

- Tin, Maung (5), Akunwun, Pakokku.  
 \*Tin, Prof, Pe Maung, M.A., B. Litt., I.E.S., University College, Rangoon.  
 \*Tin, U, A.T.M., K.S.M., 22, 50th Street, Rangoon.  
 To, U Saw Po, Deputy Inspector of Schools, Thaton.  
 \*Tripp, L. M. G., c/o Messrs. Fabricius & Co., Pakokku.  
 \*Tsain, U *Bar-at-Law*, Pegu.  
 \*Tun, Dr. Aung, M.B., Ch. B., Civil Surgeon, Shwebo.  
 Tun, U Ba, Township Officer, Chaungzon.  
 Tun, U Ba, Head, Quarters Asst., Mergui.  
 Tun, U Po, E. A. C. of Forests, 27, Godwin Road, Rangoon.  
 Tun, U Thet, 25, Prome Road, Rangoon.  
 Tway, U Chit, Inspector of Police, Pyu. (Toungoo).  
 U, U Tun, Sub-divisional Officer, Shwebo.  
 U, U Tun Hla, Resident Excise Officer, Maungdaw (Akyab).  
 U, U Kyaw Zan, Miller, Akyab.  
 Vardon, S. D, Advocate, C Road, Mandalay.  
 Verhag, A., Merchant, Messrs. Massink & Co., Ltd., Rangoon.  
 Walters, Rev. H. C., W. M. M. High School, Mandalay.  
 \*Ward, K. m. University College, Rangoon.  
 Weeb, Sir Charles M., Kt., M.A., I.C.S. on Furlough.  
 \*White, Sir Herbert Thirkell, "The Cottage", St. Ives, Cornwall.  
 Wilkie, H. G., I.C.S., Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Maymyo.  
 \*Williamson, A., M.A., I.E.S., Settlement Officer, Shwebo.  
 \*Wilson, L. D., Lecturer, Insein Engineering Institute, Insein.  
 Win, U Po, (2), Addl. Magistrate, Kyauktan.  
 Wiselham, Miss M. R., Roslyn, Prome Road, Rangoon.  
 \*Woods, E. A., Commander, Irawaddy Flotilla Co., Ltd., Rangoon.  
 Wun, U So, Junior Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Shwebo.  
 Ya, U Tun, A.T.M., Deputy Commissioner, Myaungmya.  
 Yah, U Kyaw, Sub-divisional Police Officer, Myanaung.  
 Yain, L. A., *Bar-at-Law*, 67, Merchant Street, Rangoon.  
 \*Yee, U Po, Rice Miller, Hony Magistrate, 3, Edward Street, Rangoon.  
 Yin, U Ba, Subordinate Judge, Myaungmya.  
 Yin, U Tun, Township Officer, Daik-u.  
 Yin, U Tun, Head Master, State Anglo-Vernacular School, Namtu.  
 Zahur, Mohamed, Government High School, Akyab.  
 Zan, U Ba, Sub-divisional Officer, Meiktila.  
 Zan, Abraham Shwe, Deputy Inspector of Schools, Moulmein.  
 Zan, Saya, Head Master, R. C. M. School, Thonzé

**OBITUARY.**  
1924.

U Po Hlaing.  
 Sir, A. K. A. S. Jamal (Life Member)  
 The Hon'ble Sir Maung Kin, Kt.  
 U Shwe Kyu

M. Musaji  
 J. St. C. Saunders  
 D. H. M. Silvanus

**Chinese invasions of Burma in the 18th century.\***

It is possible to exaggerate the extent of China's influence on Burma—political or cultural—but it is difficult to assess too highly the historical value of its references to Burma, scattered over the 24 Dynastic Histories and a whole host of miscellaneous literature. Wherever we look in Further India or the islands—whether to Annam, Cambodia, the Malay States, Java, Borneo or Sumatra—the facts are the same; all took their culture, script and religion from India, but the chief record of their olden history they owe to China. From the beginning of the 1st century B. C. China understood the writing of history much as we understand it to-day. Annals were preserved, documents filed, biographies written; statements of travellers and itineraries were collected; there were census reports and district gazetteers, bibliographies, dictionaries, treatises on music and ceremonies, on trade, botany, hydrography and phonetics. All were grist to the historian. From the 3rd century A. D. scientific principles of map-making were clearly grasped, subject only to the limitation that the earth was thought to be flat. On the fall of one dynasty its successor set about the task of writing its history. The whole mass of material was collated by laborious scholars who were content to waive the theory if only they might register the fact.

Most interesting to us, no doubt, are the sections on foreign countries. It is strange, surely, to find in the Chinese history of the T'ang dynasty ten pages devoted to Pyu music. It is as if, in a history of England, we found a chapter devoted to the tom-toms of Timbuctoo. Yet to this happy chance we owe our earliest full-length picture of Burma, about the year 800 A. D. During the next three centuries, down to Kyanzitha, Chinese history is almost silent about Burma, for the Sung dynasty drew its line of frontier north of Yünnan. As a result, there remains unsolved perhaps the hardest problem in Burmese history, namely—who are the Burmans? and how did they get here? For the fall of Pagan the Chinese, or rather the Mongols, were largely responsible; and the chief record of their invasions of Burma has been translated into French by Huber in Volume IX of the *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*, and placed side by side with the meagre story of the Hmannan Yazawin. For the next period, of Shan domination, there is abundant material in Chinese; but apart from brief summaries by Parker, none of it is translated. One may safely surmise that when these sources are tapped, the history of Burma in this bewildering period will need to be rewritten.

