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Axel Michaels and Xu Yunheng

Who Won the Sino-Nepalese War of 1791–1792?

A Study in Transcultural Complexity



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The First Battle of the Sino-Nepalese War: “The Capture of Ca-mu (sKya mo)” 1793 (QL Gui-chou)

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Sigla, Abbreviations and Editorial Conventions

AM	Axel Michaels
BLBJL	*The Official Historical Account of Strategies in the Pacification of Balbu* (*Qin-ding Balbu Ji-lüe*) 1790
Cata.	*Catalogue of the Documents on Tibet and Tibetan Issue Stored in the First National Historical Archive* (*Zhong-guo Di-yi Li-shi-dang-an Guan Suo-cun Xi-zang he Zang-shi Dang-an Mu-lu*)
Chin.	Chinese
CPC	*Calendar of Persian Correspondences*
DG	Daoguang, the era used by the grandson of QL
DL8	Biography of the eighth Dalai Lama 1811
DN	*Documenta Nepalica* (https://nepalica.hadw-bw.de/nepal/)
JQ	Jiaqing, the era used by the son of QL
KRKD	*Documents of the Grand Council for the Gorkha*, (*Kuorka Dang*) 1791–1793
KRKJL	*The Official Historical Account of Strategies in the Pacification of Gorkha* (*Qin-ding Kuorka Ji-lüe*) 1795
MB	Manik Bajracharya
Mnc.	The Manchu language
Mon.	Mongolian
MS	Manuscript
Mvy.	*Mahāvyutapatti*, a Sanskrit-Tibetan Dictionary, with later added Chinese, Mongolian, and Manchu references
Nep.	Nepālī
NepBhV	*Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī*
NGMPP	Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project
PB	Pabitra Bajracharya
PC6	Biography of the sixth Panchen Lama (before) 1791
PC7	Biography of the seventh Panchen Lama 1883
PG	Pradip Ghimire

PPP	Punya Prasad Parajuli
QL	Era of Emperor Qianlong, e.g., QL 57/7/3 = the 3rd day of the 7th lunar month in the 57th reigning year of QL = 20 August 1792
RA	Rabi Acharya
RK	Rajan Khatiwoda
RRC	*Regmi Research Collection*
Skt.	Sanskrit
Tatsag8	Biography of the eighth Tatsag Hutuktu 1812
Tib.	Tibetan
TP	Autobiography of Doring Tenzin Peljor 1806
VS	Vikrama Saṃvat (month, bright or dark half of the moon, day, year)
WZTZ	*General Chronicle of Ü-Tsang* (*Wei-zang Tong-zhi*) 1795
XY	XU Yunheng
YZ	Yongzheng, the era used by the father of QL

[…]	Contents supplied by the authors
{…}	Contents deleted by the editor XY
Blue font	Paragraphs with different readings in the series of similar narratives in Chinese private historiographies (in 2.2.6 and 2.2.8 only)

A Note on Transliterations

Given the confusing issues with spelling, identification, and localization of personal and place names, we have in the main text of Part I largely standardised proper names using diacritical marks only for lesser-known proper names. In the appendices, we present variations of terms and names as they appear in the languages of our sources. We have only marked verbatim quotations with quotation marks, but not our summaries of the texts. If not otherwise indicated, additions in square brackets ([…]) in quotations are from us.

Nepālī and Sanskrit

We follow the standard system transliteration transliterating the Devanagari script (except for most personal and place names in Part I). Regarding Nepālī we mostly use the *Nepālī Bṛhad Śabdakośa* as a standard. In this language, the final consonant is usually written with an inherent short *a*, which in speaking the language is generally not enunciated.

Chinese and Tibetan

Some earlier scholars used Wade–Giles in their works, but now there is a general tendency to use Pinyin instead. Hence, Pinyin is used if the text is translated directly from Chinese, while Wade–Giles is employed if the original text cited, or if the scholars' names used it.

While using Pinyin, there are two points that XY proposes to make it more readable for non-PRC readers. 1) Hyphens are used to connect syllables within words or names, such as Sun Shi-yi 孫士毅, *gong-xian* 貢獻, unless the continuous form is commonly used, such as "Sichuan". 2) some semi-syllabic characters used in transcriptions, such as *er* and *le*, are reduced to one phoneme, i.e., -r and -l, such as in Kuorka 廓爾喀.

In the bibliography, if a publication was published in Japan, the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese characters is used. In the case of Taiwanese or Cantonese contributors, the Wade–Giles system or the Cantonese transliteration is used according to the principle of naming after the original.

When it comes to Tibetan, the problems consist in the disparity between classical spelling and the pronunciation in contemporary Lhasa dialect which yields many simplified transcriptions. When the language "Tib." is given before the transcription, the transcription is based on the Wylie transliteration. Thus, the root letter instead of the prescript is capitalised. Hyphens are not used within words.

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I, Axel Michaels (AM), am especially grateful to have met Yunheng (XY). Initially, I had only intended to ask him to translate a few Chinese sources for me. However, it quickly became evident that he was not only deeply knowledgeable about Chinese history but also instrumental in uncovering many other valuable sources. As a result, he became a co-author, and it is thanks to his efforts that so many Chinese and Tibetan sources on the Sino-Nepalese War have been compiled, edited, and translated here for the first time.

Part I
The Wars

1 Introduction

The Sino-Nepalese War of 1791–1792, also called the Sino-Gorkha War or, seen from the Peking court, the "Second Pacification of Gorkha",[1] is an extraordinary event in world history. Within a span of just 25 years, from 1791 to 1816, the small country of Nepal—then commonly known as Gorkha and hardly larger than New York State—challenged two of the world's largest powers: China with Tibet and British India. This occurred during a period when the rule in Kathmandu was unstable. The royal Shah dynasty was weakened by infant kings, rival regents, and powerful aristocratic families. Despite this internal turmoil, Nepal embarked on campaigns of conquest, expanding westward into Garhwal and eastward into Sikkim, as well as subjugating southern regions such as Butwal, Palpa, and other little kingdoms.

For centuries, China including Tibet and Nepal had limited interaction with each other. The geographical barrier of the Himalayas, along with challenging trade routes, made it difficult for substantial contact to occur. However, there were some trade exchanges and the presence of monks from both regions.[2] The most famous early encounters are: from the fifth to the seventh century onwards, Chinese pilgrims travelling to the land of the Buddha, even though it probably was only Wang Xuan-ce who first visited the Kathmandu Valley;[3] in the seventh century, the marriage of the earliest known ruler of Tibet, Songtsan Gampo (Tib. Srong btsan sgam po), to the Nepalese princess Bhrikuti (Tib. Khrid btsun, titled Bal mo bza', literally, "the queen/lady from Nepal"); in the Tang Dynasty, the visit of the envoy Wang Xuan-ce with troops advancing as far as Magadha; in 1260, during the Yuan

1 More precise would be Qing-Gorkha War but since the war is best known as Sino-Nepalese War, we also follow this convention. In modern Chinese sources the Gorkha-Tibet War and the Sino-Nepalese War are often called First Gorkha Campaign (1788) and Second Gorkha Campaign (1791–1792) (Dai 1994; Deng 2007a and 2007b); cp. Theobald 2020, 114.

2 For the early reports, see Deeg 2016. For a more recent description of the trade route, s. Tuladhar 2004.

3 Michaels 2024, 89.

dynasty, the journey of Nepali craftsmen Araniko (Chin. A-ni-ge 阿尼哥), to Khanbaliq (Chin. Da-du "The great capital", later Peking) where he built the White Stupa of Miao-ying Temple in Beijing; and in the Ming dynasty, Chinese delegations visiting Nepal during the reigns of the king Sthitimalla and Jyotirmalla. Nepal did not exist as a state at that time and so it is not surprising that even Emperor Qianlong knew little about Balbu, as Gorkha was called.

It was only with King Prithvi Narayana Shah (r. 1769–1775), the visionary founder of unified Nepal, that something resembling a political doctrine emerged. He started what the historian Mayura Jang Kunwar called a "forcible amalgamation" of the many feudal states in the Himalayas.[4] He imparted a significant instruction to his people in his *Divyopadeśa* ("Holy Instruction"). He metaphorically referred to Nepal as a "gourd between two rocks"[5], symbolizing the landlocked positioning of Nepal amidst China and (British) India. In this context, he offered the following advice to his people:

> Maintain a treaty of friendship with the Emperor of China. Keep also a treaty of friendship with the Emperor of the southern sea [i.e., the Viceroy in Calcutta].[6]

But already Bahadur Shah, the second son of Prithvi Narayana Shah and regent between 1778 to 1779 and 1785 to 1794, disregarded the king's instruction and started wars with the northern neighbours, Tibet and thus, the Great Emperor of China. Until today, Nepal's geographical position offers limited opportunities for independent growth and exposes it to the constant risk of being overshadowed or absorbed by either of its more powerful neighbours.

In this situation, it is reasonable to analyse the relationships between these countries by adopting a methodological nationalism approach, which considers the nation-state as the primary analytical unit. However, it is important to recognise that such a reductive perspective oversimplifies the complexities and entanglements that exist in the spaces in between—the fluid and contested borders, and the diverse range of people, institutions, cultures, religions, polities, and natural as well as climatic conditions in the trans-Himalayan region.

4 Kunwar 1962, 285.
5 Stiller 1989, 42; cp. Mulmi 2021, ch. 7.
6 Stiller 1989, 42.

It is within this complex reality that we must strive to understand and navigate, avoiding the limitations imposed by rigid conceptual or theoretical frameworks.

To truly comprehend and embrace this intricate web of interactions, we must acknowledge complexity as an inherent research problem that raises fundamental questions about the concept of transculturality. By transculturality, we mean the concept that cultures are fundamentally not to be understood as closed entities, but as entities interwoven with each other in various forms. If this concept is understood as the default mode of approaching political, social and cultural developments, it usually reveals unnoticed or hidden agents whose influence should not be underestimated. These issues will be addressed in the conclusion, as we strive to grapple with the dense and multifaceted nature of the concept of region and its interconnected dynamics.

We therefore will delve into the theoretical implications stemming from the semantic complexity of the sources. We argue—with Frank Perlin[7]—that this complexity should be recognised as the foundation for comprehending the comprehensibility and translatability of diverse (trans)cultural realms. The lack of conceptual clarity in Humanities is, thus, not a flaw but a chance to explore diverse paths beyond oversimplified, often Western-centric ideas. This journey leads us to embrace complexity through subjective, narrative, non-verbal, sensual, visual, and arbitrary dimensions and, above all, the intrinsic misunderstanding inherent in languages, which, as we hope to show, can sometimes be an advantage.

Moreover, reports on the course of the conflicts and wars vary in length and completeness. While some contradict each other, most generally agree. However, the unclear situation regarding the origin and course of the Sino-Nepalese War, and who emerged victorious, which is the focus of this book, is largely because most sources have not or only partly been edited and translated. Most accounts of the Sino-Nepalese War were based on translations of Chinese and Tibetan sources. This has been deplored by Mayura Jang Kunwar: "Due to the difficulty of obtaining authentic Nepalese material, scholars, both Eastern and Western, have used the prolific, well-documented and pompously worded Chinese accounts of the campaign."[8] We therefore endeavoured to assemble, for the first time, the key texts in Nepali,

7 Perlin 2020.
8 Kunwar 1962, 292.

Chinese, to a lesser extent in Manchu, and Tibetan, presenting them in their original languages along with predominantly new translations. Based on these and other sources, we attempt to provide an overview of the various perspectives on the events and outcomes of the war, especially to answer the basic question of this book: Who won the war?

2 The Sources

Essentially, there are sources on the Sino-Nepalese War from three sides—the Kingdom of Gorkha (Nepal), the Qing Empire (including texts in Chinese and Manchu), and the Tibetan government (including monks and aristocrats). In addition, there are English reports, which, with a few exceptions, are rather secondary because they are based on reports from the indigenous sources. The most important sources are collected in this volume. Although some of them have already been published in print, almost all sources have not yet been published in adequate English translations. The selection collected in this volume includes texts that are as close as possible to the political and military events, partly because their authors took part in the war itself. While the Nepalese sources (2.1) and Chinese archival documents (2.2.1–5) consist mainly of historical documents and some commemorative inscriptions preserved in various forms,[9] Chinese historiographies (2.2.6–8) and the Tibetan biographies (2.3) comprise retrospective reports after the war with a semi-century. In Part I, 2.1–3, we give brief introductions to the content of the sources, in Part II, 2.1–3 follow editorial clarifications.[10]

2.1 Sources in Nepālī

The Nepālī sources for the Sino-Nepalese War can be divided into letters, reports, inscriptions and a few marginal remarks in other texts. The report from 1793 (2.1.5) is of outstanding importance, but its author is not known. It is one of the longest texts on the course of the

9 Further Chinese archival and literary materials were also consulted. However, given their extensiveness, it is impossible to translate the thousands of pages in this volume. Excerpts and summaries are given in footnotes for reference.

10 Please note that the numbering of Part I (The Wars) corresponds to that in Part II (Sources). Therefore, we mention the Part numbers only when we refer to the texts.

war ever. A year earlier, King Rana Bahadur Shah (or, more likely, Regent Bahadur Shah in his name) had already written about the war that had just begun in a letter (2.1.4) to officials in the Kumaon.

Crucial for the origin of the war, in addition to the disputes over trade and currency issues (see Ch. 3), is the flight of the second brother of the Panchen Lama, Shamarpa, after he had been ignored in the inheritance and fled to Nepal (2.1.1). This document created by Shamarpa was also quoted in the Tibetan sources.

The question of who won the war is answered in various texts, such as the *Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī* (2.1.9), also known as "Wright's Chronicle" (Wright 1877) or in an inscription in Nuvakot from 1868 (2.1.12). There is no clear document on this issue, but there are various formulations of an understanding, if not formal agreement (2.1.6). The treaty of Kyirong VS 1850 (1790) in the run-up to the Sino-Nepalese War (2.1.3)[11] is better documented, especially since it is mentioned in a letter (2.1.2) by Rana Bahadur Shah from VS 1846 (1789) and supplemented by Chinese and Tibetan sources.

In the aftermath of the war, delegations have been sent to Beijing to fulfil the tributary obligation. The question of whether these are gifts or tributes plays a major role in the lyrics. An order by Phaṭya Śaṃśera from 1893 (2.1.13) is instructive in this regard. For example, there is an instruction (2.1.7) from Rana Bahadur Shah for the envoy Devadatta Thapa from 1792 and a letter (2.1.8) to the senior most *kājī* Damodara Pande from the same year. There is a wealth of documents on the subsequent missions, most of which have been published by Vijay Kumar Manandhar.[12] Two long, previously unpublished documents from 1925 (2.1.10–11) deal mainly with the dangers and resistance of such expeditions. They are of interest because there is also an English account describing a meeting between an Englishman seeking a land trade route from China to India and the head of the mission, *kājī* Jagatsera Khatri Chetri.

11 Cp. Komatsubara 2017.

12 V.K. Manandhar 2001 and 2004; see also T.R. Manandhar and T.P. Mishra. 1986.

2.1.1 Shamarpa's Dharmapatra, VS 1849 (1788)

This *dharmapatra* is a formal declaration of loyalty to the Gorkha Kingdom, written by Syāmarpa Lāmā, in which he and others declare their allegiance to the Gorkha King after leaving Lhasa and China, symbolised by their consumption of the king's salt, a traditional act of loyalty. The text contains a solemn pledge not to betray Gorkha by revealing its weaknesses to Lhasa, engaging in conspiracies, or disobeying the king's orders. It also includes a vow to avoid unauthorised communication with Lhasa. Any violation of these commitments would invite divine punishment from the revered deities at Bauddha and Svayambhu. This was also retold to Tenzin Peljor in Bahadur Shah's dialogue with him at the Gorkha court (2.3.2d).

2.1.2 Letter to *Bhāradāras* of Gorkha Gegarding Kerung, VS 1846 (1789)

This letter is addressed to the officials Ranavira Khatri, Amvarasim Thapa, Vandeva Thapa, and soldiers of the Kuhruva,[13] Thuma,[14] and Kampani (military units). The writer reports that all is well on their side and hopes the same for the recipients. They share important news that, following the orders of the Chinese Emperor, envoys from China arrived, and a *dharmapatra* (a religious and formal agreement) was completed between Tibet and Nepal. The letter recalls an agreement made during the reign of King Pratapa Malla, where Bhimala Kaji negotiated a border settlement with Tibet, establishing a boundary at Kuti (Nyalam). As part of this agreement, Tibet was required to pay an annual tax of 50,001, which was to be delivered to Kathmandu. The Chinese envoys were received, and letters and gifts were dispatched to the Chinese Emperor. The letter concludes by instructing the recipients to gather all ammunition, rifles, gunpowder, and other military supplies from various forts and return them to the sender's location.

13 Read: *kuruvā*, a military unit.

14 A military subdivision comprising a number of villages in the hills headed by an *umrao*.

2.1.3 The Treaty Between Gorkha and Tibet Regarding the Currency, VS 1846 (1789)

It appears that there is no authoritative document confirming this agreement, commonly referred to as the 1789 treaty of Kyirong (summarised, for instance, in Stiller 1975, 199–200). Significant discrepancies exist among various sources when comparing the Nepali-Tibetan and Chinese accounts regarding their content and specifics, as discussed by Rose (1971, 42) and Regmi (1975,1, 433–34). The closest available Nepālī text is found in *Itihāsaprakāśa* (vol. 1, 53), where the compensation amount is stated as 50,001 rupees (see also Komatsubara 2017, 184), and the witnesses are listed. The title of the document is *Gorkha mahārāja kana lāsābhoṭkā rājale 50001 ru. prativarṣa dine karadasandhi—saṃvat 1846 śrāvaṇamā keruṅmā*, with the exact date noted as VS 1846 *śrāvaṇa vadi* 12 roj 1. Additional relevant documents include *gorkha ra bhoṭako mudrā sandhi* (Naraharinātha 1965, 20) and *keruṅsandhisanbandhi patra gorkhābhārālāī-samvat 1843 bhādra mā* (ibid., 53), which recall all participants of the expedition to Kathmandu.

2.1.4 Letter of Raṇa Bahādura Śāha to Officials Sent for the Conquest of Kumaon Garhwal, VS 1849 (1792)

This letter was written by King Rana Bahadur Shah though it was effectively composed by Regent Bahadur Shah, as the king was seventeen years old at the time. It is addressed to the officials (*bhāradāra*) who had been sent for the conquest of Kumaon and Garhwal. It is dated Sunday, the seventh of the dark fortnight of Kārttika, VS 1849 (1792 CE). The officials are *kājī* Jagajita Pande, *sardāra* Ambarasim Thapa and *kaptāna* (Captain) Golya Khavasa. It is the earliest document in Nepālī reporting this war.

2.1.5 A Copy of a Report of the Sino-Nepalese War of 1793 and the Agreement Between China/Tibet and Nepal [= Report of VS 1850]

This anonymous 28-folio text, also referred to as the "Memorial" or "official memorial," provides a comprehensive Nepali war report from VS 1850 (1793 CE). It chronicles the events of the war from the initial

clashes in Tibet in 1788 to the conclusion with the so-called Treaty of Betravati in late 1792. It is the most extensive report in Nepālī on the Sino-Nepalese War.

2.1.6 The Understanding of Betravati (1792–1793)

There appears to be no formal document in the Nepalese archives that verifies the peace arrangements mentioned by General Padma Jang Rana in his *Life of Maharaja Sir Jang Bahadur* (1909), which lacks an original document. The Nepalese scholar Yogi Naraharinātha (1965, 121; engl. transl. 1964, 2) summarises this 'treaty' and notes that it is a summary of the treaty, written in English and stored in the Jaisīkoṭhā office in Kathmandu. This is likely the version referenced by Padma Jang Rana.[15]

2.1.7 Instruction for Devadatta Thāpā's Visit to Beijing, VS 1849 (1792)

These directives from King Rana Bahadur Shah to *kājī* Devadatta Thapa provide guidance for communication with the Emperor of China (VS 1849). The King emphasises respect through traditional gestures. He notes that their unfamiliarity with Chinese customs, despite advice from Syāmarpa Lama, led to a conflict with Tibet. Key points for communication include: (1) Request the Emperor to instruct Tibet to use only pure silver coins, as the current circulation of debased coins is unfair and sinful; (2) Confirm ongoing communication regarding relations with the British; (3) Assure the Emperor of friendly relations with Navāb Āsapat Daulā. (4) Express gratitude for the Emperor's support and request assistance if needed. (5) Obtain a letter from the Emperor confirming his support. It can be read together with 2.2.3a, 2.2.3e, and 2.2.3f, in which their request for later military support from China was expressly dismissed in Peking.

15 Rana 1909; there is another Engl. transl. by Naraharinatha 1964, 2. However, Stiller (1975, 212) comments that there is no indication "that this is an official treaty." Similarly, Sreedhar (1988, 249): "The peace settlement of 1792 was not a formal agreement …" Interestingly, however, in 1949 CE, this treaty was presented to the United Nations Organisation as an additional proof of Nepal's independent and sovereign status (Stiller ibid.). For other primary and secondary sources on this issue, see Rose 1971, 59 n. 28 and 65 n. 44. See also Prem 1980, 36.

2.1.8 Letter of Raṇa Bahādura Śāha to the Senior Most *Kājī* Dāmodara Pā̆ḍe, VS 1849 (1792)

In the letter, it is emphasised that the Chinese Emperor is a significant figure. The King acknowledges that, with divine grace, they could have expelled the Chinese from Nuvakot but chose not to escalate the conflict. Both sides intend to pursue a peace treaty. Tu thyang (Fuk'anggan, 1753–1796 CE) had suggested sending one of the four *kājīs* to China with a letter and gifts to meet the Emperor.[16] The King notes that failing to send a *kājī* is inadequate. He proposes that the senior *kājī*, Damodara Pande, should make the trip. It can be read together with 2.2.2d and 2.2.3a.

2.1.9 *Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī*—History of the Kings of Nepal—A Buddhist Chronicle, ca. VS 1895 (1838)

This chronicle, which was composed around 1838 CE by a Buddhist scholar from Patan, contains a short remark on the war, in which the Gorkha King clearly is declared to be the victor of the war.[17]

2.1.10 An *Arjī* from Jagatsera Khatrī Chetrī Regarding His Journey to Tibet and China, VS 1925a (1868)

and

2.1.11 An *Arjī* from *Kājī* Jagatsera Khatrī Chetrī Regarding His Journey Through Tibet and China, VS 1925b (1868)

These two letters, written by *kājī* Jagatsera Khatri, recount a mission through Tibet to China. Khatri describes his assistance to a distressed British citizen, Thomas Thornville Cooper, in his efforts to discover a trade

16 Regarding the Chinese letters related to this war, if we consider the date of 2.1.8 here to be 30 August 1792, Fuk'anggan's suggestion might be on 13 August 1792 (QL 57/6/26) (WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 30–32; WZTZ 1982, 405–6). However, Fuk'anggan's suggestion could also have been expressed orally to Ranjit Pande or Bhotu Pande. 2.2.2c might have been Rana Bahadur Shah's reply to Fuk'anggan's suggestion on 25 August 1792, while Rana Bahadur Shah focused more on the tribute in 2.2.2d on 11 September.

17 Bajracharya and Michaels 2016, vol. 1, 20.90–94 and vol. 2, 135.

route from China to India, as well as details regarding the transport of opium.

2.1.12 Nuvakot Inscription, VS 1925 (1868)

The text begins with an invocation to the Goddess Bhairavi. It recounts the lineage of Prithvi Narayan Shah, highlighting his two sons: the elder Simhapratapa (Pratapa Simhadeva) and the younger Bahadur Shah, who served as regent for King Rana Bahadur. Rana Bahadur was a powerful king known for his military conquests from a young age. Under Bahādura's wise and devoted rule, Gorkha's northern border was at the Ganges. During this time, a Chinese invasion occurred, but the Emperor retreated after his troops faced significant losses. In a gesture of devotion, King Rana Bahadur and Prince Bahadur Shah offered a gold roof and door to Goddess Bhairavī, recalling the devotion of Kṛṣṇa towards Sudāmā. This offering, made in 1792 (1714 Śaka), symbolised their vow during the invasion and was intended to bring auspiciousness.

2.1.13 Phaṭya Śamśera's Order, VS 1950 (1893)

This document—an order (*ādeśa*) from General Phatya Shamsher to *vakila* Kulananda—regulates the purchase of presents to be presented in the quinquennial missions to the Emperor of China. The document refers to the mission of 1894, headed by *kājī* Indra Bikram Rana (Manandhar 2001, 189–200, Sever 1989, 201–5). In the arrangement between China and Nepal after the Sino-Nepalese War in 1792, it was agreed that Nepal should send "products of the country" (*āphnā deśamā ubjeko vastu*: see Naraharinātha VS 1965, 121) to China. However, China generally accepted that these presents were in some cases bought in India (Mānandhar 2001, 34).

2.2 Sources in Chinese

Overview

Chuang 1979 and Feng 1993 explore the potential materials on Qing history in general. We will focus on the sources related to the Gorkha

campaigns. Despite some archival documents written in the Manchu language,[18] most of the texts on the Sino-Nepalese War are written in Chinese from different perspectives.[19] The Chinese sources are extensive. Relevant archival sources cover almost every month in the periods from 1788 June to 1790 May and from 1791 June to 1793 September, while the literati wrote influential and concise narrations of the course of the conflicts. These sources are heterogeneous and require a close investigation into their genres and ideologies. Based on the criteria of their adjacency to the core of courtly decisions, we might divide the sources eight-fold, namely

(A) Archived documents, including memorials and edicts;
(B) Commemorative inscriptions;
(C) Compilations of strategies or courtly records;
(D) Imperial corpora of statutes;
(E) (Semi-)Official biographical works;
(F) (Semi-)Official local chronicles;
(G) Literary works produced privately during the events; and
(H) Private historiographies.

In short, memorials reported events to the Emperor who ordered discussion among the imperial institutions. Investigations were thus done and memorialised. The Emperor thus had his edicts drafted and issued. These procedures were documented in archival documents (A). Some of his edicts were simultaneously taken down in the compilations of courtly records (C). These archival sources existed only in manuscripts. The Emperor later formulated commemorative inscriptions (B) based on the memorials and his edicts (A). He also ordered compilations

18 Shang 1990 and Hu 1994 are consulted for the Manchu terms.

19 The Emperor Qianlong required Manchu and Mongolian officials to write war reports in Chinese because the Chinese ministers were responsible for sending soldiers and provisions. The "Edict to Kinglin, Yamantai, and Bajung" says, "The letters to Li Shi-jie should be written in Chinese characters to make it convenient [for him] to read. You gave him Manchu letters. For those mistakes made by Kinglin and Yamantai, there should be a serious declaration of criticism" 寄信李世傑自當以漢字書寫, 便於觀覽, 乃復給以清字。慶林雅滿泰種種錯誤之處, 著嚴行申飭 (BLBJL, vol. 6, QL 53/9/11). Cp. Söderblom 2024, 75; Oidtman 2013, 25. Nevertheless, when it concerned Manchu officials or Tibetan affairs only, the Emperor received Manchu memorials and issued Manchu edicts. In these cases, the Chinese translations of Manchu documents were often abbreviated (Komatsubara 2009, Deng 2009, 21). In addition, some war reports seem also to have their Manchu versions in the archive (Cata. Mnc. no. 8724 = 3–2–3387–024).

of strategies (C) to be made after the case was fully closed. After the death of the Emperor, further compilations of courtly records (C) were made, while former decisions were also collected in imperial corpora of statutes (D). Upon these materials, imperial historiographers and local officers might compile biographical works (E) and local chronicles (F), taking some other additional sources. The Emperor was very interested in making a "regime of truth", hence ordering to draft lots of these official and semi-official books.[20]

Non-official writings were also made during the event. They were mainly literary works (G), including poetry, diary, prose, and notes. In addition, a later individual literatus might also have gather information from available sources and thus write private historiographies (H) retrospectively. The tradition of private history was largely suppressed in the Qing Dynasty until the 1840s.[21] Earlier than that, the scholars either followed the official eulogising narratives (e.g., 2.2.6) or multiplied their works in the form of manuscripts instead of printed books (e.g., 2.2.7).[22]

(A) Archived Documents, Including Memorials and Edicts

The archived documents serve as the major source for historians. Eminent Taiwanese scholar on Archival Studies, Chuang Chi-fa has visited many aspects of these documents.[23] Some of the relevant documents from the imperial archive have been edited and translated by Haenisch 1938 and 1959.

The Chinese ministers sent memorials to the court from the frontier. Usually, these memorials reached the Emperor within one month after their departure from Tibet or the Sino-Nepalese battlefields.[24] The Emperor might issue notes in red ink (硃批 *zhu-pi*) on them, send them back, and later recollect them in "Palace Archives" (宮中檔 *Gongzhong Dang*). Memorials on military affairs often found their way to

20 Wang 2013, 487.
21 Ibid., 471, 615.
22 Ibid., 495.
23 Chuang 1979, vol. 1 also gave English summaries of the Chinese chapters (1–6, 26–27, 29).
24 One might compare the date of reception in KRKJL and the date given in original memorials. In Part II, 2.2.3c [7], the Emperor also remarked that it took more than 40 days to reach the Palace from Nepal.

the Grand Council.[25] The memorials were copied in Chinese in 軍機處漢文録副奏折 (*Jun-ji-chu Han-wen Lu-fu Zou-zhe*, abbreviated as *Han-wen Lu-fu*) "Memorials of the Grand Council in Chinese Copies". It was stored orderly according to months.[26] If the Emperor decided that some memorials should be sent to other departments, one will probably also find them in "Cabinet Archives" (内閣檔案 *Nei-ge Dang-an*), part of which is held by Academia Sinica. "Palace Archives" and the archives of the Grand Council are now in Taipei and Peking. The Taiwanese collection of the National Palace Museum has been mostly digitalised.[27] Regarding the Pekingese ones,[28] some related pieces have also been published in Yuan Yi Lai in simplified Chinese editions,[29] while the catalogues of Manchu, Tibetan, and Chinese documents concerning Tibetan affairs have been published in 1999. It should be noted that memorials were not always telling the truth, whereas the edicts might not be fully carried out as they declared.[30]

Memorials were also sent from the Grand Council and other ministries when the Emperor ordered (mainly Agūi and Hešen) to inquire and discuss. Concerning the Gorkha campaign, these memorials were put into the Special Record Books, namely the Grand Council's "Special Archives" (專檔 *zhuan-dang*). 廓爾喀檔 (KRKD, *Kuorka Dang*), *Documents of the Grand Council for the Gorkha* encloses memorials and edicts from October 1791 (QL 56/9–10) to May 1793 (QL 58/1–3).

Upon receiving memorials, edicts were issued by the Emperor Qianlong. The edicts were often articulated verbally and then drafted by the Grand Council in written form for the Emperor to correct them. Several edicts can thus be found in KRKD, some of which are translated in 2.2.3.[31] Edicts can either be issued through the cabinet to inform the Empire as a whole or be sent directly to related ministers secretly.[32] The Chinese ones issued publicly are in "Imperial Edicts during

25 The Grand Council: Mnc. *Coohai nashūn i ba*, Chin. *Jun-ji Chu*, literally, "Office for the Handling of Confidential Military Affairs". See Bartlett 1991, Song 2018.
26 Chuang 1979, vol. 1, 74; Bartlett 1988. Mosca 2013 and Komatsubara 2017 both used the archive to uncover the acquisition of information related to Gorkha or British India.
27 Chuang 1983 gave a detailed introduction to these archival documents.
28 Cp. Shan 1987.
29 China Tibetology Research Centre, et al 1994.
30 Feng 1993, 166–67.
31 Chuang 1979, vol. 2, 86–89. Later, Chuang 1982 took it extensively as the source of his scholarly understanding of the Gorkha campaign.
32 Chuang 1979, vol. 1, 173, 182.

Qian-long's reign" (乾隆朝上諭檔 *Qian-long Shang-yu Dang*), while Manchu ones issued privately have been published in *Imperial Correspondence in Manchu during Qian-long Era: Compiled with Chinese Translation* (乾隆朝滿文寄信檔譯編 *Qian-long-chao Man-wen Ji-xin-Dang*, hereafter Qianlong Manchu Secret Edicts). Some of the edicts find their way into compilations of courtly records. The dichotomy of publicity and secrecy was also called the inner and outer courts.[33] It can be further divided four-fold. The innermost was the Palace (宮), as presented in the "Palace Archives". Then came the Grand Council (軍機處, including its historian institute of strategies 方略館) situated at the border of interior and exterior court. The Grand Council issued courtly directions (廷寄) or secret edicts/secret court letters and were also responsible for later compilations of strategies. The cabinet (內閣) or ministerial (部) documents and courtly records (注) comprised the information of the exterior court,[34] while the imperial historiographers (國史館) were further away, situated outside the forbidden city.

(B) Commemorative Inscriptions

Commemorating a victory by inscriptions has been an orthodox Chinese practice ever since 班固 (Ban Gu)'s Inscription of Yanran in 89 CE. Inscribing on stones or metals implies the eternity to be preserved by generations. Immediately after the war, the Emperor ordered his quadrilingual inscription, i.e., the Potala Inscription, to be made. He also mentioned his composition of the text in many edicts sent to the entire Empire.[35] Jade plates, silk tapestries, and paintings on silk were also made by the Emperor to bear his poems and essays related to the Gorkha campaign. The Potala Inscription thus existed in various forms (see Figures 21–23, in Part II 2.2.5). Sometimes, other ministers wrote calligraphy in the name of the Emperor.[36]

33 Dabringhaus 2011; Bartlett 1991, 4.

34 See also Feng 1988.

35 An edict to Fuk'anggan and others mentioned that the Emperor fully completed the text in four languages on 16 November 1793 (KRKJL, vol. 42, QL 57/10/3). The Emperor might have started writing it in Manchu, Chinese, and Mongolian earlier, as the Chinese text starts with "Yesterday, I authorised the surrender of Gorkha", which was on 25 October 1793 (QL 57/9/10), He might have ordered the translation into Tibetan. The ministers were already trying to find artisans to carve the stone in January 1793 (KRKJL, vol. 48, QL 57/12/27).

36 Wang 2022.

Apart from the Potala Inscription (2.2.5), there were lots of other inscriptions made in Lhasa, Tashilhunpo, Jehol, and Peking.[37] For example, the Jo-khang Inscription (1793) was noticed by Richardson 1974, listed as no. 12. It was written by 楊揆 (Yang Kui, 1760–1804, styled Li-chang 荔裳) in an extravagant language of parallel writing (駢文 *pian-wen*), titled 廓爾喀紀功碑 (*Kuorka Ji-gong Bei*), "Stele Inscription of the Achievement [against] Gorkha". Yang Kui followed Fuk'anggan's army and compiled some summons and memorials for him.

In addition, the Emperor himself made some other inscriptions at Jehol. There were also inscriptions around Lhasa and Tashilhunpo by the ministers commemorating the event, such as the one by Heliyen, 重修關帝廟碑 (*Chong-xiu Guan-di-miao Bei*), "Stele inscription of the restoration of the temple dedicated to Guan-di" in 1793.[38] Hailanca and He-ning ordered a poetic inscription in Tatsag rJe-drung Hutuktu's residence in Lhasa, while Fuk'anggan and Heliyen wrote two more in the Guan-di Temple in Lhasa.[39]

Most of these inscriptions follow the orthodox narration of the Sino-Nepalese War issued by the Emperor in his edicts and the Potala Inscription. It should be stressed that inscriptions in the Chinese language are not merely stone steles erected, they are rubbed and distributed to be the model for calligraphy. They are copied in printed texts to show historical authenticity as well, as in the case of Zhou Ai-lian's travel notes.[40]

In addition to these, the courtly paintings and verses on tributary envoys,[41] elephants, horses, battles, warriors (Figure 1), and banquets also comprise the imperial commemorational rituals.[42] Some of the war illustrations were also made into etchings and block prints to re-create the majestic panorama.[43] They were painted mainly in Western style,

37 Zhang 1988 collected many of them. However, there might be some mistakes in his edition. Franke and Laufer 1914 and Haenisch 1950 also collected some inscriptions but did not cover those in close relation to the Sino-Nepalese War.

38 WZTZ 1896, vol. 6, 23–33; WZTZ 1982, 288–97.

39 WZTZ 1896, vol. 6, 10–14; WZTZ 1982, 279–82. The interactions between these stele-inscriptions with the local community in Lhasa have been studied by Zhang 2024 (ch. 7–8).

40 Zhou 1804 (1913), vol. 4, 28–34.

41 Chuang 1989, 126–27. Chuang 1992, 235–40.

42 Cp. Waley-Cohen 1996 and Bügener 2015.

43 Nie 1999; Wädow 2010; Takata 2012; Lin 2015; Bügener 2015; Shih 2017, 318; Pastukhov 2021.




Figure 1: Jade inscription of the Preface to the Eulogies of the Meritorious Ministers during the Gorkha Campaign (source: 玉插屏。國立故宮博物院, 台北. CC BY 4.0. www.npm.gov.tw. 故玉 002723N000000000)

with Chinese landscape painting as the background.[44] These printed paintings were granted to royals and ministers around 1800.[45]

(C) Compilations of Strategies or Courtly Records

To the category of courtly records belong the following texts:

- 起居注 (*Qi-ju-zhu*) *Diaries of the Emperor's Movements and Utterance.*

This was made on the spot, recording imperial rituals, edicts, memorials, and other events. Although it is believed that "the Emperor would not read these diaries", he might dismiss the historians when making secret decisions.[46] It can also be considered the archival documents as it involved fewer editorial works, being closer to the original situation.[47]

44 Chuang 1992, 247.
45 Komatsubara 2020, 31.
46 Chuang 1983, 307–13.
47 Feng 1988, 625.

- 大清高宗純皇帝實錄 (*Da-Qing Gao-zung Chun-Huang-di Shi-lu*) *Veritable Records of the Emperor Qian-Long.*

This is a kind of chronicle made after the Emperor's death, for the reference of the following rulers as well as the next dynasty. It is considered to have been completed by 1799 (the year in which Emperor Qian-long died), first in Chinese and then translated into the Manchu and Mongolian languages. It involved the labour of the Grand Secretaries (大學士), 董誥 Dong Gao (1740–1818) and 慶桂 Qing-gui (Mnc. Kinggui) (1737–1816), who were also involved in the Sino-Nepalese War in Peking.[48] Camman 1951 abbreviated it as CSL (*Ching Shih-lü*). The genre had extensive censorship, falsification, and alteration in its editorial process.[49]

- 東華錄 (*Dong-hua Lu*) *Records Compiled by the Gate of Dong-hua*, 1884.

The part concerning Qianlong was in the extended version and sequel (thus 東華續錄 *Dong-hua Xu-lu*) to the earlier work, *Dong-hua Lu* by Jiang Liang-qi 蔣良騏. *Dong-hua* was the major gate to the forbidden city on its east wing, leading to the Hall of Literary Glory (文華殿 Wen-hua Dian). The sequel was compiled in 1884 by 王先謙 Wang Xian-qian (1842–1917), a scholar who served as an imperial educator. It was based on imperial documents as its title suggests. However, the publisher of the sequal was not the imperial court in Peking but Wang's household in Changsha. Hence, it stands between an official orthodoxic historiography and a private historiography. It also includes some materials from poems, *Ji-lüe*, etc., which had been censored or ignored by *Veritable Records*.[50] Camman 1951 has taken them as the major source in his investigation of the war, spelling it as *Tung-hua Hsü-lü*, abbreviated as THHL.

Compared to courtly records, the compilations of strategies, *Accounts of Strategies* (紀略 *Ji-lüe*) are of more significance for our study on the Sino-Nepalese War. The genre was compiled in a separate historian institute of strategies (方略館) in the Palace which is affiliated to the Grand Council.[51] The historiographers collected memorials and edicts. They were copied or printed in this very institute in the Hall of

48 Bügener 2015, 503.
49 Chuang 1992, 99–111.
50 Feng 1993, 53–54.
51 Li 2020.

Martial Valour (武英殿 Wu-ying Dian) and should be dispersed in the Empire.

Shortly after each campaign, the Emperor ordered a *Historical Account on Strategies* to be made. The textual layout was a combination of (1) poems by the Emperor concerning certain victories, namely "Heavenly Paragraphs" (天章 *tian-zhang*), (2) orders and edicts from the Emperor, and (3) memorials from ministers, arranged in chronological order according to the arrival date of the memorials and the issue date of the edicts. The compilers resorted to both Manchu and Chinese sources. The edicts and memorials were mostly censored and abbreviated.[52] Nevertheless, they are handy in drawing a chronology of battles and events, as the editorial work concerned mainly Tibetan affairs and imperial secret institutions not to be known by the Chinese.

- BLBJL欽定巴勒布紀略 (*Qin-ding Balbu Ji-lüe*) *The Official Historical Account of Strategies in the Pacification of Balbu* (i.e., first Gorkha War), 1790.[53]
- KRKJL欽定廓爾喀紀略 (*Qin-ding Kuorka Ji-lüe*) *The Official Historical Account of Strategies in the Pacification of Gorkha*, 1794.[54]

Historical and contemporary Chinese scholars built their scholarly understanding mainly upon these two *Ji-lües*.[55] The two books have photo-printed versions published in 1992 and punctuated versions by Ji 2006. They are completed very soon after the wars. The former existed only in manuscripts, while KRKJL was printed around 1795 and distributed later. By 1815, many memorials of Chinese governors mentioned their receiving KRKJL.[56] 2.2.1 extract the first tributary letter presented to Peking from BLBJL, while 2.2.3 compares some of the edicts in KRKJL with their earlier versions in KRKD.

52 Chuang 1983, 37, 184; Komatsubara 2009; cp. 2.2.3.

53 For the dating of BLBJL, see a memorial on 23 October 1790 (QL 55/9/16) cited by Huang 1989, 253.

54 For the dating of KRKJL, see KRKJL, vol. 54, QL 59/10/14. Some considered the date to be 1796 (Feng 1993, 386). Bügener dated by the preface as 1793 (2015, 243).

55 Yao 2006, 228–37. Modern Chinese scholars such as Dai 1994 relied largely on BLBJL and KRKJL.

56 《宮中檔奏摺-嘉慶朝》, 陳預　奏, 〈奉恩賞欽定平定臺灣紀略及廓爾喀紀略各一部恭摺叩謝(附件:奏自臨清回省沿途察看早穀情形)〉, 嘉慶20年06月04日, 故宮 104790 號, 頁 *1*, 國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統;《宮中檔奏摺-嘉慶朝》, 阮元　奏, 〈奏謝恩賞欽定平定台灣廓爾喀紀略各一分〉, 嘉慶20年08月22日, 故宮105573　號, 頁　*1*,　國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統.

In addition, there is a 3-volume sequel to KRKJL complied by 吳燕紹 Wu Yan-shao (1868–1944) and his son 吳豐培 Wu Feng-pei (1909–1996), utilizing the Pekingese archive. It was printed in 1977 and kept confidential and thus almost inacces sible.

(D) Imperial Corpora of Statutes

The corpora of statutes of the Qing Empire were compiled five times. They contain regulations, precedent edicts, and illustrations. It is the most reliable source of imperial rituals, institutions and administration. It covers a wide range of topics. Thus, legal codes were also drafted on specific topics such as the statutes on tributary affairs. These sources comprise the following texts:

- 允祿 (Yun-lu, Mnc. Yūnlu) 皇朝禮器圖式 (*Huang-chao Li-qi Tu-shi*) *Designs of the Ritual Instruments for the Imperial Dynasty*, 1st edition in 1759, revised in 1792 and 1803.

It contains paintings and drawings of imperial musical instruments, ritual instruments, and costumes. The original author was the uncle of Emperor Qianlong. After the Gorkha campaign, the manuscript version of the book was revised to include the Gorkhali musical instruments,[57] which comprise the last pages in the volume on musical instruments.

- 笳吹番部合奏樂章滿蒙漢合譜集七種樂章 (*Jia-chui Fan-bu He-zou Yue-zhang Man-Meng-Han He-pu-ji*) *Seven Musical Genres in Manchu, Monglian, and Chinese of Cordombi and Šibang* / 笳鼓樂章 (*Jia-gu Yue-zhang*) *Musical Genres of Reed-Pipes and Drums*, probably around 1800.

Originally, *cordombi* and *šibang* were musical forms of the Mongolian people.[58] Later, other foreign musical forms were also listed under it. The possible musical dance related to it has been researched by Aisin Gioro 1988, based on the *Compilation of the Statutes in the Qing Empire*. 2.2.4 is found in this collection.

57 Lin 2020, 116.
58 Lin 2009, 105.

- 托津 (Tojin) et al. 欽定大清會典 (*Qin-ding Da-Qing Hui-dian*) *Compilation of the Statutes in the Qing Empire*, 1818.

Each Emperor might commission a compilation of statutes. It was not exactly the legal code but served as an imperial legal corpus. The texts were made for later rulers to deal with events that happened before. Thus, they were all-encompassing and voluminous. The order of chapters is arranged according to the responsibilities and organisations of imperial institutions and their officers.[59] This series compiled in 1818 covers imperial decisions made during 1758–1812 (QL 23–JQ 17). In the chapter on *Li-fan-yuan*, it is stated that the Gorkhalis should present their tributes as the Tibetans, operated by the Imperial Household Department. The volumes of precedent cases mention coinage, military, prohibitions, and in the music section Gorkha is listed before Vietnam. The volumes of illustrations give detailed descriptions and drawings of the musical instruments.

- 欽定理藩部則例 (*Qin-ding Li-fan-bu Ze-li*) *Official Regulations and Precedent Cases of the Li-fan-yuan*. 1847, based on an earlier version in 1817.[60]

Due to the voluminosity of the imperial statues, regulations on special topics were commissioned to be collected and compiled for special needs. This book concerns *Li-fan-yuan* (理藩院; Mnc. *tulergi golo be dasara jurgan*). Literally, the institute refers to the board in charge of vassals, foreign affairs, or external provinces while earlier translations rendered it as "Colonial Office at Peking".[61] It regards the inner Asian matters including the diverse Mongols, Tibetan, rGyalrongic groups, Islamic people, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Gorkha as well. These were not considered to be the traditional four remote regions (四裔 *si-yi*), which were managed by the Ministry of Rites (禮部 *li-bu*) for their guest rituals (賓禮 *bin-li*). The Gorkhalis were regulated together with Tibetans, along with other Lamaistic people from the Amdo region. However, the Gorkhalis were mentioned very few times compared to the Tibetans, as Gorkha could not be equal to Tibet which was already

59 Feng 1993, 85.

60 Mnc. *Hesei toktobuha tulergi golo be dasara jurgan i kooli hacin i bithe.*

61 Lobscheid 1866, 425; Haenisch 1938, 21. For a detailed study, see Schorkowitz and Chia 2016. The Tibetan name was [*mong gol*] *sbyor khang* "administrative office". The Tibetan term for the particular branch was probably *sne shan sbyor sgo che* (van der Kuijp and Tien 2022, 28, 36).

attached to the census and map (e.g., Huang-chao Yu-di Quan-tu) of the Qing Empire (隸版圖 *li-ban-tu*).[62]

Besides, the official concordance of placenames, *Qin-ding Xi-yu Tong-wen Zhi* (欽定西域同文志 *Official Concordance of Proper Names in the Western Regions*), can also be placed in the imperial corpora of official books. It is helpful for the identification of multilingual placenames.

(E) (Semi-)Official Biographical Works

Biographies are the most orthodox way of writing history in China. They tend to focus on a person's deeds, discourses, and virtues and thus present them as role models for the upcoming generations. It often highlights the contributions of a single person. The Imperial Archives had special historiographers drafting biographies for royals and ministers, while literati might also copy various materials from the archives and epitaphs to compile biographies separately. Hummel 1944 followed a similar way to present the history of Qing.

A chronological biography of a key military chief in the war is used for reference in our work:

- 花沙納 (Hua-sha-na, 1806–1859) 德壯果公年譜 (*De Zhuang-guo-Gong Nian-pu*) *The Chronology of De-leng-tai, The Duke with posthumous title Zhuang-guo*, 1857.

德楞泰 (De-leng-tai, 1749–1809)[63] accompanied Fu'kang-an in many battles. The author Hua-sha-na was the grandson of De-leng-tai.[64] The first version of the book was printed in 1856. In the next year, a new edition added more materials. Volume 2 regards the 1790s and has the dated narration of the protagonist's conduct during the war, citing memorials and edicts.

Meanwhile, many other collections of biographical works were printed, for example:

(a) 錢儀吉 (Qian Yi-ji) 碑傳集 (*Bei-zhuan Ji*) *Compilation of Stele Biographies*, 1826, printed in 1893.

62 See Part II, 2.2.3e. Cp. Oidtmann 2018, 22.
63 Hummel 1944d.
64 Hummel 1994c.

(b) 李桓 (Li Huan) 國朝耆獻類徵 (*Guo-chao Qi-xian Lei-zheng*) *Categorised Testimonies of the Venerated Elderly of Our Dynasty*, printed in 1884.
(c) 清史列傳 (*Qing-shi Lie-zhuan*) *Biographies of the History of Qing Dynasty*, printed in 1928.

While (a) collected eulogies of personal lives after the death of the biographed,[65] (b) and (c) might have taken the materials compiled by the imperial historiographers from the imperial archives.[66] Deng used (a) to show Hailanca's great contribution in the war, as a supplement to KRKJL.[67] As they mainly took archival documents as sources, they are not extensively considered here.

Besides, orthodox historiographies were often compiled by the next dynasty. It is the successor's job to write an orthodox historiography for its predecessor. Most information was arranged according to the main contributors or participants in their biographies. The compilation of the *Draft History of Qing* started after the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1914. The collective work of compilation was put to an end in 1927, whereas many of the biographies were not yet polished. Later certain editorial activities were conducted separately by various scholars.

The authorship was led by a former Governor-General 趙爾巽 Zhao Er-xun (1844–1927) and conducted by many scholars who culturally and even politically adhered to the then-defunct Qing Dynasty.[68] It had many mistakes and unnecessary editorial deletions, although the compilers utilised various sources from (A) to (E).[69] In the next year of its first publication in 1927, it was banned by the Nationalist Party of China (i.e., the Kuo-min Tang). However, many versions were still printed and sold in places such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Manchuria, and Japan, out of the reach of the Nationalist Party of China. Information regarding the Sino-Nepalese War can be found in vols. 15, 91, 101, 312, 318, 328–34, 345–49, 525, 529, among which the following are important.

65 Feng 1993, 322. For example, Hailanca's biography here was listed in vol. 116, composed by Xiong Bao-tai 熊寶泰, titled 書武壯公海蘭察軼事 (*Shu Wu-zhuang-gong Hai-lan-cha Yi-shi* "Anecdotes of the Duke of martial strength, Hailanca"). The text eulogised Hailanca's martial strategies.
66 Chuang 1983, 446; Feng 1993, 320; Wang 2013, 583, 598–99.
67 Deng 2007b, 43 n. 1.
68 Wang 2013, 640.
69 Chuang 1979, vol. 2, 152; Feng 1993, 64.

Vol. 91 志 (*Zhi*) no. 66 禮 (*li*) and no. 10: 賓禮 (*Bin Li*): *Rites for guests* mentions the institutional difference among the Western foreign vassals and the Eastern ones, the latter of which were considered closer and more civilised from the Han-Chinese perspective.

Vol. 101 *Zhi* no. 76 Music no. 8: 樂 (*Yue*) *Book of Music* mentions the performance of Gorkha music in the court after the war.

Vol. 330 Biography no. 117 福康安 = Fuk'anggan[70] mentions the Gorkha's request for peace instead of capitulation, while vol. 331 Biography no. 118 海蘭察 = Hailanca (ca. 1739–1793) tells us more about the battles and shows that he was a more tactile strategist [than Fuk'anggan].[71]

Vol. 527 Biography no. 314 屬國傳 (*Shu-guo Zhuan*) *Biographies of Subordinate States* no. 2 has the story of the "surrender" of An-nam in 1789/1790, which will be referred to on the understanding of a "surrender" to the Heavenly Dynasty.

Vol. 529 Biography no. 316 *Biographies of Subordinate States* no. 4 begins with the basic information of Gorkha and gives a detailed narration of the battles giving names of the warriors but with some mistakes on proper names.

(F) (Semi-)Official Local Chronicles

Each region in China is keen on compiling and re-compiling regional history, including historical sites, inscriptions, classical references, local products, customs, religions, celebrities, literary works, etc. During the Qing Dynasty, many local chronicles were produced alongside the *General Geographical Gazetteer* (大清一統志 *Da-qing Yi-tong Zhi*; Mnc. *Daicing gurun i uherileme ejehe bithe*).[72] These texts were often written under the collective effort of local officials as well as scholars. Most of them were based on existing local chronicles of the predecessors. The earlier, the more original. For the Gorkha issue, we have two important local chronicles related.

70 Hummel 1944a.
71 Hummel 1944b.
72 Dabringhaus 1994, 121.

- WZTZ 衛藏通志 (*Wei Zang Tong-zhi*) *General Chronicle of dBus-gTsang*, ca. 1800, printed in 1896.

The authorship of this text has been long debated.[73] The dating was not completely clear until recently Zhao and Qian 2023 found a complete manuscript version at Peking University. It is now evident that Heliyen, Sungyūn, and He-ning (later changed into He-ying) were the compilers of this chronicle. These ambans residing in Tibet might have intended to make an official local chronicle but did not complete the work but did not complete the work. In the end, WZTZ was block-printed in 1896 by an officer 袁昶 (Yuan Chang). Yuan Chang later reminded the court that the Russians would invade Tibet which would be much worse than the German occupation of Kiautschou Bay in 1897.[74] He was killed in 1900 for his opposition to the Boxer movement. He probably had edited and printed WZTZ out of his worries for foreign interference of Tibet. Since the manuscripts of WZTZ are not available to us, we had to rely on the 1896 printed version.

The book begins with the Potala Inscription (2.2.5) and imperial poems upon receiving victorious reports from Nepal. Vol. 2 focuses on geography and borders issues. Vol. 6 records temples, where many other inscriptions were cited. Vols. 10 and 11 concern monetary and commercial issues and mention the silver coins as well as the activities of Newari merchants. Vol. 13 *Ji-lüe* ("Account of Strategies") has three sub-sections. Some important letters exchanged between Fuk'anggan and the Gorkha court can be found in the first two sections. These cited documents cannot be found elsewhere. Therefore, it is extremely important. 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 include some letters from vol. 13.

73 According to traditional understanding, it was compiled by Heliyen (WZTZ 1896; Feng 1993, 203). Dabringhaus 1994 and many other scholars including the punctuator of modern publications consider Sungyūn to be the author (WZTZ 1982). Dabringhaus further gave the date as 1795 (1994, 264). The Chinese scholar Zhang Yu-xin proposed Hening (Oidtmann 2018, 266 n. 91). The collective authorship proposed by Cao 2014 is quite convincing given internal textual evidence. Later, it was testified by Zhao and Qian 2023.

74 "The harm of the sudden German occupation of Kiautschou Bay was rapid but minor. The Russians neighbour us closely from then northwest to northeast. The 48 tribes of the Mongolian Kalka will be lost to the foreign realm, which is the complicated and major peril." 德突據膠灣, 其禍急而小; 俄自西北至東北, 與我壤地相錯, 蒙喀四十八部將折入異域, 其禍紓而大 (*Draft History of Qing*, vol. 466 Biography no. 253).

- 四川通志 (*Sichuan Tong-zhi*) *General Chronicle of Sichuan*, 1816.

The compilation of this official local chronicle of the Sichuan province was led by the Governor General of Sichuan, Chang-ming 常明. Wei Yuan (Part II, 2.2.8 [9]) cited Yao Ying who cited this work as his source about the Gorkha expedition. It not only has a concise retrospective narration of the war but also reports on other states around Gorkha. We refer to this work while studying Wei Yuan's' source of information.

Besides the traditional local chronicles, some Chinese officers and the Mongolian amban residing in Tibet, Sungyūn, made maps of Tibet and Gorkha after the wars.

- Ma Jie (馬揭) and Sheng Sheng-zu (盛繩祖), 衛藏圖識 (*Wei Zang Tu-zhi*) *Illustrated Remarks on dBus-gTsang. 1792.*

The authors relied on personal experiences from Dartemdo Tibet and earlier official local chronicles and offered information for future military punitive expedition to Gorkha.[75] It referred to Bam Saheb meeting the Chinese officers as "paying tribute" (入貢) after having disturbed Tibet because of trade (與西藏以交易滋事).[76] It contains maps, illustration of folks, and reports on the customs of the Gorkha kingdom, such as the preference of cleanness (尚潔).[77]

- 松筠 Sungyūn (1752–1835) 西藏圖説 (*Xi-zang Tu-shuo*) *Maps of Tibet with Explanations*, 1795–1800.

The text existed in manuscripts (photo-printed in 1966) and was later block-printed in the nineteenth century together with other works of Sungyūn.[78] It had two annotated maps depicting the routes toward Kathmandu through either Nyalam or Kyirong by Sungyūn. The monument of five stupas (probably Nyagahmani/Pancamane hill) and a Sherpa temple was considered to be the gate to Kathmandu. Huang Pei-qiao 黃沛翹 later made a commentary on these maps (1886).

75 Ma and Sheng 1792, book 1, "Preface", 4b.
76 Ibid., book 3, "Spieces of the Barbarians with Illustration", 51.
77 Ibid., 50–52.
78 In 隨緣載筆: 五種 (*Sui-yuan Zai-bi: 5 Zhong*) *The Brush recording the Imperial Enterprise according to Pratyaya: Five Books* held by the Library of Congress. His poems are also published in the collection.

(G) Literary Works Produced Privately During the Events

Literary works are also an important source in Chinese history since many of the composers had a strong sense of "poetry as history" (詩史 *shi shi*). In the Sino-Nepalese War, the Chinese side engaged many literati officials to write literary reports, letters, summons, memorials, and eulogies.[79] Meanwhile, the ministers in charge of provisions and some commanders were also literati-officials. Fuk'anggan himself has composed poems in addition to his commemorative inscription in Lhasa, although his poems are not available to us now. Rumours were that his colleague, Sun Shi-yi, wrote the poems for him. All these literati official left an extensive corpus of texts, speaking of their experience that was not memorialised to the Emperor. They are relatively scattered and shorter, thus fitting into the footnotes to be quoted and translated.

Among them, Wu 1985 has included 楊揆 (Yang Kui), 林儁 (Lin Jun 1731–1805), 松筠 (Sungyūn), and 孫士毅 (Sun Shi-yi 1720–1796).

- 楊揆 (Yang Kui) 桐華吟館衛藏詩稿 (*Tong-hua-yin-guan Wei-zang-shi Gao*) *Draft Poems composed in dBus-gTsang of the chanting Pavilion of Paulownia Flower.*

It is the poetry collection of the author of the aforementioned Jokhang inscription. He dwelt extensively on the hardship and landscape in various aspects. He also informed us of the Sino-Nepalese translator, the textual formation of the lyrics, and the ghost-writers of Fuk'anggan. The poems exist only in manuscripts, photo-printed in 2010. Yet, the manuscripts were not available to us. Hence, we fully rely on Wu 1985's edition in simplified Chinese.

- 林儁 (Lin Jun) 西藏歸程記 (*Xi-zang Gui-cheng Ji*) *Records of returning from Tibet*.

Lin was in charge of provisions during the war. He had crossed the border and entered the Gorkha realm.[80] He wrote about his travel from Lhasa to Dartsemdo. Wu 1985 cited it from 小方壺齋輿地叢鈔 (*Xiao-fang-hu-zhai Yu-di Cong-chao*) *Collected Passages on Geography from the Studio with [an Ancient Bronze] Square Vase* by 王錫祺 (Wang Xi-qi). It is not very relevant to the war itself.

79 Dai 2017, 347.

80 His departure from Dzongka was mentioned in Ohūi's memorial (KRKJL, vol. 36, QL 57/7/16).

- 松筠 Sungyūn 西招紀行詩 (*Xi-zhao Ji-xing-shi*) *Poems on the Journey of Enlisting the West*, 1795 and 丁巳秋閱吟 (*Ding-si Qiu-yue-yin*) *Poems upon Inspection of the Military Parade in the Autumn of Year Ding-si*, 1797.

Sungyūn, a Mongolian bannerman, served as the amban residing in Tibet after the war.[81] He succeeded Heliyen and actively participated in administrative matters.[82] In both the years of 1795 and 1797, he travelled around Tibet and investigated potential military strategies. He took Gorkha as the imagined enemies. Therefore, in his auto-commentary to the poetry, he referred to the former invasions. His account of the invasion routes is valuable, as later private historiographies focused more on the Chinese expedition instead of the Gorkha invasion. Wei Yuan later quoted him without indicating the source (Part II, 2.2.8 [3]).

- 孫士毅 (Sun Shi-yi) 百一山房詩集 (*Bai-yi-shan-fang Shi-ji*) *Collection of Poems of the Mountain House of Hundred-one*, printed edition 1804.

Sun Shi-yi was in charge of provision. He failed to defeat the Vietnamese troops in 1789 and was succeeded by Fuk'anggan who negotiated peace with the Vietnamese King. Sun was severely punished by the Emperor, but he received the title of Grand Secretary again during the Gorkha campaign. He travelled between Sichuan and Tibet several times. He also kept correspondence with the frontier and was in good relationship with some of the Lamas. His poems spoke of the hazardous natural landscape and mourned over the loss.

Apart from Wu's collection, Heliyen and He-ying/He-ning also wrote poems that are still available to us.

- 和琳 (Heliyen 1753–1796) 芸香堂詩集 (*Yun-xiang-tang Shi-ji*) *Collection of Poems of the Rue Pavillion*, printed between 1796 and 1800.[83]

Heliyen was the younger brother of Hešen, the most favoured minister of the Emperor. Heliyen was in charge of provisions in Tibet and later served as the amban residing in Tibet after the war.[84] He wrote several poems to Fuk'anggan and also one to Yang Kui, telling us that Yang

81 See also Heissig 1962. Amban residing in Tibet refers to Chin. Zhu-zang Da-chen 駐藏大臣 or Mnc. *dzang de tefi baita icihiyara amban.*
82 Dabringhaus 1994.
83 Found in the National Library of China, no. A03224.
84 He was a very active amban and issued inscriptions (Richardson 1974, no. 15).

Kui composed the summons (2.2.2b).[85] He also complained about the thriftiness and greed of some Tibetans.[86] He, along with Fuk'anggan, was commemorated in the Imperial Ancestral Temple (太廟 Tai Miao) after he died at the age of 43 in another expedition in 1796. Later, when Hešen was sentenced to death in 1799, Heliyen was removed from the Imperial Ancestral Temple. Hence, the book must have been printed before 1800.

- 和瑛 (He-ying, earlier named He-ning 和寧, 1741–1821) 易簡齋詩鈔 (*Yi-jian-zhai Shi-chao*) *Copies of Poems of the Studio of Simplicity in the Book of Changes*, printed in 1823.

He-ning was also a Mongolian bannerman. Because the later Emperor Dao-guang had the same word *ning* in his name, He-ning's name was changed to He-ying. He also served as the amban residing in Tibet and might have contributed to WZTZ. In his poetry collection, he had poems related to Gorkha dated from 1791 to 1800, including several poems to Fuk'anggan, rejoicing upon hearing the capitulation, transportation of the tributary elephant from Nepal via Bhutan to Tibet and further to Peking, and instruction in 1800 to the Gorkha King and the Gorkhalis who learnt Chinese. He was very devoted to his job, collecting information about the South, which resulted in a poetic essay:

- 和瑛 (He-ying) 西藏賦 (*Xi-zang Fu*) *Poetic Essay on Tibet*, first printed in 1797, reprinted in 1882.

He-ning added extensive auto-commentary to it, narrating the geography and other aspects related to Tibet. Thus, it was cited by Yao Ying to explain the complicated trans-Himalayan geopolitics and further quoted by Wei Yuan (Part II, 2.2.8 [9]).

Last but not least, the Emperor also wrote poems upon receiving memorials. His poems are not to be put under this category as they were not composed upon experiences from the battlefronts but were often produced together with his edicts. These imperial poems can be found in the opening volumes of KRKJL and BLBJL, as well as a special anthology, 御製詩文十全集 (*Yu-zhi Shi-quan Ji*, *Compilation of Poems and Proses concerning the Ten Complete [Martial Glorious] by the Emperor*).

85 Heliyen, vol. 1, 34.
86 Ibid., 32–33; Deng 2009, 27 n. 3.

Besides poetry, travel notes and diaries can also be counted as literary texts. For example:

- 江鎮西 (Jiang Zhen-xi, 1759–1818) 西藏行説: 七戰附, (*Xi-zang Tu-shuo: Qi-zhan fu) Journeys in Tibet along with the seven battles*, written in 1792, printed in 1902.

The author Jiang Zhen-xi (*alias* Jiang Zhi-jian 江志堅) served as an imperial historian. Therefore, he followed Fuk'anggan to the Gorkha campaign with a strong sense of documentation. His diary was found in his family genealogy printed in 1902, currently stored in Shanghai Library, which was first noticed by Song 2021. Jiang started formulating the text when he arrived at Shelkar in the spring of 1792 and continued that summer on his march. The text describes each battle. Some of his writings are parallel to Fuk'anggan's memorials.

- 周藹聯 (Zhou Ai-lian) 竺國紀遊 (*Zhu-guo Ji-you*) *A Travel in the Country of Hindu*, first printed in 1804.

The author was the secretary of Sun Shi-yi.[87] Although he did not cross the border, he witnessed the transportation of provision and the tributary mission in Tibet. The book contains many notes that he compiled during his travel in Tibet. He travelled to Tibet in 1792 and 1793 several times, staying there for months. The notes were made during his stay. However, he lost these manuscripts on his way back and recovered half of them in 1801 by memory. It was published then in 1804. In 1913, the great bibliographer Fu Zeng-xiang 傅增湘 had it reprinted in type-print. He made a significant note of the causes of the war: the revenue issue, monetary conflict, and Shamarpa's ambition, which might have been the most common perception of the Han-Chinese people by then.[88] He also wrote about the shortage of food among the soldiers.[89]

- 姚瑩 (Yao Ying, 1785–1853) 康輶紀行 (*Kang You Ji-xing*) *The Travel of the Light Wagon to Khams*, written in 1845, printed in 1867.

Yao Ying, as an officer stationed in Taiwan, was involved in the Nerbudda incident (1842) during the First Opium War.[90] After the war, he was "exiled" to Tibet and gathered information, probably because

87 He was mentioned in Sun's memorial (KRKJL, vol. 36, QL 57/7/16).
88 Zhou 1804 (1913), vol. 4, 21–22.
89 Ibid., vol. 2, 8–9.
90 See also Mosca 2013, ch. 7.

of his anxiety over foreign invasion.[91] His book existed only in manuscripts till its printed version in 1867. Wei Yuan (Part II, 2.2.8 [9]) in his 1846 edition cited all the related passages in Yao's book on Gorkha.

In addition to the Chinese side, the Vietnamese and Korean materials written in Chinese are also worth attention. The first tributary mission of the Gorkhalis in 1790 was contemporaneous to the Vietnamese first tributary mission of the Dynasty of Nhà Tây Sơn. The lyric by Nguyễn Quang Bình comes just before that of Rana Bahadur Shah. In the summons and edicts (2.2.2 and 2.2.3), we can often notice references to the King of Annam. Gorkha and Annam were often juxtaposed as the conclusion of the Emperor's martial "glories". The surrender of Annam was also debated among Vietnamese and Chinese historians.[92] Therefore, taking the Vietnamese case as a parallel will improve our understanding of the "surrender" to the Heavenly Dynasty:

- 吳家文派 (Ngô-gia văn-phái "Writers of Ngô family") 皇黎一統志 (*Hoàng Lê Nhất-thống Chí*) *Records of the Unification of Imperial Lê*, 1804.
- 大南寔錄 大南正編列傳初集 (*Đại-Nam Thực Lục: Đại-Nam Chính-biên Liệt-Truyện Sơ-tập*) *Veritable Records of Dai Nam: The First Compilation of the Biographies* 卷三十偽西, vol. 30, *The Tây Sơn Pretenders*, printed in 1889.

Moreover, the Korean and Vietnamese ambassadors have written notes and diaries on the imperial banquet for tributary envoys. These texts are called 燕行錄 (*Yan-xing Lu*/*Yŏn-haeng Nok*) *Records of Journey to Pekingese Court*. One of them is particularly remarkable:

- 朴趾源 (Pak Chi-wŏn, styled 燕巖 Yeo-nam, 1737–1805) 熱河日記 (*Yeol-ha Il-gi*) *The Jehol Diary*, 1780.

The Korean mission in 1780 witnessed the replica of Tashilhunpo (in Korean Chal-sim-nyun-po) in the Jehol Palace, as well as the Emperor's religious inclination toward the sixth Panchen Lama. Their reports can improve our understanding of the Emperor's emotions regarding Tibetan Buddhism and the Gorkha invasion.

91 Wang 2013, 628.
92 Zhang 2010; Ge 2014.

- 徐浩修 (Seo Ho-su, 1736–1799) 燕行紀 (*Yŏn-haeng Gi*) *Records of Journey to the Pekingese Court*, 1790.

The Korean mission in 1790 met the Vietnamese "King" at Jehol and noted his bribery of Fuk'anggan to memorialise their "surrender" and retreat in vol. 2. His understanding of the Vietnamese "surrender" and the retreat of the Qing army during the Vietnam Campaign can be taken as a possibility of what in fact took place across the battlefield of the Gorkha Campaign.

Other diaries of the Korean and Vietnamese ambassadors also have accounts of the Gorkhali envoy. However, they are not relevant to the war, hence not considered.

(H) Private Historiographies

In China, there are three major genres of historiographies, namely: chronology, biographies, and the courses of events. Each would have a comment from the author in the end that indicates the particular didactic purpose of writing this piece of history. This genre of event-history was relatively new, originating from the late twelfth century. To avoid the crime of unauthorisedly compiling a separate orthodox history, private historiographers often use this new unorthodox genre. Private historiographies for the Gorkha War all took this form. The entire event is given from causes to courses and conclusion in a passage. Owing to their concision and brevity, most scholars relied upon them. However, it should be noted they were mainly the digest of other sources. We have chosen the three most important pieces of private history of the Gorkha campaigns, namely the historiographies of Zhao Yi (around 1793), Zhao-lian (around 1820), and Wei Yuan (1842–1846).

The Edited and Translated Texts

To offer a clearer understanding of the intricate concluding phase of the war and the complex concept of tribute, we have chosen to edit and translate the most relevant documents formulated during the war from miscellaneous sources. They could help us retrieve the perspective of the actors in the war. For a clearer vision of the whole event from 1788 to 1793, we also selected the four most important historiographies by

authors of different backgrounds, three of which are private retrospective historiographies that embody different understandings. In chronological order, these sources include the following:

2.2.1 Tributary Letter Sent to Peking, 1789–1790

This was an auspicious memorial (表 *biao*) presented to the Emperor. Upon this, the Emperor issued an edict as a reply and the finale of BLBJL. It was written or maybe translated in a formulaic language, adjusted to the imperial rhetorics. It reported the conflict between Gorkha and British India.

2.2.2 Letters Across the Battlefield, Summer/Autumn 1792

This small collection of letters sent back and forth on the battlefield is taken from WZTZ, printed in 1896. The very first letter from Rana Bahadur Shah in WZTZ was brought with gifts back to Tibet by Fan Zhong (范忠), a Chinese soldier and Sri gcod Tshe ring (色角七哩), Tenzin Peljor's attendant.[93] Fuk'anggan replied furiously with all the gifts thrown back, because he considered the Gorkha to be deceitful and it was improper to present gift to the Great General in this way. This was reported to the Emperor on 14 April 1792 (QL 57/3/23).[94] When Fuk'anggan reached Dhunce, the second letter from Rana Bahadur Shah (a) issued on 16 July (QL 57/5/28) reached the Chinese troops in August.[95] Fuk'anggan refuted the letter immediately for the second time (b). The third letter from Rana Bahadur Shah issued 27 July on (QL 57/6/9) was brought to Fuk'anggan by Tenzin Peljor[96] and another letter to Cengde at Listi as well.[97] The fourth letter from Rana Bahadur Shah issued on 5 August (QL 57/6/18) was brought to Fuk'anggan by four headpersons, Bhotu Pande, Narasimha, Ramjit Pande, and Balabhadra

93 See also Komatsubara 2018, 92.
94 KRKJL, vol. 25. The letters can be found in WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.1, 31–34; WZTZ 1982, 373–75.
95 Probably, it is the letter in the First Historical Archive, Cata. Mnc. no. 8669 = 3–2–3408–001.
96 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 26–28; WZTZ 1982, 402–4.
97 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 28–29; WZTZ 1982, 404.

Khawas.[98] The rebuttal of Fuk'anggan was then issued on 13 August (QL 57/6/26), immediately before the Betravātī battle.[99] After the battle, the fifth letter was received with the corpse of Shamarpa, contracts, and looted objects on 25 August (QL 57/7/8) (c). Gorkha promised to retreat from the mountains in this letter. Two more letters were issued on 31 August (7/14) and 11 September (7/25) with the attendants of Shamarpa who were at Jia-rong-ke-chu (Boudhanath, Tib. Bya rung kha shor).[100] On 11 September, Rana Bahadur Shah also stated that he had prepared the tributary gift with musicians (d).[101] After that, the letter was written in an official language to the Emperor (2.2.3a).

Although Fuk'anggan claimed to be the author of these letters (or more precisely "summons"), he might have not written them himself. It seems that Yang Kui[102] and Fang Wei-dian (方維甸 1759–1815)[103] wrote the summons for Fuk'anggan to communicate with the Gorkhalis.

2.2.3 Official Edicts, Memorials and Summons, 1792–1793

Several documents that involve the Imperial Institute are collected here, read from miscellaneous works, such as KRKD, KRKJL, WZTZ, etc.

2.2.3a Official Letter of Surrender to The Emperor from Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, September 1792

The text is preserved in WZTZ.[104] It was presented to the Emperor by Devadatta Thapa via Fuk'anggan according to the official imperial procedure. The letter was embedded in another letter brought to

98 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 29–30; WZTZ 1982, 405 = Cata. Mnc. no. 8683 = 3–2–3410–047, Chin. no. 12093, [4–2–]50–91–1.
99 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 30–31; WZTZ 1982, 405–6.
100 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 37–39; WZTZ 1982, 412.
101 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 39b.6–10; WZTZ 1982, 413.
102 "*Prologmena to Yang Li-chang's* [i.e., Yang Kui] *drafts of poems under the Paulownia blossoms*" says "[He] drafted the summons sent to the barbarians" 題楊荔裳桐華吟稿: 番人傳檄草, 戰馬掛詩筒 (Heliyen 1796–1800, vol. 1, 34).
103 Yang Kui's "*Coincidentally drafted a poem with changing rhyme for my senior Fang Bao-yan* [i.e., Fang Wei-dian]" says "Your hand has drafted thousands of words of summons" 偶成轉韻奉酬方葆巖前輩: 草檄千言出君手 (Wu 1985, 173). Fang also accompanied Fuk'anggan to Taiwan.
104 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.3, 9–13; WZTZ 1982, 422–24.

Fuk'anggan. The letter concluded the event, made a promise of peace, and introduced the tributary ambassador Devadatta Thapa as the Prime Minister of Gorkha to the Great Emperor. The original document in its Chinese version might be in *Han-wen Lu-fu* 3–157–7619–1. The later translated Manchu version is found in the First Historical Archive (Cata. Mnc. no. 8769 = 3–2–3413–030 and no. 8754 = 3–2–3413–021).

2.2.3b Official Reply from Fuk'anggan, 3 October 1792

The text is preserved only in WZTZ.[105] It was the official reply from Fuk'anggan to accept the surrender. The earlier authorisation of the Emperor allowed Fuk'anggan to decide by himself whether to march further or close the case as it was. He thus accepted the capitulation and instructed Gorkha, following the Emperor's intention.

2.2.3c Edicts, 7 October 1792

The two edicts on the same date are found in KRKD, KRKJL, Yuan Yi Lai, etc.[106] One was issued through the cabinet to inform the entire Empire of the unwillingness and necessity of the Gorkha campaign. It declared the official conclusion of the expedition. However, the Emperor still expressed his wish to receive the news that Fuk'anggan might reach Kathmandu. The other one was issued secretly to Fuk'anggan, etc. It mentioned the hardship of the army and some articles to be imposed on Gorkha and Tibet after the retreat.

2.2.3d Edict with Articles to Instruct the Gorkha as a Reply to Fuk'anggan's Memorial (25 September), 31 October 1792

This edict is also found in KRKD, KRKJL, etc.[107] It was the reply from the Emperor upon receiving 2.2.3b. The Emperor ordered Fuk'anggan to instruct the Gorkha King. He defined the relation with Gorkha,

105 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.3, 16–18; WZTZ 1982, 428.
106 KRKD QL 57/7–8, 167–80; KRKJL, vol. 39, QL 57/8/22; Yuan Yi Lai, no. 918.
107 KRKD QL 57/9, 71–76; KRKJL, vol. 42, QL 57/9/16.

returning the kingly title and territory to Rana Bahadur Shah. It reclaimed Dram and intended to end commercial connection. It also prescribed tributary missions.

2.2.3e Oral Instruction from Agūi and Hešen to Devadatta Thapa, 23 February 1793

The instruction[108] was given by the ministers Agūi and Hešen to the envoy in a face-to-face manner. The original draft is found in KRKD. It rejected many requests from Devadatta Thapa. It also explained why the Heavenly Dynasty could not assist Gorkha in the case of an invasion from British India.

2.2.3f Letter from Devadatta Thapa to Gorkha Raja, 24 February 1793

Letters were sent between Kathmandu and Devadatta Thapa.[109] It narrated the imperial grace granted to them and mentioned 2.2.3e.

2.2.4 Rana Bahadur Shah, Lyrics for Qianlong, 1792–1793

廓爾喀王拉特納巴都爾恭頌歌詞 (*Kuorka Wang Latna Badur Gong-song Ge-ci*) *Lyric of Praise from the Gorkha King Rana Bahadur* undated Manuscripts, text composed probably in 1792.

