the PLA. After the Nationalist army recaptured the city, the Comintern ordered the CCP to incite a revolution in Guangdong. Although most of the Chinese Communist generals, including Ye, opposed this plan, Ye complied. He employed two units from the Fourth Army to support the Guangzhou

(Canton) Uprising on December 11, 1927. However, the results were disastrous and the Communists were driven out of the city two days later. Ye fled to Hong Kong with Zhou Enlai and Ye Ting. Ye Jianying escaped the recriminations that followed and went to Moscow to study military science for the next five years.

Ye returned to China in 1932 and became chief of staff of Zhang Guotao's (Ch'ang Kuo-tao) (1897–1979) Fourth Front Army. After the collapse of the Jiangxi Soviet in 1934, the Fourth Front Army moved from west Hunan Province to Sichuan (Szechwan) Province. In the meantime, Mao Zedong's First Front Army conducted the famous Long March (1934–1935). They bore the brunt of Nationalist attention and did not reach the relative safety of Sichuan to reunite with the Fourth Front Army until July 1935.

The joy of reunion was short-lived as a strategic debate and power struggle ensued between Mao and Zhang. Although Mao had eliminated many of his rivals earlier at Zunyi, Zhang had a larger force and had sufficient credentials and seniority to challenge Mao for leadership of the party. Zhang wanted to move northwest to try to establish contact with the Soviet Union, while Mao believed that north Shaanxi (Shensi) Province was the safest location for a new base. Eventually, Zhang gained control of the army, but Mao had positioned himself and his allies within the Politburo and the Central Committee. Unfortunately, this compromise would not last.

Events came to a head on September 10, when Mao departed with 11,000 members of the First Front Army—he was forced to leave behind those that had been integrated into the Fourth Front Army. At this point, Ye defected to the First Front Army, taking maps and an alleged telegram proving

Zhang's intent to use force to bring Mao and the Central Committee into line. This act would secure Ye's position in Mao's favor from thereafter. Mao later proclaimed that Ye had saved the party and the Red Army and praised him for being cautious like Zhu Ge and keeping his head at important movements like Lu Duan.

After arriving in Yan'an, Ye became chief of staff of both the North Shaanxi Revolutionary Military Committee and the First Front Army. After the formation of the Second United Front with the Nationalist forces and the transformation of the Communist forces in Shaanxi into the Eighth Route Army, Ye retained his position as chief of staff. After 1936, he also supported Zhou Enlai's diplomatic work as director of the liaison office with the Nationalists, first in Xi'an and then in Chongqing (Chungking). In 1941, he returned to Yan'an to serve as chief of staff for the newly formed Central Revolutionary Military Commission, the predecessor to the Central Military Commission (CMC).

After World War II, Ye returned to Chongqing and was active in the postwar peace talks. One of his key accomplishments was facilitating the movement of Communist forces in his home province of Guangdong to north China. In February 1947, with the civil war expanding and hopes of peace evaporated, Ye returned to Yan'an. He was immediately designated secretary of the Central Committee's Rear Committee and his first task was to evacuate the CCP's critical apparatus, cadre, and personnel before Nationalist forces seized the capital. In July 1947, Ye moved his command to Xibaipo, Hebei (Hopei) Province to establish the temporary headquarters of the Central Tasks Committee, which was responsible for day-to-day business. It consisted of the CCP high command minus Mao, who was serving

as a decoy with Peng Dehuai's (P'eng Tehuai) (1898–1974) Northwest Field Army.

At the end of 1948, with the Ping-Jin Campaign ongoing, Ye transferred to take command of the forces allocated for the occupation of Beiping (now Beijing). In February 1949, after the Beiping garrison surrendered, Ye became mayor of the city and began preparing it to become the new capital of the Communist regime. One of his first tasks was restoring the city name back to the more prestigious title of “Northern Capital,” or Beijing.

After overseeing the initial transition of Beijing and handing off his duties to Nie Rongzhen, Ye returned to his native home in south China to assume the highest political and military offices therein. During the first half of the 1950s, he was secretary of the South Central Bureau, commander of the South China Military District, mayor of Guangzhou, and chairman of the Guangdong People's Government. Ye soon lost these positions during the height of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, possibly due to his opposition to radical land reform in south China.

In 1954, Ye returned to Beijing to become director of the PLA Military Equipment Supervision Department. The next year he was appointed Inspector General of Training and elevated to the rank of marshal. In 1958, Ye became the first president and political commissar of the PLA's Academy of Military Science. A year later, he was elected to the Central Military Commission (also known as the Military Affairs Commission), and in 1961, he was given control over a committee dedicated to military training and science. In these positions, he made strides toward modernizing, streamlining, and professionalizing the PLA before Lin Biao's (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) “red” reforms and the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976 set the army back decades.

In February 1967, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Ye and other major military figures, including Chen Yi (Ch'en Yi) (1901–1972), Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiangch'ian) (1901–1990), Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-ch'en) (1899–1992), and Tan Zhenlin launched an attack against the Central Cultural Revolution Leading Group, at the time led by Chen Boda and Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914–1991), Mao's wife. This was deemed the February Adverse Current, and Mao was able to defuse the attack by purging and marginalizing most of its participants. As was the pattern for most of his career, Ye was able to escape serious punishment, unlike Chen and Tan, who were public criticized and forced into semiretirement.

In 1969, Ye was elected to the Politburo Standing Committee during the Ninth National Party Congress. After Lin Biao's failed coup in 1971, Ye assumed responsibility for the day-to-day activities of the CMC, and two years later he became vice chairman of the Central Committee. In 1975 he became the minister of defense. Mao likely chose Ye for these senior posts in order to maintain some stability and professional leadership after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. He also believed that Ye could work with the new party leadership, which would later be known as the Gang of Four.

However, after Zhou Enlai's death in 1976 and the elevation of Hua Guofeng (1921–2008) over Deng Xiaoping as premier, Ye claimed illness, and his duties with the CMC were assumed by Chen Xilian (Ch'en Hsi-lian) (1915–1999). Ye's act was highly symbolic, as it demonstrated his intent to not support the new regime with military backing. In September, not long after Mao's death, Hua secretly called on Ye and others to dispose of the Gang of Four. After securing the loyalty of key PLA

units in the capital, Ye played a primary role in planning the arrest of the Gang of Four on October 6.

In 1977, Ye resumed his work handling the daily affairs of the CMC. Throughout the rest of the 1970s, he supported and helped elevate Deng Xiaoping to peacefully and gradually wrest power from Hua. Ye remained a key political driving force throughout Deng's reforms in the early 1980s. He continued to assume a number of prestigious titles in the 1980s, including vice chairman of the CCP until that position was abolished in 1982. Ye died on October 22, 1986, in Beijing.

Dr. Christopher Lew

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Beiping-Tianjin Campaign; Chen Xilian; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Eighth Route Army; Gang of Four; Guomintang; Guangzhou Uprising; He Long; Hong Kong; Hua Guofeng; Jiang Jieshi; Jiangxi Soviet; Lin Biao; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; Nationalist Army; Nie Rongzhen; Northern Expedition; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; Whampoa Military Academy; Xu Xiangqian; Yan'an; Ye Ting; Zhang Guotao; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De.

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Ye Ting (Yeh T'ing) (1896–1946)

Chinese Communist general and the commander of the New Fourth Army during the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1946. Born in Huiyang (Hui-yang) County, Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province, on September 10, 1896, Ye Ting enrolled at the Baoding (Paoting) Military Academy in 1916. He withdrew in 1918 because of financial problems and joined his provincial army, where he became a member of the Guomintang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1920. In 1924, Ye went to Moscow for advanced training, where he met Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-chen) (1899–1992) and joined the Moscow branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China).

Returning to Guangdong in 1925, he was assigned to command and train what later became the Independent Regiment, an attachment of the GMD National Revolutionary Army's Fourth Army, recruiting many CCP members and Communists graduated from the Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy. After the GMD-CCP split in mid-1927, Ye fled and participated in the two abortive Communist uprisings in Nanchang, Jiangxi (Kiangsi), and Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong, in August and December, respectively. At the end of 1927, Ye left the party and lived in retirement abroad.

When the Second Sino-Japanese War began, Ye returned to China in October 1937 to command the newly created New Fourth

Army, a force comprising Communist guerrillas in the lower Yangzi (Yangtze) River valley under the National Revolutionary Army and a symbol of the GMD-CCP united front. Ye's appointment owed much to his connections with both the Nationalist and Chinese Communist military leaders during the 1920s. In January 1938, the New Fourth Army formally came into being, with headquarters in Nanchang and a field command post in southern Anhui (Anhui), operating along the communication lines between Nanjing (Nanking) and Shanghai within Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, between Nanjing and Wuhu (Wuhu) in Anhui, and between Nanjing and Hangzhou (Hangchow) in Zhejiang (Chekiang). After the Japanese took Xuzhou (Hsueh), Jiangsu, Ye's forces operated behind Japanese lines north of the Yangzi River in May.

Ye's rapid extension of operations in the Jiangsu-Anhui area and his victories over the Japanese mopping-up campaigns in southern Anhui in 1939 and 1940 aroused Nationalist suspicions. The GMD leaders feared growing CCP power that might undermine its rule after the war. The situation culminated in the New Fourth Army Incident, also known as the Southern Anhui Incident, of January 1941. Ye was charged with insubordination to military orders and imprisoned for the remainder of the war until March 4, 1946, when he was set free as a result of repeated demands by the Chinese Communists. Released, Ye requested reinstatement of his CCP membership, which was immediately granted. On the way from Chongqing (Chungking), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, to the Communist base in Yan'an (Yenan), Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, on April 8, 1946, Ye's plane crashed in northwest Shaanxi, and he was killed.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Nationalist Revolutionary Army; New Fourth Army; New Fourth Army Incident; Nie Rongzhen; Soviet Union; United Front; Whampoa Military Academy.

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Yijiangshan, Battle of (January 1955)

Yijiangshan, a half-square-mile islet, belongs to the Dachen (Ta-ch'en) Island Group, which is about 20 miles off the coast of Zhejiang (Chekiang) Province in southeast China. Yijiangshan, seven miles north of the Dachen, became the target of a landing campaign of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954–1955. In September 1954,

Chinese Communist forces in the Fujian (Fukien) and Zhejiang Provinces along the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Pacific coast began an intensive artillery bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled offshore islands. In the following months, while the artillery force continued their heavy shelling, the PLA air force, navy, and infantry troops prepared an amphibious landing against some of the offshore islands occupied by the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) forces.

On December 16, PLA field commanders met at Ningbo to discuss the Yijiangshan landing and sent a request to the Central Military Commission (CMC) for approval. Zhang Aiping, front commander, decided to launch the landing of Yijiangshan on January 18 and called General Chen Geng (1903–1961), deputy chief of the General Staff in charge of operations. Chen reported directly to Mao Zedong. Mao left the final decision to Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898–1974). Although Peng approved Zhang's request, the high command continually tried to avoid any conflict with the American forces in order to continue the civil war on Taiwan without disturbing the international Cold War.

On January 18, 1955, the PLA front command launched the Yijiangshan landings. The GMD garrison at Yijiangshan numbered only about 1,000 troops armed with some 60 artillery pieces and 100 machine guns. Zhang's 10,000-men attacking forces had overwhelming numerical superiority. At 8:00 A.M., to begin the attack, 54 bombers and 18 fighters raided key GMD positions, headquarters, and defense works at both Yijiangshan and Dachen. Over six hours, the bombers dropped 127 tons of bombs on the islands. Then, at 12:20 P.M., coastal artillery at Toumenshan began a two-hour bombardment of Yijiangshan. Between

2:30 and 3:00 P.M., 3,000 troops landed. The Second Battalion, 180th Regiment, landed first on the south side of the island, while the First Battalion, 178th Regiment, landed on the east, followed by the Second and Third Battalions. By 5:30 P.M., troops controlled the entire island. By 2:00 A.M. the next morning, the PLA had annihilated all remaining GMD pockets of resistance. The GMD lost its entire garrison of 1,086 men, including 567 dead and 519 prisoners. The PLA suffered 1,592 total casualties: the Army had 393 dead and 1,037 wounded, nearly 50 percent of its landing troops; naval forces had 23 dead and 139 wounded. The Navy lost one landing craft sunk and had 21 ships damaged, while the Air Force suffered no losses except eight bombers and fighters damaged.

Flush with victory, Zhang pressed an attack against the Dachens. On January 19, 200 bombers conducted the largest air raid in PLA military history. The GMD command on the Dachens was badly shaken by the Yijiangshan's loss. The Eisenhower administration, for its part, persuaded Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) to withdraw his troops from the Dachens with American assistance. Between February 8 and 12, the Seventh Fleet helped the GMD evacuate some 25,000 military and 18,000 civilian personnel from the Dachen Islands. On February 22, after the GMD was informed that the U.S. would not assist in the defense of Nanjishan Island, it was evacuated as well. By February 26, all of the East China Sea offshore islands along the Zhejiang coast were under PLA control.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Chen Geng; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Communist Party; General Departments of the People's Liberation Army; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Korean War; Mao Zedong; Peng Dehuai; People's Liberation Army.

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Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368)

Founded by the Mongol leader Kublai (Khubilai) Khan (1215–1294) after he defeated the Chinese army of the Song dynasty (960–1279). Genghis Khan (Chinggis or Chengiz Khan) (1162–1227), Kublai's grandfather, and the Mongol leaders established the most powerful medieval military system of the time, which dazzled their Chinese opponents. The Mongol army used ferocious terror tactics, sparing cities that offered no resistance but often massacring all inhabitants of those that did. In 1206, Genghis Khan unified different Mongolian tribes through warfare to become one country called Yeke Mongghol Ulus. After Genghis Khan established the Yeke Mongghol Ulus, he constantly led his army in campaigns to enlarge his territory. He conquered the Kara-Khitan Khanate in 1218, exterminated the Khwarezm-Shah dynasty in 1219, and even expanded to Eastern Europe. In

1227, he conquered the Western Xia regime. He died in that expedition.

After Genghis Khan's death, Yeke Mongghol Ulus continued his predecessor's expansion. Under the new leadership of Kublai Khan, the Mongol army conquered the Jin dynasty in 1234. Kublai cavalryman even fought to the heart of Europe in 1241, conquered Tibet in 1246, extinguished the Dali dynasty in 1253. In 1271, Kublai Khan announced that he was the emperor of Yuan, formally establishing the Yuan dynasty. The Yuan capital was moved to Dadu (Peking, now Beijing) in 1272. After the Yuan conquered South Song in 1279, Yuan finished its expedition of unification in 1279.

The unification of China by the Yuan ended the political division that began during the last years of the Tang dynasty. It helped the development of China as a unified country. In the central government, the administration included both Mongols and Chinese in the Central Secretariat, while the Privy Council and the Censorate were in charge of military affairs and supervision of government officials. Locally, both provincial and county administrations were also inclusive in a dual system. For the first time in Chinese history, the Tibet (Xizang) region was organized as an administrative unit, directly under the control of the central government. The links between the various minorities were strengthened, and the links along the border helped economic and cultural development. Yuan made China once again central to Asian economy and politics.

