



The Devil's Handwriting

PRECOLONIALITY *and*
the GERMAN COLONIAL STATE
in QINGDAO, SAMOA,
and SOUTHWEST AFRICA

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[SIX]

The Foreign Devil's Handwriting & German Views of China before “Kiautschou”

China borders on the end of Almanye.

GASPAR DA CRUZ (1569)¹

We need missionaries from the Chinese.

LEIBNIZ (1697)²

In the view of the Chinese we are barbarians, and the popular name *Fankwei* [fan gui], “foreign devils,” precisely captures the stance we assume toward them.

REINHOLD WERNER, German navy captain (1873)³

Whatever the Chinese might have been in the past, today they are nothing but dirty barbarians who need a European master and not a European ambassador—the sooner the better!

ELISABETH VON HEYKING, wife of the German Envoy to China (Beijing, February 1897)⁴

The story of European views of China from Marco Polo through the end of the “long nineteenth century” is usually told in three stages. During the Middle Ages China was only vaguely described, mislocated on maps, and not even consistently named.⁵ Yet it was considered to be a wonder-

1. Gaspar da Cruz [1569] 1953, p. 72.

2. Leibniz 1994, p. 51.

3. R. Werner 1873, p. 231.

4. Heyking 1926, p. 205.

5. Well into the seventeenth century Europeans still called the parts of China north of the Yellow River “Cathay,” while the southern parts were called “Mangi,” “Manzi,” or even “Upper India.”

ful and rich utopia. Marco Polo and his brother visited Kublai Khan, who had extended his hegemony over “Cambulac” (Beijing) and established a summer residence at “Xanadu” (Shangdu) in 1264. In the next century the Franciscan friar Odoric of Pordenone described a country with the greatest cities and rivers in the world, and incredible wealth.⁶ Between the sixteenth century and 1750, this medieval discourse of wonder gradually evolved into a more detailed formation that historians have called Sinophilia. Created above all by the Jesuit missionaries to China and their counterparts who stayed in Europe, this was still a predominantly positive representation. China appeared now as an advanced civilization, on a par with or even superior to Europe. From the mid-eighteenth century onward, increasingly negative views of China began to prevail in Europe.⁷ Europeans now described China, like India during the same period, as stagnant or in terminal decline, its elites as corrupt, and its culture as less than fully civilized, even barbaric or savage. Slowly, the Chinese were assimilated to the “natives” who populated the European imagination. Sinophobia, as this discourse is conventionally labeled, was partly a response to changes inside Europe and China and the shifting relations between the two. But it was also initially an explicit refutation of Sinophilia, that is, a reversal of fortunes within the field of European proto-Sinology. Increasingly, Sinophobia also encompassed specific technologies for governing China in an anticipated colonial future.

Although this is not my main purpose here, it is worth noting several of the reasons for these broad tendencies in European perceptions of China. European Sinophilia emerged in the context of blossoming European trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and of perceptions of China as a huge and untapped market. The relative equality between China and Europe was shifting in this same period toward a European lead, but China continued to surpass European states in terms of its sheer territorial expanse and population size.⁸ Another source of Sinophilia was the Chinese themselves, who resisted attempts by Europeans to classify them as barbarians, sometimes turning this language back on the Europeans. Matteo Ricci told of one missionary staying in the home of a learned Chinese Christian, who said to him, “I really should feel ashamed in your presence . . . because it seems to me that you put all the Chinese, and particularly myself, in the

6. Odoric arrived in China in 1322 and returned to Italy in 1330, where he dictated a narrative of his journey (Odorico n.d. [1933]; Lach 1965–93, vol. 1, bk. 1, pp. 40–41; Hartig 1913).

7. See Appelton 1951; Lach and Kley 1965–93; Kley 1971; Étiemble 1988; Berger 1990; Janderek 1992; and Spence 1998.

8. Pomeranz 2000.

same class, into which we Chinese formerly put the unbelieving Tartars and barbarians.”⁹ This resistance persisted into the nineteenth century and beyond, but with a decreasing ability to influence European ideology.

The Jesuit China mission was responsible for many of the substantive details of Sinophilia. This mission was not separate from the expansion of European capitalism, of course, and certainly was not opposed to it. Missionaries traveled to and from China in the ships of the East Asian trading companies, and until 1596 the Jesuit Chinese mission was based in Macao under the protection of the Portuguese, who operated the first and longest-lived European trading enclave in China.¹⁰ None of this explains the Jesuits’ relative success in penetrating the Chinese imperial court or their celebrated “accommodation” to Confucianism. The Jesuit missionaries were renowned for learning local languages, and in China they dressed and coiffed themselves in the style of the mandarins and adopted a non-dogmatic approach to what they understood to be the dominant “religion” of the Chinese elite, namely Confucianism.¹¹ Their goal was to transform China gradually by influencing key members of its official class rather than seeking rapid, wide-scale conversions. Indeed, the number of Chinese converts remained small, due not only to the mission’s targeted focus on the mandarin class but also to recalcitrance and resistance. The Jesuit depiction of China remained extremely positive nonetheless, and European images of China were heavily mediated by these productions from the mid-sixteenth until the mid-eighteenth century. Even the literature on China written by Protestants in England, Germany, and the United Provinces drew mainly on Jesuit writings. A new set of motives for endorsing the Jesuit-based view of China appeared during the Enlightenment, as Voltaire and the Protestant philosopher Christian Wolff used China to conjure up the possibility of a rational, enlightened monarchy.¹²

The subsequent Sinophobia in Europe also had numerous sources. The mid-eighteenth century saw a marked increase in aggressiveness toward China by European merchants, who complained bitterly about barriers thrown up against them by local officials. Traders had lamented their treatment by the Chinese in earlier centuries, but little of this reached the ears of broader European publics. All of this changed with the publication of George Anson’s *Voyage round the World* (1748), a best-selling account of the

9. Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, p. 327; also p. 201. See L. Liu 2004, chap. 2, on this political-semiotic struggle between China and Britain in the nineteenth century.

10. Pons [1999] 2002.

11. Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, p. 154.

12. Gerlach and Wollgast 1979.

British commodore's five-month stay in Macao and Canton (Guangzhou) that was translated into German in 1795. Anson's book was structured as a point-by-point refutation of what he called "jesuitical fictions."¹³ These ideas were reinforced and elaborated in the accounts written by participants in George Macartney's embassy to China in 1793, most influentially by John Barrow (the same John Barrow we encountered in South Africa), but also Johann Hüttner, the only German accompanying that mission.¹⁴ Britain's nineteenth-century shift toward an energetic enforcement of "open markets," during the period known as "free-trade imperialism," thus accounts partly for the shift in tone. But the two high points of vigorous Sinophobia were actually located in periods without an uncontested hegemon, namely, the decades between the end of Dutch hegemony (roughly 1730) and the rise of British hegemony after 1815, and during the late nineteenth century, when uncontested British global power began to recede.¹⁵ This is not to say that Europeans returned to Sinophilia between 1815 and the 1880s, however. Such a complete reversal was foreclosed by other developments: the rise of "scientific" race theories and of more explicitly Eurocentric philosophies of history, the widening of the technological gap between China and Europe, and the disappearance of the Jesuit mission after 1773. The Protestant overseas missionary societies that began to emerge at the end of the eighteenth century were less appreciative of China than the Jesuits and less interested in striking accommodating compromises with extant Chinese practice.¹⁶ The Protestants were more oriented than the Jesuits had been toward lower Chinese social strata, in an effort to bypass resistance by

13. Anson [1748] 1974, p. 368.

14. Macartney 1962; Barrow [1804] 1806; Marshall 1993; Dabringhaus 1996; Hevia 1995b.

15. During these nonhegemonic periods Europeans struggled for overseas trading advantages against one another and against China, and there was no recognized hegemon to mediate disputes and press China for "open door" access. The mid-nineteenth century, by contrast, was one of unparalleled British economic and naval superiority, and one result of the Opium Wars was greater access to Chinese markets and Chinese souls for *all* European traders and missionaries, not just for the British. For an example of the connections between these policies and descriptions of the Chinese character, see "Free Trade with China," *Chinese Repository* 2 (1833-34): 355-74. On the periodization of the Dutch and British hegemonies see Arrighi 1994.

16. For representative Protestant views of China in this period see Gützlaff 1834, 1838. As we saw in earlier chapters, there were also significant differences in the orientations of the Rhenish Mission in Southwest Africa and the London Missionary Society in Samoa. The former abandoned the idea of working through indigenous elites and tended to collect lower-status people from disparate ethnic groups, while the latter were successful in converting the majority of the population and did not limit their efforts to one class or the other.

the mandarins. They also hoped to convert larger numbers and to forge an indigenous ministry. The growth of democratic sentiment in Europe fed the distaste for China and other traditional hierarchical polities. Karl Marx's revulsion against "ancient despotism" in India and China, for example, nearly canceled out his loathing for European imperial interventions in the same places.

German visions of China have to be placed in a wider European context, as in the earlier chapters. I will first discuss the most influential representations in the pan-European discussion before turning to specifically German ones. Indeed, German images of China in both the Sinophilic and Sinophobic periods corresponded closely to general European trends. All of the influential treatises on China were translated into German, and some of the most important Sinophobic texts were written by Germans, including Hegel, Herder, Marx, and Gützlaff. Max Weber's *Religion of China* can also be considered in this context as a classic example of Sinophobia.¹⁷ Two German specialists on China were directly connected to the occupation of Qingdao: Ferdinand von Richthofen, a geographer who first called German authorities' attention to Jiaozhou, and Elisabeth von Heyking, wife of the German minister to China during Qingdao's annexation and the author of exotic romance novels set in overseas colonies. In the late nineteenth century, Karl May, the prominent German author of adventure tales, wrote three novels set in China, and Theodor Fontane's *Effi Briest* contained the most famous Chinese figure in nineteenth-century German literature. By closely examining a specific national literature I will be able to show that Sinophobia did not completely displace Sinophilia in the nineteenth century but was superimposed upon and interwoven with it. This persistent multivocality of German views of China was of critical importance for native policy in "Kiaochow."

Europe's Cathay

In Xanadu did Kubla Khan
A stately pleasure-dome decree

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, "Kubla Khan"

The most influential medieval European book on the Far East that included a treatment of China was John Mandeville's *Travels*, which "began to cir-

17. There is a sizable literature on the older German discourse on China. See Aurich 1935; Debon and Hsia 1985; Fang 1992; Gollwitzer 1962; Hsia 1985; Jacobs 1995; Li 1992; Loh-Loh 1982; Pigulla 1996; E. Rose 1981; Schuster 1988; Selden 1942; and Tscharnier 1939. On Weber, see Steinmetz 2006a.

culate in Europe between 1356 and 1366” and was widely reproduced even before the invention of the printing press.¹⁸ Although Mandeville’s text has long been decried as a fabrication and a plagiarism, it was immensely popular, surpassing Marco Polo’s authentic account in circulation.¹⁹ Indeed, sixty-five of the three hundred extant copies of Mandeville from the era before the invention of the printing press are in German, suggesting that he was probably “more popular in Germany than elsewhere.”²⁰ Mandeville’s book was a magical fable that reinforced the general sense of the Far East as “the supreme source of riches and marvels.”²¹ Mandeville described the “land of Cathay” as “a great country, beautiful, rich, fertile, full of good merchandise,” whose people were “marvelously clever in anything they want to do, more than any other people in the world.” Of the great khan of Tartary, emperor of Cathay, Mandeville wrote that he was “the greatest King, passing all other Kings, and the richest in gold, all kinds of treasure, and of greatest royalty.” Centrally important for future European uses of China was Mandeville’s image of the emperor surrounded at his table by “many philosophers and men learned in different branches of knowledge.”²²

Marco Polo’s narrative was “the first such work by a Westerner to claim to look at China from the inside,” and his “most famous early reader” was Christopher Columbus.²³ Polo’s text was also a romance of the court of Kublai Khan that presented China as an enormous, glamorous, and benevolent dictatorship.²⁴ Versions of Polo’s *Travels* appeared in German as early as 1477, and new translations were published in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.

The next stage in the elaboration of Western representations of China resulted from early Portuguese and Spanish mercantile expansion and the establishment of the Jesuit mission. By 1557 the Portuguese had taken control of Macao and started trading in Canton. Several decades later Spaniards were trading illegally along the Chinese coast. In 1624 the Dutch occupied the island they called Formosa; the English arrived in Canton in 1637. By

18. Moseley, introduction to Mandeville 1983, p. 9.

19. Appleton 1951, pp. 5–6. Mandeville’s book was translated into German around 1400 and was republished another nine times in German between 1481 and 1507 and again in 1580 and 1600 (Lach 1965–93, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 330–31).

20. Lach 1965–93, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 330.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

22. This places the text historically before or during the conquest of the Southern Song dynasty by Kublai Khan. Quotes from Mandeville 1983, pp. 141, 143, 149, and 151.

23. Spence 1998, pp. 1, 17.

24. Appleton 1951, p. 6; Polo 1993, vol. 1, pp. 266–69.

the early seventeenth century, China had become “a prime object of commercial interest.”²⁵ As a result there were over fifty independent accounts of China published in Europe during the seventeenth century, plus a large number of novels, plays, and historical or comparative treatments.²⁶ The seventeenth century also saw the beginnings of European chinoiserie, that is, the selective integration of romantic Chinese images into European objects d’art, gardens, and textiles, as well as isolated examples of more serious artistic interaction.²⁷

Sinomania

European accounts of China before the mid-eighteenth century echoed Polo and Mandeville in focusing on the country’s sheer wealth and grandiosity and its well-ordered state, its excellent form of government.²⁸ The 1585 book by the Augustine monk Juan González de Mendoza became “the point of departure . . . for all subsequent European works on China written before the eighteenth century.”²⁹ Mendoza’s title, in the English translation, summarized his argument: *The Historie of the Great and Mightie Kingdome of China, and the Situation Thereof: Together with the great riches, huge cities, politike gouvernement, and rare inuentions in the same*. He emphasized the “huge bignesse” of the king’s “mightie and sumptuous pallace” and concluded “that they liue with so great abundance, that all things do flow so that they lacke nothing necessarie for their bodies,” although their souls did of course lack Christianity.³⁰ Giovanni Botero, in his widely read *Ragion di Stato* (Reason of State, published in 1589), wrote that “there is not in all the world a kingdom . . . that is either greater, more populous, or more rich, or more abounding in all good things, or that hath more ages lasted and endured than that famous and renowned kingdom of China.” China was “an extremely well-administered country.”³¹ In 1583 Matteo Ricci opened the first Catholic mission in China since the departure of the Franciscans two and a half centuries earlier. Ricci’s books were extremely favorable to

25. Lach 1965–93, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 816.

26. Lach 1965–93, vol. 3, pt. 4, p. 1743.

27. Jarry 1981; Gruber 1984; Sullivan 1997.

28. Guy (1963) used the term “Sinomania” in describing this intellectual formation.

29. Lach 1965–93, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 744.

30. Mendoza 1853, vol. 1, p. 77; vol. 2, p. 287.

31. Botero [1589] 1956, pp. 264–65, 150. For similar praise see Montaigne [1580] 1958, p. 352; Temple 1814, vol. 3, pp. 39, 342; William Whiston (1696; see Appleton 1951, p. 33); and Careri [1704] 1752, p. 327.

China, “offering a picture of a vast, unified, well-ordered country” run by a “professional bureaucracy selected” on the basis of merit, and “held together by a central controlling orthodoxy, that of Confucianism.”³²

Europeans, especially Jesuits, singled out the role of the Chinese scholar-official for special praise. Father Nicolas Trigault, a Jesuit who published the “most influential description of China to appear during the first half of the seventeenth century,” based on Ricci’s journals, wrote that “the entire Kingdom is administered by the Order of the Learned, commonly known as The Philosophers,” who surpassed others in courage, adding that perhaps this “has its origin in the fact that the mind of man is ennobled by the study of letters.”³³ The Portuguese Jesuit Gabriel de Magalhães (a distant relative of the explorer and navigator known as Magellan), who lived in Beijing during the reign of the second Qing emperor, wrote that the chief end of “the Law of the *Learned*, as they call it” in China, is “the good Government of the Kingdom.”³⁴ Olfert Dapper, compiler of a text on the second and third Dutch embassies to the Chinese emperor in 1666–68, agreed: “It is remarkable that the entire empire . . . is governed by philosophers, who have a pure and undiluted [*unvermengte*] rule.”³⁵

Europeans in this period often suggested that the Chinese monarchy was controlled by a system of checks and balances. According to Dapper any abuse of power by the emperor had traditionally been prevented by the mandarins, who used their “undaunted freedom and confidence in the admonishing of their Kings and Emperors, when they saw them wander from the way of Vertue.” Even now, Dapper wrote, it is “customary that the Governors throw down their badges before the Emperor if he asks them to do something they fear may prove prejudicial to the Realm or if he ignores their admonishment.”³⁶ By the same token, abuses directed against the common people by the provincial mandarin rulers were watched over by a board of investigating censors. Trigault approvingly told the story of one mandarin, “delinquent in the performance of his duty,” who was “put out of the way

32. Spence 1998, p. 31. Ricci concluded that the Chinese needed Western logic and Christianity in order to advance (*ibid.*, p. 31–35).

33. Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, pp. 55–56; on Trigault, see Lach 1965–93, vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 512–13.

34. Magalhaes 1688, p. 193.

35. Dapper, “Dritte gesandtschaft an den Kayser von Sina oder Taising,” in Dapper 1675, p. 41.

36. This translation is from Montanus 1671, p. 403, a direct translation of Dapper’s original Dutch text from 1670, which was itself based on Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, p. 50.

with considerable torture.”³⁷ Sir William Temple emphasized that in China “all orders and commands of the King . . . are made upon the recommendation or petition of the council proper and appointed for that affair,” and that “all great offices of state are likewise conferred by the King, upon the same recommendations . . . so that none are preferred by the humour of the Prince himself, nor by favour of any Minister, by flattery or corruption, but by force or appearance of merit, of learning, and of virtue.”³⁸

The theme of the philosophers’ role in government was linked to the idea of meritocracy. In 1589 Giovanni Maffei praised the exam system and absence of a hereditary nobility in a country where every man is the “founder of his own fortune.”³⁹ The report on the Dutch embassy of 1666 observed that the “ascent to the greatest place of dignity” in the Chinese government was not “lockt up from any sort of People . . . but opened to every one at the Emperor’s pleasure.”⁴⁰ China’s meritocracy was especially attractive to educated Europeans who lacked economic wealth and hereditary cultural capital. The career of Father Johann Adam Schall von Bell, the German Jesuit who worked at the Chinese court and was eventually promoted to the rank of first-class mandarin (see fig. 6.1), enthralled generations of European (and Chinese) intellectuals.

This was related to the theme of education and literacy. Mendoza noted that the Chinese had printed books long before Europe, and Magalhães wrote, “I do not believe there is any Kingdom where there are so many Scholars as there are Bachelors of Art in *China* . . . nor that there is any other Country where the knowledge of letters is so universal and so common.”⁴¹

37. Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, p. 50; see Hucker 1966 on the Chinese Censorate.

38. Temple 1814, vol. 3, p. 337.

39. Giovanni Pietro Maffei, *Historiarum indicarum libri XVI* (Venice: D. Zenarium, 1589), translated in Lach 1965–93, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 804. For an almost identical statement see Careri 1704, p. 348.

40. Montanus 1671, pp. 392–93. William Temple wrote, “As other nations are usually distinguished into Noble and Plebian, so that of China may be distinguished into Learned and Illiterate” (1814, vol. 3, p. 330). Many Europeans in the seventeenth century commented on the lack of a hereditary aristocracy in China and found it shocking that schools were open to all based on merit (Lach 1965–93, vol. 3, pt. 4, p. 1627; vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 781).

41. Mendoza 1853, vol. 1, p. 131; Magalhaes 1688, p. 88. Navarrete ([1676] 1962, vol. 1, p. 151) described the Chinese as “much addicted to Learning and inclin’d to Reading.” Careri ([1704] 1752, p. 340) asked, “What kingdom is there in the world so full of universities as China?” Even in the middle of the nineteenth century the Catholic missionary Evariste Régis Huc ([1855] 1970, vol. 2, p. 56) described China as a “philosophical oligarchy.”



FIGURE 6.1 Johann Adam Schall von Bell. From Athanasius Kircher, *China illustrata* (1667). (Courtesy of Special Collections Library, University of Michigan.)

China's sheer antiquity and tradition-based stability exercised a powerful grip on European minds in this period, in contrast to the condemnation of traditionalism by Sinophobes. The Jesuits repeated the Chinese neo-Confucians' representation of their mother country as ancient, well documented, and unchanging.⁴² For Trigault the Chinese were superior to Europeans in disdaining conquest and thus successfully preserving "what their ancestors have bequeathed them . . . through a period of some thousands of years."⁴³ This fascination with tranquil stability is understandable in the context of the religious and political warfare in Europe at the time

42. Osterhammel 1998, p. 391. Osterhammel's magnificent book has not yet been translated into English.

43. Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, p. 55.

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(especially the Thirty Years' War). The apparently peaceful assimilation of the Manchu conquerors to Chinese ways presented Europeans with a stark contrast to their own factiousness during the Counter-Reformation.

Alongside these central topoi were a variety of other themes that showed China to be equal civilizationally to Europe and even superior in some respects. Again, most of these claims would be disputed or their meanings inverted in the subsequent period:

- The Chinese language was a subject of endless European fascination and, in this period, of praise. Giovanni Careri extolled the language for containing “at least 54,409 letters,” which he said were able to express their meaning “with such a grace, vivacity and force, that they seem not to be characters, but voices and tongues that speak, or rather figures and images, which represent every thing to the life.”⁴⁴ The Berlin proto-Sinologists Andreas Müller and Christian Mentzel, philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and a number of English scholars were so intrigued with Chinese that they believed it might provide the key to the rediscovery of the primitive universal language of the Bible or the construction of a new one.⁴⁵
- Chinese medicine was widely praised.⁴⁶ Careri cited the Jesuit Daniel Bartoli to the effect that Chinese doctors “far outdo our physicians of Europe.”⁴⁷ Sir William Temple observed that the Chinese physicians were “admirable in the knowledge of the pulse, and by that, in discovering the causes of all inward diseases.”⁴⁸
- Chinese politeness was widely admired. Careri contended that “the most courteous and mannerly people among us, in *China* would seem rude and savage.”⁴⁹ Sinophobes later would reframe this as wasteful pretention.
- Europeans at this time were much more tolerant of the treatment of Chinese women than in a later period. A Scotsman in the employ of the Russian court who took part in an official embassy to China in

44. Careri [1704] 1752, p. 339.

45. Mungello 1985; Appleton 1951, pp. 22–36. John Webb (1669) argued that the Chinese descended from Noah through Shem and that their land had “been peopled while the earth still spoke one language” (Appleton 1951, p. 28).

46. Mungello 1985, p. 39.

47. Careri [1704] 1752, p. 341.

48. Temple 1814, vol. 3, p. 297. Temple was probably drawing on the account of Johann Grueber, discussed below.

49. Careri [1704] 1752, p. 352.

1719–22, John Bell, even praised the Chinese “*above all*” for their “decent treatment of their women of all ranks.”⁵⁰ Discussing the practice of drowning female infants, Trigault suggested that “this barbarism is probably rendered less atrocious by their belief in metempsychosis, or the transmigration of souls.”⁵¹

- Even in the area of religion there was a surprising level of appreciativeness. In 1659 Rome instructed Jesuit missionaries “that they should adapt Christianity to the indigenous cultures of foreign people rather than imposing European manners and customs.” Non-Western cultures “were to be changed only where they contradicted the Christian religion and morality,” and there was an emphasis on developing an indigenous clergy.⁵² This reinforced the “accommodationist” strategy that had already become standard practice among Jesuits in China. Similarities and points of communication were sought between Christianity and the “religion” of the educated upper classes, Confucianism. Magalhães composed a treatise arguing that “both the Chinese and Europeans were descended from a common Biblical source and that the similarity of the morality of the ancient Chinese to Christianity was due to the Chinese receiving their Old Testament morality directly rather than indirectly through natural theology.”⁵³ Non-Jesuit writers like William Temple, Christian Wolff, and Voltaire were effusive in their praise of Confucian practical ethics. For most of the seventeenth century and well into the eighteenth European readers were provided with a growing literature on Confucianism and translations of many Chinese classics.

One of the most interesting formal aspects of this Sinophilic literature is its high level of dialogism and syncretism as compared to the early literatures on Africans and Polynesians, or to the later Sinophobic literature. Although this seems to reflect the fact that China was indeed a literate culture with a large publishing industry, the “barbarization” of China in the nineteenth century belies the argument that European representations were necessarily tied to observed realities. Many Chinese spent time in Europe, especially in Rome. One eighteenth-century volume included a ten-year correspondence between a Frenchman and two Chinese Jesuits who had studied theology in France and Rome.⁵⁴ Another genre was the Chinese

50. Bell [1763] 1966, p. 182.

51. Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, p. 86.

52. Mungello 1985, p. 24.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

54. Meiners 1778.

response to critical European accounts. A fairly negative depiction of China by Evert Ysbrants Ides from 1706 was published together with a Chinese rejoinder. Voltaire's "Entretiens chinois" (1758–59) is a (fictional) discussion between a Jesuit in China and a Chinese mandarin who has studied in Europe, and his "Catéchisme chinois" (1764) presents a dialogue between a Chinese prince and a scholar. A number of European writers used the device of the "wise and tolerant mandarin" visiting London or Paris and commenting on the inadequacy of European sexual and political behavior.⁵⁵ A 1664 religious treatise called *Summary of the Spread of Heavenly Teaching/Tien xue chuan kai* was a "collaborative effort involving several Jesuits and a Chinese convert," and the book's main author was Chinese.⁵⁶ Chinese voices were of course frequently filtered through European ones, and even when they were reported directly, the interlocutors were partly Europeanized Christians.⁵⁷ The level of syncretism, dialogism, and exchange was still far greater in the case of China than in other parts of the colonized or pre-colonial world.⁵⁸ The inclusion of Chinese characters or formal devices from Chinese-style landscape painting allowed Europeans a glimpse of a radically different culture and aesthetic (see fig. 6.2).⁵⁹ Some Chinese texts were also translated into European languages. One that became especially popular in Europe in the eighteenth century was *The Little Orphan of the Family of Tschao (Zhao Shi Gu Er)*, a fourteenth-century play, which told the story of an abusive mandarin whose career (and life) was ended by the combined efforts of other mandarins and the emperor himself. The play thus ratified

55. Jones 2001, p. 24; see also Blue 1999.

56. Mungello 1985, pp. 92–93; 1982.

57. Only at the end of the nineteenth century did writings by contemporary non-Christian Chinese comparing Western and Chinese culture begin to appear in Europe, for example, Gu Hongming (Ku Hung-Ming; see Ku 1898, 1911) and Chen Jitong (1890, 1892). By that time, however, Sinophobia was in full bloom, and the very presence of Marquis Chen, the Chinese ambassador to Paris, seemed to fan the flames of the "yellow peril" discourse among Europeans (Gollwitzer 1962, p. 31).

58. China was also open to European culture in the Kangxi and Qianlong Emperor periods. The Old Imperial Garden (Yuanming Yuan), originally outside Beijing, was designed by Jesuits and Chinese artists at the command of the Qianlong Emperor between 1737 and 1759 and included baroque-rococo elements alongside traditional Chinese ones (Wong 2001; see plates 7, 8). Europe's openness is also suggested by chinoiserie, however simplified its images. There was almost no comparable stylistic syncretism involving Oceanic or African art until twentieth-century cubism and expressionism (see J. Lloyd 1991; Einstein 1915; and Harrison, Frascina, and Perry 1993). But while Gauguin is often dismissed for imposing contemporary European pictorial conventions on Polynesian subject matter, some of his graphic work does integrate Polynesian formal elements.

59. As in *Regni Chineses descripto* (1639; title page reproduced in Lach 1965–93, vol. 3, pt. 1, plate 72) or the illustrations in Dapper 1675; and Kircher 1670.




FIGURE 6.2 Two Chinese ladies, from Athanasius Kircher, *China illustrata* (1667). (Courtesy of Special Collections Library, University of Michigan.)

the view of the Chinese state as balanced and just. *The Little Orphan* was adapted and translated several times in the next century, most famously by Voltaire as *The Orphan of China* (*L'orphelin de la Chine* [1755]).⁶⁰ Voltaire's play was performed almost two hundred times at the Comédie française before 1833 and was translated into other languages, including German.⁶¹ It differed in several significant ways from the Chinese original, including a less tragic ending that allowed Voltaire to produce the synthesis of nature and reason that he saw embodied in Confucian China.⁶²

Voltaire was the last prominent European writer before the twentieth century to present an almost uniformly commendatory picture of China in all his works, "even up to the last, when the [China] cult showed signs of

60. Voltaire [1755] 1877, p. 296; Appleton 1951, pp. 82–89. Voltaire wrote the play after reading missionary Joseph Henri Marie de Prémare's translation of the Chinese original, which was published as "Tchao Chi Cou Ell; or, The Little Orphan of the Family of Tchao: A Chinese Tragedy," in Du Halde 1741, vol. 3, pp. 193–237.

61. Park 1974, p. 112.

62. Voltaire's play has not been analyzed or even much performed since the eighteenth century (but see Park 1974 on two twentieth-century productions). Formally *L'orphelin* is a mix of classical tragedy and melodrama.

disappearing in France.”⁶³ China, he insisted, was superior to Europe with regard to ethics and government. It was a “vast empire, powerful and wise,” even if it was inferior to Europe in scientific and artistic terms.⁶⁴ Like the Jesuits, he applauded the combination of a powerful central authority, advised and checked by scholar-officials selected on the basis of merit. Voltaire argued that Chinese tribunals showed Europe “how to manage the blood of man”: “for more than four thousand years they have not executed a villager at the outskirts of the empire without sending his case to the emperor, who has it examined three times by his tribunals” before reaching a decision.⁶⁵ He vehemently attacked Montesquieu’s despotism thesis as well as the more derivative but influential Sinophobe, Cornelius de Pauw.⁶⁶ Voltaire’s “most extravagant praise” was reserved for Confucius, whose portrait faced him in his study as he worked.⁶⁷ Along with his immediate contemporary François Quesnay, Voltaire accomplished the secularization of Jesuit Sino-philia.⁶⁸ He applauded China for its strictly empirical historiography, which eschewed creation myths, and for creating a well-regulated (*police*) society without relying on superstitions like the idea of hell as a means of controlling the masses.⁶⁹ He praised Confucianism as the only religion in the world that had never been “soiled by fanaticism” or sparked civil war.⁷⁰ Voltaire even seemed to condone the Yongzheng Emperor, a practicing Buddhist, for driving most of the Christian missionaries out of China, repeating the emperor’s question “What would you say if I sent a troop of bonzes or lamas to preach their laws in your country?”⁷¹ Jonathan Spence notes that Voltaire “gave a new twist to Western historiography” by *beginning* his universal

63. Rowbotham 1932, p. 1050.

64. Voltaire 1963, vol. I, p. 67.

65. Voltaire [1766] 1879, pp. 556–57.

66. Voltaire 1963, vol. I, p. 216; [1776] 1879b. Voltaire also criticized Commodore Anson for basing his account of China on the “little people of Canton” and conflating them with Chinese officialdom (1963, vol. I, p. 217).

67. Rowbotham 1932, p. 1057; Voltaire [1776] 1879b, pp. 469–70.

68. Quesnay, economist, leader of the physiocrats, author of the *Tableau économique*, and adviser to Louis XV, was born in 1694, like Voltaire. According to Rowbotham 1932, p. 1051, one of Voltaire’s favorite professors was the Jesuit René-Joseph de Tournemine, who corresponded with Father Joachim Bouvet at the Chinese Court in Beijing. Like Leibniz, Voltaire sought interlocutors from the Jesuit China mission.

69. Voltaire 1963, vol. I, pp. 66–67, 71.

70. Voltaire 1879b, p. 81; 1963, vol. I, p. 222.

71. Voltaire [1764] 1879, pp. 153–54. The Yongzheng Emperor (ruled 1723–35) curtailed the involvement of the Jesuits at the court and cowed them into being “extraordinarily circumspect in their behavior,” but without actually banning or expelling them (Spence 1990, p. 84).

history in *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* with a discussion of China. Hegel would soon begin his lectures in the philosophy of history with China as well, but to radically different effect.⁷²

Voltaire's Sinophilia was interwoven with hints of the imperialist approach to China that would wreak so much havoc during the next century. His dedication of *L'orphelin* to Richelieu already gives a hint of the looming protocolonialist attitude toward China that was being articulated by Commodore Anson during the same decade. The Chinese, Voltaire submitted here, "don't yet realize how superior we are to them."⁷³ Unlike the Jesuits, Voltaire was not referring to spiritual superiority; instead, this represents an early application to China of social-evolutionary theory. Voltaire was closer to Montesquieu in this sense than his more explicit critiques of that writer would indicate. In this respect, he represents a transitional figure, embodying both the apotheosis of Sinophilia and its supercession.

German Views of China in the Era of Sinomania

Some [of the Chinese are] more yealow, *like vnto the Almans*, yelow and red colour.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ DE MENDOZA⁷⁴

To what extent did Germans contribute to Sinophilia's arc? The German-speaking lands were cut off from the beginnings of European overseas expansion due to their political fragmentation and, after the Reformation, because of initial "Protestant hostility to Catholic pilgrimages and victories overseas."⁷⁵ Nonetheless, many Germans participated in the pan-European wave of overseas expansion and information gathering. Already during the sixteenth century, "thousands of Germans were involved in the spice trade as merchants and investors, and in the overseas voyages as sailors, gunners, and pilots."⁷⁶ In the following century many more traveled to southern Africa and the Far East in the employ of the Dutch East Indies Company (founded in 1602), and smaller numbers in the service of the Russian tsar, or the Jesuit order. China began to play a central role in the systems of German philosophers and social theorists starting with

72. Spence 1998, p. 97; Hegel 1956.

73. Voltaire [1755] 1877, p. 298.

74. Mendoza 1853, vol. 1, p. 11 (my emphasis).

75. Lach 1965-93, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 342.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 329.

Herder in the eighteenth century. China figured centrally in Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history and in Max Weber's sociology of world religions. Little of what these writers said about China was uniquely German, however, but was part of conversations that spanned Europe and its East Asian contact zones. Nonetheless, German imperialists in the nineteenth century sometimes paid special attention to German Sinological legacies.

The ranks of the Jesuits in China began to include Germans after 1611, when Spain and Portugal first allowed missionaries from other countries to work overseas. The Jesuits disseminated information about China in the German-speaking parts of Europe.⁷⁷ The most renowned of the German Jesuits in China was Johann Adam Schall von Bell (known in China as Tang Ruowang), who became president of the Astronomical Board (see fig. 6.3) at the emperor's court in Beijing.⁷⁸ Continuing a practice introduced by Matteo Ricci and perpetuated by generations of Catholic missionaries, he dressed like a Chinese mandarin. After the Manchu conquest in 1644 he began shaving himself closely in the style of the new ruling elite.⁷⁹ The emperor eventually promoted Bell to the rank of first-class mandarin. Bell wrote a history of the Chinese mission, published in Latin in 1665 and translated into German the following year.⁸⁰ Another German Jesuit, Johann Schreck, known also as Terrentius or Terrenz (Chinese Teng [Deng] Yü-han), was Bell's predecessor and an acquaintance of Galileo and Kepler, and had also worked at the Beijing Astronomical Board. He reformed the Chinese calendar and translated astronomical and anatomical works into Chinese.⁸¹ According to Athanasius Kircher, who had taught in Würzburg, Schreck was "famous all over Germany, and much liked by princes."⁸² Schreck accompanied Nicolas Trigault on his European "propaganda tour" for the China mission in 1616,

77. The names of German Jesuits in China are listed in *Zeitung auss der neuen Welt oder Chinesischen Königreichen* (Martini 1654b); for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Huonder 1899, pp. 183–97. On Jesuit education in Germany see Krammer 1988; and Hengst 1981.

78. Bell died in Beijing in 1666 at the age of seventy-four. On Bell, see Duhr 1936; Allan 1975, chap. 8; Malek 1998; and Vāth 1991.

79. On Bell's close-shaven look we have the testimony of the Dutch embassy (Montanus 1671, p. 4; also Nieuhof [1669] 1972, p. 117).

80. Schall von Bell 1834.

81. Allan 1975, pp. 118–19; Huard 1953, pp. 269–71; Collani 1998, pp. 85–87. Schreck was born in Konstanz in 1576 and arrived in China in 1621, where he died in 1630 (Reil 1978, p. 64; Iannaccone 1998). Another German Jesuit in seventeenth-century China was Andreas Wolfgang Koffler, who converted a number of high-ranking members of the court of the last Ming dynasty pretender, the Yung-li Emperor, after the Manchu conquest (Collani 1992).

82. Kircher 1670, p. 149.

visiting German cities and courts and speaking to enthusiastic bishops and students, raising money and recruiting new missionaries. One stop was the university in Würzburg, which was staffed by Jesuits.⁸³ Kilian Stumpf (Chinese Ji Li'an), a young Jesuit from Würzburg, was beguiled by the prospects of a missionary career in a country that seemed much more prosperous and peaceful than Central Europe. Stumpf spent twenty-five years in Beijing, from 1695 until his death in 1720, and was deeply involved in the rites controversy. He served as rector of the Jesuit College and in 1714 as visitor for Japan and China, the highest Jesuit office in East Asia. He also directed the Beijing Astronomical Board and created the first glass factory in China.⁸⁴ Stumpf's activities inspired others from Würzburg to seek employment in the China mission. Bavarian Ignaz Kögler (Chinese Dai Jinxian) succeeded Stumpf as director of the Astronomical Board in 1717 during the final years of the Kangxi Emperor's reign.⁸⁵ Most German Jesuits in China defended Stumpf's position in the rites controversy, arguing that veneration of ancestors and of Confucius had a "civil" character and could therefore be reconciled with Christianity.⁸⁶

Johannes Grueber (Chinese Bai Naixin) was an Austrian Jesuit known as one of the first Europeans to traverse eastern Tibet. In February 1656 Grueber received official instructions from the Jesuit order in Rome to seek "an overland route to China."⁸⁷ The goal was to free the Jesuits of their dependence on the sea route, with its attendant dangers of the conflicts between the Dutch and Portuguese trading companies and the constant threat of pirates, and to begin missionary work among the people living along the

83. Willeke 1974, p. 418. Jesuits frequently returned to Europe from China to recruit new personnel and seek financial support for their mission (Collani 1989, p. 549).

84. Lange [1722] 1968; Reil 1978, pp. 59, 62, 73, 39; Naundorf 1975, 1975-76; Willeke 1974; Bernard 1940. Stumpf translated Newton's *Tabulae mathematicae* into Chinese.

