


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The Prospect of Global History

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The Qing Empire in the Fabric of Global History

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Abstract and Keywords

This chapter offers a brief review of dominant approaches to placing early modern China in its world context, discussing major findings, ongoing debates, and emerging challenges. Attention to different geographic regions, periods of time, and topics of research, including economic, political, and cultural and intellectual history, have led to competing judgements about the degree to which the Qing Empire was integrated into global developments. Against this background, and with reference to the case of the Qing official Ghombojab, it argues that the rise of global history can complement research that focus on the Qing empire or China as a whole, by emphasizing the differential impact of global forces on individual Qing subjects and their reciprocal individual contributions towards shaping those forces.

Keywords: early modern China, Qing Empire, Ghombojab, global history, Mongols, Inner Asia, cartography

China in the World: Competing Perspectives

China's interactions with the outside world have been intensively studied. From an overwhelming early emphasis on diplomacy with European countries, this scholarship has now expanded to cover many periods, regions, and topics. The rise of global history presents an opportunity not only to reaffirm the significance and accelerate the pace of this research, but also to explore new approaches. This short essay will therefore consider what forms innovation might take, in light of established and emerging scholarship. It concentrates primarily on the early modern period, roughly 1500 to 1800, an era that has provoked conflicting judgements about China's influence on the world, and the world's influence on China.¹

Current scholarship in English on early modern and modern China in the world evolved from the political history of Qing foreign relations with the West in the period after the Opium War.² Following an approach formulated in the 1941 article 'On the Ch'ing Tributary System' by John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Têng, scholars juxtaposed a 'traditional' mode of foreign relations, in which Ming and Qing emperors claimed ritual superiority over other monarchs, with one developed in Europe and progressively imposed on China after 1842.³ Subsequent research concentrated on war and diplomacy, state-building and finance, education and missionary activity, and advances in science and technology, to see how this 'traditional' China, impelled by foreign demand and example, gradually assumed a new, 'modern' form. A smaller cohort of scholars looked back in time from the vantage of 1842, with most attention falling on western European embassies, conditions at Canton, and, to a lesser extent, early treaty-based relations with Russia.

(p.109) This focus on the West then expanded to include more careful consideration of the application to non-Western countries of China's 'tribute system', a concept invented to embrace the various ritual, trade, and diplomatic policies that seemed to distinguish Ming and Qing foreign relations from European norms. China's priority, in this view, was stable, and predictable relations with its neighbours demonstrated the emperor's ritual superiority through the reception of submissive foreign embassies. This was taken to be a mode of international relations adapted to the cultural and political values shared in Asia, particularly East Asia. As studies of ideology and written regulations have yielded over time to more granular analysis of particular cases, researchers now have a clearer picture of tension and conflict within superficially harmonious relationships.⁴ This undercuts any interpretation of Qing foreign relations based on a neat distinction between (East) Asian and European countries. Hamashita Takeshi has

posited that a China-centred 'tribute trade system' knit Asia, especially East and Southeast Asia, into an integrated network of hierarchical economic and political ties. Because European traders were forced at first to adapt to this system, Hamashita suggests that important elements of it survived into the era of treaty ports and helped shape such 'modern' phenomena as Asian nationalism and Japanese industrial development.⁵

Research on commodities flowing through Chinese ports, silver above all, led to an even more dramatic reappraisal of China's role in the early modern world. Whereas scholarship on the tribute system typically limited attention to China's nearest neighbours and the West, this work sought to integrate China into a global system in which the New World played a key part. Whereas politically oriented studies stressed China's restrictions on external contact, studies of commodity flows emphasized a 'reversal of causality' by which China did more than Europe to shape the global economy.⁶ Some went so far as to assert that in the early modern period 'the entire global economic order was--literally--Sinocentric'.⁷ Even if these claims prove to be exaggerated, as some have argued,⁸ studies of commerce in opium, tea, furs, ginseng, and other commodities leave no doubt that China's market stimulated numerous global trading ventures and helped finance expanding European power in Asia and the Americas. New appreciation of China's cornerstone role in global trade and domestic economic strength contributed to the influential thesis that parts of China rivalled parts of Europe as the world's most (p.110) prosperous regions until separated by a Great Divergence around 1800.⁹ Climate and the environment are now joining commodity flows as factors tying China to global trends.¹⁰

One strand of what has come to be dubbed New Qing History has developed comparable findings on very different terrain. Reacting against an earlier coastal bias that discounted pressing inland concerns of the empire's Manchu rulers, and against a conceptualization of the imperial worldview as monochromatically Sinocentric, this scholarship made Qing policies toward Inner Asia a political counterpart to revisionist work on China's place in world trade. Earlier findings had foregrounded indicators of China's decline and alienation from global trends before the Opium War. New Qing History scholars, by contrast, noted the achievements the Qing shared with other early modern empires: between 1600 and 1800 Manchu rulers greatly expanded the territory under their control; extinguished the formidable Junghar empire; pushed back Russian expansion by force and kept it at bay by diplomacy; won the cooperation of the Mongol aristocracy and Tibetan

Buddhist clergy as well as the Chinese literati elite; and incrementally deepened centralized control over their subjects while implementing technological, bureaucratic, and logistical innovations.¹¹

Parallels to this New Qing History can be identified in recent work on China's maritime frontier. Just as studying Inner Asia challenged a view of the Qing state as essentially Chinese, emerging scholarship on the 'Zheng Family Empire', which seized Taiwan from the Dutch and held it against the Qing until 1683, has come to see it as a maritime enterprise without an obvious Chinese precedent. Just as the Manchus held off Russian expansion, the Zheng state used diplomacy and military force to keep the Dutch at bay and protect trade routes stretching from Cambodia to Japan.¹² Nor did Qing victory mark the end of Chinese interaction with Southeast Asia. Although the vital economic role of overseas Chinese in Batavia, Manila, and other Southeast Asian outposts of European empires has long been appreciated, emerging studies are (p.111) illuminating the political role of overseas Chinese, even the presence of Chinese-dominated micro-states, in what is now Thailand and southern Vietnam.¹³