Because of Mongol domination over Eastern Europe and central Asia, Eurasian trade became possible and profitable. Over the Silk Road, many Europeans reached China, and a few left accounts of their travels. Marco Polo (1254–1324) was only one of many. Young Marco began his trip in

1271 with his father and uncle as Italian traders. They left Venice, Italy, traveling east to the Black Sea, south Russia, central Asian oases, and into China. Then Marco Polo spent 17 years in China from 1275 to 1292. He engaged in trade and also worked in the local government during the Mongols' Yuan dynasty.

To maintain a large army and support their military campaigns, the Mongol rulers forcibly took over large amount of land from the Chinese peasants and distributed them among garrison troops and temples. In addition, taxes, in terms of produce as well as labor service, were extremely heavy. The Mongol rulers also appropriated peasants' horses for military purposes. Many Chinese peasants in the north, after losing their land, became serfs to the Mongols. To sow discord among the various nationalities, the Yuan rulers divided all the people into four classes. The highest class belonged to the Mongols; followed in order by the Semu people, including Xia people and the Uygurs in the northwest and those who had migrated to China from central Asia; the Han people; and the southerners. The purpose of this division was to prevent people of the other nationalities from forming a united front against the Mongols. Cruel oppression by the Mongols precipitated resistance on the part of all peoples. In 1351, the "Red Turban Army," rose up in Yingzhou, Anhui (Anhui) Province, and peasants in many other places favorably responded. One of the peasant forces captured Dadu, overthrew the Mongol regime, and established the Ming dynasty in 1368.

Yutong Yang

See also: Genghis Khan; Kublai Khan; Ming Dynasty; Mongols; Silk Road; Song Dynasty; Song, Fortified Cities; Song-Mongol War; Tibet; Yue Fei; Zhu Yuanzhang, Emperor.

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Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859–1916)

Chinese military reformer, Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912) official, and president of the first Chinese republic. Born in Xiangcheng (Hsiangch'eng), Henan (Honan) Province, on September 16, 1859, Yuan Shikai joined the Chinese army and gained early diplomatic and military experience in Korea and in Shandong (Shantung) Province, where he impressed foreigners by vigorously attacking Boxer rebels in 1900. Politically astute, Yuan was also pragmatic and self-serving. In 1911, Qing court officials asked Yuan to mediate with revolutionaries, leading to the abdication of the last emperor in February 1912 and the elevation of Yuan himself to the position of provisional president, supplanting the militarily

impotent Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925). Thereafter, Yuan worked to strengthen his government while eliminating rivals, especially Sun's newly created Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party).

Yuan's quest for power and his awareness of China's weakness led him to a cautious, even accommodationist foreign policy, avoiding confrontation and accepting foreign loans secured by economic concessions. Prior to 1914, countervailing imperialist aspirations and some foreign sympathy for Yuan's administrative reform efforts usually prevented any one power from asserting too much pressure on the young republic, but when war diverted Western attention, Japan advanced at China's expense. In July 1914, Yuan declared nonbelligerency, seeking British support to neutralize China. London demurred. Japan immediately pressured Yuan to exempt German-dominated Shandong from nonbelligerency. Isolated, Beijing (Peking) grudgingly gave in, facilitating Japan's attack on Qingdao (Tsingtao).

In January 1915, Tokyo delivered the Twenty-One Demands that would have given Japan considerable influence over China, enjoining the Chinese to strict secrecy. Steadily and personally involved in the crisis, Yuan played his limited diplomatic cards skillfully, leaking the demands to Westerners and dragging out negotiations. But he feared stoking popular nationalism that might have unified the nation against imperialism only to unleash greater Japanese aggression or even consume his own government. Beijing won modest support from Washington and London, where both governments feared Japan's *démarche* threatened their own Asian interests. Yuan diluted Tokyo's demands somewhat but finally accepted Japan's ultimatum in May 1915, earning widespread condemnation for his capitulation.

For the remaining year of his life, Yuan attempted to revive a monarchical government, creating even more protests and defections from former allies. He gave up the scheme in March 1916. A broken man, Yuan died in Beijing on June 6 of that year.

Dr. Mark F. Wilkinson

See also: Beiyang Army; Boxer Rebellion; China, Republic of; Guomindang; New Army; Qing Dynasty; Sun Yat-sen; Warlord Period.

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Yue Fei (1103–1142)

Yue Fei was a semilegendary military commander of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279). He was falsely accused of treason but was hailed as a national hero in subsequent centuries. Yue Fei was born in 1103 in Tangyin, central Henan (Honan) Province, probably into a poor family. He became a common infantryman while still a child and rose quickly through the ranks by

virtue of his bravery and skill. Before long, he was named commander in chief of the Southern Song forces.

The Jurchen tribes established the Jin dynasty (1115–1234) in northern China in 1115 and completed their conquest of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127) in 1127. The Southern Song dynasty was weak and seemed doomed to be conquered in what became known as the Song-Jin Wars. Yue Fei met the invasion head-on and frustrated the Jin cavalry in the rugged hills where he chose to engage the enemy.

Yue Fei coordinated his land campaigns with the Song navy and recaptured all Song territory south of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, chasing the Jin north of the Yangzi as far as Luoyang. Incredible feats are attributed to him, including his defense of Kaifeng with only 800 men against a Jin army of 500,000. In 1139, Yue Fei commanded the Song army and defeated the Jin's invading army led by Wanyan Zongbi (known as Wu Shu) at Yancheng.

On July 8, 1139, Wanyan Zongbi and Wanyan Zongxian (King Gaitian) led 15,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry troops and arrived at the north of Yancheng. Yue Fei ordered his adopted son Yue Yun to attack. Yue Yun led a group of light-horsemen to strike hard at the enemy center. The central troops were the Jin's most experienced troops, called Iron Soldiers because they wore iron armor. In addition, on both sides of the Iron Soldiers were the Jin's cavalry. Yue Fei knew that, although the Iron Soldiers were well equipped from head to toe, they were not flexible. Thus, he ordered his Beiwei and Youyi cavalry units to attack the enemy cavalry followed by the infantry, who were equipped with Mazha swords and axes. His ingenious idea worked. Thousands of Jin soldiers were killed in the battle, leaving their bodies littering the

ground. The Battle of Yancheng was a great victory for the Southern Song army.

Following his defeat at Yancheng, 14 days later, the Jin army attacked Yingchang Fu. Yue Fei again ordered his son Yue Yun to lead the Beiwei cavalry with its supporting infantry to aid the local commander Wang Gui at Yingchang Fu. At the subsequent Battle of Yingchang, the Song troops gained another victory by using similar tactics. Yue Fei's army recaptured Zhengzhou and Luoyang in Henan.

After the Battle of Yancheng, the Jin army withdrew to Kaifeng. With the defense of Southern Song secured, the Song leaders split. Some of them wished to continue the war and push the Jin farther north, whereas others wished to accommodate the Jin and make peace. Yue Fei led the group who wanted to keep fighting, and his main political opposition came from Emperor Gaozong's prime minister, Qin Hui, who headed the peace effort group. Emperor Gaozong (Kao-tsung) (1127–1162) was also looking for a peace negotiation and unwilling to allow Yue Fei to press on his advance. Thus, the emperor sent out 12 gold (most urgent) orders recalling the troops under the command of Yue Fei.

When his army retreated to the south, Yue Fei was jailed and then poisoned on trumped-up charges in 1142. That year, the Song emperor signed a peace treaty, the Shaoxing Peace Accord, with the Jin dynasty. In 1162, the new emperor, Xiao Zong, rehabilitated Yue Fei's reputation and ordered a magnificent tomb and temple built in Hangzhou to honor him. The temple, which still stands, includes cast-iron statues of Qin Hui, his wife, and two other conspirators—all four bound as prisoners and kneeling in submission to the man they murdered.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Mongols; Mongols, Cavalry of; Song Dynasty; Song, Fortified Cities; Song-Mongol War; Yancheng, Battle of; Yuan Dynasty.

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Z

Zeng Guofan (Tseng Kuo-fan) (1811–1872)

Military leader and reformer in the long struggle between the Chinese government and the Taiping rebels in the mid-nineteenth century, Zeng Guofan applied a combination of traditional Confucianism and modern statecraft to defeat the most significant internal threat faced by the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

Born on November 26, 1811, in Xiangxiang, Hunan Province, to a family of modest means, Zeng rose through the civil service examination system to earn the *jinshi* (highest) degree in 1838. Prior to his arrival in the capital, Beijing (Peking), where a number of concerned scholar-officials were beginning to focus on the most practical and progressive of policy making, Zeng had been exposed to the movement known as the School of Statecraft while a student at the famous Yuelu Academy in Shanhua, Hunan. Yet it was the intellectual companionship he found in the capital that led Zeng to ground later plans for institutional reform in the officially sponsored branch of Confucianism elucidated by the twelfth-century philosopher Zhu Xi of the Song dynasty (960–1279). Unlike later reformers, Zeng never lost faith in the imperial system ruled by the Qing—the reforms he championed sought to harmonize the imperial state with a changing world.

The period of Zeng's fairly routine duties in Beijing also saw the forming of personal habits that permitted him to achieve the

great successes of his later career. From his thirties on, Zeng imposed on himself a strict, even ascetic, moral and physical discipline. He became famous for his personal rectitude, sincerity, assiduity, selflessness, and most interestingly, an almost obsessive tendency to self-criticism. Zeng kept a diary in which he recorded all of his failings, reproached himself, and outlined the path to self-improvement.

By July 1849, when Zeng Guofan was appointed sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat (an outer-court body subsidiary to the powerful grand secretaries who advised the emperor) and vice president of the Board of Rites, he had begun a systematic study of the most important of China's institutions. During the next decades, he and other high officials who made up the School of Statecraft would bring important reforms to those areas: the government monopoly on salt sales, the regulation of maritime transport, the monetary system, and the maintenance of canals, rivers, and dikes. By 1850, he had turned his attention to geography and the closely related issue of China's armies. On April 10, 1851, deeply worried by the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion in south China, Zeng submitted to the emperor a memorial describing the nation's military weaknesses and a set of recommendations.

Inspired by millenarian visions of sexual equality, communitarianism, and a classless society, the Taipings were tens of thousands of poor peasants, charcoalmakers, and miners from mountainous Guangxi (Kwangsi) Province who had been forged into a disciplined army by a charismatic and righteous

leader named Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiuch'uan) (1814–1864), who believed he was Jesus Christ's younger brother. By late 1852, when Zeng received the command to organize troops in Hunan to face the Taipings, the growing rebellion had begun what was to become an extraordinary series of military successes against China's imperial army. Many scholars, especially in China, have seen this uprising as a crucial precursor to the Chinese Communist (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) Revolution of nearly a century later.

An acute awareness of the corruption and lack of discipline that had crippled China's imperial armies convinced Zeng that locally recruited and locally subsidized troops led by members of the provincial gentry would confront the Taiping forces far more vigorously than had the Qing banner armies and Green Standard Army. Recent successes by such gentry-led local troops against the Taipings showed the system could work. Yet because regional armies had challenged the imperial state so often in the past, Zeng was reluctant to communicate to the emperor the scope of his recruiting and training operations once they were in full swing. Covertly, then, he built up a Hunanese army led by local degree-holders chosen for their ability and loyalty, and he saw to it that their first battles were waged not against the seasoned Taipings but against the local bandits who posed a constant problem in imperial China. As he instilled discipline in his troops, Zeng also instilled Confucian ideology to counter the Taiping ideology.

Though Zeng's Hunanese troops met with defeat in their first clashes with the Taipings, victories soon followed. On October 14, 1854, the Xiang (Hunan) Army, commanded by Lo Zenan and Jiang Zhongyuan, recaptured the city of Wuchang (in Hubei Province), a strategically important port city on

the Yangzi (Yangtze) River that imperial troops had failed to take.

Meanwhile, however, the Taipings had captured Nanjing (Nanking; and the Taiping renamed it Tianjing), and it was there that the final conflict between Zeng and the rebels would take place. Much had to be done before that battle, however. After a series of battles along the Yangzi, much of Zhejiang was under Taiping control by 1860. Imperial troops had been crushed in further fighting near Nanjing, and a new threat had appeared in the north: British and French troops were threatening Beijing.

In May 1860, Zeng was made governor-general of Jiangnan and Jiangxi (Kiangsi) and imperial commissioner for the suppression of the Taipings in south China. Never before had a Chinese official been trusted by a Manchu emperor with such far-reaching military powers. Zeng controlled an army of 120,000 soldiers, led by experienced commanders hand-picked by Zeng. Among those commanders was Zeng Guoquan, Guofan's younger brother, who led the successful siege of Anqing, which marked the beginning of the end for the Taipings.

Appalling internal strife had decimated the Taiping leadership holed up in Nanjing. Meanwhile, Zeng's organization had never been stronger, and inexorably his three armies (one led by Li Hongzhang, one by Zuo Zongtang, and one by Zeng Guofan himself) closed around Nanjing from different directions, eradicating Taiping resistance along the way. After a siege that lasted more than two years, Nanjing was taken in July 1864 and virtually all of its defenders slaughtered. Though it took two more years to eradicate the remaining Taiping resistance, the rebellion was truly terminated with the recapture of Nanjing.

For the role he had played in putting down the greatest military threat to the Qing dynasty, Zeng was made a marquis of the

first class, a title no civil official had held until that time. Even as he was making war against the Taipings, Zeng was involved in a number of important reforms. The Self-Strengthening movement that was expanding among intellectuals hoped to make China a stronger state by introducing a number of institutional changes based on Western examples. In Zeng's case, belief in the importance of technical improvement led him to attempt to construct a steamship without much engineering expertise in 1862 and later to set up the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai in 1865. The latter constituted a truly crucial innovation, since the arsenal not only manufactured firearms but also built ships and sponsored the translation of modern Western books. During a short respite from military responsibilities, Zeng took up the duties of governor-general and was deeply involved in the reconstruction of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui, all of which had suffered greatly during the Taiping Rebellion.

Ordered in May 1865 to take over the battle against a loose affiliation of bandits and good-for-nothings known as the Nian rebels, Zeng initiated a program aimed ultimately at severing the connection between the rebels and the local population of hilly north China. But official criticism, difficulty establishing authority over his officers, and slow progress combined to frustrate Zeng, who recommended that Li Hongzhang replace him. He then retired from the conflict. In 1867, Zeng was made grand secretary; the following year, he was governor-general of Zhili; in 1871, he was transferred to his old post as governor-general of Jiangnan, Jiangsu, and Anhui.