\*Read at the Ordinary Meeting on 29th August 1924. In a forty minutes' lecture it was not possible to make all the necessary reservations. I may be excused therefore for pointing out that the account given of the opening stages of the campaign is provisional, since here the Chinese and Burmese sources offer points of contrast and obscurity which will need further investigation. (G. H. L.)

In the 16th century the Toungoo kings, Tabin Shweti and Bayinnaung, often raided the frontier, penetrating with enormous armies into the heart of Yunnan. Things changed when they died; but the Chinese had not forgotten them when their turn came two centuries later. The immediate effect, in 1594, was the establishment by the Chinese of the Eight Gates of the frontier. The original position of these gates is somewhat uncertain; their position on my map is only approximate. They might be classed as moveable furniture, within twenty or twenty five miles. When Burma retired, they advanced; when she advanced, they retired. It saved the Yunnan Viceroy a lot of correspondence, and the Emperor was none the wiser. But the time came, as we shall see, when an Emperor looked at the map; and then there was trouble.

The middle of the 16th century saw the fall of the Ming dynasty; and the last of the family, Prince Yung-li, took refuge in Burma. In 1662, when the Manchus demanded him at the gates of Ava, he was tamely surrendered. From this date onwards, for nearly a century, Burma had no official relations with China.

This brings us to the subject of this paper. But first a word about the sources. On the Burmese side, I have used a translation of the relevant chapters of the *Konbaungzet* made for me by Maung Kin Kyi, student of this College. U Tin has shewn me a manuscript in his possession which contains further information, chiefly about the negotiations during, and after, the war. The only other Burmese record I have seen, in the Monywa Sayadaw's Yazawin, appears to be identical with that of the *Konbaungzet*. Maung Ba Kya tells me that the common author was probably the Sayadaw himself.<sup>1</sup>

The account given is on the whole reliable, if we except the numbers ascribed to the forces on either side. Mr. Harvey states in his History that Burmese historians as a matter of course shifted the decimal point one place on these occasions. From the evidence afforded by these campaigns I should call this but a modest estimate. The Burmans were strangely ignorant of the causes which led the Chinese into war. The two reasons they allege—the death of a Chinaman in a brawl near Kengtung, and a minor trade dispute at Kaungton over the question of the bridging of the Taping (a burning question, I believe,—*absit omen*—at this moment), are not mentioned at all by the Chinese.

On the Chinese side, I have used a translation by Warry from Wei Yüan's narrative in the *Shêng wu chi*, the Imperial "Military Record". This gives, I think, the best concise account of the whole war; but it omits much, especially the political or inner history of the struggle. And here I have relied on Parker's summaries from the long accounts given in the *Tung hua lu* or Imperial Archives. They are invaluable as a sidelight on the action, being authentic records of despatches received in Peking;

1. For Colonel Burney's articles and translations on the subject of these invasions, see Cordier, *Bibliotheca Indosinica*, Vol. I, p. 426. I regret that I have not had access to them.

but they must be used with caution, for the contents, as we shall see, were sometimes dressed for the Emperor's inspection, and perhaps the thing most interesting about them is his caustic comment. The only contribution I have made myself is a translation of a diary, the *Chêng mien chi wên*, written by a Chinese officer, Wang Ch'ang, who took part in the last campaign—a typical war-diary, excellent in relating what fell within the author's immediate experience, but of little use elsewhere. It appears in the *Hsiao fang hu chai Geographical Miscellany*, together with several other narratives of which Mr. Yih (of the London School of Oriental Studies) has kindly furnished me with notes. There is also an account in Chao P's *Wu kung chi shêng*. No doubt there are other sources, e.g. the Yunnan encyclopaedias, of which I know nothing. It is plain that here is abundance of material; all that prevents further research is the absence of a Chinese Historical Library in Rangoon, such as is to be found in other capitals of Indo-China.

For this excellent map I am entirely indebted to Professor and Mrs. Stamp. In the details of the frontier and Bhamo districts, of which I have no first hand knowledge, I am under great obligations to Captain Medd and Dr. Hanson of Bhamo and to Mr. Shaw of Taungbaing.

About 1750 a large Chinese colony was mining silver at Mao-lung, probably Bawdwin; and the chief merchant, visiting Ava, persuaded the king Mahādhammarājādhpati, to send to Peking one of those complimentary embassies which the Chinese regarded as tribute-missions. Two hairpins, of silver and gold, and a gilt pagoda mounted on an elephant were sent as presents. The Emperor entertained the envoy at a banquet, and on his departure gave him a door slab, inscribed in the imperial hand—"Happy Pacification of the Western Jewel". But the Western Jewel was far from being pacified; the Mao-lung colony was dispersed, the merchant executed, and the envoy returned to find his king a captive in Pegu, and Ava a smoking ruin. Meantime a usurper, a village hunter it was said, had assumed the title of Aungzeya, "the Victorious", and had the impudence to address a letter to China claiming descent from the emperor Augustus.