85. See Naundorf 1975-76, p. 270; and Streit 1931, pp. 215-16, listing some of Kögler's publications; also Kögler [1717] 1726. Kögler's successor after his early death in 1720 was August von Hallerstein, an astronomer from Ljubljana (Allan 1975, p. 214). Two Germans from Bohemia, Johann Walter (Chinese Lu Zhongxian) and Ignatz Sichelbarth (or Sichelpart), worked at the imperial court in Beijing as a musician and a painter, respectively. Walter was born in 1708 and died in 1759, and should not to be confused with the earlier German composer. Sichelbarth was born in 1708 in Neudek (Nejdek) in the Sudetenland and died in 1780 (Huonder 1899, p. 194).

86. Willeke 1974, p. 423.

87. Wessels 1940, p. 283; and Tronnier 1904, p. 329. Although Grueber was unable to take the land route to China, he did return to Europe via Lhasa and eastern Tibet, Kathmandu, Agra, Lahore, and Isfahan.



FIGURE 6.3 Astronomical instruments created by Stumpf and other Jesuits between 1673 and 1715, on the roof of the Ancient Observatory (*Gu Guanxiangtai*) in Beijing. The azimuth on the right was created according to Stumpf's instructions in 1715 by melting down the old Chinese instruments (Collani 1989, p. 562). Some of the instruments were seized as booty by the Europeans after the Boxer Rebellion and given back to China after World War I (Amelung 1998, p. 172). Photo by the author, 2005.

caravan route.⁸⁸ When he arrived back in Rome in February 1664 Grueber was interviewed by Jesuit authorities and corresponded with German notables who were curious about China. Although Grueber never published his own travel account, a long interview with him appeared in print.⁸⁹ Although his view of China was similar to that of the other Jesuits, Grueber made a unique contribution to this discourse in his account of being treated by a Chinese doctor. According to Grueber, “their doctors . . . are so excellent that they can tell from your pulse the source and special circumstances of your sickness.” His doctor was able to determine “how long I had been sick and all of the attendant symptoms, including their exact duration, and

88. Grueber traveled with a German Jesuit he met while studying theology at the University of Graz, Bernard Diestel, and continued his travels once he reached China, first with a Belgian Jesuit, Albert d'Orville, and then with a Bavarian, P. Heinrich Roth, stationed at Agra (Braumann 1985, pp. 30–41; Kaufmann 1968).

89. This interview was compiled by Count Lorenzo Magalotti and published by the French royal librarian Melchisidec Thévenot; the English translation is Thévenot 1676.

all of the other peculiarities of my suffering, with such precision that I was completely surprised.”⁹⁰

An earlier record of Grueber’s experiences appeared in the French edition of *China illustrata* (1667) by the Jesuit polyhistor Athanasius Kircher.⁹¹ This was one of the most widely circulated and quoted books on China published in the seventeenth century in any language, including German, and it is still widely available.⁹² Never having traveled to China, Kircher conformed to dominant Jesuit opinion in viewing it as “the richest and most powerful empire on earth,” and also the “most celebrated or estimable” monarchy. Following in the tradition laid down by Trigault, Kircher wrote that “this state is governed by learned men in the manner of the Platonists, and according to the wishes of the divine philosopher; in which I consider this kingdom happy. . . . This state is well governed.”⁹³ Kircher combined his praise of China “with some very severe criticism,” especially concerning the “abominable falsehoods” in Chinese religion and the supposed shortcomings of the language, which he traced to Egyptian hieroglyphics.⁹⁴

Kircher’s book is also an early example of the elevation of chinoiserie to a more sophisticated level. It included reproductions of Chinese religious imagery. One is a careful copy of a drawing by Grueber of a wood engraving of the Daoist pantheon. The landscape scroll on the table in figure 6.2 is probably the “earliest representation of a Chinese landscape painting in European art.”⁹⁵ Kircher created original syntheses of Chinese and European aesthetic forms, as in figure 6.2. He remarked that “the ladies’ costume is very modest and gracious, as you can see,” and added that the women of Europe wouldn’t be able to carry this off so successfully.⁹⁶ Comments like this, combined with the cultural syncretism exemplified by some of the illustrations, suggested a relative equality between the two cultures, counter-

90. Translation from the German version in Braumann 1985, pp. III–12.

91. Kircher’s book was translated into French as *La Chine* in 1670; this is the edition I am using here. Mungello 1985, chap. 5, details Kircher’s life and work.

92. An Amsterdam publisher first brought out Kircher’s book in Latin and, three years later, in French (1670); another Latin edition was edited in Berlin by Andreas Müller in 1672 (Reichwein 1925, p. 19).

93. Kircher 1670, pp. 223, 226.

94. Mungello 1985, pp. 135–36.

95. Sullivan 1997, p. 94.

96. Kircher 1670, p. 155. Sullivan (1997, p. 96) oddly claims that Kircher “makes no mention of this engraving in the text.”

balancing the disparagement of Chinese religion and language elsewhere in Kircher's book.

Leibniz was the most influential non-Jesuit champion of China in late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century Germany, and indeed in Europe as a whole. His pamphlet *Latest News from China (Novissima Sinica; 1697)* was one of the few texts he wrote for publication. Like Voltaire, he argued that "human cultivation and refinement [is] concentrated . . . in Europe and in China." Leibniz believed that Europe was superior in *theoretical* or scientific knowledge, while China surpassed Europe with regard to social and political arrangements.⁹⁷ He noted that "it would be highly foolish and presumptuous on our part, having newly arrived compared with them, and scarcely out of barbarism, to want to condemn such an ancient doctrine [Confucianism] simply because it does not appear to agree at first glance with our ordinary scholastic notions." In a celebrated burst of cultural relativism, Leibniz called for "missionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of natural religion." The exchange of knowledge between Europe and China, he insisted, "must be reciprocal."⁹⁸

The German Enlightenment thinker Christian Wolff pursued Leibniz's suggestion that the Chinese had succeeded in developing a practical religion based in everyday rationality despite their ignorance of Christianity. Wolff made "allusions to aspects of Chinese thought and history" in most of his works, and discussed Confucian philosophy in some detail.⁹⁹ King Frederick William I of Prussia dismissed Wolff from his teaching post at the University of Halle and banished him from the state in 1723. The precipitating cause was a public lecture two years earlier on Chinese practical philosophy in which Wolff had outraged his Pietist enemies by praising the "atheist" Chinese.¹⁰⁰ Wolff's *Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica* ar-

97. Leibniz 1994, p. 45 (my emphasis). Leibniz looked for correspondences between his binary mathematics and the hexagrams of the *Yijing* (Book of Changes); see his "Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese," in Leibniz 1994, pp. 75-138; also Mungello 1985.

98. Leibniz 1994, pp. 78, 51; 1990, p. 64.

99. Lach 1953, p. 568. Wolff was "associated with Leibniz in a number of ways," though not actually his student, as is sometimes claimed (Corr 1975, p. 249).

100. Wolff's dismissal inspired two hundred polemical tracts, statements of support from several foreign academies, and an honorary professorship from the University of St. Petersburg (Lach 1953, pp. 565-67). In 1736 a commission summoned by Frederick William I determined that there was "nothing dangerous" about Wolff, and in 1740 Wolff was invited back to Prussia by Frederick the Great; a year later he returned to Halle (Lach 1953, p. 571; see also Voltaire [1764] 1879, p. 156; and E. Zeller 1862).

gued that the Chinese had succeeded in their ethical projects by trying to accomplish only “that which is founded in nature.” The ethical success of the Chinese resulted also from their leadership by worldly philosophers (*Weltweise*), “following Plato’s” recommendation (“nach dem Ausspruch, welchen Plato gethan hat”).¹⁰¹ In a lecture delivered at Marburg in 1750 entitled “The Real Happiness of a People under a Philosophical King,” Wolff repeated his view that among the Chinese, “Kings were Philosophers, and Philosophers Kings.”¹⁰² Even if the Chinese had only attained the lowest of the three stages of virtue, one that relied “solely on natural powers, and not on true religion or revelation,” this was more than could be said for most Christians.¹⁰³ Pietists were especially upset by Wolff’s comparisons of Confucius with Moses, Mohammed, and Christ.¹⁰⁴ Also important in terms of Sinophilia was Wolff’s view of the Chinese as superior to other “pagans” for having maintained their naturally derived powers “undamaged” for millennia, which demonstrated that “natural law was accessible to and attainable by all people,” Christian or otherwise.¹⁰⁵ According to Wolff, the Chinese “were able to differentiate perfectly between good and bad practices and between true virtue and its external appearance,” even though “they knew nothing of God.”¹⁰⁶

As in France, German Sinophilia did not disappear suddenly but tapered off and became increasingly defensive. The leading German cameralist philosopher of the eighteenth century, Johann von Justi, composed his *Comparisons of European with Asian and Other Supposedly Barbaric Governments* (1762) as a rejoinder to Montesquieu’s influential thesis of Chinese despotism. In the first paragraph von Justi struck a chord of relativist tolerance, noting

101. Wolff [1726] 1740, pp. 104, 31. Published by Wolff in Latin 1726 and in German in 1740.

102. Quoted in Lach 1953, p. 569.

103. Wolff [1726] 1740, pp. 120–23. Wolff’s argument that “Christian virtue could only be achieved as the final stage in a progression that began with natural experience” and not with revelation was a “fundamental challenge to the theological ethics of the Pietists” (Larrimore 2000, p. 199).

104. Wolff [1726] 1740, pp. 67–77. The Pietists, especially Wolff’s chief opponent, Joachim Lange, were also enraged by his claim that Christianity only “provided new significance for ethical acts, customs, and dispositions that were already valuable in their own right,” and by the correlative refusal of the Pietist claim that “the only starting point for true ethics was fear of God” (Larrimore 2000, p. 200). Wolff’s Leibnizian insistence on a “preestablished harmony,” his antivoluntarism, and his precocious defense of a liberal state also did little to endear him to these enemies.

105. Larrimore 2000, pp. 203–4.

106. Wolff [1745] 1995, pars. 507, 540 (pp. 172, 203).

that every nation considers itself superior to the others. He concluded that the Chinese were in fact “much more civilized and enlightened [*gesitteten, erleuchteten*] than we Europeans.” Reiterating a familiar theme from the Jesuit literature, von Justi contrasted the wasteful luxury of European monarchs with the more frugal court of the Chinese emperors. Whereas Montesquieu had given more credence to the China-bashing accounts of European merchants in the south, von Justi praised the Chinese government for controlling the foreign merchants strictly such that they could “only show themselves as merchants, and not as conquistadors.”¹⁰⁷

Straightforward Sinophilia became increasingly rare, however, by the end of the eighteenth century and would resurface in new forms only after 1900. Frederick the Great was willing to listen to both sides of the debate, represented for him by Voltaire and de Pauw (although he finally said to Voltaire “I leave the Chinese to you”).¹⁰⁸ As in England and France, positive presentations of China were increasingly restricted to the realm of decoration. Frederick the Great built his famous “Chinese House” at Sanssouci Park in Potsdam in 1754–64, combining Chinese and European elements in its decoration and in the life-size gilded figures surrounding the house (plates 4, 5); he also built a Chinese bridge and Chinese-style “Dragon House” in the gardens, and at Lietzenburg (Charlottenburg Palace), Frederick had the Great Gallery and another room decorated in Chinese fashion.¹⁰⁹

The last and most striking examples of German Sinophilia in the eighteenth century were two allegorical paintings depicting “the Chinese emperor plowing the first furrow of the year in honor of agriculture” (plate 6) and “the Chinese empress plucking the first mulberry leaves in honor of silkweaving,” both created in 1771 for the Britz country home of Count Ewald Friedrich von Hertzberg by Christian Bernhardt Rode, future director of the Prussian Academy of Arts.¹¹⁰ Count von Hertzberg was a Prussian statesman and foreign minister and close adviser of Frederick the Great. His commissioned painting of the Chinese emperor was an almost literal illustration of the physiocratic theory of land as the source of all wealth and

107. Justi [1762] 1978, pp. 35, 70–72, preface p. 8.

108. According to Reichwein 1925, p. 93.

109. The Sanssouci Chinese House was designed by Johann Gottfried Buring and was based on a sketch by the king himself. See Hassels 1993, pp. 116–19, 144–47; Laske 1909; and Komander 1994, pp. 1–7. The Chinese House has now been restored to its approximate original state. On Lietzenburg see Verwaltung der Staatlichen Schlösser und Gärten 1973, pp. 57–58.

110. See Michaelis 1999, pp. 12, 41 n. 46.

of the need for enlightened monarchichal leadership to create the conditions for economic growth. By placing the Chinese rather than the Prussian or French monarch behind the plow, Rode's painting referred more specifically to the interpretation of China offered by the leading physiocrat, François Quesnay. In his *Despotism in China* (1767) Quesnay had disagreed sharply with Montesquieu's interpretation of the emperor as a tyrant, arguing that the "tribunals and the great mandarins" had "the custom of remonstrating with the emperor" and that his decisions did "not violate usages or the public welfare." For Quesnay, the Chinese government was "the oldest, largest, most humane and most flourishing which has ever existed," a model for European states.¹¹¹ The greatest praise a physiocrat could offer was to depict the sovereign as being actively involved in cultivating the soil. Indeed, Count von Hertzberg created a "model economy" in the fields around his Britz manor house.¹¹² The emperor behind the plow had been described in Jean-Baptiste Du Halde's *Description de la Chine* and artists depicting French kings and Austro-Hungarian emperors imitated this image.¹¹³

The Rise of Sinophobia

The conquest of the country of an inferior race by a superior race that establishes itself there in order to rule is not shocking at all. . . . Unleash this devouring activity on countries like China which are crying aloud for foreign conquest!

ERNEST RENAN, *La réforme intellectuelle et morale* (1874)¹¹⁴

David Mungello writes that the Jesuits were so influential during the seventeenth century that "those with conflicting views [of China] were merely able to criticize and lacked the power to fully establish a competing interpretive

111. Quesnay [1767] 1946, 2, pp. 214, 247.

112. Von Krosigk 1998, pp. 22–23.

113. *Gemäldegalerie* 1975, p. 364. See also the images from the last third of the eighteenth century of King Louis XVI and Kaiser Joseph II behind the plow in Budde, Müller-Hofstede, and Sievernich 1985, p. 68. The emperor and other figures in Rode's painting have European features and beards. This recalls the figures at the Sanssouci Chinese House (plate 5), the image of Confucius in Du Halde 1741 (vol. 1, frontispiece), and the images of many Pacific islanders in eighteenth-century travel accounts (B. Smith 1992). Rather than simply dismissing such Europeanization as naive we should emphasize that Chinese or Oceanic and European cultures had not yet been driven so far apart by biological racism in the eighteenth century for these images to seem absurd to artists or their publics.

114. Renan [1871] 1874, pp. 92–93.

framework of their own.”¹¹⁵ By the end of the eighteenth century, Sinophilia had been largely superseded by Sinophobia.

The more negative views associated with commercial circles and Protestant religious challengers emerged on the European continent in the early eighteenth century. Jansenists like Eusebe Renaudot, in his *Anciennes Relations des Indes et de la Chine* (1718), tried to counter the Jesuit picture of China. Christian Wolff's Pietist nemesis at Halle, Joachim Lange, was another early opponent of the Jesuit-influenced theory. These scattered voices gained momentum after 1750 and gradually came to dominate the field, even if they never fully displaced Sinophilia. In the following pages I will sketch the main elements of Sinophobia before examining several of its influential European and German exemplars.

DYEING THE CHINESE YELLOW

One dimension of Sinophobia was an inexorable *racialization* of the Chinese, accomplished in a series of discursive moves over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Chinese had been located in the upper links of the Great Chain of Being, which was a European paradigm that preceded and in some ways cleared the ground for modern ideas of race.¹¹⁶ Europeans had also traditionally described the Chinese as white. Gaspar da Cruz, in the first European book devoted solely to China, published in 1569, described Chinese women as “very white.” One of the members of the first Spanish mission to China, Martin de Rada, wrote during the next decade that the “people of Taybin [China] are all . . . white and well-built.”¹¹⁷ Most agreed that the Chinese were “in Colour and Complexion . . . like the people of Europe.”¹¹⁸ Mendoza introduced a difference between the southern Chinese, who were “browne of colour like to the Moores,” and those “farther within the countrie,” who “be like unto Almaines [Germans], Italians and Spanyades, white and redde, and somewhat swart.”¹¹⁹ This distinction

115. Mungello 1985, p. 15. Two exceptions were located at the outer reaches of Europe. England, weaker than some of the continental powers during the seventeenth century and not involved in embassies to the Chinese emperor, had more critics than admirers of China. As Appleton (1951, p. 19) points out, the term *Cataian* (Chinese) in the mouths of Shakespeare's characters was “synonymous with a diverting Munchausen.” At the other fringe of Europe, Russian embassies to China favored a dry, factual, and often critical approach.

116. Lovejoy [1936] 1964.

117. Cruz [1569] 1953, p. 149; Rada 1953, p. 282.

118. Montanus 1671, p. 713.

119. Mendoza 1853, vol. 1, p. 30.

between “white” (or “almost white”) Chinese in the north and the interior and darker Chinese in the “torrid zone” was repeated by countless writers, few of whom had actually visited China.¹²⁰ The contrast corresponded closely to a sociopolitical distinction between the mandarins at the court and the emperor, whom the Jesuits admired and cultivated and with whom they had the most intensive contact, and the officials in Canton, who were despised by both the Jesuits and the European merchants.

The Chinese were discussed as an undifferentiated category, however, by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century biologists and race theorists, craniologists, and physical anthropologists. Linnaeus placed the Chinese in the category “*Homo monstrous*” together with the “Hottentots,” who were considered by most Europeans at the time as the epitome of human debasement. In 1764 Johann Winckelmann described the shape of the Chinese nose and the angle of the eyes as a “deviation” from Greek ideals of beauty, “for it mars the unity of the forms.”¹²¹ Johann Gottfried von Herder introduced a discussion of China in his unfinished masterwork *Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (1784–91) with the assertion that the “shape of head and brain, of body and nerves” shapes the “entire destiny of man.” Herder’s discussion was premised on an axiomatic contrast between Asia and the “well-formed nations” (or “beautiful people”) of Europe and the Near East.¹²² John Barrow’s widely read 1804 *Travels in China* presented the Chinese in explicitly racial terms, and German translations of Barrow included an engraving that equated Chinese and Khoikhoi faces (fig. 6.4).

German writers often followed Buffon in classing the Chinese within the “Mongol” race, which was described by the protoanthropologist Johann Blumenbach in 1775 as an “extreme degeneration of the human species.”¹²³ In Blumenbach’s original schema, the “Caucasian” was located at the center of the system, with the other races arranged around it at different distances.¹²⁴

120. See Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, p. 77; Jürgen Andersen and Volquard Iversen, “Orientalische Reise-Beschreibung,” in Olearius 1696, p. 105; Careri [1704] 1752, p. 359; Nieuhof [1669] 1972, p. 208; Dapper 1676, p. 155; and Montanus 1671, p. 321.

121. Winckelmann [1767] 1968, vol. 1, p. 197.

122. Herder [1784] 1985, pp. 299, 160–64. Herder actually contrasts the “well-formed” (*schöngelbete* or *wohlgebildete*) peoples of Europe and the Near East not only with Asians but also with Africans, Americans, those “near the North Pole,” and those “on the islands of the torrid zone.”

123. Blumenbach 1865, p. xi, as summarized by Thomas Bendysche, editor of the 1865 edition of Blumenbach’s *Anthropological Treatises*. For other uses of Blumenbach’s schema and the term “Mongols” (or “Mongolians”), see Maukisch 1836; Goltz 1858, p. 13; and Hoffmeister 1882.

124. Blumenbach claimed to have coined the term “Caucasian,” which he took from the Caucasus Mountains (1865, p. 269).



FIGURE 6.4 *The Chinaman (1) and the Hottentot (2) Who Resembles Him*. Frontispiece from Zimmermann 1810; adapted from Barrow 1805, pp. 52–53.

Native Americans (*Amerikaner*) and Malayans (*Malayen*) were closer to the core, Mongols (*Mongolen*) and Ethiopians (*Äthiopier*, or blacks) more distant, as can be seen in figure 6.5, a visualization of Blumenbach's approach.¹²⁵

Other race theorists reversed this hierarchy, placing the “yellow races” above India and Africa. Some writers later in the nineteenth century introduced additional racial categories, which shifted the location of the Chinese. Ferdinand von Richthofen, for example, equated the “racial” category of the “Mongol” with the older meaning of “Mongolian” as “Tartar” and created a separate racial slot for the Chinese.¹²⁶

With the rising prestige of craniometry and race science, the shapes of Chinese skulls and facial angles and the tonality of Chinese skin were brought into causal correlation with specific moral failings such as the

125. From Ranke 1894–1900, vol. 2, p. 208. Ranke was the president of the German Anthropological Society, an advocate of craniometry, and a critic of “the ridiculous popular opinion that Asian cultural peoples [*Kulturvölker*] belong to a lower race,” a prejudice he attributed to the emphasis on skin color in racial schemes (ibid., vol. 2, pp. 203ff., 160; see also Zimmerman 2001, p. 91). The diagram in fig. 6.5 thus actually referred to skull forms, which Ranke wanted to disentangle from any implications about cultural or intellectual variation.

126. Richthofen 1873. Others continued to refer to the Chinese as belonging to the “Mongol race,” for example, Spiess 1864, p. 263; and Schweiger-Lerchenfeld 1901, p. 86.




FIGURE 6.5 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's racial schema as visualized by J. Ranke (1894, 2:208).

legendary “cunningness” of the Canton merchants.¹²⁷ Carl Gustav Carus, the German anatomist and psychologist who argued that not just brain size but also the color and inner “constitution” of the skin and the racially distinctive shape of the hand helped to explain differences in intelligence, compared the “Mongols” to a “locustlike” herd with a “certain mediocrity of the soul.”¹²⁸ Carus drew on Samuel George Morton, the American polygenist who had measured the volume of several Chinese skulls, finding them to be larger than the African and American varieties but smaller than the European.¹²⁹ Over the course of the nineteenth century, Chinese skin color changed from “white” to “yellow” in European perceptions.¹³⁰ Arthur comte de Gobineau discussed the shape of the Chinese forehead and concluded that the “yellow man has little physical energy,” that “his desires are feeble,” and that he tends “to mediocrity in everything.”¹³¹ After the Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), this chromatic

127. Goltz 1858, pt. 2, pp. 89, 95. An earlier article had already spoken of the “wonderful correspondence between the spirit and bodily form” after listing Chinese physical and moral shortcomings (“Ueber die Natur der Völker im Südlichen Asien, auf den Ostindischen und Südsee-Inseln und in den Südländern,” *Göttingisches Historisches Magazin* 7 [1790]: 258–306, esp. p. 303).

128. Carus 1849, pp. 58–60. Carus linked skin color to intelligence via a theory according to which “the finer organization of the skin is crucial for the development of higher mental functions, since the skin is the first and most general sense organ” (*ibid.*, p. 21). Hence, the darker skin of the “night peoples,” with its “stronger sedimentation of carbon and its cruder organization,” had formidable epistemological implications. The intellectual disadvantaging was diminished among East Asians and the “dusk” (*Dämmerung*) peoples of the New World.

129. Gould 1996, p. 85–87.

130. Demel 1992.

131. Gobineau [1852] 1915, p. 206. Of course, de Gobineau was an equal-opportunity racist and not focused on China (Mosse 1985).

change was linked to the idea of a growing threat to Europe, the “yellow peril.”¹³²

The raciological vision was crucial in wresting China away from its status as Europe’s civilizational equal and realigning it with the catalog of epithets Europeans had long associated with Africans. The conquest of China by the Manchu invaders in the seventeenth century had led Europeans, from Martino Martini through Voltaire, to focus on supposed differences between the “blind and barbarous” Manchus and the “reason and genius” of the Chinese.¹³³ Lumping the Chinese into the category of “Mongol” together with their Manchu overlords obviously precluded this distinction. The Chinese were never *explicitly* categorized as a *Naturvolk* (natural people) within German discussions, of course.¹³⁴ But in the first half of the nineteenth century, Europeans like the pioneering Protestant missionary Karl Gützlaff began calling the Chinese “semi-barbarian” and “half-civilized.”¹³⁵ This was heightened to “savage” in the writings of John Barrow and to “dirty barbarians” by Elisabeth von Heyking. The transformation of the Chinese into barbarians, savages, and generic “natives” was closely tied to the idea that China was “crying aloud for foreign conquest.”

“AN IMITATIVE GENIUS”

Like most of the inhabitants of the global periphery in the nineteenth century, the Chinese were also described as mimic men. Sinophiles had often expressed frustration at the lack of Chinese interest in Europe, but they had never before focused on mimicry. European merchants in Canton, however, thought the Chinese they encountered were exploiting their familiarity with European ways in order to cheat them.

The Chinese variant of mimicry took a specific form that revealed the extent to which Sinophobia was an intradiscursive response to Sinophilia and not just an outgrowth of generic discourses of race or an accurate recording of actual encounters. Chinese mimicry was not blamed, as in the cases of the Khoikhoi or Africans more generally, on the partial adaptation of corrupting Western ways. Gützlaff looked forward to the time when the Chinese would finally begin to “emulate the most civilized nations.”¹³⁶ The

132. Gollwitzer 1962, pp. 43–44.

133. Voltaire [1755] 1877, p. 296; Martini 1654a.

134. Osterhammel 1998, p. 243.

135. Gützlaff 1838, vol. 1, pp. 490–91, 493.

136. *Ibid.*, pp. 507–8.

“manipulative” Chinese merchants in Guangdong were not seen as cultural hermaphrodites. Instead, mimicry was attributed to an intrinsic feature of Chinese culture, that is, to a basic talent for imitation. It was also explained as a response to despotic political conditions, again inverting the Sinophile interpretation of Chinese government. Gützlaff blamed the Chinese educational system, which did nothing but teach students to “copy their ancestors.”¹³⁷ Herder criticized Chinese education as little more than training in “artificial manners” (Manieren).¹³⁸ This interpretation was codified somewhat later in the theory of “face”—the idea that the Chinese “treated all the world as a stage on which appearance was all and reality insignificant.”¹³⁹ Mimicry was read as the essence of China rather than a sign of deracination. This would make it more difficult for Europeans to imagine how to stabilize Chinese subjects through native policy in a projected colonial future.

As with the Khoikhoi, Europeans linked the “imitative genius” of the Chinese to cunning deceptiveness. According to an article in the *Göttingisches Historisches Magazin* from 1788 entitled “On the Sneakiness of Different Peoples,” the Chinese “falsify all of their wares” due to a “lack of any feelings of sympathetic empathy, gratitude, regret, or shame.” The author asserted that “if the Chinese have their equals anywhere, or even their superiors, it is among the Negroes of Africa.”¹⁴⁰ A German anthropologist heightened this attack, writing in 1858 that he “would rather interact with Negroes, or with an honest poodle or a hound,” than with the Chinese, who were known for their “addiction to imitation.”¹⁴¹ Karl Gützlaff claimed that lying was so common among the Chinese as to “incur no odium,” since their “strength is in cunning, in litigation.”¹⁴² This paradigm received an influential formulation in Commodore Anson’s *Voyage round the World*, which painted a portrait of Chinese tricksters manipulating gullible Europeans. According to Anson, “the Chinese are difficult to be paralleled by any other people” in “artifice, falsehood, and an attachment to all kinds of lucre.” In a passage widely cited by later writers, he described tricks such as stuffing

137. *Ibid.*, p. 507.

138. Herder [1784] 1985, p. 284.

139. Hevia 1992, p. 316. For an exemplary statement of the “face” theory from the period see A. Brown 1904, pp. 37–38.

140. “Ueber die Verschmitztheit verschiedener Völker,” *Göttingisches Historisches Magazin* 3 (1788): 151, 154.

141. Goltz 1858, pt. 2, p. 89.

142. Gützlaff 1838, pp. 505–6.

ducks full of gravel to increase their weight. Anson insisted that Chinese industrial talents were “but of a second rate kind,” and that “their principal excellency” lay in copying.¹⁴³ Chinese imitation and deceptiveness seemed even more insidious than partial Westernization because it was strategic and intentional.

DESPOTIC STATES OF MIND

From the end of the seventeenth century and all through the eighteenth, a spectre was haunting Europe: the spectre of *despotism*.

ALAIN GROSRICHARD (1998)

The word *despotism* “entered the language fairly late,” and from the start it was located specifically in Asia. Like Said’s *Orientalism*, however, Alain Grosrichard’s book about this category focuses almost entirely on the European fantasy of the near Orient and has little to say about China or the Far East. Yet China played a central role in nineteenth-century discussions of Oriental despotism. Indeed, the transformation of China into a despotism was even more striking than the Orientalist treatment of the Ottoman Empire, which had never been taken as a model for Europe. Grosrichard notes that Europeans “saw the Ottoman regime as having become the overriding image of political monstrosity” during the second half of the seventeenth century—the exact moment when European praise for the Chinese system of government was at its height.¹⁴⁴

Montesquieu’s *Spirit of the Laws* gave despotism its specifically “*Asiatic* features” and became “the obligatory—albeit controversial—reference for the whole of political philosophy in the second half of the eighteenth century.”¹⁴⁵ Alongside Anson’s *Voyage round the World*, it was also the fount of a literature in which specific aspects of China that had previously been praised were systematically recoded as negative.¹⁴⁶ *Spirit of the Laws* served up China as the epitome of tyranny, a land where life was governed

143. Anson [1748] 1974, pp. 351, 355–56, 367. Anticipating the structure of *colonial* mimicry, Anson mocked the Chinese by quoting one in pidgin English: “Chinese man very great rogue truly, but have fashion, no can help” (*ibid.*, p. 355). See also Timkowski 1827, vol. 2, p. 184.

144. Grosrichard 1998, pp. 3–4, 22.

145. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

146. Anson’s narrative was translated into German in 1795; Montesquieu’s *Spirit of the Laws* appeared in German just four years after its original French publication in 1748.

exclusively by force and fear, and where power was entirely in the hands of the emperor. Montesquieu endorsed the hostile tone of the merchants' reports, remarking that "our merchants" were preferable to the missionaries as a source of testimony about China—not because they were intrinsically more trustworthy but because they supported the despotism thesis: they alone "show us a settled plan of tyranny, and barbarities committed by rule, that is, in cold blood."¹⁴⁷ Yet the merchants typically had only fleeting contacts with a limited sector of the Chinese population and operated in a context of haggling; the missionaries, by contrast, lived among the Chinese, learned their language, and sometimes entered into more open-ended interactions.¹⁴⁸ Subsequent writers, including missionaries, echoed Montesquieu's language of despotism and his condemnation of the Chinese state.

Karl Gützlaff was one of the first Protestant missionaries in nineteenth-century China, and his prolific writings, especially *China Opened* (1838), advertised that China was now available for a new round of evangelizing by the Protestant denominations that had become dominant in Europe. Gützlaff started his missionary work in China alone, with no formal connections to any mission society or church, and eventually founded a short-lived Protestant society called the Chinese Union.¹⁴⁹ But much of Gützlaff's activity in China took place under the aegis of British imperialism. He undertook his second missionary voyage as translator and doctor for an exploratory expedition of the British East India Company, and his third voyage was with an armed British opium smuggler.¹⁵⁰ He served as "the official interpreter for the British government during the Opium War and helped negotiate the colonizing of Hong Kong and the opening of the five treaty ports" and was employed by the British government as a representative in various Chinese cities and in the colonial government of Hong Kong.¹⁵¹ In *China Opened* Gützlaff derived Chinese family form and national character

147. Montesquieu 1949, p. 123.

148. Montesquieu retracted some of his attack in bk. 19, which suddenly seemed to agree with the Jesuits that the core principle of the Chinese polity was filial submission and love. But as one commentator notes, these chapters "form a sort of cleanly isolated enclave" within *The Spirit of the Laws* and have little impact on the "imperious conclusion" presented in the book's opening sections (Carcassonne 1924, p. 203).

149. This paragraph is based mainly on Schlyter 1946, pp. 12–32, 292–98; 1976. Gützlaff came to China first "under the auspices of the Netherlands Missionary Society, of which he soon declared himself independent" (Hanan 2002, p. 419).

150. Lindsay and Gützlaff 1833.

151. L. Liu 1999b, p. 154.

from the despotic state form itself, in a tone that was indistinguishable from Montesquieu's:

The government also has imprinted its stamp upon the Chinese character. In every despotic country, the minds of the people are enslaved, they become cringing and adulatory; and being borne down by main force, they are obliged, whilst defending themselves from oppression, to have recourse to deceit, and sundry disingenuous practices. . . . They are a tame, one might say, a pusillanimous nation, filled with trembling and cunning. . . . The constitution of the government, so convenient to those who rule, and so irksome to those who obey, prompts parents to practice tyranny in their domestic circles; thus despotism becomes the order of the day.¹⁵²

Gützlaff's case demonstrates that someone who had studied at the university for just a single semester could become fully conversant with the main lineaments of the Oriental despotism thesis.¹⁵³

STAGNATION AND DECAY:
CHINA AS HIBERNATING *MURMELTIER*

The theme of Chinese stagnation and decay that emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century condemned Chinese civilization as a geriatric ruin, lacking all internal dynamism and capacity for development. The Sinophiles had applauded China for its unchanging culture and political stability. But just as the Ottoman Empire became the "sick man of Europe," China was transformed, in Herder's image, into the "sleeping groundhog" (*Murmeltier*) that could only be shaken from its slumber by the restless European "robbers or merchants" who were circumnavigating the globe.¹⁵⁴ In *The Wealth of Nations* Adam Smith adopted this view of China as "long stationary" and dismissed the reports produced by "weak and wondering travellers" and "frequently by stupid and lying missionaries."¹⁵⁵ Karl Marx's views of China were informed by John Stuart Mill's writings on the "Asiatic form of government."¹⁵⁶ In 1853 Marx enthused about the Taiping rebellion

152. Gützlaff 1838, vol. 1, p. 478.

153. Gützlaff enrolled at the University of Berlin in January of 1823 but was already in Holland by June of that year (Schlyter 1946, pp. 292, 21–23).

154. Herder [1784] 1985, p. 298.

155. A. Smith [1776] 1954, vol. 1, p. 63; vol. 2, p. 217.

156. D. Jones 2001, p. 69.

and prophesied that “the next uprising of the people of Europe . . . may depend more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire . . . than on any other political cause that now exists.” Yet China seemed to Marx “a living fossil” persisting in “barbarous and hermetic isolation from the civilized world.” The empire’s dissolution, he wrote, “must follow as surely as that of any mummy carefully preserved in a hermetically sealed coffin, whenever it is brought into contact with the open air.” The “Oriental empires,” according to Marx, “always show an unchanging social infrastructure coupled with unceasing change in the persons and tribes who manage to ascribe to themselves the political super-structure.” Friedrich Engels, even more taken in by fashionable Sinophobia, disparaged China as a “rotting semi-civilisation.”¹⁵⁷

Some Europeans put more emphasis on China’s static character, while others preferred the image of obsolescence or decline following earlier eras of grandeur. John Barrow combined the tropes of stasis and decline. The Chinese had already reached “a certain pitch of perfection” when Europe was still barbaric, he wrote, but they had “remained stationary” and even regressed in many respects since then.¹⁵⁸ Joseph Banks, the great promoter of scientific inquiry who accompanied Cook on his first voyage, said in the early 1790s that China had only “the ruins of a state of civilization.”¹⁵⁹ For Thomas De Quincey, the opium eater in the years before the Opium Wars, “the vast age of the [Asiatic] race and name overpowers the sense of youth in the individual,” such that “a young Chinese seems to me an antediluvian man.”¹⁶⁰ According to Alexis de Tocqueville, “when Europeans first arrived in China . . . they found that almost all the arts had reached a certain degree of perfection there, and they were surprised that a people which had attained this point *should not have gone beyond it*. At a later point they discovered traces of some higher branches of science that *had been lost*. . . . This served to explain the *strange immobility* in which they found the minds of this people.”¹⁶¹ By the end of the nineteenth century, one missionary described China as “completely covered with ruins, witnesses of an earlier stage of civilization.”¹⁶² But the example he gave was the Old Imperial Gar-

157. Marx 1969b, pp. 67–69; 1969c, p. 442; Engels 1969, p. 184; see also Marx 1977, vol. 1, p. 479.

158. Barrow [1804] 1806, p. 238. Barrow’s *Travels in China* was based on the British embassy to China of 1793 though not published until 1805.

159. Quoted in Marshall 1993, p. 24.

160. De Quincey [1821] 1950, p. 333.

161. Tocqueville [1835–40] 1945, vol. 2, p. 48 (my emphasis). One could multiply the examples of this trope ad infinitum. See, for example, Maukisch 1836, pp 173–74.

162. Stenz 1899, p. 30.

den, whose ruination was hardly the result of endogenous Chinese decline but of plundering and burning by the Anglo-French troops in 1861 (plates 7, 8).¹⁶³ Nothing could better illustrate the confusion of cause and effect in European perceptions of China.

IMPOSTURES INTELLECTUELLES?

Jesuits and Enlightenment philosophers had praised the mandarins for promulgating the “law of the learned.” Since Trigault, Jesuits had regarded Confucius as “the equal of the pagan philosophers and superior to most of them”¹⁶⁴ and had praised the Chinese educational system.¹⁶⁵ But Confucius, the mandarins, and Chinese schooling all lost their allure for Europeans after 1750. Rousseau, who had discovered so much to admire among the South African Khoikhoi, turned his attentions to the “immense country where learning is so honored that it takes men to the highest positions in the state”: “If the sciences purified morals, taught men to shed their blood for their country, and animated their courage, then the peoples of China ought to be virtuous, free and invincible. But there is no vice that does not dominate them, no crime that is not common among them. . . . Of what use to it were all its scholars?”¹⁶⁶ While Rousseau condemned the Chinese literati for their impotence, others attacked their pretensions of power. Daniel Defoe, in an early novel, *The Consolidator* (1705), mocked Chinese who claimed “many sorts of learning which these parts of the world never heard of,” including “such a perfection of knowledge, as to understand one another’s thoughts.” Defoe told the tale of the “famous Mira-cho-cho-lasmo, vice-admiral of China” about “two thousand years before the deluge,” who was in fact “no native of this world, but was born in the moon,” and who brought to the Chinese “the most exquisite accomplishments of those lunar regions.”¹⁶⁷ In the third part of *Robinson Crusoe* Defoe attacked the Chinese with less humor as a “contemptible Herd or Crowd of ignorant sordid Slaves, subjected to a Government qualified only to rule such a People.”¹⁶⁸ The exam system was no longer seen as the centerpiece of a meritocracy but as a sham. Karl May’s novel *Der blaurote Methusalem* (1889) contained a vicious satire of the system used to qualify candidates for advancement to mandarin status.

163. On the sacking of the *Yuanming Yuan* see Wong 2001, chap. 7.

164. Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, p. 30.