Reconsideration has extended to the intellectual, cultural, and religious connections between China and the outside world. Work on the Roman Catholic mission to China as both a scientific and religious enterprise, a perennial source of interest, is increasingly concentrating on the interactive nature of these encounters, in which both sides contributed jointly to forms of knowledge and religious practice that did not belong entirely to either.¹⁴ Similar approaches have been taken to Islam in a Chinese context.¹⁵ Intellectual connections within East Asia, linking China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, are drawing renewed attention, as is the cosmopolitan interaction between Chinese and Inner Asian cultural elements, in which 'Qing rule ... fostered the crossing of boundaries, a mixing and fusion, and ultimately the creation of new forms that defined a distinctive Qing culture.'¹⁶

Aspects of new findings in all of these fields overturn most of the assumptions prevailing when the 'tribute system' model was first advanced. Where historians once wrote of China between 1500 and 1800 as myopically Confucian, isolated and aloof, and approaching a political and civilizational dead end, they can now (doubtless nudged partly by the precipitous rise of contemporary China) point to commonalities with other parts of a world under the rubric of 'early modernity': economic vitality, political achievement, and intellectual openness. Yet, by a sort of law of the conservation of decline, those challenging earlier conceptions of Qing failings often feel compelled by their awareness of the empire's nineteenth-century troubles to balance

positive appraisals with countervailing reference to problems and stagnation in other spheres—typically, ones they have chosen not to study in detail. Consequently, our understanding of the Qing Empire as a whole remains fractured and contradictory, and how best to integrate these strands of scholarship remains to be determined. In the interest of brevity, this essay will discuss only one facet of these competing pictures of the Qing in the world, that involving different spatial scales of analysis.

(p.112) A disjuncture remains between how China is treated at the regional, Eurasian, and ‘truly global’ scales. Much of what we know about Qing interaction with its neighbours comes from studies with a bilateral or, at most, regional focus. These show that the Qing Empire played a major economic and political role along virtually every sector of its frontier. Fitted together, this tissue of interaction assumes a continental scale. The political awareness of the Qing state extended at one time or another to almost every corner of Eurasia, including much of the Islamic world. In addition to its immediate neighbours, it conducted correspondence before 1800 with non-contiguous rulers in Europe, Central, and Southeast Asia, who collectively held territory from the Atlantic to Korea, and from Bengal to the Arctic Circle. This correspondence included negotiations on boundaries, alliances, terms of trade, and other issues of crucial economic and political concern. Within this vast ambit, the Qing state monitored military movements, political upheavals, and trade flows, expanding or constricting its range of contacts as seemed most prudent. Few historians of Qing history have probed the degree to which this continent-wide awareness added up to more than the sum of its many regional parts, particularly the question of how far the Qing state and non-official observers connected these various strands of activity into an integrated picture.¹⁷

If the Qing is increasingly recognized as an early modern Eurasian power, its ‘truly global’ role remains more ambiguous. Global history, named after a spatial unit, relies heavily on distance as a metric for evaluating global importance. If indeed the ‘truly global’ was created by sustained trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific, then China was brought into global history by European maritime ventures that it may have partly inspired but that it did not directly encourage or plan. This America-centred criterion relegates China to a passive role, and promotes what might be called the vending machine model, in which China’s global importance is limited to serving as an unconscious engine of world trade: foreigners came to insert silver into a stationary China and departed with its goods. This model gives license for a convenient division of labour. Historians of global trade flows can emphasize the

vast sums slotted into the machine, and the distances its customers travelled, without needing to discuss how, or even whether, Qing rulers, officials, and scholars understood the global ramifications of their part in this exchange, still less how they may have tried to influence global developments. Historians of China, for their part, can concentrate on the inner workings of the machine by the study of China's domestic economic indicators. Thus, some of the most forceful revisionist claims for China's dominant role in a connected global economy have come from scholars who do not primarily study China or use Chinese sources. Historians of China seeking to place its economy in a global framework have overwhelmingly favoured a comparative (p.113) approach.¹⁸ Missing in this division of labour is the question of how aware Qing observers were of the world in which they were increasingly enmeshed.

If contact with the Americas is indeed the hallmark of the 'truly global', then it is worth considering whether early modern China can be studied at this scale except as inspiring and setting conditions for world-shaping enterprises of which Europeans were the sole conscious architects. One approach would be to study more closely the engagement of China and the New World before 1800. Although the Qing Empire neither possessed American colonies nor operated trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific vessels, there were Chinese migrants and goods in the Americas, and Chinese officials and scholars were aware of the New World through maps and written accounts. Did this constitute an active engagement before the mid nineteenth century? A second approach would be to challenge the view that the 'truly global' required engagement with the Americas on the grounds that this criterion overemphasizes long-distance connections at the expense of other metrics of global significance. In the early modern world, vessels of European empires monopolized the longest-distance voyages, so measuring the global by distance perforce emphasizes the European role. Yet, as a populous and prosperous empire with many neighbours, the Qing Empire's position would by contrast be accentuated by a measure of global importance according more weight to the percentage of the world's population, economy, or total volume of trade influenced by, say, its trade policies or economic trends. How best to balance possible metrics is a matter of huge complexity; what some may see as a useful democratization of the criteria of global history may strike others as an attempt by early modern Asianists to tilt the playing field in their favour. At the very least, however, historians should ponder whether the label 'truly global' is too easily lent to transoceanic connections of all sorts, while economic, political, and cultural interaction between the Qing and its immediate neighbours—in an age

when the Qing Empire had a larger population than Europe and the Americas combined—are viewed (through the lens of distance) as of merely regional importance.

When evaluations of the global engagement of the Qing Empire differ, they typically split along major historiographical fault lines of spatial and temporal scale and sub-disciplinary approach: contrasting Inner Asia with China, especially its coast; the successful High Qing before 1800 with the diminished Late Qing thereafter; and economic, political, and intellectual developments with each other. It would be unrealistic to suggest either that historians ignore or renounce these divides, which have been reaffirmed by generations of inquiry as sensible and convenient, or that they become expert in the minutiae of all the economic, political, religious, and intellectual strands tying the Qing Empire to the outside world across three centuries and thousands of miles of frontier. The linguistic requirements (p.114) alone that such expertise would demand are staggering to ponder. A more modest goal for global history in a Qing context is to offer a complementary plane for pursuing phenomena that remain dimly understood precisely because they cut across these divisions.