Now among the first enemies of Aungzeya, or Alaungpaya as he is more generally known, was a people of mysterious origin, the Kwe. The Chinese thought them the descendants of the suite of Prince Yung-li, one of whose names was Kuei; but this is scarcely credible, for the suite numbered only six or seven hundred and they were massacred almost to a man. Mr. Harvey has given me an interesting note on the Kwe. They are variously classed as Wa, Karen, Shan, Lahu, Lolo, Chinese, Siamese or Shan Tayok. They hardly appear in Burmese history before 1740, and seem to vanish about 1770. In Burma proper they were settled in two separate colonies, the Kwe Lawa at Okpo in Mandalay district, and the Kwe Karen near Pegu town. The former were a nest of dacoits, under a chieftain Kwe Gunna-ein, who gave continual annoyance to the old Ava dynasty. The latter were the prime movers of the Talaing

rebellion of 1740; the first nominee for the kingship, the wandering monk Smin Htaw Buddhaketi, is said to have been a Kwe, or at least brought up amongst the Kwe. When Alaungpaya first came to the fore, the Kwe of Okpo joined him; but later, suspecting a plot, he massacred seven hundred of them. Now the son and heir of the captive king of Ava had visited the camp of Alaungpaya, but receiving small encouragement he threw in his lot with the Kwe, and retired with them into the mountains of Mongmit and Hsenwi, where he was still at large in 1756. Already, at the end of 1754, Alaungpaya had sent a general to dispose of him and them.

When the Chinese heard of them, in 1762, their chief Kung-li-yen—whom I identify provisionally with Gunna-ein—was a fugitive with all his family at Mêng-lien, east of the Salween. The Sawbwa of Mêng-lien gave him but a poor welcome. He forced him to recognise Mêng-lien's suzerainty; and having robbed him of his independence, robbed him also of his money and his wife. The Kwe, indignant, made raids across the frontier. The matter was reported to the Emperor, who sympathised with Kung-li-yen, but had him decoyed and executed and his whole family imprisoned, for it would never do to have the frontier disturbed. One woman and her babe were left, with the world against them—Nangchan, once wife of Kung-li-yen. The Chinese naively remarks that she loved neither the Chinese nor the Burmans, nor even her captor, the Sawbwa of Mêng-lien. The last had first to be dealt with; in 1762, herself leading the band of avengers, she murdered him and burnt his city to the ground. But she would have her vengeance also on China and on Burma; and time was short, for an order was out for her arrest. She had friends in Kengtung, where the Sawbwa, a Burma nominee, had expelled his brother, the rightful heir, who had fled to China. She sent a message to the usurper, urging him to attack Kenghung, a neighbour state, but one of the "inner dependencies" of China. The message took effect; the fuse was lighted.

Now these regions had long been peaceful. The Viceroy of Yünnan had found leisure to write a treatise in fourteen volumes on the barbarian languages and scripts. When the Kengtung raiders appeared, the whole of southern Yünnan was thrown into panic. Three Chinese generals were severally defeated. But it was a war of sawbwars; and though the Chinese thought the Burmans were at the bottom of it, it seems probable that they were not. For Burma was otherwise engaged. In 1764 Thihapate's army of 20,000 men passed through Kengtung; they were bound, not for China, but for Siam. In the following year a general of the new king of Burma, Hsinbyushin, appeared with small forces on the Salween further north, demanding tribute from the minor sawbwars under Chinese protection. There was nothing strange about this. For centuries it had been the custom for the frontier states to pay open and nominal tribute to China on the one hand, and secret and substantial tribute to Burma on the other. When Ava was burnt by the Talains, they were glad, no doubt, of the respite from the heavier burden; and

now, when the Burmans called them to account, they were in no mood to comply. They complained to China.

Meantime the Yünnan forces were slowly closing on Kengtung. Thihapate had left it long ago, had taken Zimmè and Viengchang, and by January 1766 had joined hands under the walls of Ayuthia with Mahanawrahta's army, marching from Mergui. A Chinese army in Kengtung might well have been the signal for revolt in northern Siam; this is not stated, but I suspect it was the reason that made Hsinbyushin, in this same month, despatch a new army under Nemyosithu to relieve Kengtung. The siege of this town—the chief feature of the first Chinese invasion recorded in the Konbaungset—is scarcely mentioned by the Chinese, whose narrative of the opening stages of the war is not easy to piece together. Nemyosithu attacked the besiegers from without; there was a sortie from within; the Chinese cavalry proved no match for the Burmese elephantry, and they were driven back, first on the Talaw river, then on the Mekong, where the Chinese general fell. The campaign was over by March 1766.

This Burmese version, though uncorroborated, is very likely correct; for about this time the Yünnan Viceroy is stated to have "lost his wits," and smarting under the Emperor's censure, committed suicide "out of sheer fright." His place was taken by Yang Ying-chü, a man of large ambitions and meagre abilities. At first he made some headway in southern Yünnan; for a time Kenghung and even Kengtung were recovered. Such, at least, was the report received at Peking, but we are not bound to believe it. Elated by minor successes, he now conceived the idea of conquering Burma. "His generals" says the *Shêng wu chi*, "falling in with his humour, told him there were daily applications from states wishing to become tributary. Emissaries were despatched to Mongmit, Hsenwi, Mohnyin, Old Bhamo, Zimmè and other states to induce their chiefs to swear fealty or to invite their relatives or sub-sawbwars to do this for them. . . . All this was reported to the Emperor without examination by the Viceroy, but in effect these states were still half inclined towards Burma and were beyond the range of our effective control."