This text is found in manuscripts in the imperial collection in manuscripts in golden ink. The two Palace museums at Peking and Taipei both have a copy of it. The Pekingese version places itself after the lyrics from Myanmar and Annam, before the lyric offered by the sixth Panchen Erdeni upon the Emperor's 70th birthday. The song was written in Manchu, Mongolian, Chinese, and Devanagari on dark blue pages with gold-decorated borders. There might also be a Tibetan version of

108 KRKD QL 58/1–3, 27–31.
109 KRKJL, vol. 48, QL 57/12/14.

the lyric in the First Historical Archive.[110] Unfortunately, we do not have scores attached to the lyric.

Music was a central issue in Chinese imperial rituals according to the Confucian meliorist ideal of re-ordering and harmonising society through music. The music was played in a formal courtly setting. The tradition of institutionalising foreign music and musicians as a sect in the imperial corpora started in the sixth century. The Gorkha music was an integral part of the imperial ritual music corpus which was visited by Aisin Gioro 1988.[111] The imperial power that collected and subjugated a variety of people in the four remote directions was then incarnated in the ecumene of the Qing Empire.

Moreover, the practice of having a barbarian king composing songs that praised the emperor was even more time-honoured in China. The Confucian canons such as Mao's commentary to the *Book of Odes* and the *Rites of Zhou* mentioned the music of the barbarians should be collected and presented at court. The Song of Bai-lang (白狼歌) might have been one early example from the first century CE. It was translated by Chinese officers with transliteration by Chinese characters, titled *The Admiration of the Imperial Virtue of the Remote Barbarians* (遠夷樂德 *Yuan-yi Yao De*).

Such a song was to be played by the Gorkha musicians upon the arrival of tributary envoys. The Lyric is supposed to have been composed by the Gorkha King. However, by the poetry of Yang Kui,[112] we

110 Cata. Mnc. no. 8770 = 3–2–3414–007; Tib. no. 13214 = 3–2–3414–8.

111 Aisin Gioro 1988 gave an example that the Emperor deported some rGyalrongic people from their homeland after his Jinchuan Campaigns and required them to play acrobatics and music on various occasions. These deportees often sang about their homesickness and remained in the suburban area of Peking even after the fall of the Qing Empire in 1911.

112 "[Poem:] The peculiar tones and eccentric rhythms [of the Gorkha musicians] are like the clowns and entertainers. How could these western barbarian dwarfs be affiliated to the Ministry of Ceremonies?
Then, since the ambassador was eloquent in [diplomatic] language, he responded himself by [playing] the leather and wooden instrument, presenting several stanzas (literally, "3 stanzas", probably *metri causa*, as "6" could not fit in the meters here).
[Explanation: the Gorkha] offered two musicians. We tried to inquire about what they sing. The Great General considered it to be undignified or unrefined. The ambassador Narasiṃha made another on the second day. The new song praised the sacred virtues [of the Emperor]. It was very decently eulogised."
殊音異節類俳倡, 僸侏何堪隸太常, 自是使臣辭令好, 親賡擊木獻三章。(獻樂工二人, 試詢其所歌, 大將軍以為不莊, 來使乃爾興, 次日另制以進, 歌詠聖德, 頌揚極得體) (Wu 1985, 169).

might infer that the lyric was commissioned by Fuk'anggan after he had denounced the "authentic" music presented by the Gorkhali tributary envoy. He ordered another tune to be made and was later satisfied by the new song of Narasimha, one of the negotiators.

The Chinese version seems rather formulaic, while it indeed incorporated imperial concepts and references to the powerful Qing army. There were also many Buddhist or Indian notions in it such as Skt. *hastināga*, seven planets, Mount Sumeru, and the equivalent of Skt. *dedīpyamāna*. However, the preserved Nepālī version could not be understood. These references might be an exoticisation instead of the "authentic" representation.

2.2.5 Essay on the Ten Complete Martial Glories by His Majesty, Alias Potala Inscription, 1792

御製十全記 (*Yu-zhi Shi-quan Ji*)

This contains the Potala Inscription written by Emperor Qianlong in four languages (Chinese, Tibetan, Manchu, Mongolian) at the foot of the Potala Palace in Lhasa. The Palace Museums hold other forms of its Chinese text, including silk tapestry, jade plates, written albums, albums of rubbings, printed versions in anthologies and compilations, and so on. The texts of the inscription were also cited, copied and printed many times in other genres of texts, dispersing the "correct" collective memorial. The Chinese version can be found also in Zhang 1988, 475–80; WZTZ 1896, 31–32; WZTZ 1982, 151–52. The Tibetan version and translation were given in Richardson 1974. The English Translations can also be found in Bell 1924, 275–78, reprint in Landon 1976, vol. 2, App. XXI, 272–74 and Regmi 1975, App. III, 214–17. Elliot has translated part of it from Manchu (2009, 106).

The main text was written as an Imperial discourse, touching upon his majesty's long-reigning years, martial glories, and Heavenly destiny. It also had an extensive auto-commentary that gives the chronology of the war in detail, probably based on Fuk'anggan's memorials. The commentary was more significant for our research question, as it reveals the Emperor's understanding of the wars. However, it has not yet been considered by most scholars discussing the Sino-Nepalese War.

2.2.6 趙翼 (Zhao Yi) *The Pacification of Gorkha,* 1793–1799

平定廓爾喀述略 (*Ping-ding Kuorka Shu-lüe*)

The passage comes at the end of Zhao Yi's historiography, 皇朝武功紀盛 (*Huang-chao Wu-gong Ji-sheng*) *Accounts of the Grand Military Achievements of the Imperial Dynasty*, first printed in 1792. Many of its witnesses do not have this ending passage on the Gorkha Campaign. However, a copy in Harvard University with hand-written annotations by a scholar from Ning-hai, Chen Tan (寧海陳坦), has the passage in the same printing style as the previous pages. As Zhao printed the text at his own printing house, it can thus be inferred that he added some blocks to the book in a later printed version. Given the printing style, it was very likely to be printed in the same decade.

It should be noted that Zhao Yi (1721–1814) served as a clerk man in the Grand Council.[113] He was valued by Fuk'anggan's father, Fuheng.[114] He was once the ghost-writer for the Emperor to draft edicts and essays.[115] He was also an imperial librarian, engaged in the compilation of 四庫全書 (*Si Ku Quan-shu*) *The Complete Library of the Four Treasuries*. He also attended the campaign against Myanmar and served Fuk'anggan in his Taiwan Expedition.[116] Upon his retirement, he became a scholar of history, delving into the early and medieval history of China. He was much more learned and closer to the courtly institutions of decision-making than Wei Yuan. However, the text had a strong intention of "glorifying violence and cheering for the invincibility of the Qing military", thus veiling the hardships.

In the epilogue of this text, Zhao stated his source of information from his fellow-countryman 余珏 (Yu Jue), a military official in the troops of Fuk'anggan. Yu told him much about the natural danger and the custom of Gorkhalis, which was later used by Wei Yuan (Part II, 2.2.8 [6]) without indicating his source.

113 Bartlett 1991, 206, 221–22.

114 *Draft History of Qing*, vol. 485, Biography no. 272, Literati no. 2.

115 Zhao ranked first in the utmost imperial exam in front of the Emperor but was reduced to the third given his identity as Wu Chinese. The person who replaced him as the first in 1761 was Wang Jie, who later copied the Potala Inscription for the Emperor (故書 00086400000 清王杰書御製十全記冊 *Transcription of the "Imperial Record of Ten Great Campaigns"*). See also Wang 2013, 500.

116 Feng 1993, 390.

2.2.7 禮親王昭槤 (Prince Zhao-lian, 1776–1829) *The Surrender of Gorkha*, 1820s

廓爾喀之降 (*Kuorka zhi Xiang*)

In vol. 6 of 嘯亭雜錄 (*Xiao-ting Za-lu*) "*Miscellaneous Records in the Pavilion of Whistles*", the section *The Surrender of Gorkha* is a significant historiography after the war, which was a direct source of Wei Yuan (2.2.8). Although Zhao-lian obviously adapted Zhao Yi's text (2.2.6), he added remarks on Tibetan affairs, criticised Fuk'anggan and Hešen fiercely, and acknowledged the final defeat instead of glorifying the martial achievements.

The author Zhao-lian (1766–1830) was a direct descendent of Nurgaci, the founder of the Aisin Gioro House of the Manchu Empire. He was well educated and inherited the permanent title of 和碩禮親王 (*He-shuo Li Qin-wang*; Mnc. *Hošoi doronggo cinwang*). Although the title was ripped off in 1816, he enjoyed freedom and dared to write about sensitive topics.[117] He was interested in collecting geographical information within and beyond the Empire.[118]

The text belongs to a special genre, *Private Notes*, which somebody might consider fictional writing (especially in the history of literature written in the People's Republic of China influenced by Stalinism). However, the text is in fact rich in historical details of the court due to the author's adjacency to the imperial core. He resorted not only to official narrations but also to oral history and non-official accounts circulated around the imperial capitals. It is a valid source for our understanding of the Sino-Nepalese War.

At first, the text existed only in the form of manuscripts probably among aristocracy and literati. In 1875, it was block-printed, but in bad quality. Later in 1901, it was stereotype-printed in Shanghai, based on the manuscript in the Manchu official 端方 (Duan-fang) collection.[119]

117 Ibid., 358.
118 Shih 2017, 332, 337.
119 Cp. Lo 2014.

2.2.8 魏源 (Wei Yuan) *Qian-long's Expedition to Gorkha*, 1842–1846

乾隆征廓爾喀記 (*Qian-long Zheng Kuorka Ji*)

According to the prologue of his book, 聖武記 (*Sheng Wu Ji*) *Account for the Noble/Sacred Martial [Enterprises]* 1842–1846, Wei Yuan (1794–1857)[120] relied upon "borrowed official records of the imperial historians and libraries, private accounts found in works of the literati-officers, and traditional tales".[121] The title of this opus is also telling of his imperial nostalgia. The text was written as his advice to both the society and the court to restore the imperial glory after the Opium War in 1840. It advocated the strategy of using barbarians against each other (以夷制夷).

The text received a warm reception in China and was even more popular among Japanese Confucian scholars.[122] Many more copies were brought to Japan than Zhao Yi's work.[123] Later historical understanding of the Gorkha campaigns was often based on this text, such as 國朝柔遠記 (*Guo-chao Rou-yuan Ji*) *Conciliation of the Distant in Our Dynasty* by 王之春 (Wang Zhi-chun, 1842–1906) in 1879. Even the offspring of Bajung follows Wei Yuan's narration (Aisin Gioro and Bayara Gioro 2006, 146–48).

It should be noted that he was not as an eminent historian and scholar as Zhao Yi who ranked almost top in the imperial examination. Nor was he close to the imperial system as Zhao-lian. He was more of a strategist and public intellectual in the modern sense. However, he dedicated himself to the collection of foreign information with 林則徐 (Lin Ze-xu, 1785–1850). His most important work was based on Lin's translations of Western newspapers in Canton and Macau, which were often hearsay. Therefore, his conceptions of the Anglo-Gorkha and Sino-Russian relations were imprecise.[124] His text should be treated cautiously, not to be taken directly as a trustworthy source. Nevertheless,

120 For more information on him, see Mosca 2013, ch. 8.
121 得借觀史館密閣官書及士大夫私家著述故老傳説.
122 Andō 2017.
123 Ōba 1967, 34b.
124 Scholars have disproved Wei's arguments with the Chinese and British sources. Feng noted that the British had established treaty with Nepal by then and would not have done what Wei Yuan suggested (1996, 44–45). Gao commented that Wei made conjectures and assumptions which could not be attested by company documents from the British side or the courtly records

given its enduring influence in contemporary scholarship and discourses, it is still included.

In terms of this passage on the Gorkha campaign, he relied largely on Sungyūn, Zhao Yi (2.2.6), Zhao-lian (2.2.7), Yao Ying[125] and Mengbao. His mistakes were also valuable as they reveal a popular Chinese understanding of the nineteenth-century geopolitics. Starting with the Imperial eulogy by the Emperor and ending with Wei Yuan's historiography, we can see a chronological transformation in the understandings of the Gorkha expedition from 2.2.5–8.

2.3 Tibetan Sources

2.3.1 Biography of the Sixth Panchen Lama, before 1791

Paṇ chen dpal ldan ye shes kyi rnam thar

According to the Chinese understanding (2.2.5–8), everything started when the sixth Panchen Lama (Blo bzang dPal ldan Ye shes, 1738–1780) died in Peking. The biography gave us information about Qianlong's emotional attachment toward Tashilhunpo, which was also mentioned in Purangir's narrative (Turner 1800) and the diaries of the Korean envoy (Pak 1780). Consulting this would improve our understanding of the Manchu-Mongolian-Tibetan relation and the personal sentiment of the Emperor. Moreover, it gave a detailed list of donations received by the Panchen and a meticulous account of the construction of the stupa at Tashilhunpo in 1781. Such an ocean of wealth triggered the conflict between Drungpa (dMa pa Phyag mdzod chen mo Drung pa Hu thog thu Er dem thu No mon han Blo bzang sbyin pa)[126] and Shamarpa, the uterine brothers of the sixth Panchen.[127]

The biography was compiled by the 2nd Jamyang Zhepa ('Jam dbyangs bZhad pa, dKon mchog 'jigs med dBang po, 1728–1791), a pious disciple of the sixth Panchen Lama. He was the abbot of the Labrang Monastery (Bla brang bKra shis 'khyil). Many other monastic

of China (1998, 108). Having intensively read his work, Mosca explained the incorrect messages in detail (2013, ch. 8).

125 See Mosca 2013, 279.

126 PC6, 1162.1–2.

127 See also Schulemann 1958, 338. They were all born to a Ladakh princess (Li 2012).

officials were also involved in the compilation of this biography upon request of the Drungpa Hutuktu who might be then in the Tashilhunpo monastery.[128]

2.3.2 Autobiography of Doring Tenzin Peljor, 1806

rDo ring bstan 'dzin dpal 'byor, or *rdo ring paṇḍi ta'i rnam thar*[129]

Kalon Doring Tendzin Peljor (1760–ca. 1811) was a lay cabinet minister (Tib. *bka' blon*) of the Ghazi (dGa' bzhi) family. He was involved in the negotiation of the agreement of Kyirong 1789. Shortly after, however, during a mission to pay reparations to the Gorkha in 1791, he was taken hostage and taken to the Kathmandu Valley.[130] He was summoned to the Kathmandu court by Bahadur Shah and later returned to the Chinese camp. He climbed up a tree and witnessed the Betravati battle. Following Gorkha's "surrender" to the Qing troops in the summer of 1792, Tenzin Peljor was brought to Peking for imperial audience in 1793.[131] Although the Qing court was suspicious of his involvement in the Gorkha Wars, he was not found guilty. Probably in fear of the accusation, his wife,[132] son, and himself insisted to offer five sizable estates to the court as compensation for his failures.[133] Nonetheless, Peljor was demoted and barred from public office for a few years. To preserve the family's wealth and prestige, he successfully installed his son, Mingyur Sönam Penjor (Mi 'gyur bSod nams dPal' byor 1784–1834), as the heir to his imperial title in 1804. However,

128 Wang 2013, 238.

129 See also Shakabpa 1967, de Rossi–Filibeck 1977, F.K. Ehrhard 2007, F.X. Erhard 2020a.

130 It was reported by Bootai in his memorial received on 7 October 1791 that the Tibetan Ministers were abducted in Nyalam on 23 August 1791 (QL 57/7/6) (KRKJL, vol. 1. QL 56/8/21). See TP, ch. 19.

131 Sperling 1998.

132 Tenzin Peljor's wife was a relative of Shamarpa, as she was the younger sister of the eighth Dalai Lama, who reincarnated in the same family of the sixth Panchen (KRKJL, vol. 28, QL 57/intercalary 4/7; TP 847,15–17; F. X. Erhard 2021).

133 KRKJL, vol. 46, QL 57/11/29. The Emperor later distributed the land to the treasury of the Dalai Lama for the provision of the Tibetan army. According to Tenzin Peljor, the Emperor intended to return the estates to him and ordered Agūi and Hešen to inquire about it in the winter of 1792. However, Tenzin Peljor refused and offered them again (TP 949).

the succession of ministerial position came with a significant scandal, as the public in Lhasa accused him of bribery and corruption through anonymous posters at Bridge g.Yu thog. The accusations of his bribing the amban residing in Tibet seemed to have motivated him to document his version of events, as the Mongolian amban, Ce-bak (策拔克, Tib. Tshe'u am ban) was in good relation with Tenzin Peljor but dismissed by the Emperor Jia-qing.[134] The exact date of his death is unknown but occurred after 1811.

The autobiography might have been finished by 1806, shortly after the war and the dismissal of the amban acquainted with Tenzin Peljor. Tenzin Peljor's account of the war in this work has been used by Shakabpa (*alias* rTsis dpon Zhva sgab pa dBang phyug bde ldan, 1908–1989) in his "résumé-like translation".[135] The text is available in the Chengdu printed edition published in 1987. It was also translated into Chinese (Tang 1995). Shakabpa might have used another recension that differs from this Chengdu recension.[136] Parts of this text from the Chengdu recension have been edited and translated into English by Li 2001, Ehrhard 2007, Erhard 2021, and van der Kuijp and Tien 2022.

Tenzin Peljor might have been conceiving his narration while composing letters and declarations during the war.[137] As he was required to write to the Tibetans by the Gorkhalis and was ordered to recall the course of the conflicts and negotiation by the Chinese officers for many times, and because of the literariness in this biography titled "Music of Candid Speech" (*brjod pa zol med gtam gyi rol mo*), his memory remained vivid and detailed. We have selected several excerpts concerning the causes of conflicts (following Ehrhard 2007), the aftermath of negotiation (following Li 2001), the abduction to Kathmandu Valley, the dialogue with Bahadur Shah, and the Betravati Battle. Komatsubara 2017 also studied Tenzin Peljor's role in the formation of the treaty of Kyirong along with the Chinese memorials, while his visit to Peking and suffering from smallpox have been researched by Sperling 1998 and van der Kuijp and Tien 2022.

134 Petech 1973, 59; Li 1998.

135 *Bod kyi srid don rgyal rabs* (3rd ed., Kalimpong 1986; Engl. rendering: Shakabpa 1967). Book review see Yapp 1968.

136 Van der Kuijp and Tien 2022, 9.

137 The letters are currently stored in the Pekingese archive, Cata. Mnc., Tib. no. 8693–94, 8848–59, 13182–84. His declaration of witness in Chinese can be found in KRKD QL 57/10-11, quoted in Chuang 1982, 427.

2.3.3 Men Gompa Künga Penden's Unedited Biography, 1807

sMan bsgom chos rje kun dga' dpal ldan, 1735–1804, written by *Brag dkar rta so sprul sku chos kyi dbang phyug*

This text was written by Brag dkar rta so sPrul sku Chos kyi dbang phyug (1775–1837) and completed in 1807. Kun dga' dpal ldan, was a practicing physician who was regularly called by Chödrup Gyatsho, the tenth Sharmapa Lama, for treatment in Nepal.[138]

2.3.4 Biography of the Eighth Dalai Lama, 1811

rGyal dbang sku phreng brgyad pa'i rnam thar

The eighth Dalai Lama ('Jam dpal rGyal mtsho, 1758–1804) was functioning as the ruler of Tibet during the war.[139] His uncle was also an influential figure during the first war.[140] He had several meetings with the Chinese officers, before and after the Sino-Nepalese War. The biography was written by the seventh Demo Hutuktu (Blo bzang Thub bstan 'jigs med rGya mtsho, 1778–1819), a disciple of the Dalai Lama and later the Tibetan Regent (1811–1819). He resided in the bsTan rgyas gling monastery, which was named by the Emperor.[141] He started writing in 1811 and resorted to the notes made by the previous regent, the eighth Tatsag (the biographed of 2.3.5).[142] The text was ordered to be block-printed upon its completion.[143] Satō 1986 referred to it extensively. In 2010, it has been edited and translated into Chinese (Feng 2006). Quotations in the footnotes are taken from the modern edition instead of the block-print version.

The biography showed the perspective of the Lhasa government during the war. The Tibetan government did approve the treaty of

138 Ehrhard 2007, 125. NGMPP reel-no. L 376/3, fols. 10a/2–20b/2. See also Erschbamer 2018.
139 Rinpoche et al. 1982.
140 Satō 1986, 600, 732.
141 DL8, 588.10: "*gnam bskos gong ma'i lung las bstan rgyas gling zhes…*"
142 Ibid., 587.18–19, 588.12–14.
143 The date of its completion was given according to Kalacakra astronomy. It seemed to be the next year, i.e., 1812. The Chinese translator of DL8, Feng 2006 suggests 1827 (*me phag*). However, Demo was already re-incarnated in 1827 as the eighth Demo Hutuktu.

Kyirong. Moreover, an extensive dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Fuk'anggan was recorded, in which the Dalai Lama addressed Fuk'anggan as "the second Emperor" (*gong ma gnyis pa*). The address form largely challenged the traditional Chinese understanding of the event, showing the transcultural complexity within the Qing Empire. The close relationship between the Dalai Lama and Fuk'anggan caused the latter to praise the Dalai Lama in front of the Emperor who was almost convinced by Bajung that the eighth Dalai was incapable.[144] Last but not least, it also has vivid details of the elephants from Gorkha redistributed to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas by the Emperor.

2.3.5 Biography of the Eighth Tatsag Hutuktu, 1812

rTa tshag ye shes blo bzang bstan pa'i mgon po'i rnam thar

The eighth Tatsag (Ye shes Blo bzang bstan pa'i mGonpo, 1760–1810, alias Chin. Ji-long Hutuktu 濟嚨呼圖克圖. His title probably came from Tib. rJe drung[145]) was the Regent of Tibet during the war. Both Demo and Tatsag were officially not supposed to pay respect to the amban,[146] whereas the two Hutuktus were respected by the ambans as significant monastic and political leaders in Lhasa. Tatsag was conferred the title Kun bde gling Hutuktu by the Emperor due to his contribution during the war. A new monastery was constructed for him in Lhasa and an inscription was made by Heliyen to commemorate the victory (Richardson 1974, no. 16). In return, he presented a Kapala skull offering bowl as the gift to the Emperor.[147] His biography was written by Blo bzang 'Phrin las rNam rgyal (?–1818), a scholarly monk in the Sera Monastery, Lhasa. The two-volume work has been edited and published in 2022. The narration mainly accords with that of the biography of the eighth Dalai Lama, of which Tatsag was also involved in the textual formation.

144 Deng 2009.
145 His title, rTa tshag rJe drung, is not to be confused with 濟仲喇嘛 (probably from Tib. rTse drung nla ma) at the Tashilhunpo monastery who did divination upon the arrival of the Gorkhali army. rJe drung was a title for nobles who became monastics, while rTse drung referred to monastic official in monastic institutions.
146 Qianlong Manchu Secret Edicts, vol. 24, no. 4190 (QL 59/8/11).
147 故雜 001973N000000000.

2.3.6 Rindzin Chöying Dorjé's Autobiography

Gser phreng = Bka' brgyud gser phreng chen mo, in: *Biographies of Eminent Gurus in the Transmission Lineage of Teachings of the 'Ba'-ra dKar-brgyud-pa Sect, 1970.*[148]

Rindzin Chöying Dorjé (Rig 'dzin Chos dbyings rdo rje 1772–1838) hailed from the esteemed Jamling lineage of Kyirong in Mangyül Gungtang. His principal abode, the Barawa Monastery of Drapu Chöling, was situated near the Nepalese border. The text offers insights into the political landscape of Tibet spanning the years 1788–1792, encompassing the Gorkha invasions. He seemed to have fortunately been free from injury during the first war and stayed in retreat in the 1792.[149]

2.3.7 Letters of the Teshu Lama

In 1789, it was probably Drungpa Hutuktu who sent a letter to Cornwallis in the name of the Panchen Lama. After the war, another letter, probably written by the seventh Panchen Lama (dPal ldan bsTan pa'i Nyi ma 1782–1853)[150] himself, was sent to the British Governor. The connection between the Panchen Lama and the Governor in Calcutta started with the sixth Panchen Lama when Bogle went to Tibet. Although the British did not reach Lhasa, they kept a good relationship with the Panchen Lama in Shigatse. An Indian Yogi Purangir even followed the sixth Panchen Lama to Peking.[151] The relation continued as Daljit was also sent to Tibet from India in February 1793 (QL 58/1).[152] The Panchen

148 For further editions see Erschbamer 2018, n. 10.

149 Khenpo 2013, 223: *bcu bdun sa spre lor gor bod dus zing skabs| lha srung gi byin mthus dgon pa dang rje nyid la gnod pa cher ma byung bar| rang gnas bkra shis chos gling du bcad rgyar lo gsum bzhugs|* "At the age of 17, during the year of Earth Monkey (1788), Tibet went into turmoil. By the blessing power of the protective deity, great damage did not occur to the monastery and the master. He stayed in bKra shis chos gling monastery, which was his own abode, for a three-year retreat." The monastery is Drapu Choling near the present day Chongse Village.

150 The biography of the seventh Panchen (PC7) has been published in its two-volume edition along with a translation in 2022. However, he lived a long life and the biography was completed towards the end of the nineteenth century in 1883.

151 See Petech 1950b; Kollmar-Paulenz 2023.

152 KRKJL, vol. 57, QL 58/3/8.

Lama thus replied through Daljit and spoke about his understanding of the war in the letter. Fuk'anggan, Heliyen, Hui-ling and Sun Shi-yi might have interfered with the letter according to their memorial after the war.[153]

153 "Now, we ordered Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni together to write a reply to [the Governor in Kolkata]. It will be sent after we have revised it properly." 現令達賴喇嘛與班禪額爾德尼共擬寫回信一封, 由臣等酌改發去 (KRKJL, vol. 57, QL 58/3/8).

3 The Gorkha-Tibet War of 1788–1789

Tibet held a pivotal position in the old trans-Himalayan trade network, serving as a vital hub for exporting various commodities to Nepal. Among these goods were salt, wool, silk, horses, and sheep, which formed the backbone of commerce between the two regions.[154] In return, Nepal primarily exported items like rice, lentils, spices, clothing materials, and silver coins,[155] with the latter being a crucial source of revenue for the Nepalese government.[156]

The Kathmandu Valley was part of the important trade route between India and Tibet or China.[157] According to Komatsubara (2022), the earlier treaty between the Malla King Pratapa Malla and Tibet prioritised the route through the Kathmandu valley instead of those via Sikkim or Bhutan, while Kyirong was often under the control of the Malla Kings since the seventeenth century. Jaya Prakash Malla signed an agreement with Tibet to utilise the Nuwakot-Kyirong route in 1758. The trade routes through Nyalam and Kyirong were both essential for the Kathmandu rulers. Before the Gorkha conquest of the Kathmandu Valley, Prithivi Narayan Shah already seized Nuwakot in 1744 and soon blocked the trade route via Nyalam around 1759/1760. Thus, the Mallas were weakened. In 1775, Gorkha signed a new agreement with Tibet to make sure trade between them should be done via the Kyirong and the Nyalam routes.[158]

The relationship between Nepal and Tibet underwent a significant transformation when a dispute arose over border and trade matters, including the accusation that the Tibetans mixed dust into the salt sold to Nepal. But the conflicts escalated especially over the Kathmandu

154 Shakabpa 1967, 156.
155 Tibet had no mint of their own: Petech 1950a, 288.
156 Kirkpatrick 1811, 217–18; V.K. Manandhar 2004, vol. 1, 72; Acharya 2018, 58.
157 See Camman 1951, App. D for a list of traded articles from 1782.
158 See also BLBJL, vol. 6, QL 53/9/11.



Figure 2: Silver Tibetan coin produced in Nepal, early Shah period (source: Wikimedia Commons)

Valley's exclusive right to mint silver coins for Tibet. For this silver lumps with a small portion of gold dust were sent to the mints. The coins (*mahendramallī*, Tib. *bal ṭhang or ṭaṃka*) depicted on one side Lhasa and, on the other, name, title, and emblem of the Malla rulers. The profit for the Malla kings, especially Jaya Prakash Malla from Kathmandu and Ranjit Malla, the last king of Bhaktapur, was considerable amounting to 1 *lakh* per year[159] or 12 percent respective 4 percent "being derived from the gold dust, and eight per cent arising from the alloy of the mohur."[160]

The debasement of the *mahendramallī* by the Malla kings resulted in a significant reduction in their silver content—a decrease of nearly one-half of their value.[161] This prompted Tibet to react and impose unfavourable trade conditions on both countries. When Prithvi Narayan Shah came to power, he took the initiative to mint again pure silver coins, struck in his name. In his[162] *Divyopadeśa* he had laid down the principle, that the mint should be kept unpolluted: "Keep the mint pure."[163] He then attempted to enforce the new *mahendramallī* in Tibet and prohibit the adulterated coins blended with copper. According to Shakabpa's historiography, Prithvi Narayan threatened Tibet with an invasion if his conditions were not met.[164]

However, the Tibetans rejected the new currency, fearing it would cause significant economic harm and pave the way for military invasion.

159 Kirkpatrick 1811, 211.
160 De la Couperie 1881, 343.
161 Kirkpatrick 1811, 339; de la Couperie 1881, 344; Cammann 1951, 109; Rhodes 1980; Rhodes, Gabrisch and Pontecorvo della Rocchetta 1989.
162 The authorship is debated, see Michaels 2024, 309; Lubin 2024.
163 Stiller 1968, 45; cp. Stiller 1989, 18 and 1975, 191.
164 Shakabpa 1967, 158.



Figure 3: Silver Tibetan coin produced in Nepal, late Malla period (source: Wikimedia Commons)

They insisted that they would only accept the new coins if Prithvi Narayan agreed to recall all the earlier coins from Nepal. They pleaded with the king to continue minting the adulterated coins (Figures 2 and 3), which they used alongside the pure ones, maintaining the same value as the debased currency. This dispute over currency quality and redemption continued over almost twenty years. It engaged Prithvi Narayana's son Pratap Simha Shah, who ascended the throne in 1775, and the later regent Bahadur Shah, who in 1785 became the de facto ruler because Pratapa's son Rana Bahadur Shah (Figure 4) called *Gorkhāmāhārāja* ("Gorkha King") throughout the Report of VS 1850, was still an infant.

Even after ten years, when Bahadur Shah proposed introducing at least an exchange rate for the two currencies, the Tibetans remained adamant and continued to use both *mahendramallīs* equally. This had a profound impact on the trade relations between Nepal and Tibet, nearly bringing economic exchange between the two countries to a standstill. Bahadur Shah attempted to reach an agreement, but the Tibetans instead threatened him to assemble an army of 125,000 soldiers.[165] The Nepalese proposal of a meeting to settle the matter was first rejected by the Tibetans.

While these trade and currency disputes continued without major ramifications, occasional reports were sent to Beijing but often obstructed by the ambans in Lhasa.[166] Thus, Bahadur Shah attempted to directly contact the Chinese Emperor Qianlong (Figure 5),[167] as China

165 Sandhi of VS 1850, 2^{v}.

166 Haenisch 1959, 8.

167 Qian-long is the name for his era. Gao-zong (lit. "the high patriarch") was his posthumous name when he received offerings in the ancestral temple of the Empire. Another posthumous name for him was Chun Huang-di (Mnc.



Figure 4: King Rana Bahadur Shah (1775–1806, r. 1778–1799), unknown date (source: Wikimedia Commons)

held formal suzerainty over Tibet, albeit with minimal exercise in preceding years.

An incident that triggered the Gorkhali's invasion in July 1788 highlighted the arrogance of the Chinese ambassadors (*amban*)[168] to Tibet: The amban Kinglin (Chin. 慶麟 Qing-lin), for instance, a Mongol bannerman, refused to deliver the petition (*arjī*) of King Rana Bahadur Shah because it was written in a foreign language and script, deeming it incomprehensible, and returned it to Nepal.[169] Upon learning of this

Yongkiyangga Hūwangdi, "the complete Emperor"). His Manchu name was Aisin-Gioro Hung Li, in Pinyin Ai-xin-Jue-luo Hong-li.

168 On the history of the ambans in Tibet see Li 2002, 173–236. For the internal tension among the ambans in Lhasa between the wars, see Komatsubara 2006.

169 This is confirmed by in the Kyirong treat, see Komatsubara 2017, 189, 194.



Figure 5: Emperor Qianlong (1711–1799) in his formal robe in 1791 (source: Wikimedia Commons. Palace Museum in Peking, no. 00006461)

incident and other crimes of Kinglin, the Emperor's fury was evident, and he punished Kinglin by imposing a three-year sentence of wearing the wooden collar or cangue (Chin. 枷號, *jiahao*).[170] In an edict, the Emperor expressed his displeasure:

> If the people of any foreign peoples with the desire to pay tribute and submit a letter approach the governors residing in the border area with this request, then the governors at the border simply must report it and wait for my order on the question of whether or not to allow them. And whether there is any naughtiness in their letter text, how this is to be treated, that is then up to my


170 Haenisch 1959, 9.

> decision. If there is a small thing, I will reprimand and lecture it. If there is a gross violation, I will send out an army and fight them.[171]

In May[172]—or, according to others, June[173], July[174] or August[175] 1788—, the conflict resulted in a first punitive attack on Tibet launched by the Gorkhali army and in the occupation of some border towns—Kerung (Kyirong), Kuti (Nyalam), Phalavan (Phula)[176] as well as a significant portion of Tibet's south-western territory reaching up to Shelkar.

Bahadur Shah dared to take the step because he suspected that China would not intervene in the conflict. The Gorkhali forces—allegedly 3,000 men[177]—under the joint command of *kājīs* Damodara Pande and Bom [Bam] Bahadur Shah, Ranjit Kumvar and others entered Tibet in at least two wings (see Map 1):[178] One went to Kerung along the Trishuli River that was conquered; and another one that followed the Bhotia Kosi River via Kuti (Nyalam) to Tingri about 250 km from Kuti.[179] In August, a fierce battle was fought at Shikarjong (Shelkar town, currently in Tingri County),[180] in which the Tibetans were severely beaten[181] because the standing troops could not hold off the invasion due to a lack of sufficient soldiers despite the Qing's assembling of many troops from different parts of China and Tibet, which, however, could often not reach in time the battlefields.[182] According to

171 Haenisch 1959, 35—AM's translation. For the Manchu version see Haenisch 1959, 20–21. For the Chinese version see BLBJL, vol. 15.
172 CPC VIII, 977.
173 Diskalkar 1933, 360.
174 Theobald 2020, 118; BLBJL, vol. 1.
175 CPC VIII, 399.
176 Place names are given on the spelling of their territorial origin with variants in brackets; See App. A.
177 Chen and Gao 2014, 89. It was exaggerated as 6,000–7,000 or even 10,000 in Kinglin's report (BLBJL, vol. 3).
178 Regmi 1975, 432.
179 Sungyūn noted when he scrolled around the Tibetan territory, "I recall the invasion route of the Gorkha in 1788 (QL Wu-shen). They took two routes. One was from Kyirong, Dzonga, Bo-rong-ba, Mt. Yang-a-la, the main route at Tingri towards Shelkar. The other was from Nyalam, Mt. Tong-la, and Tingri, joining with the other at Shelkar" 復憶及乾隆戊申年廓爾喀入寇, 本系兩路, 一由濟嚨、宗喀、波絨巴、洋阿拉山、定日大路至協噶爾; 一由聶拉木、通拉山、定日會於協噶爾 (Wu 1985, 132). Cp. Satō 1986; Lai 1984.
180 A place on the way to Shigatse.
181 Report of VS 1850, 3^{r}; BLBJL, vol. 3, QL 53/8/22.
182 For details see Theobald 2020, 119–21.



Map 1: The areas of the Gorkha-Tibet and Sino-Nepalese Wars (drawing by Elias Michaels, 2025). Yellow area: occupied by the Gorkha army in 1789–1790; enlarged part: the battlefields during the Sino-Nepalese War 1791–1792 in Nepal

Kinglin who memorialised the report from the Tibetan ministers, the Gorkhali retreated on 14 September 1788 (QL 53/8/15).[183]

While the Tibetan troops were fighting the Gorkhali, the Tashi (Teshu or Panchen) Lama[184] despatched some lamas from the Tashilhunpo Monastery, together with other lamas from Sakya Monastery to the Gorkhali side to ask for peace negotiations.[185]

It appears that Tibet first did not ask for assistance from China in these negotiations to prevent a conflict that could endanger its autonomy. Concurrently, the Dalai Lama sought the intervention of the *rāja* of Jumla, albeit unsuccessfully.[186] Additionally, in a letter mentioned

183 BLBJL, vol. 7, QL 53/9/19. See also TP 563, 567.

184 The name Tashi was drawn from the place of residence. The Panchen Lama resided in the Tashilhunpo (Tib. bKra shis lhun po) Monastery. By then, the newly selected seventh Panchen Lama was very young. It was probably the brother of the previous Panchen Lama, i.e., Drungpa Hutuktu who acted in his name. Another probability was that the father of the seventh Panchen Lama (dPal ldan Don ʻgrub) acted in his name (TP 590, 10–14).

185 In the Report of VS 1850, 3ʳ, it is the Gorkha Mahārāja who proposes negotiations which, however, were rejected, cp. Cammans 1961, 110–11 and the Tibetan perspective below.

186 In the Report of VS 1850, 3ʳ.

above, the Panchen Lama appealed to Governor-General Charles Cornwallis in Kolkata for military aid, which was tactfully declined on the grounds that the distance between Kolkata and Lhasa is very large, that the Company has always held back towards Gorkha and that the Emperor should not be provoked because of a dispute between Tibet and Gorkha.[187] The Panchen Lama also urged the Governor not to disclose the request, fearing it could provoke the Chinese Emperor if the East India Company intervened to repel the Gorkha threat without involving China. This letter underscores Tibet's desperation and fear of Gorkha aggression.[188]

Bahadur Shah agreed on (or set) the condition that the Tibetans send Minister (Nep. *kājī*, Tib. *bka' blon*)[189] Doring Tenzin Peljor (rDo ring bsTan 'dzin dPal 'byor, 1760–c. 1811) and other "respected men" to Kerung (Kyirong) to the negotiate. Tenzin Peljor had become cabinet minister (*kalon* Tib. *bka' blon*) in 1783 at the age of 23.[190] His career reached its peak when he was appointed as the negotiator for the peace treaty with the invading Gorkha armies in 1788.

Meanwhile, the Emperor sent his imperial guard Bajung (also Pa-chung, Ba-zhong 巴忠) as the special commissioner, who served in the *Lifanyuan* and spoke Tibetan, to Lhasa, together with the General (titled Chin. *jiang-jun* 將軍 / Nep. *cāncun* / Tib. *lcang jun*) Ohūi and the Admiral (titled Chin. *ti-du* 提督 / Tib. *thi'i thu*) Cengde and many soldiers from Sichuan.[191]

187 Diskalkar 1933, n. 6. The Gorkhali had foreseen such a step because already on August 6, 1788, Rana Bahadur Shah had asked the Governor-General not to support the Tibetans after his invasion into Tibet.

188 Cp. Cammann 1951, 116.

189 For the position of cabinet minister, see Komatsubara 2010b.

190 The following is based on Erhard 2020a.

191 However, according to Tenzin Peljor's colleague g.Yu-thog, Bajung did not speak Tibetan to the ministers of Tibet (KRKD QL 57/10–11, 227). Meanwhile, the Chinese military chiefs could not communicate well with the Tibetan government as they could not speak Mongolian or Tibetan (TP 579.10–14). Zhang Zhi-yuan grew up in Dartsemdo and could speak Tibetan (TP 579.14–16) but an edict cited in his biography mentioned his weakness in writing Chinese characters. Therefore, the communication was obstructed by language and script barriers. (《國史大臣列傳正編卷173 至 174》, 清國史館本, 〈卷 173 至 174:(1)許世亨, (2)尚維昇, (3)張朝龍, (4)李化龍, (5)圖欽保, (6)張芝元, (7)彭廷棟, (8)貴林, (9)邁拉遜, (10)范時紀, (11)綽克托, (12)杜玉林, (13)穆精阿, (14)…〉, 故傳 005839 號, 件 *6* , 國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統, 30.) The edict cited was the same as "Grand Council edict to Zhang Zhi-yuan" on 30 August 1788 BLBJL, vol. 1, QL 53/7/29, while the version in BLBJL was largely censored).

While they were on their way, the Dalai Lama and the lamas from Tashilhunpo informed Bajung about the negotiations. The Tibetan lamas consented to these negotiations leading to the withdrawal of the Gorkhali army from Kerung (Kyirong) and Kuti (Nyalam), Dzongka and Phalavan (or Rongshar instead).[192] When the basic principles of treaty had been completed,[193] Bajung thus despatched two military officers, Mukdengga and Zhang Zhi-yuan (Tib. Mu Krang am ban) to be present at the Kyirong meeting,[194] but concealed these negotiations from the Emperor and hid himself behind Ohūi and the two officers.[195]

According to Dh. Vajrācārya and J. Nepāla (1970), the Tibetan leaders (namely the Sakya Trülku, Sakya Trizin) and the Tsongkhapa Trülku (i.e., the Dalai Lama) wanted to make a treaty (*sandhi*) or "'unofficial peace agreement' (Chin. *si-xia jiao-yi* 私下交易) with the Gorkhas by 'paying them off to vacate the territory [occupied by the Gorkhas]' (Chin. *xu yin shu di* 許銀贖地)."[196] In August 1788, they wrote to the Gorkha government offering the peace arrangement (*ghā garnu*) as it is clear from the letter of King Rana Bahadur Shah dated 30 August 1792 deputing the leading *kājī* Damodara Pande to negotiate with the Chinese (see Part II, 2.1.2):

> The Chinese Emperor is not a small, but a great Emperor. By the grace of the venerable goddess, we could have completely driven out the [Chinese] this time [at Nuvakot], but it did not seem to us appropriate to create a permanent conflict with the Emperor (lit. to damage the realm [*ḍhuṅgo*] of the Emperor). Therefore, he too intended to make a [peace] arrangement or negotiation (*ghā*[197]) with us, and we also intended to make [such

192 TP 648, 1–2 *gnya' nang | rong shar | rdzong dga' | skyid grong* […].
193 TP 638–40.
194 TP 642–43.
195 BLBJL has a gap of memorials from the frontier when the negotiation was made between May and July (vols. 19–21, QL 54/5–intercalary5).
196 Theobald 2020, 121. The redemption of territory was much of a disgrace which revealed the incapability of military conquest, while private transaction was still acceptable. Annual payments for peace were made by the Song court to the Tangut, Khitan, and Jurchen rulers in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, which was a national shame.
197 This is glossed *sandhi* by Vajrācārya and Nepāla 1957, 57 understanding it as a formal treaty. It was called "The proof with seals between the headpersons in charge of the pacification of border and those of Balbu, which says the two sides should remain in peace and ask for the Great Emperor through the amban residing in Lhasa upon occasion" 唐古特定邊頭目與巴勒布定邊頭

> a] treaty. Ṭuṃthyāṅ (Fuk'anggan) has also written 'send one of the four Kājīs to China with a letter and presents etc. (*sara-saugāta*) in order to pay a *darśana* to (i.e., to visit) the Emperor'. In the past, our Kājīs also used to got to Tanahu and Lamjung to conclude the treaties (*ghā garnu*) there. We realised that it is not enough not to have sent a Kājī this time (*āja*) to the Emperor. We thought that the senior most *kājī*, Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe, who has received *birtā* land grants, may go.

While on 24 March 1789 (QL 54/2/28) the Qing troops reached the old border of Gorkha,[198] peace talks took place in Kerung in June 1789—apparently, in a tent, because the city was largely destroyed by the Gorkhalis. Appropriately, there was a precisely defined seating arrangement. According to the Report of VS 1890 (3^{v}) and the Chinese report in 1792 (translated in Komatsubara 2017), the particpants of the negotiation is given in Table 1.

During the negotiations and when the major force of the Chinese troops was at Shelkar, the Gorkhalis demanded compensation for the losses incurred due to currency imbalances and roadblocks. However, since the Tibetan government rejected these demands, the Gorkha delegation sought the mediation of the lamas of Tashilhunpo, as well as of the Shamarpa Lama. All three concluded that Lhasa (i.e., the Tibetan side) bore some responsibility,[199] which the Tibetans partially acknowledged, arguing, however, that they could not fully compensate. Upon hearing this, the Gorkhalis demanded either a one-time payment of 5,000,000 rupees[200] or the cession of territory south of the (Maha)

目為嗣後雙方相互和好有事經駐藏大臣奏請聖訓印結 and "*The Proof with Seals on Permanent Friendship*" 永結和好印結 in the Chinese catalogue (Cata. Mnc. no. 7820–21 = 3–2–3271–005 Tib. no. 13147 = 3–2–3410–5, no. 13181–84 = 3–2–3410–4/7, 3–2–3411–14/16). The Tibetan name for the treaty was *Bod Gor-dkar tsho 'grig pa'i 'Chings Khra* ("*The verdict of the Binding Friendship Between the [two] Sides, Tibet and Gorkha,"* DL8, 291), *Bod Gor mThun-grub-kyi Yig-dan* (*The Document to achieve harmony between Tibet and Gorkha*," TP, see Part II, 2.3.2b), or *Chings Khra-ma* (TP passim).

198 Theobald 2020, 121.

199 Following the Report of VS 1850 (3^{r}), two Chinese *ambans* [sent by Bajung] to Kerung supported this view.

200 Chinese sources and TP both speak of three hundred Tibetan ingots of silver, which probably equals "fifteen thousand Indian silver coins (rupees)." (Komatsubara 2017, 184 n. 8). Many other Tibetan officials in Tibet also gave the same amount of payment, reported by Fuk'anggan's memorial received on 20 February and 20 March 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 18, QL 57/1/20, vol. 20, QL 57/2/28). The confession of Tenzin Peljor on 3 January 1793 also gave the

Table 1: Seat order during the negotiations of the Treaty of Kerung (1789)

Witnesses: Hindu and Buddhist deities (including the Chinese Emperor)[i] Chödrup Gyatsho (Tib. Chos grub rgya mtsho, i.e., Shamarpa Lama) as mediator	
Representatives of Tashilhunpo Monastery	9–10 monks of Sakya Monastery
Envoys of the Gorkha King:	Tibetan Government Envoys:
Sāmarpā Lāmā, Minister (*kājī*) Dāmodara Pā̆ḍe, Captain Bom Bahādura Śāha, treasurer Harihara Upādhyāya, Narasiṃ Sāhi et al.	Minister Doring Tenzin Peljor, Minister g.Yu thog (Itu) bKra shis don 'grub,[ii] Treasurer (rTsis dpon / Cin) bDe sbug pa (Devuka), Qing Military officer: Mukdenggga and Zhang Zhi-yuan (Mu Krang am ban) et al., e.g., soldiers such as Yan Ting-liang (Nyan bTsong ye)
500 members (TP 628–29)	50 members (TP 628–29, 641–42)

i Among them Buddha, Mahākāla, Śiva, Brahmā, Umā Devī, Nārāyaṇa; interestingly, the Qing Emperor is also listed as a deity ("the master of the secular law", Rājadharmeśvara 王法之主) but not the Gorkali King who was believed to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu. See Komatsubara 2017, 188 for details. According to TP, the Heavenly Emperor (*gnam bskos 'jam dbyangs gong ma chen po*) was the judge (*khrim bdag*) upon the agreement of Tibet and Gorkha (TP 643, 11–13).

ii Not mentioned in the Report of VS 1850.

Langur, i.e., Khumbu Himal, or an annual payment of 100,000 rupees. The Tibetans did not agree to this proposal.

According to the Report of VS 1850, a truce or "religious agreement" (*dharmapatra*), was signed at the conclusion of the negotiations, with copies produced in both Tibetan and Gorkhali. Later, during the Sino-Nepalese War, the Manchu Great General Fuk'anggan ordered the copies held by Gorkha to be sent out and compared with the Tibetan version. Therefore, there also existed a later Chinese translation of it for the Emperor's reference.

same story (KRKD QL 57/10–11, 200–17). However, in the letter from the Gorkha court to Bootai, the amban residing in Lhasa, it says it was 50,000 coins annually, which was calculated by Fuk'anggan as the equivalent of 300 ingots that is 15,000 *liang* (KRKJL, vol. 23 QL 57/3/9). It would be the equivalent to 9,600 taels of Chinese silver, Bengal, = 57,600 rupees, see Rose 1971, 42 and Theobald 2020, 12. Also, refer to the document *Keruṅsandhisanbandhi Patra Gorkhābhārālāī-Samvat 1843 Bhādra Mā* (see Part II, 2.1.2), where the amount is verified.

a) Chinese Version: Tenzin Peljor noted that they failed to produce a Chinese translation *in situ* in Kyirong in 1789 due to the lack of a literary translator. It was only interpreted by Don 'grub, the translator (*thung si*)[201] Therefore, the existing Chinese Version was a later translation from 1792. In 2017, the Japanese scholar Yuri Komatsubara found a Chinese version of the document in the First Historical Archive in Peking of Grand Council, under *Han-wen lu-fu*.[202] She edited and translated the treaty, segmented it into 12 parts. This is the most detailed version. It begins with 1) invocation of deities and the Emperor and then regulates[203] 2) the reparations, 3) annual payment of 50,001 silver Indian coins, 4) the conversion rate (coins should not be mixed with copper and the new coin should be converted into one and a half old coins), 5) monopolisation of trade route, 6) border issue and taxes, for instance, on salt, butter, etc.; the ownership of land, especially of Mustang and Khumbu area; and further arrangements regarding the relationship between Tibet and Nepal, e.g., 7) the welcoming of Dalai Lama's bi-annual white-washing of the *stūpas* in Kathmandu, 8) the restoration of the business of Newari merchants in Lhasa and Shigatse, 9) the release of abducted Tibetan military officer, 10) the avoidance of weapon and 11) the usual reassurance of mutual friendship between Tibet and the Gorkha, penalties for violating the treaty, and 12) the names and seals of the signatories and attendees at the time the treaty was concluded.

b) Tibetan version: According to TP, four copies and translations of the treaty were made: two each in Tibetan and Nepali.[204] Unfortunately, the bilingual Gorkhali-Tibetan copy, though listed in the catalogue of the First Historical Archive in Peking, has not yet been researched.[205]

c) Nepālī Version, dated Vaiśākha sudi 2 (11 April 1790): The original version has also not yet been found in the Nepalese

201 TP 643–44.
202 *Hanwen Lufu* 3–157–7634–51, QL 57/7/4. The treaty was officially registered in the archives of Peking much later than its original date of signing, as Rose argued that the amban, Tibetans, and Nepalese collaboratively kept the treaty from the Emperor in 1789–1790 (1971, 44).
203 In the following, we summarise Komatsubara 2017.
204 TP 640 and *Hanwen Lufu* 3–157–7634–50, quoted in Komatsubara 2017, 182.
205 Cata. Tib. no. 13183, 13184 = 3–2–3411–16.

archives, but in the Pekingese archive.[206] Yogi Naraharinath edited a document—called *Gorkha ra Bhoṭako Mudrā Sandhi* (VS 1847)[207]—that comprises the following points:

- The exchange rate between the Gorkhali and the Tibetan *mahendramallī* was fixed at two to one.[208]
- Gorkha continues to mint the coins for Tibet.
- The withdraw from Tibetan territory, from "the three border strongholds Nilam (Nyalam), Jongka (Jhunga) and Kirung (Kerung)."[209]
- It is not allowed to change this agreement.

This part was signed by Dunara Sela Huna Thona Ḍupa Phunachopa [rTse drung Don 'grub Phun tsogs from Potala], Dhurina Kājī [Tenzin Peljor], representative Purdun [sPor gdung pa], the "Great Lama's" representative Arjavegi, Esethacyan [Ye shes rgyal mtshan]

- Tibet will pay a sum of 50,001 rupees to the Gorkha King.
- The agreement was witnessed and signed by Bom [Bam] Bahadur Shah, Harihara Upadhyaya, Syama Lal Pande, Tenzin Peljor, Shamarpa Lama, Devuka, and other signatories.

Considering the amalgamation of data from these sources, it seems that because of the Gorkha-Tibet conflict, Gorkha retreated and ceded authority over the area from Kerung to Kuti and further north to Jhunga [Dzongka] and Shikarajang [Shelkar], while Tibet was compelled to pay homage to Nepal, including an annual tribute of 50,001 rupees.

3.1 The Nepalese Perspective

The Report of VS 1850 (2.1.5) aligns with the events described in the previous section in greater detail. The events can be summarised as follows:

206 Ibid.
207 Naraharinātha 1965, 20; see also PART II, 2.1.5; cp. Stiller 1975, 197–98.
208 Zhou Ai-lian (1804/1913, vol. 4, 21) reported the same rate requested by the Gorkhalis, while the official Chinese understanding of the treaty as one for one and a half.
209 Cammann 1951, 119. Geographically speaking, it is more likely to be Rongshar, Nyalam, and Kyirong, which is also verified by Tenzin Peljor (TP 648).

In 1788, the Gorkhali army engaged in a month-long war in Tibet, reaching Shelkar but facing challenging terrain. Despite Tibetan reinforcements, the Gorkha King's army emerged victorious. Subsequently, the lamas proposed peace, leading to negotiations. The Gorkha King's army withdrew, and representatives from both sides met in Kerung. Negotiations included compensation discussions, with the Gorkha King seeking rupee compensation for expenses and losses due to closed Tibetan roads. Despite agreements by the Tibetans, disagreements arose over the amount of compensation. Mediation by the lamas determined Lhasa's fault, but the delegation hesitated to compensate fully. The Gorkha king proposed various solutions, including rupee compensation, restoring the old border, or ceding new territories, but the Lhasa delegation did not agree to any proposals.

Following the conclusion of negotiations, the army chief (*cang-cun*)[210] sent ambans Mutajin and Tanga Tajin to Kerung (Mukdengga and Zhang Zhi-yuan). After thorough discussions, the ambans determined Lhasa's fault and persuaded them to agree to pay 50,000 (*sic*!) rupees annually to the Gorkha King. A religiously solemnised agreement (*dharmapatra*) was issued, and the ambans facilitated peaceful terms between the two sides. The Lhasa representatives deposited the first year's payment in the Gorkha King's treasury. The Gorkha King relinquished control of Kerung, Kuti, Jhuṅgā (Dzongka), and Phalak (Phalavan, Phula). A junior amban returned to Nepāla with the *dharmapatra* paper.

After the negotiations in Kerung, Bahadur Shah sent a delegation led by the "subordinate amban" [Yan Ting-liang][211] together with an *arjī*, presents (*najara*, *tohaphā*) and the vakils Harihara Upadhyaya and Balabhadra Khavasa as well as 20–25 other people to Beijing which they reached after 6 months and where they stayed 45 days receiving fifteen audiences by the Emperor.[212] After fourteen months, they returned with ceremonial robes and credentials of a title for both the king and his regent to Kathmandu.

210 Ohūi was holding the title of General by then. In fact, it might have been Bajung who made the decision. However, Bajung hid himself behind everyone without revealing his name or title to the Gorkhalis (KRKJL, vol. 43, QL 57/10/21).

211 Cp. Mosca 2013, 138.

212 Report of VS 1850, 4^{v}.

3.2 The Tibetan Perspective

According to Tibetan sources,[213] in the spring of 1788, the Kashag (cabinet, Tib. *bka'shag*) warned all border stations that the Gorkhalis were about to invade the country. In the sixth month of 1788, 5,000 Gorkhali troops and 3,000 porters, led by a servant (*g.yog*) of the Shamarpa named Karma mTshog sbyin (Chin. Gar-ma Tuo-jue 噶爾瑪妥覺), indeed reached Nyalam, Rongshar, and Kyirong. Lhasa sent relief troops with two generals (*mda' dpon* Pad tsal Chin. Ba-zai 巴載 and *mda' dpon* lCang lo can Chin. Jiang-jie 將結)[214] to stop the invasion. The ambans residing in Lhasa, Kinglin and Yamantai, memorialised the invasion to the Emperor, whereupon the Emperor sent his imperial guard, Pa-chung (Bajung), who spoke Tibetan, along with troops led by Cengde to Lhasa. While they were on their way, the Gorkhalis retreated from Shelkar (Shikarajang) and Saga (near Dzongka).

The Tibetans were shocked by the invasion of the Gorkhalis who vandalised everything including statues, manuscripts, stupas, and paintings. They were the enemies of the Buddhist teaching (*bstan dgra*).[215] In the hagiography of Men Gompa Künga Penden (sMan bsgom pa Kun dga' dpal ldan), the "physician" of the tenth Shamarpa Lama, the brutality of the invasion is depicted with vivid detail:

> [At the age of] fifty-three years, in the earth-male monkey year [called] *kīlaka* [= 1788], the great army of the Gorkhas like asuras in their fury, with the power of wrong prayers, got ready and proceeded to the realm of Tibet, the region of the north. They made many beings experience severe, inexhaustible suffering. Many local hermitages [and] monasteries, [together with] viharas, where the [wheel of the] Dharma had been turned, were destroyed, and so on. From then on began what became like a summer flood of the change of times and what is known up to now as the 'Crisis of the Earth Monkey [Year].'[216]

213 Our following account is primarily based on the biography Tenzin Peljor (TP 561f), used by Shakabpa (1967, 158–67) and Li (2002).

214 TP 561–62. The former was sent to Peking for his failure of defense (TP 656.8f; BLBJL, vol. 21, QL 53/6/20), while the later was abducted to the Kathmandu Valley and died of illness in 1791 (TP 828).

215 TP 577.

216 Ehrhard 2007, 125.

The autobiography of Rindzin Chöying Dorjé (Rig 'dzin Chos dbyings rDo rje, 1772–1838) also stresses the gruesome brutality of the Gorkhalis:

> In his writing, he compared the battlefield to the frightening land of the *rākṣasa* in Lanka. These figures, who originate from Indian mythology, are demons said to drink blood and eat human flesh. He added that everybody in the camp, Buddhists and non-Buddhists, were frightened by 'garlands of flesh and skin' that could be seen everywhere. This probably refers to body parts and remains that could be seen strewn about, a consequence of the war and its violent actions.[217]

Clearly, there was a disagreement between China and Tibet on the question of China's involvement in military conflicts. An old lama in charge of the storehouse of Tashilhunpo named rNam rgyal (*bKra shis lhunp po'i gnyer tsang rnying pa bla ma rNam rgyal*) sent a letter to his old friend of Shamarpa, saying that the Chinese army (*rgya dmag*) would be a great disturbance to all the three, China, Tibet and Nepal (*rgya bod bal gsum tshang mar*).[218]

While Cengde (Tib. Khrin Thi'i thu) with 2,000 troops was on his way to Lhasa, the Gorkhalis retreated from Shelkar and Saga. By the time, the amban Kinglin, probably influenced by the Tibetan government, tried to inform the troops to stop marching, constantly telling them that the Gorkhalis had retreated and the Sakya Hutuktu sent people to make peace in September and October.[219] Tenzin Peljor remarked that Cengde was rather enthusiastic in marching forward quickly.[220] A short time later, the vanguard of the Chinese army led by Cengde reached Lhasa. Tenzin Peljor accompanied the Chinese troops to Tashilhunpo, from where Cengde's further march was obstructed for various reasons. Shakabpa interpreted his biography as:

> All arrangements had been made at Shigatse for the speedy advance of the army. Fresh horse, and rations were on hand. Still, Shen T'ai-tu [Cengde, who held the title Ti-du] spent five days at Shigatse, making a number of petty excuses for delaying the

217 Erschbamer 2018, 135.
218 TP 591, 9–18.
219 BLBJL, vol. 7, QL 53/9/16; vol. 10, QL 53/10/7.
220 See also TP 567, 569.

> advance. After holding a number of meetings with his officers [Zhang Zhi-yuan and other rGyal-rong officers], Shen [Cengde] told me that if we advanced without waiting for the main body of the imperial army to catch up, we would be inviting defeat and disgrace. If we remain at Shigatse until the main army joined us, our total number would be too great for the resources of the town. He then asked me if I had a solution to the problem. I received the impression that the officer wanted to avoid a fight. I gave my opinion that the Tibetan troops were doing well, and since the Chinese troops looked even more capable, we were certain to defeat the Gurkhas if we advanced. If we attacked and drove the Gurkhas out now, then we would be in a stronger bargaining position when the rest of the imperial troops did arrive. Then, if the Gurkhas did not comply with our demands, we could march into Nepal. Shen T'ai-tu [Cengde] then openly asked me if there was no way in which we could negotiate with the Gurkhas and suggested that I write to the Dalai Lama about it. I told him that I would not pass my responsibilities on to the Dalai Lama. We had been sent to Shigatse to fight, and fight we must![221]

While they were waiting for more imperial troops to join, winter had set in so that the Chinese troops finally stayed in Shelkar for eight months.[222] In the spring of 1789, the Tibetans contacted Chödrup Gyatsho, the tenth Shamarpa (see below, Part I, 4), in Nepal who suggested that the parties meet in Kyirong for negotiations. Bajung, the special commissioner, must have been in favour of it as well. In the end, the Tibetan and Chinese

221 Shakabpa 1967, 159 = TP 567–73. The strong exclamation at last cannot be found in the published edition. It might be from the other recension held by Shakabpa (van der Kuijp and Tien 2022, 9 n. 12). In the edition, Tenzin Peljor expressed the urgency and futility of reporting back and forth, requesting the army to march forward. He also mentioned that the Tibetan local officers were bullied by the Chinese troops in the name of their failure to prepare for service, while the Chinese troops waited further. Interestingly, Cengde was commemorated as who insisted on fighting at first after the campaigns ended (KRKJL, *Poems by the Emperor*, part 3). The Emperor wrote a poem to commemorate his merit that begins with, "He argued with Bajung, which reveals his ambition [in fighting]" 曾爭巴忠, 尚有雄心.

222 They probably did not transport provisions from Sichuan but relied on local supply, as the Emperor did order that the Tibetan government should supply the provisions late to be paid according to their value by the Chinese (BLBJL, vol. 4, QL 53/8/23).

delegations made their way to Kyirong, where they arrived five days before the Gorkhalis.

Tenzin Peljor, accompanied by representatives from two Tibetan monasteries, Sakya and Tashilhunpo, met with Gorkha officials in Kyirong. The Gorkhalis, led by Bam Bahadur Shah, cited three main reasons for their occupation of Tibet: they blamed the Tibetans for the death of their king (Prithvi Narayan, Tib. Pi ti ṇa raṇ), believing the king had been cursed, as the Tibetans supported Sikkim against Gorkha; they accused the Tibetans of neglecting to resolve issues related to currency exchange between old and new coins; and they expressed concerns over Tibetan military preparations in the Back of Tibet, which they saw as a potential threat to their own country. The Gorkhalis demanded an annual payment of 300 *rdo tshad*[223] (equivalent to 9,600 *taels* of silver)[224] and proposed tithing on gold mining and salt import, while also insisting on exempting Nepalese merchants in the occupied regions from taxation.

During the negotiations, Tenzin Peljor described Shamarpa Lama as "very proud and pleased with himself."[225] Shakabpa summarises Tenzin Peljor's account of the result of the negotiations as follows:

> We agreed to devalue all impure Nepalese coins being used in Tibet. The old coins, which had no impurities, would have the same value as the new coins being minted in Nepal. It was agreed that Tibetan salt would contain no impurities and that the border inspectors would strictly enforce this rule. Rice and salt must be valued at the current market price, to which of course there is no limitation. Any Nepalese rice trader having to stay in Tibet at an inn must be given free accommodation and firewood; but ten per cent of his sales from rice will have to be given the innkeeper. Tibetan merchants are not permitted to enter Nepal for any purpose of trade or exchange. If a Nepalese subject commits any crime in Tibetan territory, he will be tried and punished by the Nepalese representative in that area. Tibetan officials will have no jurisdiction in the case. To recover the four districts captured by the Gurkhas, Tibet must pay Nepal an annual tribute

223 TP 648, 1.
224 Li 2002, 144.
225 Shakabpa 1967, 161. See also TP 642.17–643.9: Shamarpa could speak Gorkhali, Chinese, and Tibetan. He was compared to Devadatta (Lha sbyin), the cousin of the Buddha.

> of 300 *dotsed* [*rdo tshad*]. The Nepalese agreed to withdraw their troops immediately on receipt of the first year's tribute.
>
> Addendum: Three hundred *dotsed* have to be paid the first year; but if a senior and responsible Tibetan official visits Nepal in the next year and requests a reduction in the amount of tribute, the Nepalese agree to take it under consideration.[226]

This agreement,[227] together with the addendum, was signed and sealed in two copies by the delegations with Shamarpa as a witness. At the same time, the Tibetans wanted to include China as an arbitrator. Zhang Zhi-yuan and Mukdengga refused to officially stamp the agreement because there was no tradition to do so for the addenda in China. Their proposal to draft the agreement in Chinese was rejected by the Tibetans due to the lack of a literate translator but only an interpreter (Tib. *thung si*, Chin. *tong-shi* 通事).[228] So it happened that the written addendum was not approved by the Chinese side[229] and they were therefore not guilty of signing such a humiliating private contract during the following Sino-Nepalese War. Tenzin Peljor complained in his recollection that the Chinese officers in fact removed their own seals on the treaty before giving them to the Emperor after the Sino-Nepalese War, as narrated by Shakabpa:

> Kalon Doring states in his memoirs that the Chinese were so ashamed of their conduct that they took the original treaty away with them and removed the portion bearing their own seals before showing it to the Manchu Emperor. In a letter he wrote to the father of the Dalai Lama, Kalon Doring said that there was little difference between the Gurkhas and the Chinese. The former looted and killed because they came as enemies; but the Chinese did the same thing, and they came as friends. Owing to the misconduct of his subordinate officers and failure in his responsibilities, Pachung [Bajung], the Manchu [in fact,

226 Shakabpa 1967, 161; see also TP 635–40.
227 The following summarises Li 2002, 144–50.
228 TP 643–45. The Chinese stamps were indeed not mentioned in the later Chinese translation of this treaty (Komatsubara 2017, 195).
229 According to Deng 2009, the Emperor in fact considered the Dalai Lama to be fully responsible for the 1789 treaty.

> a Mongolian bannerman] aide-de-camp [i.e., special commissioner 欽差], committed suicide after his return to China.[230]

In the end, the Chinese officials further demanded that the Gorkhalis be liable to congratulate the Emperor with an envoy (*gnang chags kyi mtshams zhu'i mi sna*) annually from now on.[231] Yan Ting-liang (Tib. Nyan bTsong ye), a minor military officer of the Green Standard army, was thus sent to Kathmandu for it. The imperial commissioner, Bajung saw the result as a great success and memorialised his victory in pacifying the conflict to the court but concealed the true agreement. Bajung was celebrated and highly decorated for the military success of the Gorkhali retreat.

As arranged in Kyirong, the Gorkhalis were preparing for their first tributary mission. Shakabpa describes these events by summarising the biography of Tenzin Peljor:

> The main body of the imperial army returned, while one general with a few troops waited at She[l]kar to escort the Nepalese envoy to China. A month later two Gurkhas, Hari Sahib [Upadhyaya] and Bala Bahadur [i.e., Balbhadra Khavas], arrived with ten assistants bringing presents for the Emperor. They accompanied the general back to China. The Tibetans also sent an envoy.[232]

Shakabpa further commented: "It is clear from Tibetan sources that the Chinese army was more of a hindrance than a help to Tibet in the [first] war with Nepal". However, unlike Shakabpa's comment that the Tibetans were against the treaty, the eighth Dalai Lama was pleased by the agreement between Tibet and Gorkha, giving blessings to all

230 Shakabpa 1967, 161–62 = TP 646.

231 *de rjes rgya dpon gnyis nas gsung rigs su bod ljongs kyi skye rgu rnams kyang | gong ma chen por 'go 'dren skyabs mgon bcol te /|/ khrims bdag tu bkur grub pa yin gshis | 'di lo nas bzungs lo gnang chags kyi mtshams zhu'i mi sna gtong dgos zhes gsungs song bar |* "Then the two Chinese [military] officers said that the people of the Tibetan territory also entrust the Great Emperor as the patron-protector, venerating him as the judge. Hence, beginning from this year, it is said that one should send messenger of congratulations of presents" (TP 646.18–647.4). See also TP 958.3–4: *gor-kha'i mtshams zhus mi sna…*

232 Shakabpa 1967, 161–62; Cammann 1951, 122.

negotiators.[233] More essentially, some of the Tibetan representatives were sent from Potala. The uncle of Dalai Lama was in power by that time and sent a written instruction to urge Tenzin Peljor.[234] As we have seen in the previous chapters, the Potala representative was also present in Kyirong during negotiation. The eighth Dalai Lama got away with any blame later, because Fuk'anggan told the Emperor that Dalai was not aware of it.

Nevertheless, there was indeed opposition from the Tibetan side. The Tibetan Regent, Ngawang Tshülthrim was annoyed and criticised Tenzin Peljor seriously for allowing this to happen:

> In the earth-monkey year (1788), the little barbarian country of the Gurkha even dared to invade our state of Buddhism. You, ministers and local chieftains, brought up by milk, are such a group of cowards. [Qing] generals [referring to Bajong (Ba-zhong), E'hui and Chengde] cheated the great Emperor and covered up the truth. You not only did not insist on declaring a war against the Gurkha, but, even signed the Tibeto-Gurkha peace treaty, turning such an important matter into trivia. Particularly you. Duke Bstan 'dzin dpal 'byor, bright and quick-minded at a young age, were at one time considered a reincarnated lama. I had a very high hope on you and had assumed that you would be up to serving the government just as well as the former minister Tshe ring dbang rgyal and your own father Pandita. But I was wrong. I cannot believe that you agreed to hand over such a large amount in payment to the Gurkha.[235]

Tibet was not be able to follow the treaty. It invoked the Addendum, which required new negotiations and sending envoys to Kathmandu. After all kinds of suspicious clarifications regarding the composition of the delegations, the location of the negotiations and status issues, they met at Chongdui in Nyalam ("Tshong 'du in gNya' nang") in

233 […] *zhva dmar mgron gnyer Ye shes rgyal mtshan rnams nas Bod Gor dkar tsho 'grig pa'i 'chings khra spyan zhus la | so sor go bab gyi gsol ras bskyangs |* "[Father of the seventh Panchen, Tenzin Peljor, ministers, officers from Saskya and Tashilhunpo…] and Ye shes rgyal mtshan, the attendant of Shamarpa etc., requested [Dalai's] vision of the agreement between the parties, namely, Tibet and Gorkha. They were given gifts according to their ranks respectively." (DL8, 291.17–19).

234 TP 637.10.

235 Li 2002, 134 = TP 724–25, cp. Deng 2007a and 2009.

1791.[236] Since the Gorkhalis suspected the Tibetan intention to kidnap Shamarpa, they captured the Tibetan delegation led by Tenzin Peljor and immediately invaded Tibet.

3.3 The Chinese Perspective

Unlike the Tibetan sources that contain details about peace negotiations and battles, the Chinese sources concerning the events in Tibet during 1788–1789 appear to be vague. Everyone had their own agenda in their memorialisations. The Tibetan ministers and the ambans might want to get less imperial involvement, while the military officers would like to get rewards and accumulate wealth. Bajung would like to please the Emperor as soon as possible so that he can go back home, as we see his rushing back after the peace treaty of Kyirong. Some of the memorials about the battlefronts were even contradictory. While the amban reported that the Gorkhalis ran away so as to ask for the cessation of mobilising troops, the military officers might have reported combats to request an award from the Emperor. Most of the memorials from the ambans conveyed the messages provided by the Tibetan ministers, whereas later memorials from Bajung concealed many incidents, fabricating acceptable stories for the Emperor. Therefore, we will focus on the courtly decision in this chapter, emphasising how the Emperor understood the event, while the memorialised frontier information will be given in the calendric summary (Table 2 in Part I, 5.4). It was only later in 1792 that the full story of negotiation was told to the Emperor after various investigations.

The Chinese Emperor reacted to the invasion quickly by dispatching Ohūi and Bajung from the summer capital. He immediately ordered Cengde to march from Sichuan as well.[237] He was extremely annoyed by Kinglin's reaction and punished him severely.[238] Nevertheless, he could not understand the complexity of the battlefront. Sometimes, the memorials appeared to be ambiguous and even disprove each other. For the worse, these unauthenticated reports were even delayed frequently so that the Emperor was wondering why Cengde failed to memorialise regularly at the beginning of the year 1789.[239] Eventually, he could only

236 Li 2002, 153.
237 BLBJL, vol. 1.
238 BLBJL, vol. 6, QL 53/9/11; vol. 15, QL 53/12/23; Haenisch 1959.
239 BLBJL, vol. 16, QL 54/1/3.

accept the excuse that the troop could not find a route through Mount Tong-la (Tib. mThong la) toward Nyalam and thus stayed stationed around Shelkar for months.

Regarding the negotiation, the Tibetan source by Tenzin Peljor makes it clear to us that Zhang Zhi-yuan (Figure 6) and Mukdengga were dispatched to Kyirong for the peace negotiation. However, Bajung reported that he sent the two officers to summon the Gorkha chiefs.[240] Zhang Zhi-yuan, a Chinese as he was, could not write Chinese well, while Mukdengga was a Manchu bannerman. They were also subordinate to Bajung. It was probably Bajung who polished his memorials, reporting the fake news that the Gorkhali chiefs did kowtow to Mukdengga and Zhang Zhi-yuan. Bajung continued to keep the Emperor busy with other Tibetan affairs.[241] The Emperor was indeed deceived by Bajung and accepted the so-called "surrender".[242]

Moreover, Bajung and his delegation were familiar with the imperial system and knew that a tributary envoy upon the Emperor's birthday would please him. So was it arranged. The Emperor indeed paid much more attention to the tributary envoy than the physical conquest. He curiously inquired whether there would be a group of musicians together with the envoy. He was approaching 80 years old (in 1790) and the 60th reigning year (in 1795), which he set as a goal as well as a limit. He was keenly preparing to celebrate and enhance the imperial and personal glory among his East and Central Asian vassals, as many envoys from subordinate or ritually subordinate states would come to have an audience with him. Playing the music of Gorkha at court would add a brilliant touch to his merits.

Probably because of Qianlong's greater interest in his birthday party next year, despite various mistakes in Bajung's memorials, he eventually forgave Bajung with only minor reproaches.[243] Being assured of no more punishment, Bajung rushed back to Sichuan and further toward Peking to his family, disregarding the edicts requesting him to meet Shamarpa.[244] The Emperor rejoiced and considered the "campaign" to be one of his achievements.

240 BLBJL, vol. 19, QL 54/5/2.
241 BLBJL, vol. 20, 22.
242 BLBJL, vol. 21, QL 54/6/2. The Emperor expressed his worries that the Tibetans were reporting hyperbolic fake news from the very beginning in his Edict to Kinglin (BLBJL, vol. 4, QL 53/8/23).
243 E.g. BLBJL, vol. 17, QL 54/2/22.
244 BLBJL, vol. 23, QL 54/6/20; vol. 24, QL 54/8/10; vol. 26, QL 54/9/27. Emperor Qianlong's mentioning Bajung's family also reveals their intimate relationship



Figure 6: The Chinese Military Officer Zhang Zhi-yuan (source: Wikimedia Commons)

It should be noted that simultaneously in 1789 the Qing troops faced difficulties in the Vietnamese War. Even though Sun Shi-yi was fully defeated by the Vietnamese, Fuk'anggan managed to negotiate with the Vietnamese ruler who bribed his retreat. The Vietnamese ruler eventually

between the master (Mnc. *ejen*) and his slaves (Mnc. *aha*) in the Manchurian culture (cp. Swen 2021, 7–9).

decided to present the tribute by "himself".[245] Nevertheless, from the imperial perspective of the Qing Dynasty, it was a great success.

The result of the Gorkha-Tibet War is summarised by Wei Yüan (1794–1857) in the 1840s, 50 years after the first Gorkha-Tibet War. Despite some mistakes, his comments were quite precise.[246] Given the popularity of this text in both China and Japan, it reflects a later common understanding of the Chinese reaction between 1788 and as more of extravagance and disgrace than glory.

> [Wei Yüan:] Gorkha found pretexts that the commercial taxes increased and that the Tibetan salt [sold to them] was mixed with clay. They thus mobilised troops and crossed the frontier. The Tibetan troops could not defend themselves. The imperial guard (Mnc. *hiya*), Bajung, was dispatched by the court to assist [Tibet] and annihilate [the enemy] along with Generals Ohūi and Cengde. They tried to bring an end to the event by bribing peace. They secretly ordered the Tibetan Khenpo (Tib. mKhan po) to privately promise an annual payment of 15,000 [in fact, 300] ingots while holding the army from battle. At that time, the Dalai Lama did not agree. However, Bajung polished his memorial, saying the enemy had surrendered. [Bajung and others] tactfully persuaded the Gorkha tribal chieftain to pay tribute and be conferred the title of [Erdeni] King. For this campaign, not even one weapon was involved in a battle, whereas provisions cost millions [of ingots].[247]

The Emperor understood the conflict between Gorkha and Tibet to be essentially based on commercial issues as well as the timidity and thriftiness of the Tibetan people so that the Gorkhalis were not initially defeated and marched forward.[248] He was worried about further conflicts and ordered Ohūi to improve the military power in Tibet.[249]

245 There are disputes whether he came in person or delegated a fake "king". Da-nan, vol. 30, 31–37; Ngô-gia văn-phá chapter 15.

246 Quoted from Haenisch 1959, 9.

247 It was true that almost 1.5 million ingots of silver were raised for this "campaign", while around 600,000–700,000 were used in the end (Lai 1984, 428, 430). See also《宮中檔奏摺-乾隆朝》, 李世傑 奏,〈奏為遵旨查明此次官兵赴藏至將來凱旋時撤回內地約計應用軍需銀兩分晰查明具覆(附件:附奏接奉上諭之摺片)〉, 乾隆 53 年 10 月 27 日, 故宮 081340 號, 頁 *1*, 國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統.