Zeng's last significant public action was the drafting of a joint memorial with his longtime colleague Li Hongzhang. The two scholar-generals, both of whom were

conservative reformers, urged the emperor to arrange for groups of young scholars to be sent abroad to acquire the skills China so sorely needed if it was to resist and compete with increasingly predatory foreign powers. The memorial was sent on August 18, 1871, and the following year, a group of Chinese students sailed for the United States. Zeng did not live long enough to hear news of the embarkation, dying on March 12, 1872.

In many regards, Zeng represented the last of a traditionally revered species, the civil servant who held in one hand the scholar's writing brush and in the other a sword. It is a peculiarity of Chinese history that many of the great military leaders who defended the imperium utterly lacked the practical training of a military officer. Zeng was at home in both the soldier's camp and the scholar's study. Not only did he have a printing press set up in his military headquarters in 1864 to issue a variety of scholarly treatises, but he patronized celebrated scholars and established regulations for printing businesses in important Yangzi River cities. It is clear that Zeng also inspired, by his triumphant example, the growth of local military satrapies and so, quite innocently, undermined the dynasty for which he worked and fought for so many years.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Hong Xiuquan; Li Hongzhang; Nian Rebellion; Qing Dynasty; Self-Strengthening Movement; Sino-French War; Taiping Rebellion; Xiang Army; Zuo Zongtang.

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Zhang Guotao (Ch'ang Kuo-tao, 1897–1979)

Political and military leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) during the 1920s and 1930s. Zhang was born in Pingxiang County, Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Province, in November 1897. He studied Marxist thought in Peking University in 1916 under Li Dazhao (Li Ta-chao) (1888–1927). Zhang was involved in the May Fourth movement in 1919 and became a valuable student leader forming the student Marxist movement. Zhang attended Peking University at the same time Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) was an assistant librarian working in the university.

Zhang became the CCP's top party official at the first National Congress of the CCP in 1921 in Shanghai. He was elected a member of the Central Bureau of the CCP and began organizing the work of professional revolutionaries. After his time in congress, he became the director of Secretariat of the China Labor Union and the

chief editor of *Labor Weekly*. He led major strikes and became a pioneer in the labor movement in China with other prominent people such as Li Lisan and Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969).

In the Soviet Union in 1922, Zhang participated in the Congress of the Peoples and of Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East and attended ECCI meetings. In the Second and Third CCP National Party Congresses, in 1922 and 1923 respectively, he was re-elected to the Central Committee. He organized the Peking-Hankow railroad workers' strike, which was one of the first strikes by a large-scale union. In the first congress of the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) of January 1924, he was appointed a member of the executive central committee.

At the Fourth CCP National Congress in 1925, Zhang headed the Yangzi (Yangtze) Region Bureau and sat in the Politburo through the Fifth Congress, from which he was later removed on August 7, 1927 following the defeat of the Nanchang Uprising, in which he was one of the organizing leaders. He was able to regain his official positions at the Sixth CCP National Congress in Moscow in 1928, and was elected a junior member of the ECCI, using the name Zhang Biao. He returned to Moscow in 1930 as a representative of the CCP at the ECCI.

Zhang was known for his opposition to Moscow's policy of joining and/or allying with the Guomindang. While in Moscow, Zhang had allied himself with other Chinese in opposing Pavel Mif of Moscow (associated with Sun Yat-sen University) and Wang Ming. Staying three years in Moscow gave Zhang a different perspective, and by December 1930, he made friends with Wang Ming's Twenty-eight Bolsheviks.

In the 1930s, Zhang had massed a large and powerful army that became the largest

threat to Mao because Zhang was becoming a successful military commander. Today, some still believe that it was Zhang, not Mao, who led the Communists to victory in CCP's Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937) over the GMD army.

In April 1931, Zhang was put in command of the base in Eyuwan and became the representative of the Central Committee under Wang Ming. Eyuwan's association with the "traitor" Zhang Guotao explains history gaps of the revolution. Zhang's assignment in Eyuwan was to aid the Shanghai leadership's efforts to centralize the scattered rural bases. Zhang denied that he carried out Moscow's line or opposed Communists in the area.

On November 7, 1931, Zhang was elected vice president under Mao of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi (Kiangsi). In 1932, he organized the Fourth Red Army and became the head of the Sichuan (Szechwan) Soviet. At the second congress of the Chinese soviets in January 1934, he was reelected vice president under Mao. At the Seventh Comintern Congress, he was elected to the ECCI along with Mao Zedong.

During the Long March in 1934–1935, Zhang and Mao had come into conflict when Zhang and Mao united the Fourth and First Armies respectively in Sichuan on June 13, 1935. In 1935, Zhang contested Mao Zedong for leadership of the CCP. They split in the Long March. When Mao headed to the north with 8,000 troops to northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) and Gansu (Kansu) Provinces, Zhang returned to southwestern Sichuan with 11,000 troops.

On October 22, 1936, Zhang again joined forces with Mao in Gansu. In 1936–1937, Zhang was reelected vice president of the Yan'an Republic and became one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CCP. In early 1937, Zhang Guotao and his

supporters came under siege by Mao Zedong. He was often humiliated by Mao, becoming an easy target, and was too proud to ally himself with Wang Ming, who just recently came back from Moscow and was acting as the Comintern's representative in China.

In April and August 1937, Zhang opposed Mao at two Politburo meetings, and as a result in 1938, Zhang fell from power and defected to the Guomintang. After the defeat of the Guomintang in 1949, he went into exile after the Chinese Communist victory, first to Hong Kong and then to Canada with his wife in December 1968, to join his two sons. He died in Canada in December 1979.

Daniel Mason Linsenbarth

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Chinese Communist Party; Guomintang; Hong Kong; Jiangxi Soviet; Liu Shaoqi; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; National Party Congress; Red Army; Soviet Union; Yan'an.

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Zhang Wannian (1928–)

General of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1995 to 2003. Zhang Wannian was born in Longkou, Shandong (Shantung) Province, in 1928. During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, he was enlisted in the Eighth Route Army in August 1944 and joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) one year later. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Zhang served as squad leader, platoon leader, and deputy company political instructor of the Fifth Company, Thirty-Sixth Regiment, Twelfth Division in 1947–1948. Then he became regimental staff officer and chief of the communication section of the Thirty-Sixth Regiment in northeast China from 1948 to 1950.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1950–1956, Zhang became the head of the Operation Section of the 369th Regiment, 123rd Division, Forty-First Army, and then staff member of the Operation Department of the Forty-First Army Headquarters. In 1956–1958, he served as deputy commander and chief of staff of the 368th Regiment. Then he spent three years studying in the Preparatory and Basic Operation Department at the Nanjing (Nanking) Military Academy of the PLA. From 1961 to 1962, he became deputy commander of the 367th Regiment, 123rd Division, Forty-First Army. From 1962 to 1966, he was appointed commander of the 367th Regiment. Then he became chief of the Operation Department of the Guangzhou Military Region Command in 1966–1968, and commander of the 127th Division, Forty-Third Army, in 1968–1978. Zhang studied at PLA National Military Academy from 1978 to 1979.

When the Sino-Vietnam Border War broke out in 1979, Zhang was commander of the 127th Division and deputy commander of the Forty-Third Army. He led his division into Vietnam, and it had the best performance among all the PLA troops. He was awarded the Third-Class Liberation Medal and achieved Great Honors five times. In 1981–1982, Zhang was appointed commander of the Forty-Third Army. As a career soldier, Zhang had moved up from a squad leader to a regiment, division, and army commander. He was soon promoted to deputy commander of the Wuhan Military Region in 1982–1985, and deputy commander of the Guangzhou Military Region in 1985–1987. He was appointed commander of the Guangzhou Military Region in 1987–1990 and made lieutenant general in September 1988. He became commander of the Ji'nan Military Region from 1990–1992. In June 1993, he was granted the rank of general.

From 1992 to 1995, General Zhang served as the chief of the General Staff of the PLA, a member of Central Military Commission (CMC), and party secretary of the General Staff Department (GSD). In 1995, he became vice chairman of the CMC. In 1997, Zhang became a member of the Secretariat of the Fifteenth CCP Central Committee and a member of its Politburo. In July 1997, when Hong Kong was turned over to China, Zhang was the sole senior military representative at the changeover ceremonies. Zhang and other generals became interested in flexing military muscle in order to get more budgetary allocations; the ideologues could capitalize on the strait crisis to reconstruct a nationalism employed as a new ideological base for legitimization; and the preparation for an expected or unexpected action in the strait served to justify the bureaucrats' lurch toward enhanced central control. He retired in 2003.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese People's Volunteer Force; Cultural Revolution; Eighth Route Army; General Departments of the People's Liberation Army; Hong Kong; Korean War; People's Liberation Army; Sino-Vietnamese Border War.

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Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang) (1901–2001)

Chinese warlord in Manchuria (northeast China) and Nationalist general. Born in Taian (T'aian), Liaoning Province, on June 3, 1901, Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang) was the eldest son of the Manchurian warlord Marshal Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin). The elder Zhang controlled the northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin (Kirin), and Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang). Graduating from

the Fengtian (Fengtien) (the old name of Liaoning) Military Academy in 1920, Zhang joined his father's army, resisting the growth of Japanese and Russian influences in Manchuria (which dated back to the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War and the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War) and defending Manchuria against other warlords.

In June 1929, the elder Marshal Zhang was assassinated, allegedly by the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung) army. The younger General Zhang became commander in chief of the Northeast Peace Preservation Forces. That December, Zhang declared allegiance to the government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and his Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party), believing national unity was essential to halt the Japanese advance in Manchuria.

The Zhang-Jiang relationship developed strains after the Mukden (Shenyang) Incident of September 1931 in Liaoning. Following Jiang's nonresistance policy toward the Japanese advance, Zhang led his Northeastern Army out of Manchuria. At year's end, Zhang became pacification commissioner of Beijing (Peking), Hebei (Hopeh). In January 1933, he engaged the Japanese along the Great Wall, defending Rehe (Jehol), an old province comprising parts of today's northeast Hebei, southwest Liaoning, and southeast Inner Mongolia. Held responsible for the loss of Rehe in March, Zhang resigned his military posts and went abroad on an inspection tour.

Zhang returned in early 1934 and became deputy commander in chief of the Henan (Honan)-Hubei (Hupeh)-Anhui (Anhwei) "Bandit Suppression" Office, responsible for crushing the Chinese Communists (CCP, or the Communist Party of China). In October 1935, Zhang became head of the Northwest "Bandit Suppression" Office

and was stationed in Xi'an (Sian), Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, where he began communicating with the Chinese Communists who had just completed the 1934–1935 Long March and settled in the northeastern part of Shaanxi. In mid-1936, through the liaison efforts of Li Kenong (Li K'o-nung) and Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) (1897–1986), Zhang and Chinese Communist leader Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) agreed on an anti-Japanese united front.

Jiang remained the chief obstacle, which precipitated the Xi'an Incident of December 1936. In early December, Jiang went to Xi'an to discuss the last anti-Chinese Communist campaign. Unable to convince Jiang to drop this plan, Zhang, in cooperation with Shaanxi's pacification commissioner, Yang Hucheng (Yang Hu-ch'eng), kidnapped Jiang on December 12. He then invited Zhou to discuss the Nationalist-Communist cooperation. On Christmas Day, after securing Jiang's agreement on a united front, Zhang accompanied Jiang back to Nanjing (Nanking), Jiangsu (Kiangsu). On arrival, Zhang was arrested for insubordination and put under the National Military Council's strict surveillance, thereby ending his public life. In November 1946, he was taken to Taiwan and held in detention until 1991, when he went to the United States. Zhang died in Honolulu on October 14, 2001.

Law Yuk-fun

See also: Anti-Japanese War; Chinese Communist Party; Great Wall; Guomindang; Japan, Attack on Manchuria; Jiang Jieshi; Long March; Manchuria; Mongols; Nationalist Army; Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905; Sino-Japanese War; United Front; Xi'an Incident; Yan'an; Ye Jianying; Zhou Enlai.

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Zhou Dynasty (1027–221 BC)

The Zhou dynasty, which ruled China from the 1020s to 221 BC, was the longest-lasting dynasty in China and was famous for its many cultural achievements. The Western Zhou dynasty lasted from the 1100s to 771 BC; the Eastern Zhou dynasty ruled during 770–221 BC.

The Zhou started as a seminomadic tribe west of the Shang dynasty (1766–1027 BC). They settled in the Wei River valley as vassals of the Shang but eventually grew stronger than their rulers. Around 1122 BC, they fought and defeated the Shang and built a capital near modern Xi'an (Sian) at Haojing in Shaanxi (Shensi) Province. They quickly won the allegiance of other city-states, which had been dissatisfied with Shang rule. The Zhou improved their position by claiming that they had a Tian Ming, or a mandate of heaven to rule; they called their emperor the son of heaven.

The Western Zhou dynasty ended in 771 BC when northern barbarians forced rulers to move east; several Zhou vassals rebelled, and the Quanron ethnic group captured Haojing and killed King You. His son Ping survived. However, in 770 BC, he left the west and built a new capital in Luoyang



in Henan (Honan) Province in the east. That act marked the beginning of the Eastern Zhou dynasty. The first part of the Eastern Zhou dynasty was called the Spring and Autumn Period, lasting until 476 BC. The Zhou emperors lost power during that time as their feudal vassals began to realize that the empire was not all-powerful. Later, the Warring States Period, from 475 to 221 BC, was a period of near-constant warfare among the large states of China, each of which was trying to gain control of the nation.

The Zhou rulers adopted some of the cultural styles of their Shang predecessors, employing Shang artisans and adopting the Shang writing method. They introduced a feudal form of government, presenting land

to those people who became their vassals. Land inheritance underwent significant change. Under the Shang, property had passed from brother to brother, but now it passed from father to son. The Zhou adopted unique religious practices, including banning human sacrifice and worshipping the sun and stars. Bronze work, agriculture, and trade flourished during the Zhou dynasty.

Though it was violent and unstable, the Warring States Period was also the classical age of Chinese philosophy, sometimes called the Hundred Schools of Thought Period. Sun Zi's book *The Art of War*, a tactical maneuvering guide, appeared around that time, and Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism all developed as philosophies. During the Era

of Warring States, the population grew rapidly. The last Zhou emperor fell in 221 BC, and the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) began.

Amy Hackney Blackwell

See also: *Art of War, The*; Confucian-Mencian Paradigm; Muye, Battle of; Qin Dynasty; Qin Shi Huangdi, Emperor; Shang Dynasty; Sun Zi; Warring States Period.

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Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

Political and military leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) in 1927–1949, premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949–1976, foreign minister of the PRC in 1949–1958, and chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from 1949.

Born in Huai'an, Jiangsu (Kiangsu) Province, on March 5, 1898, and adopted by his relatives, Zhou Enlai received private education of traditional literature as a child. In 1911, he studied in a secondary school in Shenyang (Mukden), Liaoning Province, accepting the republican ideas. Zhou learned Marxism-Leninism and the Russian Revolution during his education in Japan in 1918–1919. He traveled to France in 1920 on a work-study basis and joined the CCP the

following year. Zhou became a Chinese Communist leader as a student activist in 1920–1921. He returned to China in 1924 and joined the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) upon instructions from the Comintern as a part of the GMD-CCP alliance that aimed at Chinese national unification against the warlords. Zhou was appointed by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) as director of the Political Department of the Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy in 1924–1925. He became a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP in 1926.