165. Wolff [1726] 1740, p. 185ff.

166. Rousseau [1750] 1975, p. 211.

167. Defoe [1705] 1840, pp. 211, 214, 218.

168. Defoe 1719, p. 298. Marx 1969, p. 68, also attacked China’s “pedantic Mandarins.”

According to Karl Gützlaff, the Chinese are “early taught that they know everything” and therefore “deem it unnecessary to think for themselves, and so pursue the beaten path.”¹⁶⁹

In his travel narratives, however, Gützlaff frequently acknowledged China’s high level of literacy and recognized that this made it an ideal “field for missionary exertion” where “even the smallest tracts will be perused to advantage.”¹⁷⁰ And despite their rejection of the Jesuits’ accommodationism, many nineteenth-century missionaries, including Gützlaff, were themselves partly engulfed by Chinese culture. Before entering China for the first time in 1830 Gützlaff already claimed to have been “adopted into the Guo clan from Tong’an in Fujian.”¹⁷¹ Gützlaff “adopted a Chinese name and tried . . . in every way to live as a Chinese,” dressing at times like a Fujianese fisherman (see fig. 6.6).¹⁷² Even more revealing of his partial identification with a China he claimed to scorn are a series of novels Gützlaff wrote in Chinese, which are set entirely within a Chinese context featuring Chinese Christians. One of these is said to be the “earliest novel in Chinese with a first-person narrator.” Significantly, this novel “opens with an ‘I’ who falls asleep and dreams” and is “both the hero as well as the narrator of the book”; this figure’s surname is identical to Gützlaff’s adopted Chinese surname, and like Gützlaff’s adoptive family he hails from Quanzhou Prefecture.¹⁷³ Gützlaff is by no means the only European whose imperial posture was undercut by a strong imaginary identification with a Chinese imago, as we will see in the next chapter.

TURNING LEIBNIZ ON HIS HEAD:

JOHN BARROW’S REVERSALS AND RECODINGS

John Barrow’s *Travels in China* was the most widely read account from the British embassy to the Chinese emperor led by Lord Macartney in 1793–94.¹⁷⁴ The Macartney mission resembled Captain Cook’s voyages and others discussed in chapter 4 in the same period in its emphasis on science and long-range political advantage rather than immediate economic gain (although that consideration was never entirely absent).¹⁷⁵ The embassy included

169. Gützlaff 1838, vol. 1, p. 507; see also Tocqueville [1835–40] 1945, vol. 2, p. 259.

170. Gützlaff 1834, p. 433.

171. Hanan 2000, p. 420.

172. Schlyter 1946, p. 293.

173. Hanan 2000, pp. 430–31. Unlike other missionaries, Gützlaff probably wrote his Chinese novels without much help from Chinese assistants (*ibid.*, p. 427).

174. See C. Lloyd 1970, for biographical information on Barrow.

175. Dabringhaus 1996, p. 55.



FIGURE 6.6 *Karl Gützlaff from Stettin, English Missionary in China, Wearing the Costume of a Fujian Sailor.* Lithograph by Cäcilie Brand, ca. 1830, based on a painting by George Chinery. Image from author's collection.

a painter, a draftsman, five German musicians, numerous other experts, and Barrow as treasurer.¹⁷⁶ Unlike earlier Russian and Dutch embassies, the party included no merchants.¹⁷⁷ More than Cook's voyages, the Macartney mission had the central aim of transforming previous ethnographic representations, namely, "finally to overcome the older Jesuit representations of China and to scientifically document the suspected shortcomings of the Chinese mode of government with rich material documentation."¹⁷⁸

As a result, Barrow's *Travels in China* is structured as a series of explicit refutations of the Sinophile position associated with Jesuits and the European Enlightenment. Whereas the absence of a hereditary nobility and sharp class distinctions and the power of the scholars had pleased the Jesuits, it was repugnant to Barrow. Reversing Justi's earlier juxtaposition

176. Some of Alexander's paintings and sketches are reproduced in Susan Legouix-Slovan, "William Alexander," in Budde, Müller-Hofstede, and Sievernich 1985, pp. 173–86.

177. Cranmer-Byng, "Introduction," in Macartney 1962, p. 24.

178. Dabringhaus 1996, p. 55.

of the European and Chinese court societies, Barrow portrayed the Chinese court as materially impoverished rather than thrifty. Whereas the Jesuits had sought to find common ground between Christianity and Confucianism, Barrow insisted that Chinese religious beliefs not only “appear absurd and ridiculous” to us but were also “equally inexplicable by the people themselves who confess them.” Where generations of Europeans had praised the Confucian emphasis on filial piety, Barrow attacked the state’s enforcement of parental authority. Barrow criticized the Chinese for torpid “mental powers”; for a cruelty “not to be surpassed among the most savage nations”; for tastelessness in architecture, theater, music, and painting; and for a language that was defective and “poor.” Ignoring the existence of the stone statues of warriors at the tomb of the Ming Hongwu Emperor in Nanjing and failing to anticipate the discovery in the twentieth century of thousands of life-size figures from the Qin dynasty at Xi’an (Changan), Barrow was quite certain that “in the whole empire there is not a statue . . . that deserves to be mentioned.”¹⁷⁹

Barrow also contributed to racializing the Chinese and downgrading their civilizational status. Exhibiting dubious taste by calling himself a reader of “the ingenious Mr. Pauw,” Barrow acknowledged that he had been predisposed to think about the Chinese in racial terms even before his trip.¹⁸⁰ Barrow had spent six years in the harshly racist Cape Colony before writing the account of his earlier trip to China. *Travels in China* repeated his earlier theory about the physical similarities between the Chinese and the Khoikhoi.¹⁸¹ In the later text he recalled that “a Hottentot, who attended my travelling over Southern Africa, was so very like a Chinese servant I had in Canton, both in person, features, manners, and tone of voice, that I almost always, inadvertently, called him by the name of the latter.” For Barrow, all natives looked alike. In earlier centuries it would have seemed implausible to categorize the Chinese as barbarians, much less savages, and even Defoe had forced himself to qualify his judgment by calling them “*little better than savages.*” But Barrow noted here that “few *savage tribes* are without the unnatural custom of maiming or lopping off some part of the human body” and added that “among *savage tribes*, the labour and drudgery invariably fall heaviest on the weaker sex.”¹⁸² Since “barbarians” were conventionally ranked above “savages” in European ethnodiscourse

179. Barrow [1804] 1806, quotes from pp. 284, 156, 115, 220.

180. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

181. Barrow 1801–4, vol. 1, p. 278; [1804] 1806, p. 33.

182. Barrow [1804] 1806, pp. 33, 50, 93 (my emphasis).

this marked the radical edge of that clash of “barbarisms” characterizing nineteenth-century British-Chinese relations.¹⁸³

Even writers whose explicit aim was to put the Chinese in their savage place sometimes found it difficult to sustain a seamless and systematic argument. Only the most powerful thinkers, such as Hegel and Weber, whose use of China was subordinated to an overarching theoretical argument (and who didn’t actually visit China), were able to restrict themselves rigorously to examples from the Sinophobic register. The difficulty in maintaining a consistently Sinophobic line was due in part to the weighty heritage of European Sinophilia, but it also reflected empirical Chinese realities. Most European travelers were able to perceive the difference between pastoralist societies like the Ovaherero and a society organized around a functioning state with a nationwide bureaucracy and a partly modernized military that was capable of mounting some successful campaigns (for example, against the Boxer movement in Shandong Province at the end of the century; see chap. 7). Difficulty in hewing to a consistent Sinophobia also stemmed from organized resistance by the Chinese to being treated as barbarians. China was able to successfully resist the flogging of Chinese indentured laborers in German Samoa as “unjust [and] derogatory to the dignity of the Chinese Empire” through its consul in Apia and its envoy in Berlin.¹⁸⁴ Despite resistance from German colonial officials in the Pacific and settlers in Samoa who wanted to see the Chinese categorized along with “Malayans, Chamorros, etc.” as “semicultured peoples” (*Halbkulturvölker*) located legally in between “natives” and “whites,”¹⁸⁵ the colonial administration instead reclassified all Chinese in Samoa from “native” into “foreigner” status in 1912 (see chap. 5). The reason for this change, according to the Colonial Office was that “negotiations” in Berlin had made it obvious that “the Chinese government would [never] be satisfied” with being treated like natives.¹⁸⁶

183. L. Liu 2004, chap. 2. Toward the end of his narrative, however, Barrow describes the Chinese as *differing* in their “opinions” from “all the rest of mankind, whether civilized or savage” ([1804] 1806, p. 230).

184. “Memorandum: Treatment of Chinese/Samoan Island,” December 23, 1910, Imperial Chinese Embassy, Berlin, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 5588, p. 2r.

185. Oßwald, governor of German New Guinea, to RKA, January 22, 1911, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 5588, p. 20r.

186. RKA to governor of German Samoa, October 16, 1911, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 5588, p. 40r; *Samoanisches Gouvernements-Blatt* 3 (41, April 25, 1905): 133; 4 (21, January 6, 1911): 71. Wilhelm Solf, then still governor of Samoa, agreed that the equation of a “highly developed *Kulturvolk* [the Chinese] with the Samoan natives . . . seems anomalous” (Solf to RKA, Janu-

A brief comparison between Barrow's text and another account of the 1793 British embassy by George Staunton underscores the continuing multivocality of British discourse on China even in this predominantly Sinophobic period. Although Barrow's book achieved "a far wider circulation," Staunton was the embassy's secretary and wrote its official report.¹⁸⁷ Staunton emphasized China's relative superiority to other countries; the "ingenuity," "dexterity," and sustained hard work of the Chinese laborer; the antiquity of useful inventions and "those of decoration and refinement"; and the excellence of plays like *The Orphan of China*. His account highlighted the "maxims of humanity prevalent in the government," the gazettes that published reports of "offenses committed by mandarines," and the meritocratic system of advancement through exams that were "open to all classes of men." Yet these classic Sinophile examples were accompanied by long quotations from Barrow's journals lambasting China.¹⁸⁸ Although Sinomania resurfaced periodically in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, writers of Staunton's stature rarely embraced that framework wholeheartedly after 1850. Born thirty-seven years before Barrow and educated while Sinophilia was still dominant, Staunton represents a late excrescence of the receding paradigm. His book is a transcript of what we might call, with Bourdieu, the hysteresis of ideological habitus.¹⁸⁹

German Sinophobia

Disdain for China in Germany stemmed from sources similar to those elsewhere in Europe. The infamous race theorist Christoph Meiners translated a French Jesuit text on China in 1778 which argued that "this nation, which is in so many respects distant from our own, is just as rich and happy, and perhaps richer and happier, than we are."¹⁹⁰ Meiners noted in his introduction, however, that he favored China's critics. In his next treatment of the Chinese, published in 1795–96, Meiners redeployed evidence

ary 28, 1911, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 5588, p. 4v). In fact, this had not seemed anomalous to him in 1900.

187. C. Lloyd 1970, p. 28.

188. Staunton 1797, quotes from vol. 3, pp. 100, 105, xii, III, 317.

189. C. Lloyd 1970, p. 28, claims that Staunton is "pompous" and "almost unreadable." The difference, however, is more ideological than formal. Barrow's ethnographic codes tend to be closer than Staunton's to the neocolonial racism and sweeping cultural generalizations of a writer like Lloyd.

190. Meiners 1778, p. 18.

from the Jesuit literature *against* Sinophilia. The Chinese arts were now said to be nonexistent, not only because the Chinese lacked all natural artistic capacity but also because they were “exclusively oriented toward utilitarian goals”—a quality that writers like Quesnay had singled out for praise. The Chinese, according to Meiners, lacked “acuity and profundity of spirit.”¹⁹¹

Herder’s analysis of China was also largely derivative of the eighteenth-century critics, but he added the accents of the romantic discourse of authenticity.¹⁹² Herder began his discussion of China in *Ideas* with praise for the country’s orderliness and lack of a hereditary nobility, but his tone quickly changed. After insisting that a “middle path” had to found between the Jesuits and their critics, Herder’s discussion swung toward the latter. He accused the Chinese of bad taste, “semi-Tartarish despotism,” an orientation toward imitation and deception, and a mixture of “sensual refinement” with “uninventive ignorance” and argued that they were “like the Jews” in their standoffishness and “vain pride.” A people that isolated itself from the rest of the world would automatically degenerate into a “slave culture.” In the familiar idioms of German romanticism—which he of course helped to invent—Herder contrasted the “artificial character” of the Chinese with more “natural” cultures. Thus, while biological race science was beginning to assimilate the Chinese to Africans and other “natural peoples,” Herder aligned German culture with “nature” and China with the anti-Semitic stereotypes of overcultivated Jews. Chinese men, he wrote, were unnaturally effeminate.¹⁹³ And in a critique that inadvertently underscores the imperial dispensation of his thinking (even as he ostensibly rejected colonialism), Herder criticized China’s coastline for “almost completely lacking inlets and bays.”¹⁹⁴

191. Meiners 1795–96, vol. 1, pp. 181, 198.

192. Wiethoff 1971.

193. Herder [1784] 1985, pp. 281–85. In an anonymous article in the *Neues Göttingisches Historisches Magazin*, which Meiners coedited, we can read in 1792 that “the Chinese man envies the strong beard of the European, which he sees as a sign of manhood” (“Ueber den Haar- und Baartwuchs der häßlichen und dunkelfarbigen Völker,” *Neues Göttingisches Historisches Magazin* 1 [1792]: 502). German criticism of Amerindians also often focused on their underdeveloped beards (Zantop 1997, chap. 3).

194. Herder [1784] 1985, p. 284. Most Europeans before the mid-nineteenth century, including the Sinophobes, were thinking less about colonizing China than about improving it and profiting from it through the extension of trade and property rights. Even in 1872 Walter Bagehot worried that “war with China might precipitate an internal collapse leaving Britain or a western condominium with the baleful consequences of having to ‘manage the country’” (Jones 2001, p. 89).

Hegel's Sinophobia was more systematic than Herder's. Like Voltaire, but to very different effect, Hegel placed China at the beginning of his narrative of world history. In *The Philosophy of Right*, *Philosophy of Religion*, and *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, China figured as the primitive stage in the historical unfolding of the world spirit toward freedom and self-consciousness. Hegel's analytical narrative was well served by Montesquieu's portrait of despotism. Equating China with the historical moment at which the sole element of subjectivity or individuality was the emperor himself, Hegel argued that in China, and in the "Eastern nations" more generally, only "one is free," namely, the emperor, who was "lord over the . . . world of the mandarins." Chinese religion was deficient because it involved the "primitive element of magical influence over nature" and because it remained fused with the state: "The emperor . . . alone approaches heaven." Chinese religion was thus "essentially State-Religion" and "not what *we* call religion," which requires that man withdraws "from his relation to the State" into a "free, spiritual, disinterested consciousness." The distinguishing feature of the "character of the Chinese people" was that "everything which belongs to Spirit . . . is alien to it." The emergence of self-consciousness was stunted because Chinese subjectivity was based on *external* rather than internal morality, on mere compulsion rather than the free disposition of the subject. The Chinese sciences were for Hegel "merely empirical" and "absolutely subservient to the Useful on behalf of the State," lacking the "free ground of subjectivity, and that properly scientific interest, which make them a truly theoretical occupation of the mind." Hegel repeated the familiar claim that the Chinese were skilled in "imitation" but not in the arts, again tracing this to their childlike heteronomy as despotic subjects.¹⁹⁵ He derided China for the lack of differentiation between the spheres of law and moral sense, religion, and the state, providing twentieth-century modernization theory with its core conceit. The only respect in which Hegel's vision of China disagreed with Anson and de Pauw was his belief that the Middle Kingdom was not "destined to be . . . conquered and subjugated"—in contrast to India, whose "necessary fate" was "to be subjected to Europeans." China had a crucial, if primordial, role to play in the unfolding of the Idea.¹⁹⁶

195. Quotes from Hegel 1956, pp. 19, 132, 131, 138, 134, 137; 1984-87, vol. 2, p. 555. Africa, for Hegel, had "no movement or development to exhibit" at all, and was therefore completely external to the movement of human history. The discussion of historical differences in the development of the Idea was thus founded on the formation of races, a process that was said to lie beyond history.

196. Hegel 1956, pp. 115, 142.

The thesis of China's primitiveness or decay had specifically German accents even if the basic lines of argument were familiar. For Herder, Hegel, and Friedrich von Schlegel, China had already played its part in world history. Earlier European visitors had described Chinese politeness as a time-consuming but harmless eccentricity, and for some it was a sign of China's excellence. But in 1800, a neo-Herderian text by linguist Johann Christoph Adelung claimed that China, like France, had forfeited its former cultural excellence by *exceeding* optimal levels of cultivation. This argument was redolent of the romantic juxtaposition between French *civilisation* and German *Kultur* and restated Herder's theory about the life cycles of cultures. Where Christian Wolff had seen Chinese culture as corresponding to a rationality founded in nature, romanticism provided a language for rejecting China as a deviation from nature, as artificially theatrical and mendacious, and therefore as antithetical to self-realization and freedom.

En Route to Qingdao: Speaking of the Devil

Sinophobia became all pervasive with the British-led campaigns to force the Qing emperors to open China to trade and missionaries. German Sinophobia prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, by contrast, was mainly a theoretical affair. The disjuncture between the source of raw materials and the location of its theoretical synthesis did not mean that Germans were entirely absent from the eighteenth-century Chinese coastal trade, however. Merchants from Hamburg, Bremen, and Emden, and others sailing under the Prussian flag, landed trading ships in Canton starting in 1747. Prussia and Hamburg operated consulates there during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (although these consulates were not actually controlled by Germans until later).¹⁹⁷ The Chinese concessions to Britain after the First Opium War led to increased German trading in China and an even larger increase in German shipping companies working the Europe-China routes and the Chinese coast. In 1849 there were only thirty-three German merchants in China, and just four purely German trading companies.¹⁹⁸ By the early 1860s, after the Second Opium War,

197. Stoecker 1958, pp. 37–40; Boehm 1859, p. 194. The first Prussian and Saxon consul in Canton was appointed in 1847 (Ratenhof 1985, p. 30). A map of the European settlements in Canton from 1856 shows the extent of the "German zone" ("Briefe eines jungen China-Deutschen aus den Jahren 1855 bis 1859," *Ostasiatischer Rundschau* 12 (6, 1931): 155.

198. Stoecker 1958, p. 45.

as much as two-thirds of Chinese coastal shipping was controlled by German-owned companies, although the German share declined again after the American Civil War.¹⁹⁹ Some of these Germans tried to gain a larger share of the coastal shipping business by treating Chinese merchants and passengers less brutally than the British.²⁰⁰ This may be one reason that anti-Chinese literature did not emerge directly from the German mercantile contact zone in the 1850s, but had to wait for the Prussian mission of 1860–62.

THE PRUSSIAN EXPEDITION TO CHINA

The 1860 Peking Convention opened new treaty ports to European trade and habitation, permitted foreigners and missionaries to travel in the interior, and created a framework for foreign powers to open legations in Beijing. The first Prussian expedition to East Asia (1860–62) was led by the former consul general to Warsaw and future interior minister, Count Friedrich zu Eulenburg. His main assignment was to negotiate trade advantages for Prussia, although vague colonial plans were also bruited. In 1861 Eulenburg concluded a separate treaty with China that gave Prussia the same rights as Britain and France.

The accounts written by participants in the Prussian expedition followed British precedent in treating the Chinese as an inferior race and the Chinese state as retrogressive.²⁰¹ The first chapter of the official report on the Prussian expedition's arrival in China at Shanghai stuck closely to the thesis of Chinese decadence:

The impression Shanghai makes of a deep decline is also present to a lesser extent in other Chinese cities. It is as if their civilization had exhausted itself [*als hätte ihre Gesittung sich ausgelebt*]. Everywhere the most extreme negligence and decrepitude is found alongside traces of ancient culture, power, and greatness. . . . As for the contemporary Chinese individual, he has a played-out, self-satisfied, even decrepit and undignified character. . . . Their existence has an empty, prosaic, and masklike character. If you ask local Europeans . . . you will hear

199. *Ibid.*, pp. 43–47; Wätjen 1943, p. 237.

200. Stoecker 1958, p. 48; Wätjen 1943, p. 236.

201. Stoecker 1958, p. 63. On the goals and accomplishments of the expedition, see the official report (Berg 1864–73), and, more recently, B. Martin 1988, 1991. Other contemporary accounts include Spiess 1864; R. Werner [1863] 1873; Kreyher 1863; and Maron 1863.

stories of villainousness, treachery, and calculating cruelty. . . . Almost nowhere is human life worth less than in China.²⁰²

This account elevated local European merchants to the status of privileged informants. A separate treatment of the expedition by Reinhold Werner, at the time a captain-lieutenant in the Prussian navy, reproduced many of the old chestnuts of merchant-class Sinophobia. Werner claimed to have seen children's corpses washing up onto the shore near Canton. According to Werner "there can hardly be a people that is less attached to the truth than the Chinese. To tell a lie is nothing less than honorable."²⁰³ A merchant who accompanied the expedition, Gustav Spiess, described his encounter with a group of Chinese dignitaries and aristocrats as "a shabby comedy" in which "few of us could suppress a smile when a high Chinese bureaucrat, the former viceroy of the province," appeared on the scene. The Chinese official's retinue reminded Spiess of "clowns at the county fair." Recalling De Quincey's picture of "antediluvian" Chinese youth overpowered by the "vast age of the race," Spiess remarked that the women of Beijing were "prematurely wilted," and he echoed contemporary race theory in his observation that they had "an ugly skin color."²⁰⁴

FERDINAND VON RICHTHOFEN

One of the most significant German contributions to an explicitly colonial framing of China in the decades leading up to the annexation of Qingdao was made by the pioneer geographer (and unwitting ethnographer) Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen (fig. 6.7).²⁰⁵ After taking part in the Prussian East Asia expedition, von Richthofen was active for six years as a geographer in the California gold rush. This period was marked by mounting racism against Chinese workers on the west coast of the United States, and von Richthofen's views of the Chinese seem to have been strongly shaped by these experiences. He believed that the Chinese question would soon replace the "Negro question" in importance in the United States. Von Richthofen returned to China in 1868 and traveled for four years through fifteen of the eighteen provinces, scouting out potential ports and mines for future

202. Berg 1864-73, vol. 3, pp. 385-86.

203. R. Werner [1863] 1873, p. 232.

204. Spiess 1864, pp. 226, 255.

205. On von Richthofen, see X. Liu 1986; Osterhammel 1987; and Engelmann 1988.



FIGURE 6.7 Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen.
From Drygalski 1906.

exploitation and gathering material for his multivolume geographic treatise.²⁰⁶ Between his return to Germany in 1873 and his death in 1905 von Richthofen was the most influential China expert in the country. In addition to his activity as rector of the University of Berlin von Richthofen was a member of the national *Kolonialrat*.²⁰⁷

From the very beginning von Richthofen's texts constructed the Chinese as an inferior subject race. In 1861 von Richthofen "communicated that he found the country unattractive and that he did not think he could warm to

206. Drygalski 1905.

207. Von Richthofen also played a central role in the Berlin Geographical Society for three decades, founded the Institute for Oceanic Studies at the University of Berlin, participated in international geographic commissions, taught at Bonn, Leipzig, and Berlin universities, and was elected to the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1899 (Drygalski 1905). His most famous publication, the five-volume *China* (1877–1912), remained unfinished at his death and was completed by others. Tiessen 1906 lists all of von Richthofen's publications.

it.”²⁰⁸ His travel diary from 1868 opens with the statement “I was prepared for disappointments all around.” Clearly, he had been primed with Sino-phobic ideas.²⁰⁹ In the introduction to his multivolume work he remarked that China “lacks all of the charms that brighten the days of the traveler in Japan.”²¹⁰ He referred to the Chinese as *natives* (*Eingeborenen*) throughout his diaries and publications and systematically contrasted them with the category “white.”²¹¹ In one diary entry von Richthofen joked with a European missionary that “his angels must belong to the Caucasian race” and received the answer that “there are not yet any slanty-eyed angels.”²¹² In a 1898 text von Richthofen discussed the “specific odor that is unique to the [Chinese] race and is only noticed by the foreigner.”²¹³ He berated Chinese men for failing to be “masculine and energetic.”²¹⁴ And while it has still not been established whether there really was a sign at the public garden on the Shanghai Bund reading “No Dogs or Chinese Allowed!” von Richthofen stated unequivocally that a European could never become truly attached to a Chinese “except in the form of the relation between a master and his dog.”²¹⁵ The category of “Chinese” in von Richthofen’s writings was equated with “servant,” “worker,” and, increasingly over time, “colonial subject.” In 1873 he discussed the problem of not being able to tell one “native” from another, along with other urgent matters in native governance: “When we speak of the Chinese here at home, we imagine a certain picture according to the received images in which the slanted position of the eyes and the queue play a central role. If we then travel to China and the fantasy image transforms itself into a real one, all Chinese indeed look alike to us at first. . . . But if we stay long enough in a single place in China we can begin to make out individual differences. We are able to distinguish our servants and other natives with whom we interact . . . from the millions.”²¹⁶

208. Drygalski 1905, p. 686.

209. Richthofen 1907, vol. 1, p. 23. The discussion in the following paragraph draws on Osterhammel’s (1987) important analysis of these diaries.

210. Richthofen 1877–1912, vol. 1, p. xl.

211. Richthofen 1907, vol. 1, pp. 13, 26, 84, 116–17, 119; 1877–1912, vol. 1, p. xii; 1898, p. 137.

212. Richthofen 1907, vol. 1, p. 136.

213. Richthofen 1898, p. 99. For similar remarks, see Kronecker 1913, p. 1.

214. Richthofen 1871, p. 151.

215. Richthofen 1907, vol. 1, p. 144. According to Fairbank (1986, p. 147) the infamous sign was never actually photographed.

216. Richthofen 1873, p. 37.

Von Richthofen's 1898 book *Shandong and Its Port of Entry Jiaozhou*, written to coincide with the colonial takeover, is a crucial source for reconstructing German views of China at the dawn of colonialism in Kiaochow. It is his only book-length treatment of Chinese culture in general and of Shandong in particular, and the only text he wrote before 1900 for a general audience.²¹⁷ It is also the only book published during von Richthofen's lifetime that contains selections from his travel diaries. Because it was published in 1898 it cannot be considered entirely "precolonial"—the colony was founded a year earlier—but it provides a sense of influential German views of China at the onset of the occupation. (The book's role is therefore comparable to Augustin Krämer's *Samoan Islands*). Although the problem of running a colony in China is addressed only in the final pages, von Richthofen included passages from his earlier writings that seemed relevant to problems of colonial management. Indeed, the fact that he did not feel a need to distinguish between "the traveler" and "the colonizer" as the addressee for his advice underscores the colonial impetus of his work, which was ostensibly organized around traveling and geography.

Von Richthofen repeated his opinion that "during all of my voyages I have scorned the idea of descending to the level of the Chinese through . . . a simulation" of their appearance and practices.²¹⁸ As Osterhammel notes, von Richthofen described himself as imperiously punishing "immediately on the spot," like a colonial ruler.²¹⁹ In an astonishing passage in the 1898 book that drew from his diaries, von Richthofen presented a complete scenario to illustrate the method for maintaining a dominant stance while traveling in China. He began with an uncomfortable situation familiar to readers of such stories.²²⁰ First, the European in China hears the cry "Yang Kwéitsze" (*Yang guizi*, that is, "foreign devil"). Next, perhaps, a "little pea or a small object" is thrown; then "more calls are heard"; and then the small

217. Von Richthofen's *Chrysanthemum und Drache* was also written in a popular tone and dealt with the period of the Boxer Rebellion. His five-volume *China* was directed toward a "narrower circle" of academic geographers (Richthofen 1877–1912, vol. 1, p. xi).

218. Richthofen 1898, p. 128. In his diaries von Richthofen objected to the adoption of Chinese manners and clothing by European missionaries as a "descent into the customs of a lower race," insisting that missionaries should "assume a higher standpoint than the native in every respect" (1907, vol. 2, p. 140).

219. Osterhammel 1987, p. 179.

220. Similarly, D. F. Rennie, a member of the British occupation forces in Beijing in 1860, kept a daily journal in which he described Chinese throwing worthless iron cash at the British as they passed and calling out "gui zi" (Rennie 1865, vol. 1, p. 72, quoted in L. Liu 2004, p. 102).

projectiles “get bigger, and soon stones are flying.” An “*excess*” of this sort would rarely even get started, however, if one followed this sage advice:

You sit on your horse, displaying yourself openly, and proceed calmly on your way, apparently indifferent, completely ignoring the mob. Because as soon as the crowd’s initial state of bewildered curiosity has given way to the second stage of incipient rage you will already have reached a different location with a new crowd that is still at the first stage. If there is the smallest sign of hostility, however, such as the casting of a pea (which always comes at you from behind), you should wheel around with lightning speed; then you will be able to recognize the perpetrator by the anxious collapse of his facial expression. Punishment should then be carried out immediately. . . . [For me] it was usually enough to leap off the horse, grab the perpetrator by the queue, and give him a swift kick.²²¹

If this passage illustrates von Richthofen’s affinity for colonial practices of everyday domination, another passage spells out the longer-term goals of European presence in China beyond simple motives of economic profit, toward which von Richthofen always had an ambivalent relationship. Discussing missionaries, von Richthofen recommends that they should seek to transmit not just religion but Western culture itself: “Conversion should recast the person and raise him to a higher level in ways that are also visibly recognizable.” This was a rejection of the Jesuits’ commitment to changing only those aspects of Chinese culture that directly clashed with Christianity. Von Richthofen’s comment that these are “the same conclusions Livingstone reached in Africa” underscores his amalgamation of the Chinese into a generic “native” category.²²²

Von Richthofen’s description of Chinese culture was as demeaning as his view of the country’s inhabitants, whom he already held “in very low esteem” in 1869.²²³ Often he simply repeated familiar formulas. In one article he asserted that China would “not take a single step on its own” and that “any initiative will have to come from outside.” Von Richthofen claimed that China had moved from “stasis” to “regression.”²²⁴ In an essay

221. Richthofen 1898, p. 126–27. Elsewhere von Richthofen specifies that “the method of a jovial treatment” of the natives is “often better than a proud dismissal” (1907, vol. 1, p. 110).

222. Richthofen 1898, p. 220.

223. Richthofen 1907, vol. 1, p. 142; 1870, p. 323.

224. Richthofen 1871, p. 151; 1907, vol. 1, p. 142.

published immediately after his return to Germany he specified that the aim of “European-American civilization” must be to “shake the foundations” of “Chinese culture,” awakening the country from its “paralysis” and allowing it “to enter the path of progress once again.”²²⁵

Like many other Europeans and Americans at the time, von Richthofen intended to “open China,” that is, to make it useful for Euro-American capitalism and missionary work. He wrote two memoranda to Bismarck in 1868 and 1871 while he was still in China that stressed the urgent need for Germany to acquire a permanent spot in East Asia, and he specifically recommended “Tschusan” (Zhoushan) at the entrance to Hangzhou Bay.²²⁶ Von Richthofen also counseled “improving the means of transportation” (especially railways) and laying telegraph lines to promote the “growth of industry and trade.”²²⁷ Although the advantages resulting from the construction of a railway between Europe and China would initially accrue to Russia, Germany would probably be “the second to profit from it.” In a previous article von Richthofen had discussed ongoing British and French efforts to penetrate Chinese markets.²²⁸

Despite his class-derived hesitancy about joining the modern bourgeoisie, von Richthofen had the appropriate vision of the laboring masses. In a book on Shandong and Jiaozhou, von Richthofen devoted an entire section to the “diligence and frugality” of the popular classes. The workers of this region were characterized by their “well-built bodies” and “tough muscles.” Ever practical, von Richthofen noted that “the common man amazes us with the amount of work he accomplishes and the length of time he labors” as long as he is “provided with a small supply of food [*bei geringer Zuführung von Nahrung*].” And the “Chinaman is also unsurpassed as a servant or boy,” von Richthofen added, since he “cares for the welfare of his lord . . . and fulfills his duties silently and with perfect punctuality.”²²⁹

In the second volume of *Cbina*, published in 1882, von Richthofen called Jiaozhou Bay in Shandong Province the “biggest and best ocean harbor in all of northern China” and added that it would be “especially well suited to supply not only all of Shandong but large parts of the great plain with trade goods.”²³⁰ His attention was not yet entirely focused on Shandong, however,

225. Richthofen 1873, pp. 47-48; also 1907, vol. 1, p. 28.

226. Richthofen 1898, pp. 71-72; 1907, vol. 1, p. 44; Engelmann 1988, p. 10.

227. Richthofen 1873, p. 48; 1873-74b, p. 125.

228. Richthofen 1873-74a.

229. Richthofen 1898, pp. 114-15.

230. Richthofen 1877-1912, vol. 2, p. 262.

until the annexation of Kiaochow in 1897. As a member of the *Kolonialrat* von Richthofen participated in the discussions of the colonization of Kiaochow, and he explicitly recommended Hong Kong as a model of a “small but distinguished” colonial state.²³¹

Despite a seemingly thoroughgoing colonial approach, however, von Richthofen’s writings cannot be described as uniformly Sinophobic. This underscores the continuing multivocality of discourse on China even after the Second Opium War and Japan’s military defeat of China in 1895. During the 1870s von Richthofen often referred to China as a “cultural people” (*Kulturvolk*) and a “civilization.”²³² Von Richthofen asserted that the Chinese were more educated than peasants in some parts of Europe and praised them as being “highly gifted” and oriented toward practical matters.²³³ Von Richthofen seemed to become increasingly appreciative of China’s cultural conservatism over time, describing it in 1902 as being preferable to “the character of a people that breaks with all traditions from one day to the next and wants to see everything changed.” His 1902 book, written in the wake of the hysterical German and European attacks on China around the Boxer Rebellion, distanced itself from “superficial and mocking judgments . . . arising from an overhasty or completely cursory familiarization with [Chinese] customs and mores.”²³⁴

In addition to these amendments and counterweights to Sinophobia, von Richthofen also identified with a positive image of the Chinese mandarin, like the Jesuits since Ricci and contemporary missionaries like Bishop Anzer (discussed below). His self-descriptions during his China travels were patterned on an image of the Chinese mandarin, as Jürgen Osterhammel points out. Already in 1871 von Richthofen mentioned that he was traveling on the Han River in a “mandarin ship outfitted with every comfort.”²³⁵ In a later book he suggested various ways in which German officials posted to China could “retain a distinguished standpoint” and their “*authority as high mandarins*.”²³⁶ Von Richthofen’s discussion of the technique for managing a hostile crowd suggested ironically that he was “objectively playing the

231. Richthofen 1898, p. 266. He did express some skepticism about Western intervention in China, however, likening the West’s promotion of Chinese modernization to the “suicidal” creation of a “monster” (1897, p. 32; also 1898, p. 306). Already in 1873–74 von Richthofen had raised the specter of a “flood tide” of Chinese workers moving westward (1873–74b, p. 126).

232. Richthofen 1873–74b, p. 126; 1873, p. 46.

233. Richthofen 1907, vol. I, p. 65; 1873, p. 46.

234. Richthofen 1902, p. 225, 224.

235. Richthofen 1871, p. 153.

236. Richthofen 1898, p. 128 (my emphasis).



FIGURE 6.8 Self-portrait of Ferdinand von Richthofen sketched during his China travels. From von Richthofen 1907, vol. I, facing p. 18.

role of a member of the indigenous upper class” (see fig. 6.8).²³⁷ Without assuming that von Richthofen’s diaries provide an accurate reproduction of events, his self-representation as a Euro-mandarin is indicative of the power of inherited Sinophilia to structure the imagination even of Europeans whose conscious program was colonialist.

By the time he published his diaries von Richthofen was indeed an educated German “mandarin” in historian Fritz Ringer’s sense. Like the meritocratically selected mandarins in the Chinese bureaucracy, this Prussian mandarin was a self-made man, at least according to his own account. He frequently reminded his readers of his difficult years in China spent traveling alone, or accompanied only by a servant. Von Richthofen’s six-year sojourn in the United States and his references to his excellent American friends contributed to this image of a modern individualist. Yet von Richthofen was also a scion of the Prussian aristocracy, and his career was profoundly shaped by that social class and its proximity to power. His parents were close to the royal family of Württemberg, and his family belonged to the *Alter Briefadel* (old nobility of patent), second in antiquity and prestige only to the *Uradel* (ancient nobility) among the German nobility. Von Richthofen’s inclusion in the Prussian expedition to China resulted from family connections: the

237. Osterhammel 1987, p. 179.

original commander of that mission was his uncle, Emil von Richthofen.²³⁸ The fact that von Richthofen reported directly to Bismarck while traveling in China underscores his insider status. His reports were published in the Berlin Geographical Society's journal and in the prestigious geographic journal *Petermanns Mitteilungen*. Von Richthofen became chairman of the Berlin Geographical Society almost immediately after returning to Europe in 1873.²³⁹ All of this, along with his future role as adviser to the government concerning China and the Kiaochow colony,²⁴⁰ underscore the extent to which von Richthofen participated in all three of the main fractions of the dominant class in imperial Germany: the aristocracy, the academic elite, and the modern bourgeoisie.²⁴¹

Von Richthofen's partial identification with Chinese elites might seem redundant for a member of Prussia's old elite if it were not for the mounting challenges to the nobility's social preeminence, and perhaps to his own insecure professional future during his youthful years in China and California. Imaginary identifications can be organized around fantasies of *defending* one's social standing as well as fantasies of class exaltation, as we saw with Lothar von Trotha in chapter 3. By the time he had become an established academic mandarin, a different set of motives pushed von Richthofen toward Sinophilia, which was still a marker of ethnographic sagacity and cultural refinement in university and Sinological circles. The lack of unity in von Richthofen's views of China, the combination of critical, laudatory, and identificatory approaches, corresponds to his mixed set of class allegiances and interests, his contradictory class location.²⁴² Von Richthofen's family origins and his connections with Prussia's political elite and with the business world in Germany, California, and Shanghai pushed him toward the Sinophobia typical of those classes. His associations with academia pulled him toward the Sinophilia that was characteristic of practicing Sinologists

238. Engelmann 1988, pp. 7–8; Hampe 2001, p. 182.

239. Drygalski 1905, p. 692.

240. See the 1896 report by von Heyking to Chancellor Hohenlohe referring to von Richthofen's work, reprinted in Leutner 1997, pp. 93–95. Navy pastor Hans Weicker (1908, p. 147) also referred to von Richthofen.

241. Von Richthofen's travels in China between 1868 and 1872 were "financed by the Bank of California during the first year and thereafter by the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce," which "represented British and American business interests" (Osterhammel 1987, p. 170).

242. I am adapting E. O. Wright's (1979) suggestive term to the Bourdieuan understanding of class as a subjective and cultural phenomenon based partly on the distribution of material assets but not reducible to the latter.

and that was once again becoming predominant among the intelligentsia in general at the beginning of the twentieth century.

SINOPHILIA IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
GERMAN SINOLOGY, SINOSCOPIA, AND
RELATED FIELDS

Between the late eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries most German intellectuals had shifted toward Sinophobia, as exemplified by Hegel. This partly reflected the temporary class alliance between the German *Bildungsbürgertum* and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie against the aristocracy and monarchy at that time. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, however, the economic bourgeoisie emerged as the dominant fraction of the dominant class in German society. One response among German academics to this altered force field was the emergence of attitudes—including attitudes toward non-Western cultures—that promised to distinguish *Bildungsbürger* from both the older nobility and the modern business elites.