248 Potala inscription (Part II, 2.2.5 [2]).

249 Deng 2008; BLBJL, vol. 23.

These worries proved to be reasonable, as the Sino-Nepalese War soon happened. However, the Emperor was deeply influenced by the narration given by Bajung, despite Bajung's suicide in September 1791. He was rather confident that Bajung dared not to deceive him. Meanwhile, Bootai also memorialised that Tenzin Peljor went to Nyalam for the restoration of temples, a check on the border, and the discussion of debts with the Gorkhalis.[250] Thus, in 1791, the Emperor still thought that the Tibetans owed money to Gorkha in previous transactions. He once decided to pay the money for the Tibetans, using his own treasury to close the case. Meanwhile, as an emperor, he remained suspicious and ordered other ministers to do more investigations. Eventually, he found discrepancies in the reports and realised the existence of a peace treaty during the Gorkha-Tibetan conflict. In a later edict on the drought in 1793, he took this as a cautionary example, saying that he should have figured out the deceitfulness of Bajung and reacted earlier.[251]

***

The events at the frontiers after the Kyirong agreement remain somewhat unclear. We do not know whether the Gorkhalis fully retreated from Rongshar, Kyirong, and Nyalam after signing the Kyirong Treaty. The most detailed account, provided by Leo Rose,[252] relies on Chinese sources and often overlaps with accounts of the Sino-Nepalese War. However, it is certain that in the autumn of 1789, Rana Bahadur Shah dispatched a delegation to the imperial court in Peking. This mission, led by the *vakila* Harihara Upadhyaya, Balabhadra Khavasa, and approximately twenty to twenty-five other officials, aligns with the details in the Report of VS 1850. The delegation brought customary ceremonial gifts such as Gorkhali swords and palm leaves-manuscripts,[253] embarking on a six-month journey. Having arrived at Peking before the full moon of the 12th lunar month of QL 54 (January 1790),[254] they were warmly received on 4 February 1790, the traditional beginning of

250 Yuan Yi Lai, no. 860; Deng 2009, 21. The versions preserved in WZTZ, vol. 13.1 and KRKJL, vol. 1 were intensively censored.
251 Deng 2009, 24. *Veritable Records QL*, vol. 1403, QL 57/intercalary 4 /Bing-shen.
252 Rose 1971, 52–67.
253 BLBJL, *Poems by the Emperor*, vol. 26, Final Edict.
254 BLBJL, *Poems by the Emperor*.

spring. During their forty-five-day stay in Peking, they were granted fifteen audiences with the Emperor, often accompanied by envoys from other countries, and received various gifts and ceremonial robes. A translator, Ma Ting-xiang, was also rewarded for his service.[255] He later served as translator for Fuk'anggan and Yang Kui in 1792. Rana Bahadur was honoured with the Manchu-Chinese title *erdeni wang* (Chin. 額爾德尼王), meaning "Brilliant King" (literally "King of Treasure", Sanskritised as *ratnarāja*), while Bahadur Shah received the title *kung* (Chin. 公 *gong*), signifying "Duke." After fourteen months, the delegation returned to Kathmandu. The Emperor took great delight in the reception of the tributary envoy from such a distance.

To sum up, the sources agree that a meeting happened in Kyirong regarding the currency and trade problems, although earlier Chinese memorials concealed the nature of its being a peace negotiation and reported that the Gorkhalis did kowtow to the Chinese military chiefs.[256] Written documents about the agreement of Kyirong were made as proof, while their existence was deliberately kept from the Chinese Emperor. That this agreement was not to last long is part of the chapter after next. Before that, however, it is necessary to address the shady role of an intermediary in Kerung.

255 *Qianlong Veritable Records,* vol. 1346.
256 BLBJL, vol. 21, QL 54/6/2; Cata. Mnc. no. 7624 = 3–2–3408–029.

4 The Role the Tenth Shamarpa Lama, Chödrup Gyatsho

Lobsang Palden Yeshe (Tib. Blo bzang dPal ldan Ye shes) was the sixth Panchen Lama (also known as Tashi Lama or Teshu Lama and abbot of the Tashilhunpo Monastery, one of Tibet's most important Geluk monasteries, that was founded in Shigatse in 1447 by the First Dalai Lama, Gendun Drub (Tib. dGe 'dun Grub pa). Lobsang Palden Yeshe was the elder stepbrother of the tenth Shamarpa, Mipam Chödrup Gyatsho (Tib. Chos grub rGya mtsho, 1733–1792). The Panchen Lama was also the younger brother of Drungpa Hutuktu (Tib. Drung pa sPrul sku, Chin. Zhong-ba Hu-tuk-tu), who also accompanied him to Jehol and Peking in 1780 and served as the treasurer of Tashilhunpo. The three were uterine brothers. When Lobsang Palden Yeshe died in November 1780 of smallpox in Peking after the celebration of the 70th birthday of the Emperor, there were severe inheritance disputes between his brothers, Drungpa Trülku and Chödrup Gyatsho (Shamarpa Lama) (Figure 7). These disputes caused turbulences in the relationship between Nepal, Tibet and China.

During this conflict, Shamarpa Lama came to Nepal. The reasons for this have been reported differently. He fled to Kathmandu either in 1784 or 1786,[257] or, according to a document of 9 June 1788, took refuge there,[258] together with fifteen "influential men of Tibet."[259] According to the *Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī* (20.90),[260] Shamarpa fled to Kathmandu as he did not receive any share or benefit in the division of the treasures following the passing of his elder brother.[261] So was the

257 Ehrhard 2007, 119 and 121; Erhard 2020a; according to Shakabpa 1967, this took place in 1786; see Stiller 1975, 195–96; according to Li 2002, 142, he went on a pilgrimage in 1784. Ohūi reported that Shamarpa went on a pilgrimage to the stupas in 1783 (QL 48) (BLBJL, vol. 14, QL 53/12/6).

258 See Part II, 2.1.1; Boulnois 1989, 86, Li 2002, 142.

259 Regmi 1975, 430.

260 Misleadingly known as the Wright Chronicle.

261 Cammann 1951, 112.



Figure 7: Chödrup Gyatso, the Tenth Shamarpa Lama (1742–1792), painting on cloth, 63,5 × 40,6 cm (source: Wikimedia Commons/Rubin Museum of Art)

understanding of the Chinese sources.[262] Another possible reason for Shamarpa's flight to Kathmandu could have been his fear stemming from rumours that the Panchen Lama was poisoned or committed suicide in Beijing.[263]

It is also said that he went there on a semi-official pilgrimage[264] to whitewash the two stupas of Svayambhunath[265] and Bodhnath together with "a monk official, dGa' ldan bKa' bcu[pa] and a 'doctor' (Tib. *em chi*) from the private treasury of the [Eighth] Dalai Bla ma […], as was the custom."[266] Shamarpa's cousin,[267] the cabinet minister, Tenzin Peljor's report suggests that Shamarpa Lama was on an official mission to deal with the coinage problem.[268]

After Shamarpa Lama reached Kathmandu ruled by "the evil king of Gorkha, possessed by the chief of demons and cursed with the thought and deeds of a jealousy that could not bear the wealth and prosperity of others",[269] he is said to have gained significant influence within the Rana administration.

However, after some time, Shamarpa fell ill and called in 1786 the "doctor and medical practitioner"[270] Men Gompa Künga Penden (sMan bsGom pa Kun dga' dpal ldan, 1735–1804), from Yol mo to treat him. In the genealogy, *Brag dkar rta so sPrul sku Chos kyi dbang phyug,* it is stated that from then on Men Gompa Künga Penden treated Chödrup Gyatsho "for a long time."

While the entourage of Shamarpa Lama, the monk and the doctor, returned to Tibet, though without having been able to fulfil their wish to whitewash Buddhist receptacles for the Tibetan government, he himself remained in the Kathmandu Valley.

262 KRKJL, *Poems by the Emepror*, part 1, 18–20; Zhang 1988, 465–66. See also Part II, 2.2.8, 2.

263 Cammann 1951, 112; Regmi 1975, 429; Stiller 1975, 196 and 203. It was likely that these rumours were spread by Shamarpa himself (Yongdan 2021, 76).

264 Stein 1972, 99; cp. *Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī* 20.90.

265 Kunwar 1962, 291.

266 Ehrhard 2007, 119.

267 KRKD QL 57/11, 214.

268 Ehrhard 2007, 120.

269 Tenzin Peljor in Ehrhard 2007, 119. According to Tenzin Peljor's autobiography, he did not have a favorable view of Nepal. Tenzin Peljor described it as "a land of foreigners" (Tib. *phyi rol pa*), in contrast to a land of insiders, which are Buddhists (*nang pa*). He referred to the country in this way due to the prevalence of practices like animal sacrifices (*dmar mchod*) and suttee (*bud med gson bsergs*), which he found troubling. He also disliked the food made of rice flour in the region (see Part II, 2.3.2c).

270 Ehrhard 2007, 125.

According to Tibetan and Chinese sources, he apparently more and more stirred up unrest, betrayed the immensely valuable treasures of the Tashilhunpo monastery[271] (Figures 8–9) and incited the Gorkhalis to rob the monastery after Tibet had failed to meet its payment obligations.[272] Leo Rose calls this an "obvious fabrication", because the huge wealth of the monasteries was "no mystery to Kathmandu due to the thousands of Nepali traders and pilgrims who had travelled in Tibet."[273] However, his influence could be seen by the fact that he presided over the negotiations in Kyirong as part of the Gorkhali delegation.

According to the Report of VS 1850 (5^{r-v}), the high official and Dalai Lama's treasurer named Cin Devuka (rTsis bDe sbug [pa]) visited Kathmandu in 1791 to renegotiate tribute payments as arranged in the addendum to the agreement of Kerung and to request forgiveness for not being able to pay the annual payment. He asked the Gorkha officials to first arrest Shamarpa Lama and bring him to Lhasa, accusing him of causing disturbances. Devuka, described in the Report as "friendly on the surface but treacherous within", blamed Shamarpa Lama for the ongoing troubles and demanded his return to Lhasa.

Bahadur Shah, however, remained adamant on the long-overdue payment of 100,000 rupees. According to the Rajput code of honour,[274] they were obligated not to hand over the refugee Shamarpa Lama to

271 Markham 1876, lxxvi; Kunwar 1962, 288; Rose 1971, 37. The wealth of the Monastery has been described by Zhao Yi (2.2.2) as follows: "The residencies of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen all have gold-casted tiles on the halls. All the precious seats, girders, columns, and rails were embedded with pearls, jades, and gems. Their colours gleam so brightly that one cannot look at them closely. They are indeed well-decorated (*avataṃsaka*) storeyed pavilions furnished with seven jewels (*sapta-ratna*) [as mentioned in the Buddhist *sūtra*s]." The Tashilhunpo monastery was restored after the cultural revolution with huge amount of state investment, see Namgyal 1988 Tanjun 1993; Phun tshogs rnam rgyal 2010.

272 Kunwar 1962, 288; Shakabpa 1967, 158, Erschbamer 2018, 128. Bootai reported that he had the intention to abduct his stepbrother from Tashilhunpo (KRKJL, vol. 4, QL 56/10/6).

273 Rose 1971, 37; Li (2002, 142) casts doubt in this "puzzle" as well. However, the huge donation from Manchu and Mongolian rulers to the Tashilhunpo monastery reached there only in the 1780s. Even though the wealth of Tashilhunpo was known to many, the newly acquired wealth might have not been known to Nepal. During the invasion, the major robbery also occurred to these new donations instead of the old wealth. Therefore, Shamarpa might indeed have infomred the Gorkhalis of the new acquisition of the Tashilhunpo monastery. He might have complained that he was excluded from the distribution of the new donation.

274 CPC X, no. 851, 179 (letter of Rana Bahadur Shah to Gajarāja Miśra).




Figure 8: Tashilhunpo Monastery, Shigatse, between 1844–1862 (from the Wise collection, British Library, © British Library Board, shelfmark: Add.Or.3016 f.2)



Figure 9: Burial chorten of the tenth Panchen Lama (constructed in 1993), Tashilhunpo Monastery, Shigatse, 2018 (source: Wikimedia Commons)

his adversaries.[275] Such protection might have resulted in rumours that Bahadur Shah had an affair with Shamarpa's consort, which was certainly not true.[276] However, Bahadur Shah did have a good relationship with Shamarpa.

The treasurer Devuka summoned Lhasa's ministers Tenzin Peljor and g.Yu thog (玉托) bKra shis don 'grub to the border near Nyalam and Sindhupalchok in 1791, where he met his demise. Once again, Shamarpa Lama took on the role of mediator. Bahadur Shah despatched officials to negotiate with Lhasa's representatives in Nyalam, but upon suspecting their intentions to seize Shamarpa Lama, they abducted the officials from Lhasa, including Tenzin Peljor and g.Yu thog. Chinese military officers Wang Gang (王剛) and Feng Da-cheng (馮大成) were also among the abducted group. They were sent as captives to the Kathmandu Valley.[277]

The "doctor and medical practitioner," Men Gompa Künga Penden, provides the following account of the events:

> In that very year, during [the negotiations of] a peace treaty between Tibet [and] Gorkha at gNya'-nang [Nyalam], [the treaty] fell through because of the false and deceitful Tibetan ways, so that a host of manipulating Gorkhas, [who were] ungentle and deceitful, overthrew most of the Tibetans. And when many influential persons, including the ruling pair of Tibetan ministers (=rDo-ring bsTan-'dzin dpal-'byor [Tenzin Peljor] and g.Yu-thog-pa bKra-shis don-grub [Yuthok Tashi Dhondup, G.Yu-thog]) and representatives of the members of the two main monasteries (=bKra-shis lhun-po [Tashilhunpo] and dGa'-ldan [Ganden]) were guided [as hostages] to Bal-yul [Nepāla = Kathmandu Valley], [and when] in addition manifold suffering [occurred owing to] the disturbance of the elements, including the fever of the gorges, [the effects of drinking] turbid water and so forth, Kun-dga' dpal-'byor [Kunga Peljor] provided a variety of medical remedies. In particular, when the great steward of the All-Knowing [Third] Panchen [Bla-ma] slipped, with extremely great clarity [Kun-dga' dpal-ldan] bowed down in service [to him] and by calming the pain of many distressing diseases, [he

275 Kunwar 1962, 290.
276 KRKD QL 57/6, 134.
277 Cp. Theobald 2020, 126; KRKD QL 57/11, 229–31.

> succeeded in getting the steward to] recover his breath and rest [again] in [a state of] happiness.[278]

According to the autobiography of Tenzin Peljor,[279] Bahadur Shah was worried that the Tibetan captives might be connected with the Tibetan population around Betravati and Kyirong and that they would not be accustomed to the warm climate in Kathmandu. The Tibetan captives were first brought to a mountain around the Kathmandu Valley and then to Changu Narayan (Tib. gTsang kun ṇa raṇ = Khyung rong byon), an ancient Vaishnava site on a hilltop near Bhaktapur in the Valley, while Wang Gang and Feng Da-cheng were brought to a dark room in Kathmandu.[280] Later, they were moved near Bodhnath (Tib. Bya rung kha shor)[281] apparently under the supervision of the Shamarpa Lama. They were placed under a small hut, watched by people from the newly annexed Jumla (Tib. Jum lang),[282] and visited by King Rana Bahadur and Regent Bahadur Shah. The Shamarpa Lama was accused by Tenzin Peljor of inciting the Gorkhalis to invade Tibet, having sexual relation of low moral standard, and converting his portion of the Tashilhunpo loot into jewellery for his consort and clothes for himself.[283] Tenzin Peljor also suggested that the Shamarpa Lama might have poisoned himself in his house in Bodhnath when Qing armies approached the Gorkha Kingdom. Later, when Tenzin Peljor was summoned to the Kathmandu Palace by Regent Bahadur Shah, the Regent blamed the deceased Shamarpa for his earlier provocative words and his *dharmapatra* of loyalty in front of the two stupas (2.3.2d).[284] In the end, the then-defunct Shamarpa took all the blame and became the culprit for the Chinese, Gorkhalis, and Tibetans.

Regardless of the blame on Shamarpa from three sides, he might not have played such an essential role in causing the war. In Kathmandu, tensions flared as Rana Bahadur Shah reached adulthood, becoming increasingly opposed to the regent under the influence of the Shamarpa Lama. The regent, in turn, deemed it necessary to assert power by taking renewed action against Tibet, which had failed to fulfil the terms

278 Ehrhard 2007, 126.
279 The following narrative follows Erhard 2020a and his talk at Heidelberg University on 30 November 2023. Checked against TP 785–86, 813.
280 KRKD QL 57/11, 230.
281 TP 817.
282 TP 854.
283 TP 819–21.
284 TP 856–60.

laid out in the Kyirong agreement. The tension was also made known to the Emperor as he remarked in his Edict:

> But Shamarpa was only in alliance with Bahādura Śāha in the realm of the enemy. Balabhadra Śāha and other Śāhas all complained about Shamarpa and had discord with Bahādura Śāha. Bahādura Śāha is the most cunning and evil. He already had the intention of seizing the throne.[285]

In his Jehol inscription, the Emperor finally declared to the Empire that the conflict was essentially rooted in the inheritance dispute between Shamarpa and Drungpa.[286] So was it accepted by Chinese and Manchu historiographers (2.2.6–8), who sometimes confused Shamarpa with Tenzin Peljor.

However, Shamarpa's instigation might have played a less important role than the economic reasons beginning with coinage.[287] The Chinese secretary Zhou Ai-lian, who worked on provisions in the war, understood it rather differently. Shamarpa's incitation was only the last reason for invasion, while the Gorkha internal strife and the Gorkha-Tibetan dispute on payment and money were more important, as he wrote:

> Reason 1: The border of the Back of Tibet is close to Gorkha. Since the Gorkhali annexation of Balbu [the Kathmandu valley], there were continuous military affairs among themselves for years. As the Gorkhali internal strife expanded, they lacked spare time to consider the border issue. Afterwards, the border was put into order via the negotiation of the Duke of Tibet Tenzin Peljor. Three hundred ingots were given [to Gorkha] once. Gorkha mistook it for an annual regular revenue. As their demand was not satisfied, they took it as a pretext to invade.
>
> Reason 2: The foreigners are accustomed to use silver coins. (Auto-commentary: beyond Dartsemdo, the minted [copper] coins from the [Chinese] bureau are no longer used. Only the silver and silver coins are used. One weighs 1 *qian*, 5 *fen* [approximately 5.6 grams or 4.7 grams]. The Gorkhas fussed

285 KRKD QL 57/7–8, 99–103.
286 KRLJL, *Poems by the Emperor*, part 1, 18–20; Zhang 1988, 465–66.
287 Satō 1986, 524, 536.

> about the relative purity and intended preposterously to use one for the value of two. This did not work [for the Tibetans]. Without profit to make, the Gorkalis held despair within.
>
> Reason 3: The Red-hat Lama Shamarpa exaggerated upon the pursuable abundance and wealth in the land of Tibet.[288]

Nevertheless, Shamarpa was safely dead by the end of the war. It was much easier for the Chinese Emperor to blame him and punish his associates than to accuse the Gorkha kings of any serious offence. Moreover, it accorded with Emperor Qianlong's policy and personal inclination towards the Gelukpa and against the Kagyu sect. He soon prompted a prohibition on Shamarpa's reincarnation and ordered the confiscation of Shamarpa's monastery in Yangpachen (Tib. Yangs pa can) and other properties in Tibet. The money became provisions for Tibetan soldiers, while the monastery was converted to the Gelukpa sect of Buddhism.[289] This restriction on the Shamarpa lineage endured until the twentieth century, when the Fourteenth Shamarpa, Mipam Chokyi Lodro (1952–2014), was recognised as an incarnation.[290] However, its lingering impact is having two Karmapas nowadays.

288 Zhou 1804 (1913), vol. 4, 21–22: 一因後藏邊界與廓爾喀毗連, 自廓爾喀兼並巴勒布, 連年兵革, 內訌方張, 未暇計及。既乃清厘邊界, 經西藏公爵丹津班珠爾議, 給元寶三百枚。廓爾喀誤為每歲地租常例, 索求不獲, 藉詞侵犯。一因番俗多用銀錢(自打箭鑪出口卽不用局鑄銅錢, 專用銀及銀錢)一枚重一錢五分。廓爾喀較量成色, 妄思以一當二, 而勢不能行。無利可牟, 心懷觖望。一因紅帽喇嘛沙瑪爾巴侈言藏地殷富可圖.

289 *Qin-ding Li-fan-bu Ze-li*, vol. 62 no. 943 西藏通制下 番兵軍器定制.

290 Erhard 2020a.

5 The Sino-Nepalese War of 1791–1792

In August 1791,[291] Bahadur Shah sent a force with probably 3,000[292] troops to Kyirong and Nyalam (Kuti) because the Tibetan government had not met its promises of annual payment to Gorkha. This turned the Gorkha-Tibet conflict into the Sino-Nepalese War. Until then the Imperial Court of the Qing Dynasty did not know that the Tibetans made a peace treaty in 1789 and failed to fulfil their obligations. Nevertheless, when the Emperor heard of the second invasion, he feared that the Gorkhalis would motivate the Tibetan people to flee and thus take over all of Tibet and intimidate other regions.[293]

During this second invasion, the Gorkhalis seized the border towns Nyalam, Kyirong, and Dzongka as well as Tingri and Shelkar. They reached Shigatse on 17 September[294] and looted the Tashilhunpo monastery of the Panchen Lama on 18 September 1791,[295] where a lot of gold and silver as well as donations from the Emperor and other Manchu-Mongolian dignitaries were stored.[296] The Gorkhalis did not face much resistance since major parts of the Tibetan army had withdrawn and the amban Bootai had evacuated the young seventh Panchen Lama, luring the Gorkhas deeper into Tibet. However, the Gorkha retreated from Shigatse on 4 October after the robbery and combat with the Green Standard military officer Xu Nan-peng (徐南鵬) at Shigatse.[297]

291 According to Rose, on August 6, 1791; Theobald (2020, 125): "autumn 1791". According to the report by Bootai, the amban, the invasion of Nyalam took place on 5–6 August 1791 (QL 56/7/6-7) (KRKJL, vol. 1, QL 56/8/22; Yuan Yi Lai, no. 860).
292 Cp. Theobald 2020, 126 with more details.
293 Potala inscription (Part II, 2.2.5 [3.1]).
294 KRKJL, vol. 3, QL 56/9/25.
295 KRKJL, vol. 4, QL 56/10/6.
296 Cammann 1951, 121.
297 KRJKL, vol. 4, QL 56/10/11.

In this situation, the Emperor had practically no option but to intervene militarily in the conflict. In his auto-commentary of the Potala inscription (Part II, 2.2.5 [3.1]), this is clearly expressed:

> "[…] Gorkha dared to invade and disrupt again last year (1791). Having abducted Tenzin Peljor and others as hostages, they robbed the Tashilhunpo Temple of its treasure and properties. Their recklessness and savagery had reached the extreme. I was compelled to order the mobilisation of the army. I denounced their offences and initiated the punitive expedition. Moreover, Gorkha had invaded and annexed its adjacent tribes for years. It amalgamated the three tribes of Bal-pu (Kathmandu Valley). Thus, they became neighbour to Nie-lam (Nyalam/Kuti), Ji-long (Kyirong), and Zong-ka (rDzong dga') in the Back of Tibet. But for severe punishment and great destruction, they would further invade and annex the Front and Back of the Tibetan territories. [If so], the places around Sichuan and Da-jian-lu (Dartsemdo) would have no year of peace anymore."

The Tibetan government and the ambans residing in Tibet appealed to the Emperor for support, as the Qing Emperor held a protective role over Tibet.[298] Emperor Qianlong thus decided to drive out the Gorkhalis from Tibet and initiated a much larger punitive expedition into the Gorkhali realm,[299] although he had already ordered Cengde, the provincial banner General of Chengdu to march toward Tibet.

Finally, Qianlong appointed Fuk'anggan[300] (Figure 10) to command an army of reportedly between 16,700 to 125,000[301] soldiers marched into the heart of Nepal, transforming the conflict into the Gorkha Kingdom vs. Qing Empire War. This campaign is listed as the last of the

298 See Part II, 2.2.3e.

299 Cp. Killigrew 1979, 47–49.

300 Surname: Chin. 富察 Fu-cha, Mnc. Fuca; Name: Chin. Fu-kang-an, Mnc. Fuk'anggan; in Nepālī, also spelled or known as Fugangan, Fu-gang-an, Fuk'angan, Thung Chan Chun, Tung Thyang, Thoong-Than or Ṭuṃthyāṅ, or Sund Fo (Markham 1876, lxxvi); cp. Theobald 2020, 127. The name Tung Thyang (var. Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg < Tib. Krung thang) came from the Chinese title for high-ranked imperial officials, "the Grand Secretary who sits in the middle among other officials", 中堂大學士.

301 For a more detailed account of the Gorkhali, Chinese, rGyalrongic, and Tibetan troops, see Lai 1984, 151; Theobald 2020, 126. It seems that circa 7000 made their way into Nepal.



Figure 10: The Great General Fuk'anggan (source: Wikimedia Commons)

"Ten Great Campaigns" or "Ten Complete Martial Glories" (*Shi-quan Wu-gong* 十全武功) of the Emperor, the commemorative inscription of which was written by Qianlong himself.[302] It was one of the most expensive and difficult campaigns, "far more an achievement than Hannibal's crossing of the Alps."[303]

Regent Bahadur Shah was extremely fearful of the Emperor's punitive expedition and issued an executive order (*rukkā*) granting land for the purpose of performing "two hundred thousand *puraścaraṇas* of the *mahāsahasracaṇḍī*"[304] at the time of the Chinese invasion, which ended in September 1792 near Nuvakot, a day's journey from Kathmandu. In a brutal battle that resulted in thousands of casualties on both sides, the Chinese troops were met with strong counterattacks.

As can be seen from the reports and the engravings of the Emperor,[305] (Figures 11–12) the fighting was mainly with bows and arrows, matchlocks and rifles, some leather cannons, [306] but also with burning foliage and torches.[307] The Gorkhalis had fortified forts (*killā*), probably built earlier by the Tibetans, some of which the Qing soldiers tried to capture with hammers. The army mainly consisted of infantry and some cavalry.

302 2.1.1; cp. Dabringhaus 1994, 39, 55 and 1996, 11; Pastukhov 2021.

303 Cammann 1951, 123. However, the financial cost was much lower than the Taiwan Expedition and the two Jinchuan campaigns (Lai 1984, 428–30). In terms of loss, it was also lower than the Myanmar campaign (Dai 2004).

304 Girvāṇayuddha Śāha 1804; this is a ritual implying the one thousandfold recitation of the *Caṇḍī*, the recitational form of the *Devīmāhātmya*; it is also mentioned in the *Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī* 20.92 (135). As Astrid Zotter has convincingly shown, the *Puraścaryārṇava* mentions the reason for such a performance in time of distress: "In case the kingdom falls, there is a great calamity, people are killed, great danger looms, elephants are killed, horses are killed or an enemy army threatens—during these and other various forms of distress, in dangers that arise from loss, illness and so on, one should perform, or have performed, a *sahasracaṇḍikā* recitation" (A. Zotter's translation in the commentary to Girvāṇayuddha Śāha 1804).

305 Pastukhov 2021, Fig. 170–84. Based on preliminary drawings by Beijing missionaries these images were engraved in copperplates at the Academy of Painting in Paris and then together with 200 prints each sent to the Qianlong Emperor. Most of these printing plates together with prints are stored in the Ethnographic Museum of the Humboldt Forum Berlin. See Wädow 2010; see also Bügener 2015.

306 The Arsenal Museum in Kathmandu contains two of these captured cannons (see Landon, 1976, vol. 1, 262–63), which were apparently only usable a few times before they exploded.

307 Raṇa Bahādura Śāha's letter from 1792 (Part II, 2.1.4).



Figure 11: The Battles of Ma-gar Xiar-jia and Syaphru in the Gorkha-Campaign of 1792, painting on silk 182 × 138 cm, probably accessed by Victor Goldschmidt around 1920 (Courtesy: © Völkerkundemuseum vPST Heidelberg, 2024)



Figure 12: The First Battle of the Sino-Nepalese War: "The Capture of Ca-mu (sKya mo)" 1793 (QL Gui-chou) (source: Wikimedia Commons)

The Gorkhas increasingly employed guerrilla tactics and geographical advantage to inflict significant losses on the enemy. However, the course of communication across the battlefields and outcome of the war are presented differently in the sources.

5.1 The Nepalese Perspective

The Nepalese perspective is based on two documents: the letter from Rana Bahadur Shah dated 1792 (2.1.4) and the Report of VS 1850 (2.1.5).

The Letter from Rana Bahadur Shah dated Kartika badi 7, VS 1849 (10 October 1792) is regarded as the earliest Nepalese report of the war. Addressed to three *kājī*s—Jagjit Pande, Sardar Amar Singh Thapa (senior), and Captain Golayan Khawas—who were engaged in the conquest of Kumaun and Garhwal in West Nepal, the letter reflects the urgent need for their return to Kathmandu to aid in the conflict against China. During this period, Nepal found itself engaged in warfare on multiple fronts so that Nepal could not forcefully counter the attacks of the Chinese troops. However, by the time the order reached them, the war between Nepal and China had already concluded. In the missive, King Rana Bahadur Shah instructs the officials to redirect their efforts towards resuming the campaign in West Nepal and consolidating the administration in the territories already conquered.

These instructions are followed by a report of the Sino-Nepalese War that essentially confirms the Report of VS 1850 even though it does not yet include the final battle in Betravati. According to this, the following course of the war occurs. The events transpired over several months, involving shifting battlegrounds, negotiations, and ultimately a diplomatic resolution, as chronicled in historical records from the year 1792. As the war involved two battlefronts, the narration sometimes shifts between the Nyalam-Listi front with the *cancun* (the General, Cengde or Ohūi) and the Kyirong-Betravati front with *tungthyang cancun* (Fuk'anggan).

The letter of King Rana Bahadur Shah to Gajarāja Miśra,[308] resident in Benares, dated 11 October 1792, basically confirms the Report of 1850 (2.1.5), which gives the most detailed report of the course of the war:

308 CPC X, no. 851, 179.

The battle begins again (1791)

In September 1791, Rana Bahadur Shah's forces marched towards Digarca (Shigatse), engaging in battles and reaching the Tashilhunpo monastery. The monks, unable to fulfil the demands for gold and money, saw their monastery plundered by the Gorkhali soldiers who faced challenges on their return, with losses due to smallpox and food shortages.

A few months later, Chinese army chief Fuk'anggan arrived in Lhasa. He accused the Gorkha King of arresting Lhasa's *bhāradāra* officials, Dhurin Kaji (= Tenzin Peljor), and others, and plundering valuables from Digarca. The Gorkhalis defended their actions, citing unpaid dues and deceitful intentions on the part of Lhasa. Despite sending a friendly letter and a *dharmapatra* to Fuk'anggan, tensions escalated, and the Chinese forces prepared for battle against the Gorkha King's forces.

Cengde's attack on Kuti and the retreat to Listi, the eastern battlefront

The conflict between both armies clashed in Kuti (Nyalam). King Rana Bahadur Shah[309], sent reinforcements to Kuti but due to a sudden snowfall, neither side could advance. When the snow cleared, the Chinese army marched from Chengdu to Khasa (Dram). Despite previous unsuccessful attempts, the Chinese army [led by Cengde] attacked Kuti with cannons, capturing the fort. The Gorkhali army, armed with rifles and other weapons, suffered losses, and the arsenal was set on fire, resulting in the burning of gunpowder and soldiers.

The Gorkhali forces retreated to Listi, anticipating the general [Cengde] intention to move toward the Nepalese side. A battle ensued at Listi, where the Gorkhali forces defeated the Chinese army that faced difficulties in Listi due to the hot season and food shortages, resulting in many casualties. Bahadur Shah decided not to pursue the retreating Chinese army further, recognizing the challenges they faced. The Chinese army's actions caused trouble for people in Lhasa but did not strain relations with the Emperor.

309 The Report of VS 1850 mentions only the "Gorkha King (*Gorkhamahārāja*), i.e. the King, despite the fact his uncle Bahadur Shah was the de facto ruler.

Fuk'anggan's troops intervenes in the fighting, the major battlefront

The Gorkha King faced intervention from the Chinese forces led by Fuk'anggan. These forces arrived in Lhasa, accusing the Gorkha King of arresting officials, including Dhurin Kaji (Tenzin Peljor), and looting commodities in Digarca. In response to this accusation, the Chinese representatives demanded the release of the noblemen, as well as the imprisonment of Shamarpa Lama, promising forgiveness and gold in return.

The Gorkha King agreed to release the arrested noblemen and give up seized territories but refused to arrest and send back Shamarpa Lama. This led to a clear warning from Fuk'anggan that the mutual friendship would end unless Shamarpa Lama was handed over, stating that further communication from the Gorkha King would not be welcome.

The battle for Kukurghat and Kerung, retreat to Rasuva

In the aftermath of the tensions, Fuk'anggan and his troops moved to the fort of Kukuraghat (Chin. Ca-mu = Tib. sKya mo) after a dispute in Jhonga (Dzongka), where they met with little resistance. From Kerung (Kyirong), Shatrubhanjan Malla joined to provide support, but a heavy fight broke out at Pangusi (Chin. Bang-xing = Tib. sPang zhing), resulting in significant casualties on the Gorkha King's side. Satrubhanjan Malla, despite inflicting damage on the Chinese forces, suffered injuries and retreated to Kerung, where a large-scale battle ensued for several days.

The Chinese forces surrounded the Kerung fort and set fire to the ammunition dump, causing a substantial loss for the Gorkha King's troops. Despite being outnumbered, the King's forces resisted, but eventually, they fled from the fort to Rasuva. A three-day battle took place at Rasuva, followed by a retreat of the forces to Timure (Chin. Se-dam = Tamang Sedang) as the Chinese troops continued their advance.

Retreat to Syaphru, Dhunche, Deurali and Ramche

Anticipating a significant battle at the fort of Kerung Killa, troops sent for support by the Gorkha King arrived at Syaphru. A three-day battle

ensued, with both sides using cannons and rifles. The Chinese forces, unable to advance through the main route, took an alternative path,[310] through snowy mountains and surprised the Gorkha King's troops, forcing them to flee.

Earlier Gorkha King's troops, positioned in Dhunche, engaged in a three-day battle with the Chinese forces but were unable to defeat them. Subsequently, the King's troops positioned for battle near Syaphru in Deurali. The Chinese troops encircled them, resulting in the capture of the location. The Chinese side lost one amban in the process.[311] Recognising the disadvantage of fighting in the lowland, the Gorkha King's troops withdrew from Dhunche to station at Kabhre.

Facing a formidable Chinese army, the Gorkha King dispersed a large army to Dhaibung, led by various commanders. The Chinese troops arrived in Khabre, leading to a confrontation. However, the Chinese forces eventually fled and stationed themselves at Ramacya (Ramche), suffering casualties in the process.

Upon receiving a letter from the Chinese commander, the Gorkha King ordered his troops to leave Dhaibung and fortify positions along the main route. Negotiations were proposed, and the Gorkha King returned earlier captured Chinese soldiers, along with a messenger carrying a letter to Fuk'anggan. Fuk'anggan requested that both sides refrain from firing until negotiations were complete.

Confrontation and peace offer at Betravati

In response, the Gorkha King ordered his troops to cross the Betravati River and fortify positions along the main route. The Chinese troops fortified at Dhaibung/Kabhre. Fuk'anggan requested Nuvakot as a station, proposing a meeting with the Gorkha King. In response, the Gorkha King fortified frontiers and houses further, seeking assistance from the British Governor General and expressing doubt about the Emperor's intention to have a treaty. The Gorkha King proposed Dhaibung as a station instead of Nuvakot. Fuk'anggan, displeased with this response, began constructing a second bridge across the Betravati River to reach Nuvakot with his troops.

310 It was probably led by Hailanca = Nep. Haikuna.
311 It was probably *solon niru* Dorji (KRKJL, vol. 35, QL 57/7/14).

The Gorkha King thus ordered an attack to push them back, instructing them not to cross the river where the Fuk'anggan was positioned. Fuk'anggan, deploying forces that had defeated Gorkhali troops at Deurali, attempted to take forts at Caphadi and Dudhiya (Dudya). A confrontation ensued, with the Gorkha King's troops gaining the advantage due to higher ground. The Chinese troops suffered losses, with many soldiers falling from the mountain or drowning in the Betravati River.

Fuk'anggan, witnessing the defeat, ordered the establishment of a strong checkpoint at the Betravati bridge. However, the Gorkha King's troops resisted, preventing the Chinese troops from completing a new bridge. Many Chinese soldiers drowned, and some threw cannons into the river. Fuk'anggan, realising defeat, opened the way over the old bridge.

On the next day, Fuk'anggan expressed regret for the losses and proposed negotiations. He abandoned the intention to march to Nuvakot and suggested settling the matter through letters. The Minister outlined conditions for withdrawal, including sending items seized from the Gorkha King and proposing a tribute to the Emperor. The Gorkha King, after consulting with his advisors, considered the proposal and received a letter from the British Governor General advising friendship with the Emperor. Facing challenges, including a fever among Chinese troops and a shortage of supplies, the Gorkha King decided to send an emissary to the Emperor, complying with the Fuk'anggan's conditions to maintain friendship. The emissary carried items related to Shamarpa Lama, seized valuables, and gifts for the Emperor.

The agreement of Betravati

The negotiations between the Gorkha King and Fuk'anggan resulted in an agreement with several key points:

1. After five years, a *vakila* (representative) of the Gorkha King would go to the Chinese Emperor with an *arjī* (petition) and tributes to pay *darśana* and report back.
2. The Gorkha King and the Dalai Lama would maintain their friendship and refrain from future conflicts, keeping their respective territories.
3. Unalloyed coins of the Gorkha King would be accepted as such in transactions in Tibet, while adulterated coins would be given their corresponding value.

4. If any enemy threatened the Gorkha King's troops, it should be reported to the Chinese Emperor for assistance.

Both parties agreed to these terms, and the Minister, along with his troops and Gorkha King's representatives, left Dhaibum and returned to China. The officials of the Gorkha King accompanied the Minister to Kerung, where they received extraordinary gifts and medals. Following Fuk'anggan's instructions, they sent injured Chinese soldiers and other commodities back to China and then returned to Nepal from Kerung.

In the meantime, Cengde stationed in Listi of the eastern battlefront, wrote a letter to the Gorkha King expressing affection. The Gorkha King replied with gifts for a feast, fostering goodwill. On the second day of the bright fortnight of Karttika, Cengde and his troops left Listi and returned to China.

Subjugation of Tibet

After the Fuk'anggan Minister and Chinese troops returned to Lhasa, they left three lamas from Digarca, Samkhya (i.e., Saskya), and Lhasa.[312] Subsequently, they arrested the noblemen of Tibet and their associates, including Dhyamju Kaji [Tenzin Peljor], the two brothers of the Dalai Lama of Lhasa, along with Tava Kaj. The previous police officer (*ṭhānedāra*) and amban of Lhasa [Bootai] were also fettered, and two new ambans [Cengde and Heliyen] and about five hundred soldiers were appointed as *ṭhānedāra* in Lhasa. The Chinese forces left Lhasa and returned to their side in the month of Phagun (February/March).

During their stay in the Gorkha King's territories, many Chinese soldiers were injured and died due to the hot season and strong winds. Forced labourers from Tibet (Tib. *'u lag*) were brought in to bury the corpses, and due to a shortage of wood, they took it from the houses. The Tibet realm experienced additional challenges, including deaths from smallpox, leading to the closure of the two-way trading route.

Consequently, the political authority in Tibet shifted, with the *kājī* of the Tibetan Government and the Dalai Lama of Tibet losing influence. The Tibetans were now considered subjects or cultivators of China, and Chinese orders were followed in the region.

312 These were the people who partook in the Kyirong negotiation in 1789.

In contradistinction to most Chinese sources glorifying their achievements, this report identifies the Gorkhalis as victors in at least one battle, notes Fuk'anggan's expressed desire for peace negotiations amid the hostilities, and highlights the Chinese retreat before the Gorkhalis in Khabre. Notably, the report mentions Shamarpa Lama as a key reason for the war, rather than solely focusing on the lack of compensation payments from Tibet.

To be true, Qing troops marched along the Trishuli River, inflicting heavy damage on Nepalese forces. But despite facing overwhelming odds, a comprehensive defeat of the Gorkhali army was averted. Simultaneously, Nepal faced conflicts on other fronts, including Sikkim's incursions, the ongoing war with Garhwal, and open revolts within its borders. The challenges made it difficult for Bahadur Shah to defend against the Qing army, leading him to seek help from the East India Company. However, negotiations failed, intensifying the critical military situation.

After successful battles, the Qing army suffered a setback at a flooded Betravati near Nuvakot. According to the Report of VS 1850, a Nepalese counterattack at Betravati resulted in a Qing defeat. General Fuk'anggan's punitive actions demotivated troops, resulting in rapid desertion and retreat. Many Chinese troops died, prompting Fuk'anggan to seek a truce with Nepal.

For fear that the Chinese troops could not return before the winter made the trans-Himalayan passes impassable[313] and as a face-saving outcome for both sides, a peaceful arrangement but apparently no official truce was arranged in Betravati near the Trishuli river, a mile to the north from Nuvakot.[314]

However, this is the Nepalese perspective, which implies a sort of triumph (if not victory) of the troops of the Gorkha King, but the events look very different from the Chinese and Tibetan point of view. The

313 Cp. Yuan Yi Lai, no. 915 = KRKJL, vol. 40, QL 57/9/3. Indeed, snow started in Kyirong in August/September 1792.

314 The exact date and whereabouts of the signing ceremony are not clear. There seemed to be no signing ceremony of any written documents. Rose (1971, 64) gives 30 September 1792, which was the date of the memorial of the Chinese negotiator Fuk'anggan stating the acceptance of the conditions of the Nepalese government from September 27 [= 2.2.3a], and October 31 for the Emperor's ratification [= 2.2.3d]. The official letter of acceptance from Fuk'anggan to Rana Bahadur Shah was dated 3 October (2.2.3b). B. Acharya (2013, 251) dates the event on 6 October 1792.

question of who won the war must remain open for now; we will revisit this in Chapter 6.

5.2 The Chinese Perspective

The quadrilingual Potala Inscription of November 1792 (Part II, 2.2.5), located below the seat of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, is an impressive document that was probably written by Emperor Qianlong himself. Its extensive auto-commentary in Chinese summarises the memorials of Fuk'anggan and crafts the authorised correct memory of the great martial glories. The entire course of the war is supposed to be remembered in such a way that the Chinese troops won one battle after the other so that the Gorkhalis could be quickly pushed back if they had not first voluntarily withdrawn. The inscription begins by stating the imperial intention and its reliance on the righteous path and divine favour for these military successes. The Emperor concluded with his understanding of surrender and submission with allegiance and articulated his obligation in these unintentional military mobilisations. He also explained the reasons for giving up the captured territory in the realm of Gorkha.

The narrative of the conflict started with a detailed account of the Gorkha's incursions, particularly after their initial aggression in 1788, which were inadequately addressed by his commissioners, leading to further disruptions. The inscription describes the failures of imperial official Bajung and Tibetan minister Tenzin Peljor, who negotiated detrimental agreements with Gorkha and the evil Shamarpa Lama, obstructing military response.

Frighten the enemies

On 19 September 1791 (QL 56/8/22), the Emperor heard about the Gorkha invasion and the abduction of Tibetan ministers. He was on his way to Jehol, the place where he often met tributary envoys.[315] Bajung committed suicide, while Bootai further requested to evacuate the two great Lamas from Tibet to Sichuan or Kokonur. He felt the seriousness and was thus compelled to mobilise his army, which he had originally

315 Forét 2000.

intended not to do because he saw the conflict with Tibet over trade and debt as a local matter. There was a danger that the aggressive Gorkhalis, who had already conquered the three royal city-states in the Kathmandu Valley, would also attack other states and regions.

In the Emperor's recollection, Bajung failed to exhibit China's military strength, so that Gorkha could dare to invade Tibet a second time and occupy large parts of the Back of Tibet upon the instigation of Shamarpa. The annual payments of silver ingots and treaties with other countries were such a disgrace that reminded every Chinese of the military weakness of the Han-Chinese people in the tenth to thirteenth centuries. It should never have happened. The imperial glory was affected.

The Emperor was thus furious, as his absolute power failed to intimidate his subjects: Bajung cheated him; Shamarpa colluded with the foreigners; the Tibetans paid money for peace; the Gelukpa religion and Tibet were in danger; and Gorkhalis were marching forward. The Emperor exclaims almost desperately, "Who could expect Bajung to have monopolised my authority and acted on his own?", as the Qing emperors considered themselves to hold the absolute authority.

Protect Tashilhunpo

The Gorkhalis also plundered the Tashilhunpo Monastery, which just received the Emperor's divine endowment. In fact, Tashilhunpo was quite easy to defend. However, when the Gorkhali forces approached, the amban Bootai took the Panchen Lama away. The monastics did a divination and decided to abandon the place. Such a timid reaction and the plunder of Tashilhunpo immensely displeased the Emperor, which might be one of the triggers for his determination.

Tashilhunpo had a special meaning in the innermost of the Emperor. Eleven years ago, the Emperor built a replica of the Tashilhunpo temple (Figure 13) at Jehol to welcome the Panchen Lama, the guru of the Emperor's guru. He was very serious about this visit and even learnt colloquial Tibetan himself.[316] He also made a portrait of himself, dressed as a Tibetan Gelukpa monk, situated in this Temple.[317] As this replica was truly resided by the Panchen Lama, it was of great

316 PC6, 948.
317 Nie 1999, 203, no. 47.



Figure 13: The Replica of Tashilhunpo Temple at Jehol Palace, Photo by Gisling (source: Wikimedia Commons).

significance to Manchus, Mongols, and Chinese.[318] The Korean ambassadors called it Tashilhunpo directly.[319] After the death of the Panchen, the Emperor paid great attention to his return to the real Tashilhunpo and ordered the stupa to be made with pure gold and gems.[320] Panchen's relics received immense donations from the Mongolian kings on his way back.[321] The robbery of Tashilhunpo itself would be a great shock for the entire Empire largely constituted by Manchu, Tibetans, and Mongols. The latter two were just subjugated by the Emperor with the efforts of more than three generations. The influence of such a robbery on Tibeto-Mongol affairs and his feelings should not be overlooked, as the Emperor expressed his anger, worries and lamentation in his own poetry inscribed in this replica of Tashilhunpo (Figure 13).[322] He was very furious upon hearing that Bam Bahadur Shah once resided in the

318 It was thus know as 班禪行宮 "the palace of Panchen" (Shulemann 1958, fig. 36; Zhang 2016).
319 Pak 1780 (1956). See also Zhang 2016, 186–87.
320 Wang and Chen 2013; Wang 2013.
321 PC6, 1301–66.
322 *Poem on the event of the Tashilhunpo Temple* 扎什倫布廟誌事 written by the Emperor in the replica of Tashilhunpo Temple at Jehol (KRLJL, *Poems by the Emperor*, part 1, 18–20; Zhang 1988, 465–66).

room of Panchen.[323] The golden plates granted to the Panchen Lama were robbed, while the jade plates were thrown away. The failure of protecting the important Gelukpa site, the burials of the Panchen Lamas (see Figures 8–9), and the inscribed permanent endowments might pose a question to the Buddhist population, whether the Emperor was still capable of protecting the Buddhist religion. Therefore, the robbery of the Tashilhunpo Temple in Shigatse was deliberately omitted in the Tibetan version of the Potala inscription, lest the Tibetans have doubts and fear.

For all these personal, administrative, military, political, and religious motivations, the Emperor finally ordered a decisive punitive expedition to restore his glory and power. Although he initially did not receive much information, he was determined to have a frightful counterattack against or even an eradication of the Gorkhalis. He mobilised troops from Sichuan, Yunnan, rGyalrongic regions, Derge, and, most remarkably, Solon, in almost northmost Manchuria. It was indeed a multi-ethnic army.

He appointed Fuk'anggan as the Great General and Hailanca as Councellor in October/November 1791. Fuk'anggan had just finished his Taiwan and Annam campaigns from 1787–1789, while Hailanca won his fame in the Dzungar War and later assisted Fuk'anggan in the Jinchuan and Taiwan campaigns. They were the closest imperial guards of the Emperor. Day and night, the Emperor carefully worked out the strategy with Agūi and Hešen in the Grand Council, while the army demonstrated exceptional endurance and tactical prowess, overcoming treacherous terrain and enemy forces in multiple engagements.

Reclaiming Tibet victoriously

The campaign commenced in the winter of 1791 (QL 56/11), with troops marching from Xi-ning through harsh conditions to Tibet. Many soldiers suffered from the shortage of food, poor horses, and altitude sickness. After Fuk'anggan's arrival, he waited for more troops to come. He began his advance from Tingri. By then, Cengde was already

323 Yuan Yi Lai no. 902: QL 57/2/29 Fuk'anggan in memorial: "Bam Saheb immediately resided the room where Panchen Erdeni meditated" 瑪木薩野即在班禪額爾德尼坐靜房内居住; QL 57/4/3 Emperor's reply in red ink: "Disgusting! This bandit should be captured alive, tied, and sent to Peking." 可惡, 此賊必生致解京方好.

fighting in Nyalam in January/February 1792. They sent Ar-zeng Shah, the nephew of Bam Bahadur Shah, as a captive to Peking. He went through inquisition by torture and provided much information to the Grand Council.[324]

On 16 June 1792 (QL 57/intercalary 4/27), as the snow melted, Fuk'anggan and his assistants advanced from Tingri westward into annexed Tibetan territory. Local provisions sustained the army as they reclaimed territory and advanced deeper into enemy territory. They marched from Dzongka, Ca-mu (sKya mo), to Mar-xiar-ga (Mar dkar), Bang-xing (sPang zhing), and to Kyirong and Rasuva. Hailanca used surprise and deception to outmanoeuver the enemy. The army was divided into maneuverable groups to attack in multiple directions, capturing key positions and causing significant enemy casualties. Tularama, a Gorkhali military chief, was captured in Kyirong.

They thus reclaimed the Tibetan territory in June/July (QL 57/5) and marched into Nepal through Timure, Syaphru, and Dhunce. Despite formidable defences, including control over mountain passes and strategic river crossings, the Chinese forces pressed on, employing strategic diversions and direct assaults to overcome the enemy's defences. It was a Gorkha captive, named Gang-ga-le-ta-ze-xi (崗噶勒塔則西), who worked as an informant for the Qing commanders. He once worked at the royal palace before captivated in 1791 but later ended up among the Manchu bannermen in suburban Peking.[325]

Closing the case hastily

They paused at Ramche on 27 July (QL 57/6/9). From Ramche, the Potala inscription started to abbreviate the process of the campaign. According to WZTZ and Fuk'anggan's memorials, frequent exchange of summons and petitions started around Ramche. Fuk'anggan had received the letter (petition) of "surrender" issued by Rana Bahadur Shah earlier on 16 July (QL 57/5/28) (2.2.2a). Fuk'anggan rejected it on 2 August (QL 57/6/15, 2.2.2b). By then, significant progress had been made, prompting the Gorkhalis to negotiate, which was again sternly rejected. The Gorkhalis sent four headpersons, Bhotu Pande, Narasimha, Ranjit Pande, and Balabhadra Khawas, to Fuk'anggan on

324 KRKD QL 57/6, 123–24.
325 Mosca 2013, 152 and 349 n. 104.

5 August (QL 57/6/18).[326] Two of them were retained, while the other two carried Fuk'anggan's rebuttal on 13 August (QL 57/6/26).

Thereupon, the Betravati Battle took place on 19–20 August (QL 57/7/2–3), in which some high-ranked military officers died, especially Taifingga, whose death shocked the Emperor.[327] Nevertheless, it was still memorialised as a victory, later even commemorated as the seventh victorious battle during the campaign. The Emperor emphasised in the inscription that despite the rows of rifles, his army was motivated to fight courageously.

Regardless of the obstruction at Betravati, substantial losses for the Gorkhalis and significant territorial gains for the Chinese forces were considered to have frightened the Gorkhalis. In the face of mounting pressure and encirclement by the Chinese forces and incursions from neighbouring regions, the Gorkhas ultimately surrendered because of fear. The lack of further reports on military conflicts indicates a truce following the Battle of Betravati in August 1792. More exchange of messengers with letters took place in September (e.g., 2.2.2d). Instructions were mostly accepted by Gorkha, leading to the withdrawal of Chinese troops in October (QL 57/8). The official end of the war on the battlefields was 3 October (QL 57/8/18), when Fuk'anggan issued the official reply (2.2.3b). After that, the Emperor authorised the surrender officially on 7 October, though he still expected Fuk'anggan to march to Kathmandu (QL 57/8/22, 2.2.3c). Fuk'anggan returned to Kyirong on 19 October, but the Emperor was only informed of the acceptance of surrender on 31 October (QL 57/9/16). On that date, the Emperor issued another edict directing the Gorkha King through Fuk'anggan (2.2.3d). With this, the entire campaign came to an end. It underscored the intricate geopolitical dynamics between Gorkha, Tibet, and surrounding regions, with the involvement of foreign powers like the British playing an influential in shaping the outcome. Historical rivalries and pragmatic alliances influenced the course of the conflict, highlighting the region's strategic importance.

To sum up, the Qing army advanced through various locations, including Ca-mu (Jiamu), Bangxing or Mar-xiar-ga (Maga), Kyirong, Rasuvagadhi, Syaphru, Dhunce, and, finally, Betravati, consistently overcoming the Gorkhalis. These places were commemorated as

326 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 29–30; WZTZ 1982, 405. = Cata. Mnc. no. 8683 = 3–2–3410–047, Chin. no. 12093, [4–2–]50–91–1.

327 KRKD QL 57/8, 152–53. Immediately upon hearing the news, the Emperor authorised the "surrender" of Gorkha.

the seven victorious battlefields. Fuk'anggan had penetrated deep into enemy territory, capturing strongholds and killing thousands while sustaining minimal losses. As Fuk'anggan's forces approached Kathmandu, King Rana Bahadur Shah, began to plead for mercy and surrender. They returned captured officials, especially Tenzin Peljor, and property looted in Tashilhunpo, expressing fear and remorse for their earlier actions against the Tibetans.

The Gorkhali humbleness pleased the Emperor. Their sentiment was considered to be a "surrender" and a "submission". The Emperor wrote in the Potala inscription and distinguished between "surrender with allegiance" and "submission with allegiance." Surrender was accepted under conditions—sometimes reluctantly—reflecting the complex interplay of military force and diplomatic negotiation. In contrast, the Emperor emphasized that the Gorkhalis had willingly pledged their allegiance, expressing repentance for past actions out of respect for imperial power and grace, thereby glorifying the Empero's military might and civilizing influence.

The Emperor ends with a remarkable reference to Heaven, a typical imperial rhetoric in both the Steppes and East Asia:

> It was fortunate that I completed the ten complete martial glories within 57 [reigning] years. How could there be no blessings from Heaven?
>
> However, the more profound the blessings from Heaven, the more intense my fear. I dare not say that I bear [the blessings] in mind gratefully [enough]. I am indeed afraid of the incapability to bear [the according responsibilities]. Cautiously and conscientiously, I wait for the favour of Heaven with respect.[328]

328 The Tibetan parallel text reads "Since the grace of Heaven is, in that way, so very profound, I am also a devout believer in it. And although I bear a constant burden of responsibility and know well the extreme weakness of my powers. I pray in my heart that I may continue to enjoy the kindness of Heaven and I eagerly hope that it may make me a man of perfect uprightness." (Richardson 1974, 47). Meanwhile, the Manchu text translated by Elliot reads, "For the greater Heaven's favour, the more sincere my reverence for Heaven. Not daring to presume to know how to express my thanks, I can only beg helplessly for Heaven's blessing with utmost reverence and trepidation. Having abstained from rule, I can only hope fervently for the time that I will become a completed person" (2009, 106). The tones are different, tailored for the Chinese who favoured modesty, the courageous Manchu, and the pious Tibetan audience.

> I retreat from [the merits of] governance and [cultivate myself as] a perfect person. What more is there to be said?

A transcendental reference shines through in these sentences. It was woven into the tapestry of a cosmopolitan imperial rhetoric. The Chinese might read out the Confucian self-perfection and divine mission, while the Mongols might be reminded of Tengri, the Sky God of the Steppe people. For the Tibetans, the robbery of Tashilhunpo was censored and the Great Emperor remained as Manjushri, the gentle Bodhisattva and the great protective patron who also slayed the enemies of Buddhist teaching with his radiant sword of wisdom.

Behind imperial glory

Other Chinese sources mostly agree with the Potala inscription. According to these reports, there was a clear winner: Fuk'anggan and the Chinese Emperor. However, doubts are warranted. The subtle diction and sharp contrast may have reflected the historiographers' implicit judgment. Was the surrender "authorised", "permitted", "allowed", or maybe "approved"? Did the Gorkhali "beg", "plead", "request", or maybe negotiate of the end of the war? Was it even a "capitulation", a "peace", or a truce? Why did the commander not march on to Kathmandu to mark the victory over Nepal and possibly place a permanent envoy (amban) as in Tibet, or to eradicate the Gorkhalis and distribute the land to other local chiefs, as the Emperor once intended?

A sharp contrast can be found in the two inscriptions in the replica of Tashilhunpo at the Jehol Palace. He recollected his earnest wish to end the war in summer 1793,[329] even though he was resolute to eradicate the Gorkhas and redistribute the land in summer 1792.[330] Despite the Emperor's efforts to highlight his virtue in sparing lives, the stark contrast between the initial intention to "eradicate" the Gorkhali race and the sudden retreat reveals the underlying difficulties of the situation.

329 *Another Poem on the event of the Tashilhunpo Temple, following the rhyme used previously* 扎什倫布廟誌事叠去歲詩韻 written by the Emperor in the replica of Tashilhunpo Temple at Jehol in1793 (KRLJL, *Poems by the Emperor*, part 3, 22–23; Zhang 1988, 467–68).

330 *Poem on the Event of the Tashilhunpo Temple* 扎什倫布廟誌事 written by the Emperor in the replica of Tashilhunpo Temple at Jehol (KRLJL, *Poems by the Emperor*, part 1, 18–20; Zhang 1988, 465–66).

The eulogistic Potala Inscription omits any mention of the difficulties encountered in advancing further. In contrast, archival documents, literary works, and subtle historiographical cues suggest—between the lines—that the Qing forces ultimately failed to press forward, suffering significant losses in both personnel and strength. Most telling is the emphasis on the Gorkhalis' fear rather than a narrative of military conquest.

We also see in the secret edicts that the Emperor showed his worry of potential hardships as early as on 8 May 1792 and suggested that Fuk'anggan might decide whether to accept a surrender.[331] The Emperor's true intention was to ensure that the Gorkhalis would demonstrate their submission with allegiance, securing peace for the Tibetan territories and allowing him to achieve complete glory. He placed his trust in Fuk'anggan, whom he regarded as a son and had raised in his palace, as well as in the courageous Hailanca, believed to be the reincarnation of Vajrapani. The Emperor was confident that they would not repeat the mistakes of Bajung.

The occasion at the battlefields was far from tolerable. Fuk'anggan memorialised the hardships on 5 September 1792 (QL 57/7/19) to the Emperor and was received by him on 18 October (QL 57/9/3) on the failure of provisions, due to falling from the cliff, diseases among the soldiers, the inability to attack further, the fear of annexing an empty city of Kathmandu, the incapability of the Newars to replace the Gorkha court, etc. He had less than 5,000 soldiers by then. Meanwhile, more than 680 soldiers were ill because of the monsoon rain. The provisions and money also failed to reach him, whereas the snow season was approaching.[332]

Fuk'anggan's clerk, Yang Kui elaborated on problems on the battlefield in his 12 poems: [8 Poems of] "*Narratives of the Bitter Rain in the Clerk Room of the Military Camp in Dhaibung*" 堆布木軍營帳房苦雨述事[八首] and "*Four Poems upon [knowing] that the soldiers picked maize, pumpkins, and wild grass for food because of bitter starvation due to the failure of provisions*" 軍營糧運不濟, 士卒苦飢, 日採包穀南瓜雜野草為食, 感賦四律:

> [Because of continuous rain that lasted more than 10 days,]
> the bunches of firewood cannot be used for cooking, while the

331 Feng 1996, 46–47 = KRKJL, vol. 27, QL 57/4/18; KRKD QL 57/4.
332 Yuan Yi Lai, no. 915 = KRKJL, vol. 40, QL 57/9/3.

trousers and coats cannot be dried. Who could raise us from such muddy routes? (...)[333]

[Because of the narrowness of this clerk room] which is like the theatre for puppets. I established a block as my desk and piled up some stones as the seat. Where I sat and reclined was often rushed through by torrents and waves. (…)[334]

Because of the hardship in transporting provisions over thousands of mountains, the troops never got a full meal overnight. I dragged the heels and stammered, head pointing down with a pale look. I heard from my servants in the morning that my provisions were also finished. (…)[335]

(…) Lin Jun sent me a pig, which fell from the cliff into the valley. What reached me was his empty letter. (…)[336]

My hair was as messy and scarce as the seeds of Erigeron, while my feet were covered with layers of calli. (…) I raised my coat and walked further [on the route] where the mud covered my knees. I have already forgotten the existence of shoes but rejoiced that I could tie the socks [i.e., serve the imperial enterprise].[337]

…The clouds suppressed our camp as the covering smoke. I asked for light but light would not come. The candles were burnt out and no longer to be obtained. (…) Sitting at the end of the wilderness, I heard the nine-headed bird singing, calling the rain, and flying in swarms. (…)[338]

Yesterday, I passed the mountain peak of extreme perils, while a horse fell from the cliff into the valley. (…) [The horse bestowed to me by Fuk'anggan] came to my possession in vain as it filled the belly of the old soldier eventually. (…)[339]

(…) The route that we have taken became longer and longer every day, while our intention to return became more and more intense. (…)[340]

333 軍行苦秋霖, 浹旬不能止…束薪不成炊, 褰衣不能燎。似此泥塗中, 誰掀公出淖。
334 列帳地偪仄…何異傀儡場。支板且為几, 疊石聊作牀。往往坐臥處, 急溜過淋浪。
335 千山轉饋勞, 師行不宿飽, 曳踵行蹣跚, 垂首色枯槁。朝聞僮仆語, 我糧亦已休。
336 林西崖廉訪, 遣人饋花豬, 墜崖谷, 僅達空函。
337 蕭蕭首飛蓬, 雙雙足重繭…撩衣更前行, 汩汩泥沒膝, 縱使履已忘, 猶幸襪可結。
338 壓帳雲冪歷。呼鐙鐙不來, 燭燼不可得…空際聞鬼車, 呼雨還群飛。
339 憶昨過絕巘, 有馬墮崖谷…空入書生手, 竟果老兵腹。
340 行路日以遠, 歸思日以深。

> (…) I tried to make a rice ball out of the sand, but it could not be cooked as porridge. (…)[341]
>
> (…) Those with swelling bowels should not laugh at us who consumed the husks and the scrap of rice in them. Those with belly diseases were really distressed, imploring [the Heavens to alleviate] the desperate twists and turns. (By then, there were malaria and dysentery among the troops.) (…)[342]
>
> (…) (The provisions were transported by the foreign labourers and were mostly lost on the way). The military officers held a futile title and could only deal with vegetables, while the General was even thinking of cultivation. The wind blew down the leaves of thousands of jungles, while the frost froze the smoke from tens of thousands of stoves.[343]

In the end, Yang commented that all the soldiers much rejoiced in the coming of Gorkha messenger who brought sheep with him.[344] All warriors must have been delighted when they could finally leave the sufferings in realm of the enemy. It was fortunate for the Chinese that the Gorkhalis also would like to end the war, as expressed by Zhao-lian in his final comment (see Part II, 2.2.7).

But the Emperor's great campaign had not yet ended, as there were also ongoing issues concerning Tibet. He continued to craft strategies to regulate Tibet and prevent further conflicts. He and his ministers instructed both sides to do fair trade. He proposed restrictions on Gorkha-Tibet commercial connections and ordered silver coins to be minted in Lhasa (Figure 14).[345] The silver coins were minted with bilingual legends to show the sense of "synthesis of scripts" (Mnc. *hergen emu/šu adali* = 同文) within the Empire, as the Tibetan script transcribed the Chinese pronunciation.[346] Fuk'anggan and Heliyen sent people to investigate the borders and magnify the border markers. The Emperor also ordered the confiscation of Shamarpa's property and the prohibition on his reincarnation. Moreover, the pilgrims were supposed to be supervised.[347] We can see that the Emperor finally had a clear

341 擲沙無術可炊糜。
342 腸肥莫笑餐糠粃, 腹疾真愁問曲窮(時軍中瘡痢大作)。
343 (時用番夫轉運, 多半道亡失)都尉虛名專治菜, 將軍列議或屯田。風聲吹墮千林葉, 霜氣零消萬竈煙。
344 牽羊差喜叩關來 (Wu 1985, 166–68).
345 Burger 2016.
346 Lin 2009, 348.
347 Komatsubara 2018.



Figure 14: Silver coins minted in 1793 with Tibetan-Chinese bilingual legend (source: Wikimedia Commons).

understanding of the causes of the war. In the following years, the Qing Empire was immensely interested in Tibetan affairs.[348]

In addition, there have been ongoing conflicts beyond. Wei Yuan incorrectly argued that the British were also targeting the Gorkhali territory (2.2.8). A different view is held by Ulrich Theobald:

> While reports from the Qing side praised the heroic spirit of the Qing troops, other sources demonstrate that the Qing were rather lucky to have got so far. Over-confident because of their quick successes, the Qing were hardly pressed in the battle of Betravati. So much so, that Fuk'anggan (known in Nepali sources as Tung Thang, Tung-Thyang, or Thung Chang Chun) began to kill his retreating troops—as far as Nepali sources say. During the war, Fuk'anggan had tried to establish contacts with the British, not knowing that the latter were siding with Nepal, though without giving them outright support.[349]

However, according to Fuk'anggan, the messenger from Kolkata, Daljit told him that the British Governor (Chin. Guor-nar 果爾那爾) did not side with Gorkha but tried to tell them to keep peace with China, as the British enjoyed imperial grace in their trade business in Canton.[350] Nor did the British side with the Chinese. The Governor stressed on the monsoon and distance, notifying the original messenger sent from Tibet was ill. In the meantime, other countries, Sikkim, Jumla, and

348 Dabringhaus 1994.
349 Theobald 2020, 127.
350 KRKJL, vol. 51, QL 58/3/8.

Bhutan, summoned by Fuk'anggan to attack the Gorkhalis seem to have failed in their attempts. Jumla even fled further away,[351] confirming the Emperor's earlier worry that these tribes were useless and should not be summoned.[352]

5.3 The Tibetan Perspective

The Tibetans were largely left out of the war between China and Gorkha as the decision-maker was Fuk'anggan and ultimately the Emperor. The Dalai Lama even called Fuk'anggan the second Emperor (*gong ma chen po gnyis pa*) when meeting him.[353] He gave blessings to the Great Army.[354] The Tibetan government in Lhasa sold provisions and offered labour for the Chinese army but seemed not to have sent many military officers. It was concluded by both the eighth Dalai Lama and the Tatsag Regent that Fuk'anggan returned victoriously to Lhasa, having transformed the enemies of the Buddhist religion into servants of the monasteries.

Another perspective came from the battlefield. Particularly influential was Minister Tenzin Peljor, who claims in his autobiography to have personally observed the decisive battle near Betravati from a treetop near the river.[355] His report (2.3.2e) is widely confirmed by a letter of the Teshu (Panchen) Lama to the Governor-General dated June 28, 1793 (2.3.7).

351 Ibid.

352 KRKJL, vol. 23, QL 57/3/9.

353 *ʼjskyabs mgon chen po nas 'jam dpal dbyangs ʼjgong ma chen pos nged bod na yod pa'i 'gro ba ser skya yongs la byams brtes dgongs | ʼjgong ma gnyis pa lta bu'i blon chen khyed rdzong bda' (= brda) gnang ba bka' drin chen po snying la bcangs te |* "The Great Protector himself, Manjushri, the Great Emperor has extended a compassionate intention towards all of us, both monastics and lay people, here in Tibet. We keep in our heart the great kindness of having send you [Fuk'anggan], the great minister who is like a second emperor." (DL8 324.13–16).

354 *zla ba gsum pa'i nang du krung thang chen po lha dmag 'bum sde'i tshogs dang bcas gor dmag 'joms* […]| "In the third month, the Grand Secretary [Fuk'anggan], along with an assemblage of a hundred thousand heavenly soldiers (*lha dmag*), [went to] subdue the Gorkha soldiers. […]" (DL8 329.18–19).

355 "Hence, I, [minister] Yuthog (g.Yu thog) and the others climbed the crown of a deodara cedar and observed [the battle]", TP 891, transl. by Erhard 2020a, 335.

Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa (2.3.2) also took Tenzin Peljor as his source.[356] According to Shakabpa's interpretation, the Tibetan army launched in 1792 an offensive against the Gorkhalis at Shigatse, severing their supply lines.[357] Concurrently, a deadly epidemic afflicted the Nepalese forces, compounding their woes alongside Tibetan harassment. Forced to retreat from Shigatse, the Gorkhalis absconded with the spoils of Shigatse and Tashilhunpo. After four months, Tibetan forces[358] pushed the Gorkhalis back to Nyalam (Kuti) and Kerung, prompting the arrival of imperial troops led by Manchu general Fuk'anggan. These troops, in conjunction with Tibetan forces numbering 10,000, proceeded to engage the Gorkhalis. Seven months later, fierce fighting broke out at Kerung and Nyalam, where the Tibetan army achieved a decisive victory.[359] News of this defeat spurred the Gorkhalis to seek aid from the British and prompted King Rana Bahadur Shah to flee under the guise of a hunting expedition. A treaty was drafted to delineate the border.

According to the Chengdu 1987 edition, there seemed no Tibetan army present. However, Tenzin Peljor played an important role in diplomatic, as he was summoned by Regent Bahadur Shah to his court, requesting intervention to halt the advance. In their dialogue, Shamarpa

356 Shakabpa 1967, 166–68.

357 Shakabpa's reference to the Tibetan army defending Tashilhupo seems to be hard to authenticate by the reports of the Tibetan goverment to the Chinese ambans. According to the Chinese sources, the leader of defence was Xu Nan-peng, while the major force in the township of Shigatse was the Green Standard Army, whereas the Tibetan lamas ran away in 1791 instead of 1792. In the 1987 edition, Tenzin Peljor commented the enemies of the Buddhist teaching (*bstan dgra*), Gorkha could not forward beyond Tashilhunpo and thus retreated, while he was in fact kept in hostage in Nepal (TP 810.3–6). He mentioned that it was his father who made arrangements for the food for the officers and soldiers from China (*rgya'i dpon dmag*) (TP 809.16–810.3).

358 The edition of Tenzin Peljor's biography gave the names of the commanders as Nga'o lcang jun and Khrin thi'i thu, which are apparently Ohūi and Cengde, both being Manchu but not Tibetan (TP 852.1). He further noted that the buildings in Nyalam along with the Gorkhalis were burnt into ashes, which accords with the Chinese sources. He was not an eyewitness of it but must have heard it from somewhere.

359 Again, in the 1987 edition of Tenzin Peljor, it was the Great General, Duke and Grand Secretary Fuk'anggan (sPyi khyab dMag dpon Phu zi gung rda Krung thang chen mo), the warrior chief, the Duke Hailanca (khyu mchog gong ma'i nang blon sba dur had gong), and Hui-ling (Zi chon thu Hu'i btsong thu Hu'i rda rin) who led the army from China (*rgya nag*), including Mongolian (*sog po*), Manchu, and rGyalrongic soldiers (TP 852.5–8). Shakabpa might have interpreted Hailanca or the leader of the rGyalrongic soldiers, Zhang Zhi-yuan, as Tibetan generals.

took the blame for everything and Gorkha should pay homage to the Emperor of Peking (2.3.2d).

Upon receiving an official order (*bka' shog*) from Hailanca, the Gorkhalis eventually sent an envoy with Tenzin Peljor to plead for peace with Fuk'anggan. Negotiations resulted in conditions for peace, including the surrender of Shamarpa Lama's associates, the return of all looted objects and wealth from Tashilhunpo, and the extradition of Shamarpa Lama to China to face treason charges. However, the Shamarpa Lama had already committed suicide in Bodhnath. Fuk'anggan demanded proof of the Shamarpa's demise, and thus Tenzin Peljor was assigned by Bahadur Shah the task of authenticating the body before cremation. Tenzin Peljor, along with other captives, identified the corpse and reported back to Fuk'anggan.

It seemed that Tenzin Peljor did not manage to halt the Chinese army, as was wished by Bahadur Shah. He witnessed the Betravati Battle (2.3.2e), where the Chinese troops fell from the bridge "like the dropping of goats." He also mentioned that a chief, probably Taifingga, was killed by Bam Bahadur, shot in the forehead. Fuk'anggan regretted his hasty decision of attacking and secluded himself in the camp for almost a month. However, the Gorkhalis finally returned the requested people and object. The ambassadors were escorted to Peking by the Manchu officers for the tribute as Tenzin Peljor was for inquisition.

While in the Qing camp, Fuk'anggan expressed dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Kyirong, and inquired Tenzin Peljor about his correspondences with Lhasa during the negotiation. Tenzin Peljor was criticised for his unbecoming negotiation in 1789 (the Earth-monkey year) and faced allegations of not fighting to the death but rather being captured by Gorkhali troops in 1791 (the Iron-pig year).[360] Although the Qing troops suffered severely from arduous battles as well as the hot monsoon climate, to which many of the soldiers succumbed due to the change of the natural environment (*sa chu*), the Gorkhalis ultimately surrendered by sending Shamarpa's associates to Fuk'anggan.

Tenzin Penjor's role in the conflict was to be thoroughly investigated. He was brought to Peking in November 1792 (the Water-mouse year/9),[361] awaiting the decision of the Emperor and his Grand Council.[362] He went through several meetings with Agūi and Hešen (Ā Krung

360 Summarised from TP 895.
361 TP 925.18.
362 See also van der Kuijp and Tien 2022.

thang, Ho Krung thang) as well as the Emperor on several occasions.[363] He gave a confession which can be found in the Chinese KRKD.[364] He was exempted from any accusation in the end. After recovery from smallpox, he returned to Tibet in spring 1793.

In hindsight, the Panchen Lama penned a letter (2.3.7) to the Governor-General on 18 June 1793, outlining the sequence of events during the war as follows. It reflects the tumultuous events of the past four years, marked by repeated incursions of the Gorkhali into the region, resulting in widespread devastation. Diplomatic efforts were undertaken, including letters in Persian and Tibetan, to caution against the Gorkha King false representations and solicitations for assistance. Despite language barriers, communication between parties facilitated understanding and mutual respect.

Military engagements ensued, leading to significant casualties among the Gorkha King's forces and the eventual submission of Gorkha. Seeking forgiveness and offering tribute, the Gorkha King humbly acknowledged wrongdoing and pledged loyalty to His Imperial Majesty. The Vizier conveyed the King's plea for peace to His Majesty, who issued commands sparing the conquered territory and its inhabitants from further destruction.

Emissaries from the King sought forgiveness and expressed remorse for past actions, affirming their desire for reconciliation. They conveyed the Rajah's submission and commitment to loyalty, hoping for pardon and peace. Recognizing the King's newfound allegiance, diplomatic relations were restored, and future conflicts were averted.

As a gesture of goodwill, gifts were exchanged between parties, symbolizing the establishment of enduring friendship and mutual respect. The letter concludes with expressions of gratitude and hope for continued correspondence and friendship between the parties involved.

Despite Shakabpa's references to a powerful Tibetan army that could not be well attested in the currently available Tibetan, Chinese and Nepali sources and his claim of Tibetans being capable of repelling the Gorkhalis independently, the intervention of imperial troops altered the course of the conflict, leaving a lasting impact on Tibetan-Nepalese relations.