The CCP-GMD alliance broke down in April 1927 when the GMD purged the Communists from its ranks, precipitating the CCP-GMD power struggle that lasted for two decades. As secretary of the CCP Field Committee, Zhou joined the other CCP military leaders and launched the Nanchang Uprising to revolt against the GMD on August 1, 1927, which established the Communist armed forces. It was the beginning of the CCP's Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927–1937) and is celebrated as the birthday of the Chinese armed forces. With his organizational skills, Zhou was elected to the CCP Political Bureau (Politburo) in 1928 and became secretary-general in charge of military affairs of the Central Bureau in 1931. When Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) emerged as the top leader, Zhou became his chief supporter and closest colleague. Together they led the Red Army in the historic Long March of 1934–1935. Zhou took on the vice chairmanship of both the Central Committee and CMC, making him second only to Mao in rank, a position he had accepted as early as 1935. They developed Communist forces through World War II (WWII) through the Second United Front with Jiang Jieshi's GMD in 1937–1945.

During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Zhou was the chief CCP representative with Jiang’s government at Chongqing (Chungking), successfully negotiating cooperation with GMD to combat Japan’s aggression. After the Pearl Harbor Attack in 1941, he initiated official contact with the U.S. government, resulting in the dispatch of the Dixie Mission to the CCP Headquarters at Yan’an. When WWII was over, Zhou participated in talks with GMD with George C. Marshall (1880–1959), sent by President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) to mediate a settlement between the two parties. After the negotiations failed in 1946, Zhou returned to Yan’an in 1947 and served as the acting chief of the PLA’s General Staff during the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949. When the CCP defeated the GMD in the summer of 1949, Zhou supported Mao’s decision to lean to one side in the Cold War and supported the Soviet Union.

After the PRC’s birth in 1949, Zhou became the first PRC premier and concurrently the first PRC foreign minister. Zhou’s responsibilities were wide-ranging, including the restructuring of the political system, the drafting of the constitution, the implementation of mass socialization, and the launching of economic reforms such as the five-year plans and collectivization. His first task was to build a diplomatic partnership with the Soviet Union, the first nation to accord official recognition to the PRC. To reinforce Sino-Soviet ties, in January 1950, he visited Moscow and the next month secured the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which not only acknowledged Sino-Soviet solidarity but also promised Soviet aid to modernize the PRC’s economy and military. These ties were meant not to place China in a subordinate position of dependence, but to construct a relationship conducive to their similar global and regional interests.

Despite occasional differences with Mao on such matters as intervention in the Korean War (1950–1953) and the radical Great Leap Forward economic program, Zhou always fully supported Mao. Despite reservations as to the PRC’s military readiness, he eventually supported Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War in October 1950 so as to prove the PRC’s faithfulness to the socialist bloc. The conflict strengthened the two countries’ relationship by forcing increased military cooperation. During the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s (1894–1971) first state visit in 1954, it seemed these policies had achieved their goals when the two countries signed a declaration reiterating the equality of their relationship and recognizing their mutual respect for state sovereignty. This loyalty, together with Zhou’s own popularity, enabled him to remain in office and survive the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, during which many senior party and government officials were purged or imprisoned. Zhou’s political longevity led to some consistency in the country’s foreign policy, particularly during the Cultural Revolution and the Sino-Soviet split in the same era.

Zhou’s most notable achievements were in the diplomatic realm. In his capacity as premier, he spent much of his time abroad, boosting the PRC’s international standing. His diplomatic approach was flexible and pragmatic with the developing world. Zhou’s interest in the developing world became readily apparent in 1953. He perceived alignment with Asian and African nations as another path to elevating the PRC’s image abroad. His approach to the developing world, termed the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” was first publicized at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. He called for the mutual respect of national sovereignty and territorial

integrity, mutual nonaggression, nonintervention in internal affairs, equal mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. These became part of the so-called Bandung Spirit, which the conference participants pledged to uphold and promote. Although his foreign minister post was technically transferred to Chen Yi in April 1958, Zhou remained the chief architect of the PRC's foreign policy while at the same time holding the position as premier of the State Council and senior member of the Politburo.

Zhou's policy toward the developing world soon paid off, as Khrushchev advocated peaceful coexistence with the West, but Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate. Meanwhile, Mao vituperatively attacked Khrushchev's revisionism, and by 1963, Sino-Soviet solidarity had all but disappeared, and over the next decade led to several instances of armed confrontation, particularly in the border regions. To redress the loss of the PRC's erstwhile ally, Zhou looked to the developing world, although the onset of the Cultural Revolution prevented him from forging closer ties with the Asian-African bloc.

Zhou survived the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, when most of the old leaders were purged and Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898–1969), president of the PRC, died in prison. Exploiting his undisputed role as the chief administrator in the government, he tried to make compromises between radical idealists and conservative pragmatists. Zhou could not stop the revolutionary fever, however, and had to accept the injustices and impracticalities of Mao's measures to disrupt the party apparatus and government bureaucracy. With his acquiescence, extremists jailed or executed many conservatives and distorted China's foreign affairs with mindless zealotry and xenophobia. After thwarting a military coup by Lin

Biao (Lin Piao) (1906–1971) in 1971, Zhou regained control over the administration and worked to improve relations with the United States because the Soviet Union now posed a direct threat to the PRC.

The PRC's early alliance with the Soviet Union inevitably meant an anti-U.S. stance. Zhou's problems with the United States centered on two main issues. The first was PRC representation in the United Nations (UN) in the 1950s. Following the PRC's birth, Zhou had demanded that Jiang's GMD representative to the UN be unseated and replaced with a PRC representative. America, however, blocked such an attempt. The second issue was the island of Taiwan, which Jiang's GMD still retained and to which the United States was still attached. During his tenure, Zhou frequently reiterated the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan and harshly criticized U.S. policies toward Taiwan.

Zhou never excluded the possibility of maintaining unofficial communications with the United States. His position bore fruit after the mid-1950s, when the PRC found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically. At the Bandung Conference, Zhou initiated what later became the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, first held in August 1958, which provided the first direct channel for U.S.-PRC communications. Although these talks were often suspended due to the deadlock over Taiwan, Zhou did not abandon the hope of reaching an understanding with the United States with a view toward breaking his nation's diplomatic isolation resulting from the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution. In late 1969, he proposed to Mao a normalization of Sino-American relations.

Once the proposal was approved, Zhou was wholly responsible for the rapprochement that ultimately led to U.S. president Richard M. Nixon's (1913–1994) historic

trip to China. In July 1971, he secretly met with Henry Kissinger (1923–) to arrange for Nixon to visit the PRC. He also negotiated an end to the ban on the transfer of U.S. dollars to China and Chinese exports into the United States. In February 1972, Zhou met Nixon at the Beijing airport and attended the Mao-Nixon top summit. A week later, Zhou signed the Shanghai Communiqué, which normalized PRC-U.S. relations after 23 years of hostility. This top-level summit laid the foundation for the formal establishment of a Sino-American diplomatic relationship, which was completed in 1979. In September 1972, Zhou met the Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei in Beijing to establish diplomatic relations. Though diagnosed with cancer in 1973, he continued to meet American officials. He received George H. W. Bush as the chief representative of Washington in 1974. He talked with President Gerald Ford during his state visit to Beijing in 1975. At the Fourth National People's Congress in 1975, Zhou made important domestic policy changes by emphasizing the economic development and the nation's modernization.

Zhou died in Beijing on January 8, 1976. His death triggered mourning demonstrations that contributed to the overthrow of the radical Gang of Four, who succeeded Mao following his death later that year, and their replacement by the more pragmatic Deng Xiaoping, who emphasized economic development rather than Communist ideology.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Agrarian Revolutionary War; Anti-Japanese War; China, People's Republic of; China, Republic of; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping; Dixie Mission; Gang of Four; Guomindang; Korean War; Lin Biao; Long March; Mao Zedong; Marshall Mission to China;

Nanchang Uprising; Nationalist Army; National People's Congress; People's Liberation Army; Red Army; Shanghai Communiqué; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Sino-Soviet Split; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; Soviet Union; United Front; U.S.-PRC Normalization of Relations; Whampoa Military Academy; Yan'an.

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Zhu De (Chu Teh) (1886–1976)

The first marshal of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), political and military leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China), the first vice president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1954–1959, and chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC) from 1959–1976.

Zhu De was born into a poor peasant family in Yilong County, Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, on December 1, 1886. Landless, his father worked as a field hand for a landlord in the village. Five of the family's 13 children died of starvation and illness during childhood. His uncle adopted him at age two. At five, Zhu began to help his uncle on the farm and around the house. His uncle borrowed money and sent him to school in a nearby town from 1892 to 1904. At 19, he passed the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912) county and provincial examinations and enrolled in the regional school where some of the teachers had recently returned from studying in Japan. Zhu learned the Japanese language, about the Meiji Restoration, and reforming ideas from 1906 to 1908. After his graduation, he returned to Yilong for financial reasons and taught physical education at an elementary school for one year. But he was frustrated by the social problems in his isolated hometown under the Qing regime. He was soon attracted to the Infantry Academy of Yunnan. He joined the Tongmenghui (the United League) after he enrolled in the Yunnan Infantry Academy in November 1909.

In August 1911, Zhu graduated and served in the New Army as a squad leader in the Left Zuodui (company), Second Battalion, Seventy-Fourth Biao (regiment), Thirty-Seventh Xie (brigade), Nineteenth Zhen (division). When the Chinese Revolution of 1911 took place in October, Zhu obtained the rank of second lieutenant, then captain in December, and major in 1912. After the 1911 Revolution, he served as a company, battalion, regiment, and brigade commander in the warlord army of Yunnan. He studied *The Art of War* so well that he could recite the entire book and used it in strategic decision and battle planning during the Warlord Period (1916–1927), and soon

he was known as the Chinese Napoleon. But in 1916–1921, he became a victim of warlord politics and military plots, which forced him to resign from his post and leave Yunnan.

Since his military career was over in warlord China, in September 1922, Zhu De went to Europe for further military study and joined the CCP in Berlin in November. He was arrested twice in Germany because he participated in the public rallies sponsored by the German Communist Party in 1925. The German police did not return his passport after he was released from jail. In July, he had to leave Germany for China by way of the Soviet Union. While in Moscow, Zhu enrolled in a short training program for international Communist leaders upon his request. From July to May 1926, he studied Soviet military history, operational tactics, automatic weapons, and guerrilla warfare at the Oriental University of the Communism and labor movement in Moscow.

On his return to China in 1926, Zhu served as metropolitan police chief of the Nanchang city and also opened a Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; the Chinese Nationalist Party) army academy. In August 1927, he joined Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976) and other Chinese Communists and led the armed revolt of the GMD army after Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975) and the GMD purged the CCP in April. Zhu served as the deputy commander of the revolting Ninth Army. That fall, Zhu's units lost some of their men during their urban battles. The Communist military rebellions failed in the cities. In early 1928, Zhu and the remnants of the Nanchang rebellion troops fled to the countryside. Then he joined Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) by bringing 10,000 men to the mountains in April.

In May 1928, they established the Chinese Red Army's Fourth Army with Zhu

De the commander and Mao Zedong his political commissar. They soon made the mountains the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base and laid some groundwork for the Communist army, including the principle of the party's absolute leadership over the army; the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention; and guerilla tactics. Following the Jinggangshan model, other CCP surviving units established their military bases in the rural and border regions across the country. Zhu and Mao had created a military center at Jinggangshan for the Communist revolution. From 1928 to 1930, the Red Army engaged in many battles against the GMD and warlord armies and successfully defended its military bases, forming 10 armies, about 70,000 men. In 1929, he was the commander of the First Army Group of the Red Army, and in 1930, Zhu became the commander in chief of the Chinese Red Army. Zhu and Mao became so closely connected that to the local peasant farmers they were known collectively as "Zhu-Mao."

In 1930–1934, Jiang concentrated a large number of the GMD troops and launched five Encirclement Campaigns against the Red Army. In October 1934, Zhu and Mao broke out from Jiang's encirclement and began the Long March from central Jiangxi Province to northwestern Shaanxi (Shensi) Province, where the Red Army survived and established the Second CCP-GMD United Front in 1937–1945 against the Japanese invasion of China.

During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Zhu served as the commander of the Eighth Route Army, Eighteenth Army Group, and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CCP. The divisions of the Eighth Route Army marched to the enemy-occupied territories, where they carried out guerrilla operations

and established military and political bases. The Eighth Route Army increased from 46,000 men in 1937, to 220,000 men in 1939, and 500,000 men in 1940. By the end of World War II, the CCP's regular army had grown to 1.27 million men.

During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Zhu became the commander in chief of the PLA, working with Mao at the PLA Headquarters at Yan'an and devising the victory for the CCP over the mainland. The PLA regular forces increased from 1.5 million men in June 1946 to 2 million in July 1947, to 2.8 million in June 1948, and to 5 million in October 1949.

After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Zhu continued to serve as the commander in chief of the PLA and vice chairman of the CMC. He was elected vice chairman of the Central People's Government and vice chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Committee in 1949. After the PRC's constitution was published in 1954, he was elected the first vice president chairman of the PRC in 1954–1959 and vice chairman of the CCP in 1956–1966. He was made the first marshal in 1955. In 1959, he was elected chairman of the National People's Congress until 1976.

During the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, Zhu was dismissed from his position on the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Zhou Enlai supported him and prevented him from being harmed or imprisoned. In 1971, Zhu was reinstated as the chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. Zhu De died in Beijing on July 6, 1976.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Anti-Japanese War; *Art of War, The*; China, People's Republic; Chinese Civil War; Chinese Communist Party; Chinese Revolution of 1911; Cultural Revolution; Eighth

Route Army; Encirclement Campaigns; Guerilla Warfare; Guomindang; Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area; Jiangxi Soviet; Long March; Mao Zedong; Nanchang Uprising; National People's Congress; New Army; People's Liberation Army; Qing Dynasty; Red Army; Soviet Union; Sun Yat-sen; United Front; Warlord Period; Yan'an; Zhou Enlai.

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Zhu Yuanzhang, Emperor (Chu Yuan-chang) (1328–1398)

Chinese military leader who ended the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) and founded the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Zhu Yuanzhang was born into a poor peasant family in a village in Fengyang County,

Anhui (Anhui) Province, on October 21, 1328. As a member of the Red Turbans, a Buddhist religious sect, Zhu began his ascent to power by establishing himself as a military leader who held his forces together by combining loyalty extending from him through his individual commanders and so on to each soldier. Throughout the 1350s and 1360s, Zhu battled the other two major regimes in the Yangzi (Yangtze) River area and its tributaries on both land and water with his final victory realized in October 1367. With this consolidation, Zhu immediately turned his attention to the Yuan regime in November of 1367 with the subsequent shift of warfare from the rivers and valleys of south China to the plains of north China and the steppe and deserts of Mongolia, forcing the dynasty to face the demands of a completely new style of warfare.