Ghombojab and the ‘Sons of Chaghatai’

Although this essay does not afford space for such a study, even in miniature, I would like to make a rough sketch of the contours of one case to show some of the possibilities, and attendant challenges, of attempting histories cutting across dominant research divisions. In 1725, the Mongolian nobleman Ghombojab completed a brief genealogy of the descendants of Chinggis Khan whom he, as a member of the ruling lineage of the Üjümücin tribe, regarded as his lineal ancestor. Little is known of his life before this point. In 1692, while quite young, he was granted the title of Bulwark Duke (*Fuguo gong*), and had five audiences with the Kangxi emperor by 1709, when he was given in marriage a member of the imperial clan. By 1715, for reasons unknown, Ghombojab was stripped of his dukedom. Because his correspondence with the throne over this matter was conveyed by officials in the imperial bodyguard, it is possible that he was then a member of that body and already resident in Beijing. Sometime around 1722, the year of Kangxi’s death, Ghombojab was put in charge of the Tibetan School, where he worked alongside members of the Tibetan Buddhist clergy to train officials in the language skills needed for correspondence and scholarship. As his position suggests, he was known as someone with a remarkable mastery of languages.¹⁹

Tucked away in his genealogy, Ghombojab gave the following description of the progeny of Chaghatai, son of Chinggis Khan:

The imperial prince Chaghatai became khan in the country of the white-hatted Muslims, and established his capital in the city of Yarkand. Among his five sons, the eldest Abdula Khan sat on his father's throne. His second son, Imamaqli, became khan in Central Asia and established his capital at Samarkand. Adaramamad became khan in India and established his capital at Balkh. The fourth son, Kungkür, ruled as khan in the country of Rum, and established his capital at Istanbul. The fifth son Temür ruled as khan in the Red-hatted Urunggh-a country and established his capital at Bukhara.²⁰

(p.115) Setting aside its inaccuracies, this passage has two noteworthy attributes. First, from his vantage point in Beijing, Ghombojab's historical vision extended across Islamic Central Asia to India and Istanbul. Second, several of these names appear here for the first time in the Mongolian-language historical record. Where did he get his information?

As a point of departure, let us assume that Ghombojab encountered his informant or informants in Beijing, most likely within the orbit of the Qing court. In 1713, the Kangxi emperor informed his Grand Secretaries, and presumably other courtiers, that 'the Muslims (*Huizi*) of the northwest are of very many kinds, but all are descendants of Chinggis Khan'.²¹ In an undated note, probably a record of these same remarks, the emperor elaborated that after Chinggis had conquered the 'countries of the Muslims' he had ordered his sons to rule them, and although with the passage of time they had gradually exchanged their Mongolian characteristics for the languages, behaviour, and customs of Muslims, the rulers of these tribes remained nonetheless descendants of the Yuan.²²

Who in contact with the Qing court had information to offer about these territories, particularly Central Asia? One possibility were Russians, who in the early eighteenth century had some contact with most of the peoples of Central Asia. Conduits for information exchange intensified after 1676, as envoys, consuls, merchants, and clergy reached Beijing in larger numbers. Relations with Russia allowed the famous trans-Siberian mission of 1712-15, sent by the Kangxi emperor to the lower Volga to meet Ayuki Khan of the Torghut Mongols. Its member and chronicler Tulišen published an account of his travels in Chinese and

Manchu, with a map depicting the Qazaqs, India, and the Ottoman Empire, as well as Moscow and Sweden.

The origins of Tulišen's mission, however, remind us that long-distance Eurasian contact did not rely solely on Russian mediation. In 1698, Ayuki Khan's nephew had gone on pilgrimage to Tibet via the territory of his kinsmen, the Junghars, but political tensions left him stranded and dependent on Kangxi's patronage. Could information about Ghombojab's 'sons of Chaghatai' have come from this closely connected Torghut (Kalmyk)-Junghar network? It is possible to tentatively identify three of those 'sons' as Abdullah, the Chaghataid ruler at Yarkand (r. 1638-67), Imam Quli Khan, a descendant of Chinggis's son Joci who reigned at Bukhara (r. 1611-42), and Nadhr Muhammad, another Jochid who ruled in this period in Balkh (1606/7-41) and subsequently at Bukhara. Kūngkūr probably refers here not to the Ottoman sultan but to his vassal, the Jochid khan of Crimea.²³ The first of these four had extensive contact with the Junghars, and the latter three had political contact with the Torghuts.²⁴ Their far-flung contacts made the Torghuts an (p.116) invaluable source of political intelligence to both the Qing court and the Tibetan Buddhist intellectual world. The Mongolian cleric and scholar Sum-pa M Khan-po, who stayed in Beijing while Ghombojab was still active and was familiar with his list of the sons of Chaghatai, learned about the Ottoman Empire from a Torghut informant. This informant may also have supplied his information about Bukhara, Samarkand, and other parts of Central Asia.²⁵

Behind this diplomacy with the Torghut lay the core interest of the Qing state in Central Asia: its prolonged conflict with the Junghars, first under Galdan and then under his nephew Tsewang Rabtān. Galdan had solidified Junghar domination over the Tarim Basin and campaigned into Central Asia. It was in the aftermath of his conquests that the Qing court made its first direct contact, in 1696, with a royal descendant of Chaghatai.²⁶ As early as 1697, Kangxi knew that Galdan dominated Muslim states to his west, including (he believed) Bukhara, Samarkand, and the Qazaqs as well as nearer cities like Yarkand and Turfan. Kangxi had no wish to aid or annex Central Asian lands, and rejected the offer of a high-ranking Chinese military officer to 'lead the Muslims (*Huizi*) to attack Galdan's rear'.²⁷ The proponent of this alliance with foreign Muslims was Ma Ziyun, a native of Shaanxi and himself a Muslim. In his private life, Ma had in 1686 summoned and patronized Khwaja 'Abd Allah (d. 1689), who instructed him in the Qadiriyya branch of Sufism. Little is known about how 'Abd Allah, said to be a descendent of the Prophet born in Medina and educated in Baghdad and Egypt, had reached China. By some accounts he arrived by sea, although there is

evidence that he had travelled in Central Asia.²⁸ In the late seventeenth century, Sufi networks stretched across Eurasia, and some Sufis played an important role in Central Asian politics.²⁹ However, we have no way of knowing whether the scheme Ma put to Kangxi was based on information, or even strategies, supplied by his Sufi contacts.