Decision rested with the Emperor Ch'ien-lung. He was a strong man. His generals had won brilliant victories in Central Asia, conquering the Eleuths of Kucha, subduing the great Muslim cities of the Tarim basin, Kashgar, Aksu and Yarkand, and to the north had organised the T'ien Shan. He had revived the glories of the Han dynasties, the empire of Wu Ti and Pan Ch'ao. A still more brilliant feat awaited him, the conquest of Nepal in 1792. No monarch ever gave himself more freely to the task of administration. Few things, even on the Burma frontier, could escape that vigilant eye. Couriers covering two or three hundred miles a day kept him in daily touch with the furthest corners of the empire. In ten days messages from Burma reached Peking. He was, of course, a Manchu; he speaks with regular, and perhaps unfair,

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contempt of his Chinese troops, as compared with his "splendid Manchus." He was, moreover, a scholar and a poet; when the war was finally over, in 1790, what clinched the peace was a poem, addressed to Ava, composed by the Emperor himself. But in 1766 the conquest of Burma must have seemed to him a trifle. When Yang Ying-chü put forward his scheme, he told him to be careful, but left him freedom of action.

Thereupon the Viceroy issued an arrogant order, summoning the Burmans to submit, or woe betide them. Their only reply was to invade Hsenwi. Now the Sawbwa of Hsenwi had recently died; he had been the friend of the Kwe, and had never recognised Alaungpaya. His son had been captured by the Burmans, who had appointed his half-brother as Sawbwa; but the people of Hsenwi had murdered the latter and set up a full brother in his stead. The son, meantime, had escaped from Ava, and he and his uncle with a small band threw themselves on Chinese protection. The centre of interest now shifts to the north of Burma. Fighting continued on a minor scale in the neighbourhood of Kengtung; but Burma and China were now at grips, and the vital points are evident on this map. There are two main natural thoroughfares from China into Burma; one is along the Taping river to Bhamo and down the Irawaddy; the other leads past Hsenwi, Lashio, Hsipaw, down the Namtu to Ava. Of the three remaining invasions, the first and third followed the former route, the second the latter.

In October 1766 a Chinese colonel, Chao Hung-pang, one of the instigators of the war, surprised and took Bhamo. The Chinese says he had a few hundred men, the Burmese says a hundred and ten thousand. The discrepancy is not so great, perhaps, as might appear; for the Burmese refers to his strength in January, by which time, no doubt, his army had grown. But the stronghold of the Burmese was not at Bhamo, but eight miles down the river, at Kaungton, where Balamindin from this time onwards conducted a magnificent defence. "Inside and round the foot of the fort" says the Konbaungset, "he threw up earth five cubits deep, seven cubits thick. On the top of the fort also he prepared shelters, warrior-runs and flares. At the bastions and angles he placed his cannon holding two viss or three, and drew up ready in array men to pick up and hold the fuses. Outside the fort also he planted elephant-snags, horse-snags, breastworks, thorns, spikes, 'sharks', pits, trenches, cross-barred fences and deer's horns. A log, 25 or 30 cubits long and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  or 5 fists thick, was fastened to two short posts by a catch; this long log was so placed that it could be pulled up a rope-mechanism, and then spring back by releasing a pin inside the fort. In the barbicans on top he stationed abundance of guns, cannon, braves and formidables. There, within the fort, he stood resolute, with molten lead and liquid resin ready.....The Chinamen left a force at Bhamo market-fort to guard it and came marching, densely surrounding Kaungton. They brought along with them town-scaling ladders, dahs, spades, axes, hooks and ropes, and drew near the fort. But they could not get right up to it; for what with the thickset 'sharks,' snags, pits and trenches, and the royal troops

in the barbicans discharging guns and cannon, the Chinese were wounded and slain and their generals and captains suffered severe punishment. Therefore without stop or pause, like running water, making breastworks of pile on pile of their dead corpses, they closed right in on the foot of the fort. Then the wheel-ropes of the mechanical catapults and levers were let fly time after time, each time killing a hundred or two. Yet the Chinamen closed in; those appointed to dig up the fort posts, dug; those to plant the ladders and climb them, climbed; those to hook the fort-posts and pull them, pulled. The royal troops undaunted hurled down levered logs and molten lead and resin. From the barbicans above also, armed with dah, spear, gun, stick, faggot and bar, deftly and desperately they thrust, hewed, shot, slashed, beat and rammed. Therefore the Chinamen could not penetrate the fort, but perished pile on pile; and they said "This fort is held by gods and not by men'."

Nemyosithu was sent by river to relieve Kaungton. The Chinese had no boats but a few sampans, so it was possible to send in three captains with stores into the beleaguered fort on a misty night. Their conference was broken by a night bombing attack which Balamindin easily repulsed. He sent word to Nemyosithu to proceed upstream and take the Chinese fort at Bhamo; meantime he would hold Kaungton, and later they would make a combined attack on the besiegers. The plan succeeded; the Chinese admitted that they "fell into a complete trap and were most bloodily defeated at Bhamo." The final fighting lasted three days. Chao Hung-pang set fire to his stores and retreated.

Meantime a larger Burmese army under Mahasithu had marched overland through Mohyin and Mogaung. They crossed the river at Waingmaw, south of Myitkyina, and advanced to Nammyin creek, possibly the Namtabet. Here they were stopped by a Chinese force whose camp was on the Lisaw mountains, probably the Yawyin hills north of Sima. Mahasithu sent troops round to surprise the heedless camp; then taking the main force in front and rear, drove them back through the Wan Jên Gate as far as Sanda and Kanngai. Here however he was checked, and Nemyosithu superseded him. The capture of the Wan Jên Gate had turned the flank of the Chinese stationed at the other gates; they fell back on Muangwan, in the hope, it seems, of joining the forces operating on the borders of Hsenwi, where another Burmese force was marching up the Saiween. The Burmans ravaged the whole country, laying siege, it is even said, to T'êng-yüeh and Yung-ch'ang. The Viceroy of Yünnan "fell ill through excitement." The Emperor despatched his Court Physician to see if he was shamming, and a Confidential Officer to report on the whole situation.