With his establishment of the Ming dynasty on January 23, 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang took the reign title Emperor Hongwu (Hungwu) (1368–1398) and immediately sought to create a military system that would not be a burden on society. The Ming dynasty began due to the uprising and creation of a religious movement. The religious-led rebellion of the Red Turbans, in which Zhu participated, was successful in disrupting and ultimately toppling Yuan Empire. However, this religious group, although successful to some extent, still lacked the military control and organization needed to create and control a large and diverse area.

Zhu Yuanzhang not only experienced firsthand, but he was also well aware of, the imperfections and instability of weak military and political organizations. He saw these in his involvement during the Red Turban uprising and through his experiences with the Yuan dynasty as well. These past experiences shaped his views and ideologies and ultimately influenced the beginning

structure of the Ming dynasty. His experiences and personal interactions with the Red Turban uprising, the Yuan resistance, and his battles with the Mongols instilled in him the idea that a high level of military control and loyalty were the key ingredients to Chinese unification and dominance.

Zhu's weak education and Buddhist background caused considerable friction with the Confucian gentry, resulting in an empire that placed a majority of the power and decision-making process into his hands or those of his sons, who, as imperial princes, replaced the generals who helped him create the empire. He had eliminated a number of government positions in order to assume a more central position in the decision-making process. This included the dissemination of military control to a multitude of commissions in the hopes that this group of officials would keep one another in check. This splintering of power meant that military initiative had to come directly from the top and reflected Zhu's desire for control. As a result, the political system became truncated at the top, and the dynasty's monarchs came to rely more on personal advisors than on the civil administrators.

Early Ming views and practices with respect to economics, social policies, religion, and other ideologies were firmly controlled by the emperor himself as his belief in order and control encompassed all areas of Chinese life. He regulated religion, implemented mass transfers of people to invigorate agriculture in remote areas, and instilled a complex and vast mutual surveillance system to further limit power and lessen the possibility of an uprising. Ming fear of political strife, coups, and external threats did as much to shape these economic and sociopolitical factors as they did in shaping weapons development and the control and organization of its armed forces.

Emperor Hongwu maintained a large army, estimated at 1,198,442 regular soldiers in 1392. The goal of outfitting half with firearms clearly shows the importance the emperor placed on these weapons. As a result, the Ming would become the primary disseminator of firearms technology by the beginning of the sixteenth century and the world's first gunpowder empire. Zhu Yuanzhang recognized that territorial expansion was limited by military capability and therefore took on more of a defensive approach, realistically being content with its current geographic borders. Zhu realized that military force was the means to obtain political aims, and his influence on China's sociopolitical development shifted focus from expansion to regulation, control and stability. Even Zhu's label of holder of the proclaimed Mandate of Heaven had to be won by military victories and force. Additionally, his understanding that loose political control led to a weak and disloyal military would be reflected by future Ming policies, institutions, and military organization.

When the Ming armies were successful, it was directly related to their ability to wage war as a means of achieving political aims. Not only did Zhu Yuanzhang centralize social and institutional developments, but he also centralized military matters at his sole discretion. Out of personal experience and presumably out of fear for internal rebellions and coups, Ming China's military organization saw a series of practices that helped remove the potential of local leaders rising in power and strength. Ming China knew that a strong military was needed to rule China and to continue its dominance in East Asia.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Kublai Khan; Ming Dynasty; Mongols; Song-Mongol War; Yuan Dynasty.

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Zunyi Conference (1935)

Historical meeting of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Communist Party of China) that determined Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893–1976) as the top military and political leader of the CCP during the Long March of 1934–1935.

In the summer of 1933, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1887–1975), president of the Republic of China (ROC), concentrated 1 million GMD troops and launched his Fifth Encirclement Campaign against

the Red Army. In September, 500,000 KMT troops attacked the central region. By January 1934, Mao had lost his positions in the government due to the CCP power struggle. He lost his military authority to the Soviet advisors like Li De (Li Te, Otto Braun), a German Communist and military expert trained in Moscow for three years and then sent to China as Comintern military advisor for the CCP.

The temporary Central Committee under the leadership of Wang Ming and Li De employed an “all-out offensive” and “two fists fighting back” in their fifth antisuppression campaign. The Red Army failed, and Jiang’s troops marched into the central region through his “blockhouse” strategy. Then the Central Committee organized a positional defense by “defending every point” and “using bunkers against the enemy bunkers.” The total defense did not work and failed to either slow down or stop the offensives. In October, the Red Army gave up their central region campaign and retreated westward. Thereafter, the CCP and the Red Army lost contact with the Soviet Union. The Red Army in other provinces abandoned all of their bases and Soviet areas across the country, except two in northwest China. The survivors of the Red Army began their Long March toward northwest China on October 10, 1934.

The Long March (Changzheng) strived to save the Red Army by moving its main strength away from the GMD-controlled central region and to develop a new strategic initiative in a remote region. The Central Red Army (*zhongyang hongjun*), however, suffered heavy casualties during its western movement due to the needed protection of the Central Committee and party administration, which traveled all the way with the army. The army shrank from 80,000 to 30,000 men in late 1934.

In January 1935, the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting at Zunyi, Guizhou (Kweichow) Province, that criticized Wang Ming's "left" opportunism in military command and operations. Emerging as one of the CCP leaders at the top, Mao became a standing committee member of the Politburo at the meeting. Thereafter, the CCP became a more independent party and departed from Moscow's total control. After the Zunyi meeting, the CCP appointed Mao, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898–1976), and Wang Jiaxiang (Wang Chia-hsiang) as the Red Army high command in charge of its organization and operation. Mao's promotion prepared him as the undisputed leader at the top of the CCP party and military structure.

Dr. Xiaobing Li

See also: Chinese Communist Party; Encirclement Campaigns; Guomindang; Jiang Jieshi; Long March; Mao Zedong; Red Army.

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Zuo Zongtang (Tso Tsung-tang) (1812–1885)

General and Marquis Zuo Zongtang (Tso Tsung-tang) was a key military and administrative official of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) who, along with Zeng Guofan (Tseng Kuo-fan) (1811–1872) and Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) (1823–1901), extinguished the Taiping Rebellion and began the "Self-Strengthening movement" to modernize China's industry and defenses. He was well known as "General Tso" in the West.

Zuo Zongtang was born in 1812 in Xianyin County, Hunan Province, where he was a sickly child. His father could not afford to pay someone to teach the classics to his three sons, therefore he taught them himself. Zuo succeeded in the local civil service exams, but his parents' deaths prevented him from taking the provincial exams. He bypassed the second level, by purchase, to sit for the metropolitan exams, which he repeatedly failed. Discouraged by his prospects in the civil service, Zuo began reading Chinese books on geography, political economy, and farming. His industry and practical knowledge frequently impressed high officials who became his lifelong patrons, including Lo Ping-chang.

When Zuo Zongtang became a military advisor for Hunan Province, it was widely reported that Lo was governor, but Zuo actually governed. By 1856, Zuo had been promoted to senior secretary of the Board of War with a peacock feather. In 1860, when southern province Hunan was rife with Taiping rebels, Zuo was commissioned to create the Chu Army of 5,000 soldiers, a smaller force than Zeng Guofan had. Throughout much of his career Zuo would be responsible to Zeng, and he has been

counted as belonging to Zeng's camp; but the two came from very different backgrounds and their personalities often clashed. Zuo's character was outspoken, dictatorial, and overbearing, which frequently alienated him from Zeng. Nevertheless, Zeng recognized Zuo's usefulness, as when Zuo and his army drove the brigands out of Hunan and southwestern province Guangxi (Kwangsi) and into eastern province Zhejiang (Chekiang) by late 1860. Zuo had finally accomplished his first real military success at the age of 49, when most Chinese generals would have already hung up their armor.

For the next few years, he fought in southeastern Fujian Province against not only the rebel Shih Wang, but also their generalissimo Chuang Wang. By 1861, Zuo had been granted the joint positions of military commander and governor of Zhejiang. Two years later, for clearing the scourge of the rebellion from the Qiantang (Tientang) River all the way to Hangzhou (Hangchow), Zuo was advanced to viceroy of Min-Zhe (Fujian and Zhejiang). Even repeated bouts of malaria could not forestall Zuo and his army for very long. Contrary to the prevailing practices of Chinese armies, Zuo would not permit his men to scavenge food and supplies from the local populace. Moreover, he repaired dikes, planted cotton, and erected woolen mills wherever he campaigned because he knew that the resuscitation of war-ravaged territories was ultimately more productive. Based on his own experience with the exams, Zuo would more often promote men of ability over men of learning; if men were strong and capable, it did not matter to him if they were illiterate. Conversely, well-schooled men who were ineffective lost his respect. When Zeng's brother finally penetrated the walls of the Taiping capital at Nanjing (Nanking), Zeng announced that

their leaders Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiuch'uan) (1814–1864) and his son had been killed. However, Zuo reported to Beijing (Peking) that the Taiping prince had fled to Huzhou (Huchow) in Zuo's domain. That factual contradiction permanently estranged Zeng from Zuo. But, as counterpoint to that loss, Zuo made the acquaintance at Huzhou of two Frenchmen who would occupy his next few years: Prosper Giquel and Paul d'Aiguebelle. They convinced Zuo of the absolute necessity of naval power for China. That notion began with a few steamers of the "foreign gun squad" in 1864 and developed into the Fuzhou (Foochow) Arsenal and Fuzhou Dockyard in 1867.

In 1866, Zuo was promoted to viceroy and governor general of Fujian and Zhejiang. He was also made Earl Kejing of the First Class. But the following year, Zuo was needed elsewhere, obliging him to entrust the 75 Europeans and 500 Chinese workmen of the Foochow Arsenal to Giquel. Zuo had been called away to quell various religio-ethnic conflicts spreading through northern China. During the days of the Taiping, the Nian (Nien) Rebellion had been festering along the northern borders of central provinces including Hubei (Hupei), Anhui, and Jiangsu as well as the southern borders of eastern provinces such as Henan and Shandong.

After Nanjing fell, predatory guerrilla gangs (Nian) of bandits became more active in those five regions. The great Manchu general Sangkolin was killed trying to pacify them, and they completely bedeviled Zeng Guofan. Finally, both Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang were dispatched with Western weapons, with which they reduced the Eastern and Western Nian armies to roving gangs in 1866. Zuo was then sent to suppress the Dungan (Muslim) Revolt in China's northwestern provinces, including

Shaanxi, Gansu (Kansu), and later Xinjiang (Sinkiang). A few years earlier, the Han Chinese in those provinces had formed anti-Taiping militias, which prompted the Hui (Muslims) to form their own protective anti-Han militia. The Hui rebels wanted to establish a Muslim emirate comparable to the Taiping's quasi-Christian empire.

Zuo first pacified Shensi (1868); afterwards he laid siege to the Jinji Fortress in Gansu, executing the rebel leaders and "washing-off" its Muslims in 1871. Zuo then attacked Hezhou (modern Linxia), where the Muslims capitulated and were spared in 1872. Next, Zuo drove further westward into Xinjiang (Chinese Turkistan), where his artillery pummeled the remote bastion of Soozhou (Jiuquan) into submission, and he executed its garrison in 1873. For his victories against the Muslims, Zuo was made grand secretary in 1874. It took Zuo several more years to contain Yakub Beg at Kashgaria (1878) and to induce the Russians to relinquish Ili, Xinjiang (1881). For those accomplishments, Zuo was made First Marquis Kejing of the Second Class, and he was recalled to Beijing to sit on the Grand Council. Zuo was dispositionally ill-suited for such an appointment, so he was granted leave to become viceroy of "Liang-Jiang" (Jiangsu and Zhejiang) at Nanjing. Three years later, at almost 80 years old, Zuo again donned his general's armor to

defend Fujian from the French fleet. A dispute had arisen over Indo-china, and to emphasize their supremacy, the French bombarded Zuo's beloved Fuzhou Arsenal and Dockyard in 1884. Shortly after that crisis was resolved, like a faithful old soldier, Zuo Zongtang "faded away" in 1885.

Dr. Gordon W. Knight

See also: Hong Xiuquan; Li Hongzhang; Manchus; Nian Rebellion; Opium War, First; Qing Dynasty; Self-Strengthening Movement; Taiping Rebellion; Zeng Guofan.

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Appendix: Chinese Dynasties and Governments

Three Sovereigns and Five-Emperor Period (3000–2200 BC)

Heavenly Sovereign (Tian-huang)
Earthly Sovereign (Di-huang)
Tai Sovereign (Tai-huang, or Human Sovereign)
Fu Xi (Fu Hsi)
Nuguo (Nv-kuo or Nuwa)
Shennong (Shen-nong) (reigned 2380–2330 BC)
Yan Emperor (2320–2270 BC)
Yellow Emperor (Huang-di) (2300–2250 BC)
Emperor Yao (2250–2230 BC)
Shun (2230–2205 BC)

Xia Dynasty (2205–1766 BC)

Yu (Dayu, Yu the Great) (2205–)
Emperor Qi (Ch'i)
Zhong Kang (Ch'ong Kang)
Xiang (Hsiang)
Shao Kang (Shao Kang)
Zhu (Ch'u)
Huai
Mang
Xie (Ch'ie)
Bu Jiang (Bu Kiang)
Kong Jia (Kong Kia)
Gao
Fa
Jie (Kie)

Shang Dynasty (1766–1027 BC)

Xie (Ch'ie)
Zhao Ming (Ch'ao Ming)
Xiang Tu (Hsiang Tu)
Chang Ruo
Cao Yu
Ming
Ji (K'i)
Wang Hai
Shang Jia (Shang Kia)
Bao Yi
Bao Bing
Bao Ding (Bao Ting)
Zhu Ren (Ch'u Ren)
Zhu Kui (Ch'u Kui)
Tang
Da Ding (Ta Ting)
Tai Jia (Tai Kia)
Da Geng (Ta Geng)
Da Wu (Ta Wu)
Zhong Ding (Ch'ong Ting)
Zu Yi (Ch'u Yi)
Zu Xin (Ch'u Hsin)
Zu Ding (Ch'u Ting)
Xiao Yi (Hsiao Yi)
Wu Ding (Wu Ting)
Zu Jia (Ch'u Kia)
Kang Ding (Kang Ting)
Wu Yi
Wen Ding (Wen Ting)

Di Yi

Di Xin (Din Hsin)

Wu Geng

Zhou Dynasty (1066–221 BC)

Western Zhou Dynasty (1066–771 BC)

Wen Wang (reigned 1099–1050 BC)