Indeed, professional German Sinology, though a tiny and marginal field, remained committed to Sinophilia throughout the nineteenth century. The pioneering Chinese historian Johann Heinrich Plath contributed an essay entitled “China and the Chinese” to the *Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch* in 1857 that summarized various Chinese “discoveries in which the Chinese preceded the Europeans.” He argued explicitly against the despotism thesis, observing that “if anything, one might speak of a despotism of laws” but not of an unconstrained emperor. And he rejected the “huge prejudice that Chinese history shows no progress or development.”²⁴³ In other books and articles Plath relied on Chinese sources to investigate ancient Chinese history.²⁴⁴ The writings of the Berlin University Orientalist Wilhelm Schott in midcentury showed a great appreciation for Chinese philosophy and literature. One of Schott’s stated goals was to correct the “peculiar and absurd opinions about the Chinese” that were common at the time, even if he agreed with the protoimperialists that China could be shaken out of its current paralysis only by Europeans and attributed these shortcomings partly to “race.”²⁴⁵ Schott’s successor at the University of Berlin in 1889, Georg

243. Plath 1857, pp. 441, 450, 463.

244. E.g., Plath 1864, 1869. On Plath, see the excellent short biography by H. Franke (1960).

245. W. Schott 1826–32, vol. 1, p. v, quoted in Leutner 1987, p. 33; See also W. Schott 1830; 1857.

von der Gabelentz, published a translation of a Chinese novel in *Globus* in 1863 and a short book, *Confucius and His Teachings*, in 1888. Von der Gabelentz believed that “the largest cultural people of the Orient is also the most often defamed.” Arguing against the idea of “stagnation,” he insisted that Europeans should “not apply our own measures were they are least appropriate.”²⁴⁶ Wilhelm Grube, another Berlin professor, argued against the thesis associated with Sinologist Jan Jakob de Groot of Leiden and later Berlin University that “the massacres of Christians in China were due to religious fanaticism.” Grube insisted instead on “tolerance” as the defining characteristic of Chinese religious culture and added that “anyone who has firsthand experience in China and has seen the way foreigners behave toward the locals . . . will unfortunately have to admit that the xenophobia found throughout the empire is not completely unfounded and therefore not fully unjustified.”²⁴⁷ Sinologist Otto Franke, who played an important role in German Kiaochow, learned Chinese from Wilhelm Grube, and like his teacher he came to disparage Europeans who believed in the “yellow peril.”²⁴⁸ Many of the instructors and students at Berlin University’s Seminar for Oriental Languages, which first offered courses in 1887, stood in this Sinophile tradition (see chap. 7).

Sinoscopic Germans in other fields contributed to the persistence of Sinophilia. Gustav Klemm, director of the Royal Library in Dresden and author of the ten-volume *Cultural History of Mankind*, defended China’s “wonderful form of government, wise laws, advanced moral institutions, in sum, its unique culture” in 1847. Klemm concluded his study on an anti-imperialist note, observing that the Chinese were justified in viewing Europeans as barbarians in the wake of the First Opium War (1839–42) and that it was no longer the Manchus who threatened China but “Christian Germanic Europe, namely, England.”²⁴⁹

MAX WEBER’S EXCEPTIONAL RACISM

There were exceptions to this prevailing academic Sinophilia, of course, and one of the most striking examples was sociologist Max Weber. It is well established that Weber’s views of Poles were crudely racist.²⁵⁰ Less obvious is

246. Gabelentz 1888, pp. 2–4. He also rejected the argument that Chinese was a primitive language (Leutner 1987, p. 35).

247. Grube 1910, pp. 11, 5. Ku Hung-Ming (1901, p. 21), discussed in the next chapter, had already polemicized against the European interpretation of the Yihetuan as “fanatics.”

248. O. Franke 1911a, p. vi.

249. Klemm 1847, pp. ii, 510.

250. Zimmerman 2006.

his willful and somewhat eccentric Sinophobia. Weber's *Religion of China* was structured around the premise of Chinese economic stagnation, which he explained in terms of shortcomings of Chinese values or national culture. He drew most heavily on the writings of Jan de Groot, who considered the Chinese to be "semi-civilized" and prone to religious "fanaticism."²⁵¹ Weber was ignorant of the growth of Chinese capitalism in the late nineteenth century, including in the region around the future German colony in Shandong Province.²⁵² He also ignored the fettering impact of Western imperialism on Chinese capitalism and of British opium on the Chinese work ethic. Weber accepted de Groot's sweeping assertion that Confucianism was oriented toward "adjustment to the world" rather than "rational transformation of the world" in ways that prevented the emergence of "those great and methodical business conceptions which are rational in nature."²⁵³ Weber's views demonstrate that class position alone did not determine ethnographic postures.

CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES IN SHANDONG IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Another example of unexpected ambivalence and multivocality in the midst of ostensible Sinophobia concerns the German Catholic Steyl Mission (*Societas verbum divini*, or SVD), which became active in southern Shandong Province during the 1880s. The mission played a central role in ratcheting up tensions between China and Europe and contributed in no small part to sparking the anti-Christian *Dadao hui* (Big Sword Society) and its successor, the *Yihetuan* (Boxer) movement.²⁵⁴ The Bavarian Steyl missionary Johann Baptist Anzer arrived in Shandong in 1880 and was soon joined by missionary Joseph Freinademetz. The Steyl Mission seems at first glance to have been monolithically committed to Sinophobia. Anzer's stated goal was to achieve a "deep humiliation of Chinese pride." The SVD missionaries described China as an "empire of Satan" where "the devil's domain is far greater than in the Christian countries."²⁵⁵ They summarized the Chinese

251. De Groot 1892, p. x.

252. Mühlhahn 2000.

253. M. Weber 1964, pp. 240, 242. Weber's mistake may reveal the dangers to historical sociology of relying too heavily on secondary sources, but even more damaging is the extreme selectivity in his use of sources.

254. Gründer 1982, p. 288; Esherick 1987, pp. 80ff.; Schrecker 1971, p. 33; Kuepers 1974. For an overview of missions in Shandong on the eve of German colonization see Richthofen 1898, chap. 6; Stenz 1899 is the best firsthand missionary account.

255. Missionaries Richard Henle and Anton Wewel, quoted by Mühlhahn (2000, p. 331), who gives a number of similar quotes from Steyl missionary reports.

as “yellow slaves of . . . ancient customs” and of a “despotic bureaucracy.”²⁵⁶ After arriving in Shandong, Anzer immediately focused his attention on establishing a mission residence in Yanzhou, the city where Confucius had lived and that was revered by the Chinese. For Anzer Yanzhou was a “bulwark of the devil.”²⁵⁷ Stenz called Yanzhou the “Chinese Mecca, the bulwark of all pagans.”²⁵⁸ According to the German legation secretary, Baron Speck von Sternburg, Yanzhou was the “only place in China aside from Hunan Province where missionaries [had] not yet been able to establish themselves.”²⁵⁹ Chinese resistance to Anzer’s provocations was fierce and lasted for years. In 1890 the German *Gesandter*, or envoy, to China, Max von Brandt, succeeded in getting China and France to recognize Germany as the protector of the German missionaries, and in 1891 the Germans used this pretext to stage an aggressive confrontation by the German consul in Tianjin, Baron von Seckendorff, with the Shandong governor in Ji’nan and the Daotai (circuit intendant) of Yanzhou.²⁶⁰ This was just the first in a series of egregious interventions coordinated by Anzer and his coworkers in the province. Anzer repeatedly urged the German legation in Beijing and the Foreign Office in Berlin to use German navy warships to pressure the Chinese into letting the missionaries into Yanzhou. He finally succeeded in 1896 and set up a seminar for priests there.²⁶¹ According to Joseph Esherick, the Steyl missionaries created a parallel political structure in Shandong “which could stand over and against the Chinese polity, as an alternative authority system and indeed a rival for political power.”²⁶² Missionaries intervened before local Chinese magistrates on the side of Chinese Christians in lawsuits. Their actions finally provoked the “Juye incident,” the murder of two Steyl missionaries on November 1, 1897, by alleged members of the Dadao hui. This provided Germany

256. *Annalen der Verbreitung des Glaubens* 67 (1899): 30–31.

257. Anzer, quoted in Rivinius 1979, p. 90 n. 8. Yanzhou was the county seat; nearby Qufu was the birthplace of Confucius and the site of the Confucian temple.

258. Stenz 1899, p. 28.

259. Speck von Sternburg 1979, p. 114, report from Puoli, headquarters of the Steyl Mission in Southern Shandong, November 16, 1895.

260. Stoecker 1958, pp. 250–52. The protection of foreign missionaries in China by foreign powers was one dimension of the humiliating policy of extraterritoriality practiced by Europeans until after World War II. The Beijing *Gesandter* was at the top of the German diplomatic hierarchy in China; Germany was also represented by consuls in several cities and had a general consul in Shanghai. Germany first sent an ambassador (*Botschafter*) to China in 1931.

261. Rivinius 1987, pp. 449–456.

262. Esherick 1987, p. 85.

with its excuse for intervening militarily in the province and seizing Qingdao.²⁶³

Despite this onslaught of epithets and aggression, the Steyl missionaries also “criticized prejudices and discriminations” against the Chinese.²⁶⁴ Missionary Rudolph Pieper insisted that the Chinese were a “people with an autonomous [*selbsteigene*] culture” that should not be “underestimated according to European standards.”²⁶⁵ Many of the Steyl missionaries, who tended to come from simple agrarian backgrounds, were attracted to China in ways they did not openly admit. Georg Stenz claimed that wearing Chinese clothing was necessary to avoid being abused by people on the street (though he admitted that the Chinese still “recognized us immediately as Europeans”), and he called this masquerade a “theater.”²⁶⁶ The missionaries always posed in Chinese clothing, even for European portraits.²⁶⁷ As travelers like von Richthofen noted, Catholic missionaries in Shandong were completely embedded within Chinese material culture (even though some of the Franciscans he met could not speak or read Chinese).²⁶⁸ The counterexample of the Rhenish missionaries in precolonial Southwest Africa demonstrates that such complete assimilation into local sartorial norms was not an automatic feature of the contact zone (fig. 6.9).

Despite his apparent hostility to the Chinese state, Bishop Anzer wore Chinese clothing from the moment he arrived in China, spoke Chinese, ate Chinese food, and adopted other elements of a Chinese lifestyle. And he strove successfully to move upward within the official Chinese bureaucratic hierarchy. In 1892 Anzer was promoted to the rank of third-class mandarin by the Daotai of Zhou Xian, the birthplace of Mencius. According to von Richthofen, this was the first time in two hundred years that a foreign missionary had been promoted to this rank. Three years later Anzer was promoted to second-class mandarin status.²⁶⁹ This “brought him numerous privileges,” including the title “Excellence” and “the use of the green state

263. On the Juye incident see Stenz 1899, pp. 72–76; Kuepers 1974, pp. 139–40; Schrecker 1971, p. 33; and Esherick 1987, p. 126.

264. Mühlhahn 2000, p. 332.

265. Pieper 1900, p. 9.

266. Stenz 1899, p. 11. The Catholic Church in Shandong “came to adopt more and more of the trappings of the Chinese bureaucratic state in the effort to legitimize its own authority” (Esherick 1987, p. 84). Yet the missionaries’ adoption of Chinese accoutrements and honors often seemed to exceed what would have been necessary for legitimation in the eyes of the Chinese.

267. In addition to the numerous photos of Anzer in his mandarin outfit, all of the missionaries depicted in Stenz 1899 are wearing Chinese clothing.

268. Richthofen 1898, pp. 212–20.

269. Richthofen 1898, p. 225; see also Rivinius 1979, pp. 30–33.




FIGURE 6.9 Rhenish missionary in his Southwest African “mat house,” with European furniture and wearing European clothing. From *Berichte der Rheinischen Missionsgesellschaft*, October 1853.

sedan chair with a retinue of ten riders and bearers of his insignia.”²⁷⁰ Finally, in 1902, Anzer ascended to the level of first-class mandarin. He was assisted in his ascent by von Brandt, the long-serving German envoy to Beijing.²⁷¹ Anzer wore his mandarin costume for official photographs and crafted a hybrid image with Catholic and Chinese regalia, while Joseph Freinademetz, the cofounder with Anzer of the Steyl mission in Shandong, stuck to a more strictly Chinese image (figs. 6.10, 6.11). Anzer’s letters suggest that he was concerned with gaining respectability in the eyes not only of German elites but of Chinese ones as well. In a letter from 1894 to a missionary journal, Anzer announced that he had received “the red button of rank” from the Chinese emperor himself and added that “the announcement of this advancement in status made a very *favorable impression on the mandarins and literati*.”²⁷² He described himself proudly, in another European religious publication, as a “mandarin of the second degree.”²⁷³ Anzer also followed

270. Gründer 1982, p. 288.

271. Brandt 1901, vol. 3, p. 77. Von Brandt was envoy to China from 1875 to 1893.

272. “Schreiben des Hochwürdigsten Herrn apostolischen Vikars und Bischofs Johann Baptist Anzer von Süd-Schantung an den Geschäftsführer des Ludwig-Mission-Vereines in München,” *Annalen der Verbreitung des Glaubens* 33 (1895): 25 (my emphasis).

273. Quoted in Rivinius 1979, p. 92.



FIGURE 6.10 (above) Missionary Johann Baptist Anzer in hybrid Chinese mandarin and European Catholic costume. From *Gründer* 1982, fig. 33. (Courtesy of Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag.)



FIGURE 6.11 (right) Missionary Joseph Freinademetz. From Stenz 1924, p. 19.

the classic Jesuit strategy of using the texts of Confucius and Mencius with his Chinese students as the basis “for the construction of the Christian religion” and for raising his pupils “according to Chinese customs.”²⁷⁴

Like von Richthofen, Anzer’s discourse on China was far from univocal. His case also illustrates again the ways images of non-European cultures could be used in projects of accumulating symbolic capital and pursuing imaginary identifications. Anzer’s specific use of China differed from von Richthofen’s, however, due in part to the missionary’s humbler social origins and his distinctive social class dilemma. Anzer’s father had been an impoverished peasant and butcher.²⁷⁵ Other missionaries described Anzer as authoritarian and awkward. His heavy drinking was a topic of intrigue among the missionaries he supervised.²⁷⁶ As an arrivé even within the rela-

274. German envoy to China Speck von Sternburg, report of November 16, 1895, on the Steyl Mission, to chancellor, in Rivinius 1979, pp. 123, 129.

275. Kuepers 1974, p. 21 n. 1.

276. Rivinius 1979 describes the conflicts around Anzer.

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tively modest world of the overseas missionaries, Anzer was poorly positioned to assert the distinctive ethnographic virtues of the scholar class. In his search for symbolically recognizable status Anzer therefore gravitated toward the Sinophobic codes that were associated with the German capitalist and aristocratic classes. At the same time, he tried to cultivate an image as a scholar-missionary, as is suggested by his eager accumulation of Chinese honors and titles and his adoption of other signifiers of the Jesuits' "good" China, such as reliance on the Chinese classics.²⁷⁷ Anzer's Janus-faced relationship to China was only possible due to the multifaceted structure of extant European discourse on Chinese culture.

Multivocality in German Representations of China at the End of the Nineteenth Century

A recent study of colonialism in Kiaochow suggests that precolonial German representations of China were so uniformly "ethnocentric" that they prevented the Germans from "adequately grasping the complex reality of China."²⁷⁸ But while German views of China were indeed "inadequate," they were far from homogeneous, even in the years immediately preceding the occupation of Jiaozhou and the Boxer uprising. Even von Richthofen and Anzer, men who contributed directly to the conquest of Kiaochow and who could therefore be expected to exhibit a hostile, seamlessly colonialist view of China, revealed a deeper level of respect for China almost despite themselves. If early colonial planners in German Kiaochow drew exclusively from the harshest strands of Sinophobia, this was a selective appropriation and not an inexorable result of the cultural conditions of possibility.

A perusal of the major German encyclopedias, anthropological, geographic, and travel journals, and of certain novels and popular magazines reveals that China continued to be represented as an advanced civilization throughout the nineteenth century, or to be granted a sort of junior status among the civilized nations.²⁷⁹ The ethnological and anthropological journal *Globus* repeatedly described the Chinese as a *Kulturvolk* that ranked "just behind the Europeans in the scale of intellectual development," in the

277. Anzer also strove to accumulate honors in European fields. He occupied the dual roles of *Provinzial* (administrator) and bishop in China and referred frequently to the "Council of Trent, which had decreed that bishops were *princes* of the church." He also emphasized that he was "highly regarded and befriended in Rome and Berlin" (Rivinius 1979, pp. 41–42; my emphasis).

278. Mühlhahn 2000, p. 180.

279. For a list of the journals examined see the bibliography.

words of its editor.²⁸⁰ Another *Globus* article argued that there were three races in China—black, brown, and yellow—and that the yellow Chinese in this context civilized their own black and brown “savage” neighbors just like the Europeans civilized their own racial inferiors.²⁸¹

The multivocality of discourse on China allowed writers to reverse their evaluations from one text to the next. One of the most striking examples of a 180-degree turnaround is presented by Karl May. His first two novels on China were permeated by the familiar negative tropes of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Sinophobia. The second and best-known of these novels, *Der blaurote Methusalem* (1889), is the story of a German university student and fraternity member who travels through China having various adventures. He is promoted to the highest level in the mandarin bureaucracy without even having to study for the examination. While this might be interpreted as little more than the wishful fantasy of a lazy student, the fact that the same narrative also shows up in May’s first China novel, *Der Kiang Lu* (1880),²⁸² and that it is accompanied by criticisms of the Chinese mandarin, suggests that there is more at stake. The most disturbing passage in *Der blaurote Methusalem* builds a catalog of negative racial and cultural characteristics from an observation of Chinese children: “A nation is easily judged by the activities of its universe of children. Play is the child’s work. But how does the Chinese child play? . . . Where can we see the rosy cheeks and the flashing eyes, where can we hear the children’s happy high-toned jubilation? Almost nowhere! The Chinese boy steps out of his house slowly and pensively, looks around like an old man, walks without the slightest spring in his step to the playground, and then ruminates on how he is going to occupy himself. . . . *Everything is elderly.*” The author then advances to a general conclusion: “Like the elderly person . . . the Chinaman is not easily moved to adopt the views of others. . . . The changes that have appeared in recent years have either been forced on him or else he has only accepted them for selfish reasons.”²⁸³ Just nine years later, however, in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion, May radically altered his view of China. The narrator of *Et*

280. Karl Andree, “Die Veränderung in der gegenseitigen Stellung der Menschenrassen und die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse,” *Globus* 14 (1868): 20.

281. Garnier 1875, pp. 337–38. Gustav Fritsch (1880, p. 293) asked rhetorically “how an anthropological colloquium would react if I suggested calling the Germanic nation the European-Chinese [*Europa-Chinesen*],” and he continued that “the European is closer to the Chinaman than the Bushman is to the Kaffir.”

282. *Der Kiang Lu* was first published in 1880 and appeared again in May’s collection *Am stillen Ozean* (1894); see May [1894] 1954, chap. 7.

283. May 1889, pp. 194–95.

in terra pax begins his Chinese journey with a self-reflexive passage about prejudices preventing travelers from making anything but the most superficial observations. The racism of two missionaries is portrayed as a form of mental illness.²⁸⁴

In other examples from this period representations of China fluctuate within individual texts. Books that set out to criticize or debunk Chinese culture are infused with elements that undercut their intended message. For example, the nineteenth-century German anthropologist Oscar Peschel argued at one point in his *Races of Man (Völkerkunde)* that the Chinese had “progressively improved their condition,” but he insisted several pages later that “it is everywhere noticeable that the Chinese do not advance beyond a certain grade of intellectual development.”²⁸⁵ Just a few years earlier, Peschel had argued that the Chinese were actually superior to Europeans since they had developed their culture in isolation and despite a poor natural environment.²⁸⁶ German missionaries and explorers who struck an arrogant colonial stance toward the Chinese unwittingly found that their self-presentation was permeated by gestures and signifiers suggesting admiration and rapprochement. Writings on China were quite distinct in this respect from most texts on Southern Africans or Samoans, which tended to be less ideologically fractured.

EFFI BRIEST: A CHINA CABINET

The most extreme proliferation of disparate interpretations and uses of “China” within a single text comes from one of the most famous German novels of the nineteenth century, *Effi Briest* (1894). Initially, the “China-man” in Fontane’s novel suggests a generalized object of desire. His first

284. The first edition of *Et in terra pax* appeared in Kürschner’s *China* (1901), a glossy three-volume collection.

285. Peschel 1876, pp. 362, 374.

286. Peschel 1867, pp. 916–17. An even more peculiar case is the 1903 novel *Hung Li Tscheng oder der Drache am gelben Meer* by youth writer Friedrich Meister, who had translated James Fenimore Cooper and written a novel about the 1904 war in Southwest Africa (F. Meister 1904). In a preface to *Hung Li Tscheng* dated September 1900—written, that is, in the midst of the European campaign against the Boxers—Meister describes the Chinese as “perhaps the most gifted people on earth.” China “possessed a relatively advanced culture five thousand years ago, and has continued to progress from this basis, slowly but surely, ever since,” while Europe had developed only during the past 250 years (F. Meister 1903, p. iv). He admits that this image of steady progress flies directly in the face of the fashionable view of China as a “backward, degenerate people, with few positive sides and which must be forcibly taught European culture” (F. Meister 1903, p. iii).

appearance is as an actual historical figure who had previously lived in the provincial German town where young Effi, recently married, has settled with her husband, Baron Geert von Innstetten. The nameless Chinese figure is rumored to have violated a social-sexual taboo by falling in love with the granddaughter of the captain who brought him back from the Far East as a servant. Like the town's historical Chinaman, Effi crosses a "racial" boundary herself by taking up with Crampas, a dark-haired, romantic "ladies' man." According to Innstetten, Crampas is "one of these half Poles, unreliable, and not to be trusted in anything, particularly with women."²⁸⁷ It may seem paradoxical that China could stand for a sexually charged difference, since sexuality had never been a central aspect of European representations of China. One might conclude that China is being linked through a chain of associations to the rest of the Orient, including the Near East, with its more explicitly sexualized connotations.²⁸⁸ Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Xanadu pleasure-dome" illustrates one of the ways China had been brought into this chain. Even more important than such specific connotations, however, is China's role as the inversion or subversion of everything familiar, just as desire is the inversion or subversion of the symbolic order. As Effi remarks at one point, "There's a whole new world to discover," with "all sorts of exotic people," including "perhaps a Negro or a Turk or perhaps even a Chinaman."²⁸⁹ With its suggestions of radical alterity, China can be linked to sexual desire as a sign of the Lacanian *objet petit a*, the generalized object of desire.

The evolving portrayal of China within European discourse more broadly is echoed in the novel's narrative trajectory. After all, China also stood for radical difference within Sinophobia, but here alterity had a negative valence. By the same token, after figuring first as the "exotic" and erotic, the novel's Chinaman shifts meaning and appears increasingly as a spectral "means of education" (in Crampas' words) mobilized by Innstetten for disciplining his young bride.²⁹⁰ This pedagogical ghost is introduced into the couple's "haunted house" via a tiny picture stuck to the back of a chair, a picture of a Chinaman. Here the signifier "China" begins to concentrate the punishing, authoritarian patriarchy personified by Effi's husband. Indeed, Innstetten is associated with the most stifling aspects of Prussian bureau-

287. Fontane [1894] 1967, pp. 137, 138. I developed my analysis of this novel in discussions with Julia Hell. Fontane himself called the Chinaman "a pivot" of the novel (Greenberg 1988: 773).

288. Alloula 1986; Said 1978; Ackerman 1986.

289. Fontane [1894] 1967, p. 48.

290. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

cratic culture, which at the time of Fontane's writing was being dissected by liberals as an expression of semidespotic "eastern" Junkerdom.²⁹¹ This evocation of Oriental despotism is heightened by a suggestion of Chinese footbinding. Soon after her wedding Effi begins to take long walks because "her doctor had told her that a lot of exercise in the fresh air was the best thing she could have" in her pregnant condition. Some time later she uses the same excuse to take long walks alone, "undeterred by any unpleasant weather," and especially "in the afternoons, when Innstetten [is] starting to become engrossed in his newspapers," and when her lover Crampas is in town.²⁹² For centuries European observers had explained footbinding as a strategy used by Chinese men to limit their wives' mobility. As the Jesuit Trigault had written, "probably one of their sages hit upon this idea to keep them in the house."²⁹³ The educating Chinaman is thus not only a Prussian-Oriental despot but one whose energies are aimed specifically at curtailing women's wandering.

At a third level, Fontane taps into a fount of Sinophobia that was omnipresent in his day, specifically the theme of decay. By the late nineteenth century, racial and eugenic sciences had elaborated the topic of degeneracy in ways that linked the "extinction of the primitive peoples" and the ruination of China to the enfeeblement of modern Europeans, psychic disturbances and voluptuousness.²⁹⁴ In the context of broader discussions of degeneracy, China's status as the leading example of a declining civilization allowed the Chinaman in Fontane's novel to forge a connection between sexual transgression and death. Effi suffers a social death of ostracism, driven out of polite society, when her husband discovers her affair with Crampas. Her fate is the same as the Chinaman's, who "could easily have been buried in the Christian cemetery," according to the local pastor, but who in fact "naturally . . . couldn't be buried in the municipal cemetery" at all, as Innstetten insists. Instead, Effi writes in a letter, the Chinaman "is buried in a lonely spot next to the cemetery."²⁹⁵ And at the end of the novel, the adultress herself is buried outside the Christian graveyard, in her parents' garden.

The narrative development of *Effi Briest* thus neatly mirrors the evolution of European discourse on China from the Middle Ages to the end of the nineteenth century. Fontane not only draws on the full register of Sino-

291. E.g., M. Weber [1895] 1989.

292. Fontane [1894] 1967, pp. 104, 161, 158.

293. Trigault and Ricci [1615] 1953, p. 77.

294. Santner 1996, pp. 6-9.

295. Fontane [1894] 1967, pp. 84, 82, 97.

philic and Sinophobic ideologemes but presents them in the same order as their historical development. The initial fascination with exotic-erotic discovery is overtaken by the frozen stranglehold of despotism, which eventually gives way to stagnation, illness and death.

Toward “German-China”

Despite the perduring multivocality of German discourse about China, colonial and racist representations reached a sort of crescendo in the last years of the century. In 1869 the Prussian navy opened its first East Asian station. Around the same time German politicians, academic specialists, and traders began to press for a territorial base on the Chinese coast. As one colonial propagandist put it in the 1860s, the goal was a “German Macao or Hong Kong.”²⁹⁶ This agitation did not let up until Germany annexed Kiaochow. German envoy Max von Brandt argued in 1872 that Germany should seek a permanent place of its own in China, and that this colony could be acquired “either by purchase or by violence”—both methods were acceptable.²⁹⁷ German trade with China increased rapidly, and after the Sino-French war (1883–85) Germany became the main exporter of weapons to China.²⁹⁸ Von Brandt’s successor as German envoy, Baron Schenk zu Schweinsberg, advised the Germans to seize Jiaozhou Bay in 1894.²⁹⁹ China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War led the Western powers to see China as even weaker than they had previously believed, and made some Chinese leaders more willing to bend to European demands in exchange for military and economic assistance.

In 1894, the first year of the Sino-Japanese War, Kaiser Wilhelm insisted that if Russia, France, and Great Britain attained “important points in China,” “under no circumstances could Germany come up short.” During the next three years Germany continually pressured China for a “firm spot” on the coast.³⁰⁰ In 1895 Wilhelm II produced a crude drawing of a city in flames with clouds of smoke taking the form of an Asiatic dragon and a Buddha, facing off against a group of allegorical female figures

296. Friedel 1867, p. 62. See also Bastian 1871.

297. Brandt 1901, vol. 3, p. 326.

298. Stoecker 1958, p. 211.

299. Schenk to Hohenlohe, November 23, 1894, in Lepsius, Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Thimme 1922–27, vol. 9, no. 2221, p. 248.

300. Memo from Chancellor Hohenlohe to Foreign Secretary von Marschall of November 11, 1894, in Lepsius, Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Thimme 1922–27, vol. 9, no. 2219, pp. 245–46.

representing the various European nations (fig. 6.12).³⁰¹ The “court” painter Hermann Knackfuß turned Wilhelm’s sketch into a lithograph (fig. 6.13) that was officially presented to the Russian tsar in a “special mission” by Generaladjutant and Oberst Helmuth von Moltke.³⁰² Here the female figure leading the European nations has been turned into a male “war cherub” or St. Michael, the patron saint of the German nation. Although Kaiser Wilhelm did not coin the phrase “yellow peril,” as he boasted, his drawing is nonetheless evocative.³⁰³

Baron Edmund von Heyking arrived in Beijing to replace Schenk zu Schweinsberg as German envoy in 1896. He was accompanied by his wife, Baroness Elisabeth von Heyking. The von Heykings stayed in China until the end of 1899, presiding over the German invasion of Qingdao and experiencing the beginnings of the Boxer uprising. In a memo to the chancellor in August 1896 Edmund argued vigorously for seizing Qingdao and suggested using an incident with German missionaries as a pretext—precisely the scenario that was followed in 1897.³⁰⁴ He led the negotiations with China over the modalities of the German occupation.

Elisabeth von Heyking’s diaries from this period convey a vivid sense of the noxious tone of German anti-Chinese racism in the final years of the century.³⁰⁵ She approvingly quoted an American official in China who told her that the Chinese are “only fit to be sliced up by the different powers.” It did not even occur to the von Heykings to try to learn some of the local language. Instead, Elisabeth’s diary criticized the Chinese for being unable to “speak a European language passably.” Edmund von Heyking described the Chinese ministers of the Zongli Yamen (Foreign Office) as “all complete

301. Gollwitzer 1962, pp. 42, 206.

302. *Ibid.*, p. 207; Moltke 1922, pp. 190–91. Von Moltke described the leading figure in the version presented to the Russian tsar as a “Cherub des Krieges” (war cherub; Moltke 1922, p. 191).

303. The German anti-Semitic press compared Chinese and Jews starting in 1882 (Gollwitzer 1962, pp. 174ff.).

304. Von Heyking to chancellor, Beijing, August 22, 1896, BA-MA-Freiburg, RMA, vol. 6693, pp. 27–29.

305. In addition to the epigraph to this chapter see also Heyking 1926, pp. 207, 215, for other uses of the word *Barbaren* (barbarians) to describe the Chinese. Elisabeth von Heyking was the granddaughter of Bettina von Arnim, one of the most famous women in German letters and the author of many romantic novels. Von Heyking’s epistolary novel *Briefe, die ihn nicht erreichten* (1903) was translated into English and was said to have sold ten million copies before World War I (Ruland 1973, p. 64). Her novel *Tschun: Eine Geschichte aus dem Vorfrübling Chinas* (1914) was based on her Beijing diaries.



FIGURE 6.12 (top) Kaiser Wilhelm II, *People of Europe, Defend Your Most Sacred Treasures*: sketch of Europe defending itself against the “yellow peril” (April 30, 1895). (Courtesy of Stichting Huis Doorn, the Netherlands.)

FIGURE 6.13 (bottom) Hermann Knackfuss, *People of Europe, Defend Your Most Sacred Treasures* (1895). (Courtesy of Stichting Huis Doorn, the Netherlands.)

idiots” and “forbidding, staring masks” (abschreckende stiere Larven).³⁰⁶ The aristocratic couple was proud of its exalted social status and apparently felt no need to identify across cultural boundaries with an imago of the Chinese mandarin. Nor did they feel obliged to display any specialized knowledge of China or any of the other non-European societies to which the Foreign Office posted them. Indeed, the Sinologist Otto Franke, who acted as interpreter during the Chinese-German negotiations over the annexation of Kiaochow, recalled later that the Baron and the Baroness had adopted an extremely high-handed manner with the Chinese, whom they regarded as “dirty, cowardly, retarded, and disgusting.” According to Franke, they saw any interest in Chinese culture as a sign of a “subaltern mentality.”³⁰⁷

Transition

The broad transition from Sinomania to Sinophobia masks a great deal of continuity and heterogeneity. Only the case of the Khoikhoi, among the other ethnographic formations examined in this book, comes close to the Chinese material in terms of complexity and unsettledness. If the kaiser’s “yellow peril” hysteria dominated German discussions of China at the end of the nineteenth century, the formation of discourse on China on the eve of colonial annexation was still extremely multivocal. The layeredness of this discourse had crucial implications for German colonial practice in Qingdao.

Even the condemnatory strands of discourse on China were distinctive in ways that mattered for colonial policy. First, Sinophobia was always haunted by Sinophilia. Sinophile tropes bore the traces of the perspective against which they had originally been directed. Even a negatively coded trope like despotism carried a shadow of the same object, positively ca-thected—in this case, of the benevolent Chinese state. This is different from dominant perceptions of the Samoans or Ovaherero on the eve of colonization: in the first case the earliest “ignoble savagery” perspective was almost entirely forgotten by the late nineteenth century and the earlier Tahitian precedents had greater influence; within the second discursive formation there was almost no variation in meaning at all.

We have seen in the two earlier discussions that the details of precolonial ethnographic formations shaped the strategies of native policy that were recommended and eventually implemented. The theme of Chinese despotism, intellectual arrogance, and civilizational decline delineated a subject

306. Baron von Heyking quoted in Löbbecke 1982, document 99, p. 234; and in Heyking 1926, pp. 199, 204, 191.

307. O. Franke 1954, p. 98.

population that remained firmly in the grip of a powerful and ancient culture. The country's perceived cultural stability directed colonizers away from projects of fundamentally recasting their subjects or "shaking the foundations" of their culture (despite von Richthofen's recommendations). Europeans recognized that Britain had needed to fight two wars just to get the Chinese to abstain from referring to foreigners with the ideogram they believed signified "barbarian."³⁰⁸ The combined and mutually reinforcing power of the intact Chinese state, a self-conscious scholarly class, and a relatively homogenous elite culture anchored in canonical texts meant that the German colonizers did not even consider trying to transform their Chinese subjects. The training of Chinese apprentices for work in the German railways, mines, and shipyards was not accompanied by any official suggestion that the goal was to inculcate a modern work ethic, since not even the Sinophobic theorists had accused the Chinese of laziness. After 1905 or so there was a broad German effort to insinuate elements of German culture into China, but this was not conceptualized along the lines of transforming and governing an entire culture. Instead, this was a *noncolonial* (though perhaps imperial) program aimed at China as a whole rather than being concentrated in the Kiaochow colony. The goal was to add a specifically German accent to the process of "modernization/Westernization" that was proceeding apace in China as a whole, and not just in the colonial enclaves. In the eyes of German nationalists, Chinese modernity was being given an overwhelmingly British (and French and American) stamp, threatening to shut Germany out in a much more fundamental way than the earlier lack of colonies. Any project of Germanizing the tiny number of Chinese that lived in Kiaochow seemed to these German nationalists to overlook the more significant cultural battle. The idea of influencing the Chinese did, therefore, gain adherents, but it pointed away from colonialism.

Another aspect of precolonial discourse that constrained future colonial practice was the fact that China was not usually configured as Europe's ancestral cousin. This was one respect in which China was distinguished from the other great and putatively stagnant civilization, India,³⁰⁹ and also from Polynesia, which was imagined as an ambered version of Europe's own antiquity. No category of "noble barbarian" arose within Sinoscopia in parallel to noble savagery. The fact that the Chinese were difficult for Euro-

308. Mistakenly, as it turns out. According to L. Liu (1999b, 2004) the contested Chinese character *yí* did not have a single obvious meaning to Chinese. This did not prevent the British from insisting on the change, however, in the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin (Spence 1990, p. 181).

309. Inden 1986; Pollock 2000.

peans to imagine as part of their own family tree meant that paternalistic strategies of native policy were never formulated.

By acknowledging China's continuing cultural and political power and its radical alterity, European Sinophobia radically reduced the menu of options for colonial native policy. Sinophilia, by contrast, did not construe China as a place that even needed colonization. Although Europeans had discussed China for much longer and in much more detail than Southern Africa and Polynesia, the structure of discourse on China was configured in a way that ultimately left fewer options for colonial governance.³¹⁰

310. The existence of Hong Kong as a model did not alleviate this problem, since the British rulers had entered their Chinese colony with roughly the same set of inherited representations as the Germans and therefore faced the same set of options.

[SEVEN]

A Pact with the (Foreign) Devil & Qingdao as a Colony

Now, dear Justinian. . . . Tell us once, where you will begin. . . . In a place where there are already Christians? or where there are none? Where there are Christians you come too late. . . . The English, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish control a good part of the farthest seacoast. . . . Where then? . . . In China only recently the Tartars mercilessly murdered the Christians and their preachers. Will you go there? Where then, you honest Germans? . . . Dear Justinian, stop dreaming, lest Satan deceive you in a dream!

Admonition to Justinian von Weltz, Protestant missionary in Latin America, from JOHANN H. URSINIUS, Lutheran Superintendent at Regensburg (1664)¹

When China was ruled by the Han and Jin dynasties, the Germans were still living as savages in the jungles. In the Chinese Six Dynasties period they only managed to create barbarian tribal states. During the medieval Dark Ages, as war raged for a thousand years, the [German] people could not even read and write. . . . Our China, however, that can look back on a unique five-thousand-year-old culture, is now supposed to take advice [from Germany], contrite and with its head bowed. . . . What a shame!

KANG YOUWEI, "Research on Germany's Political Development" (1906)²

Bumrush the Show: Germans in Colonial Kiaochow, 1897-1904

During the 1860s the Germans began discussing the possibility of obtaining a coastal entry point from which they could expand inland into China. After German unification and the emergence of a German navy there was

1. Translated from the German text in Grössel 1891 by J. A. Scherer (1969, pp. 100-102).

2. Kang Youwei 1986, pp. 360-62; German translation in Felber 1994, pp. 179-80.

increasing talk of the need for a coaling station for the German East Asia Cruiser Squadron.³ Following the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), German envoys Schenck zu Schweinsburg and von Heyking unsuccessfully petitioned China to provide Germany with a harbor. In 1896 Rear Admiral Alfred Tirpitz (called von Tirpitz starting with his ennoblement in 1900), commander of the East Asia squadron, visited Jiaozhou bay and wrote a memo calling for its occupation.⁴ The following year Tirpitz became state secretary for the Imperial Navy Department and began orchestrating the massive buildup of Germany's fleet. At the end of November 1896, Wilhelm II instructed Admiral Eduard von Knorr "to prepare a plan for the occupation of Jiaozhou Bay."⁵ It was now just a matter of time before Germany found a pretext to make the first move.

As in Southwest Africa, German missionaries paved the way to colonial conquest. Germany's opportunity arose on November 1, 1897, when two of the Steyl missionaries were killed by supposed Boxers or members of the Dadao hui (Big Sword Society) in Juye County, southwestern Shandong. The Yihetuan, or "Boxers United in Righteousness," were a martial arts group initially concentrated in northwest Shandong and the border regions of Zhili Province who joined the anti-Christian movement in 1899 and spread northward toward Beijing, provoking a response by the first international "coalition of the righteous" in the twentieth century.⁶ The Boxers would play an important role in Kiaochow's constitutive period even though most of their activities were conducted far from the colony's borders.