Although Kangxi did not adopt Ma's plan, he remained well aware that the Junghars were clashing with enemies to their west. This knowledge was put to use by his son, the Yongzheng emperor, six years after Ghombojab wrote his genealogy. In preparation for his 1731 campaign against the Junghars, the emperor sent twin missions to Russia and the Torghuts, and broached the strategy of sending envoys back eastward from the lower Volga into Central Asia, to inform Bukhara and the Qazaqs of the planned Qing attack. For trustworthy agents 'perfectly familiar with Muslim affairs' and able to communicate with the Qazaqs, he sought assistance (p.117) from recently surrendered subjects at Hami and Turfan.³⁰ The defeat of the Qing expedition that year, resistance by the Russians, and the emperor's death in 1735 halted this strategy.

Another source of information on Mongol Central Asia at the Qing court were the Jesuits, and indeed in 1729 Prince Yin-xiang turned to Fr. Antoine Gaubil for historical information about 'the irruption of Chinggisid Tartars (*Tartares Gengiscaniens*) in Asia and Europe'.³¹ These missionaries also provided information about contemporary geopolitics that Qing statesmen used in conjunction with other sources. Between 1722 and 1729, the period in which Ghombojab composed his list of the sons of Chaghatai, Jesuit cartographers and their Qing counterparts were busy collecting sources and testimony to create maps integrating the Qing Empire, Russia, the Junghars, and other parts of Central Asia.³² Antoine Gaubil mentioned in 1725 a map made in Beijing based on 'reports of Tartars come from beside the Caspian Sea'. In 1729, Gaubil noted that Yongzheng's brother, who pressed him for the latest news from Europe, was also collecting information about Central Asia. When the prince received such intelligence, Gaubil observed, he 'first consulted some Muslims here [Beijing], who know something of their history and of the geography of the Muslim countries'.³³ It is unclear whether the prince turned to some among the hundreds of 'Central Asian Turkic-Muslims' who came to Beijing as caravan traders, or, more likely, Chinese Muslims residing in the city permanently.³⁴ Whether or not Chinese Muslims in Beijing kept abreast of developments in the Islamic world by questioning foreign Muslims, they certainly did so by other channels. Around 1721 one of Ghombojab's colleagues in the Qing bureaucracy, a Muslim official

named Zhao Shiyong, recorded information about the Islamic world gleaned from a Jesuit, 'a man of the country of Italy, on the western outskirts of Arabia (*Tianfang*).'³⁵

Jesuits used their presence in China to research Central Asia for their own ends. Over the course of the seventeenth century, they had systematically probed for a viable overland route from Europe to China. When the one via Siberia proved stubbornly closed to them, and the one via Persia, India, Tibet, and Xining too arduous, an ambitious plan was devised in the early 1690s to staff missions in (p.118) Bukhara and Samarkand as a bridge between Persia and Gansu.³⁶ Although this project failed, Jesuits in Persia, relying in part on Armenian merchants, were able to augment overland itineraries from Isfahan to China via India and Siberia with a third running through Herat, Balkh, Bukhara, and Turfan.³⁷

Another scholar sifting the various currents of information at Beijing in this period was Chen Lunjiong. His father, a Fujianese merchant with experience abroad, had advised the Qing court on how to capture Taiwan in 1683 and was rewarded with a high position in the Qing military. French Jesuits, in a 1717 letter home, described their debates with him over his fierce opposition to Christianity. Chen Lunjiong, whom he had once taken on a mission to Japan, served in Kangxi's bodyguard in the early 1720s and around the end of that decade composed an account of the eastern hemisphere. Although principally concerned with the maritime world, Chen's map and text described Central Asia, including the Caspian Sea, Siberia, and territories he described as 'Galdan' (the Junghars), 'Samarkand' (Muslim Central Asia), and Persia.³⁸ Chen seems to have had confidence in his knowledge of Central Asia, for in 1736 he memorialized about Siberia's important strategic position relative to the Junghars.³⁹ Chen's case reminds us that Inner Asian developments were by no means overlooked on the maritime frontier. Galdan's death in the foothills of the Altai on April 4, 1697, first reported to Kangxi on June 2, was reported at Nagasaki by a Chinese ship that had put to sea from Ningbo on July 14.⁴⁰

Taken individually, none of the conduits of information reviewed here is a certain source for Ghombojab's list of the 'sons of Chaghatai'. This is perhaps not surprising. A year after Ghombojab completed his work in Beijing, another genealogy of the descendants of Chinggis, the *Histoire Généalogique des Tatars*, was published at Leiden. This was the work of Abu 'l-Ghazi Bahadur Khan (1603–63), ruler of Khiva, like Ghombojab a historian and descendant of Chinggis. The content of his work was gleaned over the course of a life in which he had travelled throughout

Central Asia and lived in Persia and among the Qazaqs and Torghuts (Kalmyks). Originally written in Chaghatai Turki, the text was interpreted into Russian by a Muslim scholar, and then into German by Swedish prisoners of war. If it is, as the modern scholar Bertold Spuler has judged, 'widely defective for the earlier periods', this is surely due to the heterogeneous sources from which its author assembled it.⁴¹ It seems likely that Ghombojab's work was formed by a comparable fusion of different sources of information ricocheting around the Qing Empire, particularly Kangxi and Yongzheng-era Beijing.