363 TP 928–958.
364 KRKD QL 57/11, 200–17.

5.4 Calendric Summary of Events (1732–1793)

Table 2: Calendar of events leading to the Sino-Nepalese War

CE	QL	Event	Source
Before 1788			
3 Dec. 1732	YZ 10/10/ Geng-wu	The three Malla kings in the Kathmandu Valley sent "tributary" envoys to Lhasa. They requested the first amban, Sengge, to pass their petitions to the Chinese Emperor. However, the Emperor refused to receive them in Peking but accepted the gifts and awarded them, urging them to protect the Geluk religion.	*Yongzheng Veritable Records*, vol. 122
22 May 1734	YZ 12/4/20	Three envoys from the Malla Kings were authorised to go to Peking and thus departed from Lhasa. Their auspicious memorials were issued on 1 Feb. (Kathmandu), 21 Jan. (Bhaktapur), and 3 Jan. (Patan). The ruler of Bhaktapur sent a map of India and Nepal as gift.	WZTZ, vol. 15
1775	QL 40	A border conflict between Tibet and Gorkha was negotiated.	BLBJL, vol. 6
1780–1787	QL 45–QL 52	A key trade issue heightened tensions: Tibet and Nepal had been trading with a mix of pure and debased *mahindramallī* coins. Tibet resisted the newly-minted pure coins. Attempts at negotiation failed, with Tibet closing trade routes and fortifying the border.	
1780	QL 45	The Panchen Lama enjoyed abundant offerings and donations and received lavish gifts from the Emperor.	PC6
26 Nov. 1780	QL 45/11/1	The Panchen Lama died of smallpox. His relics and the presents were brought back to Tashilhunpo. Drungpa Hutuktu, the elder of the Panchen Lama did not share the wealth it with his younger brother Shamarpa.	PC6; Jehol Inscription
1783	QL 48 = Water Hare	Tenzin Peljor became cabinet minister (Tib. *bk' blon*).	TP

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
1783 (or 1784 or 1786)	QL 48	Shamarpa went to Gorkha.	BLBJL, vol. 14 (Ohūi's report)
13 July 1785		Bahadur Shah became regent (*mūlacau-tārya*), and the de facto ruler.	
1787	QL 52	The amban Kinglin did not report the conflicts between Tibet and Gorkha.	BLBJL, vol. 14 (Bajung's report)
1788–1789	QL 53–54	The Gorkha King petitioned the Chinese Emperor for intenvention of the coinage dispute, but the petition (*arjī*) was not delivered from Lhasa by amban Kinglin. He then informed Tibet that, while he sought peace, he was ready for conflict if necessary.	
1788 (QL 53)			
19 June 1788	53/5/16	The Emperor ordered Cengde to take care of the Sichuan troops who just finished their expedition to Taiwan.	QL Manchu Secret Edict, no. 3588
24–27 July 1788	6/21–24	First punitive attack on Tibet launched by the Gorkhali army invading Nyalam and occupying significant portions of Tibet's south-eastern territory reaching Shelkar.	BLBJL, vol. 1
		Tibet-Gorkha War	
June	5	The Tibet-Gorkha War started.	BLBJL, vol. 6
August		Gorkha offered a peace treaty.	Letter of Rana Bahadur Shah from 1792
1–2 August	6/29–7/1	The Tibetans fought the Gorkha at Tingri.	BLBJL, vol. 2
14 August	7/13	A battle at Shelkar happened with circa 6,000–7,000 Gorkhali enemies, later reported by Tenzin Peljor.	BLBJL, vol. 3
17 August	7/16	The Tibetans retreated from Shelkar.	BLBJL, vol. 3
19 August	7/18	The Tibetan troops retreated from Saskya and Dzongka.	BLBJL, vol. 4
21 August	7/20	Ohūi departed from Jehol to join Cengde, marching towards Tibet.	BLBJL, vol. 1

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
3 Sept.	8/4	Emeperor Qianlong issued a summon to the Gorkha King, threatening to kill him. Hešen reported that the Gorkhalis were different from Balbu that paid tribute before.	BLBJL, vol. 2; Cata. Mnc. no. 7229–7232 = 3–6–1710
15 Sept.	8/16	Kinglin wrote a letter and ordered it to be translated into Tibetan, requesting the Gorkha to retreat, as Dalai suggested to arrange peace. He also wrote to the Chinese troops to stop.	BLBJL, vol. 6
1 Oct.	9/3	The Tibetan government reported the Gorkha retreat to Kinglin, who ordered another letter to be sent by a Chinese military officer Zhou Rong-ting 周榮庭.	BLBJL, vol. 8
10 Oct.	9/12	Bajung was commissioned to Tibet.	BLBJL, vol. 6
Oct.	9–10	Kinglin reported that the Saskya and the Tashilhunpo monasteries sent envoys to Gorkha, (reported to him by g.Yu-thog).	BLBJL, vols. 10, 11
Nov.	10	Tenzin Peljor went to Shelkar. Hešen sent multiple instruction to criticise the Saskya Trinzin.	KRKJL, vol. 38; Cata. Mnc. no. 7343–7352 = 3-6–1710–3
5 Nov.	10/8	Cengde arrived at Tashilhunpo, awaiting Ohūi.	BLBJL, vol. 12
8 Nov.	10/11	Kinglin was ripped off his title by the Emperor.	BLBJL, vol. 11
19 Dec.	11/21	Ohūi and Zhang Zhi-yuan arrived at Tashilhunpo.	BLBJL, vol. 15
25–27 Dec.	11/28–12/1	Bajung arrived at Lhasa and met the Dalai Lama. He also reported the hidden letter by Kinglin, along with other crimes committed by Kinglin.	BLBJL, vol. 15; Cata. Mnc. no. 7393–7397 = 3–2–3244–29/33
1789 (QL 54)			
January	53/12–54/1	The Chinese troops failed to proceed from Tingri. Bajung conducted inquisition on Tibetan officers for their excessive tariffs.	BLBJL, vol. 16; Cata. Mnc. no. 7420 = 3–2–3268–018

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
21 January	QL 53/12/26	Emperor Qianlong ordered Kinglin to wear a cague in Lhasa for 3 years.	Haenisch 1959; BLBJL, vol. 15
7 Feb.	1/13	Emperor Qianlong issued a summons to Gorkha, blaming their coinage and disruption, while Qing troops reached Dzongka.	BLBJL, vols. 16, 17; Theobald 2020, 121
March	2	The amban Shu-lian and Bajung reported the peace in Tibet and unnecessity to mobilise troops.	Cata. Mnc. no. 7501–7502 = 3–2–3268–052/53
24 March	2/28	Qing troops were said to have reached the border of Gorkha (i.e., Kyirong).	Theobald 2020, 121; BLBJL, vol. 18
2 April	3/7	Acharya Lama who knew the Indian scripts was sent to Peking by Bajung.	Cata. Mnc. no. 7534 = 3–2–3269–003
23 April	3/28	Bajung dispatched Zhang Zhi-yuan and Mukdengga to meet the Gorkha chiefs.	BLBJL, vol. 20
June	5	Peace talks in Kerung.	TP 635-646; Komatsubara 2017
6 June	5/13	Peace Treaty of Kyirong was drafted by Shamarpa.	KRKJL, vol. 38
12 June	5/19	Zhang Zhi-yuan and Mukdengga arrived at Kyirong.	KRKJL, vol. 38
13–14 June	5/20–21	Zhang Zhi-yuan and Mukdengga met Captain Bam Bahadur Shaha and Harihara Upadhyaya. They reported that the Gorkhas expressed remorse, performed a kowtow, and also mentioned the border issue and their past friendship. Mukdengga issued warrants for both sides. The bilingual treaty of Kyirong was made.	BLBJL, vol. 21; Cata. Mnc. no. 7624 = 3–2–3408–029, no. 7821 = 3–2–3271–005.1; Tib. no. 13147 = 3–2–3410–5
July	Intercalary 5-6	The Chinese officers and troops retreated from Tibetan frontier. The trade was resumed.	BLBJL, vol. 23; Cata. Mnc. no. 7643 = 3–2–3270–044

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
		End of the Tibet-Gorkha War	
31 July	6/10	Chinese military officer Yan Ting-liang 嚴廷良 arrived at Kathmandu to arrange the tributary envoy.	BLBJL, vol. 24
autumn		Rana Bahadur Shah dispatched a mission to the palace in Peking, led by the vakila Harihara Upādhyāya, Balabhadra Khavāsa, and around twenty to twenty-five other officials.	2.1.5
4 Sept.	7/15	Yan Ting-liang with Balabhadra Khavasa, Hari Shah, etc., arrived at Tashilhunpo with the tributes, including coral, amber, golden stain, telescope, guns, knives, spices, medicine, manuscripts etc.	BLBJL, vol. 24; 2.2.1
15 Oct.	8/27	Bajung replied that the tributary mission did not have musicians.	Cata. Mnc. no. 7742 = 3–2–3272–033
28 Nov.	10/12	The envoy reached Dartsemdo.	故宮 084563
8 Dec.	10/22	The envoy reached Chengdu.	故宮 084563
19 Dec.	11/3	The Emperor Qianlong sent a letter to Cengde asking him how to address the King of Gorkha.	Qianlong Manchu Secret Edicts no. 3778
29 Dec.	11/13	Cengde reported that he had escorted the tributary mission and reached Shaanxi.	Cata. Mnc. no. 7788 = 3–2–3273–009
1790 (QL 55)			
4 Feb.	QL 54/12/ Ren-shen (beginning of spring)	The envoy had an audience with the Emperor along with those from Islamic tribes, Korea, Ryukyu, Thailand. They had a banquet in the Ocean Platform of Zhongnanhai and another one two days later.	*Qianlong Veritable Records*, vol. 1345
18 Feb.	QL 55/1/ Xin-si	The envoy had an official banquet with the Mongolians and the Emperor.	*Qianlong Veritable Records*, vol. 1345

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
24 Feb.	1/Ding-hai	Upon the arrival of Vietnamese envoy, another banquet was held with the Emperor. The Korean ambassadors Yi Seong-won and Jo Jong-hyeo wrote about the banquets.	*Qianlong Veritable Records*, vol. 1346
March	2	Further banquets were held. The Emperor rewarded the interpreter, Ma Ting-xiang 馬廷相 to be a military officer (Qian-zong, "chiliarch").	*Qianlong Veritable Records*, vol. 1346
11 April		Nepālī peace treaty.	Naraharinātha 1965, 20; see Part II, 2.1.5
22 May	4/9	The Gorkha envoy paid a visit to Dalai Lama and left Lhasa.	Cata. Mnc., no. 7859–7860 = 3–2–3310–003/4
		Rana Bahadur Shah wrote 2 letters, (brought back by Yan Ting-liang) to the Emperor and to O-hūi. The latter urges him to uphold commitments, sent with gifts.	WZTZ, vol. 13; KRKJL, vol. 46
autumn	autumn	Ohūi concealed the above two letters.	Potala Inscription
1791			
7 June	56/5/6	The Emperor sent Tatsag back to Tibet for administration.	Qianlong Manchu Secret Edict, no. 3960
12 June	56/5/11	The conflict started. Tenzin Peljor went to Nyalam to negotiation but told Bootai that he went there for the restoration of temples.	KRKJL, vol. 1; Yuan Yi Lai, no. 860
24 July	6/24	Upon arrival at Nyalam, the Tibetans told Gorkha to come for negotiation.	KRKJL, vol. 1
21 August	7/22	The conflict between Gorkha and Tibet broke out into combat and the Sino-Nepalese War started. The group of four, Tenzin Peljor, g.Yu-thog, Feng Da-cheng, and Wang Gang, were abducted from Nyalam to the Kathamandu Valley.	TP; KRKJL, vol. 1

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
21 August	7/22	Bahadur Shah sent troops to Kuti and Kerung.	Rose 1971, 37; Theobald 2020, 125
30 August–11 Sept.	8/2–14	Gorkha invaded Dzongka but later retreated to Kyirong.	KRKJL, vol. 6
31 August	8/3	Bootai moved Panchen from Shigatse to Lhasa, while the Gorkhalis reached Tingri and Shelkar.	KRKJL, vol. 1
13 Sept.	8/16	Panchen reached Lhasa. Drung-pa and Xu Nan-peng prepared to guard Tashilhunpo.	KRKJL, vol. 1
		Gorkha Started to Loot Tashilhunpo	
17 Sept.	8/20	Gorkha encircled Tashilhunpo Monastery. The monks made a divination and decided to retreat. Yamantai requested the imperial troops to come.	KRKJL, vol. 3, 12, 16; KRKD 57/4; Cata. Mnc. no. 8296 = 3–2–3368–009
19 Sept.	8/22	The first memorial of Bootai reached the Emperor Qianlong at Jehol. Bajung committed suicide.	KRKJL, vol. 1
22–23 Sept.	8/25–26	Bootai and Yamantai planned to evacuate the Dalai and Panchen Lama from Lhasa but was refused by the Dalai Lama. Dalai gave a public speech at Potala to soothe the rising doubts and fear in Lhasa	KRKJL, vol. 2; DL8
4 Oct.	9/7	The Gorkhalis retreated from Tashilhunpo, probably to Dinggyê.	KRKJL, vol. 3
9–12 Oct.	9/12–15	2,000 Gorkhali soldiers annexed Dinggyê from Zhing-sa.	KRKJL, vol. 5
20 Oct.	9/23	Bootai reported the retreat of Gorkha.	Cata. Mnc. no. 8359 = 3–2–3369–008
22 Oct.	9/25	The Emperor received news of Gorkhali arrival at Tashilhunpo. He ordered Fuk'anggan to prepare the expedition. He ordered Ohūi to expel the Newari in Lhasa who only knew image-casting and were of no use.	KRKJL, vol. 3

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
25 Oct.	9/28	Ohūi's memorial on the causes of the war (debt and numismatic issues) was received. The Emperor decided to make coins for Tibet and ordered them to march forward.	KRKJL, vol. 3
6 Nov.		The Emperor issued a public edict to punish Bootai and Yamantai for their deceitful memorials. He ordered Bootai to wear a cangue in Lhasa.	Potala inscription; KRKJL, vol. 3
12 Nov.	10/17	The Emperor withdrew his edict that ordered to repatriate and confiscate the Newar merchants.	KRKJL, vol. 5
21 Nov.	10/26	The Emperor ordered to mobilise the Solon troops. Cengde arrived at Lhasa. Bootai's ambassador, Fan Zhong arrived at Kathmandu (via Bhutan) and handed a summon to the Gorkha King. He later brought a letter back, but no one can read it.	KRKJL, vols. 6, 11, 18, 21
24 Nov.	10/29	The Emperor issued a public edict to rebuke the procrastination of Cengde and Ohūi, having realised that "the retreat of Gorkha" was in fact transporting the looted objects back.	KRKJL, vol. 4
26 Nov.	11/1	Yan Ting-liang reported the retreat of Gorkha from Dinggyê.	KRKJL, vol. 11
		End of Gorkha Retreat and Start of the Chinese Mobilisation	
27 Nov.	56/11/2	The Emperor issued public edicts, appointing Fuk'anggan as the General and Hailanca and Kuilin as counsellors.	KRKJL, vol. 7
Dec.	11	Ohūi reporterd that there was pandemic of smallpox in Tibet due to the warm weather.	KRKJL, vol. 12
21 Dec.	11/26	Fuk'anggan arrived at Xi-ning.	KRKJL, vol. 11
23 Dec.	11/28	Eldemboo, the imperial guard, arrived at Lhasa.	Cata. Mnc. no. 8502 = 3–2–3365–022

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
1792			
		Preparation of the Expedition	
19 Jan.	56/12/26	The Emperor ordered the punishment of lamas who did divination at Tashilhunpo during the invasion.	KRKJL, vol. 14
21 Jan.–16 Feb.	56/12/28–57/1/24	**The battle of Nyalam:** Cengde fought at Nyalam and finally defeated Gorkha by placing a bomb underground. Meanwhile, Fuk'anggan passed the Bayan Har Mountains and some rivers, reporting the altitude sickness of the army, as well as the shortage of provision and the dangerous routes.	KRKJL, vols. 18–22; Yuan Yi Lai, no. 893.
12 Feb.	57/1/20	Fuk'anggan arrived at the Front of Tibet, i.e., Lhasa.	KRKJL, vol. 20; DL8
2 March	2/10	Hailanca reached Lhasa.	KRKJL, vol. 24
5 March	2/13	Fuk'anggan sent summons to Sikkim, Bhutan, British India, and Jumla to urge their assistance.	KRKJL, vols. 24, 27
8 March	2/16	Fuk'anggan reached Tibet.	Report of VS 1850
17 March	2/25	Shamarpa got ill.	KLKJL, vol. 37
31 March	3/9	The Emperor changed Bootai's name into Fusihūn and punished Yan Ting-liang for giving fake news. He also told Fuk'anggan not to urge Sikkim, etc. Kuilin died around Chamdo.	KRKJL, vol. 23
6 April	3/15	The Emperor granted Fuk'anggan the title "Great General" to frighten the Gorkhalis. The Solon troops entered Tibet, reporting the shortage and weakness of horses, as well as their altitude sickness.	KRKJL, vols. 24, 25
18 April	3/27	Fuk'anggan and Hui-ling arrived at Tashilhunpo and investigated the loss. They reported the loss of the golden plates granted to Panchen.	KRKJL, vols. 26, 28; Yuan Yi Lai, no. 902, 904; DL8

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
23 April	4/3	The Emperor sent Heliyen to Lhasa for the supervision of provisions.	KRKJL, vol. 26
April–May	4	A letter from Rana Bahadur Shah was brought to Fuk'anggan by a Newar merchant. Fuk'anggan originally intended to collude with Balabhadra to catch Bahadur Shah and Shamarpa directly, but failed to do so. The letter celebrates Fuk'aggan arrival in Lhasa, discusses Gorkha-Tibetan relations, complaints about poor quality Tibetan silver, and requests review of the 1788 treaty. It was sent with gifts include brocade, felt, and a telescope.	WZTZ, vol. 13; KRKJL, vol. 30
8 May	4/18	The Emperor sent a secret edict to Fuk'anggan, Hailanca, and Hui-ling, worrying that it might be hard to reach Kathmandu. He authorised Fuk'anggan to make decisions himself according to the occasion.	KRKJL, vol. 27; KRKD QL 57/4
24 May	Intercalary 4/4	Fuk'anggan sent a reply to the Gorkha King, which is the First Summon from Fuk'anggan. It strongly rebukes Rana Bahadur Shah, refused further discussions, threatens Kathmandu, calls them to come for capitulation, and returns all gifts.	Cata. Chin. no. 12073 = [4–2–]50–76–11; WZTZ, vol. 13
25 May	Intercalary 4/5	Agūi ordered the Tibetan monks to do recitation for the annihilation of Gorkha.	Cata. Mnc. no. 8627 = 3–2–3410–020
May	Intercalary 4	Soldiers from Derge, Solon, Daur, Sichuan, Yunnan, etc., gathered in Shigatse. The total number might have exceeded 13,000 soldiers. The Bhutan King replied that they could not assist the expedition, while Sikkim and Jumla decided to attack Gorkha to reclaim their territory.	KRKJL, vols. 28, 29
5 June	Intercalary 4/16	The Emperor ordered Hui-ling to transport provisions instead of commanding.	KRKJL, vol. 29
16 June	Intercalary 4/27	Fuk'anggan started marching from Tingri, taking the Kyirong route.	KRKJL, vol. 33

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
		Qing Army Marching Towards Nepal	
June	5	China reclaimed Tibet	Potala inscription
21 June		Fuk'anggan seized Kukurghat (Camu) at the border.	Report of VS 1850
24 June	57/5/6	Fuk'anggan captured Camu (Tib. sKya mo). They killed more than 100 enemies.	KRKJL, vol. 33 = De-leng-tai, vol. 2, 15a; Potala inscription
26 June	57/5/8	Fuk'anggan captured Ma-gar-xiar-ga. Having killed almost 300, they reached Bangxing. Hailanca's horse was shoot by the enemy.	Dto.
28 June	57/5/10	Fuk'anggan attacked Kyirong before dawn. They killed almost 900.	Potala inscription; De-leng-tai, vol. 2, 18b = KRKJL, vol. 33 = Yuan Yi lai no. 907
2–3 July	57/5/14-15	Fuk'anggan captured Rasuvagadhi. He launched attack before dawn, while Hailanca made a detour to cross the river from upstream the Kyirong River.	Potala inscription; De-leng-tai, vol. 2, 23a = KRKJL, vol. 34
3 July	5/15	Shamarpa's death	WZTZ, vol. 13
5–12 July	5/17–24	Fuk'anggan reached Syaphru and captured the place by building a bridge with a withered tree.	Potala inscription; De-leng-tai, vol. 2, 26b = KRKJL, vol. 34
9–15 July	5/21–27	Cengde conquered Dram and marched toward the border.	KRKJL, vol. 35; KRKD QL 57/12
16 July	5/28	Rana Bahadur Shah wrote a letter to Fuk'anggan. It was brought to him by Wang Gang. The letter (2.2.2a) reports the death of Shamarpa.	WZTZ, vol. 13; TP; Yuan Yi Lai, no. 910
21 July	6/Geng-wu	Fuk'anggan entered the realm of the enemy. Cengde also reached Liti.	KRKD QL 57/12
24 July	57/6/6	Fuk'anggan conquered Dhunce. They killed over 300.	KRKJL, vol. 35 = De-leng-tai, vol. 2, 30b

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
		Pause for Negotiation at Ramche	
27 July	57/6/9	Fuk'anggan reached Ramche. He reported that he was commanding 6,000. The soldiers were exhausted because of the fighting and the rainy weather. He decided to rest there.	KRKJL, vol. 35 = De-leng-tai, vol. 2, 30b;
		Rana Bahadur Shah sent letters to Fuk'anggan and Cengde. Cengde later replied that he would only follow Fuk'anggan, which was called by the Report 1850 "a letter to the Gorkha King expressing affection".	WZTZ, vol. 13
2 August	6/15	Fuk'anggan sent a summon to Rana Bahadur Shah. The summon (2.2.2b) rejects everything and requests them to come for surrender.	WZTZ, vol. 13
5 August	6/18	Rana Bahadur Shah wrote a letter to Fuk'anggan. It was brought by Bhotu Pande, Narasimha, etc. Fuk'anggan criticised them and took the messengers as hostage.	WZTZ, vol. 13; Cata. Mnc. no. 8683 = 3–2–3410–047; Chin. no. 12093, [4–2–]50–91–1
13 August	6/26	Fuk'anggan sent a summon to Rana Bahadur Shah. The summon accepts their obedience but requests the withdrawal of all Gorkhali army. It refuses to have a written treaty.	WZTZ, vol. 13
Mid-August	7	Fuk'anggan received Tenzin Peljor etc. He refused to end the war and started the Betravati Battle with crossing the river.	KRKJL, vol. 38; TP; Yuan Yi Lai, no. 911
		The Betravati Battle	
19–20 August	7/2–3	Amantai, Mor-gen-bao, Taifingga, etc., were killed while crossing the river. The coprses of Amantai, etc., could never be found.	TP; KRKJL, vol. 39 = De-leng-tai, vol. 2, 36a
20 August	[7/3]	Chinese troops drown in the Betravati River.	Acharya 2013, 251

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
25–31 August	7/8	A letter of surrender by Rana Bahadur Shah (2.2.2c) was sent to Fuk'anggan with handing over the treatises, all objects from Tashilhunpo and the ashes of Shamarpa. The first person pronoun was changed into "the tiny one". On that day, the disciple of Shamarpa committed suicide.	KRKJL, vol. 39 = Yuan Yi Lai, no. 912; WZTZ, vol. 13
26 August	7/9	Fuk'anggan memorialised receiving the letter (2.2.2c).	KRKJL, vol. 39 = Yuan Yi Lai, no. 913 = Cata., Chin. no. 12101 = [4–2–]50–91–2; KRKJL, vol. 40
30 August		Rana Bahahdur Shah deputes Damodara Pande to negotiate with the Chinese.	2.1.5
31 August	7/14	A letter from Rana Bahadur Shah, explains the robbery and blaming Shamarpa.	WZTZ, vol. 13
3 Sept.	7/17	Balabhadra Khawas brought the letter above, along with Shamarpa's corpse, his attendants, and the Kyirong Treaty, to Fuk'anggan.	KRKJL, vol. 40; Cata. Chin. no. 12105 = [4–2–]50–91–3
5 Sept.	7/19	Fuk'anggan, Hailanca, and Hui-ling sent a secret report on the difficulties of marching further. Meanwhile, he memorialised the letter above.	Yuan Yi Lai, no. 915 = KRKJL, vol. 40
11 Sept.	7/25	Rana Bahadur Shah sent a letter (2.2.2d) to Fuk'anggan. He sent out the consort of Shamarpa together with other attendants and things. The letter confesses mistakes, surrenders, and mentions the preparation of tribute.	WZTZ, vol. 13
13 Sept.	7/27	The letter above (2.2.2d) was received by Fuk'anggan.	KRKJL, vol. 41; Cata. Chin. no. 11708= [4–2–]50–91–4

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
Sept.–Oct.	8	Official Letter of surrender (2.2.3a) to the Emperor was issued by Rana Bahadur Shah, while snow started to fall in Kyirong.	WZTZ, vol. 13; KRKJL, vol. 43; Cata. Mnc. no. 8769 = 3–2–3413–030
25 Sept.	8/10	The Emperor expressed his worry about the cold weather and granted permission to Fuk'anggan to accept the surrender. By then he had not yet received the memorial on Betravati Fuk'anggan memorialised the official letter (2.2.3a).	KRKJL, vol. 38; Han-wen Lu-fu 3–157–7619–1
28 Sept.	8/13	Devadatta Thapa brought gifts and 100 buffalos, etc., to Fuk'anggan's camp, while it was also the 82nd birthday of the Emperor.	WZTZ, vol. 13 = KRKJL, vol. 42
3 Oct.	8/18	Official reply to the surrender (2.2.3b) was issued by Fuk'anggan.	WZTZ, vol. 13
4 Oct.		Gorkha and China concluded a truce.	Theobald 2002, 127
4 Oct.	8/19	Fuk'anggan set the retreat date (Oct. 6, 8/21) and reported that there were less than 5,000 remaining soldiers. He decided to station 100–200 soldiers at the border.	Yuan Yi Lai, no. 917 = KRKJL, vol. 40
7 Oct.	8/22	Emperor officially authorised surrender by edicts.	KRKD QL 57/8 = KRKJL, vol. 40 = Yuan Yi Lai, no. 918 = 2.2.3c
		End of the War	
8 Oct.		Devadatta Thapa and some 50 men went with an arjī and presents to the Emperor.	CPC X, no. 851, 179.
10 Oct.	8/Ding-hai	The Chinese army withdrew from the front.	2.2.6.
12 Oct.	8/27	Fuk'anggan reached Syaphru and destroyed the fortresses. He also killed four spies captured earlier.	KRKJL, vol. 43
15 Oct.	8/30	Fuk'anggan arrived at the borde town, Rasua.	KRKJL, vol. 43

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
18 Oct.	9/3	Devadatta Thapa led an tributary envoy, escorted by the Manchu warrior Jurgangga.	WZTZ, vol. 13; KRKJL, vol. 43
19 Oct.	9/4	Fuk'anggan returned to Kyirong. He calculated that they slayed 3,000 to 4,000 enemies in total and marched forward more than 700 to 800 li.	Yuan Yi Lai, no. 920 = KRKJK, vol. 42
25 Oct.	9/10	The Emperor announced his authorisation of Fuk'anggan's retreat.	Yuan Yi Lai, no. 921
30 Oct.	9/15	Fuk'anggan returned from Kyirong. He sent Mukdengga to check the borders.	KRKJL, vols. 44, 50
31 Oct.	9/16	The Emperor issued an edict (2.2.3d) to instruct the Gorkha King.	KRKD QL 57/9 = KRKJL, vol. 42
1 Nov.	9/17	Zhang Zhi-yuan died of sickness at Kyirong.	KRKJL, vol. 50
3 Nov.	9/19	The Emperor granted the Gorkha elephants to Dalai and Panchen.	KRKJL, vol. 42
4 Nov.	9/20	Devadatta Thapa reached Tashilhunpo. Panchen recited sutra for him.	KRKJL, vol. 45
11 Nov.	9/27	Devadatta Thapa arrived at Lhasa. He met Heliyen and Dalai. They left Lhasa in 3 days.	KRKJL, vol. 44
16 Nov.	10/3	The Emperor announced that he completed the quadrilingual Potala inscription (2.2.5).	KRKJL, vols. 41, 42
16–19 Nov.	10/3–6	Fuk'anggan arrived at Tashilhunpo. He met Panchen and returned the golden plates to him. Panchen sent regards to the Emperor.	KRKJL, vol. 45
Nov. 28	10/15	Fuk'anggan approached Lhasa and met Dalai Lama. Later, Dalai Lama did ritual for the longevity of Fuk'anggan's mother.	KRKJL, vol. 45; DL8
Dec.	10	The Emperor awarded the Newar merchant in Lhasa with 100 ingots. He exiled the relatives of Shamarpa to Canton and punished Ohūi for his deceitful memorialisation in 1789.	KRKJL, vols. 43, 44, 46

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
Dec.	10–11	Fuk'anggan received the five estates of Tenzin Peljor's family. The Emperor later inquired via Hešen, whether Tenzin Peljor wanted them back, while Tenzin Peljor offered them again. Fuk'anggan requested the permission of trans-Himalayan trade and the whitewash of Svayambhunath. He also proposed to issue printed visa.	KRKJL, vol. 46; TP
6 Dec. and 10 Feb.	10/23, 12/30	Fuk'anggan proposed to put a restriction on trade, saying that only 3 times of commercial activities would be conducted within a year. Later much more trade connection was allowed with cautions upon and numismatic issue.	Yuan Yi Lai no. 928, 938
1793			
4 Jan.	57/11/22	Tenzin Peljor arrived at Peking, escorted by Hailanca's son.	KRKJL, vol. 46
3 Feb.	57/12/23	Devadatta Thapa arrived at Peking and met Hešen. They had several audiences with the Emperor in the following days.	KRKD QL 58/1; KRKJL, vol. 48; 2.2.3e, f
22 Feb.	58/1/12	The Elephants arrived at the Tibetan border via Bhutan.	KRKJL, vol. 51
23 Feb.	58/1/13	Daljit Giri reached Lhasa from Kolkata.	KRKJL, vol. 51
23 Feb.	58/1/13	Hešen rejected the Gorkhali's request for military aids (2.2.3e).	KRKD QL 58/1
24 Feb.	58/1/14	Devadatta Thapa wrote a letter (2.2.3f) back to Rana Bahadur Shah.	KRKD QL 58/1
27 March	Tib. 2/15	Tenzin Peljor suffered from smallpox	van der Kuijp and Tien 2022, 29 = TP 976f
April	58/3	Hailanca died in Peking.	*Draft History*
5 April	58/2/25	Fuk'anggan left Lhasa	DL8
19 April	Tib. 3/9	Tenzin Peljor left Peking for Lhasa	van der Kuijp and Tien 2022, 36 = TP 989

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
May	58/4	The tribute of Gorkha, elephants and horses, went to Peking through the Amdo region. At the Hall of Purple Glaze, the Emperor ordered painting for the meritorious officers.	De-leng-tai, vol. 2, 49b-50a
May	58/4	Heliyen received letters from Rana Bahadur Shah which spoke of the good relation with Tibet and the confirmation of border. Later, he received another letter from Rana Bahadur Shah, which reports a visit of somebody from Kolkatta [Kirkpatrick].	KRKJL, vols. 52, 53
May	58/4	In Dartsemdo, Fuk'anggan met Devadatta Thapa who was returning to Kathmandu.	KRKJL, vol. 52
27 August	58/7/21	The elephants and horses left Xining.	KRKJL, vol. 54
Sept.	58/8	Gorkha sent two ambassadors to Lhasa. They reported their relationship with Sikkim and Jumla to Heliyen, asking Tibet not to assist them. The Jokhang inscription by Yang Kui was erected.	KRKJL, vol. 54
18 Oct.	58/9/14	The Peking court inquired relocated Gorkha chieftain Gang-ga-le-ta-ze-xi about British Indiwhen the Macartney Embassy had left Peking.	Mosco 2013, 152
1794+			
1794	59	Heliyen made border stones with Mustang, Bhutan, Gorkha, Sikkim, and Jumla.	KRKJL, vol. 54
4 Feb. 1794	59/1/5	The Emperor ordered Heliyen to tell the Gorkha King not to send gifts so often. He also granted gift to him and ordered some Tibetans to learn Nepali. He told Heliyen to pay the allowance of the Gorkhalis learning Chinese with the imperial treasury.	Qianlong Manchu Secret Edicts no. 4138
16 June 1794		Rana Bhadur Shah regains control.	Acharya 2013, 252
5 Sept.	59/8/12	The Emperor asked Hešen to order Heliyen to find somebody knows Nepali and send him to Peking.	Qianlong Manchu Secret Edicts no. 4192

Table 2 (continued)

CE	QL	Event	Source
6 Nov. 1794	59/10/14	The Emperor completed reading KRKJL.	KRKJL, vol. 54
1794–1795	QL 59–60	An elephant granted to Dalai died because of sickness.	DL8
14 Jan. 1795	59/12/24	The Emperor ordered Sungyūn to inform the Gorkha King that he was going to succeed Heliyen as the amban residing in Tibet	Qianlong Manchu Secret Edicts no. 4210
July 1796	60/5	Fuk'anggan died during his expedition against the Hmong people. Sun Shi-yi died later during the same expedition later on 25 July. Other officers such as Yuan Guo-huang and Jušenboo who attended the Gorkha Campaign also died in this war later.	*Draft History*
15 Oct. 1796	60/9/3	The Emperor, aged 85, passed the throne to his son but kept the power in hand.	
16 Jan. 1796	60/12/7	The Emperor dismissed the request of Bahadur Shah to send envoy to Peking on his own in his edict to Sungyūn. He ordered Sungyūn to criticise Bahadur Shah.	QianlongL Manchu Secret Edicts no. 4284.
17 Feb. 1797		Bahadur Shah was murdered.	Acharya 2013, 252
7 Feb. 1799	1/3	The Emperor Qianlong died at the age of 89.	
17 Feb. 1799	1/13	QL's son arrested Hešen. Heliyen was moved out from the imperial ancestral temple.	
1800	JQ 5	Many of the army officials who partook the Gorkha campaign, such as Ohūi, Agūi, Dai-sen-bao etc., did not survive in the nineteenth century. Mukdengga, De-leng-tai, and Eldemboo survived.	*Draft History*

6 Who Won the War?

Most historical accounts generally align on the following events of the Sino-Nepalese War:

It all started with King Prithvi Narayan Shah (r. 1769–1775), the visionary founder of unified Nepal. He gave an important teaching to his people in his work *Divyopadeśa* ("*Holy Teaching*"). He metaphorically referred to Nepal as a "yam between two rocks" (Stiller 1989, 42) and thus the squeezed location of Gorkha, which later became Nepal, in the middle of China and (British) India. In this regard, King Prithvi gave the following advice to his people:

> Maintain a treaty of friendship with the Emperor of China. Keep also a treaty of friendship with the Emperor of the Southern Sea [i.e., the Viceroy in Calcutta]. (Stiller 1989, 42)

However, Pṛthvī Nārāyaṇa's youngest son, Bahadur Shah, who became Regent in 1785 due to the young age of two years of King Rana Bahadur Shah disregarded his father's message and initiated the Sino-Nepalese conflict, also known as the Gorkha-China War. Following an extended period marked by strained relations between Nepal and Tibet, chiefly stemming from trade disputes and Nepalese control over the minting of silver coins for Tibet, Bahadur Shah initiated a significant incursion into Tibet in 1788. This military campaign saw the seizure of Kerung and Kuti, accompanied by the defeat of Tibetan forces. Subsequent negotiations yielded terms favouring the Gorkhalis, securing monopolistic advantages and an annual payment of 50,000 Rupees (= 300 ingots) from Tibet, *alias* the treaty of Kyirong 1789. This was concealed by the Qing Imperial Commissioner Bajung and ended with the first envoy to Peking in 1790.

Tensions escalated when Tibet ceased paying the agreed tribute. Concurrently, upon the death of the sixth Panchen Lama of Tashilhunpo in Peking, his younger brother, the Sharmapa Lama, sought refuge in Kathmandu, whereas the elder brother Drungpa Hutuktu, the treasurer

of Tashilhunpo, held the abundant donations to Panchen Lama in the Tashilhunpo monastery. The Gorkhalis launched another invasion of Tibet, culminating in the looting of the prosperous Tashilhunpo monastery in October 1791.

This aggressive action prompted the Tibetan government to appeal for assistance from the Chinese Emperor Qianlong, who claimed suzerainty over Tibet. In response, the Emperor dispatched a substantial force under the command of the Great General Fuk'anggan. After several battles, the Chinese forces advanced up to Betravati, a day's journey from Kathmandu. Agreements were reached there, which notably included the quinquennial mission of Nepal to Beijing.

What is open or debated, is the question: Who won the war? Obviously, there is no clear winner of the war, even if it is claimed by both the Gorkhali and the Chinese sides. In general, the researchers who have dealt with the topic have also mostly sided with their sources. A closer examination of the sources, however, uncovers numerous interconnected factors.

6.1 The Nepalese Perspective

The Nepalese sources mostly saw themselves as the winners even though they surrendered several times and in various forms. Thus, the *Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī* clearly states: "[Rana Bahadur Shah] killed the Chinese army. He thus caused the Chinese Emperor to praise him."[365] In Rana Bahadur Shah's letter of 1792 (Part II, 2.1.4), too, the victory is claimed:

> When the enemy was only at one day's distance from Kathmandu, we checked him where possible and negotiated where this was to our interest. We then wrote to you about what had happened here and asked you to come post-haste. By the grace [of the goddess (*īśvarī*)] we faced the enemy by means of strength and tactics and repulsed him, maintaining the country (*dhuṅgo*) independent as usual.

365 *Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī* 20.92, 135.

Likewise, Padmagiris chronicle declares Nepal the winner:

> When the Chinese forces had reached as far as Daibang [Dhaibung] in the Nepalese territory, Ran Bahadur despatched to oppose them a Gorkha army under the command of his principal Chief Damodar Pande, who destroyed the Chinese forces and concluded a treaty favourable for the Nepal Raja.[366]

These passages are interpreted by Vajrācārya and Nepāla as follows:

> Some foreign historians have claimed that Nepal became part of the Chinese empire as a result of the Sino-Nepalese War. However, these letters [from King Raṇa Bahādura Śāha] clearly demonstrate that Nepal did not come under Chinese sovereignty in any form. Nepal's decision to sign a treaty with China was not a consequence of defeat in the war. In fact, the Nepalese forces successfully defeated the Chinese army in the penultimate battle at Betravati, and their military strength remained intact. (…) The Chinese forces reached the outskirts of Nepalese capital. In this situation, there was a potential for British intervention if the conflict with China persisted. Thus, signing a treaty with China was a wise decision under the given circumstances. The treaty did not include any provisions requiring Nepal to accept Chinese sovereignty or impose terms that would cause disadvantage to Nepal.
>
> The treaty's provision for quinquennial delegations to China was advantageous for Nepal. It established direct diplomatic relations between the two governments, ensuring uninterrupted Sino-Nepalese relations. These ties continued until VS 1965 (1908) during the reign of Candra Śamaśera. However, the fall of the Chinese emperorship disrupted diplomatic relations. The relations were later resumed in VS 2012 (1955), based on the *pañcaśīla* principles [for peaceful co-extistence].[367]

In Rana Bahadur Shah's letter to Gajarāja Miśra (the *rājaguru* of the King), the victory over the Chinese, which resulted in a peace treaty, is described in drastic terms:

366 Hasrat 1971, 94.
367 Vajrācārya and Nepāla 1957/70, 73–74 (our translation).

> A severe engagement took place in which the enemy suffered a heavy loss. Hundreds of his troops were killed and as many wounded. Some fell in the river and were drowned. The rest were routed. The Vazir in fury cut off the noses of two of his officers who were so disgusted at this mortifying disgrace that they drowned themselves in the river. Besides this, the heat of the summer season in Nepal, which is termed the *aul*, also took a heavy toll of the Chinese army. At last, peace was concluded according to which the two Bhotia diwans [Tibetan ministers, g.Yu thog and Tenzin Peljor] who had been brought as captives from Digarchi [Digarca][368] were released and the property which had been seized was restored. Similarly, a collection of fourteen parwanas [*parvāṇā*] written on gold leaf by the Emperor of China to the Lama of Digarchi,[369] was given up. In accordance with the wishes of the Vazir the writer also sent to him on 29 *Muharram* 1207 A.H. or 16 Asin (16 September 1792) some fifty men, including Diwan Deo Dutt Thappa [Devadatta Thāpā] and Balbhadar [Balabhadra Kũvara], with an *arzi* [*arjī*], some presents, and a *nazar*[370] [present] for the Emperor. The Vazir left for Peking on 20 Safar (8 October 1792) and took the Diwan with himself to introduce him to the Emperor there.[371]

Similarly, the Nuvakot Inscription of 1868 (Part II, 2.1.12) directly records the victory of Gorkha, stating: "The Emperor of China, accompanied by a large army, attacked Nepal with the intention of destroying it, but fled swiftly after witnessing the destruction of his own troops." Furthermore, according to the Report of VS 1850 (11^{r-v}), the Gorkhalis army was crushing the Chinese troops in the battle of Betravati:

> The Gorkha King's troops had the advantage of higher ground, whereas the Chinese troops were on a lower ground. Therefore, the Chinese troops fled, being unable to withstand the fight.

368 In fact, from Nyalam.

369 This is verified by the Chinese sources. For the Emperor, this was the major thing to be reclaimed. It was literally "golden album" 金冊, serving as the authorisation of the conference of the title Panchen Erdeni from the Qing Emperor to the Panchen Lama. Hence, we often translated it as "golden plates", given its donative nature.

370 Probably (Persian) *nazrana*, "customary payment", see McGregor 1997, s.v. *narana*.

371 CPC X, no. 851, 179.

Several Chinese soldiers were killed, while only a few of the Gorkha King's soldiers lost their lives. Some Chinese troops panicked, fell from the mountain and died, while others jumped into the Betravati river and drowned.

After realising that his troops had been defeated and had fled, the Minister [i.e. Fuk'anggan] watched them through his binoculars and issued the following order: 'Establish a strong checkpoint at the Betravati bridge and do not allow any fleeing soldiers who cross the Betravati river to pass. Chop off the nose of anyone who tries to cross and send additional troops.' The Minister himself came to this side of the bridge with thirteen cannons. At that time, the Gorkha King's troops at the checkpoint pushed back the Chinese troops to Betravati. Since the Chinese troops were in a hurry, they were unable to build the new bridge properly. In their rush to cross the bridge, many Chinese soldiers drowned in the Betrāvatī from the broken bridge. The remaining soldiers threw two cannons into the river out of fear of the Gorkha King's troops, and many of them jumped into the river and died. When the Minister witnessed the defeat of his troops, he opened the way over the old bridge. One of his *sardāra-amban* broke his leg while fleeing, and the remaining soldiers carried him on their back and joined the Minister's troops. However, he died three days later. The battle between the Gorkha King's troops and the Chinese troops guarding the old bridge was fought using guns. There was a small hill near the bridge, and the Chinese Minister took the cannon unit to this hill and fired at the Gorkha King's troops.

[11v] As the Chinese army could not construct a defense out of wood and stone, they made a wall using the dead bodies of their own [troops] who had died painfully on the spot. The fight continued until dark, and both sides returned to their camps. The Minister also went back to his sleeping tent.

In this rather desperate situation, Fuk'anggan made another peace offer (11^{v}–13^{r}):

On the following day, the Minister summoned Bhoṭu Pāḍe and *ṭaksāri* Narasiṃ and spoke to them, saying: "When both our troops engage in battle, sometimes we win, and sometimes we are defeated. In such a situation no one should feel discouraged.

> Previously, I had sent an order to the Gorkha King stating that we would settle the matter upon arriving in Nuvakot. I had also ordered my own troops to stay at this side of the bridge. Despite this, we suffered losses (lit. 'my troops died'). Let us consider this a [tragic] play, which I myself watched. The people and the poor population must now feel extremely terrified. The Gorkha King and the British Resident need not worry about abandoning Nuvakot as I have decided to abandon my intention of marching to Nuvakot. [Therefore], it is not necessary for the venerable Mahārāja and venerable *saheba* [Bahadur Shah] to come to Nuvakot. Now I will write a few points to the venerable Mahārāja to please him. You, too, write to him to accept to what I will write. If we can agree on the terms, I will withdraw with my troops from this realm to my own realm, report to the Chinese Emperor, persuade him, and arrange for many gifts (*khillat*) to be sent to the venerable Gorkha King and the venerable *saheba*."

Minister Fuk'anggan then issued a letter to the Gorkha King outlining a proposal. He stated that if Shamarpa were still alive, he would have captured him, but if Shamarpa had died by divine will, he requested that the remains, valuables, servants, and items seized from the Gorkha King be sent to the Emperor as proof of the successful recovery of stolen goods. These included valuables looted from the Tashilhunpo Monastery, Chinese silk, golden vessels, and presents given to Tasilemum Lama of Digarca [Panchen of Shigatse]. He also requested the return of the fraudulent documents signed in Kerung due to Shamarpa's actions. He further proposed that the two sides end hostilities by returning the documents to Peking, ending both documents, and negotiating with the Emperor. The Gorkha King was urged to send an official letter (*arjī*) to the Emperor with an exceptional tribute and one of the four *kājīs*. If these conditions were met, Fuk'anggan promised to withdraw his troops and return to his own realm. However, if the Gorkha King refused, the Minister threatened not to withdraw and to march into Nepal. The letter ended with a warning that if the Gorkha King preferred war, Fuk'anggan would prepare for it.

After reading Fuk'anggan's letter, the Gorkha King consulted with his advisors. During this time, the Chinese troops fell ill with a fever, leading to many deaths and exacerbated by a lack of food supplies. Fuk'anggan repeatedly pressed for a reply from the Gorkha King.

Meanwhile, a letter from the Governor General in Calcutta advised the Gorkha King to maintain friendly relations with the Emperor. To strengthen ties, Captain William Kirkpatrick (= Chin. Ji-li-ba-di 幾哩巴底)[372] was to be sent to help mediate. After considering both the Chinese Minister's and the Governor General's advice, the Gorkha King decided that it was best to show respect to the Emperor and avoid conflict.

As a result, the Gorkha King sent a diplomatic mission to Beijing, led by *kājī* Devadatta Thapa and other officials. The delegation carried the requested official letter along with several items: the bones of Shamarpa Lama,[373] his servants, seized valuables,[374] silver and Chinese silk that had originally been presented by the Emperor to Panchen of Shigatse. They also brought extraordinary gifts for the Emperor.[375]

The agreement proposed is the so-called Treaty of Betravati, which contains four key points:

1. After five years, a *vakila* (representative) of the Gorkha King would go to the Emperor with an *arjī* (petition) and tributes to pay *darshana* and report back.
2. The Gorkha King and the Dalai Lama would maintain their friendship and refrain from future conflicts, keeping their respective territories.
3. Unalloyed coins of the Gorkha King would be accepted as such in transactions in Tibet, while adulterated coins would be given their corresponding value.
4. If any enemy threatened the Gorkha King's troops, it should be reported to the Emperor for assistance.

According to the Report of VS 1850, both parties agreed to these terms, and Fuk'anggan, along with his troops and Gorkhali representatives, left Dhaibung and returned to China. The officials of Rana Bahadur Shah accompanied Fuk'anggan to Kerung,[376] where they received extraordinary gifts and medals. Following the Fuk'anggan's instructions,

372 Mosca 2013, 320.

373 In fact, the bones of Shamarpa did not reach Peking. The Emperor ordered it to be displayed in Tibet.

374 The seized valuables were mainly returned to Tashilhunpo or the Tibetan treasury.

375 See V.K. Manandhar 2001 for a description of this first of the subsequent quinquennial missions and the partly edition of the *arjī* and the letter of Devadatta Thāpā. It also contains two lists of the presents of the 1795 mission.

376 According to Chinese sources, they were forced to go to Kyirong to listen to the instructions of Fuk'anggan (see articles in Part II, 2.2.3d). This was

they sent injured Chinese soldiers and other commodities back to China and then returned to Nepal from Kerung.

Cengde, the head of the Chinese troops stationed in Listi, wrote a letter to the Gorkha King expressing affection. The Gorkha King replied with gifts for a feast, fostering goodwill. On the 2nd day of the bright fortnight of Kārttika, Cengde and his troops left Listi and returned to the plateau of Tingri, where he met other parts of the troops.

After Fuk'anggan and the head of the Chinese troops returned to Lhasa, they left three Lamas from Digarca, Samkhya [Saskya] and Lhasa. Subsequently, they arrested the noblemen of Tibet and their associates, including Aitu Kaji [g.Yu thog] and Tenzin Peljor along with Tava Kaj. The previous police officer (*ṭhānedāra*) and amban of Lhasa were also fettered, and two new ambans and about five hundred soldiers were appointed as policemen (*ṭhānedāra*) in Lhasa. The Chinese forces left Lhasa and returned to their side in the February/March.

During their stay in Rana Bahadur's territories, many Chinese soldiers were injured and died due to the hot season and strong winds. Forced labourers from Tibet were brought in to bury the corpses, and due to a shortage of wood, they took it from the houses. The Tibet realm experienced additional challenges, including deaths from smallpox, leading to the closure of the two-way trading route.

Consequently, the political authority in Tibet shifted, with the *kājī*s and the Dalai Lama of Tibet losing influence. The Tibetans were now considered subjects or cultivators of China, and Chinese orders are followed in the region.

In conclusion, the Nepalese sources indicate that there was no definitive winner, but rather competing claims of victory. The notion that Nepal emerged victorious can only be upheld by overlooking key nuances or by selectively emphasizing certain aspects in a one-sided or distorted manner. This is particularly evident in discussions about the challenges faced by Chinese troops with the difficult terrain and harsh weather conditions. This situation is cited in the VS 1850 Report as a reason for the Chinese withdrawal. Tenzin Peljor, Yang Kui, Zhaolian, and Wei Yüan as well as a secret report from Fuk'anggan to the Emperor[377] support this view to a certain extent saying the soldiers

taken as a signal for their submission. But surely, they were warmly received together with the army, probably by Heliyen, as they had surrendered.

377 Deng 2009. See also the edict ordering Fuk'anggan on 7 October 1792 (Part II, 2.2.6d).

become less than 5000 owing to injury, illness, natural hazards such as snowfall, hunger, etc.

In addition, there are those mentioned letters between Rana Bahadur Shah and Fuk'angan or the Emperor, preserved in Chinese. Some of them are published in Part II for the first time, with which the Gorkha King capitulated several times and submissively (see Part II, 2.2.2, 3).[378] Most later Chinese historiography, beginning with the Potala Inscription spoke of two official capitulations, while WZTZ gave even more. According to WZTZ, after a series of capitulations, King Rana Bahadur Shah writes to Fuk'anggan the following on 11 September 1792, speaking of the tribute (2.2.3d):

> The tribe of the tiny one (hereafter normalised as "I/we") looted the Tashilhunpo. Naturally, I should observe the summons and instructions, sending all looted objects out. When the soldiers of our tribe came back from the Back of Tibet last year, many were frozen to death due to the heavenly punishment for their offence. (…)
>
> Moreover, I wish to obediently submit with allegiance to the Heavenly Dynasty wholeheartedly. If I should enjoy the grace [of the Great Emperor] that remit my crime with lenience, not only my life but also the entire territory would be spared and awarded by the Great Emperor. The lives of my headpersons and subjects were also made intact by the compassion of the Great Emperor.
>
> Now, I am preparing the auspicious memorial and tribute. I am about to despatch the chief headperson to Peking. He will plead for forgiveness and imperial grace upon his audience with the heavenly face of the Great Emperor. Regarding the tribute, I do not know the statutes of the Heavenly Dynasty. I am afraid there might be mistakes. Moreover, since I am in a remote, desolate, and tiny region, there is no good product from [our region]. It is hard to express my tiny mind of reverence and fear. (…)

378 Other letters of surrender from Rana Bahadur Shah kept in China (see Part II, 2.22a-d) were written or sent on 16 July 1792 (QL 57/5/28) and Fuk'anggan's reply on 2 August 1792 (QL 57/6/15); on 27 July 1792 (QL 57/6/9) (WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 26–28; WZTZ 1982, 402–4); on 25 August 1792 (QL 57/7/8) (KRKJL, vol. 39, QL 57/8/22; WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 34–36; WZTZ 1982, 409–10); and on 11 September (QL 57/8), while the *kājī* arrived in the Chinese camp on 23 September as the ambassador (QL 57/8/8) (KRKJL, vol. 45, QL 57/9/16; WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.3, 6–13; WZTZ 1982, 422–24).

In the official letter of surrender from September 1792 to the Emperor via Fuk'anggan, Rana Bahadur Shah showed himself even more submissive as it begins (Part II, 2.2.3a):

> The auspicious memorial presented with reverence [to the Emperor]: "Your junior minister, Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, along with the uncle of your junior minister, Bahādura Śāha, having kneed down and kowtowed with joint palm and reverence, offered upwards the auspicious memorial to the chariot of the Great Emperor who is like the all-pervasive heavens that breed [every species] and shines like the sun and moon."

These letters show unequivocally that Gorkha explicitly and humbly admitted the loss of the war and declared that it was ready for appropriate tributes. However, such declarations do not mean that there was a strict vassal-like relationship between China and Gorkha. We will come back to this in the next but one section. Moreover, since we have not been able to find the original letters in Nepali, we do not know whether they were written by Rana Bahadur Shah or his regent. It seems that such letters were often intensively polished by the translators to adjust to the imperial rhetoric and please the Emperor.

6.2 The Chinese and Tibetan Perspectives

For the Chinese and Tibetans, it was mostly clear that they had also won the war.[379] In the 1840s, Wei Yuan wrote in his popular historical narrative: "Their [the Gorkhalis'] capitulation was approved."[380] Schuyler Camman, basing his analysis on *T'ung-hua hsü-lü* (Courtly Records compiled in 1884), also interprets China as the indisputable victor of the conflict: "Fuk'ang-an, a Tartar [Manchu] General

379 The literature relying on Chinese or Tibetan sources confirm this statement from Markham 1876, lxxvii ("Thus a decisive victory was gained within one march of the enemy's capital, in September 1792") to F.X. Erhard 2020b (the "Gorkha ultimately surrendered."); see also Landon 1976, vol. 2, 280; Sreedhar 1988, App. 3; Dabringhaus 1994, 56 ("bedingungslose Kapitulation"); F.K. Ehrhard 2007, 115. The exception is Ulrich Theobald (2020, 127), who speaks of a "truce" concluded in Betravati.

380 See Part II, 2.2.8, 5 ["The Surrender of Gorkha"], Landon 1976, vol. 2, 280; cp. Dabringhaus 1994, 41 with references to further Chinese sources and Sreedhar 1988, App. 3.

and Chinese military leader, achieved a significant victory over the Gurkhas at Nawakot [Nuvakot], a mere twenty miles from the Gurkha capital."[381]

Tracing it back to 1792–1793, it was clear to the Emperor that the Qing troops had won. Already in the letters across the battlefield, Gorkha admitted being subordinate to China. Thus, Rana Bahadur Shah declared: "We, Gorkha, and the Tibetans are both subordinate to the Heavenly Dynasty and still in a good relationship with each other." (Part II, 2.2.2a) As a reply to this, Fuk'anggan criticised King Rana Bahadur Shah for refusing to properly surrender to China. The words he uses are rather undiplomatic, to say the least:

> We had continuous victories. Upon the victories, I shall march forward to your hideout (Kathmandu). I must intensively annihilate Gorkha, sparing no living beings. It can never be veiled by arguments or groundless utterances.
>
> You and Bahādura Śāha, Bam Śāha, and Shamarpa should come to us in person to plead for forgiveness before our great army reaches Kathmandu. You should put your head in the mud in front of the door of our military camp. I, the Great General shall have insight into your sincerity or hypocrisy.

Not only Fuk'anggan declared so on the battlefield, the chief counsellor Hailanca also believed that the Gorkhalis, Bahadur Shah in particular, had a strong wish to surrender and gave evidence for that. In the KRKD, which was not a public text, the Emperor ordered the Grand Council to ask Hailanca on 2 February 1793 (QL 57/12/22): "Who had decided to surrender on the Gorkhali side?" Hailanca replied that it was Bahadur Shah who had decided to surrender. He noted that Narasimha and Bhotu Pande had told him that Bahadur Shah had punished those who opposed the surrender.[382]

Even earlier than the inquiry, the Emperor himself had already declared the authorisation of Gorkha's surrender to the whole Empire, as he wrote in the quadrilingual inscription from 1792 engraved in Tibetan, Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese[383] on a stone slab at the

381 Cammann 1951, 129.

382 KRKD QL 57/12, 93: 詢問海蘭察, 據稱廓爾喀一切事情俱係巴都爾薩野辦理, 此次投誠據他那裏差來的頭人乃爾興、普都爾帮哩說起即係巴都爾薩野的主意, 他還說他手下有不願的人, 巴都爾薩野還治了他的不是.

383 Shakabpa 1967, 168.

foot of the Potala in Lhasa (2.2.5). He did not take any territory from Gorkha except for Dram that was offered by Gorkha as a signal of "submission of allegiance". Hence, the Gorkhalis were not attached to the census and (*li ban-tu* 隸版圖)[384] but came in for an audience (*ru-jin* 入覲 Mnc. *dolo hargašanjimbi*) as the Torghuts, who also did a submission of allegiance earlier.[385] He decided not to integrate Gorkhali into the core of the Empire that should be managed with census and legal codes. Instead, he gave the territory back to them and regarded them as a remote tribe that would guard the border for the Heavenly Dynasty. He also accounted for not taking any territory and concluded the case with victory:

> Even if I did fully seize their territory, given its thousands of *li* distance from the Tibetan border and its impossibility of cultivation and defence, it would eventually be given to others.[386] Hence, I descended my edict to authorise their surrender and ordered the victorious withdrawal of my forces, bringing this event to an end.[387]

The war was then placed among the Ten Complete Martial Glories of Qian-long: "and now the two receptions of the surrenders of the Gorkha" (Part II, 2.2.5),[388] commemorated lavishly by various books, banquets, paintings, and poems (Figure 15).[389]

From the Tibetan side, the Lhasa government addressed the victory that the Gorkhalis became subjects to the Buddhist teachings. The eighth Dalai Lama commented in March 1793 that Gorkha had then be turned into the servants of the monastics (*lha 'bangs*).[390] Similarly, the eighth Tatsag Hutuktu condemned the Gorkha to have been the enemies of the teaching (*bstan pa'i chom rkun pa* or *bstan dgra*). He emphasised the fear of Gorkha, which made them surrender without much violence involved, whereas the Gorkhalis easily (*bde blag nyid*

384 This implies no Qing imperial law code would apply to the Gorkhalis. The Emperor also did not require the ambans to send the census again after the Sino-Nepalese War in 1792, while Gorkha was never painted on the imperial maps.
385 Schorkowitz and Chia 2016, 216–17.
386 For the intricacies of this paragraph in Tibetan and Manchu, see Part II, 2.2.5.
387 Bell 1924, 275; Richardson 1974, 46; Landon 1976, vol. 2, 272.
388 Cp. Part II, 2.2.3c, no.s 4 and 5.
389 Bügener 2015.
390 DL8, 332.16–18.



Figure 15: The Audience of the Gorkhali envoy with the Emperor, 1793 (QL Guichou), a collaboration between Chinese and European painters, late eighteenth century (source: Wikimedia Commons)

du) became subjects or servants ([*chab*]'*bangs*).[391] Besides the Lhasa side, the autobiography of Rindzin Chöying Dorjé also "continues with a statement that the Gorkhas were defeated."[392]

Apart from these decisive accounts of a final victory commemorated hyperbolically within the Empire, contermporaneous memorials, local chronicles, personal chronicles, and the diary of Jiang Zhen-xi seemed to avoid speaking too much about the last battle. This deliberate omission might be seen as a signal of failure. A sensitive Chinese reader will easily grasp the hidden pejorative meaning behind the subtle diction of these writings. The Chinese must have faced difficulties at last. Otherwise, they would exaggerate the military achievements more explicitly.

391 *dus 'dir yang bstan pa'i chom rkun pa de dag bsad gcod sogs cher ma dgos par de gong tsam nas phal mo che rang shugs su bros par gyur cing | phyin chad kyang bsam sbyor ngan pa'i sbyor ba mi rtsom par gus pas 'bangs su gtogs par rgyal blon dmangs bcas kun kyis khas len pa sogs bde blag nyid du chab 'bangs su bkol nus par gyur la.* "Then, without much need for killing, cutting, etc., those bandits who harmed the [Buddhist] teachings have mostly fled by [their] nature. Then, without engaging in impious intentions, being included as subjects due to reverence the king, ministers, and commoners all together assured. Thus, they were easily assigned the role of subjects/servants." (Tatsag8, 370.14–16).

392 Erschbamer 2018, 135.

From the Tibetan side, Tenzin Peljor gave a detailed description of the catastrophic Betravati Battle (2.3.2e) during which the Chinese suffered great loss. He was later escorted separately to Peking but later witnessed the Gorkha mission (*gor kha'i mtshams zhus mi sna*) in the Palace.[393] He was not explicit about who won the war or if he really witnessed a surrender (2.3.2e).

As major actors passed away, the imperial tone started to be volumed down. Approximately 20 years after the war, Prince Zhao-lian (2.2.7) criticised Fuk'anggan severely for his failure in 1820s, echoing with the Report of VS 1850, as he wrote with sarcasm:

> Upon reaching [the Betravātī Bridge],[394] Fuk'anggan felt as though [the troops] had smashed into the enemy's territory, as if splitting bamboo. Confident of a success within a day, he grew particularly arrogant and self-assured. Guarded in his palanquin, he waved a feather fan, comparing himself with the Marquis of Military [Zhuge Liang, the strategist during the Three Kingdom, whose implements were often a palanquin and a feather fan]. Likewise, he commanded. Our troops released their quivers and hung [weapons] from the horses, resting against their firearms. The enemy seized such a lapse to break in with a sudden counterattack. Our forces fell back in disarray. Taifingga was killed in this [skirmish], along with numerous other military officers who perished on the battlefield… Fuk'anggan further ruined the army afterwards. Yet, the timid and flinching barbarians were intimidated and awed by the might and virtue of our state.

Twenty years later, Wei Yuan, who sought to restore imperial glory (Part II 2.2.8), revised Zhao-Lian's account to downplay the defeat at Betravati, attributing it to the challenging natural landscape. However, he did acknowledge that the Gorkhalis' surrender occurred just before the Chinese troops were about to face a significant setback. These writings must have provoked doubts in nineteenth century and resulted in 1927 *Draft History of Qing*'s conclusion that the Gorkhalis offered a truce rather than a surrender:

393 TP 958.

394 It was written as Rasuvāgaḍhī (Re-suo Bridge) but should be a mistake of Pa-lang-gu Bridge, which is Betrāvatī.

> Fuk'anggan [proudly] relied on his victories, while the army was slightly unalerted. Fuk'anggan urged the troops to march forward despite the rain. The enemy made an ambush, waiting to attack. Taifingga fought to the death. The Gorkha ambassador requested for peace and was permitted by Fuk'anggan.[395]

6.3 Victory or Stalemate, Present or Tribute?

In the beginning of October 1792, the war came to an end. Whether by defeat, exhaustion or free will, is a question of debate. There were strong reasons for all parties to end the war. The Gorkha King faced limited resources, growing uncertainty about how much longer his forces could hold out, and the need to continue their expansionist campaign along the western border.

The Tibetans seemed to be afraid of the officers and troops coming in multitude from various directions. Shakabpa remarked that the imperial troops' "presence had caused a hundred times more harm to the Tibetans than the Gurkha invasion."[396] It was probably because the Chinese troops demanded many labours from the Tibetans in the form of *'u lag* ("forced labour"). Tenzin Peljor noted that several years later there was an anonymous poster on the Bridge of Yuthok (g.Yu thog) criticising him: "Therefore, in the future all Tibetans whether monks or laymen, men or women, will certainly be better off not requesting shelter from the Great Emperor, but rather seeking protection from the Gorkha King!" (quoted from Erhard 2020a, 336). The similar fear must have spread across the Tibetan territories, including Shigatse, Lhasa, Chamdo, Derge, and Dartsemdo. Such sentiment of the Tibetans was reported to the Chinese Emperor by Fuk'anggan, Heliyen, and Sun Shi-yi. It was said that people ran away when the great troops approached Tibet out of fear of smallpox and forced labour, even giving up spring cultivation and their own occupations.[397] Sun Shi-yi memorialised that around Chamdo were more than 1,000 *li* of territory with land discarded by the households that had all fled away into the

395 福康安恃勝, 軍稍怠, 督兵冒雨進; 賊為伏以待, 台斐英阿戰死。廓爾喀使請和, 福康安允之.

396 Shakabpa 1967, 168.

397 KRKJL, vol. 26, QL 57/4/3 = Yuan Yi Lai, no. 902; KRKJL, vol. 301, QL 57/5/19, vol. 36, QL 57/7/16; vol. 53, QL 58/6/8; etc.

mountains.[398] The seventh Panchen's biography reported that a plague in Lhasa accompanied the arrival of the Chinese officers in 1792.[399] Later in the same year, even the mother of Panchen Lama and himself were affected after the Chinese troops returned from Nepal.[400]

As has been drawn from first-hand sources in 5.2, the Chinese troops had suffered great losses on the battlefield, suffered from illness and shortage of supply, feared to be cut off by the approaching winter, and did not want to occupy Gorkha permanently anyway. This situation is best commented by Schuyler Camman:[401]

> Fu-k'ang-an, though tempted to sack Kathmandu, the Gurkha capital, refrained from doing so due to the Rajah of Nepal's reported flight with his treasury and the impending closure of the passes back to Tibet for the season. He opted not to risk being stranded in hostile territory without access to supplies.

Given the hardships in front of Fuk'anggan, the defeat at Betravati must have shaken his mind. Nevertheless, he would have to report it as a victory. It should be noted that similar cases occurred in Myanmar (1765–1769) and Annam (1788–1789), where a military defeat or stalemate on the battlefield was turned into a success and later commemorated as one of the martial glories upon the arrival of "tributary" envoys. Fuk'anggan's father, Fuheng was appointed the supreme general against Myanmar in 1769, after the death of the previous chief commanders, Liu Zao, Yang Ying-ju, and Mingšui. Fuheng and his troops suffered from illness, bad weather, torrents, lack of supply, and the agile guerrilla strategy of the Myanmar troops. Everyone would like to end the war. Towards the end of 1769, a treaty or truce was made between lower-ranking officials on both sides, without invoking higher officers.[402] The Emperor only concluded the success upon receiving

398 KRKJL, vol. 36, QL 57/7/26.

399 *'di skabs lha sa'i nad dogs je che dang | zhol du'ang nad dogs re gnyis byung bas mjal phyag gi rigs rgyas bcad dang rgya dpon khag la'ang ja rgyugs gnang ma bde bas ja mar 'bul ba gnang* | "At that moment, Lhasa had more and more the suspicion of illness. Even at the foot of Potala (*zhol*), there was one or two [cases] of suspicious illness. The audiences were cut off entirely, while it was not convenient to hold tea gatherings for the Chinese officers." (PC7, 122).

400 PC7, 126.

401 Cammann 1951, 129–34.

402 Dai 2004, 167.

the tribute in 1789 (QL 54), after he permitted the Myanmar request to resume trade.[403]

The Annam case was more dramatic, involving Fuk'anggan himself. According to Vietnamese sources written in Chinese, Fuk'anggan was bribed by the king of Vietnam and instructed him to write an auspicious memorial so as to please the Great Emperor. Later, the Vietnamese sent a fake king to Beijing to wear the Manchu robe and pay tribute, in which the Emperor took delight so much that he allowed the faked king to embrace the Emperor's knees at Jehol.[404] The Vietnamese envoy also wrote extremely flattering poems to the Emperor. The contemporary Korean ambassador was furious at such flattery and remarked that they had bribed Fuk'anggan to teach them how to please the Emperor.[405] It is also possible that the Gorkhalis were bribing him as well. Thereupon, Fuk'anggan was able to establish a lasting truce through a tributary relationship and submissive letters.

Worn down and demoralised, both sides were indeed exhausted and on the verge of letting go of past grievances. As Tenzin Peljor writes:[406] "Both sides expressed the desire to forget past ill feelings." Fuk'anggan, foreseeing the hardships of marching on, made a truce or even a secret agreement with the Gorkhas, as Bajung had done during the first "campaign". He was fortunate enough that the Emperor trusted him and authorised his decision immediately.

Despite the extravagant inscriptions in Lhasa, it is not unlikely that what is being memorialised is not what happened on the battlefield, but a way of the pacification of the Emperor rather than the disobedient Gorkhalis. It was more important to honour the Emperor with a reasonable story than to eradicate the Gorkhali enemies. The Emperor had doubts and thus made many inquiries with his ministers, such as Cengde, Ohūi, Dai-sen-bao, Hailanca, etc. separately, documented in KRKD, but he accepted what Fuk'anggan memorialised after all. At least publicly, the Qing Emperor no longer questioned the victory, took delight in his achievements, and ordered more commemorations.

403 *Draft History of Qing*, vol. 528, Biography no. 315, Vassals, no. 5.
404 Da-nam, vol. 30, 37–39. See also *Draft History of Qing*, vol. 527, Biography no. 304, Vassals no. 2 Vietnam.
405 Seo, 464, quoted by Ge 2014, 246.
406 Quoted from Shakabpa 1967, 168.

Nevertheless, the key question for us remains whether the outcome was truly a victory or more of a peace agreement or understanding. To clarify this, two critical questions require further attention:

a) Was there any truce, treaty, or peace agreement? If so, in what form was it made, and what were its implications?
b) Did Gorkha become a vassal of China? If so, in what manner, and what were the implications of the surrender?

Truce, treaty, agreement or understanding?

Regarding the question of the agreement, one must take into consideration that for the Chinese Empire, there should not be a treaty unless it was with Russia. The Russian Emperor presented himself as the friend of Emperor Kangxi, avoiding calling himself the Kaiser in the diplomatic letter. The bilateral relation was managed in a familial way with the assistance of Jesuits instead on the state level with the Han-Chinese ministers.[407] Even for Russia, the treaty *Pactum Nertschiae* in Manchu, Latin, and Russian was not translated into the Chinese language until the Late Qing period. In the case of the aforementioned Sino-Myanmar "treaty", the high-ranked generals were also absent, while the official narration called it a summon (*xi* 檄), instruction (*xun* 訓), or order (*yu* 諭).[408] Both imply the inferiority of Myanmar. In the Gorkha campaign, the same words were used by the Emperor Fuk'anggan for the letters and messages to Rana Bahadur Shah.

The society of the Han-Chinese literati might question the Emperor's legitimacy if there happened to be an equally important ruler fighting with the empire. The Chinese Emperor should be the only heavenly son (*tian-zi* 天子) surpassed by nobody. A treaty would acknowledge another Emperor in the ecumene all under heavens. Therefore, to avoid the disgrace of referring to it as a "treaty" (*yue* 約) in the sense of negotiation,[409] the Qing Empire instead called it a "contract" (*quan* 券) or an "agreement" (*he-tong* 合同)[410] over some minor trade issue (*jiao-yi xi-gu* 交易細故).[411]

However, the Tibeto-Gorkha Kyirong treaty was indeed established in 1789, witnessed by Chinese. It was thus referred to in the following

407 Swen 2021.
408 Cp. Lobscheid 1866–69, 1033, 1257, 1715.
409 Ibid., 1822.
410 Ibid., 40, 490.
411 Ibid., 1810.

manner, avoiding the word "treaty". Instead, it was often called "unofficial peace agreement" (*si-xia jiao-yi* 私下交易, literally "private transaction").[412] The Archive Catalogue listed it as the proof with seals (*yin-jie* 印結). It should be noted that "proof" (*jie* 結) is different from a "treaty", as it is often offered upward as a guarantee, while Fuk'anggan often called it "the large and the small agreements" (*da-xia he-tong* 大小合同). Even though the 1789 treaty of Kyirong was often called "contract", Fuk'anggan insisted that it should be returned. Merely a private written contract was to arouse immense anxiety over such a disgrace for the Heavenly Dynasty.

As for "the Treaty Betravati", it became uncertain whether it was a formal written agreement or an exchange of letters or an oral understanding. Written documents were referred to in the following manner during the Sino-Nepalese War: In the Sino-Nepalese negotiation, we also find "proof of willingness" (*gan-jie* 甘結).[413] The term was referred to in Fuk'anggan's summon as a reply to Bhotu Pande's request. He furiously rejected the Gorkhali request to "establish and issue" (*li-ju* 立具) such a document.[414] Quite a while after the Betravati Battle, on 7 October 1792, the Emperor requested the Gorkhalis to "offer upward their proof of willingness" (*chu-ju gan-jie* 出具甘結) while taking a vow in front of Yamāntaka (Vajrabhairava) (Part II, 2.2.3c). Such a written proof was unilateral and asymmetrical, as the Chinese refused to negotiate a proof but ordered the Gorkhalis to offer one to them. From the Chinese perspective and sources, it is hard to imagine that Fuk'anggan issued any written guarantee to the Gorkhalis, as his letters were all called "summons" (*xi* 檄), implying an unequal relationship.

It was quite likely that the agreement of Betravati was never formalised in a single document signed by both parties but rather a consensus

412 TP 635–46; Komatsubara 2017; Theobald 2020, 121.

413 The Tibetan term *gan rgya* "written contract" for it seems to be a transcription and translation of the Chinese word. Cp. Kobayashi 2018. The word *rgya* means "seal" in Tibetan, which had great significance in Tibetan politics from medieval times.

414 Fuk'anggan on 13 August 1792 (QL 57/6/26) wrote, "Now according to the petition of Bhoṭu Pāṇḍe, etc., in front of me, you wished to establish and issue the proof of willingness to indicate that you dare not to disturb any more. This is extremely unsuitable". "今著普魯爾邦哩等面稟, 欲將不敢再行滋事緣由, 立具甘結, 所言尤屬不合". The Emperor replied in his edict: "How could the grand Heavenly Dynasty consider it worthwhile to take up a written proof with you?" "以堂堂天朝, 豈屑與汝立結" (WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 30–32). Normally, the Chinese Empire could not offer any written document as proof or treaty. It can only bestow edict to the tributary states.

established through an exchange of letters and messages (2.2.2–3). It might also be concluded retrospectively. To date, there appears to be no document in the Nepalese archives that formally attests to the peace arrangements described by General Padma Jang in his *Life of Maharaja Sir Jang Bahadur* (1909), although this account is provided without any accompanying original document. The Nepalese scholar Yogi Naraharinātha (2.1.6) summarises this "religious agreement" (*dharmapatra*), the *Gorkha ra Bhoṭako Mudrā Sandhi* (VS 1847), commonly known as the so-called "Treaty of Betravati," as follows and mentions that this is a Nepālī summary of the treaty written in English and stored in the Jaisikotha office in Kathmandu, probably the version Padma Jung was quoting:

1. From now onwards, China (Cīna) will remain as a father (*pitā*) of both Nepal and Tibet. Nepal and Tibet will behave with each other as brothers.
2. The price of the commodities looted in Lhasa should be paid by the Tibetan officials to the Nepalis after a proper investigation by the government of China.
3. Excluding armed soldiers, any Nepali is allowed to enter the border of Tibet and China at any time, establish factories and runs business.
4. If a fight breaks out between two brothers (Tibet and Nepal), the representatives of both governments should send a detailed report to Peking. The Peking Palace will make a final decision to solve the problem.
5. If a foreign power attacks Nepal, China will support Nepal.
6. To respect and show 'a father son relationship', the two brothers (Nepal and Tibet) will send products of their own country to China once in every 5 years.
7. In return, China will send presents (*kośelī*) to show friendship. China will make all necessary arrangements for the diplomats (of Nepal and Tibet) who come to and leave China.[415]

Naraharinath (1964, 2) gives a slightly different translation:

Gorkha-Bhot-China-Arbitration-Treaty 1792

1. That China should henceforth be considered as father to both Gorkha and Bhot [Tibet] who should regard each other as brothers.

415 2.1.6 (Naraharinātha 1965, 20); id. 1964, 2; cp. Stiller 1975, 197–98.

2. That after due investigation by the Chinese Government the Value of the articles plundered at Lhasa would be paid to the Gorkha sufferers by the Bhote authorities.
3. That all Gorkhali subjects with the exception of armed soldiers, would ever be permitted to travel, to establish factories and to carry on trade within the Jurisdiction of Gorkha and Bhot.
4. That if either of the two brotherly states should commence on unprovoked dispute with the intention of possessing the territories of the other, the representatives of the two Governments would report all particulars to the court of Peking which would finally decide the dispute.
5. That if Gorkha be ever invaded by a foreign power China would not fail to help her.
6. The two brotherly states would send to China some produce of their countries every five years in token of their filial love.
7. That the Chinese Government would in return send to Gorkha a friendly present and would make every necessary arrangement for the comfort of the mission to and from.

Paragraph 1 can be traced in the letters (or in Chinese, "petition" *bing* 稟) from Rana Bahadur Shah to Fuk'anggan. Paragraph 2 of compensation for the confiscation of Newar merchants' commodities was done earlier and later in Lhasa and thus not negotiated on the battlefield according to Chinese sources. Paragraphs 6 and 7 were later carried out by missions to Peking. However, the rest paragraphs were not acceptable in the eyes of the Qing Empire. Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 were all firmly refuted by Fuk'anggan, Hešen, and the Emperor sooner or later. Particularly, it would be utterly impossible for the Chinese to accept paragraph 5, as was explained by Hešen to Devadatta Thapa (2.2.2e).[416] As for paragraph 3, the Emperor even said that the connection between Gorkha and Tibet should be cut off entirely and permanently in his official edicts of authorisation (2.2.3c), but Fuk'anggan later requested the Emperor to re-open the trade route on certain conditions.

Whether this contract existed cannot be conclusively clarified, although the possibility was ruled out by the Chinese sources, considering the rebuttals from the Ministers and Gorkha's numerous letters and gestures of submission and tribute.

416 For the underlying "diplomatic" considerations, cp. Mosca 2013, 294–97.

Presents or tributes

The tributary issue starts with paragraphs 5–7 of the "Betravati Treaty". Paragraph 6 speaks of "products of their own country" (i.e., Nepal and Tibet) to be sent to China. Have these been tributes? What were the Chinese understandings of a tribute? Had Nepal thus become a tributary state? Most scholars call these products simply "presents" or "gifts".