The kaiser learned of the missionaries' murder on November 6. The following day, after receiving assurance that the Russian tsar would not object to a German intervention, Wilhelm II ordered his East Asia squadron, under the command of Admiral Otto von Diederichs, to seize Jiaozhou Bay. The emperor was determined to put an end to what he called Germany's "hypercautious [*hypervorsichtige*] policy in East Asia" and to show the Chinese once and for all, "with the most brutal ruthlessness," that he was "not to be toyed with."⁷ German battleships arrived in Jiaozhou Bay on November 13. The next morning about 500 troops landed on the shore, cut the telegraph lines, and occupied Qingdao. The town had been a seaport and fishing vil-

3. Schrecker 1971, pp. 5-9.

4. Stichler 1989, pp. 19-20; Hubatsch 1955, p. 33.

5. Lepsius, Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Thimme 1922-27, vol. 14, pt. 1, p. 47n.

6. Esherick 1987; Cohen 1997.

7. Telegram from kaiser to Foreign Office, November 6, 1897, in Lepsius, Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Thimme 1922-27, vol. 14, pt. 1, p. 67.

lage since the Ming dynasty and had expanded into a small commercial center with sixty-five shops due to the recent garrisoning of Chinese troops and the completion of the road inland to Jiaozhou.⁸ Admiral Diederichs informed General Zhang Gaoyuan, commanding officer at Qingdao, that he had two days to evacuate his 1,600–2,000 troops from the town's four barracks. Under instructions from the central Chinese government, General Zhang capitulated.⁹ Diederichs immediately set up a provisional occupational government in the local *yamen* (government building).

The negotiations with officials in Beijing lasted several months and took place under conditions specified by the Germans, led by Baron von Heyking. The Germans were able to insist, in contrast to earlier times, that the negotiations take place in their own legation.¹⁰ An "atonement treaty" was signed on January 15, 1898; in it the Chinese government agreed that Li Bingheng, governor of Shandong at the time of the missionary murders, would never again be employed as a civil servant. China also agreed to contribute money for the construction of cathedrals at several sites in Shandong, including the village where the missionaries had been killed, and to attach banners to the churches proclaiming that they had been built by the Chinese emperor as reparation. The most important result of the negotiations was the "lease treaty" (*Pachtvertrag*) of March 6, 1898, which granted Germany sovereignty over the area it called "Kiautschou" for ninety-nine years.¹¹ According to boundaries that were worked out by a commission during the coming months, the leasehold was an area of 553 square kilometers encompassing the village of Qingdao, several larger towns (Licun, Cangkou, Shazikou), and 275 tiny villages (see map 5). Qingdao proper had only about seven to eight hundred inhabitants in 1897, not counting the Chinese soldiers stationed there. Another eighty to one hundred thousand lived in the rest of the leasehold.¹² Since most of these people were extremely poor, their ability to choose whether to remain within the German territory or to move was severely curtailed. This is just one of the ways in which the Germans were able to immediately begin treating Kiaochow as a colony in the strict sense. After all, Southwest Africa was based on

8. Zhang Shufeng 1991; also Lu and Lu 2005, p. 11, which reproduces rare photographs of Chinese village life during the first year of the German occupation of Qingdao.

9. Weicker 1908, p. 34; Admiral Otto von Diederichs, "Die Besetzung von Tsingtau am 14.XI.1897," BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Diederichs, vol. 24; Stichler 1989, pp. 23–44.

10. Lindenbergh 1900, vol. 2, p. 252; Stichler 1989, pp. 62–63.

11. The treaty is reprinted in Leutner 1997, pp. 164–68; also in Mohr 1911, pp. 1–5. A photograph of the Yanzhou cathedral is reproduced in Stenz 1924, p. 9.

12. Matzat 1998a, p. 106.

protection treaties that were not understood by their African signatories as giving the Germans the right to settle there, but this did not stop the colonizers from treating that “protectorate” as an outpost of German state sovereignty.

The treaty also identified a fifty-kilometer buffer zone surrounding the colony. China retained sovereignty within this zone, but Germany reserved the right to deploy troops there and to participate in the regulation of rivers. More sweepingly, the Chinese agreed to “abstain from taking any measures or issuing any ordinances therein without obtaining the prior consent of the German government” (article I of the 1898 treaty). The most contentious sections of the treaty provided for the construction of two railways through Shandong Province by one or more mixed German-Chinese companies. Germany was also granted the right to mine for coal in a zone extending fifteen kilometers inland along each side of the railway line.

Thus arose the first European colony that was located fully on the Chinese mainland.¹³ Other European powers seized the opportunity to gain their own mainland concessions or to formalize control over existing spheres of influence. Russia occupied and leased Dalian and Lüshun (Port Arthur) in March 1898, Britain leased Weihaiwei in Shandong in July 1898, and France leased Guangzhouwan in 1899.¹⁴ The Germans also sought to expand more deeply into Shandong Province, taking advantage of divisions within the Chinese governing elite and of the treaty’s vague language.

Kiaochow was administered directly by the German navy rather than the Foreign Office, an anomaly within the German colonial empire. The equivalent of the *Schutztruppe* for Qingdao was the Third Naval Infantry Battalion, which was created specifically for Kiaochow. The first Third Battalion troops arrived in Qingdao on January 26, 1898, led by Admiral Oskar Truppel (later von Truppel), who would play a central role as governor of the colony.

13. British Hong Kong, a model for the German planners of Kiaochow, was initially restricted to Hong Kong island: the New Territories that are joined to the Chinese mainland were leased from China to Britain, along with 230 other offshore islands, in 1898, in the wake of Germany’s land grab in Qingdao. Macao, across the Pearl River estuary from Hong Kong, had long existed as a Portuguese colony but was also located mainly offshore. A third island, Taiwan, had been ceded to Japan following the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895.

14. Other than Portuguese Macao, British Hong Kong, and Japanese Taiwan, there were no actual colonies in China before Kiaochow (the French Indochinese Union was located in countries that had long been free of Chinese rule), even if there were dozens of treaty ports and foreign settlements with varying degrees of extraterritoriality. On this entire complex of infringements on Chinese sovereignty see Cordier 1901-2, vol. 3, chap. 23; Grünfeld 1913; and Fairbank [1953] 1969.

On April 27, 1898, Kiaochow was declared a German “protectorate” (*Schutzgebiet*), the standard term for a colony in German law.¹⁵ Although this aligned Kiaochow with the general legal framework in force in all of the other overseas colonies, those laws said nothing about the specific regulations, decrees, and policies that would be implemented in any given colony. During the first year of the Kiaochow colony the governor’s authority was still limited, insofar as his decisions had to be submitted for approval to the naval authorities in Berlin before they could be published and enforced. Starting in 1899, however, prior approval from Berlin was required only for “the most important and far-reaching regulations.” Indeed, no locally adopted regulation was ever overturned by the Berlin authorities, even if Governor Truppel was eventually forced to adopt policies he opposed and was sacked in 1911 for continuing to resist them.¹⁶ This unusual infringement on the governor’s authority occurred in the context of a growing sense on the part of metropolitan German authorities that Kiaochow should be released from its colonial status. Colonial governors were always powerless when their colonies were being bargained away by the motherland for some greater diplomatic gain. It was not Kiaochow’s leasehold status that differentiated it from the other German colonies but the fact that it was located in China, whose place in German geopolitical calculations began to change in the years leading up to World War I. This change was due to Germany’s increasing isolation within Europe and Chinese anticolonial resistance. But in almost all other respects the Germans defined Kiaochow as a colony, just like the colonies in Africa and the Pacific.

Native policy in Kiaochow was hammered out within a context of geopolitical and economic considerations that were complex and changing. Kiaochow continued until 1914 to serve as a coaling, repair, and shipbuilding station for the German navy, but officials did not see this as the colony’s main purpose. Admiral von Knorr had already insisted in 1895 that a harbor in China would be worthless to the navy unless it was also an economic entrepôt.¹⁷ Japan’s military capacities advanced rapidly in the years immediately following the occupation of Qingdao, and the Germans recognized that Kiaochow could not be defended against Japanese attack.¹⁸ This was

15. See the imperial decrees from 1898 in Mohr 1911, pp. 6–7. The codification of German colonial law started in 1886, culminating in the 1900 “Schutzgebietsgesetz” (Law on German Protectorates); see *Das Schutzgebietsgesetz . . . Textausgabe mit Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Sachregister* (Berlin: Mittler, 1901).

16. Seelemann 1982, p. 87; also p. 106 n. 123; Schrecker 1971, p. 60.

17. Admiral von Knorr, “Denkschrift betr. des Stuetzpunktes in Ostasien,” November 8 1895, quoted in Seelemann 1982, p. 131 n. 1.

18. Seelemann 1982, p. 9.

confirmed in 1914, when the colony was overcome by Japanese forces after just two months of fighting. Tirpitz agreed that Kiaochow would never flourish as a mere military base but had to become a trading entrepôt like Hong Kong.¹⁹ He also wanted the colony to become a showcase for the navy's organizational skills as part of his maneuvering vis-à-vis the Reichstag and the kaiser to build up the navy.²⁰ A memo from Kiaochow's governor to the Naval Office in 1900 emphasized that "the existence of the colony has no justification if it does not become the home base for large German companies trading in the interior."²¹ Special emphasis was placed in the colony's first years on building the railway, opening coal mines, improving the harbor, and creating a naval shipyard, activities that were understood as profit-making enterprises servicing international as well as German clients.²² Qingdao was set up as a "free port," modeled on Hong Kong, although this status was terminated in 1905.²³ Customs duties were charged only for goods that passed through Kiaochow and entered Chinese territory or that were exported abroad.²⁴

But if broadly economic goals seemed to have primacy over military ones, the colony still did not correspond to theories of imperialism as being fundamentally driven by capitalist interests. The colonial state ended up running most of the key industries in Kiaochow, since German capitalists like Krupp and Siemens were unwilling to invest there.²⁵ The urban commercial sector stayed mainly in Chinese (and increasingly, over time, in Japanese) hands. As a result, colonial native policy had to attend to the concerns of Asian businessmen.²⁶ An exception was the Shandong Railway Company, which became "the only profitable and dividend-paying company that actually penetrated into the interior of Shandong Province." It was in the hands of major German banks.²⁷ German marines performed much of the original landscaping and early construction work in Qingdao.

19. See Tirpitz 1919, vol. 1, p. 91, for a summary of this view.

20. Berghahn 1971; Witt 1973; Mühlhahn 2000, pp. 114, 201.

21. Jaeschke to RMA, "Ursache des Boxeraufstandes," October 9, 1900, BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 6782, p. 306v.

22. The shipyard built and repaired ships and made everything from boilers to "masts for the telegraph lines between Tibet and Peking" (Seelemann 1982, p. 273).

23. Schrecker 1971, p. 73; Stichler 1989, pp. 238-45.

24. Schrecker 1971, p. 74.

25. Mühlhahn 2000, p. 143.

26. See, for example, the comments in the government's annual *Denkschrift* for 1898-99, p. 27: "Compared to last year, conditions have improved slightly with respect to the small Chinese businessmen. Businessmen from other districts have moved here."

27. Stichler 1989, pp. 93, 126; V. Schmidt 1976.

Native policy in Kiaochow was constrained by the need to attract Chinese inhabitants, business, and workers, since there was never any intention of making Kiaochow into a settlement colony and its German population consisted mainly of navy personnel. Chinese labor was central to the construction of the harbor, government buildings, and railways, and in extracting coal from the German-owned mines.²⁸ But no Chinese could be compelled to live or work in the colony, since it was surrounded by China, which still claimed the colony's subjects as its own.²⁹ Of course, it was not feasible for most of the nearly two hundred thousand people who lived within the leasehold at the beginning of the German period to move away, since they had families, temples, ancestral graves, land, and houses in the region. The colony was aided by the fact that it drew trade away from the town of Jiaozhou and the ports on Jiaozhou Bay which had been active trading centers before 1897. Economic activity in Shandong became more oriented toward Qingdao and the leasehold.³⁰ The city's population reached fifty-five thousand by 1913—an increase of 730 percent in seventeen years.³¹

A more important influence on native policy than the sheer existence of China was the ability of the Chinese state to mount effective challenges to German practice *within* the colony. Germany became increasingly sensitive to Chinese demands after 1904, but even before that time a skillful provincial governor like Yuan Shikai could affect German behavior in the leasehold. Indeed, the entire colonial period was characterized by a struggle between the Germans and the Chinese state over the very definition of the new political entity. The governors in Qingdao and the German navy High Command insisted on referring to Kiaochow as a “protectorate,” while Chinese officials in Beijing and Ji'nan insisted on calling Kiaochow a “leasehold.” In article 3 of the original 1898 treaty the Germans had conceded that the

28. Falkenberg 1984, 1986.

29. Of course, this does not differentiate Kiaochow fundamentally from colonies in Africa and the Pacific. Colonial armies were generally unable to prevent populations from emigrating to neighboring territories in this period. In 1904 many Ovaherero were able to resettle in Bechuanaland; others slipped past German guards unnoticed and reentered the colony. Samoans traveled to Tonga and Fiji as they pleased, disregarding the German government's requirement that they apply for permission.

30. During Kiaochow's colonial era this part of Shandong became economically more active than the previously dominant areas in the province's southwest around the Imperial Canal, even if modern industry was completely absent in the province (Mühlhahn 2000, p. 40–61).

31. Matzat 1998a, p. 106.

Chinese emperor retained ultimate sovereignty over the Chinese residents of Kiaochow and was granting sovereignty to Germany only temporarily. The Chinese tried repeatedly to undermine the Germans' interpretation of the treaty by suggesting that a Chinese consul and a state official be posted in Qingdao. The Germans countered Chinese efforts to compromise their sovereignty by granting a sort of leasehold citizenship to Chinese who were born in Kiaochow. These Kiaochow citizens were protected from extradition to China and retained a right to residence in the colony while traveling outside it.³²

Kiaochow had a thoroughly colonial character. The new buildings that were included in the first city plan for German Qingdao in 1898 (plate 9) staked out the rudiments of a new state. These included the government building (completed in 1906), a temporary residence for the governor (replaced in 1907 by the more glorious governor's mansion, which loomed over the European side of town; fig. 7.13), a military hospital, and the railway station (completed in 1901; fig. 7.1).³³ By 1899–1900 the urban master plan included another crucial component of a colonial state—a prison for European prisoners—and this building was quickly completed, along with a second prison for Chinese (in Licun). No new military barracks were included in the original plan because the Germans were able to move their troops immediately into the buildings that had been left behind by the Chinese army, but they soon found these to be inadequate and replaced them.³⁴

Although these new buildings laid a symbolic claim to German sovereignty, a peculiar extension of the Chinese state was already present at the heart of the colonial city in the earliest plan—the headquarters of the Chinese customs office. Colonialism as I have defined it involves the transfer of sovereignty from locals to outsiders along with a politics of difference that consigns locals to second-class status. But sovereignty is a continuum, not an either-or affair.³⁵ In Kiaochow's case the infringement on colonial sovereignty came partly from without, due to the unusual situation of an external state claiming sovereignty over a colony's citizens—not unlike the

32. Crusen 1913.

33. The 1898 city plan also included a slaughterhouse (completed in 1906) and Protestant and Catholic churches, both of which were eventually built in slightly different locations. A provisional Protestant church (*Governementskapelle*) was completed by December 1899, and the Steyl Mission headquarters, which could hold three or four hundred people for services, was completed in 1902; see Lu and Lu 2005, pp. 168–70.

34. New barracks for two divisions of the Third Navy Battalion were already mentioned in the *Denkschrift* for 1898–99, p. 27.

35. Stoler 2006.



FIGURE 7.1 *Top*, Railway station in Qingdao (ca. 1910), the final station of the Shandong railway. From *Ansichten von Tsingtau und dem Hinterlande* (n.p.: n.d., ca. 1910). *Bottom*, Facade of the contemporary Qingdao station (2005). Photo by the author.

West German stance toward the German Democratic Republic before 1990. The infringement in Kiaochow also stemmed from the fact that all colonial states rely on a rudimentary level of toleration and cooperation on the part of the colonized. As a result the colonized are able to gain some control over the ways in which colonial policy is implemented, which is the equivalent of saying that they can take back, or retain, some degree of sovereignty. It would be unrealistic to restrict the definition of colonialism to cases of pure

foreign sovereignty. As we will see, Chinese in Kiaochow laid claim to the state in this way to a greater extent than the inhabitants of the other two colonies examined so far, and in doing so they gained incremental control over the state and began to “decolonize” it.

A second defining feature of modern colonialism is the rule of difference, which is linked to native policy in the ways previously discussed. Assumptions of fundamental Chinese inferiority and difference were inscribed into the original urban plan for Qingdao. There was a “villa district” with German street names, restricted to European residents. The governor’s provisional residence was located in this neighborhood, next to the home of the “commissary for Chinese affairs,” Dr. Wilhelm Schrameier, and the mansion of Captain Freiherr von Liliencron, the governor’s adjutant and commander of the Third Naval Infantry Battalion (fig. 7.2).³⁶ Starting in 1899 the Qingdao master plan also indicated the location of a cemetery restricted to Europeans—as if its authors were reading *Effi Briest*. The 1899 map also recorded the emergence of a new settlement of Chinese laborers at the site that would soon become the workers’ district, Taidongzhen (“east of the heights”); a second workers’ district known as Taixizhen (“west of the heights”) was added somewhat later (map 6). An industrial zone was already emerging along Jiaozhou Bay near the small harbor (map 6).

The neighborhood of Dabaodao (Tapautau) was also sketched into these initial city plans. Its streets’ simple grid pattern contrasted with the smoothly curving boulevards of the European district. The Germans called Dabaodao the “Chinesen-Stadt” (Chinese city) and created a cordon sanitaire that divided it from so-called upper Qingdao, although this buffer zone was quickly filled in with new structures. Despite its Chinese name, Dabaodao was designed from the start to become a mixed zone of commercial, industrial, and residential activities in which both Europeans and Chinese could live, work, shop, and own property.³⁷ It was dominated by simple Chinese and European-style houses, shops, and businesses, along with some larger buildings like the Qingdao branch of the Ruifuxiang store on Kiautschoustrasse (fig. 7.3). Photographs taken in Dabaodao (fig. 7.4) during the German colonial period often show a mix of people wearing

36. On von Liliencron see Hans-Joachim Schmitt, “Die Verteidiger von Tsingtau und ihre Gefangenenschaft in Japan (1914 bis 1920),” “Tsingtau und Japan 1914 bis 1920, Listen, Etatstärke für das Schutzgebiet Kiautschou,” at <http://www.tsingtau.info/index.html?listen/etat1913.htm>; also BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 79, p. 9r.

37. Seelemann 1982, p. 70.



FIGURE 7.2 Home of Dr. Wilhelm Schrameier, commissary for Chinese affairs, with the home of Captain Liliencron (adjutant to the governor) in the background, *left* (ca. 1900). From Kiautschou *Denkschrift* for October 1899–October 1900, Anlage 8.

European and Chinese clothing.³⁸ This district's in-between status was revealed by an ordinance prohibiting “screeching pushcarts” (*kreischende Schiebkarren*) in Qingdao, in order to “spare the European inhabitants of Tsingtao any unpleasant confrontation with Chinese culture.” This ordinance was extended to Dabaodao but not to the purely Chinese districts Taidongzhen and Taixizhen.³⁹ The existence of this zone suggests that the boundaries between colonizer and colonized were already porous in the colony's foundational period. From the very start Kiaochow revealed both the desire to maintain hierarchical difference and countless compromises and infringements on this rule.

My aim in the following section is not to provide a detailed history of every aspect of colonial government in Kiaochow. There are already several solid historical studies of this colony.⁴⁰ My focus is instead on native policy.

38. Streets in Dabaodao also combined the names of towns in Shandong Province with the German word *Strasse*, yielding names like Kiautschoustrasse.

39. Mohr 1911, p. 130; Klein 2004, p. 319.

40. Overviews of colonial government in Kiaochow are given in Schrecker 1971; Seelemann 1982; Stichler 1989; F. Huang 1999; and Mühlhahn 2000. Other significant studies are




FIGURE 7.3 Qingdao branch of the Chinese-owned Ruifuxiang store on Kiautschoustrasse in Dabaodao District of Qingdao (ca. 1907). From a postcard.

For that reason I begin with the most striking features of German colonialism in Kiaochow, the strict segregation of urban space and of the legal system, and then turn to other aspects of social apartheid in Kiaochow, as well as the violence directed against the Chinese in the colony and Shandong Province between 1897 and 1905. These policies cohere into a common pattern, guided by an understanding of the Chinese that is strikingly consistent with the Sinophobic discourse discussed in the previous chapter. Like the Ovaherero, the Chinese were treated as radically different and racially inferior. In contrast to the Ovaherero, however, they were not seen as amenable to cultural transformation, given their loyalty to their ancient culture.

Zhang Yufa 1982; Biener 2001; Liu Shanzhang 1991; and Hinz and Lind 1998. Leutner 1997 provides translations into German of historical documents on Kiaochow as well as useful introductions to each of the sections. Berlin *China-Studien*, edited by Mechthild Leutner, is also important, especially Kuo and Leutner 1986, 1991, and 1994; and Kuo 1986.



FIGURE 7.4 Business premises of Europeans (*top*) and Chinese (*bottom*) in Dabaodao District of Qingdao (ca. 1903). From Kiautschou *Denkschrift* for 1902-3, Anlage 6.

Shaken, Not Stirred: Segregated Colonial Space and Radical Alterity during the First Phase of German Colonialism in Kiaochow, 1897-1904

In the words of a German newspaper published in China at the time of the annexation, the Chinese were “driven out” of old Qingdao.⁴¹ One of the first interventions by Admiral Diederichs was to forbid all land sales in the leasehold without his approval. Proclamations to this effect in Chinese were posted in the villages.⁴² Diederichs pressured county officials into giving him copies of the tax books, which he used, along with consulting local experts, to determine who owned each plot of land in the leased territory. Anyone who owned land the Germans thought they would need for their construction plans was forced to sell at prices determined by the Chinese cadastral surveys.⁴³ The navy administration purchased enough land for the city and harbor, approximately two thousand hectares, or 3.6 percent of the entire area of Kiaochow.⁴⁴ After drawing up an initial plan for Qingdao, the government held an auction in October 1898 to sell plots of land in the city that were not going to be used for official construction.⁴⁵ According to one German businessman who participated in the public sale of land, it was “full of excitement” and “prices were driven up to three dollars the square meter.”⁴⁶

The extant Chinese village was razed and its inhabitants dispossessed, and a new colonial city arose in its place. The Qingdao master plan disregarded the previous location of streets and buildings almost entirely (plate 9). A “tent village” of workers that had sprung up near the site of the future Dabaodao district was dismantled, and even the dirt beneath the settlement was removed, since it was thought to be contaminated.⁴⁷ Other

41. “Die bauliche Entwicklung Tsintaus,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 33 (May 20, 1899): 1.

42. Matzat 1985, p. 7; Schrecker 1971, p. 66.

43. Diederichs also convinced thousands of villagers to sign “right of preemption” (*Vorkaufrecht*) agreements in exchange for payments equal to twice the amount of their annual taxes. This money was then deducted from the sales price if and when the German government decided to buy the land. When some villagers tried to charge “unreasonable” prices for their land, the government issued a decree authorizing expropriation of land through purchase (Schrecker 1971, p. 67; Schrameier 1914, pp. 2-10).

44. Stichler 1989, p. 99; Matzat 1985, p. 13; Schrecker 1971, p. 212.

45. Other land was given to groups such as missions that were “adjudged to serve the public interest” (Schrecker 1971, p. 71).

46. Bigelow 1898, p. 580.

47. There were in fact numerous cases of typhus and intestinal disease among the Germans during the first years of the occupation. See Eckart 1997, pp. 465-66.

nearby neighborhoods and villages that disturbed the planning of colonial urban space were “put to rest” (*niedergelegt*), in the revealing words of one of the navy’s surveyors in 1900, describing the village of Yangjiacun (just beyond Taidongzhen) which had grown rapidly as a settlement of people displaced from upper Qingdao.⁴⁸

Strict separation between Europeans and Chinese was the guiding principle of the urban plan. In 1899 one newspaper wrote that “Tsintau today is still Chinese in its external appearance” but “in a few months the impression our Asian colony makes on a stranger will be completely different.”⁴⁹ According to one of the navy’s surveyors the goal was to produce a clear “demarcation of our territory from China.” As von Tirpitz noted later, “Thus we avoided being in direct touch with China.”⁵⁰ The spatial vagueness of these statements is revealing. In reality, only the leasehold could be demarcated from China, since the city of Qingdao did not have a direct border with China, but at the same time, Kiaochow could not avoid “touching” China. The spatial demarcation was thus a doubly internal one, directed against the interior and the exterior Chinese Other. The internal Chinaman was necessary to the colony’s livelihood but he was also feared and disdained on “racial” grounds and as a potential agent of the Chinese government. An early German tour book claimed that Qingdao’s “greatest advantage compared to other Chinese coastal cities” like Shanghai or Tianjin was “that the Chinese settlement is separated completely from the European one.”⁵¹

The European district, “upper Qingdao,” consisted mainly of large villas along the southern bays (Qingdao Bay and Clara Bay, now known as Huiquan Bay, to its east). According to the building code only 55 percent of the land could be built up, and even today this district has large parks. The streets were wide, curving, and wooded and were named after German

48. Deimling 1900, p. 57. Yangjiacun had been described just a year earlier by a German official as “a pretty Chinese village.” See Heinrich Mootz, “Die Namen der Orte in Deutsch-Shantung,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* special ed., June 26, 1899, p. 2. Two years after this article appeared, in a book on “place-names in German Shandong” the same author (Mootz 1901, p. 9) referred to Yangjiacun in the past tense.

49. “Ein Bild von Tsintau,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 25 (March 25, 1899): 1.

50. Deimling 1900, p. 50; Tirpitz 1919, vol. 1, p. 103. According to von Tirpitz, the town itself was walled in as “Boxer protection,” but he must have been speaking metaphorically. In actuality there were no city walls, since this would have resembled traditional Chinese cities.

51. Behme and Krieger 1906, p. 97. At the same time, according to this guidebook, “the life and activities of the Chinese offer an interesting spectacle” for the European tourist (*ibid.*, p. 99).

rulers.⁵² And “millions and millions of trees and bushes were planted” in the colony, since there was “one thing which the German has a very difficult time giving up” when he leaves home—his forests.⁵³ A green belt of trees was planted around the European zone, although in the spirit of segregation, none were planted in the Chinese section. The government even imported German trees and planted German grapes for wine.⁵⁴ According to the boundaries specified in the *Cbinesenordnung* (Chinese ordinances) of June 1900 Chinese were not permitted to live in the European neighborhood.⁵⁵ It was impossible to exclude Chinese servants from residing there, but they were lodged in small “coolie houses” that were “strictly separated from the Europeans.”⁵⁶ In addition to the architectural dualism, this absence of Chinese residents in the villa district led German visitors to write things like the following: “When I arrived in Qingdao and . . . looked around the train station a little, I was overcome by the feeling: you’re in a completely German territory here [*ganz auf deutschem Boden*]. This feeling accompanied me everywhere during my stay in Qingdao.”⁵⁷ The German houses, hotels, and official buildings constructed in this period were almost exclusively German or European in style, although some details corresponded to a generic notion of “tropical” architecture.⁵⁸ Some of these constructions were shipped to Qingdao from Germany. The governor’s first residence, for example, was a prefabricated “tropical house” (*Tropenhaus*). The military hospital was “constructed of pasteboard made in Germany.”⁵⁹

Dabaodao was where most of the colony’s better-off Chinese lived. The housing was not as luxurious as in the European zone, and the streets and buildings were more densely packed. Houses there often had two stories, in a style that was typical of middle and southern China and that is said to have

52. Godshall 1929, p. 124. Today, these same streets seem narrow and picturesque in comparison to the wide grid pattern typical in most Chinese cities.

53. Weicker 1908, p. 82; also Berensmann 1904, p. 596. Chinese who damaged trees in the colony could be sentenced to forced labor and up to fifty lashes (Mohr 1911, pp. 151–52). For a programmatic argument about this aspect of German colonization, see “Der Nutzen der Aufforstung” in *Der West-östliche Bote*, vol. 1 (6–7, March–April 1914), pp. 184–89.

54. Kiaochoh *Denkschrift* for 1900–1901, pp. 39–40.

55. Chinese investors were allowed to buy land and to build in the European zone, and as discussed below, upper-class Chinese were allowed to live there after 1911.

56. Kronecker 1913, p. 8.

57. Schweitzer 1914, p. 136.

58. The first generation of large “villa” houses was built without basements and with other peculiarities that turned out to be disadvantageous in the Qingdao climate (Kronecker 1913, p. 8).

59. Deimling 1900, p. 56; Warner 1994, p. 292; see also Bigelow 1898, p. 580.



FIGURE 7.5 Railway station in Gaomi (ca. 1904). From BA-MA-Freiburg, *Nachlass Truppel*, vol. 78. (Courtesy of BA-MA-Freiburg.)

reflected the presence of businessmen from the lower Yangzi region and Canton.⁶⁰ Some German bureaucrats and employees of the German merchant firms took up residence there as well. If Dabaodao was not as racially restrictive as the other districts, the official *Denkschrift* (Report) showed that the cultural distinction was reproduced internally there, by calling attention to the architectural distinction between European and Chinese “business premises” in the neighborhood (fig. 7.4). In a similar spirit, the railway stations built by the Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft (Shandong Railway Company) were done in German style inside the colony (figs. 7.1, 7.5) and in partly Chinese style outside the colony.

Taidongzhen and Taixizhen were zoned exclusively for Chinese residence. As in Dabaodao, streets in these neighborhoods were laid out in a tight, “very functional and completely regular” grid pattern to facilitate police control (see map 6). The German police station (fig. 7.6) stood in the middle of the district.⁶¹ Streets in Taidongzhen and Taixizhen were given

60. Biener 2001, p. 103.

61. Weicker 1908, p. 67.




FIGURE 7.6 Police station in Taidongzhen District of Qingdao (German colonial period). From Lu and Lu 2005, p. 160.

“typical” Chinese names. As the colony’s “Chinese commissary,” Wilhelm Schrameier, remarked, the big firms in Qingdao needed large numbers of “cheap coolie houses” for their workers. Although the size of “coolie houses” and rooms in Taidongzhen and Taixizhen was controlled by German regulations, they “ignored the European style of construction and used the typical Chinese one” instead.⁶² More substantial houses were also built in these districts, often in the traditional northern Chinese style with enclosed courtyards.⁶³ The harbor district, finally, had bland industrial buildings and functional housing for the apprentices attending the shipyard’s school (see fig. 7.7).

The colony’s entire legal and administrative structure was also bifurcated, with separate arrangements for Western civilians (a category that included Japanese) and Chinese.⁶⁴ Qingdao had an Imperial Court (*Kaiserliches Gericht*) throughout the colonial period. In 1907 a German Appeals Court was also established in Qingdao. It was independent from the consulate,

62. Schrameier 1914, p. 27.

63. Biener 2001, pp. 103–4.

64. Japanese were treated like Germans and other “nonnative foreigners” in German colonial law in general and in Kiaochow in particular. This was especially important in Qingdao given the large Japanese commercial presence. See Mohr 1911, p. 61 (par. 2 of 1900 decree “Legal Affairs in the German Protectorates”).



FIGURE 7.7 Housing for Chinese apprentices in Qingdao (German colonial period). From BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 62, p. 11, verso.

which was controlled by the German Foreign Office.⁶⁵ European businessmen and property owners could elect representatives to a citizens' representative council that advised the governor.⁶⁶

The legal treatment of the Chinese was determined by a mixture of German and Chinese law, with the latter being filtered through German interpretations. This was structurally similar to the approach used in colonies with oral cultures, where indigenous legal understandings were overcoded and mingled with European ones.⁶⁷ A "Governor's Order on the Legal Conditions of the Chinese" (April 15, 1899) set out the basic guidelines.⁶⁸ As in other German colonies, civil or criminal cases pitting Europeans against "natives" were to be tried by Germans—in this case, by the Imperial Court. Any civil case involving only Chinese and in which the stakes were not sufficiently serious was to be judged by the German district commissioner according to his interpretation of Chinese law.⁶⁹ The district commissioners

65. Seeleemann 1982, p. 94.

66. Schrecker 1971, p. 61; Stichler 1989, pp. 93–94.

67. Mann and Roberts 1991; Mommsen and Moor 1992.

68. Reprinted in Mohr 1911, pp. 72–77.

69. Hoffmann 1907, p. 76. In principle the district commissioners initiated all cases involving only Chinese, but they were supposed to forward to the Imperial Court any case that reached a certain level of seriousness. The Kiaochow colony as a whole was divided into

were former translator trainees (*Dolmetschereleven*) and therefore did not need translators.⁷⁰ They were instructed to conduct research on Chinese legal views by talking to village elders and local mandarins. They began translating German law into Chinese and the Qing legal code and Chinese imperial decrees into German, a project that was continued by the legal faculty in the Qingdao German-Chinese college in the following years.⁷¹ But while some elements of German law were introduced into the evolving system of jurisprudence, they were “explicitly subordinated to the law of the Chinese empire,” at least as that law was interpreted by the colonizers.⁷²

The result of this merging of two legal systems was that Chinese residents were placed in double legal jeopardy and could be punished for a wide array of offenses, while Europeans were not subject to punishment for Chinese crimes that had no equivalent in German law. Offenses for which Chinese could be punished included any activities the governor declared illegal (par. 5.1) or any that were illegal according to German law (par. 5.2)—with the exception of practices related to religion, ethics, and so on—as well as anything that violated public order (par. 5.3) or that was publishable according to *Chinese* law (par. 5.4).⁷³ In civil suits involving only Chinese litigants, the governor could determine which German laws, if any, were applicable (par. 17). Legal proceedings and punishments were also adapted to local conditions as they were perceived by the district officials, producing a mixture of practices that did not fully correspond to either the German or the Chinese system. Thus, in a trial the accused was required to wear chains and to kneel before the judge with his head bowed, in an “analogy to Chinese legal hearings.” This procedure was retained in Kiaochow even after it had been abolished in China. The district commissioner was not required to keep a written protocol of the hearings or to explain his legal reasoning, but only to record his final verdict.⁷⁴ The list of permissible punishments included flogging of male convicts with government-approved instruments (pars. 8 and 9), fines, forced labor, temporary or lifelong imprisonment,

two large districts, one urban and one rural, each of which had its own district commissioner (Weicker 1908, p. 111).

70. Leupold 1998, p. 144.

71. District commissioner Heinrich Mootz completed a translation of the German penal code into Chinese in 1908; see “Denkschrift über Einrichtung chinesischer Schulen im Schutzgebiet,” BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 46v. See also Kiaochow *Denkschrift* for 1899–1900, p. 26.

72. Crusen 1914, p. 137.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

74. Hövermann 1914, p. 64; Klein 2004, p. 323.

and execution, although the latter had to be approved by the governor (pars. 6, 10, and 14).⁷⁵ Torture was forbidden, although Chinese prisoners reported that it was widely used, and decapitation was substituted for the Chinese punishment of dismemberment.⁷⁶ But the Germans frequently employed variants of the *cangue* (wooden collar) even after the reform movement eliminated its use in China (fig. 7.8).⁷⁷ The selective application of Chinese legal procedures is illustrated by the chief justice's argument that parents, elder brothers, and guardians could all be punished for crimes committed by youths under the age of eighteen. The Germans amended this to specify that no relative could be punished for crimes committed by children younger than twelve.⁷⁸

The relationship between the colonial government and its Chinese subjects was specified in some detail by the Chinese ordinances (*Cbinesenordnung*) promulgated on June 14, 1900. The philologist and translator Wilhelm Schrameier was appointed as the first Chinese commissary (*Cbinesenkommissar*), heading a "Chinese Bureau" (later called the Chinese Chancery).⁷⁹ Qingdao was divided into nine urban districts, each of which had a Chinese district head and several Chinese inspectors. All of these Chinese subofficials were under Schrameier's supervision.

The segregation of everyday life that was embedded in the city's spatial layout and its legal system was enhanced by additional regulations. Europeans and Chinese in Qingdao were found in separate hospitals, schools, prisons, bordellos, graveyards, and chambers of commerce.⁸⁰ The Chinese were allowed to visit Qingdao's famous beaches, but they had to use separate toilets there. Although Europeans could travel anywhere in the colony (and indeed, anywhere in China, as a result of the treaties concluded after the Opium Wars), Chinese were required to carry a lantern when they went out on the streets between 9:00 p.m. and sunrise and had to provide a "definite reason for being outside" if they were questioned.⁸¹ Although the Germans

75. This stipulation was similar to the one governing criminal jurisdiction in German East Africa, Togo, Cameroon, and Southwest Africa, where the district commissioner could independently order flogging, fines, and imprisonment with forced labor but required the governor's order for the death penalty.

76. Leupold 1998, p. 144. For Chinese reports on torture in German prisons from 1906 see Shandongsheng lishi xuehui 1961, pp. 148-50.

77. Mühlhahn 2000, p. 264.

78. Crusen 1914, p. 138.

79. See Schrameier's numerous publications, listed in Matzat 1985, 1986, 1998b.

80. Kronecker 1913, pp. 17-81; Mühlhahn 2000, p. 259.

81. Mohr 1911, p. 23; Seelemann 1982, p. 71.




FIGURE 7.8 Punishment of Chinese in Qingdao (German colonial period). From M. and D. Lu 2005, p. 162.

eventually agreed to let Chinese financiers participate in the mining and railway companies, there were no Chinese members on these companies' boards of directors.⁸² Chinese were not permitted to join the elite Tsingtau Club or any of the other German social clubs. Children of mixed heritage were prohibited from attending the German schools.⁸³

Another important aspect of German activity during this period with implications for native policy was the aggressive campaign to extend German sovereignty beyond the colony's borders. Although the ostensible motives behind this expansionism were to protect European missionaries and to defeat the Yihetuan and other forms of anti-Western militancy, the Germans

82. Stichler 1989, p. 149. Chinese railway and mine workers were also separated from non-Chinese workers (*ibid.*, p. 150).

83. Seelemann 1982, p. 422; Reinbothe 1992, p. 11; Zhang Yufa 1999.

seized any pretext to extend their military presence during the first seven years of the leasehold, as described by John Schrecker in his pioneering work on Chinese nationalism and German colonialism. More interesting in the present context is the fact that these military campaigns were conducted in a way that expressed aggressive disdain for the Chinese, especially for Chinese literati, antiforeign secret societies, and symbols of Chinese tradition and religion. Early in 1898 German soldiers sacked the Confucius temple in Jimo and “damaged a statue of the great wise one,” bringing down upon themselves the “fury of the Chinese intellectuals,” including the leading reformer Kang Youwei.⁸⁴ The next conflict exploded in November 1898 following an attack on missionary Stenz in the village of Jietou near Rizhao.⁸⁵ This area lay outside the fifty-kilometer buffer zone. Nonetheless, the colonial governor, Captain Paul Jaeschke, sent Lieutenant Hannemann and translator Heinrich Mootz to investigate the incident. These two were allegedly attacked by a crowd in the village of Hanjiacun in Yizhoufu Prefecture on March 29, 1899.⁸⁶ They opened fire and killed several Chinese. Jaeschke then sent an expedition of 160 men to the prefecture, where they destroyed Hanjiacun and another village, Baitianju. The German troops then proceeded to the larger neighboring town, Rizhao, where they occupied the *yamen* and demanded food and money from the local inhabitants. When the Germans left Rizhao five days later they kidnapped five mandarins as hostages and demanded the arrest of Stenz’s attackers and other concessions in exchange for the local officials’ release.⁸⁷ The *Ostasiatischer Lloyd*, a German newspaper covering all of China, wrote after the completion of this campaign that “the Chinese offices are apparently already starting to understand that the German Government in Kiaochow cannot be toyed with.”⁸⁸ The “scorched

84. Felber 1994, p. 166.

85. See telegrams from German legation in China (von Heyking) to Foreign Office, January 16 and February 23, 1899, PA-AA, R 18239 (no pagination). Stenz had been with missionaries Nies and Henle when they were murdered in 1897.