(p.119) The Qing in Global History

Pondering avenues of research that would establish the provenance of Ghombojab's list of the 'sons of Chaghatai', a small question in itself, raises larger issues about the scales at which it should be tackled. There are compelling reasons to study it in the context of Mongolian history, and indeed this is how Ghombojab and his works have most commonly been approached. After all, he was born in Mongolia, and his work, written in Mongolian, dealt with the descendants of Chinggis, a topic of special concern for the Mongolian aristocracy. His findings about the 'sons of Chaghatai' were influential within subsequent Mongolian- and Tibetan-language historical works. Yet even approached as Mongolian history, the bounds of inquiry are blurred. If Ghombojab was gleaning information from Torghut or Junghar informants that were in turn aware of the Chinggisid pedigree of other Central Asian dynasties, then Ghombojab could be seen as a member of a Mongolian diaspora with entangled genealogical and historical concerns stretching from the edge of Europe to the edge of Manchuria.⁴² Since he likened the pedigree of the Mongol aristocracy to the 'flow of the Ganges', traced its earliest origins back to India, and had a deep engagement with Buddhism, we can also see him as a northern member of an Indo-Tibetan intellectual world.⁴³

From another angle, however, the Mongolian and even Inner Asian scale of inquiry proves inadequate, and it seems more illuminating to place Ghombojab's findings in a Qing context that accentuates the role of Beijing and China. He and many others, from Manchu conquerors to Mongol aristocrats, Jesuits, Russians, Torghuts, and Bukharan merchants, converged on Beijing from beyond China proper because of China's size and significance as a market, mission field, or source of income and power. Many of those coming to Beijing were able to communicate with each other because they had, like Ghombojab, learned Chinese or Manchu for pragmatic ends, or were able to find another *lingua franca* like Latin or Mongolian. Based after 1722 in the Tibetan School, Ghombojab's duties led him to work at various times alongside Manchu, Chinese, Tibetan, and Mongolian colleagues. He reiterated his list of the sons of Chaghatai in a Tibetan history of China and Chinese Buddhism. He also translated Buddhist works into Chinese. As a polyglot with intellectual interests crossing the China-Inner Asia divide, he had much in common with other Qing contemporaries.

Although he and his writings can profitably be considered within these larger contexts, Ghombojab had assembled a particular pattern of knowledge that was not likely shared by other Qing subjects, other Mongols, or even other Mongol Qing officials in Beijing. His strikingly

novel list of the 'sons of Chaghatai' was the (p.120) product of his unique engagement with different strands of Eurasian, if not global, currents. Equally singular elements would also be found if we considered the outlooks of, say, the Kangxi emperor, Chen Lunjiong, Antoine Gaubil, Ma Ziyun, Zhao Shiyong, and other of Ghombojab's contemporaries active within the orbit of the Qing court. This variety of knowledge and experience would be yet more pronounced if we considered the full range of those whose places of birth lay scattered throughout the Qing Empire. Limiting attention to Han Chinese Qing subjects before 1800, one finds merchants sojourning in Java, labourers taken to work in Nootka Sound, Catholic seminarians sent to train in Naples, and Muslims going to the Middle East for *hajj* and study.

Individual particularities arising from the confluence of multiple institutions and networks, the likely origin of Ghombojab's list of the 'sons of Chaghatai', reveals tension between macro- and micro-historical scales of analysis when trying to relate Qing history to its global context. Historians specializing in the Qing Empire, were they inclined to do so, could sketch out intersecting networks of trade, correspondence, and human movement that linked individual Qing subjects to almost every corner of the globe even before 1800. Marshalling these cases as evidence of a large Qing 'global footprint' would likely be challenged by alternative interpretations. Historians of other empires, such as the British, Russian, or Dutch, or of other large-scale entities like the Catholic Church, or the Islamic or Tibetan Buddhist *oecumene*, might with equal justice claim some of these figures as stray Qing subjects whose global connections required the initiative and infrastructure of their own object of study. Historians specializing in China or other sub-imperial units might claim these figures for their own research by arguing that the Qing Empire's size and diversity meant that no common Qing identity meaningfully existed. Yet rejecting the Qing Empire as a unit of analysis in favour of components like China proper, Tibet, or Mongolia leaves those same components open to disaggregation on similar grounds. After all, residents of Shanxi, Gansu, Fujian, Yunnan, and other provinces had distinct patterns of sojourning beyond China proper, conducted various types of foreign trade, received different foreign visitors, and in the process accumulated distinct pools of local knowledge. The same could be said about Sinophone Christians and Muslims, or officials serving in Beijing. Demanding increasingly rigorous levels of internal cohesion could be used to shatter any group identity, leaving only an atomized constellation of individuals whose engagement with the larger world was to some extent unique and idiosyncratic.

Micro-historical attention to the ways in which various global forces, trends, and networks intersected in the lives of individual Qing subjects is one important supplement to scales of analysis already well established in the study of that empire's place in the world, notably the bilateral (e.g., Qing-Korea, Qing-Russia), sub-imperial (e.g., China proper, Tibet, Mongolia), Qing imperial, and greater regional (e.g., East or Inner Asia). For global history to produce novel findings, however, it is equally important to consider the reverse: how to reassemble the interactions of particular Qing subjects with others at the Eurasian, if not global level, in a way that illustrates dynamics cutting across the most common imperial or regional scales of research.

(p.121) One brief example, drawn from the cartography of Central Asia in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, can illustrate the interaction of individuals on a Eurasian level. It is well known that employees of the Qing state—Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Jesuits, Tibetan Buddhist clergy—played a crucial role in this mapping. They were, however, only one part of a larger field of densely interwoven intellectual activity and information transmission. Russian relations with the Qing Empire stimulated the production of general maps of Siberia and surrounding territories.⁴⁴ Some copies of these Russian maps reached Beijing by 1689, where they were consulted by Jesuits and other Qing officials. In 1690, Antoine Thomas sent to Rome from Beijing an adaptation of one, covering not only Siberia but Central Asia, Persia, and India.⁴⁵ A Russian prototype also guided Tulišen's map of Eurasia, although he seems to have added information from Torghut informants. When Antoine Gaubil prepared his own personal manuscript map of Inner and Central Asia, his use of both Torghut and Russian place names, and particular Russian names in Chinese form (e.g. his *Touliessco* for the Chinese *Tuliyesike*, from Russian *Turetskoe* ['Turkish']) shows that he had read Tulišen's account, published around the time he reached Beijing. Gaubil's map also drew on recent European maps available in Beijing (which Chen Lunjiong also consulted around this time for his map of the eastern hemisphere). At the same time, Gaubil's draft map contained historical data, making reference to Chinggis Khan and Tamerlane. This shows that he was not only drafting it with reference to the official Qing project of mapping Russia and Central Asia, but also making notes for his personal project, commenced in 1725, of writing a history of the Mongols. When it was complete, this history referred to Chinese and Manchu sources, 'Tartar' informants, and works published in Europe.⁴⁶ Although Gaubil's history was finally published in Paris in 1739, his map remained in manuscript. Still, its depiction of Central Asian cities like Balkh and Bukhara was closely related to the 1734 map by Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville

that was printed and widely circulated in Europe as part of Du Halde's celebrated description of China.⁴⁷ Another map consulted by d'Anville was a historical map of Central Asia produced for the French translation of Abu 'l Ghazi's history of the Mongols, published in 1726.⁴⁸ One of the figures instrumental in arranging that translation, Philipp Johann von (p.122) Strahlenberg, was a Swedish prisoner of war in Tobolsk between 1711 and 1722, and therefore presumably in that city when Tulišen sojourned there. Von Strahlenberg, like Tulišen, visited the Torghut territories and painstakingly produced his own maps of Central Asia.⁴⁹