Naraharinātha, in his writings, uses the term *kośelī* in Nepālī, which translates to "present." The document from VS 1850 (2.1.5, 4[v]) mentions *najara tohaphā*, "honorary gifts and presents." Rose notes that "Nepali documents invariably refer to the items sent to the Emperor as 'gifts' (i.e., *saugauli*)."[417] However, this may be a mistake on Rose's part, and it is more likely that he meant *saugāta*, a term frequently used in related documents.[418] *Saugāta* is a Persian loan word that conveys the meaning of "a present given to a higher person or authority"[419] or, less likely, "present for a friend and others brought from a foreign country."[420]

In Nepalese documents, the goods from Nepal were commonly referred to as *māmuli saugāta*, meaning "ordinary (or regular) presents" and not *sirto* the term usually used for tributes. But in Chinese sources, these same goods were described as "tributes" (Chinese: *gong* 貢) or "regional products" (*fang-wu* 方物) that Nepal had to pay.[421] The term "tribute envoy" (Chinese: *gong-shi* 貢使) was used from the beginning in BLBJL in 1790.[422] Erich Haenisch, in his work translating Manchu and Tibetan edicts and documents of the Emperor, explicitly and correctly interprets the "products of the country" as tributes.[423] He considers the relationship between China and Nepal in the late nineteenth century to be a tributary one, with the "presents" being regarded as tributary payments ("Tributleistung"), and the agreement of Kyirong as a tributary contract ("Tributvertrag"). Additionally, historical records indicate that

417 Rose 1971, 63 n. 43.
418 See, for instance Manandhar 2001, 155–60, appendices F–Z; Phaṭya Śaṃśera 1893.
419 Cp. NBŚ: *āphubhandā ṭhulo vyaktiharulāī ṭakryāine koselī*.
420 Singh 2002, s.v. *saugāt*.
421 KRKJL, vol. 41, 42 passim.
422 BLBJL, *Poems by the Emperor*, 26.
423 Tib. "*gus 'byul byed pa* = [Manchu] *albabun jafara* = Tribut darbringen" (Haenisch 1938, 38). B. Acharya (2013, 25) summarises the passage of the 'treaty' as such: "Both Nepal and Tibet will have to send a delegation to pay tribute to the Imperial Court in China every five years." Cp. Petech 1984, 213–24 who also speaks of tributes.

in 1877, one of the Nepalese missions was accommodated "in the dirty building assigned to the missions of the tributary nations."[424] All the Chinese sources (2.2) agree upon the term "tribute", be it a document or a historiography. The Imperial Statutes told the institutions to treat the Gorkha tributary envoy as the envoys of the Tibetan lamas, while their music was listed along the Myanmar, Vietnamese, Korea, and other vassal states. The *Draft History of Qing* was most explicit about it as Gorkha was listed under "subordinate states" or "vassals" (屬國).[425]

The practice of labelling gifts as tributes in Chinese sources is not exclusive to the Nepalese context. It can be observed in the British mission of Lord Macartney as well. The British, Netherlands, Russian, French, Bolognese, Hungarian were all listed as tributary states in the imperial archives and paintings.[426] Even the envoy of the Pope (Chin. 意大里亞教化王 Mnc. *idailiya gurun-i tacihiyara wembure wang*) in 1725 (YZ 3) was considered a tributary envoy to the court in Peking (Chin. 來貢 Mnc. *albabun jafanjiha*).[427]

The semantic differences between terms such as Nepalese *māmuli saugāta* and *kośelī*, and Chinese 貢 *gong* or 朝貢 *chao-gong*—cp. Table 3—are not merely translational issues. They reflect distinct worldviews and political systems at various levels and locations. While presents are typically given voluntarily, expressing respect, affection, or gratitude, tributes represent obligations that establish a hierarchical relationship between the giver and receiver. Tributes are regularly paid by one state or ruler to another as a sign of dependence. The most possible situation was that the Gorkhalis followed the Tibetan understanding of such a gift, given the fact that they were often operated by the ambans and institution in charge of Tibetan affairs.

The Tibetans themselves seem to have understood the "tribute" as a "regard" or "greeting", as the term *mtshams zhu* was used by Tenzin Peljor to refer to the Gorkhali tributary envoys after both wars. However, the Tibetan texts issued by the Emperor used the word *gus 'bul* instead, which indicated his emphasis that the gift was sent out of humble respect. Regularity was not embodied by the two words, though

424 Manandhar and Mishra 1986, 40.

425 屬 means "attach" literally in canonical commentaries. It means "vassal", "colonial", "subordinate", and "tributary state" according to Lobscheid (1866–69, 425, 1704, 1825, 1911). Mvy. gave Tib. *brtags pa / phal pa* or Skt. *parijana* Tib. *g.yog 'khor*. Mvy. also gave *māṇḍalikarājā*.

426 Chuang 1989.

427 Ibid., 67.

prescribed by the imperial statutes. They also seem to have much less sense of subordination compared to the Chinese terms that derived from the sense of "upwards". Nor had it the strong inherent sense of obligation as the Manchu and Chinese terms that are closely connected with "tax".

Table 3: Terms for tributes or gifts

Nepālī / Sanskrit / Persian	
āph āphnā deśamā ujjeko vastu	"Products of their own country" (cp. Chinese: *fangwu* 方物)
kośelī	"Gift"
saugāta	"Gift given to a higher person or authority, gift to a friend and others brought from a foreign country"
māmuli saugāta	"Ordinary (or regular) gifts"
upahāra	"Gift"[428] (This term is not used in the sources.)
dāna	"Gift", corresponding to classical Chinese 施 *shi* "donation" (This term is not used in the sources.)
sirto	"Tribute" (This term is not used in the sources.)
nazar (Persian)	"Customary payment" CPC X, no. 851, p. 179, quoted above
Chinese and Manchu Used in the Documents	
方物 *fang-wu*	"Regional product", classical term for "tribute"[429]
貢 *gong*	"Tribute" or "tax"; literally also "up"[430], also used as verb

428 Nepāla VS 2020, 90.

429 "Regional products" was the classical term for "tribute", first to be found in *the Hounds of Lü:* "Oh! the intelligent kings paid careful attention to their virtue, and the wild tribes on every side acknowledged subjection to them. The nearer and the more remote all presented the productions of their countries, in robes, food, and vessels for use." (transl. by Legge) 嗚呼!明王慎德, 四夷咸賓。無有遠邇, 畢獻方物, 惟服食器用。

430 貢 *Gong* was often combined or glossed with "offer upwards" (*xian* 獻), "collect" (*fu* 賦) or "tax" (*shui* 稅), especially in the commentaries to *The Rite of Zhou*, that ordered it to be paid by feudatories in autumns (周禮·秋官·小行人 "令諸侯秋入貢"). "Tax" was even used in the sixth century dictionary 玉篇 as the gloss. In the Confucian model, interpreted by Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, the 2nd century classicist, the product of land (九穀山澤之材) should be sent to the monarch who gathered products from everywhere (周禮·冬官·匠人 "九夫為井" 鄭注"自治其所受田, 貢其稅穀"; 天官·小宰"以聚百物"鄭注 "職方制其貢"). It was

Table 3 (continued)

職貢 *zhi-gong*	"Obligatory/regular tribute"[431]
獻 *xian*	Literally "forward [in a sacrifice]"[432], "offer to the superior"[433], the most common verb for "paying [tribute]"
賫 *ji*	"Bring", "hold", "present", commonly used as verb for 貢
Mnc. *belek* < Mon. *beleg* (бэлэг)	Terms used to name the Gorkha horses,[434] "auspiciousness" from Mongolian "gift", later Chin. *bai-lek* 伯勒克[435]
Mnc. *albabun*	"Tributary object" = 貢品[436]
Mnc. *albabun jafara*	"Present tribute" = 進貢[437]
Tibetan Terms	
gus 'bul byed pa = [Manchu] *albabun jafara*	"[Humble] respect donation/present", "offering tribute"[438], (Haenisch 1938, 38), term used in Potala Inscription
srid zhu'i gus 'bul zhe sa tshad[439]	"The object of high honour and immeasurable respect" (This term is not used in the sources.)

used to translate *śulka* in the story of Mātaṅga in the 3rd century (摩登伽經卷1 明往緣品:「貢稅法」CBETA 2024.R3, Taishō 21, no. 1300, 402b29; Wogihara 1988, 1342a), while more often it was taken for its meaning "upwards" as in *utkrośayati* (Mvy., Wogihara, 388b).

431 The classical glossary gave the meaning of 職 *zhi* as "perpetual", "regular" or "normal" 常, as the Sanskrit *nitya*. Zheng Xuan again glossed it as "tax" (周禮·夏官·大司馬"施貢分職" 鄭注 "謂賦稅也"). Zheng also glossed the word in the sense of obligation elsewhere (周禮·夏官·掌固 "民皆職焉"鄭注"謂守與任也"). Lobscheid identified 貢, 職貢, and 賦 all as "tribute" (1866–69, 1825).

432 鄭玄注周禮·春官·大宗伯"獻, 獻醴, 謂薦血腥", a more common gloss would be 進 "forward".

433 鄭玄注周禮·天官·玉府有云"古者致物於人, 尊之則曰獻". It can also be glossed as 貢 "to pay tribute" on itself. For the commentaries of Zheng cited above, we have consulted Zhang Shun-hui's thesaurus of Zheng Xuan (張舜徽 鄭雅 Zhang 2005).

434 Lin 2009, 321.

435 Oidtmann 2018, 122.

436 The noun comes from from *alban*, "tax, labour duty, tribute".

437 The verb is *jafambi*, which means "grasp", "hold up", "prepare", "collect tax", etc.

438 The Tibetan noun is a compound of *gus* and '*bul*, meaning "humble" or "devotion" and "gift", "tribute", or "offering" respectively.

439 Karmay 1991, 11, 18.

Table 3 (continued)

mtshams zhu	"Regards" This is the term used by Tenzin Peljor.
brtan bzhugs > Mnc. *Danšuk* > Chin. *Dan-shuk* 丹書克	"Celebration on longevity". The gift from Tibetan Lamas, understood by some Chinese as "tribute". (This is not used in the sources, but used as a loan word in the imperial statutes.)

The coexistence of such different understandings of central terms in the agreement on the quinquennial envoy to Peking suggests that the linguistic difference was intentionally maintained rather than perceived as an insurmountable problem. Tibetan language seems to have played a significant role as the amban contacted the Gorkhalis in Tibetan and the Qing Empire had a branch in Li-fan-yuan on Tibetology (唐古特學). Indeed, we see the possible of fluidity in the Tibetan language. The "gift" can be a "tribute" in a political sense, a "regard" between friends, an "offering" religiously, or a ritual prayer for longevity. The Tibetan monks sent envoys to Peking or Jehol, carrying their *brtan bzhugs* that congratulate the birthdays of the Emperor or the new year, which was called "the yearly line [of messengers] to have audience" (*nian-ban* 年班). Therefore, it was often periodical. It was also managed by the imperial statutes, as not all lamas were able to send regards. The verb was also not the traditional Confucian "offer upward" (*gong*/*xian* 貢/獻), but "reverently pass forward" (*cheng-di*/*gong-di* 呈遞/恭遞), although it had another name still called "enter for tribute" (*ru-gong* 入貢) in the Late Qing imperial statutes written in Chinese.[440] Chinese people can thus interpret it as a "tribute", which would be negligent of the complexity. In fact, the Emperor could also grant (*ci* 賜) *Danšuk* to the lamas.[441]

When it comes to the Gorkha Kingdom's envoy, the term used in the *Painting of Tributary Bearers* (Figure 16) was "enter for the audience" (*ru-jin* 入覲).[442] The text was drafted by the Grand Council in Chinese and then translated into Manchu.[443] The term *jin* 覲 or Mnc. *hargašanjimbi*/

440 *Qin-ding Li-fan-bu Ze-li*, vol. 57, no. 811 喇嘛事例中 八百一十一: 前後藏各間兩年一次遣使入貢.

441 故琺 000800N000000000, labelled "31 August 1780, the Emperor bestowed Danšuk to Panchen Erdeni […]" 乾隆四十五年八月初二日, 皇上賜班禪額爾德呢丹書克. […]

442 Schorkowitz and Chia 2016, 216–17.

443 Chuang 1992.



Figure 16: Balabhadra Khavas and his servant as the envoy of the audience (入覲), Painted in 1790s in Painting of Tributary Bearers 職貢圖 (source: Wikimedia Commons)

hargašambi means "meeting the monarch" or "meet in court". The Manchu term also means "to look up", "to look in distance" and "to admire", while the Chinese term is the specific word for the ritual meeting between feudatories and the son of Heavens.[444] It was once used by Buddhists for the Skt. *drś/paś*, "to see, to respect", especially with the Buddha.[445] The reverent nature in this meeting is self-evident.

According to the imperial archives, battlefront negotiations, the courtly records, and the imperial corpora of statutes, it was crucial that the Qing Empire regarded and treated Nepal as a tributary state. The way the gifts were presented, as well as the accommodation provided in Beijing designated for tributary states, exemplify this hierarchical relationship. Insisting on the term "products of the country," which includes edible goods, can be seen as a symbolic incorporation of the subordinate state into the dominant power's framework. The Emperor would take some share of the products from all lands that ultimately belonged to him or were under his command.

However, it seemed that the practical focus on the Nepalese envoy was their admiration and audience instead of what was presented, as there were no prescriptions on the gift themselves. For the Mongolian groups and Solon, there were detailed instructions on what should be

444 禮記·曲禮下 "天子當依而立, 諸侯北面而見天子, 曰覲".
445 E.g. in *Saddharuṇḍarīkasūtram*, passim.

sent from them as tribute (*gong-shu* 貢輸), as they were integrated into the census and of the Empire.[446]

In fact, some of these 'regional products' originated from India rather than Nepal.[447] Rana Bahadur Shah admitted that the products of his country would not be good enough: "(…) since I am in a remote, desolate, and tiny region, there is no good product from [our region]."[448]

The presents from Nepal generally included tusks, coral pearls (Figure 17), gemstones, various cloths and dresses, betel, nutmeg, cardamon horns of rhinos, swords, small machetes (*khukuris*) etc.; in the 1894 mission:

> A string of 109 coral beads, a piece of silk brocade, 24 rolls of satin, 13 pieces of felt cloth, 2 Rhinoceros horns, 4 Tusks of ivory, 1,000 Nutmegs, 360 oz. of Cloves, 300 oz. of Cinnamon, 360 oz. of betel nut (round), 6000 oz. of betel nut (flat), 3 Fowling pieces (all complete) and 12 Swords of different kinds.[449]

In the 1792–1793 mission the following presents were made:

> (…) an Indian palanquin, a traditional Nepalese sword called a kukri, as well as items used in Chinese medicine that were difficult to acquire in China (such as coral, cinnamon, safflower, betel palm, cloves, and Alpinia katsumadai seed (Mingqing shiliao, Geng vol., book 9, pp. 861–63). Most importantly for our purposes, the offering also included draft horses and five tame elephants.[450]

446 *Qin-ding Li-fan-bu Ze-li*, vol. 17. The Solon people should offer minks, while the lower Mongolian rulers had the duty of providing sheep. The Khalkha Khans needed to offer nine whites, including one white camel and eight white horses every year.

447 See, for instance, Phaṭya Śaṃśera 1893 (2.1.13) an order (*ādeśa*) through which the ambassador (*vakila*) to the East India Company is asked to send articles from Calcutta to be presented to the Emperor of China via Kathmandu. Cp. Manandhar 2001, 34.

448 See Part II, 2.2.3d.

449 Manandhar 2001, 190.

450 Komatsubara 2019, 84. Ming-qing Shi-liao, Geng is 明清史料庚編, *The Seventh Collection of the Historical Archival Materials of Ming and Qing Dynasties* from Academia Sinica. This volume contains cabinet documents on tributary and foreign affairs.



Figure 17: Coral Beads as tributary gift from the Gorkha King, dated 5 February 1793, note made on 21 March 1793 (source: National Palace Museum Taipei, 玉插屏。國立故宮博物院, 台北. CC BY 4.0. www.npm.gov.tw. 故玉 002723N000000000)

In this context, these elephants took on special, imperial significance. Interestingly, the elephants were seen as a special tribute.[451] (Figure 18) They were not considered celebratory tribute items. They were large and difficult to transport, so they had to take a different route like the other tributary gifts. It was intended by the Gorkhalis to also present elephants but due to the rough terrain they had to return from the Kuti (Nyalam) pass at the Tibetan border.[452] In addition, there were already too many elephants in the stables of the palace in Beijing. Qianlong therefore issued the following instructions regarding these elephants:

451 Cp. Bajracharya/Khatiwoda/Michaels 2015.

452 See Part II, 2.2.2d; Komatsubara 2019; for detailed lists of the gifts, see Lèvi 1905, 191–92; Haenisch 1938, 35 (on the 1790 mission); Manandhar and Mishra 1986, 36 and appendices; Manandhar 2001, appendices to the chapters on the various missions. He-ying oversaw transportation and wrote a long poem on it in 1793. The elephants walked 30 *li* a day and crossed the river by leather rafts or suspension bridges. They also suffered from the lack of food (He-ying 1823, vol. 1, 25–26).



Figure 18: From the scroll of Gorkhali Offering of Elephants and Horses by the Beise Hong-wu (source: Wikimedia Commons)

> Currently, there are already many elephants in the capital (Beijing), and there are enough for escort exhibitions. However, until now, there have been no elephants in Tibet. Tell Fuk'anggan the Emperor's edict is transmitted, and from those elephants being sent to Beijing, one is given to the Dalai Lama and one to the Panchen Lama and the other three sent to Beijing at a slow pace, the monks and laypeople of Ü-Tsang will always see the offered items from afar, gradually adopt the [Qing Court's] system, and be shown the prestige and authority [of the Qing Court]. (Kuoerka dang, nineteenth day of the ninth month of Qianlong 57) [i.e., KRKD QL 57/9/19][453]

The amban He-ying oversaw transportation and wrote a long poem on it in 1793. The elephants walked 30 *li*s a day and crossed the river by leather rafts or suspension bridges. They also suffered from the lack of food.[454] The elephants and horses were given Manchu and Chinese names.[455] The elephant (*xiang* 象) would bear a bottle (*ping* 瓶) which

453 Quoted from Komatsubara 2019, 85. See also KRKJL, vol. 51, QL 58/3/8.
454 He-ying 1823, vol. 1, 25–26.
455 Lin 2009, 321. "Taming the remote", "Subjugating tenderly" 馴遠象伏柔象. The pair of elephants and the two horses were also painted by Louis Antoine de Poirot and Joseph Panzi with Manchu-Chinese bilingual annotation, see Nie 1999, 244–47, no. 64.

was homophonous of an important imperial omen (*xiang* 象) of peace (*ping* 平), called "the peace, abundance, and prosperity of having an elephant" *tai-ping you-xiang* 太平有象. The South Asian elephants were often presented in such a manner.[456] The motif was also made into lamps, vases, and jade plates.[457]

In the meantime, some elephants remained in Tibet upon the imperial edict. They were regarded as an auspicious and sacred gift and a sign of the victory but the Lhasa one died of illness very soon, while the Panchen Lama gave Dalai his elephant instead.[458] Later the Gorkha King sent two more elephants to Tibet in 1795.[459]

These gifts were translated into an unbalanced relation, stressing the dominance of the Qing Empire. It was not a one-way gift but an unbalanced exchange. The Emperor cared for the tributary envoy a lot. Winter clothes were to be made for them on their journey.[460] The local governors would provide plays, opera, accommodation, and horses for them.[461] The Emperor would be delighted and constantly grant gifts back as has been told by Devadatta Thapa to Rana Bahadur Shah (2.2.3f). The Emperor settled on a long list of gifts to the King and Regent of Gorkha as well as every member of the envoy before the arrival.[462] Later, Fuk'anggan passed the request of the Gorkha mission to have more rewards from the Emperor, when he met the returning envoy in Dartsemdo. The Emperor gave more gifts of imperial garments and golden hat-tops to them on 24 June 1793.[463] The Newar merchant in Lhasa was also awarded with silver ingots for his contribution during the conflicts.[464]

The Qing court never objected that some of these presents thus had been bought in India but insisted that they were much less in value than their own presents: 4,829 vs. 14,902 *tael* were the fixed values of the goods exchanged—a fact that would show the claimed superiority of China over Nepal. The rewarding gifts were meant to show the abundance of the Empire and the benevolence of the Emperor. It was prescribed in one of the four essential Confucian classics *The State of*

456 Ho and Bronson 2004, 77.
457 Ibid., 259.
458 DL8, 369.
459 DL8, 384.
460 BLBJL, vol. 26, QL 54/9/29.
461 BLBJL, vol. 25.
462 KRKD QL 57/12, 73–84.
463 KRKJL, vol. 52, QL 58/5/17.
464 KRKJL, vol. 43, QL 57/10/21.

Equilibrium and Harmony drawn from the *Book of Rites*.[465] The *amban* Sungyūn quotes the classical idom and confirms this hierarchy in his *Maps and Strategies of Enlisting the West* (西招圖略 *Xi-zhao Tu-lüe*) in 1798:

> One should control one's desire: "(…) Considering the kings of ten thousand countries coming to present their tribute and congratulate the longevity of the Emperor, the sacred Emperor pays back much while receiving less so as to conciliate the remote."[466]

Accordingly, the presents from China included brocade and silk (clothes), hats, a ceremonial robe (*khilat*)[467], carpets, tea pots and dishes (often glassware and porcelain), rosary beads (朝珠 *chao-zhu* "beads for audiences"), bags (荷包 *he-bao* "Beutel"),[468] tea, silver etc.[469] In the penultimate mission (1894), the presents consisted

> of a thousand taels of silver (£180), four complete suits of fur, robes of wadded cotton and gauze for each member of the

465 "To escort them on their departure and meet them on their coming; to commend the good among them, and show compassion to the incompetent: this is the way to treat indulgently men from a distance. To restore families whose line of succession has been broken, and to revive states that have been extinguished; to reduce to order states that are in confusion, and support those which are in peril; to have fixed times for their own reception at court, and the reception of their envoys; to send them away after liberal treatment, and welcome their coming with small contributions: this is the way to cherish the princes of the states" (transl. by Legge) 中庸:送往迎來, 嘉善而矜不能, 所以柔遠人也;繼絕世, 舉廢國, 治亂持危, 朝聘以時, 厚往而薄來, 所以懷諸侯也.

466 Sunyūn 1798 (1847) 西招圖略: 5. "遏欲": "惟萬國來王, 各獻厥貢, 祝壽無疆, 而聖皇厚往薄來所以柔遠人也" Cp. Dabringhaus 1994, 191.

467 A *khillat* from Urdu *khil'ah* is a ceremonial silk or cotton robe, which richly adorned and given as a sign of highly respected honour guests or other persons. They are also considered as gifts awarded in return for service from tributary states. Wearing the robes with python (quasi-dragons) patterns 蟒袍 that were bestowed by the Emperor implied a ritual integration into the Qing Empire, as was done by the Vietnamese envoy (Ge 2014). The alternation of cloth was significant for the Manchu emperors. The hats 頂戴 and rosary beads 朝珠 were indicators of ranking within the imperial system. They were also a part of the imperial dress code. These gifts thus have specific ritual meanings.

468 These bags 荷包 were often given to ministers as rewards to show the personal intimacy between them and the Emperor. For a detailed study and photos of these bags, see Martin 1945.

469 The gifts in 1793 were listed in KRKD (QL 57/12, 75). These gifts in 1793 were taken as the precedence in the imperial legal corpora for reference under the circumstances of later envoys.

> mission, besides silk pongees and gauze, Peking curios and the like, according to the rank of the recipients.[470]

This imbalance in the exchange of presents was early noticed by the British:

> The fact is that Sir Jang Bahadur's cupidity is the motive spring. He sends Yak's tails and gets back gifts, Pictai Vestis et auri.[471] He gives a trout and catches a salmon.[472]

As it seems, the intentional preservation of linguistic distinctions served the purpose of reinforcing the power dynamics and maintaining the desired hierarchical relationship between China and Nepal. It allowed China to assert its dominance and control over Nepal as a tributary state, while Nepal navigated this complex linguistic and political terrain to uphold its own interests and maintain autonomy within the framework of the tribute system.

Exchange of texts

The imbalance was also seen in the genre of texts. The distinction between the *arjī* (petition) sent by Nepal's king to the Emperor and the *parvānā* (an order from a person in superior position) received in response highlights the hierarchical relationship between the two entities. The *arjī* represents a subordinate's communication to a superior, while the *parvānā* is an order from a person in a position of authority. A sample of such a *parvānā* from 1415 edited by Dhanavajra Vajrācārya,[473] demonstrates the dominant tone[474] used by the Emperor Yongle when addressing King Shaktisimha Rama of Palanchok. The Emperor does not employ honorific verb forms and instead gives orders (*ājñā*) while praising the king

470 *The Times*, 25 December 1896 quoted from Sever 1989, 205. Fur 貂皮 was probably the indicator of the imperial control in Northeast Asia and the "Sable Road".

471 A quotation from *Aeneid* 9,26, meaning 'rich in gold and colourful robes'.

472 Thornton to Wade, 25 July 1876, Foreign Secret Consultations, 3 Sept. 1876, no.s 129–33 quoted from Dhanalaxmi 1981, 70.

473 Dh. Vajrācārya 2011, 251–54.

474 Correspondingly, letters from the Nepalese kings to the Chinese Emperor were written in a submissive and devote style, see, for example, the letter of Surendra Vikrama Bahadur Shah in Lèvi 1905, vol. 2, 188–91.

for his submission to imperial commands. The *parvānā* mentions the annual sending of various gifts (*vividhopahāravastu*) by the king, a fact also noted in the *Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī* (18.132), where the "presents" are called *saugāta*.

When a letter was sent to China from Kathmandu, China demanded a form of submission to the higher power through letters that had to be written in a certain style—a style that paid homage to the Emperor and had to make the scribe appear physically small—to show reverence and obedience (恭順).

As the Qing forces advanced, the Gorkhalis, now severely weakened, repeatedly pleaded for mercy and offered to surrender. In the letters preserved in WZTZ (see also Part II, 2.2.2a, c, d, and 2.2.3a), Rana Bahadur Shah expressed his submission to the Emperor and promised to obey his commands in the future. Terrified by the overwhelming power of the Qing army, the Gorkhalis complied with all of Fuk'anggan's demands. As they neared Yambu (Kathmandu), the Gorkhalis sent envoys on several occasions, urgently requesting capitulation. Yet, they were too afraid to approach the Qing camp in person.

On 2 August 1792 (QL 57/6/15), for example, Fuk'anggan criticises the Gorkhalis for their futile resistance, noting that the Qing forces had already conquered territories up to Dhunce. He chastises King Rana Bahadur Shah for failing to surrender earlier, accusing him of greed, dishonesty, and cunningness. Fuk'anggan demands that the King personally come to submit to the Qing, warning of severe consequences if the Qing army reaches Kathmandu.

Similarly, on 13 August 1792 (QL 57/6/26), Fuk'anggan acknowledges Rana Bahadur Shah's expression of obedience but insists that surrender will only be accepted if the King personally appears. He references the example of the King of Vietnam, who accompanied Fuk'anggan on his return to see the Emperor in 1788 (QL 53). Fuk'anggan rejects the King's request to negotiate a treaty through intermediaries, declaring it impossible. He stresses that he has treated the people along his route with respect, in line with Qing customs. Furthermore, he demands that the Gorkha forces withdraw completely, return all captured goods and people, and provide the illegal treaties previously established. If these demands are not met, Fuk'anggan threatens to march directly to Kathmandu. In addition, he returns the gifts sent by Rana Bahadur Shah, rejecting them outright. This letter was probably called a "decree" or "letter of authority" (*bka' shog*) by Tenzin Peljor (Part II, 2.3.2d).

On 26 August 1792, Fuk'anggan reports receiving an obedient surrender from Kathmandu. By mid-September 1792, Rana Bahadur Shah sends multiple letters to Fuk'anggan and the Emperor, confessing his mistakes, formally surrendering, and promising regular tribute. He agrees to return territories to Tibet and renounces previous treaties. These letters[475] began with "the tiny one" (小的), in smaller font, while addressing Qianlong as the universal "Great Emperor", put on the top of the paper. Such diction was memorialised to the Emperor immediately.[476] This applies both to letters of submission and to friendly letters when a birthday or other happy events.

Nevertheless, these letters from Rana Bahadur Shah could have been embellished by the Chinese translators. It might have been transferred from a letter (*shu* 書) into a petition (*bing* 稟), a statement or an auspicious memorial (*biao* 表), and a capitulation (*xiang-biao* 降表). It could be because the translators were eager to retreat by the fierce battles and hardships that they more and more intensively polished the language to please the Emperor and obstruct further conflicts. This cannot be proven for letters, as the original Nepālī letters are not preserved or accessible. But in the case of a song (2.2.4), which Rana Bahadur Shah is said to have written in honour of Qianlong and which is kept in four languages in the palace, it can be seen that only the first verse is written in proper Nepālī while the rest makes no sense. We are not sure whether it was scribal errors, a joint effort of forgery by Fuk'anggan, etc., or the resistance from the Gorkhalis. Given the linguistic complexity, the two sides reached a conclusion that was acceptable for both.

Surrender and submission with allegiance

In November 1792, the Emperor issued the Potala inscription that reflects on the Gorkhalis' repeated defeats, noting their desperate pleas for survival and compliance with Qing demands. This includes returning Tenzin Peljor and stolen treasures, as well as their refusal to discuss contentious issues like coinage. The Emperor acknowledges the Gorkhalis' fear and submission but remains resolute, drawing parallels

475 Unfortunately, we could not trace facsimiles of the original Chinese translations but only catalogical entries in the First National Historical Archive.
476 KRKJL, vol. 39 = Yuan Yi Lai, no. 913.

with past historical examples where conquered enemies ultimately submitted to the Heavenly Dynasty.

He views the Gorkhalis' surrender because of both military pressure and their recognition of Qing superiority, framing it as both a "surrender with allegiance" (literally "turning oneself into capitulation" *gui-xiang* 歸降) and a "submission with allegiance" (literally "turn oneself into submission" *gui-shun* 歸順). The former one was the outcome of the military conquest that made sure the Gorkhalis were frightened. The latter one was even better. It indicated that the external "barbarous" people become the subject willingly. Emperor Qianlong considered the return of Dram, the humble tone, and the willingness to obey imperial instructions as a sign of Gorkhali submission. This would become an omen of imperial virtue and heavenly mission that went beyond military power.

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An unequivocal capitulation and submission from the Chinese perspective differs significantly from the Gorkhali viewpoint. This distinction is particularly evident in the interpretation of tributary presents and the status of independence. While the Chinese may view the submission as a clear surrender, the Gorkhalis likely saw it as a diplomatic negotiation or a strategic concession, maintaining a sense of autonomy. For them, the missions "were never accepted by the Nepalese as signifying or acknowledging a feudatory status. They were always regarded as goodwill delegations—gestures of friendship and respect."[477] Prime Minister Candra Shamsher, for instance, strongly rejected the idea that the "presents" constituted tributes. In a letter to John Manners Smith, Military Attaché to the Foreign Office, dated 19 April 1906, he expressed this stance:

> I may here add that the practice of sending a mission was inaugurated soon after the war between this country and China in 1792 A. D., and this practice has since been kept up more commercial advantages than for anything else. The few presents which the mission carries to Peking are not of much value and

477 Sever 1989, 204.

> certainly not in the nature of Tribute. The customary letter which is sent on the occasion is written in the truly oriental style of exuberant but meaningless politeness and follows a stereotyped rule. They are merely a means for the party to get access into the country under very advantageous circumstances, and to dispose of with very great profit of large quantity of goods which they take with them. It may be known to you that all goods belonging to the party are carried free from our frontier to Peking and back by the transport provided by the Chinese government which also provides our men free with all necessaries on the road. It was very little political significance, and I wonder therefore, to find the said enclouser [sic!] the presents are described as a tribute from Nepal. In the letter to the Emperor it is distinctly written the word 'saugat' which means 'present'.[478]

Bishop Chauvean confirms this view:

> The Chinese all say that Nepal pays tribute to their empire. I doubt much whether such is the intention of the Nepalese Government. What is there to fear from the Chinese in the present day? The only point of contact that there is between them is at Lhassa but it is very certain that the Nepalese are much more powerful at Lhassa than the Chinese, and it would not be surprizing if they expelled them altogether some day. Already the Calcutta journals have published that Sir Jung Bahadoor has views on Thibet, the conquest of which does not appear very difficult for an army trained in the European way.[479]

The notion that Gorkha lost its sovereignty through the "treaty" of Betravati is also refused by Nepalese scholars. Randhir Subba, for instance, writes in a review of Leo Rose's book *Nepal – Strategy for Survival*:

> Nor is there any substance in the view that because of the 1792 Nepal-China treaty Nepal lost or limited its sovereignty. That every five years a goodwill delegation used to go to China from

478 Foreign Secret E, June 1906, no.s 241–45, INA quoted from Manandhar and Mishra 2001, 86–87.
479 Quoted from Manandhar 2001, 161.

> Nepal to offer presents to the Chinese Emperor is only one aspect of the eastern world attitude. The concept of sovereignty as is prevalent these days originated in the west. The western concept of sovereignty has been adopted by the entire world these days. According to the modern concept, a nation which enjoys the right to establish foreign relations is sovereign. That Nepal sent presents to the Chinese Emperor every five years cannot mean that Nepal lost its sovereignty. Even after signing the 1792 treaty Nepal fought and concluded treaties with Tibet, as well as with the British Empire. Nepal's freedom to maintain foreign relations and determine policies governing these relations remained intact.[480]

Similarly, Dhanavajra Vajrācārya and Jñānamani Nepāla:

> Some foreign historians have written that after this was, Nepal became a part of the Chinese empire. But this letter clearly refutes this claim and shows that Nepal had never recognized China's suzerainty. (…) On the contrary, the Chinese troops had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Nepali troops in the last battle fought on the Betravati. Moreover, the morale of the Nepali troops was very high during these days. The letter to Kājī Damodar Pande says that 'the Nepal troops by the grace of the goddess, could have completely driven the Chinese troops out. But we did not think it proper to create permanent conflict with the Emperor. He too intends to make peace with us.' The Chinese troops had come very near the capital. Continued conflict with China would therefore have led to possibilities of British pressure over Nepal. In such situation, it was very wise on the part of the Government of Nepal to conclude a treaty with China. No provision in the treaty suggests that Nepal accepted China's suzerainty or [….] its own interests in any way.[481]

To sum up: Despite the claims on victory by both parties and despite clear expressions of surrender preserved in Chinese, Tibetan, and Manchu sources, the outcome of the Sino-Nepalese War can perhaps

480 Subba 1978, 146.
481 Vajrācārya and Nepāla 1970, 73–74.

"be best described as a stalemate. There was no real winner," as Ludwig Stiller remarked.[482] Similarly, Mayura Tang Kunwar writes: "No treaty was ever drawn up or signed at the cessation of the Sino-Nepalese War in 1793 [sic, read 1792]. There were only exchanges of letters between the Chinese commander and the Nepalese Durbar."[483] Indeed, the Chinese did not conquer Gorkha, instead withdrew behind the former borders. They did not impose vassalage on Gorkha, but "only" demanded a quinquennial tribute mission, much less than the yearly visit of the Koreans, Mongolians, and some lamas. As a result, Gorkha maintained its independence. Imperial statutes were not applied to them as new legal codes were introduced in Tibet.[484]

Yet, the understanding of Betravati marked the conclusion of the war, resulted in significant losses for Nepal and had a detrimental impact on Nepal's economic well-being. (From here on it is justified to speak of Nepal instead of Gorkha, as it concerns the impact of the war on the future of the whole country). Among the losses incurred, in addition to the loss of lives, was Nepal's numismatic suzerainty over Lhasa and other Tibetan regions that had been maintained since the Malla period and the enormous profits through the minting of coins. The economic crisis caused by this loss played a significant role in Nepal's defeat in the Anglo-Nepal War (1814–1816). In hindsight, it can be argued that Nepal might have been able to avoid a conflict with China had it pursued more diplomatic negotiations instead.

However, it appears that all parties involved in the conflict learned valuable lessons: China realised the formidable strategic barrier posed by the Himalayas; Tibet suffered great losses and recognised its far-reaching dependence on China;[485] Nepal understood the need to halt its expansionist ambitions; and British India realised the futility of attempting to conquer Nepal. As a result, the documents confirm the position that, despite setbacks and losses, Nepal managed to solidify its position between the superpowers of China and British India, while Tibet remained in an unresolved status without gaining independence.

482 Stiller 1975, 212; see also Landon 1976, vol. 1, 68–69; Boulnois 1989, 97; Komatsubara 2017, 181.

483 Kunwar 1962, 294 n. 2; the author refers to Nepali VS 2020, 202–16; Rose 1960, 141; Jain 1959, 105 who all take a similar position.

484 Oidtmann 2018.

485 *Qin-ding Li-fan-bu Ze-li* mentioned that Tibet failed to have as much fiscal surplus as before after the Gorkha robbery (vol. 61, no. 921 西藏通制上 稽查商上公用).

Nepal, thus, successfully maintained its territorial integrity and sovereignty but lost its rights and coinage privileges in Tibet and had to acknowledge, albeit only in a very formal or ritualised way, the suzerainty of the Qing Empire, by sending quinquennial missions to Beijing.[486] Wisely, Gorkha did not dare to challenge the Manchu Emperor's assertion of universal sovereignty. Even Lord Macartney subordinated himself to Beijing's "tributary" claims when he attached pennants with the inscription "The Ambassador bearing tribute from the Kingdom of England" to his ships, which had to be handed over to the palace.[487]

The three states involved in the war, China, Nepal and Tibet, thus got off relatively lightly. However, the two leading generals, Bahadur Shah and Fuk'anggan, who never met, met a tragic fate.[488] Both came from distinguished and respected aristocratic families and could look back on successful careers: Bahadur Shah was the second son of King Prithvi Narayan Shah, while Fuk'anggan was a member of the powerful Manchu Fuca clan and son of the Duke, Grand Secretary Fuheng, who was in turn the brother of Empress Xiao-xian Chun, the first and most loved wife of Qianlong. Fuk'anggan grew up beside the Emperor, which leads to suspicion that he was in fact the biological son of the Emperor, as he was not married to any of the princesses as his brothers did. Both were initially promoted after the war: Bahadur Shah became the most influential leader after Prithvi Narayana Shah; Fuk'anggan became the Duke and the Great General. One would therefore think that both were able to continue living in orderly circumstances after the war. But things turned out differently. Both lived only briefly. Bahadur Shah died at the age of forty, Fuk'anggan at forty-three. In 1794, Regent Bahadur Shah was forced to abdicate by the now adult King Rana Bahadur Shah, was arrested again in 1796 on flimsy charges and cruelly tortured until he died there on 24 June 1797. During the course, Bahadur Shah tried to approach Sungyūn for help, while his request was denied by the Emperor Qianlong who gave his symbolic support to Rana Bahadur Shah.[489] Fuk'anggan was highly praised and then sent for other expeditions with the same title, the Great General. During the war against the Hmong people in Southwest China in 1795–1796, he

486 Cp. Manandhar and Mishra 1986; Sreedhar 1988, Manandhar 2001, Michaels 2019a.
487 Kunwar 1962, 294.
488 Cp. Subedi 2025.
489 Qianlong Manchu Secret Edicts no. 4284.

was granted the title *beise*,[490] a title reserved mainly for the imperial family Aisin Gioro. However, he soon died of miasma in 1796. When Qianlong was still alive, he enjoyed a posthumous kingly title that was only granted to the imperial family members throughout the dynastic history of Qing Empire. He was venerated in the Imperial Ancestral Temple. Soon after the death of the Emperor Qianlong, Fuk'anggan was criticised for his extravagance and indiscretion, as we also see from Zhao-lian's writing (Part II, 2.2.7) and Tenzin Peljor's account (2.3.2e). More folk tales of his bad deeds were circulated in the Empire. Rumours about his being greedy, stupid, conceited, illegitimate, and extravagant never cease to be till today. Seen in this light, these two military leaders were not among the winners of the war.

490 Cp. *Draft History of Qing*, vol. 330 Biography no. 117 福康安.

7 In the Aftermaths of the War

Nepal did not protest being labelled a tributary state by China, even though it involved an asymmetrical exchange of presents, obligatory kowtow, and occasionally humiliating treatment. The benefit for Nepal was that it could maintain beneficial trade with Lhasa and China, the missions received considerable wealth,[491] and the sale of opium proved advantageous. During the missions, large quantities of opium, valued at 300,000 Rs in the 1852 mission and 450,000 Rs in the 1866–1869 mission, were sent with many porters to carry the loads. The profits primarily benefited the Rana clan, despite some of the opium being unsaleable due to its potency, resulting in its return to Lhasa by the Nepalese mission. This business, though technically based on the Betravati agreement, amounted to the misuse of diplomatic missions for the personal gain of the Ranas, especially Janga Bahadur Rana. It was one of the reasons for the unfriendly treatment experienced by Jagatsera (see 7.2 below).

7.1 Nepalese Missions to China

According to Chinese records, already from the eighth century onwards, Nepalese missions used to visit China with presents for the Emperor. Between 1384 and 1427 five Chinese and seven Nepalese missions

491 It seems that it was profitable for the Gorkhalis to send missions to Beijing. Yang Kui noted that originally, the Gorkhalis proposed a triennial envoy: "The sincerity is doubtless. Be it like the fierce autumn or the mild spring, it is upon the imperial sacred compassion. It was the fortune of the remote and desolated [state] to request for internal affiliation. Every five years, they should not be late for the temporary place reserved for the vassals to rest." [Autocommentary]: "Gorkha proposed a triennial mission in the beginning, while the Great General [Fuk'anggan] ordered them to pay a quinquennial mission owing to the remote distance so as to show the good intention to appease the distant [people]." 推心置腹更何疑, 秋肅春溫總聖慈, 幸列要荒求內屬, 爻閭休後五年期。廓爾喀先請三年一備聯貢, 大將軍以其道遠, 令五年一貢、用示柔遠之意 (Wu 1985, 169).

were exchanged between the Chinese courts and Malla courts.[492] In 1732, the three Malla kings of the Kathmandu Valley sent letters "written in golden characters"[493] deliberately offering "native products, in token of tribute"[494] to the Emperor of China, who, however, referred it back to the local officials in Tibet. In 1734, after having been proclaimed by China as a tributary state, they sent the tribute, which contained clothes, coral, amber, rhinoceros' horn, incense, herbs, and a statue of a Bodhisattva from Patan.[495]

This was the first of so-called tribute payment. Several were to follow, because between 1792 and until 1906–1908, Nepal was obliged to send quinquennial missions.[496] This was arranged in the understanding at Betravati (see the previous chapter). In the following century, altogether eighteen such missions went to China, between 1792 and 1852 quite regularly, afterwards only five missions followed.[497]

For the Qing Empire, unlike Korea, Vietnam, and Ryukyu within the Sinitic sphere and the Mongols within the Manchu-Mongol sphere, vassals from afar, such as Afghanistan, etc., operated by *Lifanyuan* were freer to a certain extent. In the case of Nepal, the tributary mission might not even need to reach Peking or Jehol but to offer their tribute in Lhasa or Chengdu.[498] The Emperor even stated that a decennial mission would be acceptable (Part II, 2.2.3d).

However, not many sons of the better families in the Kathmandu Valley were keen on going on these missions, even though it was lucrative. The more than 3000 miles long journeys were dangerous and normally last about one and a half to two years;[499] the 1877 mission took five, and the 1894 mission seven years. Brian H. Hodgson, the British Resident minister in Nepal between 1829 and 1843, reports from two

492 Rose 1971, 11–12; Petech 1984, 213–23. *History of Ming*, vol. 311, Biography 19, no. 3, 16.

493 *YZ Veritable Records, vol*. 122; Wei Yuan in Landon 1926, 275. The letters can be found in WZTZ, vol. 15, 11–12; WZTZ 1982, 38–39, 511–13.

494 Ibid.

495 Slusser 1982, vol. 1, 72; Boulnois and Chen 1972; Manandhar 2004, vol. 1, 68–69.

496 Cp. Vajrācārya and Nepāla 1970; Manandhar and Mishra 1986; Manandhar 2001.

497 Manandhar and Mishra 1986, 19–20; Petech 1996; Liu 2014.

498 *YZ Veritable Records*, vol. 122.

499 For a detailed report on the route to Lhasa, see Montgomerie and Pundit [Nain Singh] 1868. N. B., Since the anonymous 'pundit' was one of the explorers and spies trained by the British, his name has not been mentioned in the publication; cp. Smyth 1882.

official summaries of missions that were given to him by King Rajendra Bahadur Shah in 1843 and present an obviously subjective impression of the hardships the *kājī* and his delegation had to face: the unceasing riding on ponies

> through a country lamentably deficient in food, fuel, and water, by pretty long stages […] over a very rough country, for some one thousand seven hundred miles, and then only exchange his pony for the still worse conveyance of a Chinese carriage (more properly cart), […] fatigue and bad weather notwithstanding, and the high-caste Hindu's cuisine (*horresco referens*) all the while entirely in the hands of filthy Bhotias and as filthy Chinese!"[500] All this happened "under the orders of a seemingly insouciant and really pragmatical China-man, who answers all objections with "Orders of the Emperor," "Food of the country", "You nicer than us, forsooth", "Fed or unfed, you start at such an hour".[501]

Quite often members of the delegation and porters lost their lives, in three cases even the leaders died. There were many hindrances by Tibetan and Chinese officials but also through robbers and thieves as well as by the rough terrain and bad weather. According to the itinerary published by Hodgson,[502] the missions had to cross between up to 652 rivers with 607 bridges and 23 ferries. Occasionally, they were stopped on the suspicion that they were smuggling or committing espionage although, on diplomatic grounds, they were allowed to trade and did not have to pay any taxes.[503] With Janga Bahadur Rana opium became one of the most important commodities.

The delegations were normally received with great pomp. The presentation of the presents/tributes was a

> ritual performance, balanced by the forms of imperial hospitality and bestowal of imperial gifts. Hence the great importance

500 Hodgson 1880, 168.
501 Ibid., 169.
502 Ibid., 170–71.
503 Cp. the order dated VS 1942 (1885 CE) of the Prime Minister Vīra Śamśera to the customs office to waive the customs duties of the goods to be sent to the Chinese Emperor: NGMPP Document E_2779_0001.

> of ceremonies, so complicated that they must be practiced under guidance beforehand.[504]

In a report in the *Times* from 25 December 1896, it is said that the

> envoy was conveyed there [in the palace] in a green sedan-chair, and the other Nepalese on horseback or in mule carts, the start being made from the Tribute Envoys' Hall, where the whole party were lodged at the expense of the Chinese Government from the moment of their arrival. (…) the official members were conveyed to the great hall of the palace, where they prostrated themselves before the eunuch commissioned to read the Imperial edict authorising the Nepalese to return to their own land.[505]

However, the envoy was only regarded as the bearer of the message and the gifts, not as a representative of his ruler.[506]

The 1866 mission (see next section) only reached the border town Dartsemdo (Kangding), where it was halted allegedly due to a Muslim rebellion in Northwestern China, right on the route from Sichuan to Peking, but probably because the country was not yet consolidated after the second Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion. The leader of the mission and his people were brought to a lousy hovel and was told that they had to wait there for a couple of months. In the end, Jagatsera waited almost 2 years, fell sick for seven months and left the presents with Chinese officials at the border.

The mission had arrived in Lhasa on 24 September 1866. Jagatsera's name is also found in a memorial by the amban of Lhasa, Jing-wen (Chin. 景紋), who had sent the Tributary Mission to Chengdu on 3 November 1866.[507] He also mentioned that he had sent a Chinese military officer, Wu Guo-ying (吴國英, probably Ucui in Nepālī, from Wu Zong-ye 吴總爺), and other officials to accompany the mission, which might have seemed to them to be a kind of "custody." The Amban later wrote in another memorial on 15 April 1869 that he had sent them back to Kathmandu on 9 February 1869. The Amban reported Jagatsera's

504 Fairbank and Teng 1941, 147.
505 Quoted from Sever 1989, 205.
506 Dabringhaus 1996, 16.
507 Jing-wen in Wu 1986, 50–51.

disappointment, saying that he had to make them accept the unfortunate case several times.[508]

Another reason for the maltreatment of the mission was given by Janga Bahadur Rana. In 1850–1851, he had been to England and France where he met Queen Victoria and Napoleon III, who was then only President of the Republic. Janga was the first Nepalese statesman travelling to Europe and he was treated with all honours and friendly hospitality.[509] In a meeting with George Ramsay, British Resident Minister from 1852 to 1867, he indicated that the Chinese Emperor had been angry about this trip because he had expected that he would have first come to China. He insinuated that this was the reason why the mission was treated so badly by China (Manandhar and Mishra 1986, 38).

7.2 Kājī Jagatsera and the 1866–1869 Mission

In 1868 (VS 1925), *kājī* Jagatsera Chetri Sijapati (also spelled Jagat Sher, Juggut Ser, Juggut Share, Chin. Za-gad Xier 咱噶達寫熱) submitted a petition (*arjī*)[510] to Prime Minister Janga Bahadur Rana, recounting a meeting during his diplomatic mission to China. During this encounter, he had an exchange with Thomas Thornville Cooper, a British adventurer and traveller, who was actively seeking an overland trade route between China, British India, and eventually Europe. It is worth noting that this meeting occurred approximately one year prior to the opening of the Suez Canal on 17 November 1869, making it somewhat of a precursor to the contemporary "One Belt, One Road" (一帶一路, yi-dai yi-lu) strategy (see below).[511]

Although this meeting may seem like a minor event in the grand scope of global history, a closer examination reveals its significance as a typical illustration of the trans-Himalayan dynamics and the diverse perspectives and temporalities that shaped unstable regions of Highland Asia during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

508 Ibid., 114–15.

509 For a study of this mission including the translation of the travel report ("*Belait Yatra*"), see Whelpton 1983.

510 See Michaels 2019a and, with a revised translation, Part II, 2.1.11.

511 Scholars and officials in Qing China, including Yao Ying and Wei Yuan, were also thinking of a way from Yunnan to Bengal by them (Mosca 2013, 277, 289).

In June 1866, Prime Minister Janga Bahadur Rana, who had assumed power in Nepal on 15 September 1846, decided to dispatch another mission to Beijing. However, he had been hesitant for fourteen years to fulfil this commitment due to the traumatic memories of the previous mission in 1852. During that mission, many members, including the mission leader and deputy, had lost their lives. Moreover, the return journey of the mission had been fraught with mistreatment, particularly at the hands of the Khampas (Tib. Khams pa) on their way. The members of the mission endured beatings and were deprived of food, shelter, and porters.

After the mission's return, Janga Bahadur Rana addressed a letter to the *amban* in Lhasa, stating:

> If you will, all is well and we shall continue as friends. If you will not, our friendship shall be broken. We shall withdraw our merchants and subjects from Tibet and shall never again send embassies to the Court of Peking.[512]

The dispatch of the mission in 1852 had indeed sparked the third war between Nepal and Tibet in 1855. During this conflict, China did not provide support to Tibet. Furthermore, the Taiping Civil War and the change of the throne in Beijing from Emperor Dao-guang to Emperor Xian-feng resulted in a delay in addressing various diplomatic matters in 1851. Meanwhile, there was a great flood in the Yellow River and many other rebellions in China around 1855.

On 20 November 1865, King Surendra received a reminder from the imperial court, conveyed by the amban, to send an *arjī* and the customary offerings.[513] This prompted Janga Bahadur to convene his advisors and brothers for consultations. Eventually, he acquiesced and selected the young and loyal *kājī* Jagatsera for the mission. Jagatsera, known for his excellent manners, was the son of a high-ranking military official who had supported Janga Bahadur during the Great Mutiny.

The preparations for the mission began immediately, although the departure from Kathmandu would take place eight months later. As was customary, such missions were led by *kājī*s and *saradāra*s, serving as the leader and deputy leader respectively, accompanied by an

512 Foreign, Secret Consultation no. 50, Foreign EA "A" File no. 249/1854, p. 6; G. Ramsay to G.R. Edmonstone, Sec. GI, August 5, 1854, NAI quoted from Uprety 1996, 59.

513 Petech 1996, 183.

average of 45 members (excluding porters). All members underwent screening by the amban residing in Tibet. The delegation consisted of military officials (*subedāra*, *jamadāra*), interpreters, local leaders (*naike*), official scribes (*kharidāra*), cooks, and other support staff.

After completing the necessary preparations, Jagatsera commenced his journey from Kathmandu on 2 August 1866. His route took him through Kerung, Shigatse and Lhasa, with the goal of reaching Beijing and personally presenting the gifts. However, he encountered restrictions and was permitted to go only as far as the Tibeto-Chinese border town of Batang. There, he was allowed to sell some of the goods he had brought for trade.

In the spring of 1868, during his stay in Batang, Jagatsera met a British individual named Mr. "Kupara," who was none other than Thomas Thornville Cooper (1839–1878), a British adventurer, traveller, merchant, and political agent (Chin. Tang Gu-ba 唐古巴)[514] (Figure 19).

Both Jagatsera and Cooper found solace in sharing their tales of suffering. Jagatsera and his mission encountered numerous challenges and setbacks, enduring a state of being stranded, humiliation, deception, and illnesses.[515] Along the way, they also faced various obstacles that resulted in the loss of valuable goods. Additionally, Jagatsera's plans to sell opium and generate profit were thwarted.

Similarly, Cooper experienced humiliation ("bully" 陵侷)[516] at the hands of Chinese and Tibetan officials. He was denied permission to continue his journey in Weixi, Yunnan, left with no funds or proper equipment, lacking authoritative travel documents. Like Jagatsera, Cooper also fell ill during his ordeal and was even subjected to arrest for several weeks.

Kājī Jagatsera recounts his initial encounter with Mr. Thomas in the *arjī* addressed to Janga Bahadur Rana (2.1.10) detailing how Cooper inquired about the route to Nepal via Lhasa and requested a travel

514 According to a memorial received on 27 September 1873,《軍機處檔摺件》, 劉嶽昭、等 奏,〈奏請准將候補府經歷田昌稼開復降級處分事〉, 同治, 故機111712 號, 頁 *1* , 國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統.

515 As an example, during the mission, Jagatsera and his team were provided with a daily allowance of 25 ounces of silver, as well as provisions, forage, and palanquins. Initially, Jagatsera had control over the allocation of these resources. However, on the return journey, the responsibility for the silver was handed over to the Chinese interpreter. Unfortunately, the interpreter only distributed a small portion of the allocated amount, as reported by Bishop Chauvean (in Manandhar 2001, 150).

516 *Foreign affairs in their entirety* Tong-zhi, vol. 85, 3–4.



Figure 19: Thomas Thornville Cooper (1839–1878, British traveller and political agent at Bhāmo (source: Archive.org, The Graphic, 28 September 1878)

document. Jagatsera clarified to Cooper that such a passage was not feasible. Furthermore, Jagatsera explained the arduous journey through a region inhabited by uncivilised people and thieves, rendering it impassable. Despite these warnings, Cooper remained resolute in his pursuit of the journey.

Subsequently, Cooper assumed the disguise of a Gorkhali and proceeded on his way. However, he was eventually apprehended in Tibet and expelled from the Tibetan regions. The subsequent circulation of this rumour caused predicaments for Jagatsera at the Tibetan-Chinese border.

In his subsequent letter to Janga Bahadur Rana, dated 15 September 1868,[517] Jagatsera provides an account of his second encounter with

517 This is an abbreviated, simplified and slightly revised version of the document Jagatsera 1868 (Part II, 2.1.11); see Michaels 2019a for more details.

Cooper. According to his report, the British traveller possessed a travel document issued by the Emperor of China, yet it proved ineffective in gaining access to Tibet. Cooper's progress was obstructed by a contingent of 350 soldiers stationed there.

Jagatsera vividly recalls the hardships endured by Cooper during his arduous journey, including scarcity of food and substandard lodging. Additionally, Cooper was incarcerated by the Chinese authorities (in Yunnan) for a duration of 35 days, only securing his release through the means of bribery. It is worth noting that Cooper's original intention was to travel to Burma. However, due to the Panthay rebellion and an unfortunate accident where his horse broke its leg, he was unable to reach his intended destination. Consequently, he found himself in Batang after traversing treacherous, untamed, and snow-covered terrain. Moved by compassion, Jagatsera extended his assistance to Cooper by providing him with nourishment, a sheep, and a horse.

The encounter between Thomas Cooper and *kājī* Jagatsera brings to the forefront a range of new dimensions that extend beyond territorial boundaries. It unveils the unrest in Southwest China and East Tibet, exposing elements such as espionage, mistrust, the limited effectiveness of passports, smuggling, and diverse political judgments and classifications. These aspects are not only substantiated by Cooper's vivid and adventurous travel report of 1871 but also by subsequent accounts detailing the encounter between Jagatsera and Cooper. Together, these reports provide compelling evidence of the intricate dynamics at play during their interaction, highlighting the complex and multifaceted nature of the situation.

Thus, Thomas Cooper's description of his initial encounter with Jagatsera conveys an impression that Jagatsera was facing more dire circumstances than Cooper himself.

> On the following day, His Excellency Juggut Share (Jagatsera), the Nepaulese ambassador, arrived. He was a young man of very courteous bearing, but seemed ill, and his conversation soon showed me that he was not only ill in body but greatly depressed in spirits. His position was anything but pleasant, and he confided to me the history of his embassy on its way so far towards Pekin. He had left Khatmandoo nearly two years before, and after a long journey through Thibet, had arrived without encountering any serious difficulties at Ta-tsian-loo, the border town of China. Here he met his first repulse; a messenger from

> Pekin brought him an Imperial order to deliver the presents sent by Jung Bahadoor [Janga Bahadur Rana] to the Emperor at that place, and return to Nepaul, as the road to Pekin was rendered unsafe by the Nien-fei [Nian Rebellion] rebels. This the young ambassador refused to do, pleading his instructions from Jung Bahadoor, which compelled him to deliver the presents in person. The authorities were determined to enforce the Emperor's orders, and Juggut Share was equally determined to proceed to Pekin; another application accordingly had to be made to the Emperor, for a reply to which he waited several months. When it came, it was in the form of a permission to him to proceed as far as Chen-tu (Chengdu), in order to dispose of several hundred chests of opium, brought for sale in China, and then to return home. He soon reached Chen-tu, and hoped to proceed further; but the authorities made this impossible. He could hire neither coolies nor boats, and what was worse, no one would buy his opium; it was too strong, and the people preferred the native drug.
>
> At the time of my arrival, he had spent several months at Chen-tu, vainly pressing his request for leave to proceed to Pekin. The officials treated him with great discourtesy, hoping by this means to force him to return, and had lodged him in a dirty hovel outside the city, which, as he said, was so filthy, that he was ashamed to ask me to visit him in it.[518]

In August 1868, having escaped from the Chinese officer Tian Changjia (田稼昌), he realised the impossibility to reach Assam in British India via Yunnan in China. On his way back to Dartsemdo, Cooper encountered Jagatsera once again at a location referred to by Cooper as "Pa-moo-tan," situated west of Batang. Cooper proceeds to provide the following account:

> While thus indulging in pleasant anticipations, a Goorkha came to say that the Ambassador was ready to see me; so off I started for his quarters, where (a great mark of distinction in this country) he received me at the door. When closeted together in his room, I narrated all my misfortunes, and requested permission to join his party, and travel with him to Lhassa. With many expressions of regret, the Ambassador informed me that he

518 Cooper 1871, 158–60; German version: Cooper 1882, 174–78.

dared not let me accompany him, for the Thibetan Government had already given him notice that they would not permit any strangers to join his party. He, however, kindly told me that if I was in need of money, he would be glad to supply my requirements and would also give me a horse. Thus, my hopes were again blighted; and for a moment or two I was unable to speak, so great was my disappointment. In Chen-tu the Ambassador had, with such apparent sincerity, proposed to me to accompany him, that I never dreamed of his now refusing. It seemed improbable that the plea of inability could be genuine, for the Thibetans were unmistakeably afraid of the Nepaulese, and I at once naturally concluded that he was afraid to take me with him without the orders of His Royal Highness Jung Bahadoor the Nepaulese Regent, whose jealous dislike of English intrusion into Nepaul was too strong for him to relish the idea of introducing an Englishman into the Thibetan nest, where he, in conjunction with the Chinese, finds so many golden eggs. Subsequent information, however, convinced me that Juggut Share would gladly have acceded to my request if he had dared; and I take this opportunity of placing on record my sense of gratitude for the great kindness experienced at his hands. (…)

Early next morning, I repaired to Juggut Share's quarters with pens, ink, and paper, and we both set to work writing; I to her Majesty's representative at Khatmandoo, stating my imprisonment and forced return; and the Ambassador to Jung Bahadoor, from whom he had not heard for several months, as the Chinese had kept back all his despatches. While thus engaged, Juggut Share could not refrain from expressing his utter astonishment in the most amusing manner; every now and again looking at me, as I sat dressed in full European costume, he would say, 'Ah, you Englishmen are wonderful men! Who but an English Sahib would travel alone in such a dreadful country as this, so far away from any of your countrymen?' From such remarks as these, which both he and his officers frequently made during the day, I learnt that whatever may be the jealous dislike of the Nepaulese towards the English in India, they certainly respect and admire the courage of 'the Sahibs.' It was at last time to return to dinner, for, as Juggut Share remarked, with polite apologies, 'his caste' could not allow of our eating together; but he had already shown his thoughtful care by sending a live sheep

> to our quarters; and I left him with a promise to call for his letters, and take leave of him, as I passed through the village in the morning.[519]

Cooper returned via Hankow (Hankou) to Shanghai in November 1868, Jagatsera via Lhasa to Kathmandu in May 1869, where he was not received with pomp due to the many casualties in his mission.

The accuracy of numerous details in Cooper's and Jagatsera's reports is supported by a report from Bishop Chauvean (Chin. Ding Shengrong 丁盛榮),[520] who headed the French Jesuit mission at Dartsemdo (Kangding/Ta chien-lu) and had the opportunity to meet both Jagatsera and Cooper.

Following their respective encounters, Cooper returned to Shanghai in November 1868, while Jagatsera made his way back to Kathmandu in May 1869. However, upon Jagatsera's return, he did not receive the expected grand reception due to the significant number of casualties that occurred during his mission.

7.3 Thomas Cooper's Quest for Trade Routes from India to China

In late 1867, Thomas Cooper set out on a voyage from China to Assam after receiving an invitation from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. His primary goal was to investigate the feasibility of establishing an overland trade route connecting China and India. On January 4, he commenced his journey from Hankow and traversed through Chengdu, Kangding (Dartsemdo), and Lithang (Litang), ultimately arriving at Bathang (Batang). However, according to the evidence provided by Jagatsera's documents as outlined above, Cooper was forced to retreat by the Tibetans, who did not permit him to proceed further.

Undeterred by the setback, Cooper made a bold decision to pursue an alternative route. He opted to take the path through Dali City (大理), with the intention of reaching Bhamo, situated at the border between Myanmar and China. This new route would lead him through the Panthay kingdom, an area engulfed in a Muslim insurgency, with its capital located in Dali.

519 Cooper 1871, 389–400.
520 Dated 17 July 1868, edited in Manandhar 2001, 148–53.


After his detour through Weixi (維西), Cooper returned to Ya'an (雅安) and embarked on a downstream journey along the Min River (岷江). He continued this route until he reached Yibin (宜賓), where he transitioned to the mighty Yangtze River, following its course downstream. Cooper's voyage along the Yangtze River eventually brought him to the city of Hankow.

In 1869, Cooper tried to travel in the reverse direction, from Assam to China. Years later, in 1876, he was appointed as a political agent by the India Office and stationed at Bhamo. Tragically, on April 24, 1878, Cooper was assassinated in Bhamo by a sepoy from his own guard, due to a personal grudge.


In his book, *Travels of a Pioneer of Commerce in Pigtails and Petticoats: An Overland Journey from China Towards India*, Thomas Cooper provides an incredibly detailed account of his expedition (Maps 2–3).[521] The narrative captures the essence of his adventurous journey, which proves to be no less remarkable than the Nepalese missions to China. Cooper's motivations, at times, seem to reflect a reverse interpretation of the "One Belt, One Road" strategy:

> The great empires of Asia, almost up to our own time, presented an unknown field, which very few were able to enter upon and explore religious prejudice and Oriental: conservatism combined to exclude the intrusive Western strangers; and but recently have we begun to acquire anything like accurate knowledge, either geographically or historically, of the vast empires and peoples of the time East. An angry and jealous fear of the aggressive force of Western civilisation has succeeded to contemptuous prejudice, and, at the present time, renders the Oriental peoples yet more reluctant to admit to the presence of the foreigner, whom still they feel themselves unable to exclude. Of this Oriental exclusiveness, the giant empire of China, slumbering in the conscious pride of its social and political system, which dates from the most distant ages, is the truest type. (…)
>
> More unrestrained and extended commercial and political intercourse between China and the West will materially tend to remove ignorance, the source of prejudice; and foreign commerce, as it advances along her water highways, will be the

521 For the veracity of these and similar accounts of travel accounts of Tibet and China, see Dabringhaus 1994, 99–120.



Map 2: Mr. Cooper's route from China to India in 1868, starting from Hankow (source: Cooper 1871, opposite 470, Archive.org)



Map 3: Routes of Thomas Cooper (1867–1868) and the Nepali mission led by Kaji Jagatsera (1866–1869). Route of Thomas Cooper (right to left): 1. Shanghai, 2. Hankow, 3. Chongqing, 4. Chengdu, 5. Dartsemdo, 6. Litang, 7. Batang, 8. Weixi. Route of Jagatsera (left to right): 1. Kathmandu, 2. Nyalam, 3. Tingri, 4. Shigatse, 5. Lhasa, 6. Chamdo, 7. Batang, 8. Litang, 9. Dartsemdo, 10. Chengdu; drawing by Elias Michaels, 2025

> herald of the superior Western civilisation, with its steamers, railways, and machinery, be welcomed as a friend, not repelled as a foe. Such a movement of progress will, ere long, it is to be hoped, set in, to save the great empire from the internal decay and ruin which now more than threatens her. To aid in this, by making Englishmen better acquainted with a portion of China, and by pioneering road for the advance of commerce, was the object of my travels; and to have done so will be a full reward.[522]

In his evaluation of trade routes from China to India, Cooper assesses three options. However, he notes that two of these routes were effectively impassable due to the ongoing Panthay rebellion in Yunnan and the presence of "Mongol banditti." As a result, only one route remained open for consideration, which he describes as "the great highway from Sze-chuan [Sichuan] to Lhassa, the capital of Central Thibet [Ü], vice Ta-tsian-loo [Dartsemdo] and Batang."[523]

522 Cooper 1871, 1 and 3–4.
523 Ibid., 4.

Cooper's book is replete with captivating narratives, offering not only thrilling tales but also providing fresh geographical insights into the land, its fauna, and flora. His journey was truly diverse, encompassing periods of illness, hunger, perilous river crossings, daunting gorges (Figure 20), fierce winds, and snowstorms. The route presented formidable obstacles in the form of "terrific snow-clad mountains".[524]

Throughout his expedition, Cooper encountered political unrest and frequent incidents of robbery, often relying on his pistol for survival. He faced "jealous animosity of the officials, and, as I believed of the people, towards foreigners, wild tribes."[525] The journey was compounded by challenges such as unreliable and insufficient information, intrigues, deceitful interpreters, and altercations with porters. Remarkably, Cooper even found himself accidentally married to a local girl due to his unfamiliarity with a ritual, inadvertently leading to an unexpected situation.

Enduring the multitude of challenges he faced, Thomas Cooper remained determined to fulfil an enduring British aspiration—a trade route from China to India.[526] The quest for such a route can be traced back to the mid-eighteenth century when the East India Company, based in Calcutta, began exploring ways to expand and enhance trade with Tibet and China, seeking increased profitability. However, the conquest of the Kathmandu Valley by King Prithvi Narayan Bahadur Shah disrupted these plans. Despite Calcutta's efforts to prevent the East India Company's exclusion from the Kathmandu Valley, their military expedition led by Captain George Kinnloch in 1768, intended to assist the ruling Malla kings, was met with strong resistance from the Gorkhalis and ended in failure.[527]

Consequently, the British had to abandon their ambitions for organizing trade between Bengal, Tibet, and ultimately China via Nepal. Instead, they sought alternative routes, with a particular focus on the Lohit Valley connecting Assam with the Tibetan region of Zayü (Tib. rDza yul), which borders India and Burma. In 1869, Thomas Cooper embarked on this route as well, but his progress was impeded by the Tibetan Mishmi people in Zayü, eventually forcing him to abandon his endeavours.

524 Ibid., 7.
525 Ibid.
526 Cp. Cammann 1951, Choudhury 1977.
527 Raj 2012.



Figure 20: Hogg's gorge at the Lan-Tsan-Kiang River in Yunnan (frontispiece in Cooper 1871, source: Archive.org). On this landscape, see Cooper 1868–1869.

These are the concluding sentences in Cooper's *Travel of a Pioneer of Commerce*, marking the culmination of his ambitious expedition and the challenges faced in his pursuit of establishing a trade connection between India and China:

> Perhaps at a future date I may submit to the public a narrative of this journey:[528] at present it will suffice to say that, after reaching the head-waters of the Braootra [Brahutra], and successfully passing through the savage and treacherous Mishmee tribes to the north of Assam, we reached a point on the frontiers of Thibet not more than a hundred and twenty miles from Bathang, where we were stopped by order of the Thibetan Governor of Zy-yul [Zayü], and compelled, after suffering much from hunger and jungle fever, to return to Calcutta; not, however, relinquishing the hope of some day successfully finding this missing link in our geographical and commercial knowledge of the route from Assam to Thibet.[529]

528 Cooper in fact did present this "narrative" in his book *The Mishmee Hills; an account of a journey made in an attempt to penetrate Thibet from Assam to open new routes for commerce* (1873).

529 Cooper 1871, 451–52.

8 Detailing the Complexity

Given the evidence from the sources, Nepal did not lose the war despite its gradual retreats. On the contrary, it was China that failed to make a decisive victory as it did not reach Kathmandu. However, it is not only the fighting parties that decide on victory or defeat. Rather, the concepts of national integrity, borders, sovereignty, or suzerainty, diplomatic languages along with natural and topographical conditions, weather, and local factors, play a crucial role. These elements are particularly significant when considering the historical context. The VS 1850 report, as well as the reports by Tenzin Peljor, Yang Kui, Zhao-lian, etc., all highlight how factors such as soldier illness, natural hazards like snowfall, and hunger led to the withdrawal of Chinese troops.

The understanding of Betravati, thus, highlights the differing perspectives on China's suzerainty over Nepal (and Tibet). The absence of a clear victor in the war and the relatively limited significance of Nepal to China contributed to this disparity. In addition to border reordering and fortification through the construction of watchtowers,[530] Nepal fulfilled minor obligations such as the restoration of plunder taken from the Tashilhunpo monastery. However, the quinquennial missions remained the most significant obligation for Nepal, even though the Gorkha government grew increasingly reluctant to undertake them.[531]

In contrast, China did not provide any military assistance to Nepal, not even during the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814–1816, despite the understanding of Nepal on agreement made in the understanding of Betravati. Hešen rejected the tributary envoys' request for any military assistance on behalf of the Emperor (2.2.3e). Later ambans, including Mengbao, followed the precedence. The impact of the war was more significant on Tibet, as it led to the presence of influential *ambans* like Sungyūn (1752–1835) and a reduction in the power of the Tibetan Ministers.

530 Dabringhaus 1994, 188.
531 Manandar and Mishra 1986, 19.

Hence, both sides derived certain advantages, although the extent of these benefits varied. The Rana prime ministers, who had seized power and faced legitimacy issues, sent missions to China to seek recognition as legitimate rulers. The Emperors emphasised the importance of regular missions and placed Nepal on the outer periphery of their network of tributary states to guard the frontier for the Great Emperor (2.2.5), known as the Cefeng system (冊封體制), thereby asserting their claim of universal power. Additionally, the Qing court always desired these missions to be led by individuals of high status, and initially even contemplated the king or his regent personally leading them to enhance the imperial glory.

In this diplomatic environment, characterised by intricate rituals and pervasive distrust, concerns arose not only about the influence of missionaries but also about espionage and smuggling. Tibetan and Chinese authorities were frequently wary of foreigners attempting to blend in by wearing local attire, as exemplified by Thomas Cooper donning a Gorkhali dress and a Manchurian "pigtail". To mitigate such suspicions, the missions were required to provide in advance notice to the ambans in Lhasa, specifying the number and names of their members. Rumours of foreigners infiltrating the country spread easily, further contributing to the atmosphere of suspicion and vigilance.

This xenophobic scepticism, particularly directed towards Western foreigners and missionaries, manifested in the imposition of travel restrictions. Tibet, for example, strictly prohibited the entry of any foreigner into the country. Treaties signed between China and France, England, the USA, and Russia during the period of 1844–1880 allowed citizens from these countries to freely travel within China's "national territory," which China interpreted as encompassing Tibet.[532] With the exception of the Capuchin monks who resided in Tibet from 1707 to 1745 before being expelled to Nepal/Gorkha and subsequently to India in 1768, in the eighteenth century most foreigners from the maritime routes were confined to the coastal regions and port cities of China under the Canton system, while overland trade was strictly managed by the Empire, especially when it comes to Chinese rhubarb. The Russians were allowed in Peking, while registered Jesuits might travel in Mainland but seemingly not to Tibet. It was only from around 1860 onwards that individual missionaries, primarily from France, attempted to enter Tibet. However, Tibet generally denied their entry,

532 Petech 1976, 219.

disregarding instructions, permissions, and travel documents issued by Chinese authorities, except for a few exceptional cases. Most of the missionaries stopped by Dartsemdo. The prevailing argument was that Tibet was a country where religion and the authority of the Dalai Lama were the sole concerns.

> Of the two assertions, the first ('Tibet is a religious country') was regularly employed by the Lhasa authorities in their official communications to foreigners; the second ('imperial authority not acknowledged') was made, in more or less explicit terms, by the Tibetan officials on the spot, charged with preventing the entry of foreign travellers into Tibetan territory.[533]

Indeed, the political and religious reservations held by Tibet and its authorities help explain why individuals like Thomas Cooper, as well as previous travellers such as George Bogle in 1774 and Samuel Turner in 1783, had no opportunity to reach Lhasa. The presence of the 350 soldiers mentioned in the initial document of Jagatsera, as mentioned earlier, is likely not an exaggeration.

Meanwhile, the situation also shows that China's power and authority were not sufficient to enable access for foreigners to Tibet in the Late Qing period. In the nineteenth century, the Qing dynasty was severely challenged by uprisings and wars, including the Islamic rebellions everywhere, such as Dungan in the Northwest and Panthay in the Southwest, and the catastrophic Taiping Civil War (1850–1864) with 20–30 million victims, famines, natural calamities and a general impoverishment of major parts of the population. This made symbolic demonstrations of power all the more important and the sending of complimentary presents was a cheap means to uphold the claimed suzerainty and the 'middle of the world' without (much) military force, which China was anyway unable to afford. This view was also expressed in 1877 by Thomas Wade (1818–1895), the British Minister at Peking:

> As a tributary state, Nepal might be classed with Burma ... in the habit of sending complementary tribute at intervals in token of amity and deference to a powerful neighbour, but the Chinese allow tribute missions to be made the opportunity of profitable

533 Ibid., 229.

> transactions for the states which send them, otherwise the custom at present day would soon come to an end and it would be impossible now for the Chinese to enforce it afresh. The custom dates from time immemorial and has the effect of keeping an artificial importance for the Chinese throne which its military could never have gained for it.[534]

The designation of Nepal as a tributary state is particularly significant in this context. Wei Yuan expressed imperial nostalgia, as he remarked, "They still pay tribute unendingly till now" in 1846. In fact, Nepal was one of the last "tributary states" to be lost, as Ryukyu entered the Empire of Japan in 1879, and Korea ended the tributary relation after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. Following the Sino-Nepalese War in 1792, both sides capitalised on the situation to their advantage. Despite declaring themselves victorious in the war, their relationship remained largely unchanged since the first mission led by Balabhadra Khavas (Figure 17) in 1790.

The endeavours of both Jagatsera and Cooper, despite their ultimate failure to reach their intended destinations, shed light on the complexity of the highland region of Asia (Haute Asie) in the second half of the nineteenth century. Their documents, along with Bishop Chauvean's report, reveal that this mountainous area, which encompasses the east of Tibet, southwestern China,[535] and to a lesser extent, Burma and north-eastern British India, was far from stable, challenging the assumptions of the nation-state model. The Emperor Qianlong and his troops encountered enormous hardships in his campaigns against the rGyalrongic rulers (in 1747–1749 and 1771–1774) and Myanmar for the dispute of the fluid feudatories in the region (starting from 1762 but mainly in 1765–1769).

The region, centring the Heng-duan Mountains, was characterised by rugged terrain, harsh climates, and a lack of infrastructure, making travel difficult. There were numerous travel restrictions imposed from all sides, fuelled by mutual mistrust and suspicion of espionage or missionary infiltration. The linguistic diversity in the area added to the complexity, making communication challenging. Additionally, there was a constant pursuit of recognition by political agents, hierarchical

534 Departmental Notes, Foreign Secret *Consultations*, 8 Oct. 1877, no.s 149–50 quoted from Dhanalaxmi 1981, 70.

535 *Alias* Tibeto-Ngwi corridor, see Shi 2018. The major force of the Sino-Nepalese War came from this region.

structures based on different criteria, the persistent threat of robbers and rebels, multiple insurgencies and wars, varied forms of trade and business with different taxonomies, and above all, significant religious, philosophical, and cultural diversity.

The intricate web of factors in this region highlights the need to move beyond simplistic categorizations and understand the nuanced dynamics at play. The challenges faced by Jagatsera and Cooper serve as a testament to the multifaceted nature of the large highland region of Asia (Haute-Asie), emphasizing the importance of considering political, environmental, social, and cultural dimensions in comprehending the complexities of the time.

In exploring the linguistic aspects of Haute-Asie, it is important to consider the nuances and interpretations of terminology used in historical documents. The understanding of Betravati mentioned earlier refers to the exchange of "products of their own country" between Nepal and Tibet, rather than simply "presents" or "gifts" as commonly interpreted by scholars.[536] This indicates that there may have been a different understanding of the nature of the goods being exchanged.

536 Rana 1909, 8; Manandhar and Mishra 1986; Uprety 1980/1998, 41; Manandhar 2001; Michaels 2019a.

9 Conclusion—Beyond Transculturality

According to Frank Perlin's meticulously argued study *City Intelligible: A Philosophical and Historical Anthropology of Global Commoditisation before Industrialisation* (2020), the historical situation described above can be understood as a Babel-like complexity. Perlin employs this metaphor to highlight the ultimately insurmountable cultural differences or, as others would argue, the deeply intertwined nature of transculturality.

As I (AM) have discussed in detail elsewhere,[537] the concept of transculturality offers a valuable framework for moving beyond the notion of "pure" nations, cultures, religions, languages, social groups, objects and artefacts, images, concepts, or practices (rituals). This is because all these domains are intricately linked and entangled through transcultural interactions. There are specific contexts and individuals that serve as particularly fertile ground for observing and understanding these entangled forms of cultural exchange and interaction, which aligns with the situation described above. These contexts include frontiers, marketplaces, harbours, and metropoles, as well as individuals who act as cultural intermediaries or middlemen such as diplomats, missionaries, travellers, traders, interpreters, tricksters, or migrants. Even in the absence of such specialised locations, situations, or individuals, transculturality consistently reveals the interconnected aspects of cultural phenomena.

Indeed, transculturality allows us to move beyond essentialist perspectives and rigidly boxed classifications. However, it raises the question of how we can understand transculturality without treating "culture" as a fixed entity. The response to this question lies in adopting a methodological approach to transculturality that challenges the

537 Michaels 2019b, on which the following remarks on transculturality are based.

notion of culture as a separate and delineated entity. Instead of focusing on fixed boundaries, we explore the interplay of strategies and discourses that are conceptually intertwined. Cultures and cultural phenomena are understood to exist in a state of constant relationship, where the conceptual boundaries are porous, open, and fluid. This perspective acknowledges the dynamic and interconnected nature of cultural phenomena, emphasizing their ongoing process of interaction and mutual influence.