Wu Wang (1046–1043 BC)

Cheng Wang (1042–1021 BC)

Kang Wang (1021–996 BC)

Zhao Wang (Ch'ao Wang)
(996–977 BC)

Mu Wang (977–922 BC)

Gong Wang (922–900 BC)

Yi Wang (900–891 BC)

Yi Wang (the second, 885–878 BC)

Li Wang (877–841 BC)

Xuan Wang (Hsuan Wang)
(827–782 BC)

You Wang (781–771 BC)

Ping Wang (771–720 BC)

Eastern Zhou Dynasty (770–221 BC)

Spring and Autumn Period

(770–476 BC)

Ping Wang (771–720 BC)

Huan Wang (720–697 BC)

Zhuang Wang (Ch'uang Wang)
(697–682 BC)

Xi Wang (Hsi Wang) (682–677 BC)

Hui Wang (677–652 BC)

Xiang Wang (Hsiang Wang)
(651–619 BC)

Qing Wang (Ch'ing Wang)
(618–613 BC)

Kuang Wang (612–607 BC)

Ding Wang (Ting Wang)
(606–586 BC)

Jian Wang (Kian Wang)
(585–572 BC)

Ling Wang (571–545 BC)

Jing Wang (King Wang)
(544–520 BC)

Dao Wang (Tao Wang) (520 BC)

Jing Wang (the second,
520–476 BC)

Warring States Period (475–221 BC)

Yuan Wang (475–469 BC)

Zhending Wang (Ch'en-ting Wang)
(468–441 BC)

Kao Wang (440–426 BC)

Weilie Wang (Wei-lie Wang)
(425–402 BC)

An Wang (401–376 BC)

Lie Wang (375–369 BC)

Xian Wang (Hsian Wang)
(368–321 BC)

Shenjing Wang (Shen-king Wang)
(320–315 BC)

Nan Wang (314–256 BC)

Seven Warring States

Zhao (Ch'ao)

Yan

Qin (Ch'in)

Chu

Lu

Wei

Han

Qin Dynasty (221–206 BC)

Qin Shi Huangdi (Ch'in Shih huang-ti)
(221–210 BC)

Qin Er Shi (Ying Huhai) (209–207 BC)

Qin San Shi (Ying Ziying)
(207–206 BC)

Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD)

Western Han Dynasty (206 BC–8 AD)

Han Gaozu (Kao-tsu) (206–195 BC)

Han Huidi (Hui-ti) (194–188 BC)

Han Gaohou (Kao-hou) (187–180 BC)

Han Wendi (Wen-ti) (179–157 BC)

Han Jingdi (Ching-ti) (156–141 BC)

Han Wudi (Wu-ti) (140–87 BC)

Han Zhaodi (Chao-ti) (86–74 BC)

Han Xuandi (Hsüan-ti) (73–49 BC)

Han Yuandi (Yüan-ti) (48–33BC)

Han Chengdi (Ch'eng-ti) (32–7 BC)

Han Aidi (Ai-ti) (6–1 BC)

Han Pingdi (P'ing-ti) (1 BC-5 AD)

Han Ruzi (Ju-tzu) (6–8)

Wang Mang (9–23)

Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220)

- Han Guangwudi (Kuang-wu-ti) (25–57)
- Han Mingdi (Ming-ti) (58–75)
- Han Zhangdi (Chang-ti) (75–88)
- Han Hedi (Ho-ti) (89–105)
- Han Shangdi (Shang-ti) (106)
- Han Andi (An-ti) (107–125)
- Han Shaodi (Shao-ti) (125)
- Han Shundi (Shun-ti) (126–144)
- Han Chongdi (Ch'ung-ti) (145)
- Han Zhidi (Chih-ti) (146)
- Han Huandi (Huan-ti) (147–167)
- Han Lingdi (Ling-ti) (168–189)
- Han Shaodi (Shao-ti) (189)
- Han Xiandi (Hsian-ti) (189–220)

Three Kingdoms (220–280)**Wei (220–265)**

- Wendi (Wen-ti) (220–226)
- Mingdi (Ming-ti) (226–239)
- Shaodi (Shao-ti) (239–254)
- Gao Gui Xianggong (Gao Gui Hsiang-kong) (254–260)
- Yuandi (Yuan-ti) (260–265)

Shu (221–263)

- Zhaoliedi (Ch'ao-lie-ti) (221–223)
- Xiaohuaidi (Hsiao-huai-ti) (223–263)

Wu (229–280)

- Sun Quan (Sun Ch'uan) (229–252)
- Sun Liang (252–258)
- Sun Xiu (Sun Hsiu) (258–264)
- Sun Hao (264–280)

Jin Dynasty (265–420)**Western Jin Dynasty (265–316)**

- Wudi (Wu-ti) (265–290)
- Huidi (Hui-ti) (290–307)
- Huaidi (Huai-ti) (307–311)
- Mindi (Min-ti) (313–316)

Eastern Jin Dynasty (317–420)

- Yuandi (Yuan-ti) (317–323)
- Mingdi (Ming-ti) (323–326)
- Chengdi (Cheng-ti) (326–342)
- Kangdi (Kang-ti) (342–344)
- Mudi (Mu-ti) (344–361)

- Aidi (Ai-ti) (362–365)
- Feidi (Fei-ti) (366–371)
- Wendi (Wen-ti) (371–372)
- Xiao Wudi (Hsiao-wu-ti) (373–396)
- Andi (An-ti) (397–418)
- Gongdi (Kung-ti) (419–420)

Northern-Southern Dynasties (386–582)**Northern Dynasties (386–581)****Northern Wei Dynasty (386–535)**

- Dao Wudi (Tao Wu-ti) (386–409)
- Ming Yuandi (Ming Yuan-ti) (409–423)
- Tai Wudi (Tai Wu-ti) (424–452)
- Wen Chengdi (Wen Cheng-ti) (452–465)
- Xian Wendi (Hsian Wen-ti) (466–471)
- Xiao Wendi (Hsiao Wen-ti) (471–499)
- Xuan Wudi (Hsuan Wu-ti) (499–515)
- Xiao Mingdi (Hsiao Ming-ti) (516–528)
- Xiao Zhuangdi (Hsiao Ch'uang-ti) (528–530)
- Chang Guang Wang (530–531)
- Jie Mindi (Kie Min-ti) (531–532)
- Xiao Wudi (Hsiao Wu-ti) (532–535)

Eastern Wei Dynasty (534–550)

- Xiao Jingdi (Hsiao King-ti) (534–550)

Northern Qi (Ch'i) Dynasty (550–577)

- Wen Xuandi (Wen Hsuan-ti) (550–559)
- Feidi (Fei-ti) (559–560)
- Xiao Zhaodi (Hsiao Ch'ao-ti) (560–561)
- Wu Chengdi (Wu Cheng-ti) (561–565)
- Hou Zhu (Hou Ch'u) (565–577)

Western Wei Dynasty (535–556)

- Wendi (Wen-ti) (535–551)

Feidi (Fei-ti) (552–554)

Gongdi (Gong-ti) (554–556)

Northern Zhou Dynasty (557–581)

Xiao Mindi (Hsiao Min-ti) (557)

Mingdi (Ming-ti) (557–560)

Wudi (Wu-ti) (561–578)

Xuandi (Hsuan-ti) (578–579)

Jingdi (King-ti) (579–581)

Southern Dynasties (420–589)

Song Dynasty (420–479)

Wudi (Wu-ti) 420–422)

Shaodi (Shao-ti) (423–424)

Wendi (Wen-ti) (424–453)

Xiaowudi (Hsiao-wu-ti)
(454–464)

Qianfeidi (Ch'ian-fei-ti) (465)

Mingdi (Ming-ti) (465–472)

Houfeidi (Hou-fei-ti) (473–477)

Shundi (Shun-ti) 477–479)

Qi (Ch'i) Dynasty (479–502)

Gaodi (Gao-ti) (479–482)

Wudi (Wu-ti) (482–493)

Yulin Wang (493–494)

Hailing Wang (494)

Mingdi (Ming-ti) (494–498)

Dong Hun Hou (499–501)

Hedi (He-ti) (501–502)

Liang Dynasty (502–557)

Wudi (Wu-ti) (502–549)

Jianwendi (Kian-wen-ti) (549–551)

Yu Zhang Wang (Yu Chang Wang)
(551–552)

Yuandi (Yuan-ti) (552–555)

Zhen Yang Hou (Ch'en Yang
Hou) (555)

Jingdi (King-ti) (555–557)

Chen Dynasty (557–589)

Wudi (Wu-ti) (557–559)

Wendi (Wen-ti) (559–556)

Feidi (Fei-ti) (566–568)

Xuandi (Hsuan-ti) (569–582)

Houzhu (Hou-chu) (583–589)

Southern Liang Dynasty (555–587)

Xuandi (Hsuan-ti) (555–562)

Xiao Mingdi (Hsiao Ming-ti)
(562–585)

Xiao Jingdi (Hsiao King-ti)
(585–587)

Sui Dynasty (581–618)

Sui Wendi (Wen-ti) (581–604)

Sui Yangdi (Yang-ti) (605–617)

Sui Gongdi (Kung-ti) (617–618)

Tang Dynasty (618–907)

Tang Gaozu (Kao-Tsu) (618–626)

Tang Taizong (T'ai-Tsung) (627–649)

Tang Gaozong (Kao-Tsung) (650–683)

Tang Zhongzong (Chung-Tsung)
(683–684)

Tang Ruizong (Jui-Tsung) (684)

Wu Zetian (Wu Tse-tien) (684–704)

Tang Zhongzong (Chung-Tsung)
(705–710)

Tang Ruizong (Jui-Tsung) (710–712)

Tang Xuanzong (Hsuan-Tsung)
(712–756)

Tang Suzong (Su-tsung) (756–761)

Tang Daizong (Tai-tsung) (762–779)

Tang Dezong (Te-tsung) (780–805)

Tang Shunzong (Shun-tsung) (805)

Tang Xianzong (Hsian-tsung) (806–820)

Tang Muzong (Mu-tsung) (821–824)

Tang Jingzong (Ching-tsung) (825–827)

Tang Wenzong (Wen-tsung) (827–840)

Tang Wuzong (Wu-tsung) (841–846)

Tang Xuanzong (Hsüan-tsung)
(847–859)

Tang Yizong (I-tsung) (859–874)

Tang Xizong (Hsi-tsung) (874–888)

Tang Zhaozong (Chao-tsung) (889–904)

Zhao Xuandi (Hsüan-ti) (905–907)

Song Dynasty (960–1279)

Northern Song (960–1127)

Song Taizu (T'ai-tsu) (960–976)

Song Taizong (T'ai-tsung) (976–997)

Song Zhenzong (Chen-tsung)
(998–1022)

Song Renzong (Jen-tsung)
(1023–1063)

- Song Yingzong (Ying-tsung)
(1064–1067)
- Song Shenzong (Shen-tsung)
(1068–1085)
- Song Zhezong (Che-tsung)
(1086–1100)
- Song Huizong (Hui-tsung)
(1101–1125)
- Song Qinzong (Chin-tsung)
(1126–1127)
- Southern Song (1127–1279)**
- Song Gaozong (Kao-tsung)
(1127–1162)
- Song Xiaozong (Hsiao-tsung)
(1163–1189)
- Song Guangzong (Kwang-tsung)
(1190–1194)
- Song Ningzong (Ning-tsung)
(1195–1224)
- Song Lizong (Li-tsung) (1225–1264)
- Song Duzong (Tu-tsung) (1265–1274)
- Song Gongdi (Kung-ti) (1275–1276)
- Song Duanzong (Tuan-tsung)
(1276–1278)
- Song Dibing (Ti-ping) (1278–1279)
- Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368)**
- Yuan Shizu (Shih-tsu) (1260–1270)
- Yuan Chengzong (Ch'eng-tsung)
(1295–1307)
- Yuan Wuzong (Wu-tsung) (1308–1311)
- Yuan Renzong (Jen-tsung) (1312–1320)
- Yuan Yingzong (Ying-tsung)
(1321–1323)
- Taiding (Thai-ting) (1324–1328)
- Tianshun (T'ien-shun) (1328)
- Yuan Wenzong (Wen-tsung)
(1328–1332)
- Yuan Ninzong (Nin-tsung) (1332–1333)
- Yuan Shundi (Shun-ti) (1333–1370)
- Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)**
- Hongwu (Hung-wu Ti) (1368–1398)
- Jianwen (Chien-wen) (1399–1402)
- Yongle (Yung-lo) (1403–1424)
- Hongxi (Hung-hsi) (1425)
- Xuande (Hsuan-te) (1426–1435)
- Zhengtong (Cheng-t'ung) (1436–1449)
- Jingtai (Ching-t'ai) (1450–1456)
- Tianshun (T'ien-shun) (1457–1464)
- Chenghua (Ch'eng-hua) (1465–1487)
- Hongzhi (Hung-chih) (1488–1505)
- Zhengde (Cheng-te) (1506–1521)
- Jiajing (Chia-ching) (1522–1566)
- Longqing (Lung-ch'ing) (1567–1572)
- Wanli (Wan-li) (1573–1620)
- Taichang (T'ai-ch'ang) (1620)
- Tianqi (T'ien-ch'i) (1621–1627)
- Chongzhen (Ch'ung-cheng) (1628–1644)
- Qing Dynasty (1644–1912)**
- Shunzhi (Shun-chih) (1644–1661)
- Kangxi (K'ang-hsi) (1662–1722)
- Yongzheng (Yung-cheng) (1723–1735)
- Qianlong (Ch'ien-lung) (1736–1795)
- Jiaqing (Chia-ch'ing) (1796–1820)
- Daoguang (Tao-kuang) (1821–1850)
- Xianfeng (Hsian-feng) (1851–1863)
- Tongzhi (T'ung-chih) (1862–1874)
- Guangxu (Kwang Hsu) (1875–1908)
- Xuantong (Hsüan-t'ung) (1909–1912)
- Republic of China (1912–)**
- Sun Yat-sen (1912)
- Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai)
(1912–1916)
- Li Yuanhong (Li Yuan-hung)
(1916–1917)
- Feng Guozhang (Feng Kuo-chang)
(1917–1918)
- Xu Shichang (Hsu Shih-chang)
(1918–1922)
- Zhou Ziqi (Chou Tzu-chi) (1922)
- Li Yuanhong (Li Yuan-hung)
(1922–1923)
- Gao Lingwei (Kao Ling-wei) (1923)
- Cao Kun (1923–1924)
- Huang Fu (1924)
- Duan Qirui (Tuan Chi-jui) (1924–1926)
- Hu Weide (Hu Wei-te) (1926)
- Yan Huiqing (Yen Hui-Ching) (1926)
- Du Xigui (Tu Hsi-Kuei) (1926)

Gu Weijun (Koo Vi-kyuin) (1926–1927)

Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin)
(1927–1928)

Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)
(1928–1931)