These cartographic interconnections, the details of which remain to be fully excavated, by no means represented a consciously collaborative endeavour. Still, not only was their content to some degree interdependent, but the circumstances in which they were created were shaped by interlocking political, commercial, intellectual, and religious currents. To arbitrarily segregate the analysis of these maps based on the languages they used, the empires within which they were composed, or the birthplaces and political or religious affiliations of their draughtsmen, would give at best a very partial picture of the dynamics by which people and information moved, merged, and influenced each other. Above all, these maps demonstrate certain interests, for instance in the geography of Central Asia, and in the history of the Mongols, that took particular forms in individual cases but were also expressions of research trends common across virtually all of Eurasia.

Conclusion

Several distinguished historians have recently shown how micro-histories can open new vistas on larger phenomena in global history, a conclusion with which this essay concurs.⁵⁰ Yet given the natural tendency of micro-history to gravitate toward cases chosen for their striking and unexpected features, it is worth emphasizing that *every* Qing subject, indeed every inhabitant of early modern Eurasia, had a unique engagement with global forces shaped by many factors, including place of residence, occupation, social connections, consumption, conversation and reading, and simply what they were curious about. Depending on what common denominators one selects as an organizing principle, whether state policies, prevailing languages and authoritative sources of knowledge, patterns of trade, religious beliefs, or institutional membership, these individual cases can be marshalled to support research calibrated to the scale of China, the Qing Empire, and entities greater or smaller. Yet when individual engagements with global forces are studied in pursuit of general conclusions about China or the Qing Empire in the world—conclusions, in other words, which aim at generalities about hundreds of millions (p.123) of people—it is easy to set aside the experience of one, ten, or ten thousand people as an exception or mere curiosity.

Herein lies the value of pairing close attention to individuals with a global level of analysis aiming to relate these individuals to vast but diffuse patterns of engagement. Common interest in the geography of Central Asia or the history and genealogy of the Mongols, for example, can serve as organizing criteria to show what has been called the ‘transnational co-production of knowledge’ working itself out above the scale of empires, continents, or organized transnational networks like the Catholic Church.⁵¹

Much scholarship has addressed the question of how to fit the Qing Empire, China, or its constituent sub-regions into their global context, on the assumption that these are coherent and self-contained entities interacting (or not) with others holding similar properties. Before cutting out these familiar patterns for analysis, however, it is useful to peer closely at the individual threads constituting the fabric of global history. Connecting strands severed as a matter of course to juxtapose, say, the Qing and British empires, or China and Europe, could be kept intact if we chose to cut out different and less obvious patterns. Ghombojab could properly be labelled a Qing subject and official, resident of Beijing, Mongolian aristocrat, and Tibetan Buddhist. Any attempt to separate out those categories for analysis in global history would have to include him. Such an approach would, however, be unable to address adequately either the uniqueness of his list of the

'sons of Chaghatai', which in 1725 he was perhaps the only person in Eurasia to espouse in that precise form, or the complex ties that probably came together to inform his ideas. Perhaps paradoxically, then, historical research that does not frame itself as studying the place of China or the Qing Empire in the world may in fact better illustrate how deeply individual Qing subjects were woven into global developments. (p.124)

Notes:

⁽¹⁾ The author wrote this paper during his term as a Member of the School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, funded by a Mellon Fellowship for Assistant Professors. He would like to thank Professor Nicola Di Cosmo for making this visit possible, and the College of William & Mary for granting him leave in the 2013-14 academic year. He also wishes to thank Fahad Bishara, David Brophy, Onuma Takahiro, and David Robinson for their assistance and insight.

⁽²⁾ This brief review primarily concerns historiography in English. The relationship of this body of historiography with Chinese and Japanese scholarship is a complex topic outside the scope of this paper.

⁽³⁾ J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Têng, 'On the Ch'ing Tributary System', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6, 2 (1941), pp. 135-246.

⁽⁴⁾ See, for instance, Andre Schmid, 'Tributary Relations and the Qing-Chosŏn Frontier on Mount Paektu', in Diana Lary (ed.), *The Chinese State at the Borders* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007); Seonmin Kim, 'Ginseng and Border Trespassing Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea', *Late Imperial China* 28, 1 (2007), pp. 33-61; Yingcong Dai, 'A Disguised Defeat: The Myanmar Campaign of the Qing Dynasty', *Modern Asian Studies* 38, 1 (2004), pp. 145-89.

⁽⁵⁾ Takeshi Hamashita, 'The Tribute Trade System and Modern Asia', trans. Neil Burton and Christian Daniels, in Linda Grove and Mark Selden (eds), *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 12-26.

⁽⁶⁾ Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, 'Born with a "Silver Spoon": The Origin of World Trade in 1571', *Journal of World History* 6, 2 (1995), pp. 201-21.

⁽⁷⁾ Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 117.

⁽⁸⁾ Kent G. Deng, 'Miracle or Mirage? Foreign Silver, China's Economy and Globalization from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries', *Pacific Economic Review* 13, 3 (2008), pp. 320–58.

⁽⁹⁾ Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

⁽¹⁰⁾ William S. Atwell, 'Notes on Silver, Foreign Trade, and the Late Ming Economy', *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i* 3, 8 (1977), pp. 1–33; William S. Atwell, 'Some Observations on the "Seventeenth Century Crisis" in China and Japan', *Journal of Asian Studies* 45, 2 (1986), pp. 223–44; Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

⁽¹¹⁾ The most compelling reconsideration of Qing imperialism is Peter C. Perdue's *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); see also Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). A slightly different approach to the 'colonial' expansion of Chinese farmers and merchants within the Qing Empire has also identified resonances with contemporary European expansion. See for instance, Emma Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).