This news was alarming; for more formidable than the Burmans was the wrath of the Emperor. Reassuring reports now poured into Peking. New generals had been appointed, with orders to march on Hsenwi and Bhamo. One general, after a fight lasting 84 hours, had

driven the enemy across the Shweli "with terrible slaughter." Yet another victory at Mêng-mao—10,000 killed, and the rebel leader captured and hanged. Nemyosithu himself had visited the Chinese camp with apologies and offers of submission. The people of Bhamo had adopted the Manchu pigtail. At the same time, it was added, we had better come to terms with Burma, restore Bhamo and offer trade facilities.

This postscript aroused the Emperor's suspicions. He sent for the map, and wondered. "These victories, I see, are all bogus. Such stuff may deceive a fool of a Viceroy, but it does not deceive me. I am asked to make a present of Bhamo etc., with trade as before. It is plain that these places have lapsed to Burma, and this request for trade is merely a trick to bamboozle me into sanctioning the *de facto* situation. The blue line on my map is marked as the frontier. If so, what are the Burmese doing inside the blue line, at Sanda and Mêng-mao? Is it not absurd that at the height of our power, having just crushed Zungaria and Kashgar, we should thus be defied by a petty state like Burma? The Viceroy will return to Peking. Ming Jui is hereby appointed Viceroy. The two generals are to be sent in chains. If they escape or commit suicide, the outgoing Viceroy will pay for it with his life."

On arrival at Peking poor Yang Ying-chü was "graciously permitted to commit suicide." No doubt he was lucky. Enquiries proved that the Emperor's suspicions were well-founded. More than half the troops who had crossed the frontier, had died of malaria. Amid the general débâcle one sole exploit stood to the credit of China. The Burmese, sweeping from the north along the line of Gates, had pounced on Mêng-mao. A Chinese colonel, Ha Kuo-lising, had thrown himself into the town and held it gallantly for eight days and nights until he was relieved. We shall hear more of Ha Kuo-hsing.

Preparations were now made for a big invasion of Burma as soon as the rains were over. The land-tax of the districts traversed by the armies was to be waived. 3,000 Manchus and 20,000 Chinese troops were sent (the Burmese estimate was  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a million). Ming Jui, the Commander-in-Chief, was one of the finest soldiers of the empire. He had won a great name already for victories in Turkestan, beyond Kashgar, and had been ennobled with the title—"Purely rejoicing, recklessly gallant, First Class Duke"—a name he thoroughly deserved. He was also a poet, author of "Rough Notes of Songs murmured at the Northern Window." His plan of campaign was soldier-like. It was a mistake, he said, to squander troops at each of the Eight Gates. The best method of defence was attack. He himself would advance through Hsenwi, restore the rightful chief, leave forces there to guard his lines of communication; then pushing on along the Namtu he would strike at the heart of Burma, at Ava itself. It was the route followed by the Manchus a century earlier in their successful chase after Prince Yung-li.

A force under Oêrtêngo was to march meantime on Bhamo, take Kaungton, descend on Mongmit and join Ming Jui at Ava.

At the end of October 1767 Ming Jui started from Yung-ch'ang. His progress was slow, for he had only bullock-transport and it rained incessantly. In 36 days he reached Wan-ting, his advanced base on the frontier. 8 days later he entered Hsenwi, the garrison fleeing on his approach. The Sawbwa was duly installed, and 5,000 men (the Burmese says  $\frac{1}{3}$  of a million), under Ta-hsing-a were left to garrison the place and forward supplies. Ming Jui himself advanced on Hsipaw with a striking body of 12,000 men. On his march the Palaung chieftains came to make their submission, all anxious to escape Burmese tyranny. Now about the New Year, 1768, three Burmese armies had left the capital, the main one under Mahasithu to march by Maymyo and Gokteik and meet Ming Jui at Hsipaw, another under Mahathihathura to proceed south along the Myitngè and take him in the rear, a third under Nemyosithu to occupy Mongmit. Mahasithu's vanguard met Ming Jui at a defile east of Hsipaw, and was repulsed. The Chinese entered Hsipaw and built a pontoon bridge over the river. The *Shêng wu chi* here gives us an interesting note on Burmese tactics:

"The Burmans possessed no regular army; in times of danger Shan levies were called out. There was however now at Ava a standing force of 10,000 men called the 'Victorious Brigade'. In actual fighting the Shan levies were placed in the van, and the 'Victorious Brigade' occupied the rear. Cavalry were posted on either flank ready to close in upon the enemy. If victory appeared doubtful, the army rapidly entrenched itself under cover of a heavy fire from artillery and small arms. When the smoke cleared away the stockade was complete, and the men were inside ready to defend it. These were the invariable tactics of the Burmans."

This must, I fancy, be an early reference to the Smoke Screen. As for the battle formation-- Shan levies in front, the 'Victorious Brigade' in the rear-- no imputation can, I think, be made against Burmese courage on this score. Discretion alone dictated the arrangement; for the impressed Shans fighting for their captors must have been, at best, half-hearted.