86. Chinese officials first argued that the crowd consisted simply of curious onlookers and later claimed that it was a voluntary militia created to fight banditry in the region.

87. Tirpitz to Foreign Secretary von Bülow, March 28, 1899; his telegram to von Bülow of April 4, 1899; telegram from Tsungli (Zongli) Yamen Beijing, April 8, 1900; protest letter from Chinese Envoy to von Bülow, April 20 1899; Tirpitz to von Bülow, April 20, 1899 (specifying that Hanjiacun was “completely destroyed” but that the smaller village of Baitianju was only “half destroyed”); all in PA-AA, R 18240–18241. See also the report by Lieutenant Hannemann from April 7, 1899, on the destruction of Hanjiacun, BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 6778. pp. 211–12; and Stichler 1989, 128–32; Mühlhahn 2000, 307–13.

88. “Die Strafexpedition ins Innere,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 28 (April 15, 1899): 1.

earth” strategy and vituperative comments directed specifically against “literati” in Shandong are suggestive of the Sinophobia in European and German circles in the years surrounding the Boxer uprising.⁸⁹

The next series of German military interventions in Shandong Province was sparked by protests against the construction of the railway from Qingdao to Ji’nan (the *Jiaoji* railroad).⁹⁰ Early in 1899 the Germans began buying land and laying down rails. In the process they destroyed farmers’ irrigation systems, divided their fields, violated ancestral burial sites, and generally infuriated villagers, who responded by sabotaging the railway tracks and destroying offices of the Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft.⁹¹ Germans killed three Chinese in a village that refused to pay a fine for stealing markers and beacons posted along the railway bed.⁹² German soldiers were stationed in Gaomi, the center of the unrest, and an expedition was conducted against Jiaozhou city.⁹³ During the summer of 1899 various towns in the region began to arm and barricade themselves with help from Yihetuan and related groups.⁹⁴ The Germans responded with a full-scale military campaign, under the leadership of Hauptmann Mauve, in which about fifteen Chinese were killed. The *Ostasiatischer Lloyd* reported proudly on the “furor teutonicus” of the German “brave knights” in Gaomi, boasting that “our firearms have so much power that the human head explodes completely when it is hit at less than four hundred meters.”⁹⁵

During the height of the Boxer Rebellion large expeditions were sent out into the province from Qingdao. Early in 1900 one hundred villages south of the Shandong railway line banded together to resist the Germans under the leadership of the Dadao hui and Yihetuan. Protective walls were built around villages, German railway workers were taken hostage, and engi-

89. See Tirpitz’s comments on the “oppositionally oriented literati [*Litteraten*]” in his telegram to the kaiser, April 7, 1899, PA-AA, R 18241.

90. On the German depredations in the towns and countryside around Qingdao see Admiral von Diederichs, “Die Besetzung von Tsingtau am 14.XI.1897,” BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Diederichs, vol. 24, p. 49; Schrecker 1971; Zhu 1994, pp. 314ff.; *Dongfang Zazhi*, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 8–9; and Shandongsheng lishi xuehui 1961, vol. 3, pp. 91–95.

91. On the destruction of Chinese graves see Yuan Rongsu [1928] 1969, vol. 1, pt. 2, sec. 18; also Stichler 1988, p. 112; 1989, p. 138.

92. “Renitenz chinesischer Lokalbeamten,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* special ed., May 1, 1899, pp. 1–2.

93. Stichler 1989, p. 148.

94. Mühlhahn 2000, pp. 113–14.

95. “Die Vorgaenge in Kaumi,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 40 (July 8, 1899): 1–2.

neers were attacked.⁹⁶ In October the Germans struck the villages of Kelan and Lijiaying, which were supposedly harboring Boxers, and over two hundred Chinese were killed.⁹⁷ In November German troops killed as many as five hundred villagers in Shawo (nowadays called Dujia) and burned the village.⁹⁸ Permanent barracks, each large enough for two hundred soldiers, were built in Gaomi and Jiaozhou. The troops stayed in these towns until 1905. The stationing of troops “far beyond the ‘leasehold’ boundaries contradicted all of the contractual agreements that had previously been forced on China.”⁹⁹

Accompanying this ongoing assault on Chinese sovereignty in the province was a fierce denigration of the Chinese. When the German soldiers occupied Gaomi in 1899, for instance, they moved into the academy (*shuyuan*) and burned valuable books from its library.¹⁰⁰ During the occupation of Jiaozhou city the following year, German soldiers lived in the examination hall and temple.¹⁰¹ Similar things went on inside the colony’s borders. The Germans occupied a Taoist-Buddhist temple near the leasehold’s boundary and used it as a customs house.¹⁰² And while the Germans often described their use of the Qingdao *yamen* for official business (see fig. 7.11) as an act of necessity, it was clearly part of the symbolic *mise-en-scène* of the conquest and specifically of General Zhang’s humiliation, which culminated in the latter’s suicide attempt. Daily life in Qingdao assumed an aggressive quality. In one incident a colonial bureaucrat struck a Chinese man with a whip for not moving off the sidewalk to let him pass.¹⁰³ A Protestant

96. “Neue Störungen des Eisenbahnbaues,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 17 (April 27, 1900): 95; “Aus dem Hinterlande,” *ibid.*, no. 6 (February 9, 1900): 36; “Die Unruhen in Kaumi,” *ibid.*, no. 7 (February 16, 1900): 39–40; “Zur Lage im Hinterlande,” *ibid.*, no. 8 (February 23, 1900): 45–46; and “Aus der Kolonie,” *ibid.*, no. 15 (April 13, 1900): 88.

97. Admiralstab der Marine 1903, p. 209; “Gefechte bei Kaumi,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 44 (November 2, 1900): 210.

98. Mühlhahn 2000, pp. 129–39; Admiralstab der Marine 1903, p. 210. As Richard Wilhelm noted in his November 24, 1900, report on the destruction of Shawo, the Boxers did not instigate the movement, which was directly provoked by the construction of the railway (in Leutner 1997, p. 287).

99. Stichler 1989, p. 218.

100. See Mühlhahn 2000, p. 120, and the letter from the magistrate of Gaomi, Ge Zhitan, to the pro-Boxer Shandong governor, Yu Xian, from July 13, 1899, in Leutner 1997, p. 277.

101. “Aus der Kolonie,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 11 (March 16, 1900): 65.

102. See S. Wilhelm 1956, p. 93, with a report on Richard Wilhelm’s second trip into the interior during his first year in Kiaochow (1899–1900).

103. “Aus Tsingtau,” *Deutsch-Asiatische Warte*, July 15, 1900, p. 2.

minister remarked that European children in Qingdao quickly learned to act like little “masters” toward the Chinese, and that “some who would never dream of striking another when at home in Europe are often unable to . . . stop themselves from occasionally using a whip on people.”¹⁰⁴

German Native Policy in Kiaochow, Compared

It may be useful to contrast German native policy in early Kiaochow with the Namibian and Samoan cases. Like the Ovaherero, and unlike the Samoans or the Khoikhoi, the Chinese were viewed first and foremost in terms of their potential economic contribution to the colony. In contrast to the Ovaherero, however, there was little interest in trying to refashion the Chinese culturally. As the official report (*Denkschrift*) on Kiaochow for 1899–1900 noted, “The guiding approach in native administration” was “to *habituate* the Chinese to the new conditions without effectively limiting the venerable autonomy of the family or their patriarchal living arrangements. *We will not intervene in private Chinese affairs or the internal governance of their communal affairs*, except to the extent required to assure public order and the security of the colony.”¹⁰⁵ Thus, even though Max Weber and contemporary Sinologists were pointing to the Chinese family and Confucian ideology as impediments to development, there was no attempt by the colonial government to eliminate Confucianism or transform the arrangements of the Chinese family. Chinese culture was seen as so deeply embedded and so all encompassing that Germans could not really imagine remaking the Chinese as abject copies of themselves, in contrast to Southwest Africa.¹⁰⁶ Describing the Dabaodao district, a German navy priest wrote that “we don’t try to change the way the Chinese go about living,” although “we also won’t let them do whatever they want to.”¹⁰⁷ This was closer to a repressive than to a “productive,” manipulative use of power. This approach to regulating a radically different culture characterized most of the German colonial interventions in Qingdao. As one of the colony’s judges wrote in 1903, colonial law should “avoid disturbing the ancient, deeply rooted, simple legal traditions of the

104. Weicker 1908, pp. 125–26.

105. Kiaochow *Denkschrift* for 1899–1900, p. 27 (my emphasis).

106. This is my only disagreement with the excellent study by Mühlhahn (2000), who emphasizes the Germans’ alleged efforts at “manipulative acculturation.” The “cultural imperialism” that emerged after 1905 partook of a different imaginary, one that was not Sinophobic and not really colonial. “Acculturation” in this later period in, for instance, the Qingdao German-Chinese college, can no longer even be seen as particularly “manipulative.”

107. Weicker 1908, p. 49.

natives as much as possible. Nothing contributes more to a fruitful and peaceful colonization than the maintenance of the old traditional customs and legal views of the people.”¹⁰⁸ The main difference from Samoa, whose native policies were also oriented toward regulated difference, was the Kiaochow regime’s overarching hostility to the Chinese. By kidnapping the Rizhao mandarins and sacking the Gaomi *shuyuan*, the Germans focused on the specific symbols that had been reviled by Sinophobes as the “many sorts of learning which these parts of the world never heard of” (in the words of Defoe). But nothing was proposed to take the place of this detested culture, which was seen as unmovable.

German Qingdao in the first period thus represents a regime of native policy premised on the absolute difference of the colonized. It was focused on the external aspects of behavior, using threats of violence and material incentives rather than ideological insinuation. This is not to deny that the subjectivity of colonized was influenced, willy nilly, by the presence of a colonial state. Chinese workers adjusted to German managers’ demands, Chinese students adapted to their German teachers’ expectations, Chinese merchants altered their ways of doing business, and the Chinese theaters tailored some of their repertoire to a European audience.¹⁰⁹ Other groups who can hardly have been immune to the foreign ideological formation include the “Chinese inspectors” under Schrameier’s supervision, the Chinese policemen, the Chinese military companies in German uniforms who were trained and commanded by the navy, and the village elders who agreed to advise district commissioners about legal cases and Chinese law.¹¹⁰ But these putative ideological changes were not the central focus of German policy. Equally important is the fact that the apprentices in the shipyard school and those in the public elementary schools took lessons in Chinese and Chinese history, rather than learning to recite the German equivalent of “nos ancêtres les Gaulois.”¹¹¹ The Chinese businessmen in the colony sold Chinese goods; the actors performed Chinese

108. Köbner 1903, pp. 6–7.

109. Seelemann 1982, p. 425. See the account of German soldiers attending a Chinese theater in Qingdao, in Lindenberg 1900, vol. 2, pp. 364–65. Figure 7.21, though unidentified, seems to be from a performance at a Qingdao theater.

110. For photos of Germans training Chinese troops in Qingdao, see BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Diederichs, vol. 45, p. 30r; and Lu and Lu 2005, p. 154.

111. “Nos ancêtres, les Gaulois” was a French colonialist slogan (and the title of an ironic poem by Leopold Sédar Senghor) according to which French colonial schools taught African children that they were descended from Celtic Gauls. This did not mean, of course, that French colonialism was trying to make Africans into Frenchmen; see Ha 2003.

plays. Without reintroducing the mind-body distinction that has been so successfully undermined in recent theories of social practice, we still need to acknowledge that the colonizers in Kiaochow were more concerned with what *they* saw as material practices and less oriented toward subjective transformations (Southwest Africa) or cultural reproduction (Samoa). Naturally, the Catholic and Protestant missions *were* focused on reshaping their Chinese followers' subjective and spiritual life. But these missions were not part of the colonial state. The Protestant Weimar Mission was more intimately connected to the colonial regime, but it actually avoided religious teaching (see below).

Of course, some Germans did claim that they were involved in a sort of civilizing mission in Kiaochow. One goal for the colony that was occasionally discussed was to lift China up, to contribute to its development, perhaps in order to make it a better trading partner for Europe. Some of those who accepted the thesis of Chinese stagnation believed that the solution was for China to adopt not just advanced European technology but also elements of European culture. Wilhelm Schrameier claimed that *everything* the Germans did in Kiaochow was aimed at “consciously influencing the Chinese.”¹¹² An economic geographer who specialized in Kiaochow insisted that “the first German sailor entering a still undeveloped land” has already exercised an “educational influence on the population” by “broadcasting orderliness, cleanliness, and by using the German language.”¹¹³ According to a legal scholar, Kiaochow's achievements would “serve as an example to the outsiders”—that is, to the Chinese—“who will then [attempt to] attain an equally high cultural level.”¹¹⁴ A German minister hoped that Germany would “show China the paths that will lead contemporary Chinese culture to the superior Christian-Germanic culture.”¹¹⁵ And a German travel writer in 1914 claimed that the Germans had “habituated the Chinese in Kiaochow to orderliness, cleanliness, and morals in just a single decade.”¹¹⁶ But all of these quotes are from the period after 1905. It was only then that there emerged a serious program intended to “influence the spirit and character” of the Chinese in the colony. By that time the entire context of this project had changed, and those who believed China was culturally underdeveloped were less influential in Kiaochow politics.

112. Schrameier 1910, p. 809.

113. Wilhelm Berensmann, quoted in Mühlhahn 2000, p. 64.

114. Hövermann 1914, p. 2.

115. Weicker 1908, p. 110.

116. Schweitzer 1914, pp. 152–53.

Early Native Policy and the Haunting of Sinophobia by Sinophilia

The central features of native policy in the first period, then, were rigorous segregation combined with aggressive hostility and a hands-off approach to cultural change. To account for this we need to consider the apotheosis of Sinophobia that occurred at the same time as the German occupation of Kiaochow. Germany was heavily involved in the joint expedition against the Yihetuan, contributing almost twenty-thousand troops to the allied forces and the “supreme commander,” Count Alfred von Waldersee. The most infamous incident in the German campaign is Kaiser Wilhelm’s July 1900 *Hunnenrede* (see chap. 1). Anxious to satisfy the kaiser’s call to “take no prisoners,” von Waldersee embarked on a series of harsh punitive expeditions against suspected Boxers and sympathizers in and around Beijing.¹¹⁷ Kiaochow was involved in the anti-Boxer campaign on several levels. In addition to the expeditions against supposed Boxers in Shandong Province, discussed above, the Third Naval Battalion sent several contingents of marines to Beijing in June 1900.¹¹⁸

The views of China among many Germans stationed in Beijing and Qingdao during the second half of the 1890s echoed the kaiser’s hostility. The new German envoy Baron Clemens von Ketteler was not predisposed to be as Sinophobic as his predecessor, von Heyking, given his background as a translator trainee in Beijing and as a diplomatic translator there and in Canton.¹¹⁹ In May 1900, however, von Ketteler allegedly told the other European envoys that the Boxer uprising signaled the onset of China’s partition. Given the hysterical atmosphere among those hoping for a second “scramble,” von Ketteler was immediately identified as an imperialist Sinophobe. He was reprimanded by the German Foreign Office, which never seriously entertained the idea of Chinese partition. During the Boxers’ siege of Beijing in 1900, before any Europeans had been killed, von Ketteler ordered German legation troops to open fire on a group of fifty to one hundred Boxers who were engaging in what the German press called “war dances” (*Kriegstänze*—presumably the martial arts from which the Boxers’ name

117. Sharf and Harrington 2000, p. 211.

118. BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 6782, especially “Denkschrift: Lage im Hinterlande von Kiautschou,” October 4, 1900, pp. 80–97; and BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 51, vol. 7. The first Qingdao contingent, led by Premierleutnant (First Lieutenant) Count von Soden, left the colony at the beginning of June 1900, and two further companies departed in the second half of June to assist Edward Seymour’s troops in Tianjin (Stichler 1989, p. 172).

119. P. Fischer 1994.

was derived) near the legation building, and seven Chinese were killed.¹²⁰ Von Ketteler also took potshots at Boxers from the walls of the German compound and personally beat a seventeen-year-old Yihetuan supporter who was captured and locked up in the Legation.¹²¹

The descriptions of Chinese officials by the “conqueror” of Qingdao, Admiral Otto von Diederichs, were replete with racial slurs.¹²² The admiral identified various examples of what he called “scoundrelish behavior and the simplemindedness and superstition that accompanies it,” and of “the trickiness and unreliability of the yellow race.”¹²³ Diederichs treated General Zhang Gaoyuan disdainfully as “a helpless weakling” and drew on the discourse of Oriental despotism in describing the “subservience” of the people of Jiaozhou and Jimo as a result of their habitual “fear” of the local magistrates.¹²⁴

Western propaganda in the context of the anti-Boxer campaign completed the process of bringing the Chinese under the sign of the generic racial “native” at the precise moment when the German colonial regime was taking shape.¹²⁵ The official *Amtsblatt* (*Gazette*) for the Qingdao colony printed an article in 1901 that began with the words “there can hardly be a single human race that has a less romantic appearance than the Chinese.”¹²⁶ The Chinese scholar and reformer Kang Youwei, who moved into Captain Liliencron’s former house in Qingdao in 1925, recognized that the Chinese

120. “Aus der Kolonie,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 39 (September 28, 1900): 194.

121. Preston 1999, p. 64, quoting from the unpublished diary of an Australian correspondent for the *London Times*, George Morrison; also O’Connor 1974, pp. 75, 95–96; Michael 1986, pp. 149–51; and Felber and Rostek 1987, p. 20.

122. Diederichs’s description of a visit to the Zongli Yamen was almost identical to those of von Heyking and E. Wolf 1901, pp. 52–55: “Five or six gentlemen sat with partially stupid facial expressions” (“Die Besetzung von Tsingtau am 14.XI.1897,” BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Diederichs, vol. 24, p. 11).

123. Admiral Otto von Diederichs, “Die Besetzung von Tsingtau am 14.XI.1897,” BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Diederichs, vol. 24, pp. 42, 45; see also *ibid.*, pp. 39, 45, on the “double-dealing” or “forked-tonguedness” (*Doppelzüngigkeit*) of Chinese officials.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 24. Diederichs had somewhat friendlier things to say about the local officials in neighboring villages; see his report “Lage an Kiautschou Bucht,” from February 15, 1898, BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 6697, p. 229f.

125. Two striking examples of this are the coffee-table books on the allied campaign, Kürschner 1901 and *Deutschland in China* 1902. Despite their patriotic, militaristic style of presentation, however, neither of these books was entirely univocal (see below).

126. “Chinesische Redeblumen,” *Amtsblatt für das Deutsche Kiautschou-Gebiet*, May 11, 1901, p. 161.

“had at least been a half-civilized nation in the eyes of the west” before their defeat by Japan, but that afterward Europeans “put us on the same level as the Negro slaves in Africa.”¹²⁷ A German vaudeville play from this period called *Our Bluejackets in Jiaozhou* began with the words “here among these Kaffirs”—using the South African generic epithet for “blacks” to refer to the Chinese.¹²⁸ In another play called *Boxer*, members of the German expeditionary force capture a Chinese woman who speaks German and ask her whether she “might have been on display in the Panoptikum” in Berlin, since “the most savage sorts of people” could be seen there.¹²⁹ The eminent founder of cellular pathology, Rudolph Virchow, invited the members of the Berlin Society for Anthropology, Ethnology, and Ancient History to view a group of Chinese who were being displayed at the Schumann Circus in Berlin in 1905.¹³⁰ Viewing “*Naturvölker*” in zoos, circuses, and fairs was not unusual in this period; what was novel was the inclusion of Chinese.¹³¹

A magazine associated with the German Navy League, *Überall*, is revealing with respect to the image of China in this period, which combined garden-variety Sinophobia with extreme belligerence. A 1901 report on “shipping along the Chinese coast” opened with the observation that “the entire economic existence of the Chinese presents not only stasis but often even regression.”¹³² Discussing a “revolt of Chinese coolies” in Samoa, the paper warned that if the Chinese dared to even touch a single white colonist, “well-suited trees and solid hemp ropes” would be found for them. The article concluded that these events in Samoa were “characteristic of the cunning and insidiousness of the yellow race.”¹³³ A photograph of two Chinese boys in a 1899 issue of *Überall* was captioned simply “Two German Subjects,” even though there was no article on Kiaochow at all, suggesting that the Chinese per se were being imagined as German subjects.¹³⁴

The theme of “pestilential filth” had been a mainstay of Sinophobia since the mid-nineteenth century, and this idea was closely tied to “racial”

127. Kang’s “Fifth Petition to the Throne” following the occupation of Jiaozhou, translated by Mühlhahn (2000, p. 106). On Kang Youwei see Lo 1967; Xiao 1975; Zhen 1991.

128. Schmasow n.d., p. 6.

129. Hellborn n.d. (ca. 1900–1901), p. 6.

130. See “Chinesentruppe,” *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 37 (1905): 445.

131. There is a huge and repetitive literature on the sordid *Völkerschauen*; for example, Benninghoff-Luhl 1986.

132. “Schiffahrtsverhältnisse an der chinesischen Küste,” *Überall* 3, pt. 2 (1903): 1118.

133. “Samoa: Revolte der chinesische Kulis auf Samoa,” *Überall* 10 (11, 1907–8): 811.

134. *Überall* 1 (3, 1899): 40.

distaste. Officials in Qingdao insisted that the segregation of the Chinese was motivated by hygienic concerns. The planners did not decide to create a system of sewage and running water for all Chinese residents of Qingdao, however, which presumably would have solved the main hygiene problems. This resembles the logic of the German's uprooting the Duala people in Cameroon from their ancestral district and moving them kilometers away. They argued that this was necessary to keep Germans from being bitten by the malarial mosquitoes that were thought to arise inevitably in the presence of Africans. The alternative of clearing the malarial swamps and letting the Duala remain in their homes was not seriously entertained.¹³⁵

Sinophobes were both fascinated with and repelled by the Chinese body, and as in the Khoikhoi and Samoan cases, this ambivalence was sexualized (even if less explicitly so than in the two other cases). A memo by one of the colony's sanitary councilors justifying urban segregation veered off into a hallucinatory tableau of desire and deviance: "Close cohabitation in tight spaces, filth and vermin, and above all the disgusting sexual deviations indulged in especially by the Chinese male make such a measure absolutely necessary. Sodomy by inserting the penis into the cloacae of large geese and ducks . . . and also pederasty, sexual abuse of children of both sexes, and rape in its most shocking forms, are all on the agenda in all of China. . . . The Chinaman certainly excites our genuine admiration with his sedulousness and . . . with the power and agility of his beautiful, athletically built body. . . . But as soon as the sun sets, depravity takes over in the opium dens, the harbor gin shops, and the bordellos."¹³⁶ Unlike in the Samoan case, European gender stereotypes were less conventionally (or nonfetishistically) heterosexual in the Sinophobic worldview. Chinese women only rarely figured as lovers of Europeans in these fantasies; instead, Europeans focused on footbinding, reproducing shocking anatomical pictures of Chinese women's feet.¹³⁷ This literature contains the same mixture of the grotesque and the prurient found in the literature on Khoikhoi female sexuality. Freud argued in his essay on fetishism, written in the same period,

135. Eckert 1999; "Enteignung in Duala," BA-Berlin, RKA, vols. 4427-31.

136. Kronecker 1913, pp. 11-12.

137. See, for example, Welcker 1870, 1872; Stricker 1871; and Virchow 1903. British and French anthropologists were no less fascinated by footbinding. For psychoanalysis footbinding can be interpreted as a form of fetishism, which for Freud was not homosexual but an alternative way for men to fend off "the fright of castration at the sight of a female genital" without becoming homosexual as a result ([1927] 1963, p. 154). Freud interprets footbinding as "mutilating the female foot and then revering it like a fetish" (p. 157).

that heterosexual European men often unconsciously elided the foot or shoe with the female genitals. But in the case of footbinding the fetish function was disrupted, since the deformed foot gestured precisely toward that “genital mutilation” (female castration) that fetishism was supposed to disavow (according to Freud). Figure 7.9, published in the anthropological journal *Archiv für Anthropologie* in 1871, contributed an additional mutilation of its own, severing the leg above the ankle.

There were few precedents for a program of attempting to remake Chinese culture along the lines of the acculturation program in Southwest Africa. Geographer Georg Wegener insisted that there was simply “no possibility of understanding between the two races.”¹³⁸ Ovaherero culture had also been described in the precolonial era as impenetrable, but the Germans seemed to believe that loss of land and cattle and the trauma of the genocide would dissolve Ovaherero culture and allow it to be remolded in more useful ways. By contrast, even the missionaries did not believe that Chinese culture was vulnerable to being forcibly transformed by external forces. The dogged resistance by the Chinese state and people to Western imperialism made projects of cultural substitution seem implausible. Chinese arrogance may have been a Sinophobic theme, but it indirectly indexed real practices of resistance. The German writer Alfons Paquet wrote that “even the lowest of these yellow-brown people carries with him like an amulet the consciousness and the instincts of his people’s ancient culture.”¹³⁹ Kiaochow’s chief engineer ended his report about a reconnaissance trip in Shandong Province with a list of “prominent characteristics” of the Chinese, which included the fact that they “consider us to be barbarians.” He concluded: “Each one of them is very aware of the Middle Kingdom’s ancient culture.”¹⁴⁰ Theories of Asiatic despotism convinced Diederichs that the local authorities in Shandong “possess[ed] and exercise[d] an absolute authority over the people that none of our military commanders could ever attain with his own troops.” The Chinese were extremely unlikely to switch their allegiances.¹⁴¹

German interventions during the initial segregationist phase of colonial rule in Kiaochow were interlaced with, or undermined by, strains of

138. Wegener 1904, p. 54.

139. Paquet 1911, p. vi.

140. A. Gaedertz, “Eine Rekognoszierungsreise in der Provinz Shantung (Schluss),” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 49 (September 9, 1899): 3.

141. Diederichs’s report, “Lage an Kiautschou Bucht,” February 15, 1898, BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 6697, p. 229r.




FIGURE 7.9 Model of a Chinese woman's foot crippled by footbinding. From Welcker 1870, p. 223.

classical Sinophilia. Even the actions of the conqueror of Qingdao were haunted by Sinophilia. Admiral Diederichs asserted that Chinese workers, though driven mainly by fear, nonetheless had “a refined sense of justice.”¹⁴² The idea of a deeply rooted sense of justice putting limits on the ruling elite had been a central theme of early Sinophilia. Diederichs defended the use of flogging as punishment in an official report in February 1898 by referring to the authority of the “Chinese punitive specifications communicated by the Bureaucrat Koo of Jiaozhou,” suggesting at the very least a certain desire for legitimacy in Chinese eyes.¹⁴³ Kiaochow's first German newspaper, the *Deutsch-Asiatische Warte*, attacked the colonial administration for its alleged coddling of the Chinese and its “extreme sensitivity in favor of the Chinese population.”¹⁴⁴ And indeed, the colonial bureaucrat who struck a Chinese with his whip for not moving from the sidewalk to let him pass, mentioned above, was berated by the governor, Jaeschke, who happened to be riding past on horseback at that moment. The *Deutsch-Asiatische Warte* commented that this was “characteristic of the kid-glove treatment of the

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid., p. 229v.

144. Quoted in Seelemann 1982, pp. 81–82.

natives as it is wrongly instituted by the offices here.”¹⁴⁵ Colonial policy was not all of a single piece, even in the first decade.

After 1904 or 1905, the forces associated with Sinophilia increasingly placed their stamp on native policy. Where the founders of the colony had failed to propose any project for remaking the Chinese soul, Sinophiles like Richard Wilhelm hoped to penetrate the “soul of China” (the title of his famous book) and to coax it out of its seclusion.

The Seminar for Oriental Languages and German Sinology as a Conduit for Sinophilia

Sinophile ideas were actively represented in the colony by the translators and by various graduates of the Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen (Seminar for Oriental Languages). This seminar was a language-training institute at the University of Berlin, founded in 1887 with the central purpose of educating officials for the foreign service.¹⁴⁶ Chinese was the language in which the largest number of translators graduated from the seminar before 1918. Although most of the Germans in the colony were associated with the navy, many of those bound for posts as district officials, translators, and other civil and military positions had studied at the seminar.¹⁴⁷ Academic Sinology, including the more pragmatic versions of it that proliferated at the Berlin seminar, was a breeding ground for the more moderate approach to China that increasingly set the tone for native policy in Kiaochow. Translators were present in the colonial administration from the beginning; translator Schrammeier was the founder of the colony’s native policy. As the Foreign Office and the German envoys in Beijing and Ji’nan shifted toward a friendlier stance toward China, the views of the translators, Sinologists, moderate missionaries, and other Sinophile groups in Kiaochow became increasingly influential in the day-to-day creation and implementation of native policy.

The seminar was significant not just because its students learned some Chinese but because it was not permeated by the Sinophobia that was

145. “Aus Tsingtau,” *Deutsch-Asiatische Warte*, July 15, 1900, p. 2.

146. Sachau 1912; Ruland 1973, p. 54; Morgenroth 1990.

147. Hövermann 1914, p. 27. Lists of SOS graduates and their job placements are given in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin*, starting in 1899. Seelemann (1982) overemphasizes a programmatic split between a Sinophile Foreign Office and a Sinophobic navy. The German envoys von Brand, von Heyking, and von Ketteler all pushed a Sinophobic and imperialist line, but none of them came up through the navy. The change in policy that Seelemann attributes to the new German envoy to China Count Arthur von Rex (1906–11) cannot be traced to a policy line characteristic of the German foreign service per se.

standard in military and diplomatic circles at the turn of the century.¹⁴⁸ The seminar's mandate, as it evolved in the years after 1887, encompassed not just modern Asian languages but also Swahili and other African languages (and eventually European languages), as well as applied topics relevant to colonial service and trade, such as tropical hygiene, colonial law, administration, history, and missionary work. The seminar's journal, *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin* (Communications of the Berlin Seminar for Oriental Languages, first issued in 1898) encompassed more than colonial and linguistic questions, just as the seminar's teachers lectured and wrote on a broader range of topics. Officially the journal's purview encompassed "literature, customs and mores, religion, legal views and institutions," the "general historical and cultural development of the specific peoples," and "art and culture." Although the editors specified that contributions were supposed to connect these themes to "trade, missions, and German colonialism," this guideline was not strictly adhered to.¹⁴⁹ Topics actually covered in the *Mitteilungen* ranged from the reorganization of the Chinese army to the work of the neo-Daoist philosopher Wang Chong.

The publications of most of the faculty, including Carl Arendt, the seminar's director from 1887 to 1902, "attempted to counter dominant prejudices and to evince understanding for China."¹⁵⁰ Arendt was a former translator and secretary at the German legation in Beijing. He lectured and published on modern Chinese history, edited the East Asian section of the *Mitteilungen*, and argued against the theory that the Chinese language lacked a grammar. Another typical figure at the seminar was Alfred Forke, who combined a respectful interest in Chinese philosophy and high culture with distaste for some of the more mundane aspects of everyday Chinese existence.¹⁵¹ Forke's long account of a trip from Beijing to Xi'an and Luoyang in 1898, for

148. The renowned Chinese historian and Sinophile J. J. M. de Groot was not part of the SOS, although he published in its journal. De Groot arrived in Berlin in 1912, taking up the first regular German university appointment in Sinology. An exception to the Sinophilia of the seminar's faculty was Wilhelm Schüler, who had been a missionary in Qingdao and Shanghai before receiving a teaching post at the seminar in 1914. Schüler's book on China and Shandong was published by the Qingdao branch of the German Colonial Society and contained no criticism of German colonialism; see Schüler 1912, pp. 347–63; and Leutner 1987, pp. 41–43.

149. *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Ostasiatische Sprachen zu Berlin* I (1, 1898): i, v.

150. Leutner 1987, p. 41.

151. Forke translated and commented on the *Lun Heng*, the main work of Han dynasty philosopher Wang Chong, in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin*, vols. 9–11. See Emmerich 1999.

instance, contained none of the deprecating comments about the Chinese or advice for dealing with the “natives” that peppered the travel narratives of von Richthofen. Forke “distanced himself” from the violent German occupation of Kiaochow and criticized “Christian conversion at the point of a gun.”¹⁵² Erich Haenisch, a student of J. J. M. de Groot and the first German Sinologist to write a *Habilitation* thesis, wrote extensively, sometimes in the *Mitteilungen*, on China in the Mongol (Yuan dynasty) and Manchu (Qing dynasty) periods and on the role of Confucianism in Chinese history.¹⁵³ The seminar also employed Chinese teachers and lecturers—perhaps one reason that de Groot scorned the institution.¹⁵⁴ One of these Chinese faculty members, Wang Ching Dao, published an article in the *Mitteilungen* on “the Confucian idea of the state and its relationship to constitutionalism.”¹⁵⁵ It would be difficult to find a better example of early-twentieth-century transculturation in the German-Chinese milieu than this essay, in view of the role of German constitutional law (both directly and mediated through Japan) in the ongoing Chinese reforms of the era. Wang relied on German theorists such as Georg Jellinek, Hermann Rehm, and Hegel (although he criticized the latter’s interpretation of China) and discussed the work of China specialists Karl Gützlaff, Richard Wilhelm, Max von Brant, and Johann Heinrich Plath.

Even before the creation of the Seminar for Oriental Languages, the typical experiences of German translators during their linguistic training in Beijing were conducive to Sinophilia. The German envoys or ministers, by contrast, socialized mainly with other European elites.¹⁵⁶ Each of the translator trainees had his own Chinese mandarin as a teacher, available to him throughout the day.¹⁵⁷ Wilhelm Schrameier arrived in Beijing in 1885 and worked as a translator at the German consulates in Hong Kong and

152. Leutner 1987, p. 43, citing an article by Forke from 1914.

153. Bauer 1967, p. 207; Haenisch 1905. In Haenisch’s very professional work the entire debate between Sinophobes and Sinophiles has already been left behind.

154. On the hiring of these Chinese teachers, see BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 656; for their names, see the *Mitteilungen*, vols. 7, 1 (1904: I-II); 8, 1 (1905: I-II); 11, 1 (1908: I-II); 14, 1 (1911: I-II); and 15, 1 (1912: I-II).

155. C. Wang 1913.

156. It is worth noting that German envoy Max von Brandt (1874–93), who served in Beijing before the recrudescence of Sinophobia at the end of the century, was less imbued with that ideology than his successors Gustav Schenck zu Schweinsberg (1893–96), Edmund von Heyking (1896–99), and Clemens von Ketteler (1899–1900). In the heat of the most Sinophobic and colonialist moment von Brandt published an interesting book entitled *Chinese Philosophy and State Confucianism* (1898).

157. According to the recollections of Otto Franke (1954, p. 47).

Canton and in the general consulate in Shanghai before taking up his post in the Kiaochow administration. According to Schrameier, the translator trainees in Beijing haunted the Chinese theaters and the antique stores, where merchants provided them with an “initial comprehensive introduction to Chinese art history.”¹⁵⁸ Sinophilia had not been entirely suppressed. Such curiosity about Chinese culture would mark Schrameier and others like him as “subaltern” in the eyes of diplomats from the nobility and militarists like Kaiser Wilhelm.

Rapprochement: The Second Phase of German Colonialism in Kiaochow, 1905–14

A frivolous game with promises was played with China, which was treated . . . like a Negro state of secondary importance [*wie einen Negerstaat zweiter Güte*].

RICHARD WILHELM¹⁵⁹

By 1905 new institutions were beginning to be superimposed on the original apartheid-like infrastructure in Qingdao. These new policies embodied a program of rapprochement, syncretism, and exchange between two civilizations conceptualized as different but relatively equal in value. Although Kiaochow was often criticized for its military character during the early years, Oskar Truppel presided over what was essentially a demilitarization of the colony and what he called “a balancing of the differing [Chinese and German] ways of thought” during his governorship (1901–11). This “balancing” took place largely against his will, but not against the wishes of the higher German authorities in Berlin and Beijing or many of the lower-level civil servants in Kiaochow.¹⁶⁰

The expansion of the German military presence outside Kiaochow was linked to a sneering distaste for Chinese culture and a refusal to treat the Shandong provincial authorities as equals. When Shandong governor Zhou Fu announced his intention to visit Qingdao in 1902 Truppel’s immediate response was that this was “barely believable.”¹⁶¹ But Zhou Fu did visit

158. Matzat 1985, p. 4.

159. Wilhelm 1928, p. 367.

160. For a representative depiction of Kiaochow as a militarized colony in the early period, see Bigelow 1898, p. 585. The quote is from a report signed by the acting governor rather than Truppel, but its content makes it clearly identifiable as the product of the latter (Imperial Government of Kiaochow to von Rex, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 217v).

161. Truppel to Mumm, December 24, 1902, BA-Berlin, R. 9208, vol. 1239, p. 5; quoted in Stichler 1989, p. 224.

Qingdao (and later moved to the colony). Richard Wilhelm recalled this event as having put an end to the “antagonistic atmosphere” by demonstrating “that more could be achieved on both sides by mutual trust and goodwill.” The most important result, according to Wilhelm, was that “the two cultures came into contact.”¹⁶² Truppel soon reciprocated, visiting Zhou Fu in Ji’nan, and his visit was turned into a grand ceremonial event.¹⁶³ Soon after Zhou Fu’s replacement as provincial governor in November 1904 by Hu Tinggan (who was replaced in turn by a young nationalist, Yang Shixiang, early in 1905), the German troops pulled back into Qingdao, abandoning their garrisons in Gaomi and Jiaozhou.¹⁶⁴ In 1910, a photograph appeared in the *Berliner Abend-Zeitung* with the caption “The children of the two governors playing together,” which seemed put Governor Truppel and the Shandong governor Sun Baoqi on an equal footing (fig. 7.10).¹⁶⁵ Photographs were taken of German colonial governors meeting other Shandong governors and state officials in which they posed as equals.

The 1905 accord on the withdrawal of German troops back into the leasehold from the province happened concurrently with a German movement toward policies of cultivating “cultural-political relationships, especially with the educated Chinese upper strata.”¹⁶⁶ In 1905 the colony’s chief justice, Dr. Crusen, proclaimed in a public lecture in Qingdao that “the so-called fifty-kilometer zone in Shandong is not a [sphere of influence] and is destined to remain Chinese forever.”¹⁶⁷ One of the other early signs of change had been the creation of the Chinese Committee in Qingdao in 1902.¹⁶⁸ Between 1902 and 1910 the twelve members of this committee were selected by Chinese merchants from the three provincial guilds (*hui-guan*) active in Kiaochow: the Jiyan guild, representing merchants from Shandong and Tianjin, the Sanjiang guild, representing the lower Yangtzi

162. R. Wilhelm 1928, p. 166.

163. See Truppel, “Reise in das Innere Shantungs,” June 1, 1903, Anlage 2 (“Aufenthalt in Tsinanfu”), BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 19, pp. 12v–14v.