⁽¹²⁾ Cheng Wei-chung, *War, Trade and Piracy in the China Seas, 1622–1683* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 222–4; Tonio Andrade has recently called attention to this 'Zheng Family Empire' as a neglected Asian 'overseas empire': 'Beyond Guns, Germs, and Steel: European Expansion and Maritime Asia, 1400–1750', *Journal of Early Modern History* 14, 1–2 (2010), pp. 165–86.

⁽¹³⁾ On Chinese as a political force in Southeast Asia long after 1683 see Masuda Erika, 'The Fall of Ayutthaya and Siam's Disrupted Order of Tribute to China (1767–1782)', *Taiwan Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 4, 2 (2007), pp. 75–128; On the complex commercial, political, and religious legacy of post-Zheng-era overseas Ming loyalism see, for instance, Charles J. Wheeler, 'Buddhism in the Re-ordering of an Early Modern World: Chinese Missions to CochinChina in the Seventeenth Century', *Journal of Global History* 2, 3 (2007), pp. 303–24.

⁽¹⁴⁾ See, for instance, Nicolas Standaert's study of Chinese Catholics marshalling Confucian and Christian learning to support of the Jesuit position in the Rites Controversy (*Chinese Voices in the Rites Controversy: Travelling Books, Community Networks, Intercultural Arguments* [Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 2012]); Henrietta Harrison's *The Missionary's Curse And Other Tales from a Chinese Catholic Village* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2013); and Catherine Jami on Kangxi's engagement with mathematics and natural science ('Western Learning and Imperial Scholarship: The Kangxi Emperor's Study', *East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine* 27 (2007), pp. 146-72, 166).

⁽¹⁵⁾ Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005).

⁽¹⁶⁾ Johan Elverskog, 'Wutai Shan, Qing Cosmopolitanism, and the Mongols', *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies* 6 (2011), pp. 243-74, p. 245; on East Asia see for instance Benjamin A. Elman, 'One Classic and Two Classical Traditions: The Recovery and Transmission of a Lost Edition of the *Analects*', *Monumenta Nipponica* 64, 1 (2009), pp. 53-82.

⁽¹⁷⁾ For two recent studies on connections between distant sectors of the Qing frontier see John Herman, 'Collaboration and Resistance on the Southwest Frontier: Early Eighteenth-Century Qing Expansion on Two Fronts', *Late Imperial China* 35, 1 (2014), pp. 77-112; Matthew W. Mosca, 'The Qing State and Its Awareness of Eurasian Interconnections, 1789-1806', *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 47, 2 (2014), pp. 103-16.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Kenneth Pomeranz, considering how to place Qing China in a global context between 1760 and 1840, finds that this is best done by (primarily economic) comparison and explicitly downplays the importance of 'global flows' or 'global currents' (208): 'Their Own Path to Crisis? Social Change, State-Building and the Limits of Qing Expansion, c.1770-1840', in David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds), *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c 1760-1840* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

⁽¹⁹⁾ For details of Ghombojab's early life, see Wuyunbilige, 'Guanyu Qingdai zhuming Menggu wenren Wuzhumuqin gong Gunbuzhabu de jidian xin shiliao', *Qingshi yanjiu* (2009), pp. 119-23; for a summary of his multilingual writings and translations, see J. W. de Jong, 'O "Zolotoj

knige” S. Damdina’; [review essay], *T’oung Pao*, 2nd Series, 54, 1 (1968), pp. 173–89.

(²⁰) For these names I have followed the forms in L. S. Puchkovskii (ed.), *Ganga-ïin Uruskhal: Istoriia žolotogo roda vladyki Chingisa:—sochinenie pod nazvaniem ‘Techenie Ganga’* (Moskva: Izdvo vostochnoi litry, 1960); slightly different Mongolian spellings are given in Coyiji (ed.) *Ghangha-yin urusqal* (Hohhot: Nei Menggu renmin chubanshe, 1980), pp. 55–7; Tibetan forms of these names are given in Ghombojab, *Rgya-nag chos-’byung/Hanqu Fojiao yuanliu ji* (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2005), pp. 208–9. This passage is translated in Johan Elverskog, *The Pearl Rosary: Mongol Historiography in Early Nineteenth Century Ordos* (Bloomington: The Mongolia Society, 2007), p. 48, n. 143. Elverskog’s translation leaves several terms in their original form; my translation interprets *Quyici* as the Chinese *Huizi* (Muslim) and *Balaša* as Balkh. *Urunggh-a* perhaps derives from Urgench.

(²¹) *Qing shilu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), vol 6, p. 505 (253.8a), KX52/2/6 (2 March 1713).

(²²) Li Di (ed.), *Kangxi jixia gewu bian yizhu* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1993), p. 95.

(²³) Zhong Han, ‘Kongga’er shiliao pingzhu’, *Minzushi yanjiu* 8 (2010).

(²⁴) Onuma Takahiro and David Brophy offered me important advice in the search for these identifications. Puchkovskii has already identified the reference to Imam Quli Khan: L. S. Puchkovskii, *Mongol’skie, Buriat-Mongol’skie Rukopisi i Ksilografy Instituta Vostokovedeniia* (Moscow: Izdvo Akademii Nauk, 1957), p. 41. On relations with Abdullah see David Brophy, ‘The Oirat in Eastern Turkistan and the Rise of Āfāq Khwāja’, *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 16 (2008/2009), pp. 5–28; on contact with Imam Quli Khan and Nadhr Muhammad, see Giorgio Rota, ‘Safavids and Kalmyks in the 17th Century: A Preliminary Assessment’, *Proceedings of the 5th Conference of the Societas Iranologica Europæa*, vol. 2 (2006), pp. 191, 194.

(²⁵) Sh. Bira, *Mongolian Historical Literature of the XVII–XIX Centuries Written in Tibetan*, trans. Stanley Frye (Bloomington: Tibet Society, 1970), 29.