This approach inevitably presents a paradox: if all culture is transcultural, then transculturality becomes conceptually redundant. Alternatively, to analyse what is transcultural, one must separate units whose existence, from a methodological perspective, must be denied due to their transcultural contingency.

Perlin's intriguing theory may provide a key to resolving this paradox, which has been a central concern in transcultural studies. Transculturality as a default mode does not abandon the idea of uncovering the various cultural strands that contribute to transcultural entanglements. Rather, it recognises the complexity inherent in such interactions. Perlin takes this complexity seriously, viewing it as a research problem rather than something to be overcome. As a result, he suggests turning away from the

> old ideal of 'simplicity' as knowledge and virtue, towards the idea of the complex: to complexity as problem and subject of description and comprehension in its own right, no longer then as the inconvenient contingency of a too detailed reality that must and can be avoided by science and method.[538]

According to Perlin's perspective, it would be inadequate to perceive the intricate complexity in Nepal, southwest China, and Tibet during the 1860s as a disorganised premodern state awaiting transformation through the imposition of "modern" economic, political, and administrative structures. Instead, he suggests transcending the traditional conceptual boundaries associated with territory, ethnicity, language, politics, and other prevailing notions.

The concepts of a tributary state, independence, sovereignty, subordination, suzerainty, and vassalage play a prominent role in the material discussed in this book. These categories have been extensively

538 Perlin 2020, 75.

utilised in fields such as political science, history, and other disciplines to establish theoretical frameworks. The primary focus has been on the stability and continuity of the tributary system as a concept that contributes to maintaining border stability, power equilibrium, principles of international law, diplomatic relations, and the prevention of conflicts or wars.

However, it needs more historical and cultural sensitivity in understanding international relations because they must be embedded in the respective cultural and historical worldviews without simply being juxtaposed to each other. Studies on international relations are often state-focused, Eurocentric, ahistorical and influenced by rational choice models. The political scientist Zhou Fangyin, for instance, sees states as rational actors driven by material interests and the tributary system of China as the "the result of rational choice and strategic interaction among China and its neighbouring states."[539] Likewise, the historian Tsiang T'ing-fu argues that the tributary system was based on a dogma of suzerainty that rules out any form of equality:

> that national security could only be found in isolation and stipulates that whoever wished to enter into relations with China must do so as China's vassal, acknowledging the supremacy of the Chinese Emperor and obeying his commands, thus ruling out all possibility of international intercourse on terms of equality. It must not be construed to be a dogma of conquest or universal dominion, for it imposed nothing on foreign peoples who chose to remain outside the Chinese world. It sought peace and security, with both of which international relations were held incompatible. If relations there had to be, they must be of the suzerain-vassal type, acceptance of which meant to the Chinese acceptance of the Chinese ethic on the part of the barbarian.... It must not be assumed that the Chinese Court made a profit out of ... tribute. The imperial gifts bestowed in return were usually more valuable than the tribute.[540]

A more nuanced understanding of international relations requires historical and cultural sensitivity, recognizing the need to situate them within their respective cultural and historical contexts rather than

539 Zhou 2011, 176.
540 Tsiang 1936, 3–4 quoted from Fairbank and Teng 1941, 140.

simply juxtaposing different concepts. Traditional studies on international relations have often been focused on the nation-state, influenced by Eurocentric perspectives, devoid of historical analysis, and driven by rational choice models.

However, to ascertain the endurance and adaptability of guiding worldviews and the institutions built upon them, it is essential to consider the specific (trans)cultural contexts. In the Han-Chinese understanding of the Qing dynasty, Nepal was indeed considered a tributary state, although it may not have occupied a prominent or regular position in the Tianxia or "all under heaven" concept (天下) rooted in the Confucian worldview of cultural and moral supremacy and political sovereignty, which perceives the universe as a harmonious whole. According to this ancient system, China and the Emperor, as the "son of heaven," are positioned at the centre of the world. Other peoples and states are concentrically arranged around this centre as

> "inner" barbarians (more sinicized) and 'outer' barbarians (less sinicized). All "uncivilized" barbarians could become 'civilized' barbarians, if they are willing to be 'transformed'. (…) Evolving from this discourse is a rigid dichotomy in Imperial China's conceptualization of its relationship with other peoples and political entities; a relationship of super-ordination and subordination as a system of co-existence between the Chinese and the non-Chinese world in full compliance with the Confucian assumptions of cosmic harmony.[541]

Meanwhile, The Qing tributary system of audience and tribute payment (*chao-jin* 朝覲 and *gong-shu* 貢輸) was manifold and cosmopolitan.[542] The Manchus used less often the term "barbarian" than the Chinese, as we can also see from the sources.[543] For them, it was more complex than the traditional Han-Chinese Confucian model. The Manchu Dynasty combined the master-slave model of the Manchus under the Imperial Household Department,[544] the Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhist worldview, the Manchu-Mongolian Steppe culture (in the ways of *hu-cong* 扈從 and *hui-meng* 會盟), the Central Asian Islamic tribes (Mnc. *hoise-i aiman*) and the Confucian ideals from the Han-Chinese. A "tribute" might mean

541 Zhang and Buzan 2012, 14.
542 Millward 1998, 201; Lin 2009.
543 Cp. the Aisin Gioros in 2.2.5 and 2.2.7 with Wei Yuan 2.2.8.
544 Cp. Swen 2021.

differently for different populations in the Qing Empire, preserved in documents of different languages and institutes. The tributary banquet was itself a polytropic cosmopolis as we have seen in the writings of the Korean ambassadors.[545]

Nepal, or Gorkha was indeed positioned in the outer circle as the "minor or external foreigners" (*xiao-fan* or *wai-fan* 小番/外番), along with the Tibetans and rGyalrongic people who were "western foreigners" (*xi-fan* 西番)[546] different from the "raw foreigners" (Mnc. *eshun fandz*, Chin. *sheng-fan* 生番). They were managed by the Central Asian tribute managing institution, *Li-fan-yuan*.[547] The Malla rulers were referred to as khans, while the title conferred to the Gorkha King was *erdeni wang*. Both shows that they were considered under the Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhist worldview, and thus listed along with the Tibetans in the Bureau of Dependencies of *Li-fan-yuan* (Li-fan-yuan Dian-shu Qing-li Si 理藩院典屬清吏司), managed by the ambans residing in Tibet.[548] Their missions were not controlled by the Ministry for Rites (*libu*) as in the case of Siam (Thailand), Korea, Myanmar, or Annam (Vietnam), the traditional tributary states within the Sinitic cultural sphere and Confucian model. The Gorkhalis were received by the Imperial Household Department instead, which made it more intimate and flexible. It cannot be denied that for Emperor Qianlong, Gorkha was significant in many aspects. Qianlong continued to enact his understanding of the hierarchical relation between him and the Gorkha King by sending summons of instructions to Rana Bahadur Shah via the amban Sungyūn, while he translated the end of the Gorkha Campaign into various ideologies within the Empire, declaring it as a great success to the entire Empire,

Tibet, playing a central role in the Sino-Nepalese relations, was a Lamaist theocracy with a strong religious authority vested in the Dalai Lama, etc. The religious claim by the Dalai Lama played a significant role in the relationship with China. Qianlong, the Qing Emperor, was personally inclined to the Tibetan Buddhism and considered himself to be Mañjuśrī. He also used the title, Mañjuśrī, and acknowledged the former Panchen Lama as his spiritual Buddhist guru, connecting

545 Cp. Ge 2014.

546 This is different from *xi-yang* 西洋, the term for the western foreigners coming by maritime routes.

547 Schorkowitz and Chia 2016, 43. See also *Draft History of Qing*, vol. 91, *Compilation of the Statutes in the Qing Empire* JQ, vol. 52 *Lifanyuan*, 31b.5.

548 *Qin-ding Li-fan-bu Ze-li*, no. 46 通例下, 司屬職掌; vol. 61 no. 926 西藏通制上, 稽查外番差人來藏.

himself with the (Buddhist) dharma-politics (Tib. *chos srid*).[549] He thus built a replica of Tashilhunpo in Jehol where the Mongolian rulers were received in a Steppe way of hunting (Mnc. Muran i aba, Chin. Mu-lan Wei-ban 木蘭圍班).[550] It must have thus influenced his determination to punish the Gorkhalis upon hearing that the real Tashilhunpo was damaged. For the Tibetans, the recovery of the treasure of Tashilhunpo was a sign of the capability of the Emperor as the best protector-patron (*gong ma mchod yon*) in the Buddhist sense, as was articulated in Dalai, Tatsag and Tenzin Peljor's biographies. For the Manchu-Mongolians, it was thus not only related to Tibetan Buddhism, which was influential among them, but also to the martial glory.

Starting from 1720, Tibet was under the changing degree of suzerainty of the Qing dynasty, so as to make sure the Mongolian population were under control. The Qing Empire's entering Tibet must have further international influence as the first amban in Lhasa, Sengge, also received the requests from the Malla kings. Now that the Gorkhalis had subjugated, the Qing Emperor replaced former Tibetan ministers and installed powerful ambans to control Tibet, although the effort faded out gradually after the death of Emperor Qianlong and a series of rebellions in China that follows

From the eyes of the Han-Chinese under the rule of the Manchu Emperor., the remission of the Gorkha race and the tributary envoy from afar due to the admiration and fear appealed to them. The Emperor showed the Han-Chinese population that the case was operated in the classical Confucian ideal of the emission (*hu-mao* 怙冒) of civilising power (*hua* 化, corresponding to Sanskrig *ājñā*) from the Emperor, as he employed these canonical idioms. He tried to escape the time-honoured criticism of an emperor of excessive military mobilisation (*qiong-bing du-wu* 窮兵黷武) but praised the benevolent virtue of sparing lives (*hao-sheng zhi de* 好生之德). He emphasised his inheritance of the heavenly mission in the cabinet edict (2.2.3c) For the Chinese Buddhist, what was articulated also resembled the model of *cakravartin* described in Prajña's translation of the *Avataṃsakasūtra*.[551] All these ideologies were

549 Ishihama 2004 and 2011.

550 See *Qin-ding Li-fan-bu Ze-li*, vol. 21 扈從事例中.

551 The *dharma* of a *cakravartin*: "The Great King (Anala) of our state established nine principles, being able to turn the kingly wheel. What are the nine? 1. His virtue subjugated the four neighbours who prepared tribute on their own. 2. When the tributary gift was not brought in, he used his grace and sincerity to move them. 3. When they were not moved but disobeyed, the [King] persuaded their monarchs and ministers to have suspicion in each other. 4. They

combined in the quadrilingual Potala Inscription that were issued and dispersed in multiple forms everywhere in the Empire. Meanwhile, the quadrilingual lyric by Rana Bahadur Shah also served the same function to accord all ideologies and canonical traditions (*tong-wen* 同文) within one tributary banquet. Towards the end of Qianlong Era, i.e., the last years of eighteenth century, the Emperor tried his best to create a polytropy in his Empire with a variety of efforts starting from the reception of Torghuts, invitation of the Panchen Lama, and now the inclusion of Gorkha music in the imperial corpora.

Therefore, the Chinese-Manchu bilingually annotated *Painting of Tributary Bearers* was ordered to be revised. It was a multi-scroll or multi-volume work. The first volume was for vassals and foreigners, while the later ones were the minorities of Taiwan and then the Mainland, such as Canton, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou. The first few illustrations in vol. 1 were dedicated to traditional vassals within the Confucian model such as Korea. Then came the westerners from the maritime routes and Russians overland, which were often managed by the Jesuits. They might even skip the official imperial institutes by resorting to the Imperial Household Department to avoid the ritually asymmetrical structure of the tributary system.[552] Then came the various Bodic people. The Gorkhali ambassador together with his servant

might thus correct their mind while having discords between monarchs and ministers. The King thus sent ambassadors to arrange agreements among them and make them turn toward the sacred civilising power. 5. If they refused the good persuasion, the King sent his army to do a punitive expedition. 6. The King watched over the commanders for their merits. 7. The King investigated the demerits and argued the defence of the fortress of the enemies. 8. Having understood that the enemies had firmly fortified fortress, the King estimated the power of the army. 9. The King deemed that the people were harmonious, and the army was powerful in his own country. The Great King (Anala) of our state possesses these nine principles, luminously opens his eyes of wisdom, and shines upon everything. Therefore, the eight directions all paid allegiance to the true civilising power/righteous command. They required to be subordinates on themselves and never turned back, just as the rivers and tides all go to the ocean and become one taste without a different intention." 大方廣佛華嚴經卷11入不思議解脫境界普賢行願品:「我國大王成就九法, 能轉王輪。何等為九? 一、德伏四隣, 自修職貢; 二、貢賦不入, 恩信感之; 三、感之不從, 説其君臣, 令相疑阻; 四、彼或革心, 君臣異議, 説使和同, 令歸聖化; 五、善説不聽, 王師討伐; 六、觀彼主率, 將德有無; 七、審其寡德, 議其城守; 八、知彼牢城, 料兵強弱; 九、自揣國中人和兵鋭; 我國大王具此九法, 慧眼常明, 照矚一切。是故八表咸歸正化, 自求臣屬, 永不退還; 譬如眾流潮宗於海, 皆同一味, 無有異心。」(CBETA 2024.R3, Taishō 10, no. 293: 712c20–29). The model of *cakravartin* here echoes with Qianlong's self-display of his decisions in the two Gorkha Campaigns.

552 Swen 2021.

came after these Tibetan populations and before the Islamic people and the Torghuts.[553] Even though the Gorkhalis were painted in 1793, posterior to all others, it found its place in the Empire after Tibet.[554]

Despite Nepal's eighteen documented missions, only ten of them between 1792 and 1908 had their presents/tributes recorded in the Chinese Collected Statutes (*Qing Hui-dian*),[555] indicating that Nepal did not hold significant importance for China after Qianlong's arduous endeavours. Within this system, status was determined by cultural-political adjacency or personal intimacy with the Emperor rather than "national" power. Therefore, they were highly valued by Qianlong as he considered it to be his great achievement. However, his successors had too many other concerns and thus were negligent to Nepal. A similar situation also happened to the Ladakhis.[556]

The Pax Sinica, founded on the complex of tributary structures, indeed exhibited inherent inequality. Nevertheless, some states within this system maintained their sovereignty and autonomy. Nepal was able to continue entering into treaties with British India and sending ambassadors to India, Burma, or Tibet. The Qing Empire also did not wish to change no customs of Nepal other than the ritual music played by the musicians at court.

> It is also true that a critical examination of Chinese historical records demonstrates that the Chinese themselves found their assumptions of cultural superiority to be more myth than reality.[557]

Accordingly, "(t)he Nepalese saw in the missions no token of subordination and no recognition of Chinese suzerainty."[558] They could well pay respect to the Great Emperor outwardly, using obedient, humble and submissive terms, while still declaring victory inwardly within the sacred Hindu kingdom.

Furthermore, Nepal was not obligated to remain in the tributary system indefinitely. Nepal did not send missions regularly every five years and eventually ceased doing so altogether in 1908 without facing

553 Chuang 1989, 127.
554 Chuang 1992, 240.
555 See Fairbank and Teng 1941, 198.
556 Cp. Mengbao, vol. 1; 2.2.8. Note D. See also Kung 2021.
557 Zhang and Buzan 2012, 16.
558 Petech 1996, 167, similarly Stiller 1975, 213; Regmi 1975, 462, 480.

any significant repercussions from China. For an external and remote country such as Nepal, "the tributary system, thus, has open access and is also inherently elastic."[559] Nepal, thus, was never truly a vassal state to China. One would not find it on the maps made by the Qing court (e.g., Huang-chao Yu-di Quan-tu), and thus the Chinese never thought about providing military aids, as they did for the Koreans.

Moreover, Nepal did not adhere to any of the Qing Empire's worldviews by offering "tributes." They did not convert to Buddhism as the Tibetan hagiographies claimed. The country had its own distinct agenda. It increasingly positioned itself as the last Hindu kingdom in the world, upholding Hindu concepts of purity such as reverence for Brahmins or the holy cow. In contrast to India, which had been influenced and impacted by Muslim and Christian invasions, Nepal presented itself as a nation that remained untainted by these external forces. Nepal put forth the notion of being a purer country than India, as astutely observed by Richard Burghart:

> Throughout the eighteenth century, Nepal was thought by the Nepālese to be a Hindu realm uncontaminated by Muslim rule. Prithvi Narayan thought that the Kingdom of Gorkha could become a 'true Hindustan' (*asal hindustan*).[560] Fifty years later, however, nearly all the South Asian subcontinent had been subjugated by the cow-eating Firangi [European] and, given the presence, as always, of the pig-eating Bhotiya of the Tibetan plateau ruled by the barbarous Celestial Emperor at Peking, the remaining Hindustan on the subcontinent and that its political isolation was necessary in order to safeguard its purity.[561]

This concept of purity, manifested through social institutions like connubium (marriage) and commensality (shared meals), permeated Nepalese society and placed non-Hindus in an inferior position. As a result, *kājī* Jagatsera was unable to dine with the Emperor or Thomas Cooper, as noted in Cooper's travel report. Additionally, upon their return, all members of the Nepalese missions, including Jagatsera, had to undergo a process of rehabilitation or purification ritual (*prāyaścitta*) before they could meet the king, Prime Minister, or be reintegrated into their

559 Zhang and Buzan 2012, 19.
560 See Stiller 1989, 44.
561 Burghart 1984, 115–16; cp. Michaels 1997 and 2005.

caste and family. This impurity was believed to be generated by crossing the ocean or leaving the sacred Indian subcontinent (*bharatavarṣa*), and even Jaṅga Bahādura experienced its effects when he travelled to London and Paris.

In sum, the historical context presents a complex interplay of various factors, including the involvement of local leaders, the presence of missionaries, the challenges posed by the highland regions, the activities of robbers and thieves,[562] the difficulties posed by the terrain and climate, the constant accusations of smuggling or committing espionage, and the personal economic interests of the Rana clan and the leaders of the missions. Within this complexity, the concepts of sovereignty, independence, and tributary state become inadequate in capturing the reality of the situation, as they tend to oversimplify perspectives. China employed diverse and adaptable methods of rule, including the granting and withdrawal of privileges, the conferral of titles and gifts (such as the *khitāpko parvānāra* in the Report of VS 1850), audiences with officials, and, regrettably, the use of violence. The Qing Empire generally tolerated cultural and religious peculiarities in the peripheries and did not seek to impose changes in local customs or forms of governance in the case of the Gorkha Kingdom. In some cases, it supplemented existing systems with the appointment of influential *ambans*, as was the case in Tibet.

The more interesting point, however, is the complexity of the situation that gives rise to a multitude of strategies with political, economic, societal, or religious objectives. These strategies are intricately intertwined with diverse cultural and transcultural environments, reflecting the diverse perspectives and worldviews at play. Zhou aptly remarks (as if he had read Perlin's study), that Top of Form Bottom of Form

> the policies of China and peripheral states under the tributary system were constantly undergoing change, and that it was by no means a rigid mode of behaviour or a unilaterally imposed status quo, but instead a complex and dynamic diplomatic phenomenon.[563]

562 Sun Shi-yi and Heliyen both recorded cases of provisions or army equipment being stolen (KRKJL, vol. 36 passim; Heliyen, vol. 1, 32–33).
563 Zhou 2011, 178.

In addition, Zhang Yongyin, professor of International Politics, and Barry Buzan, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, rightly observe (as if they had been at the Heidelberg Centre of Transcultural Studies):

> Variations in the institutional practices of the tributary system as a trans-cultural construct, therefore, are the norm rather than an exception or deviation.[564]

Nevertheless, the question still lingers: should we embrace this inherent variability as a fundamental mode rather than focusing solely on transculturality? For a long time, disciplines within the humanities, particularly those dealing with historical, textual, and anthropological material, or employing hermeneutic methods, have faced criticism for their perceived complexity. This complexity has often been portrayed as an intellectual or methodological flaw, suggesting that the humanities lack the ability to achieve rigorous and valid results compared to the sciences. However, according to Perlin's perspective, which is supported by the material presented in this article, there is another way to interpret this complexity. It is not merely a result of confusion or scholarly error, but rather a necessary aspect in dealing with diverse circumstances, locations, environments, institutions, constellations, and processes. In fact, it is this very complexity that enables the interchangeability and translatability of different taxonomies and worldviews, as Perlin, influenced by Immanuel Kant, would argue, is a priori possible.

Regarding the manifold tributary systems, the insights provided by Zhang and Buzan strongly support this perspective in a noteworthy manner:

> It is through long, tumultuous and never-ending historical and social processes of assertion, imposition, contention, contestation, rejection, acquiescence and acceptance that ideas, beliefs and metavalues constitutive of the constitutional structure of the tributary system become intersubjective, to varying degrees, between Imperial China and other constituent parties of the tributary system. Fundamental institutions defined and shaped by these processes, therefore, do not just reflect the hegemonic

564 Zhang and Buzan 2012, 24.

> institutional preferences, but also represent a collective solution invented by, and consented to among, East Asian states to the perennial problem of inter-state conflict, co-existence and cooperation. The institutional innovations of the tributary system make the East Asian order appreciably different from other regional orders in world history, from Europe to the Middle East. (…) The malleability of the tributary system is, then, a necessary virtue, which is aimed at accommodating different challenges in institutional practices in Pax Sinica.[565]

Therefore, complexity should be recognised as the foundation for comprehending the comprehensibility and translatability of diverse (trans)cultural realms. The often-lamented absence of conceptual clarity should not be considered as an analytical blemish, but rather as an opportunity to explore additional and alternative paths beyond overarching yet oversimplifying theories and methods. This exploration leads us towards the subjective, the narrative, the non-verbal, the sensual, the visual, the arbitrary, and ultimately towards embracing complexity in its intrinsic nature.

565 Ibid., 34–35.

Part II
The Sources

In collaboration with Rabi Acharya (RA), Manik Bajracharya (MB), Pabitra Bajracharya (PB), Pradip Ghimire (PG), Rajan Khatiwoda (RK) and Punya Prasad Parajuli (PPP)

1 Preface

The following sources form a selection from his wealth of other documents. They concentrate on the events before, during and after the Sino-Nepalese War. The introductions include editorial notes, the translations of 2.1–2 are all newly written, and most of the editions are first editions; all editions and translations in Section 2.2 are by Xu Yunheng (XY). Descriptions and comments on the contents of the sources can be found in Part I, 2.

We gratefully acknowledge the support the collaboration of Rabi Acharya (RA), Manik Bajracharya (MB), Pabitra Bajracharya (PB), Pradip Ghimire (PG), Rajan Khatiwoda (RK) and Punya Prasad Parajuli (PPP) in editing and translating the documents in Nepālī and Tibetan.

2 Texts and Translations

2.1 Nepālī Texts

2.1.1 Sāmarpā's Dharmapatra, VS 1845 (1788 CE)

Source: Naraharināṭha 1965, 52–53, also in Ch. Nepālī 2020, 147, no. 20.

Translation (AM)

Dharmapatra of Sāmarpā Lāmā

Written by Sāmarpā Lāmā.

We, including …. Have left Lhasa and China. We became the persons of Gorkha Mahārāja and consumed the King's salt.

If we reveal Gorkha's weaknesses to Lhasa, if we make conspiracy and disrupt the affairs of Gorkha Kingdom, or if we disobey the instructions of the Gorkha Mahārāja, or if I exchange letters with Lhasa without consulting Gorkha Mahārāja, may we be inflicted by the evil eyes of glorious Bauddha and Svayambhū …

I have written this *dharmapatra* and offered to the Gorkha Mahārāja. Date: Monday, the bright fortnight of Jyeṣṭha in the year (VS) 1845.

Edition (PG)

गोर्खाका राजालाइ लासाका स्यामर्पा लामाको शरणागति धर्मपत्र-संवत् १८४५[566]

लिषितम् स्यामर्पालामाज्यू

काजि छामारुङ्, जिङ, ढुंगीज्, जिटुङ् कर्मा तान्जे, गेलु छोजिङ्, उन्जेंमिन् डोन्, उन् जेथाचो, घेलं आँजोम्, गाक पाछुङ्, झिमकर्माल्के, कर्माजोर्के, पेमाछाँ, करिल छोवाङ्

566 This title of the document is given by Naraharināṭha.

तोर्जे छावाङ् गिमें छुंछो, हामि एतिले ल्हासा चिनिञाको माया माऱ्यौं गोर्षा श्री महाराजाका भञौं निमिष षाञौं गोर्षाको छिचरो पातलो लि भोट पुऱ्याउनामा पसौं त परिपंच गरि गोर्षाको काज हान्नमा पसौं गोर्षाका श्री महाराजाले अह्रायाको काज हामिवाट पुगि आउन्या काज गर्नामा नपसौं गोर्षाका विना वुझले भोट् मानिस चिठि कुरोमा पसौं त श्री शिंभुको, श्री वौधको कुदृष्टि ल्हासा चिनिञाको माया मार्नमा पसौं गोर्षा श्री महाराजाका निमिषको सोझो गर्नामा पसौं गोर्षाको छिचरो पातलो भोट षुऱ्याउनामा नपसौं परिपंच गरि गोर्षाको काम हान्नमा नपसौं हुकुम गर्नामा पसौं गोर्षाका श्री महाराजाले अह्रायाको काज हामिवाट पुगि आउन्या काज सोझो गरि गर्नामा पसौं विना वुझ्ले भोट मानिस चिठि कुरो पठाउनामा नपसौं त श्री वौधको सुदृष्टि हामि एतिले गोर्षाका महाराजालाई धर्मपत्र लेषि चह्राञू संवत् १८४५ साल मिति जेष्ठ सुदि रोज २ मुकाम.....शुभम्

2.1.2 Letter to *Bhāradāras* of Gorkha Regarding Kerung, VS 1846 (1789 CE)

Source: Naraharinātha 1965, 53.

Translation (PG, RK)

Hail! This letter—with auspicious blessings is written to venerable Raṇavīra Ṣatri, venerable Amvarasiṃ Thāpā, venerableVandeva Thāpā, who are worthy of all exalting similes and suchlike, and the soldiers of the Kuhruvā, Thuma and Kaṁpanī. Here, [we are] alright; [we] need [things to be] alright there [as well]. Henceforward *āge*): The tidings here are good. Hereafter (*uprānta*) upon the order of the Emperor of China, China's officers (*amvā* = *amban*)[567] arrived, and subsequently, the Dharmapatra was completed between Bhoṭa (Tibet) and us. During the reign of King Pratāpa Malla, [he and] Bhīmala Kājī reached an agreement with Tibet regarding the demarcated border of Bhoṭa and us, i.e., up to the half of Kutī of Bhoṭa. Considering the same boundary of the border as an address, an agreement was made that Tibet was to pay an annual tax of 50,000, which was to be delivered to Kathmandu. Chinese officers (*amvā* = *amban*) came to us. We met and communicated with them and despatched our people along with letters and presents (*saugāta,* for the Emperor). Therefore, you, including Kuhruvā and Thuma of various places, are instructed to gather all

567 Probably Yan Ting-liang.

the ammunition, rifles, gunpowder, bullets, and other military supplies stored in various forts and return to our location.

Issued on Friday, the 2nd of the dark fortnight of Bhādra in the year VS 1846 (17 August 1789).

Edition (PG, RK)

स्वस्तिश्री सर्वोपमायोग्य श्री रणवीर षत्रि श्री अम्वरसिं थापा श्री वन्देव थापा अरु सभ कुह्नुवा थुम कंपनीका सिपाही के आशिषपूर्वकपत्रमिदं आहा कुशल ताहा कुशल चाहिये आगे इहाको समाचार भलो छ उप्रान्त चीनका वादसाहका हुकुमले चीनका अम्वा आइकन भोटको र हाम्रो घा वन्देज धर्मपत्र भयो प्रतापमल्ल राजा भीमल काजीका पालामा आधा कुतीतक भोटको र हाम्रो जो साँध हो सोही साँधको ठेगाना वाधी सालिन्ना भोटले पचास हजार रुपया कर काठमाडौं ल्याई तिर्नु गरी वन्धेज भयो अम्वा समेत हाम्रा हजुरमा आया उनसंग वसउठ गरी चीन वादसाहथैं हाम्रो चिठीपत्र मानीस् सर सौगात समेत अम्वाका साथ पठाञू तिमीहरू पनि गढी-गढीमा रह्याको षर्षजाना वन्दुक वारुद गोली जजायल् गर्गोच् सभ अगाव हिडाइ जगा जगाका कुह्नुवा थुम समेत भै हजुर आव इति संवत् १८४६ भाद्र वदि २ रोज ६ मुकाम काठमाडौं शुभम्—

2.1.3 The Treaty Between Gorkha and Tibet Regarding the Currency, VS 1846 (1789 CE)

Source: Naraharinātha 1965, 20.

Translation (RK)

1. To facilitate easy access for the people and merchants of Bhoṭa (Tibet) and Gorkha, it is agreed that one *mohara* coin of the King of Gorkha, which has been in circulation, will be exchanged for two *mohara* coins of Tibet.
2. Tibet will agree to discontinue the operation of the Takasāra (treasury) of the Gorkha King. Gorkha will mint *sukkā-sukkī* coins and send them to Tibet for use.
3. Even if the high-ranking officials of Bhoṭa wish to alter this agreement, Bhoṭa and Gorkha will not make any changes to it. Whoever attempts to alter this agreement will incur the disfavor (*kudṛṣṭi*) of the King of Gorkha, while those who honour the agreement will receive his favor (*sudṛṣṭi*). The following

individuals endorse this agreement with their signature and seal (*sahīchāpa*):

Representative of Potalā Lāmā (Dalāī Lāmā), Dunara Sela Huna Thona Ḍupa Phunchopa (rTse drung Don ,grub Phun tsogs / Zi-zhuo Dun-zhub Peng-chuk?)[568]; representative of Dhurina Kājī (Tenzin Peljor), Purdun (sPor-gdong-pa)[569]; representative of Ṭhūlo Lāmā Arjavegī Eseṭhācyān (Yi-shi Jiam-can Ye shes rgyal mtshan)

Witnesses: Representative of Tāsī Ihimpo (Tashilhunpo Monastery, probably sent by Drungpa), Syāmarpā Lāmā; representative of Sākya Lāmā (Saskya Trizin), Ḍhevā Lopsāṅ Thinden.

4. The [Dalai] Lama of Lhasa will be required to pay fifty thousand and one rupees (50,001) annually within the month of *Karkaṭa Saṁkrānti* (i.e., Śrāvaṇa), in Kathmandu to the great King of Gorkha.

Witnesses: Hail! venerable great Vama Sāhadeva who is the king of mountains and so on, venerable Harihara Upādhyāya. Treasurer (*khajāñcī*) Śyāmalāla Pāṇḍe. Venerable Dhurina Kājī, Tenjiṅ Peñjo Chiriṅ (Tenzin Peljor), Khajāñcī Divuka (Devuka); Syāmarpā Lāmājī; Dhyāya; Vadhun and Pāñḍe; Tuṇḍup (the seventh Panchen's father dPal ldan Don grub?); Sākya Jhinapuna (officer *gzim dpon* from Saskya) and Ise Devā Dunar; Ḍhuṇḍu Pheñjelikha (the translator Don grub?); Secretary (*kharidāra*) Viṣṇu Prasāda; Secretary Viṣṇu Śaṅkara's younger brother major Dhyāna Śaṅkara. This agreement is completed on 2nd day of bright fortnight of Vaiśākha in the year (*samvat*) 1847.

Edition

गोर्खा र भोटको मुद्रा सन्धि—शाके १७१२ सं. १८४७ ई. १७९०

१. भोट (तिब्बत) तथा गोर्खाका जनता एवं महाजनहरूमा सुगमता प्रदान गर्नका लागि गोर्खाली राजाको एक मोहर तिब्बत (भोट) मा चलि आएको मोहरको दुइ मोहरमा साटिने कुरा मञ्जूर गरिन्छ ।

568 The name can be found in Cata. Tib. no. 13196 = 3–2–3412–10.
569 The Chinese version of these names have been identified by Deng 2007a.

२. तिब्बतले गोर्खाली राजाको टकसार चलाउने कामबाट वञ्चित रहन मञ्जूर गर्छ औ गोर्खाले सुक्कासुक्की छाप्ने छ र यस्को प्रचलनको लागि भोट (तिब्बत) मा पठाउने छ।

३. भोटका उच्च अधिकारीले यस सम्झौतालाई परिवर्तन गर्ने इच्छा गरे पनि भोट तथा गोर्खाले परिवर्तन गर्ने छैन। जो कोहीले यस सम्झौताको परिवर्तन गर्छ त्यस माथि गोर्खाली राजाले कुदृष्टि लगाउने छन् र जो कोहीले यस सम्झौतालाई मान्यता दिने छ त्यसलाई गोर्खाली राजाले सुदृष्टि लगाउने छन्। यसमा सहि छाप गर्ने मानिस निम्नलिखित छन्:—

पोतला लामा (दलाई लामा) का प्रतिनिधि दुनर सेल हुन थोन डुप फुनछोप; धुरिन काजीका प्रतिनिधि पुर्दुन्; ठूलो लामाका प्रतिनिधि अर्जवेगी; एसेठाच्यान्

साक्षीहरू:— तासी इहुम्पोका प्रतिनिधि स्यामर्पा लामा, साफ्य लामाका प्रतिनिधि ढेवा लोपसाङ् थिनदेन्

४. कर्कट संक्रान्तिको महिना दिन भित्रै काठकाण्डुमा तिर्ने गरि ह्लासाको (दलाइ) लामाले गोर्खाका महाराजालाई वार्षिक ५०,००१ रू. दिने छ।

साक्षीहरू:— स्वस्तिश्री गरिराजेत्यादि श्रीमद् वडा वमसाहदेव; श्री हरिहर उपाध्याय. खजाञ्ची श्यामलाल पांडे. श्री धुरिन काजी तेन्जिङ् पेञ्जो छिरिङ् खजाञ्ची दिवुक; स्यामर्पा लामाजी ध्याय; वद्हुन एवं पाण्डे तुण्डुप; साक्य झिनपुन औ इसे देवा दुनर; ढुण्डु फेञ्जेलिख; खरिदार विष्णु प्रसाद; खरिदार विष्णु शङ्करको भाइ मेजर ध्यान शङ्कर. यो सम्झौता सम्वत् १८४७ वैशाष सुदि २ मा सम्पन्न भएको हो।

2.1.4 Letter of Raṇa Bahādura Śāha to Officials Sent for the Conquest of Kumaon Garhwal, VS 1849 (1792 CE)

The document, dated 21 October 1792, has been edited by Dhanavajra Vajrācārya and Jñānamaṇi Nepāla: "Śrī 5 Raṇabahādura Śāhale Kumāū Gaḍhvāla Vijaya Garna Gaekā Bhārādāraharūlāī Lekheko Patra", in: *Aitihāsika Patrasaṃgraha* (A Collection of Historical Letters), Kathmandu: Nepāla Sāṃskṛtika Pariṣad, vol. 1, VS 2014 (1957), 56–74. An English translation of this document is available in *Regmi Research Series* 2.8 (1970), 177–88. Regarding the whereabouts of the original document, the editors write that a copy of it was in the possession of Baburam Acharya (see Vajrācārya and Nepāla VS 2014, 56 n. 1) and the original was with General Mṛgendra Śaṃśera. It was first published by Janaka Lāla Śarmā Ḍhakāla in *Itihāsa-Prakāśa* 1 (VS 2012), 3–4.

Source: Vajrācārya and Nepāla VS 2014, 56–61.

Translation[570] *(PG)*

Hail! [A decree] of him who is shining with manifold rows of eulogy [such as] 'The venerable crest-jewel of the multitude of mountain kings' and *Naranārāyaṇa* (an epithet of *Kṛṣṇa*) etc., high in honour, the venerable supreme king of great kings, the thrice venerable great King Raṇa Bahādura Sāha Bahādura Saṃsera Jaṅga, the brave swordsman, the divine king always triumphant in war.'

Hail, this letter is with blessings to *kājī* Jagajīta Pā̃ḍe, *sardāra* Ambarasiṃ Thāpā and captain Golyā (text: Golañā) Khavāsa who are worthy of exalted similes and capable of bearing royal duties.

All is well here. We want good news there. We received (your) letter and noted its contents. First, the news from here is good. You have reported that when the enemy came and encamped at Kauḍyā, many (of our troops) stayed there to resist the advance, and that when Ambarasiṃ Thāpā went there for assistance along with additional troops, the enemy was repulsed with heavy loss of life. We have read the message. You have won the battle. The letter appears to have been written in Phālguna. It reached here on the 8th of Asauja (= 23 September).

Recently, no (letter) has come from there. When the Chinese troops reached Dhaivuṃ (Dhaibung), the morale of our troops went down. We were faced with the problem of saving the country and of repulsing the enemy by maintaining troops on two fronts. This was the reason why the paid soldiers, musketeers (*tilaṅgā*) and shield bearers accompanying you had to be dismissed. There was justice in some cases and injustice in others. Yet we shall grant paddy to some and cash to others. Nobody should therefore feel dejected. We shall act with prudence. Let everybody know this and remain loyal and satisfied.

When the enemy was only at one day's distance from Kathmandu, we checked him where possible and negotiated where this was to our interest. We then wrote to you about what had happened here and asked you to come post-haste. By the grace [of the goddess (*īśvarī*) we faced the enemy by means of strength and tactics and repulsed him, maintaining the country (*dhuṅgo*) independent as usual.

There also you repulsed the enemy and retained hold over the conquered territory. Now that arrangements have been completed here, we shall have to maintain only one front there. This territory has accrued to us through our good fortune. Do not therefore abandon it. Though,

570 The translation is based on RRS 2.8 (1970), 177–88.

because of the happening here, we could not render necessary assistance, yet now we shall do so.

The letter written by Devanidhi Panta reached here after 40 days. He has written that the troops of the king of Śrīmoriyā (Sirmur) were stationed at Languragaḍha for rendering assistance but went back when the king of Garhwal failed to pay the promised money. With the advice of the Nawab, a meeting was arranged at the Alakhanaṃdā and a treaty was negotiated. The settlement was made that the territory across the Yamuna should belong to Sirmur, while that on this side should accrue to Gorkha. After making this treaty, the king went back. Srinagar came under the suzerainty of Gorkha. This is what was contained in that letter.

The same news has been communicated also by a few other people living in... (words missing). No news has arrived from there, but we have taken this report to be true. We are glad that you have done well. So far as future plans are concerned. We have sent Kālu Pā̃ḍe and Bhagu Khavāsa there. Let them stay there along with their two regiments, as well as Jogamalla and Bhaktī Thāpā. Appoint a *subbā* in that new territory along with necessary troops to look after it, and *sardāras*, *subbās*, *umarāvas* and *subedāras* as considered necessary by *kājī* Jagajīta Pā̃ḍe. Those who receive orders from the *kājī* shall obey them or else be considered rebels, and those who obey them shall be considered loyal. After making necessary arrangements there, Jagajīta Pā̃ḍe should come here, accompanied by the necessary numbers of men. The *pajanī*[571] must be held early, so come as soon as you get this royal order.

We have already informed you how our army came back after reaching Ḍigarcā. The subsequent developments are as follows.

When the news of the plunder of Ḍigarcā and the capture of the Tibetan *kājīs* reached China, the Chinese Emperor sent his General (*ujīra*), his son-in-law,[572] Ṭuṅthāṅa Cyāncuna (Fuk'anggan, the Grand Secretary, the Great General), Haikuna (Hailanca, the Duke), and other *ambans* and *sardāras*, and the Chinese Soka Yogyā Garumvā Khambā (Khsemba), with troops, to Lhasa towards the end of Phālguna (mid-March).

From Lhasa they sent a few letters for concluding a treaty, and demanded that we should give them back Syāmarpa Lāmā, who had

571 I.e., annual reorganization of civil and military services.

572 In fact, Fuk'anggan was the nephew of the Emperor. His father was the brother of the Empress. Fuk'anggan's elder brother, Fulunggan, was married to the daughter of the Emperor. Fuk'anggan's eldest brother was also married to a princess. There were thus rumors that Fuk'anggan was the illegitimate son of the Emperor which ruled out the possibility of his marrying a princess.

sought our refuse, and Dhurīna Kājī (Tenzin Peljor) and Ito (Aitu) Kājī of Lhasa [g.Yu thog], who had been detained by us, but we refused to give up those who had sought our succour, from considerations of virtue.

Thereupon General Fu-kang-an advanced with his army and on Thursday, Āṣāḍha Sudi 2, overpowered our Chhutte outpost at Kukuraghāta. To the *sardāra* of our troops at Keruṅ (Kerung) also came the news that one outpost was still in our possession. At this, Sardar Śatru Bhañjana Malla, accompanied by his troops and Tulārāma and Udhau (Uddhava), *subedāras*, along with regiments, started from Kerung. The enemy has occupied the outpost at Kukuraghāṭa and was waiting to attack the troops that would come as reinforcements, after maintaining a position on the way.

Not understanding the enemy's plans, our reinforcements, rather inadequate in number, reached the opposite side of Pāṅgsīṅṭāra (Paṅgusi). A battle took place there. 20 or 25 men of our side, along with Tulārāma Subedāra, felt fighting. 10 or 15 men of the enemy also killed. Some got wounded. Our troops retreated to Kerung, fighting all the way. At the gates of our outpost at Kerung, our Uddhava Khavāsa died of a bullet-wound. *Sardāra* Śatrubhañjana Malla killed a few persons, but when he was wounded by arrows on his back and arm, he retreated and joined his troops at Kerung. We had two forts inside Kerung and one outpost. The people who defended them were inadequate in number. On that same day the enemy attacked the fort. But when he failed to break it, he withdrew. Next day he launched an attack again, and after a fighting of about six hours failed to make any headway and so withdrew.

On the fourth day, the enemy again made and attack in the early hours of the morning. With guns and arrows and bags of gunpowder and burning foliage and torches, he first overran the outer fortifications and little before noon. In the two inner forts, fighting went on throughout the day. Three or four hundred of the enemy were killed. Two hundred were killed on our side too. A little after dusk, our two forts were branched, but some of our men managed to escape. On that same night, the enemy pursued them and reached Rasuvā a little after sunrise. Shots were exchanged by both sides all day long, and 8 or 10 of the enemy were killed.

When the enemy crossed the Rasuvā river at a high point and came to besiege our men, the latter left Rasuvā and took to their heels. At Syāpruka (Syāphrū) they met *subedāras* Bhāskara and Jagavbala who going from here along with their regiments. There was exchange of gunfire between the enemy and us from the two sides of the river.

Pravala Rānā, Bhārata Khavāsa and Raṇakesara Pā̃ḍe, together with few nobles and with the Śrīnātha regiment then reached there for the defence of Syāpruka village.

After seven or eight days, the enemy attempted to cross the river but was checked and repulsed by our gunfire. After two or three days, when they saw a strong force crossing the river at a high point, our troops considered the ascent difficult and therefore decided to shift from Syāpruka to Dhuṃce. We had a strong force at Dhuṃce commanded by Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe. *Subedāras* Bhāskara and Jagavbala, along with their regiments, were staying at adjacent places at the top of the Dhuṃce hill, named Deurālī. The enemy came upon them at that place but was twice repulsed by our men. On the third attack, two of our *subedāras*, along with 40 or 50 men were killed. The enemy occupied that territory with a loss of 200 or 250 men. From Dhuṃce our troops went there to reoccupy that area. But the enemy attacked them midway. Our troops repulsed him once, but when they came in larger numbers, a few were killed on both sides. Our troops then withdrew and joint the nobles at Dhuṃce. The place was a difficult one, and so they left Dhuṃce and came to Dhaibuṅ.

The enemy pursued them and battle tock place near Kamāryāgaḍha. Our troops won the battle and killed 40 or 50 of the enemy with shots and swords. 100 or 500 (of the enemy) fell down the hill and died. The enemy then encamped at Rāmcyā while our troops maintained position at Dhaibuṅ.

Meanwhile, the enemy sent letters from Dhuṃce expressing the desire to conclude peace. We wrote a reply to the letter here and sent a Dhewa[573] accompanying Ciniya Pā̃ḍe [Wang Gang] and Dhurīna Kājī as well as a Chinese we had detained here along with the reply. They met our nobles at Dhaibuṅ and then went to Rāmacyā. They handed the letter [16 July 1792 (QL 57/5/28) letter = 2.2.2a] over to *sardāra* Hayekuna [Hailanca] and Cuṃṭu [Cengde?], two of subordinates of Ṭuṅthāṅ. They sent the letter to General Ṭuṅthāṅ and an oral message through our courier that the place was too small for their troops and officers, and therefore we should evacuate Dhaibuṅ and send our nobles to conduct negotiations. They wrote letters on a piece of red cloth and told our couriers to show it to their troops coming through Deurālī as well as to our troops and added that they had ceased fighting and that our troops should also do the same.

573 A Tibetan officer (Tib. *sde pa*).

When the cloth was shown to the troops at Deurālī, there was a cease-fire on both sides. It was difficult for us to fight at Dhaibuṅ, and when this message came, our nobles left the place. The enemy remained on one side of the Betrāvatī, while our troops stayed on the other.

From Dhaibuṅ General Ṭuṅthāṅ wrote a letter[574] demanding that we should send to them the Chinese detained here, Dhurīna Kājī and Ito Kājī [Tenzin Peljor and g.Yu thog]. We sent them, along with Raṇajita Pā̃ḍe, Bhotu Pā̃ḍe, Narasiṃha Ṭaksārī, and Balabhadra Khavāsa to General Ṭuṅthāṅ. On Saturday, Śrāvaṇa 31, they crossed the Betrāvatī and at night met the *ambans* of the enemy troops across the river. On that same night they took the Chinese detained here and Dhurīna Kājī to General Ṭuṅthāṅ. On Sunday, our nobles who had gone from here met General Ṭuṅthāṅ at noon. They had a reply to the letter [from 13 August 1792 (QL 57/6/26)] sent from here. On Tuesday, they sent Raṇajita Pā̃ḍe and Balabhadra Khavāsa here. The letter reached here on Wednesday.

The letter contained many matters. But the main point was that Dhaibuṅ was too narrow for them, and that they therefore should be allowed to come to Nuvakot, where the king and his uncle should also go to negotiate peace; and if the king and his uncle could not come, emissaries should be sent to conduct the talks. They further wrote that if we did not allow them to come to Nuvakot and failed to withdraw our troops from the two fronts, they would come by force. A second letter was also received the same day. We prepared a reply to the second letter and ordered our troops to resist them if they crossed the river by force.

On the morning of Monday, Bhadra 8 (25 August 1792), the enemy crossed the Betrāvatī and advance at several points, including Cokde, where Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe was staying, Dhudhīyā, Thumkā, where our outpost was situated; and towards Gerkhu on the main road, which was occupied by Kṛtimāna Siṃha. Our troops repulsed them at all the three points and forced them to withdraw to the Betrāvatī.

On the bridge over the Betrāvatī, the chief Chinese official began to kill his retreating troops. As the ford was blocked, many fell into the Betrāvatī river. Several of the enemy fell down the hill and died, while other were killed by our troop's shells, swords and arrows. In all 1,000 or 1,200 of the enemy were killed. On our side, 15 or 16 were wounded by arrows, swords or shells. Of the Chinese that managed to escape across the river, two *sardāras* had their noses cut, and they immediately

574 Probably the letter on 2 August 1792 (QL 57/6/15).

jumped into the Betrāvatī river and were drowned. Bhotu Pā̃ḍe and Narasiṃha Taksārī are still in the enemy camp. The enemy has not left talking of peace despite this battle, and we too are doing the same.

General Ṭuṅthāṅ wrote two or three letters demanding that goods looted at Ḍigarcā which had reached our Palace should be sent back along with the high-ranking nobles who would be deputed to China with letters and presents for the Emperor, that the agreement signed between our nobles and *kājī* Syāmarpa Lāmā of Tibet at Kerung should be sent, and that, since Syāmarpā Lāmā was already dead, his family and belonging should also be sent back, so that they might be placed in their own monastery. We sent Hari and Balabhadra Khavāsa with all those to China along with General Ṭuṅthāṅ. We shall send high-ranking nobles with letters and presents for the Emperor, with instructions to visit China, obtain an audience with the Emperor and state our case. If (the Emperor) accepts these nobles, finalises a treaty and goes back along with his troops, it will be good.

On Āśvina 5 we sent *kājī* Devadatta Thāpā, *subbā* Pratimāna Rāṇā, Jayanta Shahi, son of *jeṭhābuḍhā* Narasiṃha Taksari, and Balabhadra, son of Khardāra Biṣṇu Śaṅkara, to China along with Ṭuṅthāṅ, on Aswin 10[575], they met General Ṭuṅthāṅ at Dhaibuṅ. Ṭuṅthāṅ was highly pleased to see our nobles and *kājīs*. The Chinese troops were suffering from the scarcity of food. Several of them were ill, and many had died. When our nobles reached there, they began to take back the sick and the offending, along with their troops and arms and ammunition. Ṭuṅthāṅ was accompanied only by his troops. On Saturday, Aswin 24, General Ṭuṅthāṅ left Dhaibuṅ along with his troops and returned to China accompanied by his troops and our *kājīs*.

Kāntipura, Kārttika *badi* 7, 1849 Vikrama (Saṃvat).

Edition (MB, PG, RK)

स्वस्ति श्रीगिरिराजचक्रचूडामणि नरनारायणेत्यादिविविधविरुदावलीविराजमान मानोन्नत
श्रीमन्महाराजाधिराज श्रीश्रीश्रीमहाराजे रणवहादुरसाहवहादुरसम्सेरजङ्गदेवानाम् सदा समर-
विजयिनाम् । स्वस्ति श्रीसर्वोपमायोग्यराजभारासामर्थ श्रीकाजी जगजीतपाडे श्रीसर्दार अम्बरसिं थापा श्रीकप्तान

575 In Chinese sources QL 57/8/8 = 23 September 1793.

गोलञा षवासके आशीषपूर्वक पत्रमिदम् ।
यहा कुसल ताहा कुसल चाहिये पत्र आयो अर्थ मालुम भयो । आगे यहांको समाचार भलो छ ।
उप्रांत कौड्यामा वैरि आइ वस्याको कतिले तहां अर्का मुष आयाकालाइ थामन वसी अम्बरसिं-
थापाले पल्टन अरू फौज समेत ग्वाहार दिन गयाको वैरिलाइ घर्काई कत्तल गरी काट्याको हान-
मार गऱ्याको फर्दसमेत विंति गरी पठाया छौ विस्तार मालुम भयो । लडाइ फत्य गऱ्या छौ
बनाया छौ, फागुणमा लेष्याको चिठी रहेछ । असौजका ८ दिन जांदा यहां आइपुग्यो ।
उप्रांत आजकाल भन्या तांहावाट आयेनन् । उप्रांत धैवुंसम्म चिनियाको लस्कर आइपुग्दा र हाम्रा
मानिसको मनसुभ घटता ढुंगा थामन्या घरी पन्यो र दोहरो फौज रात्री पनी वैरि हटाउनु पऱ्यो ।
एस्तो काज परि आउंदा ताहां तिमीहरूसंग जान्या भारा तिलंगा ढलेत खोसीन गयाका हुन् ।
कहि न्या पनि कहि अन्याय पनी पऱ्यो तपनी कसैलाइ धान कसैलाइ दाम गरी बक्सनेछौं ।
यसमा कसैले उदास हुनुपर्दैन । विवेक हामी राषनेछौं । सबैले यो कुरा सुनी षातिर-जामा रहनु ।
वांकी वैरिदेषि काठमाडौ येक दिनको दरम्यान रहदा थामिन्या ठाउँ थामी मनाइ सनाइ
सप्रन्या ठाउमा मनाइ छोडी यहां यस्तो पर्न गयो तिमिहरु धावा गरी आउ भनी लेषी पठायांथ्यौ ।
[ईश्वरी] का कृपाले आयाको वैरी जुझ बुझ ढुंगो ठाडो राषी फर्काऔ ।
उप्रान्त ताहां तिमीहरूले पनि कुलच्याको जिमी थामी आयाको वैरी टाऱ्याछौ । जहाको वन्दो-
वस्त भयापछि काज तेतै येकोहोरियो । तसर्थ ती जगा वडा ऐश्वर्यले मिल्याको छ नछा । यहा
यस्तो पर्दा केहि कुरामा थामपुर पुग्न गयेन तापनि अव हाम्रो हो थाम पुर गरीवक्सनेछौं ।
उप्रांत देवनिधि पन्तले चिठि लेख्याको ४० दिंमा यहां आइपुग्यो । तस चिठीमा क्या लेषेको रहेछ
भन्या श्रीमोरिया राजाको फौज मदतलाइ लंगुरगढमा थिया । गढवालाका राजाले कवोल्याको
रुपैजा नदिंदा फौज फिऱ्यो । नवाफका सल्लाहासित अलखनंदामा भेट भै घाको वन्दोवस्त भयो ।
श्रीयमुनापार श्रीमोरियाले षानु वार गोर्षाले षानु यो वन्दोवस्त गरी राजा फिऱ्यो ।
श्रीनगर गोर्षाको

अम्बल भयो भनी लेष्याछन् । यहि समाचार ..... वरुन्या २।४ जना मानिसले पनि लेष्याछन् । ताहा-
वाट आइपुग्याको छैन तपनी समाचार साचै ठहरायौं । समाचार साचै भयापछि त वढीयै काम
गऱ्याछौ भनी षुसी भयौं । अव गर्न्या काजका अर्थकन कालु पाडे भगु षवासलाइ ताहा पठायाको
छ । इ २ समेत इनको पल्टन औ जोगमल्ल भक्तीथापा तस नञा देसका सुवा ताहा राषी यति
फौजले ताहां संभार रहने भनी काजी जगजीत पाडेका चित्तमा देष्या सरदार सुवा उमरा सुवेदार-
लाई तैले षटाई तहा राषनु । काजीले षटायाका मानिसले षटनमा रहनु । जो रहदैन सो अपसरिया
जो रहला सो सरिया । काजी जगजीतपांडेले चाहिंदा मानिस ली तहांको वन्दोज गरी यस समय
पजनी सवेरै गर्नुछ । मोहर देषत हजुर आ.
उप्रांत हाम्रो फौज डिगर्चा पुगी फिर आयाको विस्तार अघि तिमीहरूलाई लेषेकै हो । ताहा पछि
यहां भयाको समाचार डिगर्चा लुट्याको र भोटेका काजीहरू पक्रियाको समाचार चीन पुग्दा
चीनका वादसाहाको उजीर ज्वाइ टुङ्थाङ् भन्याको र अरु च्यानचुन हैकुन अंवा गैह्र सर्दार
फौज औ चिनिञा सोक योग्या गरुम्वा षम्वा गैह्र समेत निगलदा फागुनमा लासा आइपुग्याथ्या ।
लासाबाट १।२ चिठी केही कुरा सलुकको साह्रो कुरा भन्या हाम्रा पोछा पर्न आयाका स्यामरपा
लामालाइ र तिमीहरूले छेक्याका लासाका धुरीन काजी इतो काजीलाइ हाम्रा छेउ पठाइदेउ
भनी उसले २।३ पटक लेषता हाम्रा पीछा परेकालाइ पीछाको धर्म थामना निमित्त नसौंपदा उजीर टुङ्थाङ् आफना जीय अघि सरी फौज ली आषाढ सुदी २ रोज ५ का दिन कुकुरघाटका हाम्रा छुट्टे ठाना मिच्यो । १ ठाना रह्यौको छ भनी केरुङ हाम्रा लस्करका सर्दार
छेउ षवर आउदा सर्दार शत्रुभंजन मल्ल आफ्ना तैनाथी सिपाहीसमेत तुलाराम उधौ २ सुवेदार
कंपनी समेत केरुङबाट हिड्याछन् । वैरिले कुकुरघाटको ठाना छिनी गुहार आउने फौज हानौंला
भनी आफ्नो चांजो पारी वाटमा वस्याको रहेछ । वैरिको चांजो नबुझी पाङसीङटा-रका पल्लाछेउ
हाम्रा गुहार जाने मानिस पातलै पुग्न गयाछं । तेसै ठाउंमा लडाइ जोरियेछ । तुलाराम सुवेदार

समेत २०।२५ मानिस हाम्रा षेत रह्याछन्। वैरिका पनि १०।१५ षेत रह्याछन्। केहि घाइता
भयाछन्। हाम्रा पछि हट्तै लड्दै केरुङ आयाछन्। केरुङका ठानाका ढोकामा हाम्रा उधौ षवास
सुवेदारलाइ गोली लागी मरेछ। शत्रुभंजन मल्ल सर्दारले पनि १।२ आफुले पनि हानी
आफुलाई पनि कंडामा र पाषुरामा तीरको घा लागी भागी लस्करसंग केरुङमा आइ सामील
भयाछन्। केरुङ भित्र २ गढी वाहिर १ गढी हाम्रा थिया। हाम्रा कुह्रन्या मानिस पातलै रह्याछन्।
उसै दिन किल्लामा वैरिले हमला गरेछ। किल्ला नफुट्ता पछि हटी बसेछ। उसका भोलीपल्ट
फेरि लडाइ गर्न आयेछ। २ पहरसम्म लडाइ भइ नसकी पछि हटेछ। चौथा दिनपछि येक
पहर रात वांकी छ भन्दा आइलागेछ। वन्दुक तीर वारुदका सिधिया झारपात आगो फुलटा
हाली मीची पहिले बाहिरको किल्ला ४।५ घडी दिन चढ्दा अम्वल गरेछ। भीत्रका २ किल्लामा
तमाम दीन लडाइ भयेछ। वैरिका पनि ३।४ सय मरेछन्। हाम्रा पनि २ सय मरेछन्। घडी
४ येक रात चढ्दा हाम्रा २ किल्ला फुटेछ। हाम्रा मानिस केहि निसकी भागी आया। उसै
रातमा लपेटा ली २ घडी दीन चढ्दा रसुवा आइपुगेछ। दिनभर वारपारवाट गोलीको
लडाइ भयेछ। १०।८ वैरिका मऱ्या छन्। रसुवा षोला माथिवाट तरी छेका हाल्ने गरी वैरी
आउंदा हाम्राले रसुवा छोड़ी भाग्याछन्। रसुवावाट भाग्याका हाम्रा र यताबाट जान्या भास्कर
जगवल सुवेदार कंपनी समेंतको भेट स्याप्रुकमा भयेछ। षोला वार पार वैरिको र हाम्रो आड
वारावार भयेछ। गाउ स्याप्रुकका सह्यारलाई प्रवलराना भारत प्रवास रणकेसर पांडे श्रीनाथ
कंपनी केही उमरा समेत पुगेछन्। पुग्याका ७।८ दिन पछि तर्न्या भैकन वैरि आउँदा वारीबाट
हाम्राले बंदुकको सलक लाउदा तर्न पायेनछ हटेछ। २।३ दिनपछि माथिबाट बाकलो फौज
तऱ्याको देषता हाम्रा लस्करलाइ उकालो पर्दा स्याप्रुकमा गाउंवेसीमा वस्याका हाम्रा फौज
सल्लाहसित धुंचे सऱ्याछन्। उपर हाम्रो भारी फौज दामोदरपांडे समेत धुंचेमा बस्याका थिया।

भास्कर गजवल सुवेदार कंपनी समेत धुंचेको थापलो देउराली भन्याको जग्गामा हातमाला
पुगन्या गरी वस्याका रह्याछन् । वैरिले उसै जग्गामा कटक गर्न आउंदा २ पल्ट हाम्राले घर्काइ
तेस्रो पटक हाम्रा २ सुवेदार ४०।५० पऱ्याछन् । वैरिका दुइ सये अढाइ सये परी उ जगा अंवल
गरेछ । उसै जगालाइ धुंचेवाट गुहार गयाछन् । वीचैमा वैरिले हान्न आइलागेछ । येक पटक हाम्राले
हटायाछन् । फेरि उसको भारी फौज आउंदा हाम्रा २।४ उसका २।४ मानिस मरेछन् । हाम्रा
हटी धुंचेका भारादारसंग सामेल भै असजिलो जग्गा थियो र धुंचे छोडी धैवुङ आया वैरिले
पछेडा लिइ आउंदा कमाऱ्या गढछेउ लडाइ जोरियेछ । हाम्राले जित्याछन् । ४०।५० वैरी गोली
तरवारले माऱ्याछन् । सय डेढ सय भीरमा लडी मऱ्याछन् । रामच्यामा वैरीको लस्कर वसेछ ।
धैवुङमा हाम्रा लस्कर वस्याछन् । तेस्तै बीचमा धुंचेबाट वैरिले सलुक गर्न्या आसयेको चिठी
उसले पठाउँदा हामीले ईहाबाट उस चिठीको प्रतिउत्तर ली चिनिया पांडे र धुरीन काजीका
साथको ढेवा १ छेकी राष्याको चिनिया १ पठाआथ्यां । इनले हाम्रा भारादारलाइ धैवुङ भेटी
रामच्या गयाछन् । उजीर टुङथाङदेषि मनिको फौजको सर्दार हयेकुन र चुंटु ई २ सर्दारसंग
चिठी पत्र पुग्याछन् । चिठी पत्र उजीर टुङ्याङछेउ पठायाछन् । हाम्रा जान्यालाइ मुषजवानी
क्या अराया छन् भने हाम्रा लश्कर भला मानिसलाइ वस्न यो जगा सागुरो छ धैवुं छाडिदेउ
गोर्षाका भला मानिस कुराकहानी गर्नालाइ आउन् भनी राता कपरामा अक्षर लेषी उहि
कपरातिरमाआ उनी हाम्रा देउरालीको मुखतिर पनि यहि तीर अक्षर देखा तेरा लस्करलाइ
पनि देषा हामीले पनि हात थाम्यौ तिमिहरूका लस्करमा हाथ थाम भनी अह्राइ पठायेछ । सोही
तीर देउरालीका लस्करतिर पनि देषाइ दोहरै हाथ थामियो । धैवुंमा हामीलाइ जुझन पनि
असजिलो थियो । उसले पनि भनि पठाउदा भारादारले पनि छाडिदियेछन् । वेत्रावती सांध वारी हाम्रो लस्कर पारी भै रहे । ताहा छेकी राष्याका चिनिया र धुरीन काजी इतो काजीलाइ पठाइ देउ भनी उजीर टुङ्थाङ्ले धैवुंबाट चिठी
लेख्याको थियो र ई मानीसलाइ ली रणजीतपाडे भोटुपाडे नरसिंह टक्सारी

रामदास पन्थ बलभद्र षवासलाइ उजीर टुङथाङछेउ पठाञौ । सावनका ३१ दिन जाँदा शनि-
श्चरवार वेत्रावती तरी पारी वैरिका लस्करका मुहुडाका अम्बाहरूसँग रातीमा भेटघाट भयेछ ।
उसै रात यहा रह्याका चिनिया र धुरीन काजीलाइ उजीर टुङथाङ छेउ लैगयेछ । वीहायापछि
आदित्यवार हाम्रा यताबाट जाने भारदारहरूलाइ दोपहरमा उजीर टुङथाङसँग मुलाकाद भयेछ ।
इहाबाट लै गयाका चिठीको प्रतिउत्तर ली मंगलवारका दिन रणजीत पांडे र बलभद्र षवासलाइ
यता पठाइदीयाछन् । बुधवारका दिन यहा आइपुग्या चीठीमा वहुत तरहका कुरा लेष्याका
रह्याछन् । असली कुरा भन्या हामीलाइ धैवुङ सागुरो छ । नुवाकोट आई मुष्य राजा राजाका
काका नुवाकोट हामीछेउ आई मील सलुकका बन्दोवस्त गरौं राजा र राजाका काका नाआया
भलामानिस भारा आउन् कुराकहानी गरौं हामीलाइ नुवाकोट आउन पनि दयेनौ तिम्रा दुइ
मुषका लस्कर पनि झिक्तैनौ त हामी बलैसित आउँछौ भनी चिठीमा लेष्याको रहेछ । फेरि दोस्रो
चिठि लगत्तै यस बुझको आयो । पछिल्ला चिठीको जवाफ हामीले लेषीराख्याथ्यौं । वलैसंग वारी
आया हान्नु भनी हाम्रा लस्करलाइ हुकुं बक्सीराष्याको थियो । भदौको ८ दिन जांदा सोमवार-
का विहान वैरिका १००० नौ दस वेत्रावती तरी चोकदे दामोदर पांडे भयातिर १ मुष साम्ने
दुध्या थुम्कामा १ हाम्रो ठाना थियो । उता १ मुष मुलवाटो गेर्षुतिर कृतिमान सिंह भयापट्टि
१ मुष गरी आयेछ । तीनै मुषतिरबाट हटाइ काट्तै वेत्रावतीसम्म लपेट्दै लै गयाछन् ।
वेत्रावतीका सांगुमा मुष्य चिनिया भाराले आफनु भागन्या लस्करलाइ काट्न लाग्येछ । सांगुबाट बाटो
नपाउंदा वेत्रावतीमा धेर वग्याछन् । भीरबाट लडी मऱ्याका तरवार गोली काँडमा पऱ्याका वेत्रा-
वतीमा बग्याका सब जम्मा वैरिका हजार बाह्रसय पऱ्याछन् । हाम्रा तरवार गोली तीरले घाइत्या
१५।१६ भयाछन् । चिनिया जो भागी पारी गयामध्ये सरदार २ को नाक काटी दियाछन् र
देषता देषतै वेत्रावतीमा फाल हाली मऱ्याछन् । वाकी वैरीका लश्करमा भोटु पाडे नरसिंह टक्सारी

छदैछन् । त्यो कटक भया पनि घाको संला वैरिले छाडेको छैन । हामीले पनि छाडेको छैन ।
वादसाहलाइ चिठीपत्र सर सौगात ली पगरी बाधन्या भारा चीन जान्या भै
पठाउँदा डिगर्चा लुटी ल्यायाको तम्रा दर्वारमा आइपुग्याको केहि माल
पठाइदिनु । अघी केरुङमा भोटका काजी स्यामरपा लामा तिमीहेरुका भारा बसी
गऱ्याको
धर्मपत्र त्यो पनि पठाउ स्यामरपा लामा भन्या मरी गयो । उनका परिआर आलमाल
चाकर
पनी पठाइदेउ उनैका गुम्बामा राषिदिउला भनी वारंवार उजीर टुङ्थाङ्ले २।३
चिठी लेषदा
यो सवै थोक ली हरि वलभद्र षवासलाई वडा टुङथाङका साथ चीन जान विदा गरी
हिडाऔ ।
वादशाहलाई चिठीपत्र सर सौगात ली पगरी बाधन्या भारदारलाइ चीन पुगन्या
वादसाहको
दर्शन गर्न्या आफनो केही बताउन्या गरी पठाउछौ । पठायाका भारालाइ ली घाको
ठेगाना बाधी
आफनो लस्कर ली फिऱ्यो भन्या बढीयै भयो ।
उप्रान्त असौजका ५ दिन जांदा चीन वादसाहलाई अर्जी सौगात ली काजी देवदत्त
थापा सुवा
प्रतिमन राना जेठा बुढा नरसिंह टकसारीका छोरा जयन्त साही षर्दार विष्णुसंकरको
छोरो
वलभद्रलाई वडा टुङथाङका साथ चीन विदा गरी हिडायौं । असौजका १० दिन
जांदा उजीर
टुङथाङछेउ धैवुंमा भेट मुलाकात भयेछ । हाम्रा भारा काजीहरूलाइ देषी उजीर
टुङथाङ
बहुत षुसी भयाछन् । चिनियाको लस्करलाई पनि षानालाइ गाहो पऱ्याको रहेछ ।
दुषता
पनि बहुतै दुषता रह्याछन् । मर्दा पनि वहुतै मर्दा रह्याछन् । हाम्रा भारा पुग्यापछि
दुषन्या
विरन्या लस्कर षजना फिराउन लाग्याछन् । आफु टुङथाङ उठ्तासाथ हिड्न्या
लश्करमात्र
रह्याछन् । असौजका २४ दिन जांदा शनिवार ६ तिथिका दिन उजीर टुङथाङ
लस्करसमेत
धैवुङ छाडी हाम्रा काजीहरू साथ ली चीनलाइ फिऱ्या । इति संवत् १८४९ साल
कार्तिक वदि
७ रोज १ मुकाम कान्तिपुर राजधानी शुभं—

2.1.5 A Copy of a Report of the Sino-Nepalese War of 1793 and the Agreement Between China/Tibet and Nepal [= The Report of VS 1850 (1793 CE)]

A copy of this report was first published by Bābu Rāma Ācārya in the little known *Nepāla Sāṃskṛtika Pariṣad-Patrikā*, vol. 3.3 (Vaiśāka 2011, 1954 CE), 1–28. A manuscript of the report was microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project under the number E 2730/28. It was also copied in the Regmi Research Collection volume 30, 1–34. This document has newly been edited and for the first time translated into English by Manik Bajracharya, Rajan Khatiwoda, and Axel Michaels, and has been published by the project "Documents on the History of Religion and Law of Pre-modern Nepal"—a collaboration between the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the National Archives in Kathmandu, established in 2016. The text is openly accessible in the project's database *Documenta Nepalica*.[576]

The copy in RRC, volume 30 gives reference to the original *as lagata phāṭa, paṃ[jikā] naṃ 1, darāja naṃ 1*. Unfortunately, it does not specify to what office or ministry the records section (*lagata phāṭa*) belonged and where the original was archived. The version published online and here was written in Dhaibung and sent to "Captain Kirkpatrick sahib and Bahādura (Saukāta Jaṅga) on Monday, the tenth day of the bright half of Vaiśākha in the [Vikrama] year 1850 (5 May 1793 CE),"[577] i.e., shortly after end of the war. The East-India Company officer William Kirkpatrick (1754–1812) has published parts of it in his *Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul*.[578]

Translation (MB, RK, AM)

[1r]
[This is] a book, [written in] Dhaibung, detailing the war with the kingdom of Tibet and with China's Minister (*ujira*) and the treaty (*saluk*) [that took place] from the year [Vikrama Samvat] 1846 until the year 1849.

576 Accessed through https://nepalica.hadw-bw.de/nepal/editions/show/18746 on 16 December 2024.
577 Colophon of the Report of VS 1850.
578 Kirkpatrick 1811, 339–44 (= App. 1: "Extract from a memorial of the Court of Khatmāndū, relative to the Origin of the War with Tibet").

[2r]
As written below, [this is] a copy of a report sent to councillor sahibs of Kalkattā (Kolkata) through the hands of Captain Kirkpatrick sahib and Bahādura Saukāta Jaṅga [written] on [Monday], the tenth day of the bright half of Vaiśākha in the [Vikrama] year 1850.

[This is] a side note recording the previous war with the country of Tibet under the dominion of China and the Minister of China (i.e., Fuk'anggan)[579] that happened between the [Vikrama] years 1846 until 1849; [it also records the outcome of] the treaty between the Chinese Emperor and the [Gorkha] Mahārāja Raṇa Bahādura Sāha Bahādura Samśera Jaṅga.

[The currency problem (1788)]
In the past, there was a mutual friendship between the King of Nepāla and the King of Tibet (i.e., the Dalai Lama), and the unalloyed *mahindramallī* coin from Nepal was used as currency in Tibet.[580] However, during the reign of King Jayaprakāsa Malla of Nepāla [i.e., Kathmandu] and King Rañjīta Malla of Bhadgaon, [the silver] *mahindramallī* was mixed with copper, and this debased *mahindramallī* was used in Tibet for some time. When Nepāla was brought under the control of the Gorkha Mahārāja i.e., [Pṛthvīnārāyaṇa Śāha], the debased *mahindramallī* coin was made defunct.

After the frequent exchange of letters and establishing friendship with Tibet, the Gorkha Mahārāja sent his own people to [Tibet], stating: "Because the unalloyed *mahindramallī* coins of Nepāla and also the unalloyed *mahindramallī* coins of the Gorkha Mahārāja were current in Tibet, now unalloyed *mahindramallī* coins of the Gorkha Mahārāja are again minted. As it was not acceptable to use [simultaneously] the adulterated [coin], I will send [my] pure *mahindramallī*

579 This is the Emperor's "most renowned military commander" (Rose 1971, 54) and Minister Fuk'anggan (Fúkāng'ān, 1748–1796), also called by the title Tu Thang or Tu Thyang, Grand Secretary"; cp. Acharya 2018, 71: "Chiang Chung (in some history books his name is given as Fu Kang'an)"; Manandhar (2014, 90), "General Fu-K'ang-an (Thung Thang Chan Cun)." According to Rose (1971, 56–57), Fuk'anggan called himself "Chanchoo"). Howeverm Cāncun is another title meaning "general". According to B.R. Bajracharya (1992, 315), "Fu-Kang-an and Thung Thang Chan Chun are the names of the same person, nominated by the Emperor to command his army against Nepal." In this document (2.1.5), however, Cāncun is in most cases Ohūi, the Governor General of Sichuan.

580 The Nepalese coins were valid until 1792, when Fuk'anggan introduced Tibet's first own currency; see Dabringhaus (1994, 189).

coins as currency, and they must be used in the Tibetan territory." However, the people in Tibet sent [a message] to the Gorkha Mahārāja, saying: "There are still a lot of adulterated *mahindramallī* coins in the territory of Tibet. To eliminate them will cause [us] significant damage. [Therefore], we do not agree to use [only] the unalloyed *mahindramallī* as [our] currency. Please mint adulterated *mahindramallīs* wherever you can and send them to us."

[2v]
In this way, nine to ten years passed [with the exchange] of questions and answers. As stubbornness on both sides persisted, the Gorkha Mahārāja [Raṇa Bahādura Śāha], through his ambassador, sent a new directive (*savāla*) to the people of Tibet, saying: "If you insist that you cannot eliminate the adulterated *mahindramallī*, then it is appropriate to use the pure coins as pure ones, and the adulterated coins as adulterated ones. You should continue as it was done before, just as the traders used to take articles and goods to Tibet after purchasing them from Nepāla, and [likewise] used to bring them from Tibet to Nepāla." [However], the people of Tibet did not respond and used the pure *mahindramallī* alongside the debased one.[581] Furthermore, for three to four years, the merchants were unable to travel due to the closure of the road, rendering the Gorkha Mahārāja's mint useless.

Considering these circumstances, the Gorkha Mahārāja, recognising the Tibetans as his own friends, rightly proposed: "Send nobles (*bhalā mānisa*) from your own side to the border to resolve this matter. From the side of the Gorkha Mahārāja, [representatives] will then also come. If these arrangements are done, they will be beneficial for both sides. Otherwise, it will be bad for the traders on both sides." But the Tibetans disagreed and therefore did not send respected persons to the border for the arrangement. [Instead], they said to the Gorkha Mahārāja: "We have built a road through the plains of Tingri (text: Tigri), are establishing forts along the border, and have assembled 125,000 soldiers. If you want war, then come."

When the people of Tibet sent a clear answer rejecting the [proposed] arrangements and became ready for war, the Gorkha Mahārāja understood that Tibet is a territory of the Chinese Emperor. Realising that war was not appropriate, he wrote a petition (*arjī*) to the Chinese

581 The Tibetans used adulterated and unadulterated coins interchangeably, considering them to hold the same value, cp. Stiller 1975, 193.

Emperor explaining that the people of Tibet had rejected offers of negotiations and prepared for war. He [also] wrote letters to the *amban* (text: *ambā*) and police officer at Lhasa, and the honourable Lāmās of Ḍigarcā [Shigatse] and Sākya [monastery] and despatched his people to Lhasa.

[3r]
When the petition and letters reached Lhasa, the petition was not forwarded to the Chinese Emperor but was sent back to the Nepalese side. At that time, the Gorkha Mahārāja sent a response to the Tibetans, saying: "I have no intention of making war. However, if you are not satisfied with this [arrangement] and intend to make war, then it is also acceptable for me, and I will send my army."

[The war begins—negotiations with Tibet and China]
[The Gorkhali] then sent their army[582] to Tibet and fought a war that reached up to Sikārajaṅg [Shelkar], but due to difficult terrain the army was forced to stay there for a month, encircling Sikārajaṅg. During that month, the Tibetan cavalry and infantry, along with military equipment such as cannons, came to help the troop at Sikārajaṅg three to four times, but by the grace of God, the Gorkha Mahārāja's army defeated them.

Afterwards, the respected Tashi Lāmā (text: Ṭesu Lāmā)[583] and honourable Lāmās from Ḍigarcā and Sākya [Monastery] went to the army of the Gorkha Mahārāja and said: "We can arrange a mutual peace arrangement. Stop the war!" When the Gorkha Mahārāja's army chief spoke to the honorable Tashi Lāmā, he said: "We previously attempted to make peace with [you] Tibetans but since you did not agree to it, we have come this far [with our army]. If you want to negotiate peace, you should send the *kājī* of Lhasa (i.e., Doring Tenzin

582 According to Shakabpa (1967, 158), there were 5,000 troops, or according to Regmi (1975,1, 432), 5,800 troops, along with 3,000 porters. On the other hand, the Tibetan forces consisted of 18,000 troops as stated by Regmi (1975,1, 431); see also Theobald 2020.

583 The Panchen Lama (also known as Tashi Lama or Teshu Lama) or abbot of the Tashilhunpo Monastery, one of Tibet's most important Geluk monasteries, that was founded in Shigatse in 1447 by the First Dalai Lama, Gendun Drub (Tib. dGe 'dun Grub pa). By then, the sixth Panchen Lama had passed away, while the seventh Panchen Lama was a child. The brother of the previous Panchen Lama, Drungpa Hutuktu or the father of the seventh Panchen Lama might have acted in the name of Panchen.

Peljor, see below) and [other] respected men to Kyirong (text: Keruṃ) and Kuti [Nyalam]. Respected men from both sides can sit together and arrange a treaty." The *lāmās* agreed to this proposal, and therefore the army of the Gorkha Mahārāja withdrew from Sikārajaṅg and stationed at Kerung and Kuti, Jhuṃgā and Phalāvāṅ [Phula].

When the Chinese Emperor heard all these details, [his] army general (*sardāra*, Cāncun)[584] with two to four ambans and many soldiers[585] [were sent to and] arrived in Lhasa.