164. Schrecker 1971, pp. 166–69; Mühlhahn 2000, p. 131.

165. “Bilder vom Tage,” *Tägliche Sonder-Beilage der Berliner Abend-Zeitung*, June 16, 1910, p. 3. On Truppel’s relations with Zhou Fu, see BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 33. On Sun Baoqi, who governed Shandong from 1909 to 1912, see Mühlhahn 2000, p. 473.

166. Stichler 1988, p. 117.

167. “Lokalnachrichten,” *Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten* 2 (November 29, 1905): 2.

168. Kiaochow *Denkschrift* for 1901–2, p. 23. Stichler discusses the committee as part of the German administration in terms of “collaboration” and a “comprador” class; conversely, Mühlhahn 2000, pp. 271–73, includes it under the category of Chinese strategies of resistance. Both views are partially correct but incomplete.



FIGURE 7.10 Children of the German governor of Kiaochow and the Chinese governor of Shandong province playing together. From BA-MA-Freiburg, *Nachlass Truppel*, vol. 90, document 25. (Courtesy of BA-MA-Freiburg.)

region; and the Guangdong guild, made up of merchants from Canton.¹⁶⁹ After 1910 the governor himself selected four representatives (*Vertrauensmänner*) from these guilds—two from the Jiyan guild and one each from the Sanjiang and Guangdong guilds.¹⁷⁰ Although this was a step backward in terms of representativeness and Chinese influence, the idea was that the *Vertrauensmänner* would eventually become part of the advisory committee to the governor, which had hitherto consisted exclusively of Europeans.¹⁷¹ A Chinese chamber of commerce was also created in 1909.¹⁷²

In 1904 a colonial bank director publicly praised Truppel for making the Chinese “what they should be, namely, fully equal citizens [*Bürger*] of our colony.”¹⁷³ This was certainly an exaggeration: the Chinese did not have equal rights, and the dualistic legal system remained in place until the end

169. Zhang Yufa 1986, pp. 835–36; F. Huang 1999, p. 104.

170. Mühlhahn 2000, p. 161; Hövermann 1914, pp. 26–27.

171. Mohr 1911, p. 21.

172. “Die chinesische Handelskammer in Tsingtau,” *Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten* 6 (12 October 1909): 2.

173. “Festive Speech of Bank Director Homann on the Occasion of the Onset of Governor Truppel’s Vacation, November 6, 1904,” BA-MA-Freiburg, *Nachlass Truppel*, vol. 59, p. 3.

of the German colonial period. Still, the colony was moving in the direction of greater legal and cultural equality. When the Qing dynasty was toppled in the 1911 Xinhai revolution, many upper-class Chinese scholars and ex-officials streamed into Qingdao from around the country.¹⁷⁴ Several wealthy Chinese residents of Qingdao had German wives. Partly as a result of the fact that “racial mixing” was occurring at a high social class level, but also due to the liberalizing trend in German-Chinese relations, the ban on Chinese residence in the European district was partly lifted. After 1912 there were very few areas in Qingdao that were off limits to elite Chinese. Some rich Chinese began to vacation on Qingdao’s beaches alongside European tourists.¹⁷⁵ In 1914, a law was passed stipulating that any Chinese could live in the city’s European district with the permission of the governor and the approval of three-fourths of the members of the citizens’ representative council.¹⁷⁶ Although mixed marriage was being banned and children of mixed marriages were being deprived of their German citizenship precisely at the same time in other German colonies, children of mixed Chinese and German heritage in Kiaochow retained the possibility of being treated legally as Germans (even if there was still discrimination in colonial civil society). Laws forbidding mixed marriage were never seriously entertained in Kiaochow. Instead, discussions of the topic of mixed marriage in the German East Asian press were focused on the Chinese government’s ban on Chinese students marrying foreigners while studying abroad.¹⁷⁷ From the perspective of German colonialism in Africa or the Pacific, this reversal seemed incredible. Although some Germans living in Qingdao campaigned against the admission of qualified Chinese students to the German gymnasium, the colonial administration defended their presence, defying settlers, as in Samoa.¹⁷⁸

German buildings also began to combine Chinese and European design elements, and a few were done in a fully Chinese style. During the early years of the colony any direct association of German and Chinese architecture was strictly a matter of temporary necessity or a gesture of symbolic

174. Schüler 1912, pp. 361–62; R. Wilhelm 1928, pp. 169ff.; *Kiautschou im Jahre 1911* (Tsingtau: Deutsch-chinesische Druckerei & Verlagsanstalt Walther Schmidt, 1911), p. 1.

175. Seelemann 1982, pp. 144, 158, 145, 209. The relocation of Chinese government officials to Qingdao is discussed in Meyer-Waldeck, “Monatsbericht für den Monat Januar 1913,” February 21, 1913, BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 6765, pp. 325rv.

176. “Verordnung betr. Wohnen von Chinesen im Europäerviertel,” *Amtsblatt für das Deutsche Kiautschou-Gebiet*, January 23, 1914, p. 17.

177. “Verbot von Mischehen,” *Der Ostasiatischer Lloyd*, May 27, 1910, p. 534.

178. “Zur Schulfrage,” *Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten* 2 (November 29, 1905): 1; 2 (December 2, 1905): 2.



FIGURE 7.11 German officials preening in front of occupied Qingdao *yamen*, from Admiral Diederichs's photo album. From BA-MA-Freiburg, *Nachlass Diederichs*, vol. 45. (Courtesy of BA-MA-Freiburg.)

domination. Thus, the Qingdao *yamen* building was occupied (fig. 7.11) as a show of power and because the Germans initially wanted to concentrate their efforts on other construction projects, but the main German administrative building that was completed in 1906 was done in an almost completely German style (fig. 7.12).¹⁷⁹ Other aspects of early architecture were generically “colonial” or “Oriental” without being specifically Chinese.¹⁸⁰ The veranda, for instance, was a characteristic feature of German villas and public buildings in Qingdao.¹⁸¹ The governor's mansion (fig. 7.13), completed in October 1907, had verandas whose exotic or decorative function was indicated by the fact that “some of them could not even be entered from the rooms behind them.”¹⁸²

The countryside villa of the colony's chief justice, Dr. Crusen, had a

179. The Prinz-Heinrich Hotel on the Kaiser-Wilhelm Ufer, built around 1900, was decorated on its eastern facade “with the Chinese character ‘shou,’ meaning long life” (Warner 1994, p. 268).

180. A Danish journalist who visited Qingdao in 1910 described the city's German villas as being built in a “German-Oriental style” (“Schanghai und Tsingtau,” *Ostasiatischer Lloyd*, March 11, 1910, p. 253).

181. Weicker 1908, p. 47.

182. Lind 1988, pp. 100–101; see also Warner 1994, pp. 206–9.



FIGURE 7.12 (top) Headquarters of the German colonial administration (Gouvernements-Dienstgebäude), Qingdao, completed 1906. Photo by the author, 2005.

FIGURE 7.13 (bottom) German governor's residence, Qingdao (ca. 1910). From BA-MA-Freiburg, *Nachlass Truppel*, vol. 80. (Courtesy of BA-MA-Freiburg.)

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small “Chinese temple” on its grounds.¹⁸³ A photo of the interior of another colonial judge’s home from the period shows a Chinese-style standing-screen wall in one of the rooms.¹⁸⁴ A serious scholarly study of Chinese architecture was undertaken in 1906 by Ernst Boerschmann, who had first been sent to China in 1902 as a civil engineer for the German troops occupying Beijing. He spent a good deal of time in Qingdao. Boerschmann was given a leave of absence from the army to travel in China from 1906 to 1909, and his study was financed by the German and Prussian governments. He was convinced of the “greatness of Chinese culture” and set out to study the “most impressive buildings in the most important, religiously significant places and in the centers of spiritual and economic life, just as we would do in the study of our own culture.” Boerschmann believed that religious and philosophical texts were the highest expression of China’s culture and that they were “revealed in Chinese art, especially in architecture, with a precision that has not been attained by our own artistic creation.”¹⁸⁵ The fact that German government agencies were now promoting the study of Chinese architecture rather than knocking down Chinese walls with cannonballs was part of a rather abrupt change in goals and prevailing ethnographic representations in this period.

The sheer presence of stylistic hybridity does not yet reveal the meaning to the Germans of the inclusion of Chinese architectural elements in Qingdao buildings. For example, the massive gargoylike dragon above the main entrance of the governor’s mansion (fig. 7.14) was perhaps meant to invoke “Viking” or European gothic dragons rather than Chinese ones.¹⁸⁶ It is not a repeated motif, however, but a singular one. Furthermore, the dragon seems to rise like a ship out of the pattern of waves carved into the granite eaves, and it faces west rather than east.¹⁸⁷ This strengthens the sense of the dragon as being closer to Zheng He (the mythical Chinese navigator) than James Cook. These peculiarities of the design, combined with the very anomaly of including a dragon—whether European or Chinese—in a twentieth-century German structure, indicate that processes of transcultur-

183. BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 79, p. 3v, photo “Partie auf dem Lauschan.”

184. BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 79, p. 17v, photo “Oberrichter Wilke und Frau in ihrem Zimmer.”

185. Boerschmann 1911-14, vol. 1, p. xiv.

186. Warner 1994, p. 206.

187. Town planning and architecture had been sensitive to issues of compass directions in China much longer than in Germany, of course. In the planning of Qingdao, Germany applied the grid pattern only to the Chinese districts; in the European district the course of streets and avenues conformed to the lay of the land and meandered in an effort to avoid the spread of windblown dust and also to make a non-Chinese impression.



FIGURE 7.14 (top left) Dragon on the roof of the German governor's residence, Qingdao. (Photo courtesy of Zhu Jianjun and Xiang Gu, 2005.)

FIGURE 7.15 (below) Painting in the German governor's residence, Qingdao, detail. Photo by the author, 2005.

FIGURE 7.16 (top right) Mecklenburghaus Convalescent Home, Kiaochow colony. From Lind 1998, p. 104.

ation had penetrated to the heart of the colonial state. Both of the mansion's architects were part of the colonial government and therefore responsible for the regime's self-presentation. One scroll-shaped painting inside the governor's residence seemed to show Qingdao in an earlier period, unsullied by European colonialism (fig. 7.15). The Mecklenburghaus Convalescent Home (fig. 7.16), built in 1903, combined Chinese roof elements and columns with German *Fachwerk*-style heavy wooden beams and stone.

A final example of architectural syncretism is the Tsingtau-Klub, completed in 1911, which contains a traditional "spirit wall" (*yingbi*, literally, "shadow wall") at the entrance (plate 10). Like bridges shaped in the zig-zag form, these walls were believed to keep malevolent spirits at bay; more positively, the *yingbi* was a plastic expression of metaphysical ideas, of the "thought of eternity," also often represented by a mirror. The German wall



FIGURE 7.17 Spirit wall at Fayu temple on Putuoshan Island. From Boerschmann 1911-14, I:41.

in question is made of blue porcelain tiles that recall the colors of the Temple of Heaven in Beijing and decorative walls inside the Forbidden City. The overall design of the Qingdao wall resembles that of traditional spirit walls such as the one in figure 7.17 from the Fa-Yu Temple on Putuoshan (普陀山) Island, with the larger mirrorlike image in the center flanked by symmetrical rows of smaller rectangular ornaments on both sides. Whereas the central images in the great spirit walls often depicted a “powerful mythical animal resembling a tiger in . . . extremely stylized and bizarre form,” the German ghost wall inside the Tsingtau-Klub had a stylized German eagle at its center and a fireplace. The existence of a German “spirit wall” is more than ironic, since Chinese were prohibited from joining the Tsingtau-Klub until quite late, and also in light of the European predilection for knocking down Chinese walls as punishment for China’s “decades of high-walled exclusion” of foreigners.¹⁸⁸

188. On the Tsingtau-Klub wall see Warner 1994, p. 262; and Biener 2001, p. 105; neither author comments on the irony of the club’s spirit wall. On the use and meaning of spirit walls in Chinese elite architecture, see Boerschmann 1911-14, vol. 1, pp. 41-45; and in vernacular architecture see Knapp 1989, p. 171. Seelemann 1982, p. 422, mentions the ban on Chinese membership in German clubs in Qingdao; the first quote is from Boerschmann 1911-14, vol. 1, p. 42; the second quote is from Hevia 1992, p. 315.

Other examples of the emerging approach to native policy were found in the sphere of education.¹⁸⁹ A “German-Chinese school” had already existed in the early years of the colony, but the classes were held in German and the aim was to accustom the Chinese students to “discipline” and to train translators for the navy and the government.¹⁹⁰ In 1905 the government opened the first of twenty-seven Chinese grammar schools in the colony.¹⁹¹ Instruction was carried out by two groups: Chinese teachers who had gained a reputation in the villages for their Confucian learning and German missionaries from the General Evangelical-Protestant Missionary Association (Allgemeiner Evangelisch-Protestantischer Missionsverein), or “Weimar Mission.”¹⁹² This was one of three Protestant missions operating in Kiaochow, in addition to the Catholic Steyl Mission. The Weimar Mission was a liberal, nationalist, “high church” association, founded in 1884 by theology professors and pastors who wanted to “distance themselves consciously from the dominant ‘Pietistic’ strand of the [Protestant] missionary movement” in Germany.¹⁹³ Rather than emphasizing conversion to Christianity, the Weimar Mission pursued a classical Jesuit strategy of seeking influence through the educated Chinese elites. In practical terms this meant that the Weimar missionaries focused their teaching to the children of the higher Chinese social classes on secular topics, networked with Chinese literati, and translated “the best of European and American literature” into Chinese. The Chinese grammar schools in the colony relied on the standard five-year Chinese elementary school curriculum, supplemented by German language instruction during the last two years.¹⁹⁴ In a significant gesture of cultural reconciliation, given the fraught history of Christianity in China, the curriculum contained no religious material at all.¹⁹⁵

The Weimar Mission’s most significant activity in Kiaochow was the

189. See Zhang Yufa 1999 for an excellent overview of German schools in Qingdao; and Kreissler 1989, Y. Huang 1995, and Kim 2004 for more comprehensive studies.

190. “Pruefung in der Deutsch Chinesischen-Schule,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 19 (February 4, 1899): 2.

191. See the remarks by a former Chinese teacher in the colony (Luan Baode 1982), and the comments in “Denkschrift über Einrichtung chinesischer Schulen im Schutzgebiet,” BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 45v.

192. R. Wilhelm n.d.; Stichler 1989, p. 254.

193. Gründer 1982, p. 44; Mogk 1972, p. 161. Seelemann 1982 refers to the Weimar Mission appropriately as “high church.”

194. Weicker 1908, p. 190; R. Wilhelm n.d., p. 8.

195. The government-run naval dockyards school trained Chinese apprentices, who were drawn from the provincial villages of Shandong. They were given instruction in Chinese and examined in technical matters as well as Chinese history and geography (Seelemann 1982, p. 376).

creation of the Qingdao German-Chinese Seminar (Deutsch-Chinesisches Seminar), a *gymnasium* for adolescent boys. The seminar was headed by Richard Wilhelm, the future Sinologist and Weimar Republic intellectual. The seminar trained Chinese teachers for the colony's elementary schools. Shandong governor Zhou Fu also decreed that graduates of the seminar could take the exam to enter the provincial university in Ji'nan.¹⁹⁶ The instructors for Chinese, math, physics, and chemistry classes were Chinese; Germans taught German language and history. The school gained an excellent reputation, and Chinese officials and wealthy families sent their sons there.¹⁹⁷ As in the grammar schools, there was no religious instruction and Christian holidays were not celebrated.¹⁹⁸

Richard Wilhelm defended the idea of a mainly Chinese curriculum devoid of Christian teaching, arguing that cultural exchange should not be reduced to the simple transfer of European "machine culture" or even the "proven truths of European science," but should entail "an appropriation of our thinking and inner life, both religious and scientific," with all of its "contradictions and insufficiencies."¹⁹⁹ For Wilhelm, Chinese was "one of the most significant literary languages," a "cultural oeuvre and an educational means . . . of the highest sort," without which China's admirable "state and culture would be unthinkable." Rejecting the Sinophobic claim that Chinese was linguistically primitive, Wilhelm described the Chinese script as "the containers into which a highly gifted people has placed its entire mental labor and the best works of its soul for millennia." Just "a few of these characters taken together," he marveled, "express an entire worldview with wonderful simplicity." Wilhelm spoke approvingly of one "German in Shandong who stuck his young son into a Chinese village school, in which he learned the discourses of Confucius, the famous teacher of the Chinese, just like any Chinese youngster." The "enemy" in Wilhelm's view was "not Confucianism, but the alienation and despiritualization of Chinese humanity due to a superficial European education."²⁰⁰ According to the recollections of one of the Chinese teachers at the seminar, Wilhelm often presided over early morning gatherings in which he discussed the

196. Kiaochow *Denkschrift* for 1905-6, p. 38; S. Wilhelm 1956, pp. 119-21.

197. Luan Baode 1982.

198. Gerber 2003, p. 174.

199. R. Wilhelm n.d., p. 10. As Leutner (1997, p. 431) points out, the idea that religious lessons should be voluntary was also accepted by Bishop Anzer and the Steyl missionaries when they set up their middle schools in Yanzhou and Jining in 1902. But the Catholic missions in Kiaochow and elsewhere remained committed to the goals of Christian instruction and conversion.

200. R. Wilhelm n.d., pp. 8-10.

ethical teachings of Confucius, Mencius, and Christianity. Wilhelm also elaborated an entire program of cultural synthesis and exchange that had a different accent from that of the more blatant “cultural imperialism” being proposed by figures like Karl Lamprecht and the former settlement commissary in Southwest Africa, Paul Rohrbach.²⁰¹ After being introduced to Chinese culture by Richard Wilhelm, Rohrbach helped create a *gymnasium* for girls in Qingdao, the “Schu-Fan” (Shufan) School in the Taixizhen district.²⁰² The Schu-Fan School’s curriculum, like that of the German-Chinese Seminar for boys, was part Chinese and part German and was oriented toward the children of the local Chinese elite.²⁰³

The most dramatic illustration of the shift in native policy is the creation of the Qingdao German-Chinese college (deutsch-chinesische Hochschule).²⁰⁴ The college was first proposed to the Navy Office in 1905 in a plan that was signed by the acting governor of Kiaochow but probably written by the commissary for Chinese affairs, Wilhelm Schrameier, who was influenced by discussions with Richard Wilhelm.²⁰⁵ Schrameier envisioned

201. Luan Baode 1982. On “cultural imperialism” in Wilhelmine Germany see Bruch 1982; Kloosterhuis 1994; and Rohrbach 1910, 1912.

202. See Mogk 1972, p. 162; F. Huang 1999, pp. 170–71; Blumhardt n.d.; and the Schu-Fan School’s first year’s report, in BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, after p. 265. Rohrbach was employed briefly by the Weimar Mission as a propagandist (Mogk 1972, p. 162). Gründer (1982, p. 314) interprets both Rohrbach and Wilhelm as trying to extend German influence over China through schooling, medicine, and scientific pursuits. This is too sweeping, in my view, in light of Wilhelm’s already skeptical approach to German colonialism in his November 24, 1900, report on the German devastation in the Gaomi region (reprinted in Leutner 1997, p. 287). Rohrbach, by contrast, did not hesitate to speak of the “yellow race” (1912, p. 23). Asking rhetorically whether the Chinese “are actually a *Kulturvolk* in the true and profound sense of the word,” he answered that China was “‘barbarous’ in an objective sense.” Rohrbach also endorsed the thesis of Chinese stagnation (1909a, pp. 3, 11). Such tropes are not found in Wilhelm’s writings.

203. Blumhardt n.d.

204. The college has been discussed by Kreissler (1989, pp. 131–38); see also *Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten*, October 26, 1909, p. 2; and August 1, 1913, p. 2; Mou Le 1914; O. Franke 1911b, 1954; Schrecker 1971, pp. 244–45; Luan Baode 1982; Stichler 1989, pp. 252–91; and Mühlhahn 1999, 2000.

205. See Stichler 1989, p. 255; and Matzat 1998b, p. 80, for the assessment of the document’s authorship. As Matzat points out, Acting Governor Jacobson was an “unknown lieutenant commander” who was replacing Commander Funk, who was himself representing the absent Governor Truppel. The memo’s detailed discussion of European schools elsewhere in China makes it unlikely that anyone in Qingdao other than Schrameier could have written it, as do the nearly identical formulations in a memorandum signed by Schrameier in 1908 (BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, pp. 29–47). This issue of authorship supports my general argument about the social basis of the Sinophilic turn in native policy: Schrameier came from the translating corps, a milieu that was more respectful of China than the military. The fact that he had enough influence

a unified school system in the colony reaching from the elementary to the college level. His ultimate goal was for these schools to “influence the Chinese spirit and character in an all-encompassing manner and to become the mechanism for permeating the entire province, the Shandong hinterland that depends economically on Qingdao, with German knowledge and German spirit.”²⁰⁶ At this early stage of discussion the college was construed as having an entirely German curriculum; Chinese material would be treated in the elementary schools. The German envoy to China, Count Arthur von Rex, proposed the idea of a German-Chinese university for Qingdao in 1907, and Navy Secretary von Tirpitz immediately endorsed the idea of “an educational institution on a larger scale in the interest of our influence in China.” Von Tirpitz broke with the segregationism that had hitherto prevailed in the colony and moved in the direction of cooperation with the Chinese government, writing:

It seems particularly important for the viability and especially the desired political effectiveness of the planned educational institutions that from the start the Chinese central government as well as the most important provincial governors are enlightened about the goals and advantages of the planned institutions and thus become interested in the latter; that they allocate appropriate student material and as far as possible assume responsibility for the recognition of the examinations taken in Qingdao and the subsequent advancement of the students. In the same sense I would see it as admissible and even desirable that the responsible Chinese offices be involved in the creation of the curriculum, etc., from the start.

Von Tirpitz emphasized the need to include a law faculty in the proposed university, since he expected that “the most direct political influence” on China would emanate “precisely from this school.”²⁰⁷ At this early stage von Tirpitz also seems to have imagined the school’s curriculum as entirely Western. A memo by Count von Rex in early 1908 concerning the strong demand for Western education in China noted that “the entire population wants to *civilize* modernize itself.” The fact that the verb “civilize” was

to write a memo of this importance is indicative of the unacknowledged power of the translators and kindred groups within the local colonial state.

206. BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1241, pp. 198–219, reprinted in Leutner 1997, pp. 444–53; quote from p. 449.

207. All quotes from von Tirpitz to von Bülow, October 4, 1907, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, pp. 3–4; and von Tirpitz, October 23, 1907, in *ibid.*, p. 7. For von Rex’s endorsement, see von Rex to von Bülow, May 5, 1907, BA-Berlin, R 901 (Foreign Office), vol. 38930, p. 3.

crossed out in the original memo suggests that von Rex had second thoughts about whether China was not in fact already “civilized.”²⁰⁸ This marked a significant difference from his predecessors von Ketteler and von Heyking, who had insisted that China was barbaric. The change in “ethnographic” perceptions was accompanying changes in native policy and was occurring at the highest levels of German government.

The initial aim guiding these discussions was to orient Chinese elites toward Germany. The timing on the German side corresponded to a more general movement toward ideas of a “cultural mission” to achieve German geopolitical ends. The German initiative was also related to ongoing reforms within the Chinese educational system that made such an intervention seem more plausible—specifically, the educational reforms written by education minister Zhang Zhidong that were introduced in 1904–5.²⁰⁹ The ancient Beijing-centered system of repeated examinations of candidates’ knowledge of classical texts to assess their qualification for state service was starting to give way to a nationwide system of universities that would each control their own admissions and grant academic degrees.

Many of the institutional aspects of von Tirpitz’s original plan were eventually realized. But the equilibrium between German and Chinese elements in the school’s actual constitution represented a shift in the direction of Chinese interests and some openness on the German side to cultural *métissage*. The contours of the college on its opening day in 1909 contained elements of the program of “cultural synthesis and exchange” championed by Richard Wilhlem and other German intellectuals at the time and reflected the reform ideas of Zhang Zhidong, who supported the project and whose office had conducted the negotiations with the Germans. During discussions with Germany in the months leading up to the official negotiations, Zhang Zhidong insisted that instruction in the “purely Chinese sciences” be carried out by Chinese teachers but also said that Chinese higher education in general should be “reorganized according to German models and rely on German teachers.”²¹⁰ After the Hundred Days Reforms in 1898,

208. Memo of February 25, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 20v.

209. See Ayers 1971; Fairbank and Goldman 1998, pp. 242–44; F. Huang 1999, pp. 253–66. In later years a newspaper published at the German-Chinese college attributed the school’s very existence to Zhang Zhidong, who had “called on the Chinese to ‘Learn!’”; see “Die deutsch-chinesische Hochschule in Tsingtau,” *Der West-östliche Bote* 1 (1, November 1913): 32.

210. Report from May 22, 1908, by Kiaochow governor Truppel on discussion with Zhang Zhidong on May 3, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 110v; Otto Franke to RMA, June 24, 1908, reporting on Zhang’s counterproposal to the Germans at the onset of the official negotiations, *ibid.*, p. 137.

Zhang Zhidong had coined the phrase “The old [i.e., Chinese] learning is the substance the new [Western] learning is the vehicle.”²¹¹ This was a specific adaptation of the Confucian slogan *tiyong* (體用), or “essence and practical use,” from the reformist self-strengthening movement. This meant that “Chinese learning should remain the essence, but Western learning should be used for practical development.”²¹² The German-Chinese college in its final form corresponded much more closely to this Chinese project than had been the case in the original German plan: the mechanical arts and natural sciences were taught exclusively in the “Western” mode, while the cultural sciences—law and economics—were a mixture of Chinese and European approaches.²¹³

The ability of the Chinese to codetermine the college’s form and content also resulted from an evolution in German interests. The Germans wanted the Chinese to bear a large portion of the college’s budget, and this gave Zhang more leverage in the negotiations. German geopolitical strategy was also beginning to favor a more accommodating approach to the Chinese government. The enhanced power of the translators and Sinologists in the colony and in German China policy more generally was reflected in the selection of Sinologist Otto Franke to conduct the negotiations over the German-Chinese college.²¹⁴ This assignment was significant in light of Franke’s criticism of Baron von Heyking’s aggressive style in his discussions with the Chinese government in 1897–98 concerning Kiaochow’s annexation. Franke was given quite a bit of leeway in these negotiations and agreed to allow the Chinese authorities to select the students and the Chinese teachers for the school. When Zhang argued that the school should have a Chinese codirector, Franke responded that this contradicted his instructions, but the two sides agreed that the Chinese Educational Ministry could post a permanent representative at the school.²¹⁵ Franke endorsed the idea that the college’s goal was not to transform its students into artificial

211. Stichler 1989, p. 274.

212. Spence 1990, p. 225.

213. See the report on Zhang’s initial bargaining points in the memo of February 25, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 25r. These included the idea that “the Chinese lessons have to be presented according to the specifications of the [Chinese] Ministry of Education, which should also select the instructors.”

214. See O. Franke 1954, pp. 121ff., and the documentation in BA-Berlin, DBC, vols. 1258–59.

215. This was Zhang Kai (Luan Baode 1982). See Franke’s report to von Tirpitz, RMA, July 18, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, pp. 158–65. Zhang’s report of August 14, 1909, to the Chinese State Council is reprinted in Leutner 1997, pp. 461–64.

Germans or “characterless cultural hermaphrodites.”²¹⁶ The blueprint that eventually emerged from these discussions included a mixed Chinese and European curriculum.²¹⁷ The Chinese side insisted that the school’s official (and not too mellifluous) name would be Advanced School of Special Sciences of a Special Type (Hochschule für Spezialwissenschaften mit besonderem Charakter, or *Tebie gaodeng zhuanmen xueting*). The inclusion of the adjective “special” (*besonders/tebie*) signaled that it was not going to be given the same status as the Imperial University in Beijing, but also that it was elevated in some respects above the other provincial Chinese universities.²¹⁸ Although the Germans had hoped that the degrees granted by the Qingdao college would be recognized as equivalent to those of the Imperial University, Franke conceded that graduates would have to go to Beijing to earn the highest literary degree qualifying them to become officials.²¹⁹ Governor Truppel objected vigorously to allowing the Chinese such influence over the school, but he was unable to change the agreed-upon plan.²²⁰

216. O. Franke 1911b, p. 204.

217. The final statutes were agreed upon in Beijing in August 1908; see *Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten*, October 26, 1909, p. 2. They were published in the *Amtsblatt für das Deutsche Kiautschou-Gebiet*, 1909, p. 205; and in *Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule* 1910, pp. 24–27.

218. Specifically, graduates who wanted to enter the Chinese civil service would still have to go to Beijing to take the national examination, but they would not have to take any additional courses there. See the statutes of the Qingdao college and accompanying memo from Otto Franke, August 7, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, pp. 184–95. As with most aspects of the German colony, this reading of the college’s name was also open to different interpretations on the Chinese and German sides. The Germans referred to the school simply as the “German-Chinese college,” while the Chinese colloquially called it the Heilan University, after the name of the district in which the school was built (Leutner 1997, p. 470 n. 36). The city’s official plaque on the main building of the college (which is currently occupied by the railway administration) calls it the Dehua Daxue, a direct translation of “German-Chinese University.” The doubling of the word *special* in the school’s full title also deserves comment. At the onset of negotiations the adjective “special” referred only to the sciences that would be taught there—Franke referred to the “University for Special Sciences” (Hochschule für Spezial-Wissenschaften); see Franke’s report to RMA of June 24, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 138. By August 7 of that year, at Chinese insistence, the phrase “of a special type” had been added to the school’s name; see von Rex to Zhang, August 7, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 182; also Zhang’s report to the Chinese State Council, August 8, 1909, in Leutner 1997, p. 463.

219. See Franke to RMA, July 18, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 161; and *Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule* 1910, pp. 26–27.

220. See especially Truppel to von Rex, August 18, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, pp. 215–17; and Truppel to von Rex, September 1, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, pp. 35–36.

Franke received strong backing against Truppel from Admiral von Tirpitz and the German envoy in Beijing.²²¹

When the Qingdao college finally opened in October 1909 it combined a general five- or six-year preparatory lower school with an advanced school for graduates of the *gymnasium*. Chinese courses at the lower-school level included language, literature, classics, geography, ethics, and history; at the college level, Chinese law and ethical philosophy were offered. Western disciplines taught at the lower school included German language, natural sciences, introductory philosophy (psychology, logic, and epistemology), and health lessons, based on Western rather than Chinese medicine. The upper school was divided into four specialized disciplines: law and political economy (*Staatswissenschaften*), natural sciences and engineering, agriculture and forestry, and medicine. Physics, chemistry, medicine, and engineering were all based mainly on Western science.²²² The law and political economy section, however, was more syncretic. Religious teaching, that is, European religion, was excluded from the curriculum, and religious “propaganda” was banned from the college.²²³ In his internal comments on the first draft of the German proposal, Zhang Zhidong had commended the “absence of missionary activities” and recognized that “the fact that . . . Chinese knowledge will have an established place in the school’s teaching already differentiates . . . the German school from others that have been created by foreigners.”²²⁴

The German-Chinese college brought German and Chinese teachers together in a setting that suggested a civilizational exchange rather than colonialism encounter. According to the colony’s official annual report, “young people [should] not lose touch with their own literature and culture. . . . The young men should be educated to love their fatherland . . . but also to appreciate German culture and to develop their country according to these values.”²²⁵ At the school’s opening ceremony in 1909, speakers from both sides endorsed the idea of combining the best of their two cultures. A toast was

221. O. Franke 1954, pp. 121–22; Kreissler 1989, p. 134; and Stichler 1989, pp. 287–91.

222. Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule 1909, pp. 4–21; Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule 1910, pp. 6, 10. On the medical school see the report of December 15, 1912, by navy doctor Praefcke on the “current state and further expansion of the medical division,” BA-MA-Freiburg, RM 3, vol. 7001, pp. 148–61. On the internal struggles in China between Chinese and Western medicine at this time see the brilliant dissertation by Lei (1999).

223. Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule 1910, p. 26.

224. Zhang Zhidong, report to Chinese State Council of August 14, 1909, in Leutner 1997, p. 463.

225. Kiaochow *Denkschrift* for 1907–8, pp. 10–12. See discussion of the school and the *Denkschrift* in *Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten*, August 22, 1908, p. 2.



FIGURE 7.18 Staff and students in front of German-Chinese university, Qingdao (ca. 1910–11). From BA-MA-Freiburg, *Nachlass Truppel*, vol. 81. (Courtesy of BA-MA-Freiburg.)

raised to the Chinese emperor, the “national anthem” of the Qing Empire was sung, and the school’s German director proclaimed that “all of the *cultural peoples* [*Kulturvölker*] are linked by a common bond” and should “share their discoveries.” Here the Chinese were unambiguously (re)inscribed into the dominant pole of the German racial-anthropological binary. The imperial German and late Qing dynasty flags flew side by side in front of one of the school’s provisional buildings (fig. 7.18).²²⁶

The Germans set out to reshape China but ended up with a school that more strongly resembled an open-ended cultural “joint venture.”²²⁷ In the process, many Germans gained a clearer sense of the differences among their aims in China. Richard Wilhelm and Otto Franke wanted China’s encounter with the West to take place on the basis of its own inherited traditions. This pointed beyond colonialism altogether, since it no longer

226. “Die Eröffnung der Deutsch-Chinesischen Hochschule,” *Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten*, October 26, 1909, pp. 6–7. The college’s main teaching building was not completed until 1912, and this photo is from Truppel’s photo album for 1910–11.

227. In fact, the plaque currently visible in front of the main building of the former college, placed there by the Qingdao Tourism Bureau’s Cultural Relics Department in 2000, calls the school a German-Chinese “joint-run program.” Mühlhahn (2000, p. 254) emphasizes the *disciplinary* aspects of the German cultural schooling policy. As I argued above, this is *not* specifically colonial; indeed, the model he applies here was proposed by Foucault in an analysis of Europe. To call all disciplinary strategies colonial is to stretch that adjective to the breaking point or to render it strictly metaphorical.

insisted on a rule of hierarchical difference. “Cultural imperialists” like Paul Rohrbach, by contrast, believed that influencing China would require a “reconstruction and reconstitution of Chinese culture through a synthesis of Confucian and Occidental cultural elements.” Rather than building on Chinese tradition, this approach would necessitate an “internal confrontation with Confucianism.”²²⁸ Rohrbach’s conception was compatible with a rule of hierarchical difference, although it would have represented a step away from the severe segregationism that dominated colonial policy in the initial period. Both cultural exchange and “internal confrontations” leading to a German-dominated synthesis required the colonizers to approach Chinese culture hermeneutically, even if the latter approach was compatible with continued colonial rule.

There is a difference between policy and implementation, however, and the college could have moved in several different directions. One of these was respectful exchange and translation, a process of bidirectional transculturation that would no longer privilege the European side. Another possibility was that the school would come to embody a bid for cultural hegemony and acculturation into a German-controlled synthesis. Finally, there might have developed syncretic cultural processes that actually favored Chinese teachers or nationalist reformers, as Zhang Zhidong hoped.

The activities in the college’s Law and Economy Department suggest that several of these possibilities coexisted. On one level, this department conformed to the translation-and-exchange model championed by Otto Franke and Richard Wilhelm. The law students studied both Chinese and European law.²²⁹ The department published the *German-Chinese Legal Journal* (*Deutsch-chinesische Rechtszeitung*), which carried a column by the Chinese chief judge of Shandong Province on important legal decisions from all over China.²³⁰ At the same time, the Law and Economy Department published a series of Chinese translations of German law.²³¹ This section and its journal also began to promote a synthesis of Chinese and German forms. One of the school’s law professors, Kurt Romberg, wrote that the Chinese “have created eternal values for all of humanity” in the area that “Kant

228. Rohrbach (1912), pp. 19–20. A more ambiguous figure is Alfons Paquet, discussed below.

229. See the Law School curriculum in *Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule* 1910, p. 10; also the memo by the Law Department of November 1911, in BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, p. 281.

230. See *Deutsch-chinesische Rechtszeitung* 1 (1, November 1911): 8, and the column “Gerichtentscheidungen” in various issues.

231. These were called the *Chinesisch-deutsche Gesetzsammlung* and were published in Qingdao.

called practical reason” and that these were legal “treasures” that China “should not be allowed to keep for itself.” Like Leibniz three hundred years earlier, he thus suggested that Europe had something to learn from China, that cultural exchange had to be reciprocal. What the West, and especially the supposedly less materialistic Germans, could offer China was “methodological techniques” and “legal forms.” But these empty forms had to be “filled” with Chinese contents. This was a paraphrase of the *tiyong* principle, from the pen of a colonial German. Such syncretism would contribute to an “orderly state” and an effective legal system in China, Romberg concluded. And at this point, “consular jurisdiction and foreign barracks” would, he forecasted, become superfluous.²³² This demonstrated that the open-ended cultural processes unleashed by institutions like the German-Chinese college could move away from the rule of difference toward processes of transculturation that no longer privileged the colonizers.

An even more striking example of the erosion of hierarchical binarism was the Confucius Society (Konfuzius-Gesellschaft) founded by Richard Wilhelm. Although this was not an official government institution, Wilhelm played a central role in the colony’s school system and was widely regarded as one of the most influential Germans in Kiaochow. The exalted stature of the society’s Chinese members, many of whom were high-ranking ex-officials and scholars who had supported the Qing regime and who moved to Qingdao after 1911, meant that the club’s activities had broader implications.²³³ The goal of the Confucius Society was to stimulate intellectual discussions in which “German and Chinese culture and science can enter into fruitful exchange,” according to Wilhelm. The society’s guiding principle, which Wilhelm described as the only possible foundation for “genuine relations between the Orient and Occident,” was an “exchange of the highest achievements of the spiritual heroes of both cultures.” The challenge facing the society’s Chinese members, in Wilhelm’s view, was weighty: to rescue the traditional principles and treasures of Chinese cul-

232. Romberg (1911), pp. 23, 25. Romberg also insisted that the “culture” that Germany had to offer was not merely “a series of technical skills—which were in any case already partly familiar in China, even if they were not being used.” In a veiled jab at American and British materialism, he asked whether “the crude behavior of the foreigners . . . [does not] do more to spoil ethical values than to create them among the Chinese who are chained to them?” Romberg concluded by comparing the struggle between Chinese neotraditionalists like Ku Hung-Ming (1911) and Kang Youwei and the Chinese “Western-oriented fanatics” to the “dispute between humanism and the so-called realists in Germany” (*ibid.*, p. 26).