(²⁶) David Brophy, ‘The Kings of Xinjiang: Muslims [sic] Elites and the Qing Empire’, *Études Orientales: Revue Culturelle Semestrielle* 25 (2008), pp. 69–90, p. 69.

(²⁷) *Qing shilu*, vol. 5, p. 955 (KX 183.2b-3a), KX36/4/5 (24 May 1697); vol. 5, p. 964 (KX 183.20b-21a), KX36/5/24 (12 July 1697).

(²⁸) Ma Tong, 'A Brief History of the Qâdiriyya in China', trans. Jonathan Lipman, *Journal of the History of Sufism* 1, 2 (2000), pp. 547-76; Ma Tong, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai menhuan suyuan* (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1986), pp. 83-92.

(²⁹) For more on Sufi and Muslim networks, see Francis Robinson in this volume.

(³⁰) Noda Jin, *Ro-Shin teikoku to Kazafu hankoku* (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2011), pp. 88-92; *Gongzhongdang Yongzheng chao zouzhe* (Taipei: Guoli Gugong bowuyuan, 1977), vol. 17, pp. 857-8.

(³¹) Antoine Gaubil, *Correspondance de Pékin, 1722-1759*, ed. Renée Simon (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1970), p. 237.

(³²) On this cartographic work see Matthew W. Mosca, *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the Transformation of Geopolitics in Qing China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

(³³) Gaubil, *Correspondance de Pékin*, p. 237.

(³⁴) Onuma Takahiro, 'The Development of the Junghars and the Role of Bukharan Merchants', *Journal of Central Eurasian Studies* 2 (2011), pp. 83-100.

(³⁵) According to Han Qi, this was an encounter between Zhao and Fr. Matteo Ripa: 'Cong Zhong-Xi wenxian kan Ma Guoxian zai gongting de huodong', in Michele Fatica and Francesco D'Arelli (eds), *La Missione Cattolica in Cina tra i Secoli XVIII-XIX* (Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1999), pp. 71-82, pp. 75-7. On Zhao Shiyong see *Beijing lishi wenxian yaoji jieti*, ed. Han Pu (Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 2010), vol. 2, p. 663.

(³⁶) For an overview of these Jesuit efforts see Felix A. Plattner, *Jesuits Go East*, trans. Lord Sudley and Oscar Blobel (Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds, 1950), pp. 166-215.

(³⁷) [Jacques Villotte], *Voyages d'un Missionnaire de la Compagnie de Jesus, en Turquie, en Perse, en Armenie, en Arabie, && en Barbarie* (Paris: J. Vincent, 1730), pp. 643-5.

(³⁸) Chen Lunjiong, *Haiguo wenjian lu* (no location: no publisher, 1730), 1.28a, 41b.

(³⁹) *Qing shilu*, vol. 9, pp. 516–17 (QL 21.32b–33a), QL1/6/29 (6 Aug 1736).

(⁴⁰) Hayashi Shunsai, *Ka-I hentai* (Tokyo: Tōyō bunko, 1959), vol. 3, p. 1921.

(⁴¹) Clifford E. Bosworth et al (eds), *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn (Leiden: Brill, 1967), vol. 1, p. 121.

(⁴²) I have borrowed this concept of a ‘Mongolian diaspora’ from David Robinson (personal communication).

(⁴³) Matthew T. Kapstein has placed Sum-pa Mkhan-po’s geographic scholarship within a ‘generally Indianized cultural framework’ and as part of ‘transformations of South Asian knowledge systems’: ‘Just Where in Jambudvīpa Are We? New Geographical Knowledge and Old Cosmological Schemes in Eighteenth-century Tibet’, in Sheldon Pollock (ed.), *Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia: Explorations in the Intellectual History of India and Tibet, 1500–1800* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), p. 336.

(⁴⁴) Valerie Kivelson, “‘Exalted and Glorified to the Ends of the Earth’”: Imperial Maps and Christian Spaces in Seventeenth- and Early Eighteenth-Century Russian Siberia’, in James R. Akerman (ed.), *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 57–9.

(⁴⁵) Anthony Florovsky, ‘Maps of the Siberian Route of the Belgian Jesuit, A. Thomas (1690)’, *Imago Mundi* 8 (1951), pp. 103–8.

(⁴⁶) Christophe Comentale, ‘Une Carte Inédite de Père Antoine Gaubil, S. J. : Chine et Tartarie’, in *Chine et Europe: Évolution et Particularités des Rapports Est-Ouest de XVIe au XXe Siècle* (Paris: Institute Ricci, 1991), pp. 125–33.

(⁴⁷) Theodore Foss, ‘A Western Interpretation of China: Jesuit Cartography’, in Charles E. Ronan and Bonnie B. C. Oh (eds), *East Meets West: The Jesuits in China, 1582–1773* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1988), pp. 236–7.

(⁴⁸) *Carte de l’Asie septentrionale [...] du temps de la grande invasion [...] de Zingis-Chan, pour servir à l’histoire généalogique des Tatars* (1726), <<http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b84688533>> (accessed 4 June 2014).

(⁴⁹) On von Strahlenberg's activities, see John R. Krueger, *The Kalmyk-Mongolian Vocabulary in Strahlenberg's Geography of 1730* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1975).

(⁵⁰) An early recognition of this can be found in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia', *Modern Asian Studies* 31, 3 (1997), pp. 735-62, p. 750; Bernhard Struck, Kate Ferris, and Jacques Revel, 'Introduction: Space and Scale in Transnational History', *The International History Review* 33, 4 (2011), pp. 573-84, p. 577, pp. 579-80; comments of Sebouh David Aslanian in 'How Size Matters: The Question of Scale in History', *American Historical Review* 118, 5 (2013), pp. 1431-72, pp. 1444-6. A particular successful micro-historical demonstration of 'the way in which the threads of local history are interwoven with global connections' (p. 9) is Harrison's *The Missionary's Curse and Other Tales*; see also Tonio Andrade, 'A Chinese Farmer, Two African Boys, and a Warlord: Toward a Global Microhistory', *Journal of World History* 21, 4 (2010), pp. 573-91.

(⁵¹) This phrase is taken from Sebastian Conrad, 'Enlightenment in Global History: A Historiographical Critique', *American Historical Review* 117, 4 (2012), pp. 999-1027, p. 1026.