[3v]
Then the respected Dalai Lama (text: Potalā Lāmā) from Lhasa and the respected *lāmās* from Ḍigarcā and Sākya [Monastery] told the general: "We made a mistake, [but] now we are having negotiations with the Gorkha Mahārāja for a peace arrangement. We will send our own respected men to Kerung to arrange it. Until [this] arrangement is concluded, please remain here (in Lhasa)." The general replied: "Make the peace arrangement quickly!"

Then several reputable men, [including] Tashi Lāmā's father from Ḍigarcā, three other lāmās from Sākya [Monastery], the chief *kājī* from Lhasa [named] Dhurin, the treasurer Devuka, nine to ten students of the Potāla (text: Putālā) Lāmā, arrived in Kerung. The Gorkha Mahārāja sent Sāmarpā Lāmā,[586] Kaptān (Captain) Bam Bahādura Śāha (text: Bam Sāha), Mint-master (*ṭaksārī*) Harihara Upādhyā, Narasiṃ Sāhi and other four to five respected men to Kerung [to prepare the so-called 1789 treaty of Kerung].[587] By this time, Cāncun [Ohūi] had also arrived at Sikārajang.

584 Given the following episodes, there is a compelling possibility that the individual is Ohūi. Bajung was actually hidden behind the episode, while Cengde was commanding troops instead of negotiating (KRKJL, vol. 43, 57/10/21).

585 2,000 troops according to Shakabpa 1967, 158; cp. Regmi 1975,1, 433.

586 The title of Shamarpa Lāmā (var. Zhamarpa, Shyamarpa), which translates as "Holder of the Red Crown," designates the second oldest lineage of reincarnated lāmās within the Karma Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism. The Shamar Rinpoche holds a prominent position within this tradition. In the context of the present document, the tenth Shamarpa, Mipham Chodrub Gyatsho (Tib. zhwa dmar pa 10 Chos grub rGya mtsho, 1741/1742–1793), plays a significant role. He was not only a respected figure but also a stepbrother to the sixth Panchen Lama, Lobsang Palden Yeshe. Additionally, he served as the head of the Yangpachen Monastery, located near Lhasa.

587 For this treaty, see the Chinese version edited and translated by Komatsubara 2017; for the delegations, see ibid. and Sreedhar 1988, App. II, 262.

When the respected representatives from both sides met for negotiations, the *vakila* of the Gorkha Mahārāja stated: "When the previous arrangement was made, the Tibetans acted differently and talked arrogantly, and the army of the Gorkha Mahārāja reached up to here. Because the Tibetan roads were closed for eight to ten years, the mint [of the *mahendramalli*] and custom duties were also closed, and because of this stopping, in both affairs, hundreds of thousands of rupees in expenses and losses happened to the Gorkha Mahārāja. Make an arrangement for compensating the rupees!"

In these negotiations, the Tibetans replied: "In these quarrels between both sides, we cannot compensate the excessive expenses [as you have claimed]." Then the *vakila* of Gorkha Mahārāja replied to the *lāmās* of Sākya and Ḍigarcā as well as to Sāmarpā Lāmā: "Please, you three *lāmās*, be mediators and make an arrangement. If it is our fault, we will compensate whatever loss of rupees and expenses is due to Lhasa. If it is Lhasa's fault, you should compensate our loss."

[4r]
While these negotiations were taking place, the *lāmās* judged that it was Lhasa's fault. After the delegation from Lhasa acknowledged this during the discussions, they said: "We cannot compensate for this much in rupees, but if you would consider reducing the amount, we will certainly compensate."[588] Then the *vakila* of Gorkha Mahārāja replied: "If you cannot compensate for all our expenses and losses, then give us 5,000,000 rupees and we will restore the old border. If you cannot (provide this amount), you should leave to us the new territories south of Langur which are under our occupancy. If you cannot do even this, give us every year 100,000 rupees." The delegation from Lhasa did not agree to any of these proposals.

[A kind of truce and the first mission to Beijing]
[Afterwards] the Cāncun sent the two *ambans*, Mutājin and Ṭāṅgatājīn [Mukdengga and Zhang Zhi-yuan], together with soldiers to Kerung. When both *ambans* reached Kerung, they enquired about the arguments of both sides, looked into the matter, had many discussions, and concluded on the second day that it was the fault of the Lhasa

588 Shakabpa (1967, 161) mentions a secret addendum to the treaty of Kerung stating the Gorkhalis would reduce the amount of tribute after the first year if so requested by "a senior and responsible Tibetan official."

people. They criticised them [for this], and [in the end], the Lhasa people agreed to pay 50,000 rupees annually to the Gorkha Mahārāja.[589] The *ambans*, with the gods as witnesses, caused both sides to issue a religiously solemnised agreement *dharmapatra*. After the agreement was issued, these two *ambans*, representing the Cāncun, caused the two sides to come to peaceful terms and returned to Lhasa. Later, people from the *kājī* of Lhasa and the *lāmās* of Ḍigarcā and Sākya deposited 50,000 rupees of the first year in the treasury of the Gorkha Mahāraja, as written in the agreement, took a receipt of these rupees, and returned to Lhasa. The high-level functionaries (*bhāradāra*) of the Gorkha Mahārāja also left Kerung, Kuti, Jhuṅgā and Phalāk that had fallen into their hands. The junior *amban* took the *dharmapatra* paper and returned with the army to Nepāla.

[4v]
The Gorkha Mahārāja then (in the fall 1789) sent through this junior *amban* a petition (*arjī*), customary, ceremonial or honorary gifts (*najara*) and presents (*tohaphā*) to the Chinese Emperor. [This mission] to Beijing (text: Pecin) City [was accompanied by] the *vakilas* Hari[hara Upādhyāya]-1, Balabhadra Khavāsa-1, and another twenty to twenty-five people. After the *vakila* and the junior *amban* reached Ḍigarcā, the Cāncun also despatched one *amban* [Yan Ting-liang] from his side and sent him along with the *vakila* from the Gorkha Mahārāja to the audience of the Chinese Emperor.

After six months, this *vakila* [i.e., Harihara Upadhyaya] reached Beijing City, had audience with (*darśana*) the Emperor, stayed in the city for forty-five days, and was granted fifteen audiences by the Emperor.[590] After forty-five days, the *vakila* and the other people received from the Emperor ceremonial robes (*khilata*), who also granted the Gorkha Mahārāja the credentials of a title (*khitāpako paravānā*)[591] and many ceremonial robes. Then, the *vakila*, together with the *amban* and his own people, arrived in Nepāla after fourteen months.[592]

589 In the Treaty of Kerung of 18 July 1789, 50,001 rupees were mutually agreed; see *Itihāsaprakāśa, vol.* 1, 20 (above Part II, 2.1.4; Acharya 2018, 74; Komatsubara 2017, 184.

590 Chinese sources mention four audiences only, see Rose 1971, 45.

591 The Manchu title Erdeni Wang, "Brilliant King", or according to Haenisch (1838, 32), "Noble Prince" (German "Edel-Prinz"), or Sanskritised as *ratna-rāja*.

592 Here ends Kirkpatrick's version (Kirkpatrick 1811, App. A, 339–343).

[The Shamarpa conflict (1791)]
After three years, the high official (*mutasaddi*)[593] named Cin Devuka from Lhasa came to Nepāla and said to the Gorkha Mahārāja: "We cannot pay the compulsory payment of 50,000 rupees yearly. Please pardon us." The Gorkha Mahārāja replied: "I cannot recall the *dharmapatra* that was agreed upon by both sides. If you ask for forgiveness, first send the 100,000 rupees which are two years overdue. If you [afterwards] make a request, we will give you an answer." This high official did agree to pay the overdue of two years. This official was friendly from outside but deceitful from inside.

[5r]
He said: "All these disturbances were caused by Samārpa Lāmā. Take him by any means to the border, arrest him there and take him to Lhasa."

Having considered this, the high official Cin Devuka brought secretly the *bhāradāras* Dhurin Kāji (text: Dhurain Kāji), Aitu Kāji, *sardāra* Cyāgaṃlocan [lCang can], Chasak Lāmā [Jasaγ Lama sKal bzang bstan 'dzin] and so on together with troops from Lhasa to the border. This high official said to the Gorkha Mahārāja: "Sāmarpā Lāmā and his *bhāradāras* should also be sent to the border. Then also *kājī* and other *bhāradāras* will come from Lhasa. They will sit together and make an arrangement to manage the affair."

About one month earlier, Sāmarpā Lāma and the official Cin Devuka had gone to a place called Listi (near Sindhupalcok) in the territory of the Gorkha Mahārāja. Due to God's fate, the official died there. After his death, his younger brother came and stayed at that place. As asked by the [Chinese] official, the Gorkha Mahārāja sent *kaptāna* Bam Bahādura Śāha (text: Bam Sāha), *kāji* Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe, *ṭaksāri* Narsiṃ, *sardāra* Praval Rānā (text: Parval Rānā) and *subbā* Bhāratha to Kuti. From Lhasa, Dhurin Kājī, Aitu Kājī, *sardāra* Cyāgaṃlocan, Chasaka Lāmā, and other respected persons from Ḍigarcā [and] Sākya came to Kuti. After the *bhāradāras* from the Gorkha Mahārāja together with the Sāmarpā Lāmā from Listi reached Chhusang (text: Chusāṃ) area near Kuti, the *bhāradāras* from Lhasa said: "We have not been called here to manage the issue. These people have come here in order to deceitfully arrest Sāmarpā Lāmā."

593 Cp. Rezavi 1983.

Having understood the intention, the *bhāradāras* from the Gorkha Mahārāja kept Sāmarpā Lāmā with themselves and sent him, together with soldiers, two *subedāras* and one *subbā* to Kuti.

[5v]
After the *subedāras* reached that place, they encircled the *bhārādāras*, along with Dhurina Kājī, saying: "You did not come to make arrangements for managing the affair; [instead], you were determined to arrest Sāmarpā Lāmā." They arrested Dhurin Kājī, Aitu Kāji, *sardāra* Cyāgaṃlocan (text: *cyāmalocan*) and Chasaka Lāmā (text: *chāsaklāmā*) and sent them (as hostages), along with soldiers and the Sāmarpā Lāmā, to Nepāla.

[The battle begins again (1791)]
(On September 17, 1791) the Gorkha Mahārāja's *bhārādāras* marched together with the army[594] towards Ḍigarcā and started to fight with the army of the other side and thus reached Ḍigarcā.

Fifteen days earlier, the army of the Gorkha Mahārāja had not yet reached [Ḍigarcā]. Chyāṃju Lāmā, Ṭesu Lāmā and some Chinese individuals who lived in Ḍigarcā began their journey from there to Lhasa. For the protection of the monastery, [where] about 3,000 disciples [lived] along with the *lāmās*, it was written in the *dharmapatra*: "Within 3 years, only in the first year 50,000 rupees were received from Lhasa, while the rest of 100,000 rupees were not paid. As per the *dharmapatra*, the work was not done, and therefore, the *lāmās* were responsible for 500 *dhārnis* of gold." When it was explained to the head *lāmās* from the Ḍigarcā magistrate that they should also arrange 100,000 rupees due for two years according to the *dhartra*, they went from Ḍigarcā to Lhasa. The disciples said to the *bhārādāras* of the Gorkha Mahārāja: "To the best of our ability, we cannot give the gold [you demand from us]; nor can we pay the money. The monastery is here [for you]. Do it as you please." After this, the *bhārādāras* of the Gorkha Mahārāja made a halt at Ḍigarcā for 15 days, forcefully taking cash, property, and goods whatever valuables they could find before marching away from there (i.e., the Ḍigarcā Monastery).

[6r]
As they travelled, they engaged in battles and defeated the opposing army along the way. When the army of the Gorkha Mahārāja reached

594 Probably around 18,000 troops, see Rose 1971, 52.

Khartal in Langur Himal, it is alleged that 2,000 soldiers died due to [heavy] snow, smallpox and insufficient food supplies. The surviving soldiers of the Gorkha Mahārāja, along with the *bhāradāras*, stayed there for seven months before finally arriving in Nepāla.

Afterwards, in the month of Maṅgsira of the year [Vikrama] Saṃvat 1848 (1790 CE), Cāncun [Ohūi or Cengde] arrived in Lhasa, [sent] by his Majesty the Chinese Emperor. The Cāncun wrote a letter to [the Gorkha Mahārāja], saying: "During your management of the affairs you arrested Lhasa's *bhārādāras*, the Dhurin Kāji and others, and plundered valuables from Ḍigarcā." He sent [this letter] through *amban* Pān Cūyā [Fan Zhong][595] to the Gorkha Mahārāja in Nepāla. In response, the Gorkha Mahārāja wrote: "Respected persons from two sides had met in Kerung and willingly signed the *dharmapatra* according to which 50,000 rupees from Lhasa were given. Since the remaining 100,000 rupees were left unpaid, I had sent Sāmarpā Lāmā and my own *bhārādāras* to Kerung to arrange and enforce the payment of the rupees. [However], they did not pay attention to refunding the remaining rupees, and tried to deceitfully arrest Sāmarpā Lāmā and our *bhāradāras*. When our *bhāradāras* realised the deceitful intention of the Lhasa people, they arrested Dhurin Kājī and other *bhāradāras* from Lhasa and brought them here. The amount of two years was due following the agreement of both sides and with the guarantee of Teṣu Lāmā and others. Therefore, we had confiscated the valuables from Ḍigarcā. You are the big *saradāra* of the Chinese Emperor. Here is the *dharmapatra* that was signed by two sides. Decide carefully whether it is my mistake or the mistake of the Lhasa people."

[6v]

The Gorkha Mahārāja sent this letter together with his people and exceptional tributes through the *amban* of the Cāncun to Lhasa.[596] However, the Cāncun who is the commander of the (Chinese) troops did not take care of it, arrested the people of Gorkha Mahārāja and wished to march for battle toward this side with ammunitions and canons.

595 This is probably the ordinary soldier Fan Zhong 范忠.

596 This was later the reason Ohūi was punished for the concealment of this letter.

[The attack on Kuti and the retreat to Listi]
In Kuti, the police officer (*thānedāra*) Ibhākaksa[597] from the Gorkha Mahārāja's side used to stay with a small army. The armies of both sides engaged in a war, and upon hearing about it, the Gorkha Mahārāja sent additional troop for support. The area called Khāsā, beyond Listi, had been a territory of the Gorkha Mahārāja since early on. The army arrived there to provide assistance, and two stations [further] was Kuti. After the army's decision to proceed to Kuti, they were unable to do so due to a sudden snowfall. It seemed that as long as the snow continued, neither the Gorkha army nor the Chinese army could advance. Once the snowfall had ended, the Cāncun took about fifteen to sixteen thousand soldiers from the city of Chengdu (text: Cheṃdūka) in Sichuan (text: Sigāta) province. When they reached near Khāsā, both sides prepared for war.

Previously, the Chinese army had attempted to attack Kuti several times, but without success. At that time, they [attacked] with cannons and cannon balls,[598] killing the *subedāras* and soldiers and claiming ownership of the Kuti fort. During the war, the Gorkha Mahārāja's army was armed with *caupālā* and *toḍedāra* rifles.[599]

[7r]
At this time, the arsenal was set on fire, and since gunpowder was the [main] ammunition of the war, all the gunpowder, along with the soldiers of the Gorkha Mahārāja, got burned.[600] The war could not go on, and the Gorkha Mahārāja's army retreated and returned to the Listi area. Having heard that the Cāncun [Cengde or Ohūi] happened to have the intention to come to this (i.e., the Nepalese) side, an additional troop was sent from the Gorkha Mahārāja for support. They positioned themselves close to Listi area and prepared for battle. After some days, the Cāncun arrived at Listi with his army and cannons. After both sides clashed into war, the Chinese army was defeated by the Gorkha Mahārāja's army, which fought with the *toḍedāra* and *caupavāla* rifles. As the military leader of the cavalry, the *amban*, and soldiers of the Chinese army were killed, the Chinese army retreated and halted four

597 This name is spelled as Īmāvakta in RRC_0030_0001 and as Imāṃvaksa in Ācārya (VS 2011, 11).
598 Gunpoder in leather bags, see Letter of Raṇa Bahādura Śāha from VS 1949 (2.1.4).
599 Or muskets, see Boulnois 1989, 109 and Regmi 1975, 467.
600 Ohūi and Cengde buried a bomb underground to blast the Gorkhalis.

kośas further. They could not intend to fight a war at Listi for a second time. The Gorkha Mahārāja also thought it was not right to pursue them where the Chinese Emperor's army was going. While the Chinese army was [moving] towards Listi, they faced heavy trouble due to the hot season and lack of sufficient portions of food-grains. They were helpless. Many Chinese soldiers died as the old portions of food-grains were not enough. Not even one of the monkeys living around Listi survived because the Chinese army killed and ate them all.[601]

[7v]
[Fuk'anggan's troops intervenes in the fighting]
[Then] the Gorkha Mahārāja pondered, "Our fight is with the people of Lhasa, but not with the Chinese Emperor. Some of the high-ranking generals sent by the Chinese Emperor have arrived at Lhasa, who certainly would understand the *dharmapatra* issued upon consent from both sides. They will then make [necessary] arrangements."[602] Meanwhile the big vazir (text: *ujīra*) Tuṃṭhvāṅg [Fuk'anggan],[603] *bhīkak* [and] *sardāra*, Cundūn Nājīn, along with enormous troops[604] and and the banner of the Chinese Emperor, came to Lhasa and wrote in a letter sent to the Gorkha Mahārāja[605]: "You arrested the *bhāradāras* along with Dhurin Kājī and looted commodities in Ḍigarcā. When the complaint of your big crime reached the Chinese Emperor, he sent me, the great Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg, with a big army to kill and destroy you root and branch so that even the name of Nepāla would not remain. Thus, I have come here. You have no idea of the sovereign power of China. However, a dishonest person [Sāmarpā Lāmā] from Bhoṭ (Tibet) approached you and is causing all this trouble. If you imprison him and send to me the noblemen of Lhasa together with Dhurin Kājī, who were arrested by you, accompanied by one of your senior *kājīs*, I will excuse your grave offences. Then I will also give you gold weighing as much as this troublesome Lāmā."

In response, the Gorkha Mahārāja wrote a letter to Minister Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg, stating: "We will release the noblemen, including Dhurin Kājī, who were arrested [by us] and give up your territories that we

601 Cp. Acharya 2018, 89.
602 = WZTZ 1982, 373. It was brought back by Fan Zhong.
603 He is identical with Fuk'anggan.
604 According to Wei Yuan 70,000 (Rana 1909, 6; Levi 1905, vol. 2, 181) or 125,000 soldiers (see above, 2v; Kirkpatrick 1811, 340).
605 = WZTZ 1982, 378.

seized. It is [however] not the *dharma* for a king to arrest and send back Samārpa Lāmā who came to us to seek refuge."

[8r]
Upon receiving this [letter], Minister Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg wrote in clear terms to the Gorkha Mahārāja: "If you arrest and send Samārpa Lāmā, our mutual friendship will continue. Otherwise, it will definitely come to an end. Do not write to me anymore from now on!"

[The battle for Kukuraghāṭa and Kerung, retreat to Rasuvā]
The following day, Minister Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg and his troops marched to the fort of Kukuraghāṭa [Jiamu/Ca-mu] via Jhuṅgā [Dzongka], where they had a fight with the local police officer (*thānedāra*) of the Gorkha Mahārāja and laid siege to the fort. [In July 1792][606] he proceeded to Kerung. In Kerung, too, a *thānedāra* of the Gorkha Mahārāja and his troops were on high alert within the fort.

Sardāra Śatrubhañjana Malla[607] with his troops marched from Kerung to Kukuraghāṭa for support. [However,] on their way at a location called Pāṅgusi, the troops from both sides engaged in a heavy fight. As the Chinese troops was larger than the Gorkha Mahārāja's troops, two *subedāras* and up to two hundred soldiers were killed.

Satrubhanjan Malla killed the *saradāras* of the Chinese army and two to four *ambans* using his sword but also sustained with two to four wounds himself. He then left [the location], reached Kerung, and joined *subbā* Phuvara who was stationed at the fort there. The Chinese troops surrounded the Kerung fort and a large-scale battle between both sides ensued for six to seven days. Despite this, the head of the Gorkha Mahāraja's fort did not surrender.

[8v]
In the middle of the night, the Chinese troops set fire to the ammunition dump (*bārudakhānā*), and the entire ammunition, including gunpowder, burnt down. As the Gorkha Mahārāja's troops was smaller and the one of the Chinese was enormous, the latter could surround the fort from three directions. Despite this, the *thānedāra* of the Gorkha Mahārāja and his small remaining soldiers came out of the fort and fought back. Both sides suffered causalities. Eventually, the remaining

606 Regmi 1975/1, 444.
607 The commander of the troops at Kerung (Stiller 1975, 206).

subbā, *saradāra* and soldiers of the Gorkha Mahārāja fled from the fort and arrived at a location called Rasuvā, which was previously under the control of the Gorkha Mahārāja.

On the following day, the Chinese troops pursued them and caught up with them at a bridge crossing the Betrāvatī river at Rasuvā, where a three-day battle ensued. When the Chinese troops were unable to defeat them, they constructed a new [provisional] bridge and launched a surprise attack on the troops of the Gorkha Mahārāja. The *saradāra* and *subbās* of the Gorkha Mahārāja were unable to resist and fled from Rasuvā. The Chinese troops then proceeded to Ṭimure [Se-dam/Sedang].

[Retreat to Syāphru, Dhunche, Deurālī and Ramche, Chinese victories of battles]
After receiving news of an upcoming major battle at the fort of Kerung, the troops sent for support by the Gorkha Mahārāja arrived at a place called Syāphru. The Chinese troops also left Ṭimure and both troops confronted each other at Syāphru. The battle using canons and rifles continued for three days and nights. Since the Chinese army was unable to advance through the main route, they took an alternative route near the snowy mountains and suddenly arrived in front of the troops of the Gorkha Mahārāja's troops, who were unable to withstand this attack and [were forced] to flee.

[9r]
[Meanwhile] the troops sent earlier by the Gorkha Mahārāja for support, consisting of *kājī* Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe, *saradāra* Paravala Rānā[608], and *saradāra* Bhāratha [Khavāsa]…, had reached Dhunche (text: Dhuṃce) and positioned themselves there. The Chinese troops arrived there too, and a fight ensued with canons, rifles, swords, and arrows for three days and nights. The Gorkha Mahārāja's troops continued fighting but could not defeat the Chinese. The troops of the Gorkha Mahārāj including *subedāra* Jagaval, *subedāra* Bhāskara Ḍhaleta and soldiers had already positioned for battle near Syāphru in a place called Deurālī, close to the snowy hill. The Chinese troops arrived there as well and encircled the place from all four direcions. However, the *subedāra* and others from the Gorkha Mahārāja attacked the Chinese forces from three

608 Also spelt Prabal Rānā or Prabhal Rānā, see Regmi 1975, 464 and Rose 1971, 61.

directions. Then the Chinese troops consting of 10,000–12,000 soldiers[609] came from the fourth side, killed both *subedāras* and soldiers of the Gorkha Mahārāja and seized the place. On the Chinese side, one *amban* was killed. The place Deurālī is on the top of the hill. When the Chinese troops stationed there, the troops of the Gorkha Mahārāja stationed in Dhunche below the hill. Since the troops of Gorkha Mahārāja was in the lowland, they realised that fighting there was not a great idea. Therefore, they left Dhunche and stationed at Kabhre[610] (text: Kābharyā).

[Retreat to Dhaibuṃ and return of hostages]
After this, the Gorkha Mahārāja understood that the Chinese army is great in number and, therefore, dispersed a large army consisting of *cautariyā* Śrīkṛṣṇa (text: Śrīkṛsna) Sāha, *kājī* Bam Sāha, *kājī* Abhimāna Siṃ, *kājī* Dhokal Siṃ, *saradāra* Satrusāla, and [other] *subedāras* with war ammunition such as canons, arrows, bows, etc. They all reached a place called Dhaibuṃ.

[9v]
Afterwards, Chinese troops arrived in Kabhre, and both sides confronted each other, but in the end, the Chinese troops fled from there and stationed themselves at a place called Rāmacyā [Ramche] that lies between Dhunche and Kabhre. While fleeing, several Chinese soldiers fell from the hill and died.

On that occasion, the Gorkha Mahārāja returned the previously captured Chinese soldiers [Wang Gang] along with a messenger who carried a letter written to Ṭuṃṭhvāṅg [16 July 1792 (QL 57/5/28) = 2.2.2a]. Once the letter reached Bhīkaṃ, the commander of the Chinese army, he inquired about the well-being of the Gorkha Mahārāja and made the following request "Rāmacyā is a very small place, and it is not suitable for the army to be stationed there. Dhaibuṃ is a much larger place. Therefore, out of friendship, make an arrangement to let my troops reach the other side of Betrāvatī river and be stationed there. Then, we, the head of the troops, ministers and *saradāras* will gather in Dhaibuṃ and make negotiations. Until the negotiations are completed, soldiers

609 According to Rose (1971, 59), the number of Chinese troops had risen to 13,000, while the Tibetan army had reached 7,000.

610 Kabhre is a common name in Nepal. However, it was impossible to locate such a place name near Dunche. Acharya VS 2011, 15 reads this as *kāmryā* and identifies the place with present day Kamāryāgaḍha fort.

from both sides should not fire and the river shall not be crossed by them."[611] This was the message conveyed [in the letter] to the Gorkha Mahārāja.

When the Gorkha Mahārāja learned the details of *saradāra* Bhīkaṃ's letter, he issued the following order to his noblemen: "Leave Dhaibuṃ with troops, cross the Betrāvatī river, and make fortifications along the main route[612] in Lacābuk, Cugdi, Dudhyā hills, Tuinthalā, and Nuvakot." The noblemen carried out the Gorkha Mahārāja's order. Then, *saradāras* and the head of the Chinese troops and his soldiers came to Dhaibuṃ/Kabhre[613] with their war ammunition and huge canons and made fortifications there.

[10r]
On that occasion, the Gorkha Mahārāja returned *kājī* Dhurin, Aitu, and three other Chinese soldiers [Feng Da-cheng, Hu Ting-hai, and Lu Xian-lin], who were earlier captured, to the Chinese Minister. They were accompanied by the *kājīs* Raṃjit Pā̃ḍe, Bhoṭu Pā̃ḍe, and the *ṭaksārī* Narasiṃ [on 27 July 1792 (QL 57/6/9)]. These three noblemen of the Gorkha Mahārāja reached there, where the Chinese Minister asked them whether the news of Sāmarpā's death he heard was true or false. The *kājīs* and the *ṭaksarī* replied: "Your people, *kājī* Dhurin etc. have seen it with their own eyes. Please ask them." After three days, the Chinese Minister sent a letter to the Gorkha Mahārāja, stating [13 August 1792 (QL 57/6/26) from Ramche]: "Nuvakot will be a suitable place for us, so empty it. I will come to Nuvakot with my troops to be stationed there. The venerable Mahārāja and venerable Sāheba (Bahadur Shah) should come to Nuvakot to meet me there. At that occasion, we will ensure [safety], make necessary arrangements, and I will leave Nuvakot and go to my own country with my big troops." This much was written in the letter to the Gorkha Mahārāja.[614]

When sending the letter through *kājī* Raṃjita Pā̃ḍe, [the minister] told him: "Please inquire about this matter within three days and return. If not, I will go to Nuvakot with my troops forcefully." *Kājī*

611 It probably refers to the letter on 2 August 1792 (QL 57/6/15) = 2.2.2b, while the content shows that the author might have also quoted some passages from the letter on 13 August 1792 (QL 57/6/26) from Ramche.

612 See Kirkpatrick 1811, 302–8 for a description of this route.

613 Acharya VS 2011, 15 reads this as *kāmryā*.

614 This and the following letter have been edited in Regmi 1975, App. V (513–19).

Raṃjita Pāḍe then reported all of this to the Gorkha Mahārāja. The Gorkha Mahārāja understood from the details of the Minister's letter that he [the Chinese Emperor] had no intention of making a treaty.[615] As a result, the frontiers and houses were fortified even more. He then wrote a letter to Navāb Governor General Lord Aral Kāranvānsa (Earl Cornwallis), the head of the [British] army, seeking assistance assuming that the Company Government was a true friend, and sent it to Kolkatta.

[10v]
The Gorkha Mahārāja also responded to the [Chinese] Minister's letter, stating: "If you agree to make friendship, you may be stationed at Dhaibuṃ. Nuvakot belongs to Nepal. We cannot empty the place and allow you to be stationed there." The Minister became annoyed by this point in the letter of the Gorkha Mahārāja and did not reply. Instead, he started to construct a second bridge across the Betrāvatī River to reach Nuvakot with his troops.

[Confrontation and peace offer at Betrāvatī, impending defeat of the Gorkhalis and peace of dictation]
Upon hearing this news, the Gorkha Mahārāja issued an order (*hukuma*) to his *kājīs* and *bhāradāras*: "Attack them and push them back! Do not cross the river where the Minister is positioned with the army of the Emperor."

On the second day, the Minister himself emerged from his tent, took out his binoculars, and deployed the same amban and military troops that had defeated the Gorkhali troops at Deurālī (text: Devarāli), along with two cannons, across the Betrāvatī bridge. The troops then crossed the river and divided into two groups. One group attacked the fort at Caphādī to take it over, while the other marched towards Dudhīya (text: Dudhyā) mountain.

On this very day, the 8th of the dark fortnight of Bhādra, after two *praharas* had passed, the *sardāras* and *bharādāras* of the Gorkha Mahārāja's army had strengthened their position. Both armies clashed in the middle of the way, exchanging gunfire and later using swords.

615 This was articulated in the letter 13 August 1792 (QL 57/6/26) from Ramche; see Part II, 2.2.2c.

[11r]
The Gorkha Mahārāja's troops had the advantage of higher ground, whereas the Chinese troops were on a lower ground. Therefore, the Chinese troops fled, being unable to withstand the fight. Several Chinese soldiers were killed, while only a few of the Gorkha Mahārāja's soldiers lost their lives. Some Chinese troops panicked, fell from the mountain and died, while others jumped into the Betrāvatī river and drowned.

After realising that his troops had been defeated and had fled, the Minister watched them through his binoculars and issued the following order: "Establish a strong checkpoint at the Betrāvatī bridge and do not allow any fleeing soldier who has crossed the Betrāvatī river to pass. Chop off the nose of anyone who tries to cross, and send additional troops." The Minister himself came to this side of the bridge with thirteen cannons. At that time, the Gorkha Mahārāja's troops at the checkpoint pushed back the Chinese troops to Betrāvatī. Since the Chinese troops were in a hurry, they were unable to build the new bridge properly. In their rush to cross the bridge, many Chinese soldiers drowned in the Betrāvatī from the broken bridge. The remaining soldiers threw two cannons into the river out of fear of the Gorkha Mahārāja's troops, and many of them jumped into the river and died. When the Minister witnessed the defeat of his troops, he opened the way over the old bridge. One of his *sardāra-amban* [Zhe-sen-bao, later died in Syaphrū] broke his leg while fleeing, and the remaining soldiers carried him on their back and joined the Minister's troops. However, he died three days later. The battle between the Gorkha Mahārāja's troops and the Chinese troops guarding the old bridge was fought using guns. There was a small hill near the bridge, and the Chinese Minister took the cannon unit to this hill and fired at the Gorkha Mahārāja's troops.

[11v]
As the Chinese army could not construct a defense out of wood and stone, they made a wall using the dead bodies of their own [troops] who had died painfully on the spot. The fight continued until dark, and both sides returned to their camps. The Minister also went back to his sleeping tent.

On the following day, the Minister summoned Bhoṭu Pā̃ḍe and *ṭaksāri* Narasiṃ and spoke to them, saying: "When both our troops engage in battle, sometimes we win, and sometimes we are defeated. In

such a situation no one should feel discouraged. Previously, I had sent an order to the Gorkha Mahārāja stating that we would settle the matter upon arriving in Nuvakot. I had also ordered my own troops to stay at this side of the bridge. Despite this, we suffered losses (lit. 'my troops died'). Let us consider this a [tragic] play, which I myself watched. The people and the poor population must now feel extremely terrified. The Gorkha Mahārāja and the British Resident need not worry about abandoning Nuvakot as I have decided to abandon my intention of marching to Nuvakot. [Therefore], it is not necessary for the venerable Mahārāja and venerable *saheba* [Bahadur Shah] to come to Nuvakot. Now I will write a few points to the venerable Mahārāja to please him. You, too, write to him to accept to what I will write. If we can agree on the terms, I will withdraw with my troops from this realm to my own realm, report to the Chinese Emperor, persuade him, and arrange for many gifts (*khillat*) to be sent to the venerable Gorkha Mahārāja and the venerable *saheba*."

[12r]
Having spoken to [Bhoṭu] Pā̃ḍe and *taksāri* [Narsiṃ], he [the Minister] said the following: "If Sāmarpā were alive I would have taken him. If he has died by the Almighty's will, send his remains, valuables, servants and the following items seized from the Gorkha Mahārāja [to the Emperor] in order to show that I successfully recovered valuables seized and brought from Ḍigarcā, along with some bolts of Chinese silk, and golden vessels that were looted from Ḍigarcā including the best presents [i.e., the golden plates] granted by the Chinese Emperor to Tasilemuṃ Lāmā of Ḍigarcā. Also send the *dharmapatra* that was signed in Kerung because of the fraud by Sāmarpā. We will also return the document from Lhasa and tear up both documents. Then there will be no hostility between our two sides. You should write an *arjī* to the Chinese Emperor and send an exceptional tribute (*tohaphā*) along with one of the four *kājīs*. As soon as the *kājī* arrives with the listed commodities and the *arjī*, I will withdraw with my troops from this region and return to my own realm. If, however, you do not comply with my proposal, I will not withdraw with my troops, but instead I will definitely march into the Nepāla [Valley]. In this matter, it would be very prudent if the venerable Mahārāja and the venerable *sāheba* sit down with their *kājīs* and negotiate a treaty with the Chinese Emperor. Act in accordance with my instructions and send the aforementioned letters as soon as possible. If it happens that you think it is wise to engage in

a battle, also reply quickly. I will then prepare for war." This letter was sent by the Chinese Minister to the Gorkha Mahārāja.

[12v]
After reading the particulars of the letter, the Gorkha Mahārāja consulted with his *kājīs* and *bhāradāras*. At that occasion, the Chinese troops accompanying the Minister were afflicted with a fever, which caused many of them to die. The lack of sufficient food supplies aggravated the situation, as the Chinese troops could not store food for a long time. Thus, the Chinese troops suffered in many ways. The Chinese Minister repeatedly reminded the Gorkha Mahārāja to send a reply to his letter.

In the meantime, a letter arrived from the Lord (Lāṭha) Sāheba (i.e., Governor General) in Calcutta in reply to the Gorkha Mahārāja's letter, stating the following: "You should do whatever is good to maintain friendship with the Chinese Emperor, this will make things better. To strengthen the friendship between both sides, I will despatch Captain Valiyam Kirikpātarik (William Kirkpatrick) Sāheba Bahādura." After considering what the Minister and the Lord Sahāba had written, the Gorkha Mahārāja concluded that it would be best to show respect to the Chinese Emperor and worst to be at enmity with him.

[13r]
After making necessary arrangements, the Gorkha Mahārāja sent *kājī* Devadatta Thāpā, *subbā* Pratiman Rānā and Jit [Jayanta] Sāhi, *mutasaddi* Balabhadra and fifty persons together with an *arjī* and the following items to the City of China (i.e., Beijing): the bones of Sāmarpā Lāmā, his servants, his commodities and valuables; and some silver and bolts of Chinese silk presented to Ṭasilemuṃ Lāmā of Ḍigarcā by the Chinese Emperor and then seized [by the Gorkha Mahārāja], and extraordinary gifts meant for the Chinese Emperor.[616]

616 See V.K. Manandhar 2001 for a description of this first of the subsequent quinquennial missions and the partly edition of the *arjī* and the letter of Devadatta Thāpā. It also contains two lists of the presents of the 1795 mission. From the Chinese perspective, the *arjī* combines a series of letters in September and October preserved in the Chinese sources.

[The peace arrangement of Betrāvatī, fatigue of the troops or tainted victory?]
The *Kājī* went with the commodities and met the Minister, while the Gorkha Mahārāja also sent [many] hospitality gifts to the Minister [23 September 1792 (QL 57/8/8)]. After negotiations, both parties agreed on the following terms:[617]

- after five years a *vakila* of the Gorkha Mahārāja, will go with an *arjī* and tributes (*saugāta*) to the Chinese Emperor, pay *darśana* and report back with the tidings.
- The Gorkha Mahārāja and the king of Lhasa (i.e., the Dalai Lama) would maintain their friendship and not fight again. Having come to an agreement (*akrāra*), both parties would keep their own territories as before.
- It was [further] decided that, in transactions in Bhoṭ, the unalloyed *mahindramallī* of the Gorkha Mahārāja would be accepted as unalloyed coins, and the adultered coins would be given the value of adultered coins.
- If any enemy attempted to attack the troops of the Gorkha Mahārāja, this should be reported to the Chinese Emperor so that he could send an army and ammunition for help.

Both parties agreed to this agreement.

The Minister, along with his troops and the *kājī* and others of the Gorkha Mahārāja, left Dhaibuṃ and returned to his realm. Then the aforementioned *bhāradāras*, *ṭaksārī* and *pā̃ḍe* of the Gorkha Mahārāja accompanied the Minister on a four-day walk to Kerung.

[13v]
There, the Minister wrote a letter to the Gorkha Mahārāja, handed over extraordinary gifts [meant for the Gorkha Mahārāja] to the *bhāradāras*, and awarded them with medals. He also took care of the injured soldiers and allowed them to return to Nepāla.

Following the Minister's orders, the *bhāradāras* stationed in Kerung for twenty-two days [in October 1792], sent the injured Chinese soldiers and other commodities, such as tents, to the north (i.e., China), and then they themselves headed towards Nepāla from Kerung. After that, Bhoṭu Pā̃ḍe and *ṭakasārī* Narsiṃ presented the letter and the gifts

617 Cp. *Itihāsa-Prakāśa* VS 2012, vol. 1, 121 and Jung 1974 for other summaries of the "Treaty".

given by the Minister to the Gorkha Mahārāja, and they also conveyed to him all the details proposed by the Minister.

Cāncun [Cengde], head of the troops, stationed in Listi, wrote a letter to the Gorkha Mahārāja out of great affection as he had previously done.[618] In reply, the Gorkha Mahārāja sent [materials] for a feast and gifts to the Cāncun. After receiving the letter and gifts, the Cāncun became very happy and sent a letter and gifts back to the Gorkha Mahārāja.

On the 2nd day of the bright fortnight of Kārttika, he (the Cāncun and his troops) left the place called Listi and returned to his own realm. In the meantime, the Minister had reached the plateau of Ṭingri passing Kerung and Jhuṃgā [Dzongka]. Then Can Cūn, the head of the troops, left this site and met the earlier group at Ṭingri (text: Ṭigari) and left for the other side (i.e., China).

[Subjugation of Tibet]
Once the Minister and the head[619] of the troops reached Lhasa, they left there the three *lāmās* of Ḍigarcā, Sāṃkhyā and Lhasa. Then, they arrested the noblemen of Bhoṭ and their companions, the staff etc. and Dhyāmju Kāji, Dhuren Kāji and Aitu Kāji, the two brothers of the (Dalai) Lama of Lhasa,[620] together with Ṭāvā Kāji.

[14r]
They got angry with the previous *ṭhānedāra* and *amban* [Bootai and Yamantai] of Lhasa and fettered them all stating: "It was reasonable that you had to fight when the Gorkha Mahārāja's troops came to Ḍigarcā. You persuaded Teṣu Lāmā, caused him to flee from Ḍigarcā and brought him to Lhasa." In place of these two *ambans*, they placed other two *ambans* and about five hundred soldiers as *thānedāra* in Lhasa. Having done so they departed from Lhasa to the other side in the month of Phālguna.

Due to the hot season and strong winds blowing across Lhasa and the surrounding areas, many Chinese soldiers of the Cāncun were injured in the territories of Gorkha Mahārāja, [including] Syāphru,

618 WZTZ 1982, 404.
619 Since the Minister and the head of the troops are the same individual, namely Cāncun, the use of the plural form in the following context is inappropriate and creates confusion.
620 Dalai's brothers were arrested and sent to Peking earlier, cp. Komatsubara 2006.

Dhaibuṃ, and Ṭimure, and died at Nyārūm. Forced labourers (*begāri*) [Mon. *ulaga*, Tib. *'u lag*] from the Bhoṭ realm were brought in to bury the corpses. Since they could not find enough wood [in the forests] to burn the corpses they took it from the houses. Many people in Bhoṭ also died from smallpox, leading to the destruction of the Bhoṭ realm. As a result, the two-way trading route was closed.

While the *kājī* of the King (i.e., the Gorkha Mahārāja) and the (Dalai) Lama of Bhoṭ previously held some political authority, they (the Tibetans) are now considered subjects (*raiyata*) of China. In Bhoṭ, Chinese order is followed for any task. This report accurately reflects [the events] occurred and has been written [to ensure that].

Edition (MB, PB, AM)

[1r]
१८४६ सालदेषि १८४९ साल तक् भोट् मु-
लुक्सँग र चिनका उजिरसँग लडाई भै स-
लुक् भयाको विहोराको किताप् धैवुंको १
[2r]
१
सम्वत् १८५० साल मिति वैसाष सुदि १० रोज का दिन् कपतान् किरिक पात-
रिक् साहेव वाहादुर सौकात जङ्गको मार्फत् कलकत्ताका कौसलीया साहे[वान्]हरु-
का हजुरमा रवाना गर्‍याको तल लेषिया वमोजिम्को कैफियत्को नकल् । --
सम्वत् १८४६ सालदेषि सम्वत् १८४९ तक् चिनको इलाका भोट् मुलुकसंग र चि-
नका उजिरसंग पहिले लडाइ भै वाहापछि फेरि चिनका वादसाहका र महाराजा रण
वाहादुर साह वाहादुर सम्सेर जङ्गको सलुक् भयाको मोफ्सल् कैफियेत् । --
अघि नेपालका राजाको र भोट्का राजाको २ तर्फको दोस्ति थियो । नेपालको निषरा म-
हिन्द्र मल्लिको ट्क्को चलन् भोटमा थियो ।वाहा पछि केहि दिन्सम्म नेपालका राजा
जयप्रकास मल्ल र भादगाउका राजा रंजीत् मल्लका पालामा महिन्द्रमलीमा तावा
मिलाइ षोटो महिन्द्रमलीको टक् मारि भोट्मा चलायाको थिया । जव नेपाल गोर्षा म-
हाराजको अधिन् भयो षोटो महिन्द्रमलिको टक् उडाइ भोट्संग चिठिपत्रको आवत्जा-
वत् र दोस्ति गरि अघि पनि नेपाल्या राजाको निषरा महिन्द्रमलिको चलन् भोट्मा थि-
यो गोर्षा माहाराजको पनी निषरा महिन्द्रमलिको चलन् चल्दथ्यो । अव पनि गोर्षा
माहा-
राजको निषरा महिन्द्रमलीको टक् भयाको छ षोटो चलन चलाउनु वढिया छैन् गोर्षा म-
हाराजवाट नीषरा टक्को महिन्द्रमलि पठाइदिंछु भोट् मुलुकमा चलाइदिनु भनि आ-
फ्नु मानिस् पठाउदा भोट्का मानिस्हरुले भोट्को मुलुकमा षोटो महिन्द्रमलि धेर छन् ।
त्यो षारिज गर्नामा ठुलो नोक्सान हुंछ निषरा महिन्द्रमलि चलाउनाको हामिलाई
कवोल

[2v]
२
छैन् जाहावाट पनि षोटो महिन्द्रमलिको टक् मारि पठाइदिनु भनि गोर्षाको माहाराज-
लाइ [भनि]पठाया । यस्तै सवालजवाफ्मा ९।१० वर्ष वित्यो । २ तर्फका जिद्दिले कुरो
[लं]भार
हुन जादा षोटो महिन्द्रमलिलाई षारिज गर्न सक्दैनौ भन्छौ ता नि[ष]रालाई निषरा
षोटो
महिन्द्रमलिलाई षोटो गरि चलाउनु मुनासिव छ । जस्तो अघिदेषि नेपालवाट सौदा
गरि[621]
वेपारिहरुले जिनिस र मालहरु भोट्मा लैजान्थ्या भोट्बाट नेपाल्मा ल्याउदथ्या
अैल्हे प-
नी सोहि अघिका दस्तुर माफिक् काम गर्नु भंन्या अर्को सवाल् गोर्षा माहाराजका
वकील्ले भो-
ट्का मानिस्हरु छैउ गरि पठाउदा भोट्का मानीस्हरुले येस्कुराको कवुल् नगरिकन नि-
षरा महिन्द्रमलिलाई षोटाको वरावर भोट्मा चलाया । ३।४ वर्षसंम्म २ तर्फका
माहाजन्-
हरूका आउन्या जान्या वाटो पनि वन्ध गर्नाले गोर्षामाहाराजको टक् माकुफ् भयो ।
यस्तो
हुदा पनि गोर्षा माहाराजले भोट्याालाई आफ्नु दोस्त जानी यस्कुराको वन्दोवस्तलाई
आफ्ना तर्फको भला मानीस्हरु सिवानामा पठाईदेउ गोर्षा माहाराजका तर्फवाटपनी
आउन्या छन् यो वन्दोवस्त हुनाले २ तर्फलाई वढिया छन् तर २ तरफ्का वेपारिहरु षरा-
व हुन्या छन् भनी जोग्यसित भोट्का मानिस्लाई भनि पठाउदा पनी भोट्याहरुले यस्कु-
रामा चित्त नलाई वन्दोवस्त निमित्त भला मानिस्हरु सिवानामा पठाई दियेनन् ।
तिगरिको
मैदान्मा बाटो वनाइ सक्याको छु २ सिवानाका विचमा किल्ला पनि तयार गर्दछु १
२५०००
फोज पनि ज्मा गर्याँ लडाईको मन्सुवा छ भन्या आउ भनि भोट्याहरुले गोर्षाका
महाराज-
लाइ भनि पठाया । जव भोट्याहरुले वन्दोवस्त नगरि साफ् जवाप् गरि लडाञी
गर्नामा तया-
र भया तव गोर्षा माहाराजले भोट् भन्याको चिन् वादसाहको अम्वल हो भंन्या
वुझी लडा-
इ गर्नाको मुनासिव नजानि भोट्याहरुले वन्दोवस्त गर्नाको कवोल् नगरि लडाई गर्न त-
यार भयाको वेहोराको अर्जि चिन् वादसाहका हजूरमा र ल्हासाका अम्वा ठानादार
डिग-

621 RRC_0030_0001 सौदागर र.

[3r]
३
चर्काो र साँष्याको लामाजीहरुका नाउमा चिठि लेषि आफ्ना मानिस् स्मेत् गोर्षा [म]
हारा-
जले ल्हासामा रवाना गऱ्या । ल्हासामा अर्जि र चिठिहरु पुग्या पछि अर्जि चिन
वादसा[हा]का
हजूरमा नपठाई नेपालै तरफ् फिर्ता गरि पठाया । उस वषत्मा गोर्षाका महाराज[622]
पनि
लडाई गर्नाको मन्सुवा [राषदिन]तर तिमिहरुलाई यो प्रसन्न छैन लडाई[को] मन्सुवा
छ भन्या वेस हो म पनि आफ्ना फौज पठाई दिंछु भनी भोट्याहरुलाई [जवा]
व दी पठा-
ई आफ्ना फौज भोट्मा पठाई उसै फौजले लडाई गरी सिकारजङ्संम्म पुग्यो तर
सिकारजङ् कठिनको जगा हुनाले सिकारजङ्लाइ फौजले १ महिनासम्म घेरा दी
राष्याको थियो । उसै भित्रमा सिकारजङ्को मदत् निमित् ३।४ फेरा सवार प्या-
दा भोट्याहरु लडाईको सराजाम् तोप गैह्न साथमा ली आयाथ्या तर इश्वरका कृ-
पाले उन्हेरुलाइ पनी गोर्षा महाराजाका फौजले हटाइ दियो । वाहा पछि भला आ-
दमी टेसु लामाजी डिगर्चाको र साँष्याको लामाजीहरुले गोर्षा माहाराजका फौजमा
गै २ तरफ्को मिलाप गराई दिंछौ लडाईमा कुप गर भनि भन्दा गोर्षा माहाराजका
फौजका मालीकले अघि भोट्का मानिस्हरुसित मिलाप गर्नु षोज्याको हो कवुल नग-
र्दा फौज स्मेत् आहासम्म पुग्याका हुं कदाचित् तिमि मध्येस्थ भै सलुक गराउछौँ
भन्या ल्हासाका काजिलाई भला आदमीहरु स्मेत् केरुं र कुतिमा डाकि पठाया । २
तरफ्का भला मानिस् येकट्ठा भै वसी वन्दोवस्त गरौँला भनी टेसु लामाजीलाई भंदा
येस्कुरामा ती लामाहरु राजी भया । तसर्थ गोर्षा महाराजको फौज सिकारजङ्वाट
फिरि केरुं कुति झुंगा फलावाङ्मा आई वस्यो । यो सवै विस्तार चिनका वादसाहले
सुन्दा फौजका सर्दार चान्चुन् २\४ अम्वा र धेरै फौज साथ ली ल्हासामा आया ।
तव ल्हासाको पुतला लामाजी डिगर्चाको र सांष्याको लामाजीहरुले हामिहरु-
[3v]
४
२
का तरफवाट कसुर भयाको हो अैल्हे गोर्षा महाराजसंग सलूकको कुराकाहानी
भैरह्येछ आफ्ना भला आदमीहरुलाई वन्दोवस्त निमित्त केरुं पठाउछौं वन्दोवस्त
नभैयासम्म तपाई येहि मुकाम् गर्नु हवस् भनी फौजका सर्दार चान्चुन्लाई भंदा
चाडै वन्दोवस्त गर्नु भनी चान्चुन्ले भन्या र भला मानिस्हरु डिगर्चाको टेसू लामा-
जीको वावु र सांष्याको लामाजी अरु ३ जना भला मानीस् ल्हासाको वडाकाजि धुरि-
न् देवुक् षजांचि पुताला लामाजिको चेला अरु ९।१० जना भला मानीस्हरु केरुं-
मा आया । गोर्षा माहाराजका तरफवाट पनि सामर्पा लामाजी कप्तान् वम्साह टक्सा-
रि हरिहर उपाध्या नरसिं साहि अरु ४।५ भला आदमीलाई केरुं पठाया ।उस वषत्मा
फौजको सर्दार चान्चुन् पनि सिकार्जुमा आया । २ तरफका भला आदमीहरु वसी

622 RRC_0030_0001 महाराजले म.

सवालजावाव हुन लाग्दा अघि वन्दोवस्त गर्दा भोट्याहरुले अर्को तरह गरि सेषिको कुरा गऱ्या र गोर्षा माहाराजको फौज आहासम्म पुग्याका हो ८।१० सालसम्म भोट्को वाटो वन्द हुनाले टक्सार सायेर पनि माकुफ भयो यो माकुफ हुनाले दुवै काम्मा लाषौ रुपैया षर्च र नोक्सान् गोर्षा माहाराजको भयाको छ यो रुपैयाको पत्तालगाइ दी वन्दोवस्त गर भनि गोर्षा माहाराजका वकीलले भन्या । येस् सवालजवापमा भोट्याह-
रु कायेल भई २ तरफका तक्रारमा तिमिहरुको धेरै रुपैया षर्च भयाको पत्ता-
लाई दिनु सक्तैनौ भन्दा तिमि तिनै लामाजीहरु मध्येस्त भै वन्दोवस्त गरिदेउ हाम्रा क -
सूर हो भन्या जति रुपैया ल्हासाको नोक्सान् र षर्च भयाको छ हामि पत्ता लाउ-
छौ ल्हासाको कसूर हो भन्या हाम्रा रुपैयाको पत्ता लाईदिनु भनि गोर्षा माहाराज-
का वकिलले सांष्या र डिगर्चाको लामाजी सामरपा लामाजीलाई भन्या । यस्तै कुरा-
[4r]
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काहानि हुदा लामाहरुले ल्हासाको कसूर हो भनि तजविज गऱ्या । ल्हासावाला[पनि] सवा-
लजवाफ्मा कायेल भई येतिका रुपैया पत्ता लाईदिनु सक्तैनौ केहि छेमा गरि-
दिया अवस्य पत्ताई दिउला भन्दा जति रुपैया हाम्रा षर्च र नोक्सान भयाको छ
तेस्को पत्ता लाईदिन सकदैनौ भन्छौ भन्या ५०००००० रुपैया देउ र पु[रानु] सिवा
ना का-
यम रहला येति गर्नु सक्तैनौ भन्या लगुल्[623] देषि दक्षिण जती नञा मुलुक हाम्रो हात
लाग्याका छन् हामिलाई छाडिदेउ यो पनि गर्दैनौ भन्या सालवसाल १००००० रु-
पैया देउ भनि गोर्षा माहाराजका वकिल्ले भंन्दा ल्हासावालाले १ कुरा पनि कवो-
ल् गऱ्येन् । फौजको मालिक् चान्चुन्ले २ अम्वा मुताजिन् र टाङ्ग ताजीन्लाई सि-
पाहिहरु स्मेत् केरुंमा पठाईदिया । ति दुवै अम्वा केरुंमा पुगी दुवैतर्फको मामीला
सोधी धेरै सवालजवाप् गरि दोश्रो दिनमा ल्हासावालाको कसूर तजविज गरि
हप्काऊंदा ल्हासावालाले ५०००० रुपैया गोर्षा माहाराजलाई सालवसाल दिना-
को कवोल् गऱ्यो र ति अम्वाहरुले देवताहरुलाई साछि राषि कवुलियेत्को धर्मप-
त्र २ तरफवाट लेषपढ् गराई दिया । धर्मपत्र लेषपढ् भयापछि फौजका माली-
क् चान्चुन्का तरफवाट आउन्या ति दुवै अम्वाले २ तर्फको सलुक् गराई ल्हासा
फर्कि गया । वाहा पछि ल्हासाका काजी र डिगर्चा सांष्याको लामाजीका तर्फका मानि-
स्हरुले पहिला साल कवुलियेत्मा लेष्याको वमोजिम् ५०००० रुपैया गोर्षा
माहाराजका षजानामा दाषिल् गरि ति रुपैयाको रसिद ली ल्हासामा फर्कि गया ।
गोर्षा माहाराजका भारादारहरुले पनि आफ्ना हात लाग्याका केरु कुति झुंगा फला-
क् मल्पालाई[624] छोडी दी सानु अम्वा र फौज धरमपत्रको कागज ली नेपाल-

623 RRC_0030_0001 लंगुर.
624 RRC_0030_0001 मल्या०.

[4v]
[६]
मा आईपुग्या । ति साना अम्वाका साथ गोर्षा माहाराजका तर्फवाट वादसा-
हलाई अर्जि र नजर तोहफा स्मेत् हरि वकिल् १ बलभद्र षवास १ अरु २०।२५
मानिस्लाई पेचिन् सहर तिर पठाईदिया । तिनै वकिल र सानु अम्वा डिग-
र्चा पुग्या पछि वाहावाट फौजका मालिक् चान्चुन्ले आफ्ना तर्फवाट येक्
जना अम्वा गोर्षा माहाराजका वकिल्का साथ गरि वादसाहका हजूरमा र-
वाना गरि पठाया । ६ महिनामा ति वकिल् पेचिन् सहरमा पुगि वादसाह-
का दर्सन गरि ४५ दिनसम्म तहि सहरमा रहि सवैज्मा १५ फेरा वादसाह-
को दर्सन पाई ४५ दिन पछि वकिल् र उनका साथका मानिस्हरुले वा-
दसाहका तर्फवाट भारि षिलत् पाया । गोर्षा माहाराजका निमित्त पनि म-
र्तवा षितापको पर्वाना र भारि षिलतहरु वक्सिस् गर्‍या र आफ्ना साथ
भै जान्या आम्वा स्मेत् वकिल् १४ महिनामा नेपाल् आईपुग्या । ३ वर्षप-
छि ल्हासाको मुतसद्दि चिन् देवुक भंन्या नेपालमा आई म सालवसा-
ल नालवन्दि ५०००० रुपैया दिन सक्तिन माफ्> गरिदेउ भनि गोर्षा मा-
हाराजसित जाहेर गर्दा गोर्षा माहाराजवाट २ तर्फका षुसिराजि सित ध-
र्मपत्र भै लेषपढ् भयाकोलाई झुट्टा गर्न सक्तिन माफ् माग्छौ भन्या प-
हिले २ सालको वाँकि १००००० रुपैया कोपठाईदेउ वाहा पछि विन्ति-
गोचर गर भनि जवाप् दिदा तेस मुतसंद्दिले २ सालको वाकि वावत्का रु-
पैया दिनाको कवुल गरे[न]न् । मुतसंद्दि वाहिरको भन्या मिलाफ् गर्न्या भित्रको
भन्या फरेवि थियो । तेसले यो फसाद उठ्याको सामर्पा लामाको गर्नाले हो ।
[5r]
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येस् लामालाइ कुनै जुक्तिले पनि सिवानामा लगि सिवानावाट पक्रि ल्हासा लैजाउ [भ]-
न्या तजविज गरि भित्रभित्रैवाट धुरैन् काजि अैतु काजि सर्दार च्यागंलोचन् छस-
क् लामा गैह्र ल्हासाका भारादारलाई फौज स्मेत् सिवानामा झिकाई सामर्पा ला-
मा र आफ्ना भारादारहरुलाई सिवाना पठाईदिनु ल्हासावाट पनि का[जि] [भारा]-
दारहरु आउन्या छन् तिन्हेरु आपुस्मा वसि मामिलाको वन्दोवस्त गर्न्या छन्
भंन्या कुरा सोहि मुतसद्दिले गोर्षा माहाराजासित गर्‍यो । येक महिना अघि नै सा-
मर्पा लामा र मुतसद्दि चिन् देवुक गोर्षा माहाराजका अम्वल लिस्ति भंन्या [?]
जगामा
गै वस्याका थिया । इश्वरका गर्नाले त्यो मुतसंद्दि तहि मर्‍यो । त्यो मर्‍यापछि उस्को भा-
ई आई सोहि जगामा वस्यो । गोर्षा माहाराजवाट मुतसंद्दिले भन्या वमोजिम् कपता-
न् वम् साह काजि दामोदर पाडे टक्सारि नरसिं सर्दार पर्वल् राना सुवा भार-
थहरुलाई[625] कुति पठाईदिया । ल्हासावाट पनि धुरैन काजि अैतु काजि सर्दा-
र च्यागंलोचन् छसक लामा डिगर्चा सांष्याको भला आदमि गैह्र कुतिमा आ-
या । गोर्षा माहाराजका भारादारहरुले सामर्पा लामालाइ लिस्तिवाट साथ-
मा ली कुतिको नजिक छुसां जगामा पुग्दा ल्हासाका भारादारहरुले

625 RRC_0030_0001 भारलहरूलाई.

मामिलाको वन्दोवस्त निमित्त हामिलाई डाकि पठायाको होइन सा-
मर्पा लामालाई पक्रना निमित्त यो जाल वाधि इन्हेरु आयाका हुन् भंन्या ।
निश्चये वुझि गोर्षा माहाजका भारादारहरुले सामर्पा लामालाई आ-
फुसंग राषि सिपाहिहरु स्मेत् २ सुवेदार र सुवा १ लाई कुतिमा पठाईदिया ।
[5v]
[८]
सुवेदारहरुले सोहि जगामा पुगी धुरिन काजि गैह्र ल्हासाका भारादारहरु-
लाई घेरा दि तिमिहरु मामिलाका वन्दोवस्त गर्नालाई आयाका होइनौ तिमि-
हरु सामर्पा लामालाई पक्रनाको मनसुवा राषदछौ भनि धुरिन काजि अैतु काजि स-
र्दार च्याग लोचन् छासक् लामाहरुलाई पक्रि सिपाहिहरुका साथ सामर्पा ला-
मा स्मेत् नेपालमा पठाई गोर्षा माहाराजका भारादारहरुले फौजका सा-
थ डिगर्चा तरफ कुच गरि जादा वाटाका विचमा लडाई गर्दै उस्तरफ्को
फौजलाई हटाउदै लगि डिगर्चा पुग्या । गोर्षा माहाराजका फौज नपुग्दै १५ दि-
न अघि छ्यांजु लामा टेसु लामाजि डिगर्चा वरुया चिनिजाहरुका साथ डि-
गर्चावाट ल्हासा रवाना भयाका थिया । गुंवाको निगहवानि निमित्त ३०००
जति चेला लामाहरुसंग धर्मपत्रमा लेष्या वमोजिम् ३ साल मध्ये १ साल-
को मात्र ५०००० रुपैया ल्हासावाट दाषिल भयो । वाकि १००००० रुपैया पुऱ्या-
येन । धर्मपत्र लेष्या वमोजिम् काम गरेन । येस् कारनले ५०० धार्नि सुन ला-
माहरुका जिम्मा चढ्छ । २ सालको वाकि १००००० रुपैयाको पनि पत्ता लाई-
दिनुपर्छ भनि धर्मपत्रमा लेषियाको सवै विस्तार गर्दा डिगर्चाको मालिक्
लामाहरु डिगर्चावाट उठि ल्हासा गया । हामिहरुले सुन दिनाका मक्दूर
छैन रुपैयाको पत्ता लाई दिन पनि सक्तैनौ गुंवा हाजिर छ मन पऱ्याको गर भनि
चेलाहरुले गोर्षा माहाराजका भारादारहरुलाई भन्दा गोर्षा माहाराजका
भारादारहरु १५ दिनसम्म डिगर्चामा मुकाम् गरि जो पायाको नगद जि-
निस् माल असवाव् जफ्त गरि वाहावाट येस्तरफ कूंच गऱ्या । वाटाका
[6r]
९
विचमा अधिजस्तै लडाई गर्दै उस्तरफ्को फौजलाई हटाउदै आऊंदथ्या । गोर्षा
माहाराजका फौज षारताल लंगुर पाहाड्मा आईपुगदा हिउ पर्नाले सिपा-
हिहरु हिउमा दुव्याका र विफरले र अनाज रसद नपुगनाले मऱ्याका [स]-
वै ज्मा २००० जति सिपाहिहरु मऱ्या । अरु वाँकि रह्याका गोर्षा माहाराज-
का भारादार सिपाहिहरु ७ महिना वित्या पछि नेपालमा आई पु[ग्या] । [या]हा प-
छि सम्वत् १८४८ सालको मंसिर महिनामा चिन वादसाहका हजूरवाट फौज-
को मालिक् चान्चुन् ल्हासामा पुगि आफु चान्चुन्ले कुन मामिलामा ल्हासाका
भारादार धुरिन काजिहरुलाई पक्रि डिगर्चाको माल असवाप् लुटि लग्याका
हौ भनि चिठि लेषि पान् चूँया अम्वा [?] लाई नेपालमा गोर्षा माहाराजका
हजूरमा पठाई दिंदा केरुंमा २ तरफका भला आदमि वसि षुसिराजिसित धर्म-
पत्र लेषपढ भयाको हो सो वमोजिम् १ सालको ५०००० रुपैया ल्हासावाट दि-
यो २ सालको १००००० रुपैया वाकि रहनाले येस्को वन्दोवस्त र सोहि रुपै-
या पाउनालाई सामर्पा लामा [?] र आफ्ना भारादारहरुलाई केरुं पठाईदिया-

थ्याँ । उन्हेहरुले हाम्रा वाकि रुपैया दिनाको वन्दोवस्तमा चित्त नलाइ साम-
र्पा लामा र हाम्रा भारादारहरुलाई दागा गरि पक्रन षोज्या र जव ल्हासावा-
लाले यो दागाको मन्सुवा गऱ्याको हाम्रा भारादारहरुले थाहा पाया धुरिन का-
जि गैह्र ल्हासाका भारादारहरुलाई पक्रि ल्याया केरुंमा अघि टेसु लामा गै-
ह्र जामिन् भै २ तरफको वन्दोवस्त भया वमोजिम्का २ सालको रुपैया
वाँकि हुनाले डिगर्चाको माल असवाप् जफद गरि ल्यायाको हो तिमि चि-
न वादसाहका हजूरका ठुला सर्दारमा हौ २ तरफवाट लेषपढ् भयाको धर्म-
[6v]
१०
पत्र मौजुद छ । मेरो कसूर हो कि ल्हासावालाको कसूर हो वेस गरी विचार गर्न
भंन्या कुराको चिठि लेषि गोर्षा माहाराजले आफ्ना मानिस्लाई अनौठा तो-
फा दि तेसै चान्चुन्को अम्वाको साथ ल्हासामा पठाई दिदा फौजको मालिक्
वडा चान्चुन्ले येस्कुराको तजविज नगरि गोर्षा माहाराजका मानिस्लाई
कैद गरि लडाई निमित्त लडाईको सराजाम् तोप गैह्र ली येस्तरफ्-
को मन्सुवा गऱ्या । गोर्षा माहाराजका तरफ्का थानेदार इभाकक्स[626] सुवेदा-
र थोरै फौज ली कुतिमा वस्याको थियो । २ तरफ्का फौजले लडाई भिड्न
गयो र यो लडाई भयाको कुरा सुनि गोर्षा महाराजवाट मद्दत्लाई फौज
पठाया । लिस्ति भन्दा उता षासा भन्या जगा अघिदेषिको गोर्षा माहाराजाको
अमल् हो । वाहा मद्दत् निमित्त गयाको फौज पुग्याको थियो । वाहावाट २ वास ऊ-
ता कुति थियो । फौजले वाहा जानाको मन्सुवा गर्दा यक्कासि हिउ पर्न लागेर फौज
वढि जानसकेन । हिउ रह्यासम्म गोर्षाको फौजले उता वढि जान सकन्या छैनौं भं-
न्या देष्यो । चिनको फौज पनि यस् तरफ् आउन सकन्या छैन भंन्या देष्यो । हिउ सकि-
या पछि सिगातको[627] इलाका छेंदूक सहरको सुवा र फौजको मालिक् चान्-
चुन् १५।१६ हजार जति फौज ली षासाको नजिक्मा आईपुग्दा २ तरफको ल-
डाई जोरिया । चिनको फौजले अघि कुतिमा धेरै पल्ट आईलाग्याथ्यो तर चिन्-
को फौजको केहि नचल्दा उस वषत्मा तोपहरुका गोलाले आजित गरि
सोहि सुवेदारलाई र सिपाहिहरु गैह्रलाई मारि कुतिको किल्ला आ-
फ्ना कवुजामा ल्याया । लडाई जोरिंदा गोर्षा माहाराजको फौजको चौपवा-
ला र तोडेदार वंदूक थियो । उस वषत्मा वारुदषानामा आगो लाग्दा
[7r]
११
लडाईको षजाना वारुद हो गोर्षा माहाराजको सवै वारुद र सिपाहि स्मेत् जल्दा
लडाई नजोरि पछि हटि गोर्षा माहाराजका फौज लिस्ति जगामा फिरि आ-
या । फौजको मालिक् चान्चुन्ले येस् तरफ्का मन्सुवा राषिरहेछ भंन्या षवर सु-
नि फेरि गोर्षा माहाराजवाट मद्दत्लाइ फौज पठाया । लिस्ति भंन्या जगा[लाई]
[वलि]यो तुल्याया । केहि दिन पछि चान्चुन् फौज र तोप स्मेत् लिस्तिमा
आईपुग्या । ताहा २ तरफको लडाई जोरिन्दा गोर्षा माहाराजका फौजले

626 RRC_0030_0001 ईमावक्त; Ācārya (VS 2011, 11) इमांवक्स.
627 Acārya 2011, 11 सयिागको.

तोडेदार र चौपवाला वन्दुकहरुले लडाई गरि चिनको फौजलाई हटा-
या । रिसालाको सर्दार अम्वा र चिनको फौजका सिपाहिहरु मारिया र
चिनको फौजले ४ कोस टाढा गै मकाम् गऱ्या । फेरि दोश्रा फेरा चिनको
फौजले लिस्तिमा लडाई गर्नाको मनसुवा गर्न सकेन । गोर्षा माहामाहा-
राजका फौजले पनि चिन वादसाहको फौज जानि पछेटा लाग्नाको मु-
नासिव देषेन । जउन् चिनको फौज लिस्ति तरफ् थियो गर्मिका याम्
हुनाले र रसद अनाज नपुग्नाले धेरै दुषन्या र षान नपाई लाचा-
र हुन्या भया । धेरै दिन्देषिन्को पुरानु रसदको अनाज षान नहु-
न्या थोरो वहुत् पुगदथ्यो तापनि चिनको सिपाहिहरु धेरै म-
ऱ्या । लिस्तिको आसपासमा रहन्या वाँदरहरुलाई पनि चिनका
फौजले येउटा पनि वाकि नराषी मारि षाया । हाम्रा ल्हासावाला-
सित तक्रार भयाको हो चिन वादसाहसँग तक्रार भयाको होइन ।
[7v]
१२
चिन वादसाहवाट पठायाको ठुला सर्दारहरू ल्हासामा आयाका छन् ।
तिन्हेरूले अवस्य २ तरफवाट लेषपढ भयाको धर्मपत्रलाई वुझि
वन्दोवस्त गराई दिन्या छन् भंन्या गोर्षा माहाराजको चितमा थियो ।
यस्तै विचमा वडा उजिर टुंठ्वाङ्ग भीकक् सरदार चुन्दून् नाजीन्
वादसाहको निसान् स्मेत् वेहिसाप फौज ली ल्हासामा आइ ल्हासा-
का भारादारहरू धुरिन् काजि गैह्नलाई पक्रि डिगर्चाको मालहरू
लुटि लग्याको तिम्रो ठुलो कसूरको नालिस् चिन वादसाहका हजु-
रमा पुग्दा नेपालका नीरवीज र नाउ नरहन्या गरी मार्ना र वरवा-
द गर्ना निमित्त धेरै फौजका साथ म वडा टुंठ्वाङ्गलाइ पठाइ दिया र
आयाको छु तिमिहरूलाई चिनको सलतनत्को केहि षवर छैन
तर भोट्को १ जना फरेवि मानिस् तिमिहरू छेउ आइ फसाद उ-
ठाउन लागिरह्येछ उसलाई कैद् गरि तिमिहरूले पक्रि ल्यायाका
ल्हासाका भारादार धुरिन् काजि गैह्नलाई आफ्नु तरफ्का वडा का-
जिका साथ गरि म छेउ पठाईदिया तिम्रो ठुलो तक्सीर माफ् गरिदि-
उला त्यो फसादी लामाको वरावर तौलि सुन पनि दिउला भनि गोर्षा
माहाराजलाई चिठि लेषी पठाउँदा उस्को जवावमा पक्रिल्यायाका
भारादारहरू धुरिन् काजि गैह्नलाई र तेस् तरफ्का मुलुक् हामिले क-
बुजा गऱ्याकोलाई छोडिदिंछु हाम्रा सरनमा आयाको सामर्पा ला-
मालाई कैद गरि पठाईदिन्या राजाको धर्म होइन भंन्या गोर्षा माहा-
[8r]
१३
राजका तरफ्वाट टुंठ्वाङ् उजीरलाई चिठि लेषि पठाया । फेरि उस्को जवाफ-
मा सामर्पा लामालाई कैद गरि पठाइदिंछौ भन्या २ तरफ्को दोस्ति रहन्या
छ होइन भन्या कदाचित् पनि रहन्या छैन् अव उप्रान्त मेरा हजूरमा चिठि
पनि नलेषनु भंन्या साफ जवाव गोर्षा माहाराजलाई लेषि पठाई [आ]-
फु उजिर फौजका साथ दोश्रा दिनमा झुंगाको वाटो गरि कुकुरघाट्को कि-

ल्लामा रह्याको गोर्षा माहाराजको थानदारलाई गाफीलीमा आई कि-
ल्लालाई घेरा दी वाहावाट केरुंतिर वढ्या । वाहा केरुंमा पनि गोर्षा माहा-
राजको थानदार फौजका साथ किल्लामा तयार थियो । सर्दार सत्रुभंज-
न् मल्ल फौजका साथ केरुंवाट कुकुरघाट्का मद्दत्लाई गया । चिन-
को फौज वेहिसाप वाटाका विचमा पाङ्गुसि[628] भन्याका जगामा २ तरफको
फौजको मुकाविला भै लडाई भयो । चिनको फौज ज्यादा गोर्षा माहाराज-
को फौज कम् हुनाले २ सुवेदार र सय दुइ सय जना जति सिपाहि ताहा
षेत पऱ्या । सत्रुभंजन मल्लले चिन फौजका सर्दार २।४ जना अम्वा-
हरूलाई तरवारले काटि आफुले पनी २।४ घाउ षाइ वाहावाट हटि के-
रुं आइपुगि केरुंका किल्ला वरुन्या सुवा फुवरसित सामिल भया । चिन-
को फौजले केरुंका किल्लालाई घेरा दी ६।७ दिनसम्म २ तरफ्को ठु-
लो लडाई हुदा पनि गोर्षा माहा[रा]जको किल्लावालाले किल्ला छोडि-
[8v]
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दियेन । तर चिनको फौजले किल्लाका भित्र वारुदषानामा रातका वि-
चमा आगो लाईदिंदा लडाईको षजाना वारुत सवै जल्यो । गोर्षा माहाराज-
को फौज कम् चिनको फौज वेहिसाप हुनाले चीनको फौजले तीनै तरफ-
वाट सोहि किल्लालाई घेरा दीया तापनि गोर्षा माहाराजको थानादार-
ले थोरै फौजका साथ किल्लावाट वाहिर आई लडाई गर्दा २ तरफका
सिपाहीहरु षेत पऱ्या र वाकी रह्याका गोर्षा माहाराजका सुवा सर्दार सिपा-
हि गैह्र वाहावाट हटि गोर्षा माहाराजको पुरानु अमल्दारि रसुवा भन्या ज-
गामा आया । भोलिपल्ट चिनको फौज पनी [उसै]जगामा पछेवा लागी आई-
पुग्यो । वाहा रसुवा नदिको[629] पूलमा दिन ३ सम्म लडाई हुदा चिनको फौजले
दवाउनु नसक्दा तेसै नदिमा अर्को वाटो गरि पूल वाँधि गोर्षा माहाराजका
फौज माथि चिनको फौज येक्कासि आईपुग्दा गोर्षा माहाराजका सर्दार सुवाह-
रू वाहा अडन नसकी रसुवा भंन्या जगालाई पनि छाडिदिया र वाहावाट
चिनको फौज टिमुऱ्या भंन्या जगामा आयो । अघि गोर्षा माहाराजले केरुं-
को किल्लामा ठुलो लडाई हुन लागिर[ह्या]छ भंन्या षवर सुनि मद्दत्-
लाई पठाई दियाको फौज स्याफ्रु भंन्या जगामा पुग्याको थियो । उस्तर्फ-
वाट चिनको फौजले पनि टिमुऱ्यावाट कुंच गरि आउदा सोहि स्याफ्रु भ-
न्या जगामा २ तरफको फौज जोरिन्दा तीन रात तीन दीनसम्म वाहा तोप
वन्दुकको लडाई पऱ्यो । चिनका फौजले कति गर्दा पनि मुल वाटोवाट
आउनु नसकी दोश्रो वरफान् सित जोरियाको पाहाड् माथिको वाटो गरि
[9r]
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चिनको फौज येकासि गोर्षा माहाराजको फौजको अगाडि आईपुग्दा गोर्षा मा[हारा]-
जको फौजले तेस जगामा पनि अडन नसकि छाडिदियो । गोर्षा माहाराजले [अघि]

628 RRC_0030_0001 पांसी; Acharya VS 2011 पाङ्गसा.
629 RRC_0030_0001 गढीको.

मद्दत निमित्त पठायाका काजि दामोदर पाँडे सर्दार परवल राना सर्दार भारथ
फौज स्मेत् धुंचे भंन्या जगामा गै वस्याका थिया । वाहा पनि चिनका फौज पुगि [तिन]
[रात]ती-
न दिनसम्म तोप वन्दुक् तरोवार तीरको लडाइ भयो । गोर्षा महाराजको मुर्चा फोरन
नसक्या पनि लडाइ गर्दै थियो ।उसै स्याफ्रु जगाको नजीक पाहाडको माथी वर्फानको
नजीक्को [देउराली] भंन्या जगामा गोर्षा माहाराजका फौज सुवेदार जगवल् सुवे-
दार भास्कर ढलेत सिपाहिहरूस्मेत् मोर्चा वाधि वस्याका थिया । वहि पनि चीनको फौ-
ज आई चारै तरफ्वाट तेस जगालाई घेरा दिदा पनी गोर्षा माहाराजका सुवेदार-
हरु तिनै तिरवाट चीनका फौज माथी जाइपऱ्या [त]र गोर्षा माहाराजका फौज मा-
थि चौथा तरफ्वाट १०।१२ हजार चिनको फौज आई गोर्षा माहाराजका दुवै सु-
वेदार र सिपाहिहरुलाई मारि त्यो जगा पनी आफुले दषल् गऱ्यो । चिनको फौ-
ज तरफ्को १ अम्वा मारियो । देउरालि भंन्या जगा पाहाडको माथि छ । वाहा चिनको
फौजले डेरा गर्दा गोर्षा माहाराजको फौजले पाहाडको मुनि धुंचे भंन्या जगामा मुका-
म् गऱ्याको थियो । गोर्षा माहाराजको फौज निचा जगामा हुनाले लडाई गऱ्या वढि-
या हवैन भंन्या वुझि धुंचेवाट पनी हटि काभ्र्या[630] भंन्या जगामा आइ मुकाम् गऱ्यो ।
वाहा पछि गोर्षा माहाराजले चिनको लस्कर धेरै छ भंन्या वुझि चौतरिया श्रीकृस्न
साह काजि वम् साह काजि अभिमान् सिं काजि धोकल् सिं सर्दार सत्रुसाल गैह्र
सुवेदारहरूलाई धेरै फौजका साथ लडाईको सराजाम् तोप् वाण तीर गैह्र स्मेत् ष-
[9v]
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टाई पठाया र तिनीहरु सवै धैवुं भंन्या जगामा पुग्या । वाहापछि चिनको फौज का-
भ्र्यामा आईपुग्यो र २ तरफ्को लडाई जोरिन्दा नीदानमा चिनको फौज वाहा-
वाट हटि भागि धुंचेको र काभ्र्याको विचमा रामच्या भंन्या जगामा गै मुकाम्
गऱ्यो । भागि जादा पाहाडवाट षसी चीनका सिपाहिहरु धेरै मऱ्या । उस वष-
त्मा गोर्षा माहाराजले अघि पक्रि ल्यायाको चिनको सिपाहिलाई आफ्ना
हल्हल्[कारा]का साथ टुइ्ठ्वाइ्का नाउमा चिठि लेषि पठाइदिया । त्यो चिठि फौ-
जको मालिक् भीकंछेउ पुग्दा तिनै फौजका मालिक्ले गोर्षा [माहा]राजको
भलाकुसारि सोधी दोस्तिका राहले रामच्या [भन्या] जगा साह्रै सानु छ फौ-
ज वस्ना लायक्को छैन धैवुं भन्या जगा ठुला छ तेस जगावाट आफ्ना फौ-
जलाई वेत्रावती नदिको पार लगि मुकाम गराई देउ र फौजका मालिक्
र सर्दारहरू वजीर स्मेत् धैवुंमा आई जवावसवाल वन्दोवस्त गरौला व-
न्दोवस्त नभयासम्म २ तरफका सिपाहिहरुले हात नचलाउनु नदी पनी ये-
ताकोले उता उताकोले यता नतर्नु भनि गोर्षा माहाराजलाई चिठि लेषि पठा-
या र गोर्षा माहाराजले पनी भीकं सर्दारको चिठिको वेहोरा वुझि आफ्ना भा-
रादारहरूलाई फौज स्मेत् धैवुंवाट कूच गरि वेत्रावतीको यस् पार आई ल-
चावुक्[631] चुग्दी दुध्या पाहाड तुइन् थला नुवाकोट्को मूल रस्तामा मुर्चा वाँधी

630 Acharya VS 2011, 15 reads this as *kāmryā* and identifies the place with present day Kamāryāgaḍha fort.
631 Acharya VS 2011, 15 लचावुफ्.