233. For a list of the members of Wilhelm’s Confucius Society see Forsman 1979, pp. 102–3. These included Zhou Fu, the former Shandong governor.

ture, which were in great danger. Many of these treasures had been “crudely destroyed during the storms of the [1911] revolution.” One of the society’s central goals was therefore to create a library “for the collection of Chinese treasures,” but World War I broke out just as the building was completed.²³⁴ Unlike Augustin Krämer and other ethnologists and Orientalists at the time, Wilhelm did not pillage the most valuable artifacts of a culture under siege but instead tried to make sure they were protected in China.

Explaining the Shift in Native Policy

The period after 1905 represented a fairly dramatic shift in native policy, accompanied by more positive portrayals of the Chinese both in Germany and in Kiaochow. Before asking about the reasons for this development we need to consider the possibility that the colonial regime before 1904 was already based on mixed principles, despite its seemingly thoroughgoing racialism. The partial reliance on Chinese law in Chinese trials led inexorably to mixed legal forms, even if the people in charge were Germans.²³⁵ The chief justice of Qingdao, Dr. Crusen, summarized the legal system as a “unique, half German and half Chinese form.”²³⁶ But allowing such cultural-political interpenetration, even within the repressive context of the law, could open the floodgates to uncontrollable cultural change. A legal dissertation written in 1911 defended the German reliance on Chinese law with reference to “the respect for an ancient culture that has shown a high degree of competence and development in all areas, including legal science.”²³⁷ What is remarkable here is not just the assumption that China was a developing rather than a stagnant country or the expression of respect, but the reappearance of the resonant Sinophile idea of an admirably *ancient* culture. This bears little resemblance to the arguments and emotions associated with German efforts to preserve customary law in Samoa or among the Namibian Rehoboth Basters. Such justifications for the preservation of Chinese elements

234. R. Wilhelm 1914, pp. 248, 251, 250; see also 1928, p. 179.

235. John Schrecker (1971, pp. 62-63) argues that the role of the district commissioner as practiced, especially in the rural district, was close to that of the Chinese *zhixian* (district magistrate), who also combined administrative and judicial functions. But the district commissioner in Germany’s other colonies was also entrusted with “far-reaching powers” (Gann and Duignan 1977, p. 70), including judicial ones. Only a more careful investigation of this question would allow us to determine the extent to which the self-understanding of the rural district commissioner in Kiaochow was shaped by the local Chinese elite.

236. Crusen 1914, p. 134.

237. Karlowa 1911, p. 25.

in the colony's legal system had not been widespread when that system was first created. These elements were initially retained for more pragmatic reasons. The harsh penalties of Chinese law were seen as a useful deterrent. But even though legal syncretism did not necessarily reflect any real appreciation of Chinese culture, the daily activities of the district commissioners required that they immerse themselves in Chinese law, and this inevitably oriented them toward a more "hermeneutic" approach to the colonized culture.

The shift in official policy starting around 1904 did not correspond to any major events in the colony comparable to the 1894 and 1904 wars in Southwest Africa. Three main factors have been proposed as explanations: economic pressures, Chinese resistance, and German military and foreign policy considerations. The second and third are significant in accounting for the *timing* of the move away from the early regime of harsh segregationism, but they cannot explain the *form* of the policies that took its place. The two previous case studies in this book suggest that native policy was shaped by precolonial ethnographic imagery and symbolic competition among social groups within the colonial state. Let us first consider the factors emphasized in the existing secondary literature.

Economic considerations tell us very little about either the timing or the form of this shift. German capitalists in China criticized the Kiaochow colony as too militaristic and statist and called for its liberalization.²³⁸ But this did not necessarily imply more liberal *native policies*. In fact, newspapers associated with German economic interests in China, like the *Ostasiatischer Lloyd* and the *Deutsch-Asiatische Warte*, more frequently criticized the Kiaochow government for its overly lax treatment of the Chinese. In any case, German residents had only "extremely limited possibilities of truly influencing the decisions of the governor" through the strictly advisory citizens' representative council.²³⁹

One might hypothesize that economic considerations influenced the changes in less direct ways. The Kiaochow colony had been evaluated by the navy and Foreign Office from the very beginning in terms of its economic potential, which referred above all to its contributions to trade. The navy's scorched earth policies in the colony's hinterland in 1899–1900 provoked protests by some German business interests that "Germany doesn't gain anything in the end if the railroad moves through wastelands devoid of human beings and steams past ruined towns and villages, proclaiming the

238. Mühlhahn 2000, p. 160.

239. Stichler 1989, p. 94.

“triumph of culture.”” If this continued, Germans would soon be the “most hated foreign devils.”²⁴⁰ Schrameier later recalled that the colonial government had reacted too harshly during the Boxer period and that the Chinese had nearly fled the colony, which would have been an economic disaster.²⁴¹ The point is that these policies were pursued nonetheless during the initial years. It is unclear why economic considerations should have become more important after 1904.

Another possible “economic” explanation would focus on the fact that trade within the colony was largely in Chinese hands.²⁴² The shift toward a more congenial native policy may have been related to the fact that the colony’s economic life depended not just on attracting and retaining a Chinese labor force but also on promoting Chinese-owned businesses. Yet even these considerations could not specify whether the colonizers would pursue a policy of assimilation, guarantee a “separate but equal” status for the Chinese, or engage in some version of cultural synthesis. What changed after 1905 was more than simply a relaxation of earlier restrictions or an agreement to listen to the colony’s Chinese residents.

All studies of Kiaochow have emphasized the impact of resistance and cooperation (or collaboration) on the colonial regime. The sheer presence of the Chinese state represented a crucial difference from the other German colonies. Starting with Yuan Shikai, governor of Shandong in 1900–1901 (and later the first president of the Republic of China, from 1912 to 1916), provincial authorities in Ji’nan worked with great success to contain the Germans in Kiaochow by undercutting German mining activities in the province, opening up Ji’nan as a “self-opened mart” (*zikai shangbu*), reminding the Germans of the colony’s limited (ninety-nine-year) life expectancy and its status as “leasehold,” and insisting on the equality of the “two governors.” But previous studies have not connected resistance and collaboration

240. “Gefechte bei Kaumi,” *Nachrichten aus Kiautschou, Beiblatt zum “Ostasiatischen Lloyd,”* no. 44 (November 2, 1900): 210; see also letter from Eugen Wolf to chancellor, April 11, 1899, PA-AA, vol. 18241 (no pagination).

241. Schrameier, “Ueber die Entwicklung und Bedeutung des Kiautschougebietes: Ein Rückblick,” *Deutsch-chinesischer Verband 1914, Anlage zum Jahresbericht* (Berlin, 1915), p. 41 (BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 655).

242. Seelemann 1982, p. 484; Mühlhahn 2000, p. 169. Klein (2004, p. 322) argues that Kiaochow’s administrators decided to loosen the restrictions on Chinese residence in the European district because they were impressed by the financial power of the Chinese immigrants to Qingdao after 1911. This may help explain that particular decision, but it does not account for the broader shift in native policy after 1904.

to the transformation of native policy inside the colony.²⁴³ Hans-Christian Stichler suggests that since the Boxers and other movements (including the 1911 Xinhai revolution) did not openly challenge the Kiaochow administration, the Germans basically had a free hand within the colony.²⁴⁴ In several cases when the Chinese directly challenged policies inside the colony, they were unsuccessful. When the government created the Chinese Committee in 1902, for example, Chinese merchants asked to be allowed to work directly with Shandong provincial officials. This was vetoed by the German legation in Beijing.²⁴⁵ In 1910, the Shandong governor asked Germany to help him conduct a census of the leasehold, again insinuating China's partial sovereignty over Kiaochow. The governor, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, responded that the Germans alone were responsible for this.²⁴⁶

This is not to suggest that Chinese resistance around native policy was always ineffective. When Sun Yat-sen came to Qingdao in 1912, the students at the German-Chinese college threatened to leave the school if they were not allowed to meet him on the school's premises. Local merchants threatened to leave the colony if they were not permitted to meet Sun. The Germans capitulated.²⁴⁷ Chinese envoys to Samoa and Berlin were able to end the flogging of Chinese workers in Samoa, as noted earlier.

Native policy was also affected by the evolving profile of German *geopolitical* strategy. Both the navy and the Foreign Office were increasingly oriented toward improving relations with China in order to secure a possible ally as Germany became isolated inside Europe.²⁴⁸ The result was an approach to China that resembled the Americans' "open door" policy, insofar as it backed away from any suggestion that Germany wanted to infringe

243. Schrecker (1971) and Mühlhahn (2000) frequently invoke Chinese resistance, but both authors locate it outside the colony proper. When discussing policies in the colony's schools and workplaces, Mühlhahn emphasizes Foucauldian discipline rather than resistance, and Schrecker emphasizes German efficiency.

244. Stichler 1989, p. 109.

245. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

246. Seelemann 1982, pp. 452-53.

247. See local Chinese newspaper clippings sent by Consul Mercklinghaus from Ji'nan to DBC, October 6, 1912, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, pp. 257-79; and Kiaochow governor Meyer-Waldeck to DBC, October 26, 1912, *ibid.*, pp. 282-87).

248. The 1905 Russo-Japanese War also made Germany more interested in finding alternative partners in the global periphery (Seelemann 1982, pp. 445-46; Stichler 1989, p. 234). According to Trumpener (1968, pp. 14-16), Germany was not actually seriously cultivating the Ottoman Empire as a "natural ally in the foreseeable future" before 1914, but the two countries were plunged into a hasty alliance on August 2.

on Chinese sovereignty.²⁴⁹ This change in strategy led to an acute struggle over the direction of China policy between the administration of Kiaochow, on the one hand, and the Foreign Office, German legation, and secretary of the navy, on the other. The Foreign Ministry “moved rapidly to restrict the influence of the naval government in Qingdao to the Leasehold’s borders,” going so far as to set up a separate consulate in Ji’nan in order to create a counterweight to its own colony in the same province.²⁵⁰ The aims of the movement for “cultural imperialism” tended to overlap with the new geopolitical strategic orientation when it came to China.

Geostrategic considerations thus influenced colonial native policy by urging powerful actors in the Foreign Office and the navy to censure Truppel when he resisted reforms and to shift power to a different set of Germans in Kiaochow. As a committed colonialist, Truppel recognized that granting the Chinese nearly equal status in running the college was, from a colonial standpoint, a “Begriffsverwirrung” (category mistake) and an “injury to German sovereignty in the protectorate.”²⁵¹ He rebuked the navy and the Beijing legation, insisting that the time was “not yet ripe for China to jointly govern any aspect of the colony.” A university jointly run by the Chinese could easily take on the character of a purely Chinese school. And the Chinese were not the colonizer’s *partners* but rather “our charges [*Schutzgenossen*], our subjects.”²⁵²

THE IMPORTANCE OF ORIENTALISM

If the first phase of colonial native policy was based on the Sinophobia that crystallized in the era leading up to 1897 and the Boxer uprising, the second phase fell back on a version of Sinophilia whose main contours had emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, Sinophilia made a powerful comeback more generally after 1900. This was generated partly by revulsion against Kaiser Wilhelm’s populist anti-Asian slurs and

249. Indeed, Chancellor von Bülow had already used the expression “open door” (in English) in describing German aims in China during the height of the Boxer uprising (P. Fischer 1994, p. 351). On the interpretation of American imperialism as anticolonial and as epitomized by the “open door” approach see W. Williams 1959; Steinmetz 2005e.

250. Seelemann 1982, pp. 437, 440.

251. Truppel to RMA, August 31, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, p. 53r, on “Chinesenschule.”

252. Kiaochow Government [Truppel] to von Rex, August 18, 1908, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1258, p. 215.

the atrocities committed in the German campaign against the Boxers. Venerable Sinophile tropes had been hovering just below the surface even in some of the most blatant examples of “yellow peril” discourse in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, as shown in the previous chapter. Karl May’s *Et in terra pax*, the story that represented a complete reversal in that best-selling author’s representation of China, appeared in a lavishly illustrated three-volume collection called *China* that was published in the immediate wake of the suppression of the Yihetuan. The second volume was given over entirely to a 450-page treatment of “The Troubles, 1900/1901” by a German lieutenant, detailing all aspects of the military expedition. The most notorious aspects of the Germans’ intervention were celebrated here in patriotic style, including the participation of the gunboat *Iltis* in the destruction and storming of the Dagu fort at the mouth of the Beihe River in June 1900 and the “cleansing” (*Säuberung*) of Yihetuan supporters in Zhili Province outside Beijing by members of the East Asian Expeditionary Force.²⁵³ The contributors to the first volume, which dealt with Chinese culture and history, were mainly missionaries, military officers, consuls, university professors, and a navy surveyor who had studied Jiaozhou Bay before the 1897 annexation and had published a crudely patriotic book on the colony. But the third volume, entitled “Narratives, etc., from and about China,” included not only May’s novel and other literary texts by Germans but also translations of Chinese novellas. In this respect the three-volume compilation resembled Du Halde’s *Description de la Chine*, the pinnacle of Jesuit Sinophilia. Another coffee-table book on the campaign, *Deutschland in China*, included picturesque color images of Chinese scenes. An image of Count von Waldersee at his desk in the Beijing Winter Palace (plate 11) is an interesting example of the multivocality of discourse on China. On the one hand, this illustration is a record of official looting. Von Waldersee’s usurpation of the place of the Chinese mandarin or empress resembles in this respect the occupation of the Qingdao *yamen* (fig. 7.11) and other instances of pillaging in the wake of imperialist invasions.²⁵⁴ On the other hand, the image identifies von Waldersee with his Chinese envi-

253. The storming of the Dagu fort was condemned by European envoys in Beijing and by Social Democratic leader August Bebel in the German Reichstag as a “declaration of war” (Michael 1986, p. 151). Even some of the admirals of the powers present at a war council on June 15 voted against storming Dagu (Herrings 1903, p. 47). For a recent treatment of these campaigns see Hevia 1992.

254. Hevia 1992; Wong 2001, p. 143; Tong 2006.

ronment, turning him into a cryptomandarin and symbolically reversing the direction of usurpation. One visual axis connects von Waldersee's blue uniform and the large, blue, patterned vase behind him. There is a reverse echo of the figure-ground pattern of the medals and buttons adorning von Waldersee's uniform in the figure-ground pattern of blue decorations on the white vase. Some of the patches on the vase also resemble the iron cross on von Waldersee's chest. A second axis runs between the calligraphic tablet hanging on the upper-left-hand wall, von Waldersee's hands, and the open inkpot on the desk. This depiction of von Waldersee contrasts sharply with the image of the aggressive Teutonic "Hun" (e.g., fig. 6.13). Von Waldersee could even be confused with a Confucian scholar, leaning meditatively over his desk, his delicate hands engaged in an activity that recalls Chinese calligraphy.²⁵⁵

As the writings of Confucius and Mencius started to become better known in translation, some modern intellectuals followed Richard Wilhelm in abandoning imperialist claims to superiority. A book by the Chinese intellectual Ku Hung-Ming, *China's Defense against European Ideas*, appeared in German in 1911. Ku had studied in Edinburgh and Leipzig and had served as secretary-interpreter to Viceroy Zhang Zhidong. After the Xinhai revolution of 1911 he taught English literature at Beijing University.²⁵⁶ *China's Defense* was translated into German by Richard Wilhelm and had an introduction by Alfons Paquet, the publicist, travel writer, playwright, and supporter of Martin Buber's version of Zionism, who had spent six months traveling in China, including Qingdao, and who had met Ku Hung-Ming in Shanghai.²⁵⁷ As a guest of Shandong governor Zhou Fu in 1902, Ku had met members of the Kiaochow colony's delegation.²⁵⁸ Ku was also part of Rich-

255. Of course, this image is also sensitive to the public presentation preferred by von Waldersee himself. The frontispiece of von Waldersee's published memoirs, for instance, depicts him holding an open book rather than a sword (Waldersee 1923, vol. 1).

256. L. Liu 1999a, p. 163.

257. Paquet 1911, pp. xi-xiv; 1912, pp. 29off. Paquet wanted to turn Qingdao into a "place of self reflexion, of spiritual work, of thinking in the Far East" and called for a German at the head of the Beijing legation "with deep knowledge of China, both a statesman and an intellectual." Paquet stylized China as a "communistically organized empire" presenting a model for a German "synthesis of absolutism and socialism" as a European "middle empire," against the British and American systems (Paquet 1912, pp. 304, 317; 1914, pp. 59, 61; see also Koenen 2003, p. 685). In the 1920s Paquet wrote a number of plays, including the proto-Brechtian *Fabnen*, that were directed by Erwin Piscator at the Berlin Volksbühne.

258. Hauptmann von Scholler's report of April 21, 1902, on the "greeting deputation" sent to the Shandong governor in March 1902, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1238, pp. 211-15.

ard Wilhelm's circle in Qingdao.²⁵⁹ Later Ku was nominated by Wilhelm and others for the post of "first scholar" at a planned Richthofen Institute in Beijing.²⁶⁰ As Paquet wrote in his introduction to one of Ku's collections of essays, the Chinese writer urged Europeans to acknowledge the connection between racism and the colonizer's "ecstasy of domination." According to Paquet, Ku described the Yihetuan as "misguided and betrayed, but still brave Boxer chaps [*brave Boxerburschen*]." Like Zhang Zhidong, Kang Youwei, and other nationalist reformers before 1911, Ku embraced Confucianism as a means of warding off imperialism (even though that tradition was personally foreign to him). Most significant in the present context was the fact that this description of the Boxers as "brave chaps" was published in Germany just a decade after Kaiser Wilhelm's "Hun speech" and the murder by Yihetuan sympathizers of Baron von Ketteler during the siege of Beijing.²⁶¹

The main lineaments of native policies in Kiaochow thus resonated with traditional and reemerging Sinophilia. Just as Sinophobia had been a calculated and point-by-point refutation of Sinophilia, the new policies in Kiaochow seemed to be a deliberate reversal of those of the earlier period. They took for granted that China was an advanced civilization on a level equal to that of Europe. Opening these floodgates within a colonial context pointed beyond European claims to sovereignty and supremacy, beyond colonialism.

FANTASIES OF EXALTATION: SUBALTERN STUDIES ON THE SIDE OF THE COLONIZER

Wherever there was a German colony . . . the most varied occasions were useful for holding Germans together: *we passed over all class differences*.

ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ²⁶²

The shift in native policy was thus propelled by economic and geopolitical considerations and by Chinese resistance; the first decade of the twentieth century also saw the (re)emergence of a distinctive strand of ethnographic discourse. This does not mean that elite class conflicts internal to

259. R. Wilhelm 1928, p. 183.

260. Communication by German legation in Beijing to chancellor, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 655, pp. 40-45, April 16, 1914.

261. Paquet 1911, pp. iv, vii.

262. Von Tirpitz 1919, vol. 1, p. 109 (my emphasis).

the colonial state field and imaginary identifications across the colonizer-colonized boundary were unimportant in China. If figures like Otto Franke and Richard Wilhelm had not been available, the powers in Berlin pressing for a more accommodating stance toward China would not have been able to change colonial practice in Kiaochow so readily.

The center of gravity of the ongoing creation and implementation of native policy was gradually relocated. The first period was dominated by the governors—Captains Carl Rosendahl, Jaeschke, and Truppel—and overseen by von Tirpitz and the navy. In the second period the focus moved from the top military personnel toward men who followed the translator career path within the German Foreign Office and toward navy personnel who had undergone preparation at the Seminar for Oriental Languages.²⁶³ The most sensitive political positions for native policy in the colony were staffed by “philologists.” Translator Wilhelm Schrameier was the colony’s Chinese commissary for twelve years, from 1897 to 1909. The district commissioners in Qingdao and Licun, men like Heinrich Mootz and Emil Krebs, were former translator trainees who had gone through the language immersion training in Beijing.²⁶⁴ The Kiaochow government paid a special bonus to “all military and civilian personnel who passed a language exam,” and many of them spent some time at the Seminar for Oriental Languages in Berlin before shipping out to Qingdao, or took Chinese lessons once they were in the colony.²⁶⁵ The Weimar Mission schools brought teachers to the colony who were overwhelmingly Sinophilic. Although some of the Germans who came to teach at the German-Chinese college were technical specialists with no special interest in China, others entered through the translating and Sinological paths. Sinologist Ferdinand Lessing, for example, taught at the college and directed its library’s Chinese collection.²⁶⁶ Lessing was a pioneer in the study of Mongolian culture and linguistics, Buddhism, and Chinese art.²⁶⁷ He “studied law and Oriental languages in Berlin and earned a diploma in Chinese at the Seminar for Oriental Languages (1902–5) before going to China in 1907, after a brief stint at the [Berlin] Ethnological

263. Seelemann 1982, p. 361, also discusses a split between Sinophobes and Sinophiles in Kiaochow but sees the former as merchants and petty bureaucrats and the latter as administrators. Although this seems correct with regard to the German merchants, it does not capture the divisions among the colonial state’s personnel.

264. Stichler 1989, pp. 107, 108 n. 1.

265. Weicker 1908, p. 111.

266. Deutsch-chinesische Hochschule 1910, p. 22.

267. Lessing and Walravens 2000.

Museum.”²⁶⁸ Lessing exemplifies the circulation between the Sinological milieus in Germany (especially Berlin) and official and semiofficial positions in Kiaochow.²⁶⁹ He was also involved in a strike against the German-Chinese college when its director, Georg Keiper, tried to enforce a set of “school ordinances” drafted by Governor Truppel that these professors saw as infringing on their academic autonomy.²⁷⁰ Essentially, this was the same inraelite class struggle as the fight between Theodor Leutwein and the von François and von Trotha contingent in Southwest Africa and between Solf and the settlers and navy officers in Samoa, except that the *Bildungsbürger* were never put in charge of the colony in Kiaochow.

Truppel’s approach had fallen into disfavor with the navy and the Foreign Office by this time. Admiral von Tirpitz directly “criticized the behavior of Truppel, whose attempts to gain influence over the school triggered the conflict.”²⁷¹ Truppel was a narrow-minded, traditional military man, but his personal papers show little evidence of the nasty racism of von Heyking or von Trotha. Rather, it was Truppel’s stubborn commitment to the first model of colonial governance introduced in Kiaochow that made him fall into disfavor.²⁷²

The translators and “men on the spot” who were imbued with one or the other version of Sinophilia now began to shape policy at all levels. The centrality of culture and education to this new alignment in native policy reflects the increased importance of the *bildungsbürgerliche* fraction of the trichotimized German elite within Kiaochow policymaking. A German diplomat who was in Beijing from 1906 to 1908, Artur von Kemnitz, recalled this shift in the center of gravity of the colony’s governance away from what he called the “more effective” consular service personnel to the “professionals” (*Fachleute*) and career translators, members of the translator career path (*Dolmetscherlaufbahn*). Von Kemnitz argued vehemently that “China hands” and “specialists” were “useful only as advisers” but that only “diplomats with comprehensive global experience” should be the “responsible bearers

268. Leutner 1987, p. 50.

269. Lessing taught at Beijing University and the Medical College in Mukden (Shenyang) before returning to Berlin in 1925 for an appointment at the SOS (Lessing and Walravens 2000). From 1935 until his retirement Lessing taught at the University of California in Berkeley.

270. Keiper to Betz, December 19, 1910, BA-Berlin, DBC, vol. 1259, p. 228.

271. Mühlhahn 2000, p. 249.

272. Truppel was elevated to the nobility by Kaiser Wilhelm shortly after his demission as governor in 1911 and became a member of the *Aufsichtsrat* (supervisory board) of the Shandong Railway Company the following year (Stichler 1989, p. 86).

of German policy.”²⁷³ Von Kemnitz accused the latter groups of having undergone a process of “Sinification” (*Verchinesung*) due to their “long stay in the country.”²⁷⁴ The examples of Governor Truppel and Sanitary Councilor Kronecker make it clear, however, that a long stay in China was not sufficient in and of itself to “Sinify” anyone. Instead, certain Europeans were already prepared to be Sinified before they arrived in China. In part this involved preparation in places like the Seminar for Oriental Languages, where Sinophile discourse could be internalized. Equally important were the symbolic and imaginary projects common to many members of the middle-class educated classes. For many German *Bildungsbürger* like Richard Wilhelm and Alfons Paquet the image of the Chinese mandarin whose learning put him in charge of a meritocratic but absolutist state possessed an almost irresistible appeal.

Officials who were more secure in their personal class position seemed to recognize the social aspirations that undergirded much of German Sino-philia. The extremely class-conscious von Heykings sneered at Germans who showed any interest in Chinese culture.²⁷⁵ Otto Franke observed that elites in the Foreign Office wanted to have lawyers making the important decisions rather than the “subaltern spirits” who “worried about such irrelevant things as Oriental languages.”²⁷⁶ Wilhelm Schrameier’s failure to be promoted to a higher position than Chinese commissary within the foreign service was attributed to the prejudice against translators.²⁷⁷ Governor Truppel fulminated against “Sinified” German bureaucrats who threatened to undermine the hierarchical distinction between Chinese and Europeans. When the director of the Chinese Customs Office in Qingdao, Ernst Ohlmer, wrote a memo in 1905 calling for German cooperation with America and China in order to stave off Japanese expansion, Truppel accused Ohlmer of being “more Chinese than the Chinese bureaucrats.”²⁷⁸ This insinuation that translators and other go-betweens with the

273. Von Kemnitz to Foreign Office, March 12, 1917, and minute from March 2, 1917, both in PA-AA, R 2167, no pagination (Deutschland 135, Nr. 15). On the *Dolmetscherlaufbahn* see the 1888 “Notiz,” reprinted in Sachau 1912, p. 51.

274. Von Kemnitz to Foreign Office, March 12, 1917, PA-AA, R 2167, no pagination (Deutschland 135, Nr. 15).

275. O. Franke 1954, p. 98.

276. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

277. Stichler 1989, p. 156. Schrameier failed to be promoted to the new consular position in Ji’nan in 1904 (Matzat 1998, pp. 112–19).

278. Mühlhahn 2000, p. 163. See Schrecker 1971, pp. 75–77, for an explanation of the Imperial Maritime Customs Office and its role in Qingdao. The fact that a German was in charge

Chinese were prone to going native is indicative of the ongoing symbolic struggle among colonial Germans. The fact that Ohlmer was an arrivé from very modest background conditions, but one whose overall power as a customs official equaled Truppel's, fueled the flames.²⁷⁹

To understand the connections between individual social class "projects" and Sinophilia we can look more closely at two men involved in the shift after 1905, Otto Franke and Richard Wilhelm. Franke had graduated from the Berlin SOS seminar, published in its journal, and gone through the standard Foreign Office translator traineeship in Beijing. In 1909 he was appointed to the first German chair in Sinology at the Hamburg Colonial Institute (the precursor of Hamburg University, which was founded in 1919). Like the Berlin seminar, the Hamburg institute's curriculum involved the training of colonial administrators. After the war Franke held the prestigious Sinology Chair at Berlin University (1923–31). Franke was later called the "most prominent Sinologist in Germany."²⁸⁰

Franke resembled Wilhelm Solf in distancing himself explicitly from overt racism against the Chinese, which he suggested was the province of the traditional German elites. Not only did Franke's approach to cultural class distinction resemble Solf's; the two men's careers overlapped at numerous points. Both studied Sanskrit with the same professors at Göttingen and Kiel. In 1887, Franke met Solf again at the Seminar for Oriental Languages. A year later Franke began his career as a translator with the German consular service in China. Having heard Solf's story about his unpleasant interactions with von Heyking in Calcutta, Franke found himself working under the same man in 1896. As a translator during the negotiations over the annexation of Qingdao, Franke strongly disapproved of von Heyking's haughty manner, saying that the envoy scorned officials who were ignorant about China and exhibited an "artificially heightened race feeling." Like Solf, Franke preferred to associate with intellectuals, academics, and other Sinologists while he was abroad and later in his career.²⁸¹ During a posting to the German consul general in Shanghai, Franke attended sessions of the

of it was something the Germans had insisted on in the original leasehold negotiations, but Ohlmer was regarded suspiciously as "a representative of China" and as "a Chinese official" from the start (*ibid.*, p. 77). During his time in China Ohlmer accumulated a significant collection of porcelain (see Wiesner 1981).

279. Stichler 1989, pp. 81–82.

280. Theunissen 1947, p. 277.

281. O. Franke 1911a, p. vi; 1954, p. 98. Franke later recalled having felt especially happy during a period spent with a "homogeneous circle" of journalists at a Cologne newspaper (1954, p. 113).

local branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, just as Solf had participated in the Bengal Asiatic Society while in India.

In addition to these symbolic distinction strategies oriented toward other Europeans, Franke seems to have cross-identified with Chinese elites. Except for some Catholic missionaries, few Germans dressed in traditional Chinese clothing after 1900. Identification took different forms. Franke recognized that the traditional Confucian ideas were so powerful that “even the first Christian missionaries who lived in China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could not escape their influence.” Like these “learned Jesuits,” Franke himself seems to have been “overcome by the wisdom of Chinese antiquity.”²⁸² He claimed to have been more interested in gaining the respect of “educated Chinese” than of other Germans.

Franke’s pronounced resentment vis-à-vis German elites sheds a different light on this entire complex. In his memoirs Franke recalls his own proud refusal to follow the “typical custom of waiting indefinitely in the antechamber” in order to meet an official in the Prussian Ministry of Culture, and speculates that his pride cost him a teaching post in that case. Just a few pages earlier in his memoirs Franke reports on Prince Chun’s refusal to perform three kowtows to Kaiser Wilhelm during his “atonement mission” to Berlin after the Boxer Rebellion. The requirement that Europeans perform the kowtow before the Chinese emperor had been a source of sharp conflict since the Macartney mission in 1793.²⁸³ Franke’s identification with Prince Chun seems to have been based on the same mixture of cultural pride and humiliation that he associated with the Chinese—a mixture that was also typical of the symbolic and imaginary identifications of German *Bildungsbürger* at the time.²⁸⁴

Richard Wilhelm (fig. 7.19) provides a second example of the uses of China by Wilhelmine *Bildungsbürger* in their symbolic class maneuvering. Wilhelm worked as a missionary and teacher in Kiaochow from 1899 to

282. O. Franke 1906, p. 163.

283. O. Franke 1954, p. 117. On the demand that Prince Chun perform a kowtow, see *ibid.*, p. 111; and Hetze 1987. On the 1793 kowtow conflict during the Macartney mission, see E. Pritchard 1943; and Hevia 1995a.

284. Franke’s memoirs were written before Germany’s defeat in World War II but were not published until 1954, after his death in 1946. His narrative of Prince Chun’s atonement mission may therefore have been overdetermined by the “humiliations” of Germany in the Versailles Treaty (just as Paul Rohrbach displaced the “devil’s handwriting” onto that treaty), but there is no textual evidence for this reading either here or in his other post-World War I writing.



FIGURE 7.19 (left) Richard Wilhelm. Frontispiece from *S. Wilhelm* 1956.



FIGURE 7.20 (right) Lao Naixuan. From *R. Wilhelm* 1926, facing p. 160.

1919, and, like Franke, he became a renowned Sinologist in Germany in the 1920s. Most interesting in the present context is Wilhelm's profound identification with the imago of the Chinese scholar-gentleman. Like Solf and Franke, Richard Wilhelm staked out a distinguished class position that was defined by the possession of rare cultural knowledge and noble acquaintances which clearly differentiated him from the crass commercial bourgeoisie.²⁸⁵ This symbolic effort was doubled by a set of imaginary identifications. Even if Wilhelm did not dress in traditional Chinese mandarin clothing—something that was already going out of fashion even among the Chinese literati with whom he liked to associate—he called those costumes “gorgeous” and “imposing.”²⁸⁶ Carl Jung thought that Wilhelm had

285. Wilhelm does not seem to have considered it necessary to distance himself from the German nobility. Unlike Franke and Solf he was not confronted in his daily missionary work with embittered aristocrats clinging to their last bastion of power in the military and foreign service.

286. *R. Wilhelm* 1928, p. 167.

acquired a Chinese habitus by the time he returned to Europe in 1920. Hermann Hesse insisted that “if you look at Wilhelm’s picture for a longer period of time, you become aware of the fact that his friendly smile is very Asiatic . . . playfully expressing all of the nuances between archness and sarcasm, like the stories, legends, and anecdotes of the great wisemen of old China.”²⁸⁷ In his death notice for Wilhelm in 1930, Hesse called him “chinesisch-weise” (wise like a Chinaman) and “the mandarin, the most Chinese European of our era.”²⁸⁸ As Jung wrote, Wilhelm became “a pupil of a Chinese master of the old school and . . . an initiate in the psychology of Chinese yoga.”²⁸⁹ Wilhelm’s enthusiasm for yoga was certainly unusual for a European male of his era. His recollections of Qingdao were filled with praise for friends like the former education minister in Ji’nan, with his “thorough mastery of Chinese literature,” and for the other “distinguished representatives of the old culture” whom he met regularly after 1911.²⁹⁰ One Qingdao acquaintance was especially important to Wilhelm: Lao Naixuan (fig. 7.20), a former magistrate and member of the Board of Education who moved to Qingdao and worked with Wilhelm on his famous translation of the *Yi Jing*.²⁹¹ Although Wilhelm’s published account did not bother to give his mentor’s biography or even his full name, referring simply to “my reverend master Lao,” it did mention that Lao Naixuan’s own teacher’s family had been “closely related to the descendants of Confucius.”²⁹² The implicit suggestion was that Wilhelm himself was an indirect intellectual descendant of Confucius. Like Bell and Anzer, Wilhelm received a mandarin button (fourth class) from the Chinese emperor and earned the rank of *Daotai* (circuit intendant). He compared his meetings with Chinese literati after 1911 to the “high-water marks in Chinese history when scholars and artists met, as, for instance, the meeting of the scholars in the Pavilion of the Orchards” described by the calligrapher-poet Wang Xizhi in the fourth century.²⁹³ In his 1914 article on the Qingdao Confucius Society Wilhelm compared his own efforts to save treasures of Chinese art and literature

287. Hesse 1956, pp. 131–32.

288. Hesse 1930.

289. Jung 1966, p. 55. In 1930 Wilhelm was asked to lecture on yoga at a congress of German psychotherapists (*ibid.*, p. 60).

290. R. Wilhelm 1928, pp. 169–70.

291. *Ibid.*, pp. 180 ff. Lao Naixuan specialized in Chinese phonetics, dialects, and reform of the writing system (Cheng 1999). According to Wilhelm, Lao Naixuan was directed to him by Zhou Fu, the former governor of Shandong Province. See Xu Youchun 1991, 1170–71.

292. R. Wilhelm 1928, p. 181.

293. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

from the ravages of the Chinese revolutionaries and foreign capitalism to the work of Confucius, who had toiled to preserve the “highest and worthiest products of the Chinese spirit” in the face of the “torrent of destruction” unleashed by the first Chinese emperor (the Qin king, Shi Huangdi), who burned the scholars’ books and was also said to have buried the scholars alive.²⁹⁴ Even more revealing of the cross-identifications at play was the fact that Wilhelm moved immediately from the historical repression of scholars by the Qin Emperor to the contemporary threat, which he identified as “the invasion of the crude, materialist sides of European-American civilization.”²⁹⁵

Wilhelm’s work and writing was enthusiastically devoted to “intellectual and spiritual exchange” and “synthesis.” He was memorialized by Carl Jung as a “mind which created a bridge between East and West and gave to the Occident the precious heritage of a culture thousands of years old.”²⁹⁶ Wilhelm’s Sinophilia stood firmly in the tradition of Jesuits like Schall von Bell and Du Halde, despite his Protestant background. His criticism of Europe was conservative, or, rather, a kind of conservative modernism. His aim vis-à-vis Europe was not to eliminate “machine culture” but to limit its claims to total hegemony.²⁹⁷

294. R. Wilhelm 1914, p. 249. But see Bodde 1986, pp. 71–72, 95–96, on this infamous and possibly mythical execution.

295. R. Wilhelm 1914, p. 249.

296. Jung 1966, p. 53. After returning to Germany in 1920, after twenty years in China, Wilhelm befriended Jung, Hesse, Buber, Keyserling, Paquet, and other Asia enthusiasts. He taught at Beijing University between 1922 and 1924, and from 1924 until his death in 1930 at the university in Frankfurt am Main, where he founded the Sinological Institute. His works on Chinese philosophy and his translations of the Yi Jing and other works into German are still valued and still in print. European views of China had come full circle by the 1920s; Jung had discovered that “our unconscious is full of Eastern symbolism,” and he attacked even more vehemently than Wilhelm the “European materialism and cupidity” that were “flooding China” (Jung 1966, p. 59). Chinese thought, according to Jung, had “set in the soil of Europe a tender seedling, giving us a new intuition of life and its meaning, far removed from the tension and arrogance of the European will” (*ibid.*, pp. 60–61). Kolonko (1997) attributes the entire shift in the “German view of China from negative to positive in the twenties” to Wilhelm’s translations and writings. Judging by Hermann Hesse’s own enthusiastic writings on China, the contents of his personal library, and his comments on Wilhelm’s importance, this view is partly correct (Hsia 1974).

297. Despite the overwhelmingly positive assessments of Wilhelm by his intellectual contemporaries and in the present (e.g., Sun 2003), Wilhelm’s belief that China and Europe belonged to two different historical periods (1928, pp. 234–35) was certainly oversimplified. China was also capable of producing its own “mechanical culture,” for instance. Although Wilhelm may have led a sort of “double existence” (Gerber 2003, p. 174) as a member of both



FIGURE 7.21 Germans and Chinese, in a scene from colonial Qingdao. From BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, N 224, vol. 80 (photo album), p. 29 recto. (Courtesy of BA-MA-Freiburg.)

Conclusion

The contours of the new native policies that were emerging in Kiaochow after 1905 can be explained in terms of the details of Sinophile discourse and the internal dynamics among different sectors of the colonizers, specifically, the symbolic and imaginary identifications of the middle-class translators and Sinological *Bildungsbürger*. The immediate impetus for this shift in policy was located at the level of global power alignments. The local result was that by 1914, native policy in Kiaochow had become a highly contradictory formation. On the one hand, social life was still largely segregated in the hospitals, schools, and clubs, and the legal system remained dualistic.²⁹⁸ At the same time, there was some residential desegregation, economic life in the colony was increasingly dominated by the Chinese and Japanese, the schools were promoting cross-cultural exchange, and people like Richard Wilhelm were bridging the cultural gap, at least in the realm of high culture. The Tsingtau-Klub responded to criticism after 1906 by al-

the colonial and local Chinese elites, the fact that he retained a Chinese “boy” need not be seen as a contradiction, since service relations were hardly un-Chinese.

298. Seeleemann 1982, p. 422.

lowing Chinese to play tennis there. Germans and Chinese attended local theatrical events together (fig. 7.21).²⁹⁹

If things had continued this way, Kiaochow might have eventually lost its colonial character altogether. The Japanese conquest of the colony in 1914 made this future unknowable. The Germans of Qingdao became prisoners of the East Asian state whose subjects had been elevated into the category of “white” in German colonial law.³⁰⁰ As elsewhere in the Pacific and Africa, the German overseas empire ended almost as abruptly as it had started.

299. This unlabeled and undated photograph from Truppel's collection seems to represent a scene at a local Qingdao theater, possibly the one in Dabadao.

300. Krebs 1998.