Ming Jui advanced to Gokteik. "There was a huge rock on the mountain road skirting the pass, which Natural Bridge the enemy had rendered unavailable by uprooting all the trees which grew in the sides of it and had made it passable even to transport animals." Near by, the Burmans held the south bank of the river. The Chinese found a ford, crossed and drove them back on the main body of 20,000 men encamped in 16 stockades. Here, in February 1768, the main battle was fought,

Mahasithu, attacking the outposts, provoked Ming Jui to "raise his foot". The force despatched was charged by Burmese cavalry, but these were surrounded and overwhelmed. The elephantry also were routed. Ming Jui then attacked one of the stockades "by scaling a hill and charging down on it. Ten men of Kueichou were the first to enter, and they were well supported. The rebels were driven out and the village destroyed. Three more of the stockades were carried, and the other twelve were not defended. Large stores of grain and ammunition fell into our hands, and our prestige rose high." Two or three thousand Burmans were slain. Ming Jui in the thick of the fight received a nasty stab near the eye. In honour of the victory he was created a Prince by the Emperor. The Burmese version is brief but expressive: "The whole army sank. The troops fled topsy turvy, helter skelter." All that Mahasithu could do was to rally the remnant at a camp in thatch grass jungle, and to despatch an officer to inform his king of the disaster. The road to Ava was open. Ming Jui advanced to Hsumhsai, passed Maymyo, and reached Singaung 8 miles beyond. It was but two stages to Ava.

When the messenger reached the palace, Hsinbyushin was at prayer in his oratory. An Atwinwun admitted him at once into the presence. But though the king saw him, he asked him not a word. His prayers over, he retired into the Glass Chamber. The Atwinwuns, frightened, whispered in close session with the messenger in the Byetaik. Four hours after sunset, at the fifth gong, the king remarked: "I saw during the day something that looked like a soldier. What is the matter?" The messenger then entered the Glass Chamber, and told his tale. When he had finished the king said: "All my generals are a joke. Let no one stop the Chinese. Let them come down even to my palace." The ministers bowed down silent, none daring to utter a word. Next morning the king sat in council. The royal family and all the ministers were present. The latter said: "The enemy are now two stages or three from Ava. Make a clean sweep of all the houses in the suburbs and prepare the city for a siege and summon levies from all the riverine towns." The king replied at length, recounting the occasions in history when China had invaded Burma—in the reign of Pyusawhti (1st century A. D.), Narathihapate (1287), Kyawzwa (1300), Minkhaung (1444), Pindale and Pyemin (1648-1662), and finally the recent inroads—had they ever really succeeded? "All the Chinese who enter my kingdom are doomed. Let not a house nor tank nor monastery be touched. Let all my subjects in my kingdom work and eat as usual. When the Chinese come to Shwekyetyet, I shall cross the Myitngè with my four brothers, and like mine ancestor Pyusawhti, myself shall smite them though they come as thick as leaves or grass, and cast them all into the Irawaddy. As the oracle saith 'There shall be a dusty cart track from Shwekyetyet to Shwetaung-u,' for I will cross treading on Chinese carcasses." The four brothers answered: "Take thine ease, O King, in thy golden palace. We four will go and

slay all the Chinese, not one shall escape." And the king said: "Though all my kingdom be women, there are we five brothers who are men; and who in Jambudipa can withstand us?"

Now all this time the forces of Mahathihathura had not been idle. His second in command, Teinkyamingaung, had been sent on ahead to intercept Ming Jui's convoys. The Chinese troops on the lines of communication had surrounded him, for he disobeyed the order to retreat. He held out manfully in a bamboo stockade until he was relieved. This small success put heart into the Burmans, who now recaptured the bridge at Hsipaw and destroyed the fort at Lashio, the Chinese retreating on Hsenwi. Teinkyamingaung was despatched with cavalry and muskets to Kunlon Ferry to cut off supplies. Mahathihathura marched on Hsenwi, where he was joined by Nemyosithu advancing from Mongmit. The Chinese troops "had gathered and become a lump", and when they heard that Teinkyamingaung was upon them with elephants, they "began to gaze at the sky and the clouds (*teinkya*)". Now Ta-hsing-a, the Manchu commander, had fortified the town of Hsenwi and left a mixed garrison of Chinese and Shans; his own fort was some distance away. The Burmans first attacked the town and took it; then surrounded the starving fort, cut off its water-supply, and carried it by assault. Ta-hsing-a himself, disgusted at the cowardice of his troops, committed suicide. The Burmans were now free to march on Ming Jui.

That fine soldier was in difficulties. There was no food for the men, no forage for the horses. The bullocks fell and died by the wayside. All the villages were empty and their stores bunt. No news had come from Oêrtêngo, who ought by now to have joined him from Mongmit. Moreover he had no boats, and now realised that there was a river to cross between him and his goal. We may well believe that he advanced to the edge of the plateau and saw the spires of Ava in the distance, guarded by the gleaming thread of the Myitngè. He decided to retreat.—Meantime Mahasithu had plucked up courage, and when Ming Jui withdrew to Hsumhsai he attacked him twice by day and night with desperation. The Burmans, it is said, could not hold their swords for the blood, but Ming Jui's troops, though starving, were not to be defeated. His line of retreat was determined by the necessity of finding food. The Burmans, he was told, had a grain depot at Monglong, south of Mongmit. Perhaps, returning that way, he might join hands with Oêrtêngo. Plunging north into the mountains he reached Monglong, and found indeed a quantity of grain. The Palaung chiefs had welcomed him three months earlier; and he now heard there was paddy stored in the hills of Taungbaing. He turned north-west through mountainous country and marched to Mêng-yü. Says the *Shêng wu chi*:

"Ever since we changed our direction at Singaung, the Burmans hung on our rear and cut off our sick. They knew we were starving and

had given up hope of marching to Ava. They therefore mustered in full force to harass our retreat. Our men had now to fight every step of the way. One division was detailed to fight while the other continued the retreat. The latter, after one or two miles, formed up and awaited the fighting party, and then took its turn in covering the retreat. Ming Jui, Kuan Yin-pao and Ha Kuo-hsing took their station with the rearguard in turn, using their best efforts to keep the men together. A day's march was never more than 10 miles, and 60 days were spent between Singaung and Mêng-yü. During this time we had one successful encounter with the enemy. It was at Mang-hua," (perhaps Man-hwè), "where we bivouacked near the summit of a hill, the enemy occupying its lower slopes. Ming Jui had noticed that the Burmans had begun to hold him in small account, and now resolved to read them a lesson. They had learnt the meaning of our bugle-calls and knew that each day before marching we blew three long blasts; and this was the signal for them to start in pursuit of us. On this occasion, just before daybreak, the advance was sounded as usual, but our men, striking camp, lay in ambush close by. On came the enemy in full pursuit; but they were suddenly received by a heavy fire from all sides and driven headlong down the hill, over 4,000 slaughtered. From this time forward they never ventured to encamp nearer than 6 miles from us. Ming Jui halted some days near the scene of the victory, and made over to his troops some horses and bullocks he found there."

But meantime some Palaungs had shewn the Burmans an old disused road to the silvermines; and this enabled them to strike the main road ahead of Ming Jui, and stockade it. When the latter reached Mêng-yü, some 70 miles from his base at Wan-ting, he found himself in a trap. A Chinese scout despatched from Yünnan to discover Ming Jui's whereabouts, found him here hemmed in with seven bodies of the enemy; for two days he remained in view of the camp, but could not get in. Ming Jui himself sent letters by two Shans asking for assistance. The Governor of Yünnan scraped some men together and sent them to the rescue. They met the remnants of Ming Jui's force, under Ha Kuo-hsing, staggering into Wan-ting. Their story was soon told. As a last resource Ming Jui "had ordered a night retreat, each officer to cut his way out as best he could. He himself, with a few hundred men chosen from the flower of his army, stayed to the last to cover the retreat. At daybreak a desperate fight ensued, each man of the rearguard fighting with the strength of a hundred." The rest made good their escape, but the rearguard fought to the end. When hope was gone, Ming Jui, "before committing suicide, cut off his pigtail and sent it to the Emperor as a last token of affection." His body was buried secretly under a tree. The Burmans never knew of his death.

But what had happened to Oêrtêngo? He had wasted over a month before Kaungton where Balamindin stood impregnable. The whole country was desolate, and he had difficulty in procuring food. The Emperor sent him urgent orders to cut his way to Ming Jui at Hsumhsai;

whereupon, paralysed by fear, he fell back on Han-t'a—probably Hantet, 8 miles south-west of Kaungton. Volunteers had offered to go to the rescue of the starving garrison in Hsenwi; he refused to allow them. The Viceroy had sent him seven urgent messages; he left them unanswered. Finally he returned to China by a circuitous route, taking 20 days to cover 20 miles. The Emperor's fury knew no bounds. Strict enquiries were made into Oêrtêngo's movements, and it was found that his cowardice had cost Ming Jui his life and was the main reason for the failure of the whole campaign. His father, son and brothers were incarcerated; his wife sent as a slave among the Kirghizes; his uncle's wife was also to have been sent, but she preferred suicide. He himself was sliced to pieces. His daughters were torn from their husbands and imprisoned. His uncles, nephews etc. were sent as slaves to Turkestan. The Emperor was amazed at his own moderation.

His sorrow for Ming Jui was no less bitter, when he knew how near he had been to success. For after all those months of fighting it was found that Ming Jui had lost only ten to twenty per cent of his effectives. The scholar Chao I, who served as a secretary in the next campaign, comments as follows:—

"When Ming Jui began his retreat, the enemy's ranks were continually reinforced from all sides, while we had no supports nor reserves. They could procure supplies anywhere, while we had none. They had cannon mounted on elephants, while we had only small arms, diminishing in number from day to day. The noise of their cannon and musketry was as ten myriad fireworks exploding at once, rendering speech inaudible. Yet in spite of all, during nearly 70 days of retreat, we sustained no defeat in open battle, and gained one great victory at Mang-hua.

"Ming Jui each morning rose early and directed operations in person with the fighting and retreating columns alternately. He often came into camp at nightfall, not having drunk a drop of water all day. Grain had long been exhausted, and sliced beef was the only provision; he took his share of it with men in the ranks. He looked kindly to the wants of his officers who suffered much from exhaustion, hunger and wounds; and he refused to abandon his sick and wounded, ordering them to be carried by the local levies. Thus it was that no man, however much he suffered, had a word of blame for the General.

"Ming Jui died, not because he could not have saved himself, but because he was returning without having carried out the instructions of his master. It was true that the Emperor had ordered the retreat, but the order never reached Ming Jui. . . Encompassed daily with growing difficulties he would say to his officers: "The enemy know we are in extremity, but for the sake of our country we must fight on, that they may know its orders are clear and irrevocable and that its servants fulfil them to the death. No reinforcements are coming for us, but we must

do our utmost to impress the enemy with our determination and so make the work easier for those who come after us." This, says Chao I, was a far-sighted, patriotic resolve, and not the decision of a desperate man. "The people of Yünnan and the troops who accompanied him never spoke of Ming Jui without tears, for his hold upon their affections was not less than that of the famous generals of olden time."