Lin Sen (1931–1943)

Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) (1943–1949)

Li Zongren (Li Tsung-jen) (1949–1950)

Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)
(1950–1975)

Yen Jiagan (Yan Chia-kan) (1975–1978)

Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo)
(1978–1988)

Li Denghui (Lee Teng-hui) (1988–2000)

Chen Shuibian (Chen Shui-bian)
(2000–2008)

Ma Yingjiu (Ma Ying-jeou) (2008–)

People's Republic of China (1949–)

Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung)
(1949–1959)

Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i)
(1959–1968)

Song Qingling (Sung Ch'ing-ling)
(1968–1972)

Dong Biwu (Tung Pi-wu)
(1972–1975)

(During this interval, the presidency was
abolished in 1975–1982)

Li Xian-nian (1983–1988)

Yang Shangkun (Yang Shang-kun)
(1988–1993)

Jiang Zemin (Chiang Tse-min)
(1993–2003)

Hu Jintao (2003–)

Chronology

3000 BC	Three Sovereigns (Sanhuang) begin.	475 BC	Spring and Autumn Period ends. Warring States Period begins.
2600 BC	Three Sovereigns ends. Five-Emperor (Wudi) Period begins.	221 BC	Warring States Period ends. Zhou ends. Qin dynasty is established by Qin Shi Huangdi.
2250 BC	Battle of Zhuolu occurs.	220 BC	The Great Wall is under construction.
2205 BC	Great Yu (Dayu) establishes Xia dynasty.	209 BC	Rebellion is led by Cheng Sheng.
1766 BC	Xia ends. Shang dynasty begins.	208 BC	Battle of Julu occurs.
1027 BC	Battle of Muye occurs. Shang ends. Zhou or Western Zhou dynasty begins.	206 BC	Qin ends. Han or Western Han dynasty begins.
771 BC	Western Zhou ends.	111 BC	Han Wudi annexes Vietnam.
770 BC	Eastern Zhou dynasty begins. Spring and Autumn Period begins.	108 BC	Han Wudi conquers Korea.
632 BC	Battle of Chengpu occurs.	8 AD	Wang Meng topples Western Han.
551 BC	Confucius is born in Shandong.	23	Western Han ends.
535 BC	Sunzi is born in Zhejiang.	25	Liu Xiu restores the Han by establishing Eastern Han (or Later Han) dynasty.
500 BC	<i>The Art of War</i> is written by Sunzi. Laozi is born.	184	Yellow Turban Rebellion begins.

200	Battle of Guandu occurs.		Northern Zhou (Chou) dynasty begins.
208	Battle of Chibi occurs.		
220	Han ends.		Western Wei ends.
	Three Kingdoms Period begins.	577	Northern Qi ends.
	Wei is founded.	581	Northern Zhou ends.
221	Shu is founded.	589	Sui dynasty begins.
229	Wu is founded.		Chen ends.
265	Jin or Western Jin dynasty begins.	618	Sui ends.
280	Three Kingdoms Period ends.		Tang dynasty begins.
316	Western Jin ends.	631	Tang Taizong fights Turkic nomads.
317	Eastern Jin dynasty begins.	645	Tang invades Korea.
383	Battle of Fei River occurs.	655	Tang conquers Korea.
386	Northern-Southern Dynasties begin.	684	Empress Wu seizes power.
	Northern Wei dynasty begins.	705	Empress Wu dies.
420	Eastern Jin ends.	755	An-Shi Rebellion begins.
	Southern Song dynasty begins.	874	Huang Zhao Rebellion begins.
479	Southern Song ends.	884	Huang Zhao ends.
502	Liang dynasty begins.	907	Tang ends.
534	Eastern Wei dynasty begins.	960	Song or Northern Song dynasty begins.
535	Northern Wei ends.	1123	Song fights the invading Jurchen troops in the north.
	Western Wei dynasty begins.	1125	The Jurchens takes over Kaifeng and establish the Jin dynasty.
550	Eastern Wei ends.	1127	North Song ends.
	Fubing system begins.		Southern Song dynasty begins with Lin'an as the capital in the south.
	Northern Qi (Ch'i) dynasty begins.		
557	Chen dynasty begins.	1234	Song-Mongol War begins.
	Liang ends.	1271	Yuan dynasty begins.

<p>1279 Southern Song ends. Kublai Khan conquers Tibet.</p> <p>1351 Red Turban Army launches rebellion.</p> <p>1368 Yuan ends. Ming dynasty begins.</p> <p>1404 Zheng He leads seven expeditions to Persia, Arabia, and Africa.</p> <p>1593 Ming army defeats Japanese invading army in Korea.</p> <p>1632 Li Zicheng leads a peasant rebellion.</p> <p>1644 Li's army takes over Beijing. Ming ends. Manchus enter the Great Wall and establish the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty.</p> <p>1681 Three feudal princes' rebellion begins.</p> <p>1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk is signed between China and Russia.</p> <p>1723 Emperor Yongzheng's Banner reforms begin.</p> <p>1727 Treaty of Kiakhta is signed between China and Russia.</p> <p>1813 Eight Trigrams Rebellion begins.</p> <p>1839 First Opium War begins between China and Great Britain.</p> <p>1841 Hong Kong is ceded to Great Britain by the Qing.</p>	<p>1842 First Opium War ends with a British victory. Treaty of Nanjing is signed.</p> <p>1844 Treaty of Wangxia is signed between China and the U.S.</p> <p>1850 Taiping Rebellion begins.</p> <p>1851 Nian Rebellion begins.</p> <p>1853 Taiping army takes over Nanjing. Small Sword Society is founded in Shanghai.</p> <p>1856 Second Opium War begins.</p> <p>1857 Second Opium War ends with British and French victory. Treaty of Tianjin is signed.</p> <p>1860 Ever-Victorious Army is founded in Shanghai. Second Opium War ends.</p> <p>1861 The Self-Strengthening movement begins.</p> <p>1864 Qing army takes over Nanjing. Taiping Rebellion ends.</p> <p>1865 Jiangnan Arsenal is set up in Shanghai.</p> <p>1866 Sun Yat-sen is born.</p> <p>1868 Nian Rebellion ends.</p> <p>1884 French-Chinese War begins.</p> <p>1885 French-Chinese War ends with a French victory. Treaty of Tianjin is signed between China and France.</p> <p>1894 Sino-Japanese War occurs and China is defeated. The New Army is founded.</p>
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| <p>1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki is signed between China and Japan.</p> <p>1897 Boxer Rebellion begins.</p> <p>1899 Open Door Policy is initiated by the United States.</p> <p>1900 Eight foreign armies invade China and defeat the Boxers.</p> <p>1901 Boxer Protocol is signed between China and eight powers.</p> <p>1903 Sun publishes the “Three Principles of the People.”</p> <p>1904 Russo-Japanese War begins over Manchuria.</p> <p>1905 Russian army and navy are defeated by Japan.
Russo-Japanese War ends.</p> <p>1906 Beiyang Army and Navy are formed by the Qing.</p> <p>1911 October 10: New Army officer launches uprising in Wuchang.
Chinese Revolution begins against the Qing.</p> <p>1912 January 1: Republic of China (ROC) is founded with Sun as its president.
February 12: the last emperor abdicates and Qing ends.
March: Marshal Yuan Shikai becomes ROC president.
August: Sun reorganizes the Tongmenghui into the Guomindang (GMD).</p> <p>1916 President Yuan dies.
Warlord Period begins.</p> | <p>1921 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is founded.</p> <p>1922 Fengtian-Zhili War occurs.</p> <p>1924 January: The CCP-GMD coalition begins.
June 16: Whampoa Military Academy is founded with Jiang Jieshi as its commandant.</p> <p>1925 March 12: Sun dies.
August 26: The National Revolutionary Army is founded with Jiang as its commander.</p> <p>1926 Northern Expedition begins under the command of Jiang.</p> <p>1927 Jiang defeats warlords and establishes new ROC government in Nanjing.
Warlord Period ends.
April 12: Jiang terminates the CCP-GMD coalition.
August 1: the CCP launches the Nanchang Uprising.
September: Mao Zedong leads the Autumn Harvest Uprising.
December: the CCP launches the Guangzhou Uprising.</p> <p>1928 CCP Red Army is founded.
Jinggangshan revolutionary base area set up.
Mao begins guerrilla warfare against the GMD.</p> <p>1930 The CCP launches the Changsha Uprising.
Mao establishes the Jiangxi Soviet.</p> |
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- Jiang organized four Encirclement Campaigns against the CCP base areas.
- 1931** September 18: Japan invades Manchuria.
- 1933** Red Army College is founded.
- 1934** Jiang's Fifth Encirclement Campaigns drives the Red Army out of its base.
- Jiangxi Soviet ends.
- The Red Army's Long March begins.
- 1935** The Long March ends.
- Yan'an becomes the capital for the CCP for the next 13 years.
- 1936** Anti-Japanese Military and Political College is founded at Yan'an.
- Xi'an Incident occurs, and Jiang is arrested by his generals.
- 1937** July 7: Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurs.
- August: Red Army merges as GMD Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army.
- September: Battle of Pingxingguan occurs.
- December: Japanese seize Nanjing, the capital of ROC.
- Anti-Japanese War begins.
- 1938** March–April: Battle of Taierzhuang occurs.
- March–June: Battle of Xuzhou occurs.
- 1940** The Eighth Route Army's Hundred Regiments Campaign begins.
- 1941** Japanese "Three-Alls" operations begins.
- American Volunteer Group is formed.
- New Fourth Army Incident occurs.
- 1942** General Joseph Stilwell begins to serve as Jiang's military advisor.
- Jiang sends GMD armies to the China-Burma-India Theater.
- 1943** Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) is created.
- 1944** Japanese launch "Operation Ichi-go" in China.
- America's Dixie Mission arrives at Yan'an.
- 1945** August 6: U.S. force drops the first atomic bomb on Japan.
- August 8: the Soviet Red Army attacks Japanese in China.
- August 9: U.S. force drops the second atomic bomb on Japan.
- August 15: Japan surrenders unconditionally.
- October: Mao-Jiang negotiation fails at Chongqing.
- December: U.S. president Truman sends Marshall to China for further mediation.
- 1946** Marshall Mission failed.
- Chinese Civil War begins between the CCP and GMD.
- Jiang launches an all-out offensive campaign against CCP-held regions.

- 1947** Marshall returns to the U.S.
 Jiang's strategy changes from broad assaults to attacking key targets.
 The CCP creates field armies as mobile force.
 Lin Biao's Northeast Field Army begins offensive campaigns.
- 1948** The CCP's offensive campaigns begin.
 October–November: Liaoning-Shenyang (Liao-Shen) Campaign occurs.
 November–January 1949: Pin-Jin (Beiping-Tianjin) Campaign occurs.
 November–January 1949: Huai-Hai Campaign occurs.
 November: The CCP creates the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
- 1949** April: The PLA crosses the Yangzi River.
 April 23: The PLA seizes Nanjing.
 October 1: Mao proclaims the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC).
 December: Mao visits the Soviet Union and meets Stalin.
- 1950** February: Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance is signed.
 May: Campaign against Counterrevolutionaries begins.
- June: The PLA begins the Bandit Extermination Campaign.
 June 25: The Korean War breaks out.
 August: Chinese Military Advisory Group is sent to Vietnam.
 October: China intervenes in the Korean War by sending the PLA troops.
 November: Chinese launch two offensive campaigns against the UN force.
- 1951** January: Chinese Third Offensive Campaign in Korea.
 February–March: Chinese Fourth Offensive Campaign in Korea.
 April–May: Chinese Fifth Offensive Campaign in Korea.
 July 10: Truce negotiations begin in Korea.
 China launches the Three Antis and Five Antis movements.
- 1952** Mao calls for a national movement to learn from the Soviet Union.
 China continues fighting the Korean War while negotiating for peace.
- 1953** June: Chinese Summer Offensives begin in Korea.
 July 23: Korean Armistice is signed and the Korean War ends.
 Campaign against Counterrevolutionaries ends.

- 1954** July 20: Geneva Agreement is signed and French troops withdraw from Vietnam.
- August-September: The First Taiwan Strait Crisis begins.
- September 20: The First National People’s Congress (NPC) convenes.
- September: The NPC creates new Ministry of Defense with Peng as the minister.
- December 2: U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty is signed for Taiwan’s safety.
- 1955** January 15: China starts its first nuclear weapons program: Project 02.
- January 17–19: Battle of Yijiangshan occurs.
- July 30: The Second NPC Plenary issues the Military Service Law.
- November 4: China makes its first plan for nuclear weapons development.
- 1956** September 15–27: The Eighth CCP National Congress convenes.
- Mao calls for the “Blooming of the Hundred Flowers” movement.
- 1957** Mao launches the Anti-Rights movement.
- November: Mao visits Moscow and meets Khrushchev.
- December: A Soviet-made P-2 surface-to-surface missile arrives in Beijing.
- 1958** The Sino-Soviet split emerges.
- The Great Leap Forward movement begins.
- The second Five-Year Plan (1958–1962) begins.
- August 23: Second Taiwan Strait Crisis occurs.
- 1959** March: the PLA suppresses the Tibetan rebellion and Dalai Lama flees to India.
- April: The Second NPC elects Liu Shaoqi as the PRC’s president.
- July 2–August 16: The CCP Eighth Plenum purges Peng.
- 1960** The great Sino-Soviet polemic debate begins and lasts for three years.
- Mao criticizes Khrushchev as a “revisionist.”
- August 13: All 12,000 Russian experts leave China and all Soviet aid stops.
- 1961** A serious economic depression known as the Three Hard Years begins and claims more than 20 million lives.
- 1962** September 24–27: CCP Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee is held.
- October 20: Sino-Indian Border War breaks out.
- November 22: China announces a cease-fire along the Chinese-Indian border.
- 1963** April 12–May 16: President Liu visits Indonesia, Burma,

- 1963 (cont.) Vietnam, and Cambodia. May: Mao starts the socialist education, also known as the Four Cleanups.
- 1964** October 16: China carries out its first nuclear bomb test.
December 20: The Third NPC opens and reelects Liu as president.
Movement to Resist America and Aid Vietnam begins.
- 1965** May 14: China conducts its second nuclear test.
July: China begins to send troops to Vietnam.
- 1966** May 16: Mao launches the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
June: The Red Guards are organized as the driving force for the movement.
August: Mao meets millions of the Red Guards in Beijing.
October: Liu, Deng, and many officials are publicly criticized and purged.
The PLA establishes the Second Artillery Corps (Strategic missile force).
- 1967** January: The mass organizations begin to overtake Shanghai; other cities follow.
March: Armed clashes take place between different mass organizations.
July: An armed clash occurs in Hubei, and more than 180,000 are killed.
- To prevent civil war, 2.8 million officers and soldiers of the PLA are employed to restore order through military administrative committees.
- 1968** October 13–31: The Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee holds and officially purges Liu and many leaders from the party, government, and the PLA.
December: China has sent 23 divisions, totaling 320,000 troops, to Vietnam.
- 1969** March: Border skirmishes between PRC and USSR occur.
April 1–24: CCP Ninth Congress recognizes Lin Biao as Mao's successor.
November 12: President Liu dies after two years of detention.
- 1970** The Sino-Soviet border conflicts continues.
Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho begin secret talks to end Vietnam War.
China withdraws its troops from Vietnam.
April: China launches its first satellite.
- 1971** Five Seven One (571) Plan is formed.
September 13: Lin Biao and his family are killed in a plane crash in Mongolia. Mao begins a purge in the military and appoints Ye as defense minister.