My time, Sir, is up. The story of the last invasion and the long delay before peace was made, must be left for another occasion.

G. H. LUCE.

#### NOTE ON SOME CHINESE SOURCES.

The 聖武記 *Shêng wu chi* (ch. 6, f. 8 recto—f. 12 recto) contains the 乾隆征緬甸記 *Ch'ien lung chêng mien tien chi*, "Record of the campaigns in Burma of (the emperor) Ch'ien-lung," of 魏源 Wei Yüan. The same account, with some omissions and additions, entitled *Chêng mien tien chi*, appears in the 小方壺齋輿地叢鈔 *Hsiao fang hu chai yü ti ts'ung ch'ao* of 王錫祺 Wang Hsi-ch'i (Part 10, Fascicule 4, f. 227 recto—f. 230 recto). The latter miscellany contains two works by 王昶 Wang Ch'ang, the 征緬紀略 *Chêng mien chi lüo* (f. 233 recto—f. 240 verso), "Short account of the campaigns in Burma," which gives perhaps the fullest account of all; and the 征緬紀聞 *Chêng mien chi wên* (f. 241 recto—f. 251 verso), "Record of experiences during a campaign in Burma," a diary of the last invasion; I hope to publish later, *in extenso*, a translation of the latter. The same miscellany, amongst other brief articles on Burma, contains two short works by 師範 Shih Fan, the 緬事述略 *Mien shih shu lüo* (f. 231 recto—f. 232 recto), "Short account of Burmese affairs," from the Ming dynasty onwards up to the invasions; and the 入緬路程 *Ju mien lu ch'êng* (f. 253 recto and verso), "Itinerary of the roads into Burma"; the latter appears also in the *Shêng wu chi* (ch. 6, f. 12 recto and verso). The account of 趙翼 Chao I (which I have not seen in the original) appears in a small book entitled the 武功紀盛 *Wu kung chi shêng*. In University College Library, Rangoon, there is now a copy of the 東華錄 *Tung hua lu* and Supplements, together with a collection, copied from it, of the numerous scattered references to Burma. Translations and summaries by Parker and Warry are to be found in the Secretariat files. The former has translated, amongst other works, an "Account of Mien-tien, or Burma, taken from the Momein Annals, republished in 1888"; I have not succeeded in obtaining this work; but it is probably the same as the *T'êng-yüeh chih* mentioned by Taw Sein Ko in his interesting note, *R.S., A.S.B.*, 1918, pp. 22—24. From Cordier's *Bibliotheca Indosinica*, Vol. I, p. 439, I gather that the *Ch'ien lung chêng mien tien chi* has also been translated into French by M. Camille Imbault-Huart, in *Journal Asiatique*, Série VII, t. XI, fév.-mars 1878, pp. 135—178,

#### GWE.

"Until a British party visited the Wild Wa country in 1893 it was firmly believed that the Wa were cannibals. The story is as old as the time of Vasco da Gama, for there seems no reason to doubt that 'the Gueos' of Camoëns' *Lusiadas*, Cant. X, cxxxvi, are the present day Wa. The passage is thus . . . rendered in Bowring's *Siam*, volume II, page 1.

'O'er these vast regions see a varied throng  
Of thousand unknown nations crowd the coast;  
The Laos both in lands and numbers strong,  
Avas and Birmahs in their mountains lost,  
And savage Gueos, scarcely seen among  
The deep recesses, where the barbarous host  
On human flesh with brutal hunger feed,  
And with hot iron stamp their own—rude deed!

. . . It is, however, certain that the Wa are not cannibals, at least not habitual cannibals" (*Gazetteer of Upper Burma and Shan States* I. i. 497). This is perhaps the earliest mention of the Gwe, for *Lusiadas* was finished in 1570.

2. "Or, en malais, l'Annam et le Tonkin sont appelés Kutchi . . . La forme portugaise est fréquemment Cauchi-cnina; en anglais, on sépare encore les deux parties du mot. Je ne doute pas que Cauchi réponde au Kutchi des Malais. Pour ce qui est de la deuxième partie du mot, je croirais volontiers, avec Terrien de Lacouperie, qu'elle a été ajoutée pour distinguer le Kutchi de Chine du Kutchi de l'Inde, c'est à dire de Cochin. Quant à l'étymologie de Kutchi . . . c'est pour moi presque certainement le nom de Kiao-tche, qui resta appliqué au pays annamite au moins jusqu'à la fin du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Il est passé dans Marco Polo sous la forme Caugigu (Kiao-tche kouo). C'est à ce même nom qu'il faut faire remonter l'appellation de Keo donnée aux Annamites par les Laotiens et les Cambodgiens, et ce sont enfin les Keo, donc les Annamites, qu'il faut sans doute retrouver dans les 'sauvages Gueos' de Camoëns" (Pelliot, p. 299, n. 1 of *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient* 1903). The last sentence seems questionable. Chiao-chih is one word; but when the Chinese organised it as a prefecture, it was called Chiao-chou *i.e.* Chiao prefecture.

3. "[Jangoma *i.e.* Chiengmai is] very ill neighboured by the Gueoni (Paulus Venetus giveth them the name Gaugigii) who possess the mountains, whence falling in great companies to hunt for men whom they take and eat, they commit cruel butcheries amongst them" (book III p. 214 of Heylyn "Cosmographie in Four Books" publ. London 1669, Bodleian Radcliffe C. 13). Mr. W. A. Wood, H. B. M.'s Consul General, Chiengmai, writes to me: "The Laos placed themselves under

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