- October: China is admitted to the United Nations.
- 1972** February 21–28: President Richard Nixon visits China, where he signs the joint Shanghai Communiqué.
- 1973** U.S. and China announce the establishment of liaison offices in their capitals.
- China ends its Movement to Resist America and Aid Vietnam.
- August 24–28: CCP Tenth Congress holds and reelects Mao as the chairman.
- 1974** January: The PLA’s Xisha Islands Defensive Campaign occurs.
- October: Mao brings Deng back from the purge as the first vice premier.
- 1975** January 13: The Fourth NPC promulgates the second constitution.
- April 5: Jiang Jieshi dies.
- December: President Gerald Ford visits Beijing and agrees to terminate the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Treaty and withdraw U.S. military forces from the island.
- 1976** January 8: Zhou Enlai dies.
- July 28: An earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale rocks Tangshan and becomes the largest earthquake of the twentieth century by death toll, about 240,000–255,000 people killed, 164,000 severely injured, and 779,000 injured.
- September 9: Mao Zedong dies at 82, and the Cultural Revolution ends.
- October: The Maoist leaders, or the Gang of Four, are arrested by Hua Guofeng, Mao’s successor.
- 1977** July 16–21: CCP Tenth Central Committee supports Hua’s leadership.
- August 12–18: CCP Eleventh National Congress elects Hua as chairman.
- 1978** Deng Xiaoping becomes the key leader and begins an unprecedented seismic reform and opening up to the world to modernize China after his historical speech, “Emancipate the Mind,” at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee.
- 1979** January 1: The U.S. normalizes relations with the PRC.
- January: Deng becomes the first PRC leader to visit America, holding talks with Jimmy Carter and signing the protocols.
- February: China invades Vietnam with 200,000 PLA troops.
- March–May: The “Democracy Walls” become the “Beijing Spring” movement.
- 1980** November 20–December 29: The Supreme Court holds open trials of the Gang of Four.

- 1981** The CCP Central Military Commission elects Deng as chairman.
- Hu Yaobang replaces Hua as chairman of the CCP Central Committee.
- 1982** September 1–October 1: The CCP holds its Twelfth National Congress.
- December 4: The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth NPC adopts the new constitution. The 1982 Constitution becomes the current constitution.
- 1983** The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is established.
- 1984** April 26–May 1: President Ronald Reagan visits China and meets with Deng.
- October: CCP Central Committee decides to reform the economic structure. Fourteen coastal cities and the island of Hainan are opened to foreign investment.
- 1985** President Li Xiannian visits Washington to sign a pact allowing sale of nonmilitary technology to China.
- U.S. vice president George H. Bush visits China.
- 1986** Sino-Vietnamese border conflicts continue.
- Deng carries out military reform in the PLA.
- 1987** The CMC reduces the scale of the PLA’s operation in Vietnam.
- Deng lays out three stages of achievement for China’s modernization.
- 1988** April: The First Session of the Seventh NPC adopts two constitutional amendments on private property and protection of the ownership.
- 1989** April-May: Hundreds of thousands of students and citizens hold demonstrations in Beijing, which later spread to 116 cities.
- May 6–16: The students encamp at Tiananmen Square and begin a hunger strike.
- May 19: The government establishes martial law and deploys 22 infantry divisions in the cities.
- June 3–4: The PLA troops open fire at the students and citizens at Tiananmen Square, estimated thousand casualties.
- 1990** April: President Yang Shangkun promulgates the Basic Law of Hong Kong Special administrative Region (SAR) adopted by the Seventh NPC.
- 1991** After the Tiananmen Incident, Jiang Zemin becomes the top leader as the chairman of both the party Central Committee and Central Military Commission.
- December 25: The Soviet Union collapses.
- 1992** The political negotiation between China and Taiwan begins.

- May: Falun Gong, one of the *qigong*-based exercise groups, established.
- 1993** March: The First Session of the Eighth NPC makes nine important changes as amendments including some changes in the Preamble to the Constitution.
- 1994** January: The State Council promulgates the Regulations on the Administration of Sites for Religious Activities.
- 1995** The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis begins.
- 1996** July: China fires missiles near Taiwan and conducts military exercise in the Taiwan Strait.
- November: Jiang calls for the “two transformations” of the PLA.
- 1997** February 28: Deng Xiaoping dies at age of 93.
- July 1: British returns Hong Kong to the PRC.
- Jiang Zemin meets U.S. president Bill Clinton in Washington.
- 1998** President Clinton meets Jiang in Beijing.
- The PRC begins publishing the National Defense White Paper.
- 1999** The People’s Armed Police increases to 1 million troops.
- July: Jiang outlaws the Falun Gong movement and arrests 90,000 members.
- December: Portugal turns Macao back to China.
- 2000** February: Jiang states the “Three Represents,” which become his legacy.
- 2001** The Law on Population and Birth Planning is promulgated.
- October: U.S. president George W. Bush visits Shanghai.
- November: China joins the World Trade Organization (WTO).
- 2002** February: President W. Bush visits Beijing.
- November: The SARS virus breaks out in southern China.
- 2003** The Armed Police has 31 armies, including 508 armed police regiments and 42 special regiments, such as helicopter, artillery, chemical, and tank regiments.
- Official records show 4,143 fatalities in coal mining.
- There are 58,000 mass protests this year.
- July 31: There are 5,328 SARS cases and 349 fatalities.
- October 15: China sends the first human flight to outer space. China becomes the third country in the world to have independent human spaceflight capability.
- 2004** There are 74,000 mass protests this year.
- November: The government launches a new detention

- 2004
(*cont.*) campaign targeting writers, journalists, and political commentators.
- 2005 There are 87,000 mass protests during the year.
- Authorities have 32 journalists in jail this year.
- The Ministry of Public Security estimates that 10,000 women and children are abducted and sold each year, and between 2 and 4 million women are involved in prostitution.
- October 12: China launches its second human spaceflight, Shenzhou 6.
- 2006 More than 80,000 incidents of social unrest and protest take place this year. China has 490,000 police, 150,000 detectives and investigators, and 1.5 million PAP. At least 930 cases of police torture take place. More than 300 police officers have been killed every year since 1993.
- Official statistics show that 31 million people are below the poverty line.
- 2007 China has more than 580,000 police, 150,000 detectives, and 250,000 traffic cops and special police, all of whom are under the control of the Ministry of Public Security.
- Authorities have arrested 270 priests of the underground churches this year.
- A total of 1.8 million people are in jail.
- The FCCC reports 160 incidents of harassment of foreign journalists when they conduct interviews this year.
- 2008 March 14: Buddhist riots occur in Lhasa. Official state media reports 4,434 persons are arrested.
- March 28: The government confirms 28 civilian and one police officer dead, and 325 civilian are injured during the “3-14 Riots.” According to the India-based Tibetan Government-in-exile, more than 220 Tibetans are killed and 7,000 Tibetans arrested.
- April 29: The Lhasa Intermediate Court sentences 30 Tibetans to three years to life in prison for their participations in the “3-14 Riots.”
- May 12: An earthquake measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale rocks Wenchuan, Sichuan. Official statistics show at least 69,000 killed, 374,000 injured, 18,000 still missing, and 4.8 million people homeless.
- August 8–24: China hosts the Olympic Games in Beijing, with 10,500 athletes competing in 302 events of 28 sports.
- 2009 July 5: Tens of thousands Uyghur demonstrators gather in Urumqi, Xinjiang. After confrontations with police, the demonstration escalates into riots with 197 people killed and 1,721 others are injured.

July 18: The World Uyghur Congress reports 600 killed during the “7-5 Xinjiang Riots.” The official confirms more than 1,500 rioters have been arrested.

November 14–17: President Obama visits China and explains the significance of civil liberties to Chinese students in Shanghai.

December 23: Liu Xiaobo is sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment.

December 29: British citizen Akmal Shaikh is executed by lethal injection by Chinese authorities after he was convicted of drug smuggling in October.

December: 22 Uyghurs are sentenced to death for participating in the “7-5 Riots.”

2010

January: Google makes an announcement that the company will no longer cooperate with China’s censorship laws.

February 18: President Obama meets the Dalai Lama in the White House.

October 8: The Nobel Committee awards the 2010 Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo.

2011

January 9–12: U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visits China.

January 19–21: President Hu Jintao meets President Obama for a state visit.

March 5–14: The Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress approves the 12th Five-Year Plan and accepts Xi Jinping as the new leader.

Glossary

- ACFTU** All-China Federation of Trade Unions
- ACWF** All-China Women's Federation
- Anti-Rightist Campaign** Mass movement against nonparty members and those who were critical against the CCP politics in 1957
- CAMS** China Academy of Military Science
- CAS** China Academy of Science
- CASS** China Academy of Social Sciences
- CCP** Chinese Communist Party (or the Communist Party of China)
- CCYL** Chinese Communist Youth League
- CFISS** China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies
- Chaha'er (Chahar)** An old province comprising the northern part of today's Hebei
- CMAG** Chinese Military Advisory Group (in Vietnam)
- CMC** Central Military Commission
- CO** Commissioned officer
- Comintern** Communist International Congress, Moscow, Soviet Union
- COSTIND** Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense
- CPG** Central People's Government
- CPPCC** Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
- CPVF** Chinese People's Volunteer Forces (in the Korean War)
- CRAWP** Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants
- CSSM** China Society of Strategy and Management
- DMZ** Demilitarized Zone
- DPRK** Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
- DRV** Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
- ECMR** East China Military Region
- ECSF** East China Sea Fleet
- Eight Points for Attention** The Red Army's rules: (1) speak politely; (2) pay fairly for what you buy; (3) return everything you borrow; (4) pay for anything you damage; (5) don't hit or swear at people; (6) don't damage crops; (7) don't take liberties with women; and (8) don't ill-treat captives
- FCCC** Foreign Correspondent's Club of China
- February Adverse Current** Political efforts of marshals and generals to stop the Maoists' attempt to involve the PLA in the Cultural Revolution in February 1967

FFC Fujian Front Command

Five-Anti Movement An all-out assault on the bourgeoisie in cities in 1951–1954

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

The mutual respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, nonintervention in internal affairs, equal mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence, proposed by Zhou Enlai in the 1950s

Flying Tigers The American Volunteer Group (AVG) was organized in mid-1941

FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

Four Olds Old concepts, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes

GAD General Armaments Department

GAPP General Administration of Press and Publications

GLD General Logistics Department

GMD Guomindang (or Kuomintang, KMT; Chinese Nationalist Party)

GPD General Political Department

Great Leap Forward A massive movement to industrialize through labor power and collectivization instead of technology and private enterprise in 1958

GSD General Staff Department

HET History Editorial Team

HPRS Household Production Responsibility System

HQs Headquarters

Hundred Flowers Campaign In the spring of 1957, this campaign was designed to allow party members and intellectuals to vent their pent-up frustrations in a highly controlled framework but threatened within only a few weeks to undermine the Chinese communist regime

ICBM Intercontinental-range ballistic missile

ICP Indochinese Communist Party (Viet Minh)

July 20 Incident On July 20, 1967, an armed conflict brought the entire province of Hubei into a civil war. During and after the incident, more than 180,000 officers, soldiers, and civilians were killed or wounded in the city streets of Wuhan.

KWP Korean Workers' Party (North Korean Communist Party)

Little Red Book Mao's quotations printed in a book with a red cover

LVT Landing Vehicle, Tracked

MAAG Military Advisory Assistant Group (U.S.) (in Taiwan)

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NDU National Defense University

NEA Northern Expeditionary Army (GMD)

NEBDA Northeast Border Defense Army (PLA)

NEFA North-East Frontier Agency

NEMR Northeast Military Region

NFU No-First-Use

NKPA North Korean People's Army

NLF National Liberation Front (Viet Cong)

NPC National People's Congress

NRA National Revolutionary Army (GMD)

NSC National Security Council (U.S.)

NVA North Vietnamese Army

OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (United Nations)

PAP People's Armed Police

PAVN People's Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam)

PHET Party History Editorial Team

PHRD Party History Research Department

- PLA** People's Liberation Army
- PLAAF** PLA Air Force
- PLAF** People's Liberation Armed Force (Viet Cong)
- PLAN** PLA Navy
- POE** Privately owned enterprise
- Politburo** Political Bureau (CCP)
- POW** Prisoner of war
- PRC** People's Republic of China
- Red Guards** Mostly college, high school, and middle school students empowered by Mao in the Cultural Revolution
- Rehe (Jehol)** An old province made up of parts of today's northeast Hebei, southwest Liaoning, and southeast Inner Mongolia
- RMA** Revolution of Military Affairs
- RMB** Renminbi (Chinese currency)
- ROC** Republic of China (Taiwan)
- ROK** Republic of Korea (South Korea)
- ROTS** Reserve Officer Training and Selection
- ROV** Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
- RTL** Reeducation Through Labor
- SAM** Surface-to-Air Missile
- SARS** Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
- SEZ** Special Economic Zone
- SLBM** Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
- SMAG** Soviet Military Advisory Group
- SOE** State-Owned Enterprise
- Suiyuan** A defunct province west of Cha-ha'er comprising the central part of current Inner Mongolia
- TAR** Tibet Autonomous Region
- Three-Anti Movement** A mass movement in the cities targeting corruption, waste, and obstructionist bureaucracy during the Korean War
- Three Main Rules of Discipline** The Red Army's rules: (1) obey orders in all your actions; (2) don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses; and (3) turn in everything captured
- Three Supports and Two Militarizations** Support Leftist masses, manufacturing production, and agricultural production; and martial laws with military administration and military training of civilians
- UN** United Nations
- UNF** United Nations Forces
- U.S.** United States
- USSR** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- VA** Veteran Administration
- Viet Cong** Vietnamese Communist force in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War
- VWP** Vietnam Workers' Party (Vietnamese Communist Party)
- WTO** World Trade Organization
- WWI** World War I
- WWII** World War II
- XUAR** Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
- ZC** Zhejiang Command
- ZFC** Zhejiang Front Command
- Zhongnanhai** The "Middle and Southern Seas," a palace of the emperors and empresses within the Forbidden City in the center of Beijing that became the home of Mao, Zhou, and other top CCP leaders. Most of the important top CCP, PRC, and PLA meetings, such as the Politburo, were and still are held there.

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