वस्तु भनि लेषिपठाउदा गोर्षा माहाराजको हुकुम् वमोजिम् भारादारहरुले
गऱ्या । सोहि चीनको फौजका मालीक् र सर्दारहरू लडाइको सराजाम् वेहिसा-
प र तोपषाना फौजस्मेत् ली धैवुं काभ्र्यामा आई मुर्चा वाँधि मुकाम् गऱ्या । उ-
[10r]
१७
स वषत्मा काजि रंजित् पाडे भोटु पाडे नरसिं टक्सारिलाई लडाईमा पक्रि ल्या[या]-
का धुरिन् काजि अैतु गैह्र ३ जना चिनियास्मेत् चिनका वजिरका हजूरमा गो-
र्षा माहाराजले पठाईदिया । गोर्षा माहाराजका ३ जना भारादार वाँहा पुग्यापछी
चिनका वजिरले समर्पा लामा मऱ्यो भंन्या षवर सुन्याँ साचो हो कि झुठो [हो]
[भनि]
सोधदा काजि टक्सारिहरूले तिम्रा मानिस् धुरिन् काजि गैह्रले आफ्ना [आषा]ले दे-
षि आइ रह्याछन् वुझ्नु हवस् भनि विन्ति गऱ्या । दिन ३ पछि सोहि चिनका व-
जिरले नुवाकोट् असल हुन्याछ्र षालि गरिदिनु फौज स्मेत् नुवाकोट्मा आ-
ई वसौला नेपालवाट पनि श्री महाराज र श्री साहेव नुवाकोट् आई मसंग भेट
गर्नु र उस वषत्मा षातिरज्मा दी मामिलाको वन्दोवस्त गरि आफ्ना धेरै लस्कर
स्मेत् नुवाकोट्वाट् कुंच गरि आफ्ना मुलुक्मा जाउला भंन्या वेहोराको चिठि
गोर्षा माहाराजका नाउमा लेषि यो कुरा ३ दिन भित्रमा वुझि आउनु होइन
भंन्या जवरदस्तिसंग फौज स्मेत् नुवाकोट्मा पुग्न्या छु भंन्या कुरा काजि रंजि-
त् पाडेसंग भनि चिठि स्मेत् काजिलाई पठाईदिया । काजि रंजित् पाडे गो-
र्षा माहाराजका हजुरमा पुगि काजिले भन्याका कुरा सवै विन्ति गऱ्या । गोर्षा म-
हाराजवाट वजिरको चिठिको वेहोराले वजिरको सलूक गर्न्या मन्सुवा छैन भं-
न्या वुझि मुर्चा किल्ला घरहरु वलियो तुल्याई सर्कार कम्पनि अग्रेज वहादूरला -
ई साचो दोस्त जानि मदद मागना निमित्त फौजका मालिक् नवाव गौरनर ज-
नरल लाड अरल् कारन्वान्स वहादुरका षिदमत्मा चिठि लेषि कलकत्ता
[10v]
१८
रवाना गरि वजिरको चिठिको जवावमा पनि दोस्ति गर्नाको मन्जुर छ भन्या धै-
वुंमा मुकाम् गरि मामिलाको वन्दोवस्त गर्नु नुवाकोट भन्याको नेपालै हो ताहा
षलि गरि डाकन सक्तिन भनी गोर्षा माहाराजले लेषि पठाया । गोर्षा माहारा-
जले यस्तो वेहोराको चिठि लेषनाले वजिर दिक्क भै फेरि चिठिको जवाव
नलेषि वजिरले आफु र फौज स्मेत् नुवाकोट्मा आउनालाई वेत्रावति
नदि[मा] [दोश्रा]पूल दुरस्त गराउन लाया । चिनको फौज नदि पार भै यता आ-
उनाको मन्सुवा गर्दैछ भंन्या षवर सुनी उन्हेरूलाई हानि उसै तरफ फिराई
दिनु नदि उस्पार जहाँ वादसाहको लस्कर वजिरले मर्चा वाध्याको छ ता-
हा तिमिहरुले पनि नजानु भनि गोर्षा महाराजले आफ्ना लस्करका काजि
भारादारहरूलाई हुकुम् लेषि पठायाको दोश्रा दिन षुद आफै वजिर पाला-
वाट निस्की दुरविन हातमा ली जौन अम्वा र फौजले देवरालिमा गोर्षा मा-
हाराजको फौजलाई फत्त्य गऱ्योथ्यो उसै अम्वा र जङ्गि फौजलाई २ तोप् स्मे-
त् वेत्रावति नदिको पूलवाट यस तरफ् पारि तरि जानालाई षटाउदा
उनै फौज नदि तरि आई दुइ गोल भै येक गोल चफदीको किल्ला लिना-

को मन्सुवा गरि जाइलाग्यो । दोश्रो गोल दुध्या पहाड तिर जाईलाग्यो । उसै
दिन भादौ वदि ८ का दिन २ पहर दिन चढ्दा गोर्षा माहाराजका फौज-
का सर्दार भारादारहरू पनि आफुआफु वलियो गरि तयार भयाका
थिया । दुवै तरफको वाटाका विचमा मुकाविला भै लडाइ भयो र अलि-
क् छिन्सम्म वन्दुक्को लडाई भयो । पछि तरवारको लडाई पऱ्यो । गोर्षा माहा-
[11r]
१९
राजको फौज उचा जगामा थियो । चिनको फौज तलतीर थियो । यस्कारन-
ले [चिनको]
फौज अडन नसकि भाग्यो । चिनका सिपाहिहरू धेरै मारिया । गोर्षा मा[हाराज]-
का सिपाहि केहि मात्र षेत पऱ्या । चिनको फौज कति साह्रै आँति पाहाड मा[थिवा]-
ट षस्दै मऱ्या । कति वेत्रावतिमा फाल हाली मऱ्या । यस्तो वेहोरा भयाको[मा] व-
जिरले मेरो फौजले सिकिस्त षाई भागी आयो भनी दुरविनले हेरि [वहि] वेत्रा-
वतिको पूलमा वलियो गरि चौकि वसाई वेत्रावति तरि भागि आउन्या सिपा-
हिहरूलाई यस्तीर आउन नदिनु जो आउला उस्को नाक् काटनु फेरि अरु फौ-
ज पनि पठाउनु भंन्या तजविज गरि आफु वजिर १३ तोप् साथमा ली येस्तरफ्
पूलमा आईपुग्या । उस वषतमा गोर्षा माहाराजका [चौकीको] फौजले चिनको फौज-
लाई वेत्रावतिसम्म हटायाको थियो । चीनको फौज [हत्]पत् हुनाले नजा पूल
वेस गरि दुरुस्त गऱ्याको थियेन । हडवडिमा चिनको फौज यकै फेरा पूलवाट जाँदा
पूल भट्की धेरै चिनको फौज वेत्रावतिमा डुव्या । वाकि रह्याका सिपाहिहरूले पनी
गोर्षा माहाराजको फौजको डरले २ तोप्लाई नदिमा फालि सिपाहिहरू पनि धेरै
नदिमा फाल हालि मर्दा सोहि उजिरले आफु फौजले सिकिस्त षायाको देषि पुरानु
पूलको वाटो षोलिदिया ।तेहि चिनको फौजका सर्दार अम्वा भाग्दा षेरि येऊटा गोडा
भाच्याको थियो । तेस अम्वालाई मानिस्हरूले पिठमा वोकि वाँकी रह्याका सिपा-
हिहरु स्मेत् उजिरको फौजमा आईपुग्या । त्यो अम्वा ३ दिनपछि मऱ्यो । पूलमा चौ-
कि वरुया गोर्षा माहाराजाको फौजको र चिनको फौजको लडाई वन्दुकको हुन्थ्यो ।
तेसै पूलको नजीक्मा १ सानु पाहाड थियो । तेस पाहाडमा चीनका वजिरले तो-
[11v]
२०
१०
पषाना लगि आफैले तोप सोझ्याई गोर्षा माहाराजका फौज तरफ् गोलि चलाउ-
दथ्या । चिनका फौजको मुर्चा काठ ढुंगाको नहुनाले जो सिपाहिहरु दुषि म-
र्दथ्या अथवा मारिंथ्या वहि मर्न्या सिपाहिहरुको मुर्चा वनाई लडाइ ग-
र्दि[थ्या] । येस्तै तवरको लडाई हुंदाहुंदा रात पऱ्यो र २ तर्फको फौज आफ्नाआफ्ना
जगामा गया । वजिर पनि आफ्ना सुतन्या पालमा गया । भोलि पल्ट उसै उजिरले
भोटु पाडे र टक्सारि नरसिंलाई आफ्ना हजुरमा डाकि दुइ तरफ्को लडाई हु-
दा फौजले कैल्हे फत्य गर्दछ कैल्है सिकिस्त षांछ यस्मा दुवै तरफ्वाट केहि
दुष मनाउ नगर्नु अघि मैले गोर्षा माहाराजलाई नुवाकोट्मा आई मामि-
लाको वन्दोवस्त गरुंला भनि हुकुम् गरि पठायाका हो आफ्ना फौजलाई प-
नि वेत्रावतिको येस् पार राषुं भन्या उर्दि गऱ्याको हो उस्मा मेरा सिपाहिहरु मरि-

या यो मानु तमासा हो हेर्‍याँ अव र रैयत्हरू र गरिव गुर्वा साह्रै डरायाको हुनन्
गोर्षा माहाराज र श्री साहेवले पनि नुवाकोट् षालि गर्नाको चित्तमा लिनु पर्दैन
म पनि नुवाकोट् जानाको इरादा राषतीन श्री महाराज र श्री साहेवले पनि
नुवाकोट्मा आउनाको जरुर छैन म ऐल्हे श्री महाराजलाइ षुसि गर्ना नि-
मित्त २।४ कुरा लेषि पठाऊदछु तिमिहरुले पनि मैले लेषि पठायाको कुरालाई
कवुल गर्नु भनि लेषि पठाउ यो कुरा कवुल गर्नाले म पनि लस्कर स्मेत् येस् मु-
लुक्वाट कुंच गरि आफ्ना मुलुक्मा फर्कि गै चिन वादसाहका हजुर्मा विन्ति गरि
चिन वादसाहलाई षुसि तुल्याई श्री महाराजका नाउमा र श्री साहेवका नाउमा भारि

[12r]

२१

षिल्लत् वक्साई पठाईदिउला भन्या । इ सवै कुरा उनै पाँडे टक्सारिह-
रु छेउ भनि [साम]-
र्पा लामा जिउदै भया साथै लैजान्या थिञा इश्वरका गर्नाले मरेछ भन्या [तसको]हा-
डमाल असवाव र नोकरहरु स्मेत् औ डिगर्चाको जवद गरि ल्यायाको माल अ-
सवावहरु यस् सिवाय आजकाल तिमिहरुले जवद गरि ल्यायाको [चिन]वाद-
साहका हजुरवाट डिगर्चाको तासिलेमूँ लामालाइ षिल्लत् मिल्याको अ[व]ल् ना-
मि तोहफा र चिज वस्तुहरुमा र डिगर्चामा लुट्याको मालहरुमाको थोर वहुत कुचि-
नको थान् र चाँदि औ सुनका भाडाहरु वजिरले गोर्षा माहाराजवाट जपद गर्‍या-
को माल असवाव फिर्ता गरि ल्यायो भन्या पार्नालाई पठाइदिनु अघि सामर्पा
लामाको फरेवले केरुंमा लेषपद् भयाको धर्मपत्रको कागज पनि पठाइदिनु ल्हा-
सावाट पनि कागजपत्र फिर्ता गरि दुवै कागजलाई फादि दिउला र फेरि दुवै तर-
फ्को झकरा तक्रार हुन्या छैन् चिन वादसाहाको नाउमा पनि येक अर्जि लेषि अ -
नौठा तोहफाको नजर स्मेत् चार काजिमा १ काजिसंग पठाईदिनु जव लेषिया
वमोजिम्को चिज वस्तुहरु र अर्जि ली काजि मेरो हजुरमा पुगला उस घ-
डिमा लस्कर स्मेत् यस मुलुक्वाट कुंच गरि आफ्ना मुलुक्मा जाउला
कदाचित् यो मैले लेष्याको जस्तो गरेनौ भन्या लस्कर स्मेत् म आफ्ना मुलुक् तर-
फ् जान्या छैन झ्न नेपालै तिर चढाई गरुंला यस्कुरालाई श्री महाराज र श्री सा-
हेवले आफ्ना काजि भारादारहरु वसि सल्लाह गरि चिन वादसाहसंग स-
लुक् गर्‍या बढिया होला भनि वुझदछौ भन्या मैले लेष्या वमोजिम् काम गरि
माथि लेषियाका चिठिहरु चाडो मेरा हजुरमा पठाईदिनु कदाचित् लडाई

[12v]

२२

[...] १
गर्नामा आफु वढिया बुझ्दछौ भन्या पनि चाडै यस्को जवाव पठाईदिनु म पनि
लडाईलाइ तयार हुला भनि चिनका वजिरले गोर्षा माहाराजका नाउमा
चिठि लेषिपठाया र गोर्षा माहाराजले वजिरको चिठिको वेहोरा वुझि यस् कु-
राको सल्लाह काजि भारादारहरुसंग गर्ना लाग्याका थिया । तस्तै वषत्मा व-
जिरको फौजलाई येकासि औल् लागि धेरै सिपाहिहरु मर्‍या । रसद अना-
जहरु पनि नपुग्न्या कहिवाट पुगी गयो भन्या पनि धेरै दिनको पुरानु षान नहु-
न्या हुनाले सवै तिरवाट चिनको फौजलाई दुष र वेथा लग्नाले आफु

चिठिको जवाव लेषि पठाउनु भनि गोर्षा माहाराजलाई वजिरले वारंवार
ताकिदि गरि पठाया । यस्तै विचमा गोर्षा माहाराजको चिठिको जवावमा क-
लकत्तावाट लाठसाहेवका हजुरवाट पनि जस्ता तरहले चिन वादसाहसँ-
ग दोस्ति सलूक् हुंछ सो गर्नु उसले वढिया हुन्या छ दुवै तरफको दोस्तिको
जरो वलियो गर्ना निमित्त म आफ्ना तरफ्वाट कप्तान् वलीयम् किरिक्पात-
रिक् साहेव व[हा]दूरलाइ पठाइ दिउला भनी लेषि पठायाको चिठि पनि आई
पुग्यो र गोर्षा माहाराजवाट वजिरले लेष्याको र लाठ साहेवले लेष्याको वि-
चार गरि चिन वादसाहलाई मान्या वढिया होला झगरा तक्रार गर्‍या घटि-
या होला भन्या । आपुसमा तजविज गरि वजिरले लेष्या वमोजिम् सामर्पा
लामाको हाड् र नोकरहरु उस्को माल असवाव स्मेत् औ चिन वादसा-
हवाट डिगर्चाको टासिलेमुँ[632] लामालाई षिल्लत् भयाको चिजवस्तु र जव-
द गरि ल्यायाको मध्ये केहि चाँदि त कुचिन्को थान् औ चिन वादसाहका न-
[13r]
२३
जर निमित्त अनौठा तोहफा र अर्जि स्मेत् काजि देवदत्त थापा सुवा प्रतिमन् राना
जित् साहि वलभद्र मुतसद्दिहरुलाई ५० जना मानीस् साथ गरि विदा दीई
चीन्[633] सहर पठाया । ले चीजवस्तुहरु ली वजिरसंग गै भेट् मुलाकात् [गर्‍या] ।
वहापछि गोर्षा माहाराजवाट जाफत् लायक्को सरजाम वजिरका हजूरमा
पठाईदिया । दुवै तरफ्वाट ५ वर्ष पछि गोर्षा माहाराजको वकिलले अर्जि र सौ-
गात् स्मेत् ली चिनवादसाहका हजुरमा गै चीन वादसाहको दर्शन गरि आफ्ना
हाल विन्ती गर्दै रहनु गोर्षा माहाराज र ल्हासाका राजाले मिलिरहनु फेरि आ-
पुस्मा झगडा तक्रार नगर्नु भंन्या दुवै तरफवाट अक्रार भै अघि देषिको
गोर्षा माहाराजको जगा गोर्षालाई ल्हासाको ल्हासैलाई गरि दुवै तरफको
षुसिराजीसंग फै[सला] गरिदिया । गोर्षा महाराजको निषरा महिन्द्रमलि-
को टक् र अघिका राजाका षोटो टक्लाई जिन्सी षरिद गर्दा निषरा टक्-
को निषराको मोल् षोटो टक्को षोटैका मोल् गरि भोट् मुलुक्मा चल-
न् गराईदिया । कोहि दुसमन्ले गोर्षा महाराजको फौज् माथि लडाई-
को मन्सुवा गर्‍यो भन्या यस्कुराको इत्तलाय चिन वादसाहका हजुरमा गरि
पठाउनु र वादसाहको हजुरवाट मददलाई षजाना र फौज वक्साई प-
ठाई दिउला भनि यो अकरार दुवै तरफवाट ठहरिया र वजिरले आफ्ना फौज
र गोर्षा माहाराजका काजि गैह्र मानिस्हरुलाई साथमा ली धैवुंवाट
कुंच गरि आफ्ना मुलुक् तरफ् गया । गोर्षा महाराजका लेषिया वमोजिम्-
का भारादार टक्सारि पाँडे ४ दिनको वाटो केरुंसम्म वजीरका साथ-
[13v]
[२४]
मा गया । वाहा वजिरले गोर्षा माहाराजलाई चिठि लेषि अनौठा तोहफा स्मे-
त् भारादारका हवाला गरि भारादारहरुलाई पनि भारि षिल्लत् दी हा-

632 RRC_0030_0001 ताले लबि.
633 RRC_0030_0001 पेकनि्.

म्रा दुष्याका सिपाहिहरुलाई सिहार संभारसंग यतातिर पठाई नेपाल
तिर जानु भनि हुकुम्दी वजिर वाहावाट कुंच गऱ्या । भारादारहरुले वजिर-
ले अह्राया वमोजिम् २२ दिनसम्म केरुंमा मुकाम गरि दुष्याका सिपाहि-
हरु र पछि रह्याका पालडेरा माल असवाव गैह्रलाई उत्तर तरफ रवाँना
गरि केरुंवाट नेपाल् तरफ आया भोटु पाँडे नरसिं टक्सारिले वजिरले प-
ठाइदियाको चिठि र तोहफाहरु गोर्षा महाराजका हजुरमा गुजराई वजिर-
ले भनि पठायाका कुराको सवै विस्तार विन्ति गर्या । कुति लिस्ति तरफ व-
स्याको फौजको मालिक् चान्चुन्ले अधिका जस्तै [ठुलो] महर्वानिले दोस्ति-
को चिठि लेषि गोर्षा महाराजलाई पठाया । गोर्षा महाराजवाट पनि उस्को ज-
वावमा जाफ्त् तोहाफा स्मेत् चान्चुन्लाई पठाइदिया । त्यो चिठि र तोहफा
पुगनाले चान्चुन् वहुतै षुसि भै आफ्ना तरफवाट पनि चिठि तोहफा गोर्षा
महाराजलाई पठाइ दी कार्तिक सुदि २ का दिन लिस्ति भंन्या जगावाट कुंच
गरि आफ्ना मुलुक् तरफ गया । उस् वषत्मा वजिर केरुं झुंगाको वाटो गरि टि-
गरि मैदान्मा पुग्याका थिया । फौजका मालिक चान्चुन् पनि यतावाट जा-
दा दुवैजना तहि टिगरिमा सामेल भै उस्तरफ् कुंच गऱ्या । वजिर र फौज-
का मालिक् ल्हासामा पुग्यापछि डिगर्चा सांष्या ल्हासाका ३ लामालाई छोडि
भोटका भला आदमी मुसाहेव कारिन्दा गैह्र र ल्हासाको लामाका दुई भाई रा-
जा ध्यांजु[634] काजि धुरेन् काजि अैतु टावा काजि गैह्रलाई पक्रि ल्हासाका अ-
[14r]
२५
घिल्लो ठानादार अम्वा माथि रिसाई गोर्षा महाराजको फौज डिगर्चामा आउ-
दा तिमिहरुले लडाई गर्नु पर्न्या मुनासिव हो टेसु लामालाई फुल्याई डि-
गर्चावाट भगाई ल्हासा लग्यौ भनि सवैलाइ नेल हालि तिनै दुई अम्वा-
का वदलामा अरु दुइ अम्वा र ५ सय जति सिपाहिहरुलाई थानादार ज-
स्तो गरि ल्हासामा राषी फागुन मैन्हामा ल्हासावाट उसतरफ कुंच गऱ्या । ल्हा-
साका नजिक् सयकरौं कोस् एताउता गर्मिको दिन हुनाले र घटिया
हवा चलनाले गोर्षा महाराजको मुलुक् स्याफ्रु धैंवु टिमुऱ्यामा दुष्या-
का चान्चुन्का सिपाहि ङ्यारुंमा षंवा सोषपु[635] चिनिञा धेरै मऱ्या । ति मु-
र्दारहरुलाई गाड्नालाई भोट् मुलुकवाट सवै वेगारि पक्रि ल्याया ।
जलाउना निमित्त दारुवा नपाउदा घरघरका काठहरु झिकि ल्या-
या । विफर् हुनाले पनि भोट्का मानिस्हरु धेरै मऱ्या । त्यस्तै डवल्ले भो-
ट मुलुक् वैरान् र षराव हुन जानाले अझसम्म दुवै तरफका वेपारि सौ-
दागरहरुको आउन्या जानाको वाटो वन्द भया रहेछ । यस् भन्दा अघि रा-
जाको काजिको ल्हासाका लामाको थोर वहुत् भोट्मा हुकुम् चल्द
थियो । अव तिन्हेरु रैयेत्का हिसापमा छन् । भोटमा साना ठुला काम्मा
चिनिञाको हुकुम् चल्दछ । यो कैफियेत् जस्ताको तस्ता छ र लेषियो ।

634 RRC_0030_0001 छ्यॉंजु.
635 RRC_0030_0001 सोधयु.

2.1.6 The Understanding of Betravati (1792–1793 CE)

There seems to be no document in the Nepalese archives to formally testify the peace arrangements corresponding to the one quoted by General Padma Jang Rana in his *Life of Maharaja Sir Jang Bahadur* (1909), albeit without any accompanying original document. The Nepalese scholar Yogi Naraharinātha. (1965, 121; Engl. transl. 1964, 2) summarises this 'treaty' as follows and mentions that this is a Nepālī summary of the treaty written in English and stored in the Jaisīkoṭhā office in Kathmandu, probably the version Padma Jang Rana was quoting.
Source: Naraharinātha 1965, 121.

Translation (AM)

"1. From now onwards, China (Cīna) will remain as a father (*pitā*) of both Nepal and Tibet. Nepal and Tibet will behave with each other as brothers.
2. The price of the commodities looted in Lhasa should be paid by the Tibetan officials to the Nepalis after a proper investigation by the government of China.
3. Excluding armed soldiers, any Nepali is allowed to enter the border of Tibet and China at any time, establish factories and runs business.
4. If a fight breaks out between two brothers (Tibet and Nepal), the representatives of both governments should send a detailed report to Peking. The Peking Palace will make a final decision to solve the problem.
5. If a foreign power attacks Nepal, China will support Nepal.
6. In order to respect and show 'a father son relationship', the two brothers (Nepal and Tibet) will send products of their own country to China once in every 5 years.
7. In return, China will send presents (*kośelī*) to show friendship. China will make all necessary arrangements for the diplomats (of Nepal and Tibet) who come to and leave China."

Edition (AM)

१. अब उप्रान्त नेपाल तथा तिब्बत दुवै देशको चीन पिताको रूपमा रहने छ। नेपाल तथा तिब्बत दुवैले आफुहरुलाई भाइ-भाइ नाताले व्यवहार गर्नेछन्।

२. चिनियाँ सरकार द्वारा समुचित जाँच पडताल गरि सके पछि ह्लासामा लुटियेका मालको सारा मूल्य तिव्वती अधिकारीहरुले लुटियेका नेपालीहरुलाई तिर्नु पर्नेछ ।
३. शसस्त्र सैनिक वाहेक समस्त नेपाली जनताले जुन समयमा पनि तिव्वत र चीनको सिमा-क्षेत्र भित्र भ्रमण गर्न. कल कार्खानाहरु स्थापित गर्न तथा व्यापार चलाउन अनुमति पाएका छन् ।
४. यदि दुइ भाइ-भाइ देशहरु मध्ये कुनै एक पक्षवाट परस्परमा अकारण एक आर्काको प्रदेश हत्याउने अभिप्राय लियेर झगडा उठेमा दुवै देशका सरकारका प्रतिनिधिहरुले पेचिन (पेकिङ्ग) दर्वारमा पूर्ण विवरण पठाउनु पर्ने छ । यही पेचिन (पेकिङ्ग) दर्वारले झगडा समाधानको अन्तिम निर्णय दिनेछ ।
५. यदि नेपाललाई कुनै विदेशी शक्तिले चढाइ गर्यो भने चीन नेपाललाई मद्दत गर्न अवश्य विफल हुने छैन ।
६. यी दुवै भाइ भाइ देशहरु आफ्नो पैतृक आदरभाव दर्शाउनको हेतुले प्रत्येक पाँच वर्षमा आफ् आफ्ना देशमा उब्जेका वस्तु चीनमा पठाउने छन् ।
७. चीन सरकार यस्को सट्टामा सौजन्य दर्शाउने कोशेली पठाउने छ तथा चीन सरकारले चीनमा आउने औ जाने शिष्टमण्डललाई सुविधाका प्रत्येक आवश्यकीय व्यवस्थाहरु मिलाई दिनेछ ।

2.1.7 Instruction for Devadatta Thāpā's Visit to Beijing, VS 1849 (1792 CE)

Source: document PATRA80_00004, from the Foreign Ministry collection, National Archives Nepal.

Synopsis (PB, RK, AM)

These are Directives by King Raṇa Bahādura Śāha to *kājī* Devadatta Thāpā, to be despatched to the Emperor of China [cp. 2.2.3a, e, f], on what he should communicate to the Emperor (VS 1849):

By offering our respects to the Emperor through bowing, presenting the *khillata* (ceremonial robe) and the *kitāp*, we have been honoring his authority.

We were unaware of Chinese customs. However, Shamarpa Lama stated, "I have lived in China for 5–7 years and am familiar with their customs." Trusting his knowledge, we followed his advice, which ultimately led to the conflict between Tibet (Bhoṭ) and ourselves.

When Ṭuṅthvāṅ [Fuk'anggan] was arriving with his troops in Lhasa, Shamarpa was about to be handed over. However, he claimed to

be ill, saying he would go once he had recovered. He remained unwell and, after a few days, passed away.

After this, Ṭuṅthvāṅ advanced into our territory with a large army. Despite our longstanding respect for the Emperor, this situation arose because we had relied on poor advice. We sent a message to Ṭuṅthvāṅ explaining this. He replied, "Send a *kājī* (minister) with gifts (*saugata*) and an *arjī* (petition) to the Emperor along with me. I will convey your message, express your respect, and advocate on your behalf." However, the Gorkha Mahārāja replied, "I am still a young ruler. My intention was to send my uncle, the regent Bahādura Śāha, but due to the necessity of his presence to govern, I could not send him." Therefore, I, Devadatta Thāpā, have come in his place.

If Ṭuṅthvāṅ asks you to explain our concerns, convey the following points:

Traditionally, in both Tibet and Nepal, pure silver coins were used. Towards the end of the previous regime, as the rulers became impoverished, debased coins mixed with copper were sent to Tibet. Under our reign, we resumed sending pure silver coins, which were favored by Lhasa. However, Tibetans began circulating both pure and mixed coins. This practice of using debased coins alongside pure ones is neither customary nor fair. It also brings misfortune and is considered sinful. Request the Emperor to instruct Tibet to exclusively use pure silver coins.

If asked regarding our relations with the British, [reply him that] we will keep you informed through [regular] correspondences.

If asked about our relations with Navāb Āsapat Daulā, inform him that our borders meet in the west, and we maintain friendly relations.

We are grateful for the Emperor's support. Should we face any challenges, we will seek his assistance and request that wealth and troops be provided.

Bring back a letter from the Emperor confirming his agreement to support us. Make this the central point of your discussions with him.

Date: Tuesday, the 2nd of Asvin in the year VS 1849 (18 September 1792 CE)

Edition (RA, MB, PB, RK, AM)

श्री दुर्गासहाय
स्वस्ति श्रीगिरिराजचक्रचूडामणिनरनारायणेत्यादिविविधविरूदावलीविराजमानमानोन्नतश्रीमन्महाराजाधिराज-

श्रीश्रीश्रीमहाराजेरणवहादूरसाहवहादूरसम्सेर्जङ्गदेवानाम् सदा समरविजयिनाम्
चिन वादसाहछेउ देवदत्त थापा काजिलाई पठाउदा विंति गर्न्या कुराको सवाल
चिन वादसाहलाई हामिले षिल्लत् र किताप सिरचह्राई वादसाहलाई मान्यैको हो
चिनको दस्तुर हामिले केहि जान्याको थियेन । स्यामर्पा लामाले ५।७ वर्ष चीनमा म
वस्याको छु चिनको दस्तुर म जाँ-
दछु भनि स्यामर्पा लामाले भन्दा वढियै कुरो देषायो हो भनि भरपर्न जादा भोटको र
हाम्रो झगरा पारिदियो
भारि फौजसित टुथ्वाँङ् लाहासा आईपुग्दा स्यामर्पा लामालाई चिन [corr. लिन]
आया म वुझाउँला भन्थ्यौ बुझावन जाउ भनि हा-
मिले भन्दा मलाइ विसन्च छ संच भयापछि म जांला भनि वडो गाह्रो मानि
वोल्या । विसंच छँदै थियो । अलिक् दिनपछि
स्यामर्पा मऱ्यो ---
ताहापछि भारि फौज लि टुँङ्थ्वाङ् हाम्रा राज्यभित्र आइपुग्या । अधिदेषि हामिले
वादसाह मान्याकै हो । घटिया मा-
निस्का विगार्दा एस्तोपर्न गयो भनि भर भारादारलाई वक्साउन पिछापर्न टुङ्थ्वा-
ङ्छेउ पठाआथ्युँ । टुङ्थ्वाङ्ले पि-
छाजति पर्न आयौ त पिछा पनि लिऔ भोटसितको तिमिहरुको झगरा पनि छिनि
दिउंला वादसाहका हजूर एक ज-
ना काजि अर्जि सौगादसमेत हाम्रा साथ गरि पठाउ वादसाहका हजुर्मा पुऱ्याइ पिछा
पारि वडोमान् मरातव वक्सी-
स सर्क राजी गराइ पठाँउँला भनि टुँङ्थ्वाङ्ले आग्या गर्दा महाराजले म भन्या
नावालक छु काकावावालाई पठाउँ
भन्या मुलुक्को सम्भार रहन्या थियेन र पठावन नसकि हामिलाई पिछा पर्न वक्साउन
आउ भनि मर्जि भयो र आयाका हुं
भनि विंति गर्नु
टुँथ्वाँले तिम्रो मतलव दुषदर्द विंति गर भनि मेहेरमान्गि गऱ्या वादसाहछेउ विंति
गर्नाको तपसिल
भोटको र नेपालको चलन् अधि परापरदेषि ताँवो नमिलेको चोषो चांदिको छाप
चल्थ्यो विचमा पछिका राजा कंगाल
हुनाले तावो मिस्याको षोटो चलन्को छाप गरि भोट पठाँउथ्या । हाम्रा पालामा
असल चांदिको चलन् वढिया हो भनि पठाँ-
आथ्युँ । पहिले त लासाले पनि वढियै मान्योथ्यो पछि असल चांदि र तांवो मिस्याको
वरोवरि चलन् गर्न लाग्या तांवो र चां-
दि वरोवरि चलावन्या परंपरादेषिको पनि रित् होइन । षोटो चलन् गऱ्या पाप पनि
लाग्छ सुभ पनि हुंदैन । हाम्रो विं-
तिं लाग्या चोषो चाँदिका छापको चलन् लासालाई हुकुम हुन्या हो भनि विन्ति गर्नु
फिरंगिसित कस्तो छ भन्या चिठिपत्रको श्रेष्ठाचार छँदैछ
नवाफ आसपत् दौलासित तम्रो कस्तो छ भनि सोध्या पश्चिमपट्टि उन्सित सांध
जोरियाको छ हामिसित पनि मिलापै छ भनि विं-
ति गर्नु

वादसाहले हामिलाई पिछा पनि लिनु भयो हामिले पनि वादसाह मान्युँ हामि माथि कोहि वलीयो हरिप् चढिआया-
का दिनमा हामि मद्दत्को विंति लेषौंला । तस् दिनमा धन् फौज पठाई गुहार गर्नु भनि विंति पार्नु । वादसाहले हामिलाई
पठायाका चिठिमा मद्दत् दिउंला भनि लेषाई ल्याउनु । यो कुरो जेठो गरि गर्नु । ईति सम्वँत १८४९ साल मिति आश्वीन सुदि
२ रोज ३ । शुभम् ।

2.1.8 Letter of Raṇa Bahādura Śāha VS 1849 (1792 CE) to Kājī Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe or Bhoṭu Pā̃ḍe and Rāmajit Pā̃ḍe

Source: Naraharinatha 1965, 55–56[636]

Translation (AM)

The Chinese Emperor is not a small, but a great Emperor. By the grace of the venerable goddess, we could have completely driven out the [Chinese] this time [at Nuvakot], but it did not seem to us appropriate to create a permanent conflict with the Emperor (lit. to damage the realm [*ḍhuṅgo*] of the Emperor). Therefore, he too intended to make a [peace] arrangement or negotiation (*ghā*[637]) with us, and we also intended to make [such a] treaty. Ṭuṃthyāṅ has also written "send one of the four Kājīs to China with a letter and presents etc. (*sara-saugāta*) in order to pay a *darśana* to (i.e., to visit) the Emperor". In the past, our Kājīs also used to got to Tanahu and Lamjung to conclude the peace arrangements (*ghā garnu*) there. We realised that it is not enough not to have sent a Kājī this time (*āja*) to the Emperor. We thought that the senior most Kājī, Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe, who has received *birtā* land grants, may go. Therefore, you must go. If you delay, there will be damages to [our] realm. [Thus], you may need to go from there. So far as orders are concerned, you are a Pā̃ḍe of our palace so do all that will benefit our realm and give you the credit. There is nothing you do not know. You know everything. Understand this well. Send a reply immediately (lit. within a *ghaḍī*) after getting this letter. Delay will harm

636 See also RRS 2(4), April, 1970, 98.
637 This is glossed *sandhi* by Bajrācārya and Nepāla 1957.

us. Date: Thursday, the 13th of the bright fortnight of Bhādra VS 1849 (30 August 1792 CE) from Kāntipura.[638]

Edition

श्री ईश्वरी
श्री दुर्गा सहायः १
स्वस्तिश्रीगिरिराजचक्रचूडामणिनरनारायणेत्यादिविविधविरुदावलीविराजमानमानोन्नतश्रीमन्महाराजाधिराज श्री श्री श्रीमहाराजे रणवहादुरसाहवहादुरसंसेरजङ्गदेवानां सदासमरविजयिनाम् :-
स्वस्ति श्रीसर्वोपमायोग्यराजभारसामर्थ श्रीदामोदर पाँडेके आसिषपूर्वकपत्रमिदम् अँहा कुशल ताहाँ कुशल चाहिये आगे आहाँ को समाचार भलो छ उप्रान्त चिन को वादसाह भन्या को सानु होइन ठुलो वादसाह हो यस पाला आया को·····का मेहेर ले काढि कन धपाउँ भन्या पनि सकिन्या थियो तर वादसाह सँगको ढुङ्गाको विगार पारि राषनु पर राम्रो पर्देन तसर्थ उसले पनि घाइ गर्न आँट्यो हामिले पनि घाई गर्न आँट्युँ चार काजिमा एक काजि चिठि पत्र सर सौगात ली चीन वादसाहको दर्सन गर्न पठाई देउ भनी टुंथ्वाङ्ले पनि लेषेछ तनहुँ लमजुङ् मा पनि घा गर्न हिजो काजीहरु जादै थिया आज वादसाह छेउ काजी नपठाइ पुग्दैन यो हाम्रा चित्तले पनि देष्यो आहा अरु काजिहरुलाइ भन्दा जेठो काजि विर्ता पाउन्या दामधर पाँडे जाला भनि भन्या तसर्थ तैंले जानु पऱ्यो ढिल गऱ्या ढुङ्गाको विरिन्या छ तैले तेतैवाट हिडनु पर्ला अह्राउन पह्राउन का अर्थलाई हाम्रा दर्वारको पाँडे होस् ढुङ्गाको सप्रन्या तँ लाइ जस हुन्या तँ नजांन्या केहि छैनस् जान्यै जस् एस कुराको तेरो बुझ यो मोहर पुग्याका एक घरिका विचमा एस कुराको उत्तरा चाँडो विंती गरी पठा ढिल गऱ्या विरिन्या छ मिति भाद्र शुदि १३ रोज ५ मुकाम कान्तिपुर शुभम् (संवत् १८४६)

2.1.9 Nepālikabhūpavaṃśāvalī (c. 1838 CE)

This chronicle, also known as Wright Chronicle,[639] has been edited and translated by Bajracharya and Michaels 2016. It contains a short remark on the war in chapter 20, 90–94 (Bajracharya and Michaels 2016, vol. 1, 116–17 and 2016, vol. 2, 135), in which the king clearly is declared to be the victor of the war.

638 Vajrācārya and Nepāla 1957, 71–72.
639 Wright 1877.

Translation (MB, AM)

[90] He [Raṇa Bahādura Śāha] summoned Śyāmārpā Lāmā of the northern direction, learned secrets from him, performed *sikhārjuna*[640] etc., sent the troops that looted Digarcā, and brought back much wealth. He thus ruled, causing harm to the Emperor of China. [91] The Chinese Emperor, being unable to bear this, sent Kājī Dhurīna and Minister Thuṃmaṃthāma[641], accompanied by a large army. [92] When they had reached Dhebuṃ[642], the king caused the Lākhyā Bāṃḍā of Bhiṃkṣe Bāhāla in Pāṭan to perform *puraścaraṇa*,[643] sent Minister Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe there, and killed the Chinese army. He thus caused the Chinese Emperor to praise him. [93] After a few days, the Chinese Emperor proposed a truce, and peace was made between the two.

Edition

॥ [90] उत्तर दिसामा श्यामर्पा लामा बोलाई भेद सुनि सिखार्जुन आदि गरि · लस्क र पठाई दिगर्चा लुटी धेरै धन ल्याई चीनका बादसाहकन धक्का गरी हुकुम चलाया ॥ [91] फेरी ताहापछि चीनका बादसाहले सह|न नसकी · धुरीन भन्याका काजीसित थुंमंथाम मंत्रि पठाई · धेरै लस्कर पठाया र · [92] धेबुं पुगीरहदा पाटन् भिंक्षेबाहा-लका ला|ख्या बाडालाई पुरश्चरन् लगाई · मंत्रीनायक दामोदरपाडे पठाई · चीनका लस्कर संहार गरी · काटी · बादसाहले धन्य क|हाई हुकुम चलाया ॥ [93] फेरी केही दिनपछि · चिनका बादसाहले मिलीजुली रह्या बढिया होला भन्दा सलुक भैगया ॥ ॥

2.1.10 An *Arjī* from Jagatsera Khatrī Chetrī Re His Journey Through Tibet and China, VS 1925a (1868 CE)

This letter has previously been edited and translated also in *Documenta Nepalica* (ID no.: DNA_0003_0047) and Jagatsera 2021 and Michaels 2019a, where more details of persons and places are given. See also the following document.

640 Shikarjong or Shelkarhasa.
641 Tumthvang.
642 Dhaibung
643 See Part I, 5.1. for explanation.

Translation (AM, MB, PB)

Śrī
No. 280[644]
1 – The Emperor (of China)
2 – His Majesty's Government (of Nepal)
3 – The Government of Tibet
Petition (*arjī*)
Uprānta: Master, Compassionate One, the earlier news from the letter of Thursday, the 2nd day of the bright fortnight of Bhādra in 1925, which I sent from the city of Vāthāṃ[645] will be known to you. Local porters (? *dhevā*) of the city of Aulithāṃ[646] were given the responsibility of delivering loads of opium to the city of Vāthāṃ. Of the loads that were to be handed over after arriving in Vāthāṃ 2 could not be delivered because they fell into a river. For the 2 loads that could not be delivered, the costs of 128 *gyāmā*s[647]—with 1 *gyāmā* being equal to 3|6 (3.1.6) silver *ṭāka*s—totals 460|8 silver *ṭāka*s.[648] Men whom the [Au]lithām porters sent with us collected [the money] from the Khālsā[649] agents. Having received the silver, we [your] servants departed for Nepal from the city of Vāthāṃ on Sunday, the 5th of the bright fortnight of Bhādra.

Having walked for 2 days from Vāthāṃ, we reached the village called Khojani. It so happened that the Englishman named Mr. [T. T.] Cooper had arrived there that same day on his way to Pecin (Beijing)—the man about whom I had written to you, Your Excellency, from Vāthāṃ. This English *sahib* heard of my arrival in that village, and he came to meet me, and [so] I met him. Then this *sahib* asked me to stay 1 day in that village so that he could explain me his sufferings. I agreed and stayed for 1 day in that village. This is what the *sahib* told me:

"Some time ago, from Ṭhiṃḍaphu [Chengdu = 成都府],[650] Cuṃducyāṃcuṃ [the General of Chengdu, Wu Tang 成都將軍吳棠], a high-ranking

644 This refers to the document number in the registry.
645 Batang, a city at the border between Tibet and Sichuan.
646 Litham or Lithang.
647 In modern Tibetan *gyama* (*rgya ma*) refers to half a kilogram.
648 The *ṭāka* or *tã̄ka* (Skt. *ṭaṅka*) is a silver coin that was introduced to Tibet by Newar traders in the sixteenth century. In Lhasa opium was sold for its weight in silver. Cp. Waddell 1975, 478. It was in use until 1939, when rupees began to be used.
649 Apparently Tibetan functionaries.
650 The place is described elsewhere as a station between "Paitan" [Ba-tang 巴塘] and "Lochang syan" [Lushan County 蘆山縣] along the route from Kathmandu

minister of the (Chinese) Emperor provided (to me) a travel document to go to Lhasa [in] Tibet, [and to] Nepal and India. I came here with [that] travel document. I proceeded leisurely along the way, arriving in the province of Tausyān Tausyān [Sichuan] and the cities of Tārcandeu [Dartsemdo],[651] Lithāṃ (Lithang) and Vāthāṃ [Ba-tang]. As I was preparing the horses etc. to depart for Lhasa after resting a few days in Vāthāṃ, they sent 350 armed soldiers (*sipāhi*) from the Tibet border and caused me great trouble. When they interrogated me—who and what I was—I showed them the travel document provided by the Emperor's high-ranking minister. They didn't accept the travel permit, saying, 'You're a rogue. Return to where you have come from. You cannot pass through our territory.' I was alone with only 2–3 servants and seeing that it would be awful were my life to end in vain for standing ground against so many persons and seeing that they would not allow me to pass through their territory, I instead decided to [pass] through the territory of Iunyān (Yunnan), come out in the territory of Burma and go on to Calcutta. On the way I suffered greatly for [lack] of food and shelter. Even though I had some wealth, it was of no use in such an uncivilised territory. After 20 days of surviving on milk and some plain wheat flour I found in a place where I had come upon pastureland, I reached the territory of Iunyān. There the Chinese arrested me and jailed me for 35 days. Even though I showed them the travel document from the Emperor's high-ranking minister, they didn't accept their own minister's travel document. [Only] by paying out a lot of silver [could] I escaped from there. Wishing to go to the land of Burma, I walked for another three days. However, due to the very big war among the Chinese people,[652] everything along the way was closed. I decided that I would go to Hindustāna back through China. I suffered even more on the way back than before. My horse broke a leg, and I had to abandon it. The Khāmbālis (i.e. Khampas) did not give me a horse, even though I [would have] paid them. Although I wanted to buy it with my own money, I couldn't do so. I had to walk on foot for several days in such dangerous, uncivilised and snowy territory. Finally, completely exhausted, I met you."

When he told this, I couldn't contain myself, given the great friendship between the British Government and the Nepalese Government, and having seen the utterly great suffering the *sahib* had been through,

to Beijing and "as taken during the Embassy of Chauntra Pushker Sah, showing the number and position of the mountain[s] passed" (Hodgson 1856, 488).

651 Tārcandeu is most likely Tārciṃdeu (Dar rtse mdo /thartsendo/).

652 Probably the Panthay Rebellion.

I did as much as I could for him. I gave him whatever food I had. Since he hadn't eaten meat for several days, I gave him a sheep, and when I saw the trouble the *sahib* had walking, I also gave him a good horse. When we saw a large *tulukulām*[653] of Tibetans, [he] didn't say anything [more] about staying with me. The next day the *sahib* came to me to bid farewell and said: "I will never forget the favour you bestowed upon me by providing me with a horse in such a desperate time."

Then he (again) departed for Ṭhiṃḍaphu. I arrived on the same day in a village called Lhāmdi[654] at the Tibetan border. At this place, a Tibetan officer, a *maṃgāmṭheci*,[655] came to me. The rumour was that the Gorkha[li]s have brought several Englishmen, dressing them as themselves, had arrived in Lhasa, and the *maṃgāmṭheci* of Maṃgām received a big signature (i.e., a letter from a high authority) from there. However, we couldn't verify the substance of it. This was told to us by the *maṃgāmṭheci*. Under the suspicion that several Englishmen had been brought from Ṭhiṃḍaphu, soldiers were placed at different places including the border. We have only heard rumours but haven't seen [things] for ourselves.

My Lord, it has been three years that we left your feet. These people are with us day and night: 3 [or] 4 persons including the Ucui[656] who were provided to us by the *ambā* (Chinese ambassador Jing-wen) in Lhasa, 20 [to] 25 Chinese soldiers, and a Tibetan official named Phuphuchiriṃ[657] provided by the four *kājī*s of Kāsyāl. A Chinese soldier named Tāṃtālce accompanied us from Cuṃdu (Chamdo?) [sector] of Ṭhiṃḍaphu up to Tārcindeu[658] town. High officials at various places accompanied us to their borders and questioned [us]. If we had surreptitiously brought with us Englishmen, these officials would not have allowed us through. Suspecting that we had brought [Englishmen], even though we didn't think of such a thing, they assembled a great *tulukulām*. At the crossroads called Lhāmdi in Tibet we gathered together with Chinese soldiers and the Tibetan official, the *maṃgāmṭheci* of

653 Meaning of this term is unclear.
654 Around Bathang and Chamdo.
655 *manga* is known to have been a kind of tax, while *theci* is perhaps derived from Nep. *ṭheka[dāra]*, "contractually appointed revenue collector".
656 This might be the military officer accompanying them whose name was Wu Guo-ying 吳國英, probably addressed as Wu Zong-ye 吳總爺.
657 Probably a transliteration of phur bu tshe ring, the Central Tibetan pronunciation being Phūbu Tshering.
658 Tārcandeu, Tib. *Dar rtse mdo*.

Maṃgām, and discussed about the required horse-*khālsā*.[659] I realised that it would be good, regarding the rumour that we had brought many Englishmen and caused this *tulukulām* out of a misunderstanding, to talk about it once the [local] Chinese and Tibetan officials had heard about it and gathered. I said to the Tibetan official, the *maṃgāmaṭheci*: "You have posted many soldiers at the border thinking that we, the *kājī*s of Gorkha, have brought many Englishmen from Ṭhiṃḍaphu. How many Englishmen do you see with us? Where did you hear that we brought Englishmen? We have come on our Government's business, and we will return to our kingdom. Regarding the question whether or not we have brought Englishmen, here are Chinese and Tibetan officials as witnesses. You can ask them."

The *maṃgāmṭheci* replied: "The Gorkha Government and the Tibetan Government are one. We didn't say that you have brought [Englishmen]. We didn't even mean that you intended to bring [some]. When such a big [entourage bearing] a gift for the Chinese Emperor arrives, some may come along hidden among it. People have been placed because there has to be a check at the border."

When they said checking must be done at their border, we kept quiet. Then the *maṃgāmṭheci* made the arrangements for us regarding the required *khalsā*. We departed from Lhāmdi village on Sunday, the 12th of the bright fortnight of Bhādra and reached Maṃ village on Monday, the 13th of the bright fortnight of Bhādra.

Up till today we have bought a total of 55 horses [of the number] ordered by His Majesty's Government and by other parties, and by us, Your servants. We regularly checked them over as much as our knowledge allowed us to. All the horses have remained healthy up to now. We will depart from here on Wednesday, the 1st of the dark fortnight of Āśvina. I have written this letter containing the current news. I will keep you posted on future news. Please forgive [Your] servant for any mistake in writing. What more [to say] to the Knowledgeable One!

Crores and crores of prostrations by Kājī Jagatsera Khatrī Chetrī, ever [Your] servant.

Wednesday, the 1st of the dark fortnight of Āśvina in the (Vikrama) era year 1925, station Calīcalāu. Auspiciousness.

659 Probably a tax relating to horses.

Edition (AM, MB, PB)

[1r-part1]
श्री \
«नं २८०»
श्री ५ वादसाह
१
श्री ५ सर्कार
२
श्री भोट् सर्कार
३
अर्जि
उप्रांत ष्वामित करुणानिधान् यस अर्जिभंदा अघिको हालषवर १९२५ साल भाद्र शु-
दि २ रोज ५ मा वाथां सहरवाट चह्राइपठायाका अर्जिवाट जाहेर होला औलिथां सहर-
का धेवाहरूलाई वाथां सहरसंम पुर्याउना निमित्त जिंमा दियाका अफिंका भारि मध्ये
वाथां पुगि वुझिलिदा अफिंका भारि २ षोलामा षस्यो भनि वुझाउन नसक्याका भारि
२ के अफिं ग्यामा १२८ के दर ग्यामा १ के चादि टाक ३।६ का दर्ले ज्मा चांदि टाक
४६०।८
लिथांका धेवाहरूले हामिसगै पठायाका मानिसहरूले षाल्सावालसग उठाई दि-
या र नीज चादि बुझिली भाद्र शुदि ५ रोज १ का दिन वाथां सहरवाट हामि सेवकहरू
पनि नेपालतर्फ रमाना भै आञ्यूँ वाथांवाट २ दिनका वाटो आई षोजनि भंन्या गाउ-
मा पुग्याकै दिनमा अघि वाथाङ्वाट हजुरमा अर्जि लेषि चह्राइपठायाका मिष्टर कु-
पर नाम गर्याको अंग्रेज पनि यसै गाउमा पेचिन्तिर जानालाई आउदा रह्याछन्
म तेस गाउमा पुग्याका षवर नीज अंग्रेजले सुन्या छन् र नीज अंग्रेज साहेवले म-
सग भेट् गर्न आया र मैले भेट् गर्यौं नीज साहेववाट यस गाउमा तपाईले १ दिं मुका-
म् गरिदिनु भया मेरा जो भयाको दुष दर्द विस्तार गर्दा हुँ भनि भंदा नीज साहेवका व-
चन् मानि १ दिं नीज गाउमा मुकाम् गर्या र नीज साहेवले गर्याको कुरो पैल्हे ठिंडफु-
वाट ---१---का ठुला मुषतियार चुंदुच्यांचुंङ्वाट भोट् ल्हासा नेपाल हिंदुस्थान्
जानलाई राहादानि गरिदिदा सो राहादानि लीकन येस् तर्फ आञाँ वाटामा आउदा
तौस्यान् तौस्यान् देसमा र तार्चेन्देउ सहरमा लीथांमा वाथांमा सुविस्तैसग आ
ञाँ र केहि दिन वाथाङ्मा वसी थकाइ मारि वाहा पछि ल्हासा तर्फ जाउ भनि घोडा
षाल्साको वंदोवस्त गर्दा तेहि वेलामा भोट्का सिवानावाट ३५० हतियार वाध्या-
का सिपाहि पठाई मलाइ साह्रै दुष दिया त को होस् क्या होस् भनि धेरै कुरा गर्दा
मैले ---१---का ठुला मंत्रिले दियाको राहादानि देषाञाँ निज राहादानिलाई प-
नि केहि मानेनन् त लुच्चा होस् जुन् वाटो आयौ उसैवाट फर्कि जाउ हाम्रा मुलुकवा-
ट जान हुदैन भनि भंदा आफु येउटा र २।३ जना चाकर मात्र हुदा मेरा ज्यू अनाहक्मा
जाला १ जनाले यतिकासग जोर गरि ज्यान गयो भन्या वहुत पाजी ठहर्न्या देषता र इ-
नीहरूले इनिका मुलुकवाट जान नदिन्या देषता वरू इउन्यान्का मुलुकवाट ब्रह्मा-
को मुलुक निस्की कलकत्ता जानाको मनसुव गरि गयाँ र जादामा वाटामा षानु पिनु
वस्तुमा साह्रै दुष पायाँ आफुसग धन् भैकन पनि यस्ता जंगली मुलुकमा केहि ला-

ग्दो रहेनछ केहि दिन् गोठ भेटेका ठाउमा दुद र अली अलि काचो पिठो षाई जिविका चलाइ २० दिन्को वाटो गयापछि इउन्यान्का मुलुकमा पुग्या र ताहा चिनियाहरू-ले पक्रि ३५ दिंसम्म मलाइ कैद गर्या ---१---का तेत्रा मंत्रीका राहादानि देषाउदा-मा पनि आफुनु मंत्रिका राहादानि मानेनन् र ढेरै चादि षर्च गरि ताहावाट उम्क्यर ब्रह्माका मुलुकतिर जाउ भंन्या मनसुव गरि दिं ३को वाटोसंम गञा र चिनियै चिनिया-को साह्रै ठुलो लडाइले वाटो घाटो सवै वंद भयाको देषदा फेरी चिनैको वाटो गरि हिंदुस्तान जांछु भनि त्यहि वाटो फर्किआयाका हुँ अघि जादामा भंदा फर्किआउ-दा झन् साह्रै दुष पाञाँ आफु चह्रन्या घोडाको षुट्टो भाचियो र छोडिआञ्यूँ अरू घोडा ज्याला दिदामा पनि षांवालिहरूले घोडा दियेनन् आफनु दामले किनी चह्रिजाउ भन्या पनि पायेन र येस्ता अघोरि जंगली औ वर्फानका देसमा ढेरै दिंसं-म पैदल हिडि आउनुपर्दा साह्रै फजित षाइ आउदा तपाइसग याहा भेट् भयो भनि नीज साहेवले वृतांत कुरा गर्दामा वृटी सर्कारको र ---२---को साह्रै दोस्ती हुदा मैले पनि इ साहेवले साह्रै दुष पाई वडा वडा आपत् षाई आयाको देषता मेरो पनी छाति रहेन मैले पनि सकेसंमको षातिर गर्या जो मसित भयाको षान्या पिन्या प-नि दिञाँ मासु पनि षान नपायाको ढेरै दिन भयाछन् र भेडा पनि दिञाँ नीज साहे-वले पैदल हिडि कष्ट षाइ आयाको देषता मसित वढिया घोडा थियो तेहि घोडा नीज साहेवलाइ दिञाँ भोटेहरूको ठुलो तुलुकुलाम् देषदा मेरा साथ लागिआनाको केहि

[1r-part 2]

कुरा गरेनन् भोलिपल्ट नीज साहेव मसित आइ विदा भै मलाइ यस्ता आपदमा ति-मिले घोडा दियाको मैले यो गुन् विर्सन्या छैन भनि ठिंडफुतिर गया म पनि तेसै दिन-मा भोट्का मिवाना ल्हाम्दि भंन्या गाउमा आञा नीज जगामा भोट्का काजकाम् ग-र्न्या मंगाम्ठेचि पनि आया गोर्षालीहरूले ढेरै अंग्रेज आफनै पहिरन् गराइल्याया-का छन् भंन्या कुरा ल्हासामा भै याहा मंगाम् वरुन्या मंगाम्ठेचीलाइ पनि ठुलो दस्कत् आयाको छ भंन्या समाचार वाहिरी कुरा मात्रै सुनियो तेस्को मुद्दा कुरो केहि थाहा पा-येन याहा मंगाम्ठेचेले भन्या ढेरै अंग्रेज ठिंडफुवाट ल्यायाका छन् भनि जगा जगामा सिपाहि राष्याका रह्याछन् सेवानामा पनि सिपाहि राष्याका छन् भंन्या वाहिरि कुरा सुन्या हामिले भन्या देषेनौ प्रभु हामिले हजुरका पाउ छोडिआयाको ३ साल भयो हाम्रा साथमा ल्हासाका अंवावाट साथ लाइदियाको उचुइस्मेत् ३।४ जना र चि-निया सिपाहि २०।२५ जना कास्याल्का ४ काजिले साथ लाइ पठाइदियाको भोटे भारादार फुफुछिरिं नाउ गर्याको १ जना यति मानिस रात दिं हाम्रा साथैमा छ-न् ठिंडफुका चुंदुवाट पनि तार्चिन्देउ सहरसंम तांताल्चे मान् गर्याको चिनिया भारादार १ पठाइदियाको थियो जगा जगाका भारादार आफना आफना सिवा-नासंम पुर्याउदै जाचदै गरिआयाका छन् हामिले हाम्रा साथमा अंग्रेज लुका-इ ल्यायाको भया हामिसगै आउन्या नीज भारादारले नै ल्याउन दिन्या थियेनन् मनैमा नभयाको कुरा आज हामिले ल्यायाको छ भंन्या यत्रो तुलुकुलाम् गरि-राष्याको रहेछ ल्हामदि भंन्या भोट्का दोसाधमा चिनिया भारादार नीज मंगाम् वरुन्या भोट्या भारादार मंगाम्थेचे हामिहरू ज्मा भै जो चाहिन्या घोडा षाल्साको कुरा गर्यौं फेरि हामिसग ढेरै अंग्रेज ल्यायाको छ भंन्या कुराका गल्वा मा वेवुजैमा इन्ले तुलुकलाम् गर्याको सुंदा चिनिया भारादार भोटे भारादार भयाका वेलामा यो कुरो गर्या देषि वढिया होला भंन्या मेरा चित्तले देषदा नीज भोटे भारादार मंगाम्ठेचे-

सग हामि गोर्षाका काजिहरूले ठिंडफुदेषि ढेरै अंग्रेजहरू सगै ल्यायाका छन् भनि ढेरै सिपाहि सिवानामा ल्याइराष्याका रह्याछौ हामिसित कति अंग्रेज रहेछ कति देष्यौ हामिले अंग्रेज ल्यायो भंन्या कुरा काहा सुन्यौ आफनु ---२---का काममा आ-
या थ्युँ आफना राज्यमा फर्कि जांछौ हामिहरूले अंग्रेज ल्याउनु नल्याउनुका कु-
रा गर्दामा साछि चिनिया भारादार भोट्का भारादार यहि छन् सोधि हेर भंदा निज मंगामथेचेले गोर्षा ----२ ---र ---३ ---यकै हुन् तपाइहरूवाट ल्यायो भन्याको पनि होइन तपाइहरूवाट ल्याउला भंन्या हाम्रा मनसा पनि छैन यत्रा ---१---
का सौगात् आयाका वेलामा लुकि छलि आयाको होलान् भनि हामि सेवानामा वरूया भारादारहरूले जाचनुपर्नाले मानिस रह्याका हुन् भनि भन्यो र तिन्का सि-
वानामा तिन्ले जाचवुझ गर्नुपर्छ भनि भंदा हामिले जवाफ केहि दियेनौ हामि-
हरूलाइ पनि नीज मंगाम्थेचेले जो चाहिन्या षाल्साको वंदोवस्त गरिदिया र ल्हाम्दि गाउवाट भाद्र शुदि १२ रोज १मा रमाना भै आई भाद्र शुदि १३ रोज २ मा मंगा-
उ पुग्यौ आजसंम ---२---को र तर्फ तर्फका फर्मायसि षरिद भयाको र हामि सेवकहरूको स्मेत् ज्मा घोडा ५५ षरिद भैसकियो हामि सेवकहरूका वुद्धिले भेट्यासंम जाचि लीराष्याको छ आजसंम घोडा पनि सवै सावुद छन् जाहावाट हामिह-
रू आश्वीन वदि १ रोज ४ मा रमाना भै आउछु जो भयाका हालषवरको अर्जि लेषि चह्राइपठायाको हो पछि पनि जो भयाका हालषवरको अर्जि लेषि चह्राइपठा-
उन्या काम गरूंला हरपमा उचनिच पर्याको सेवक माथि क्षेमा राषिवक्स्या
जावस् विज्ञे चरणेषु किमधिकं
सदा सेवक काजि जगत्सेर षतृ क्षतृको
कोटि २ दंडवत् कुर्नेस्
इति संवत् १९२५ साल मिति आश्विन वदि १ रोज ४ मुकां चलीचलाउ शुभम्

2.1.11 An *Arjī* from Jagatsera Khatrī Chetrī Re His Journey Through Tibet and China, VS 1925b (1868 CE)

In this *arjī*, Kājī Jagatsera Khatrī Kṣetrī reports on his meeting with the British traveller Thomas Thornville Cooper while he was on a mission to China. The document is edited and translated by Axel Michaels in collaboration with Manik Bajracharya and Pabitra Bajracharya (DNA_0004_0009). The report on the first meeting between Jagatsera Khatrī, an officer of ministerial rank (*kājī*) in Chengdu is described by the British traveller Thomas Thornville Cooper in the following words, which seem to portray Jagatsera in a more miserable situation than the Englishman:

> On the following day, His Excellency Juggut Share [Jagatsera], the Nepaulese ambassador, arrived. He was a young man of

> very courteous bearing, but seemed ill, and his conversation soon showed me that he was not only ill in body, but greatly depressed in spirits. His position was anything but pleasant, and he confided to me the history of his embassy on its way so far towards Pekin. He had left Khatmandoo nearly two years before, and after a long journey through Thibet, had arrived without encountering any serious difficulties at Ta-tsian-loo, the border town of China. Here he met his first repulse; a messenger from Pekin brought him an Imperial order to deliver the presents sent by Jung Bahadoor [Janga Bahadur Rana] to the Emperor at that place, and return to Nepaul, as the road to Pekin was rendered unsafe by the Nien-fei rebels. This the young ambassador refused to do, pleading his instructions from Jung Bahadoor, which compelled him to deliver the presents in person. The authorities were determined to enforce the Emperor's orders, and Juggut Share was equally determined to proceed to Pekin; another application accordingly had to be made to the Emperor, for a reply to which he waited several months. When it came, it was in the form of a permission to him to proceed as far as Chen-tu [Chengdu], in order to dispose of several hundred chests of opium, brought for sale in China, and then to return home. He soon reached Chen-tu, and hoped to proceed further; but the authorities made this impossible. He could hire neither coolies nor boats, and what was worse, no one would buy his opium; it was too strong, and the people preferred the native drug.
>
> At the time of my arrival, he had spent several months at Chen-tu, vainly pressing his request for leave to proceed to Pekin. The officials treated him with great discourtesy, hoping by this means to force him to return, and had lodged him in a dirty hovel outside the city, which, as he said, was so filthy, that he was ashamed to ask me to visit him in it. (Cooper 1871, 158–60 and 1882, 174–78).

Later, after his failed attempt to reach Assam in British India and thus a direct trade route from China to India, Cooper met Jagatsera again in a place called by him Pa-moo-tan west of Batang (see DNA_0003_0047 and Michaels 2019a for more details). This is what Cooper (1871, 398–400) reports:

While thus indulging in pleasant anticipations, a Goorkha came to say that the Ambassador was ready to see me; so off I started for his quarters, where (a great mark of distinction in this country) he received me at the door. When closeted together in his room, I narrated all my misfortunes, and requested permission to join his party, and travel with him to Lhassa. With many expressions of regret, the Ambassador informed me that he dared not let me accompany him, for the Thibetan Government had already given him notice that they would not permit any strangers to join his party. He, however, kindly told me that if I was in need of money he would be glad to supply my requirements, and would also give me a horse. Thus my hopes were again blighted; and for a moment or two I was unable to speak, so great was my disappointment. In Chen-tu the Ambassador had, with such apparent sincerity, proposed to me to accompany him, that I never dreamed of his now refusing. It seemed improbable that the plea of inability could be genuine, for the Thibetans were unmistakeably afraid of the Nepaulese, and I at once naturally concluded that he was afraid to take me with him without the orders of His Royal Highness Jung Bahadoor the Nepaulese Regent, whose jealous dislike of English intrusion into Nepaul was too strong for him to relish the idea of introducing an Englishman into the Thibetan nest, where he, in conjunction with the Chinese, finds so many golden eggs. Subsequent information, however, convinced me that Juggut Share would gladly have acceded to my request if he had dared; and I take this opportunity of placing on record my sense of gratitude for the great kindness experienced at his hands. (…)

Early next morning I repaired to Juggut Share's quarters with pens, ink, and paper, and we both set to work writing; I to her Majesty's representative at Khatmandoo, stating my imprisonment and forced return; and the Ambassador to Jung Bahadoor, from whom he had not heard for several months, as the Chinese had kept back all his despatches. While thus engaged, Juggut Share could not refrain from expressing his utter astonishment in the most amusing manner; every now and again looking at me, as I sat dressed in full European costume, he would say, 'Ah, you Englishmen are wonderful men ! who but an English Sahib would travel alone in such a dreadful country as this, so far away from any of your countrymen?' From such remarks as these,

which both he and his officers frequently made during the day, I learnt that whatever may be the jealous dislike of the Nepaulese towards the English in India, they certainly respect and admire the courage of 'the Sahibs.' It was at last time to return to dinner, for, as Juggut Share remarked, with polite apologies, 'his caste' could not allow of our eating together; but he had already shown his thoughtful care by sending a live sheep to our quarters; and I left him with a promise to call for his letters, and take leave of him, as I passed through the village in the morning. After I had dined, several officers of the Embassy called upon me, nearly all of whom spoke Chinese, which they had acquired during their two years sojourn in China; several who did not speak Chinese, understood Hindostani, and this served as a medium for conversation" (Cooper 1871, 389–400).

Translation (MB, PB, AM)

[page 1r]
Śrī
His Majesty's Government – 1
Government – 2[660]
No. 287
Letter [to the king] (*arjī*)
Uprānta: O Master, Treasure of Compassion, while [I was] in the city of Ṭhiṃḍaphu,[661] an English traveller by the name of Mister Kupara [Thomas Thornville Cooper] came to meet me and said to me: "You are a high-level functionary of the Government of Nepal; I am a man [representing] the British Government. These two governments enjoy a great friendship. From China I want to go to Lhasa, then to Nepal, and from Nepal to Calcutta. If you issue me a travel document, I [shall] take [that route] from here."

Since you said that we should meet Englishmen [only] when they come to meet us, I met him for that reason. Regarding the travel

660 Probably referring to the Chinese government.

661 The place must be Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan, which is spelled by Marco Polo (The Travels of Marco Polo, vol. II, ed. by Henry Yule et al., 1903, chs. XLVII and XLVIII) as Sindifu, and by Protestant missionaries as Ching-too Foo (*Encyclopedia Britannica*, 9th ed. (1878), vol. V, p. 638). Cooper 1871, 157 himself mentions that he met Jagatsera in "Chen-tu".

document, I answered the said sahib [as follows]: "Firstly, Sir, you know the country, China. A travel document [issued] by me will not work there. From [the border] there you reach (lit. 'is') the district of Tārciṃdeu (Dartsemdo),[662] [then] the district of Lithām (Litang)[663] [and] the district of Vāthām (Batang).[664] If you go further, [you reach] wild territory, [and] from there the Lhasa area. In these areas travel documents [issued] by me do not work; [therefore], I cannot issue the travel documents. If you ask me for advice, I must tell you what I have seen and heard. I certainly cannot tell you to go through that wild area. They themselves won't let you go [there]. Because of dacoits and thieves even groups of 15/20 people cannot walk [through their territory]. Moreover, the area has been destroyed due to the Nyāruṃ[665] war." I have heard news at Ṭhiṃḍaphu that the said sahib left, saying: "Either my life will end, or I leave [it] in your hands [to save me]." Today, after we reached Vāṭhām, we heard that he too had reached Vāṭhām in the dress of a Gorkhalī and proclaiming, "I am a Gorkhalī." He [and his entourage][666] stayed 15 days in Vāṭhām. [But] the people of Vāṭhām city recognised him as an Englishman and said, "If you are a Gorkhalī, show your papers (*sanada*)," and [proceeded to] arrest him. The Tibetan *maṃgāmtheci*[667] stationed at the border to Tibet heard of

662 This place is Tatsienlu or modern Kangding (Tib. *dar rtse mdo*).

663 Lithang or Litang is a town in Kham of Tibet, China's Sichuan Province.

664 Batang is a town at the border between Tibet and Sichuan.

665 Nyarong (瞻對), a region in East Tibet, is often equated with present-day Xinlong County. The isolated region was long controlled by tribes and an influential family until it was unified by Gompo Namgye (or Namgyal, Tib. mGon po rnam rgyal, 1799–1865) in the mid-nineteenth century. The Qing dynasty attempted to assert control but with little success, since Namgyal managed to control the trade routes between China and Tibet. In the end, the Tibetan government, then itself under the administrative rule of the Qing dynasty, had Namgyal murdered and took control of the region. The geographer J. Huston Edgar reports that Nyarong belonged to Tibet until 1911 (Edgar 1930–1931, 22). On the Nyarong War (1862–1866) see also *Draft History of Qing*, vol. 513, Biography 300, Tu-si 2; Alexander Gardner 2019, ch. 21, and Powers and Templeman 2020, 469, s.v. Nyag Rong. See also Kaschwesky and Tsering 1973.

666 It seems that a few other persons accompanied Mr. Cooper. In DNA_0003_0047, Cooper speaks of two or three servants, probably referring to "[t]wo interpreters, for the Chinese and Tibetan languages, and a mule-driver" (Cooper 1869/1870, 335). According to his travel report of 1871 (Cooper 1871, 15–16), they were Chinese Christians from Hankow} called George Philipps (the interpreter), whom Cooper called Philip throughout, and Timothy, a guide also called Lowlee.

667 *Manga* is known to have been a kind of tax, while *theci* is perhaps derived from Nep. *ṭheka[dāra]*, "contractually appointed revenue collector".

this same news and sent 350 soldiers and stopped them, not allowing them to step into Tibet. Since they did not open the way to Lhasa to the said Englishman, he descended later to Nyāhit by another route down to Burma territory with the idea of going to Calcutta. This much was said by a Franciscan[668] sahib living in Vāṭhām.

Once I reach the Tibet border and verify matters, I shall go about the task of writing to you another *arjī* and sending it off.[669]

May I, your servant, be forgiven any mistake in the writing.

Always your servant Kājī Jagatsera Khatṛ Kṣatṛ[670].

Annotated Edition

[page 1r]
श्री\
श्री ५ सर्कार
१
सर्कार
२
नं
२४७
अर्जि । ---
उप्रांत ष्वामित करूणानिधान् । हामिहरू ठिंडफु सहरमा छदै येउटा अंग्रे-
ज मुसाफेर मिष्टर कुपर नाउ गऱ्याको १ आइ मसित भेट् गर्न आयो र त-
पाइ नेपाल -१-का भारादार रह्याछौ म वृटी[स] सर्कारका मानिस् हु इ दुइ
सर्कारको ठुलो दोस्ती छ म भन्या चिन्वाट ल्हासा उत्री ल्हासावाट नेपाल
गै नेपालवाट कलकत्ता जांछु तपाइले राहादानि गरिदिनु भया म यता-
वाट जांछु भनि निज अंग्रेजले भंदा मलाइ भन्या । -१-वाट अंग्रेजहरू-
ले भेट्न आया भन्या भेटेस् भंन्या मात्र हुनाले भेट् गऱ्या । राहादानिका कु-
रालाई नीज साहेवलाइ उत्रा दियाको कुरो । प्रथम चिन्का मुलुक तिमि सा-
हेवलाइ थाहै छ मेरो राहादानि चल्दैन वाहादेषि तार्चिन् देउका मुलुक
छ लिथांको मुलुक छ वाथांको मलुक छ अरू गया जंगलिहरूका मुलु-
क छन् वाहादेषि ल्हासाका मुलुक छन् इ मुलकमा मेरो राहादानि चल्दैन-
न् राहादानि भन्या मवाट गरिदिन सकदैन सल्लाहका हक्लाई भंछौ भ-
न्या आफुले देषे सुन्याको भंनुपर्छ तिमिलाइ यस् जंगलिहरूका मुलुक्-
वाट जाउ भंन म ता सकदैन इनिहरूले जान दिन्या पनि छैन डाका चोर ला-

668 Cooper 1871, 124 speaks of 300 French missionaries in 1868.
669 This is probably the document DNA_0003_0047.
670 Read Jagatsera Khatrī Chetrī.

ग्येर १५।२० जना मानिसका डफा पनि हिड्न सकदैन न्यारूंका लडाई-
ले मुलुक पनि विग्रीरहेछ भनि मैले जवाफ दियूँ । नीज साहेवले की त मेरा
ज्यू गयो कि तपाइलाई छोडे भनी गयो भंन्या समाचार ठिंडफुमा सुन्या-
थ्याँ । आज वाथांमा आइपुगी सुंदा हामि गोर्षाली हुँ भनि गोर्षाली पो-
साक् लाई वाथांसंम आइपुगी वाथांमा १५ दिन वस्याछन् । वाथां सह-
रका मानिस्हरूले इ त अंग्रेज हो भनि चिन्ह्याछन् र गोर्षालि हो भन्या गो-
र्षाका सनद होला देषाउ भनि पक्रेछन् । यही षवर भोट् -२-का दो-
साधमा वरुया मंगाम्थेचेले थाहा पायाछन् र ३५० सिपाहि पठाइ
भोट्का सेवाना कुल्चन नदि छेकेछन् र निज साहेवलाइ ल्हासाको वा-
टो गरि जान नदिदा पछि न्याहित्मा अंन्यत्रको वाटो गरि ब्रंह्माका मु-
लुक उत्री कलकत्ता जांछु भनि तालीफु सहरको वाटो गरि गयो भंन्या वा-
थां वरुया फ्रीसिस्का [corr. फ्राँसि-
स्का] साहेवले भन्याको कुरो । अरू कुरा भोट्का सेवा-
नामा पुगि तहकित्का कुरा वुझी पछिका अर्जिमा लेषि चह्राइपठाउ-
न्या काम गरुंला । हरप्मा उचनिच पर्‍याको सेवकमाथी क्षेमा राषी
वक्स्या जावस् ।
सदा{सेवक?} काजि जगत्सेर षतृ क्षतृको
कोटि २ दंडवत् कुर्नेस् ।

2.1.12 Nuvakot Inscription, VS 1925 (1868 CE)

According to Naraharināṭha (1965), this golden plate inscription in Rañjanā script is nailed against the wood above the right side of the door of Nuvākoṭa Bhairavī Temple. In the middle of the artistic half-moon designed header, there is a sword (*khaḍga*) of Bhavānī in the shape of Karavīra petals, adorned with a garland. The moon is on either side of the sword, the sun is under the right moon, and there are other symbols such as a quiver of arrows, a bow, a sword, a conch, and a wheel. Naraharināṭha provides the measurements: 1 *vittā*, 2 *aṅgula* in length, and 1 *vittā* in breadth. There are 8 verses and 20 lines, each line containing 32 to 35 letters.
Source: Naraharināṭha 1965, 285–86.

Translation (extract, RK)

Verses 1–3: Invocation to the Goddess Bhairavī
Verses 4–8: … Pṛthvī Nārāyaṇa Śāha had two sons who were foremost among princes and conquered Kāmadeva, the deity of lust and pleasure.

The elder son was Siṃhapratāpa (also known as Pratāpasiṃhadeva), and the younger was Bahādura Śāha, who served as the regent for the venerable King, Raṇa Bahādura. Raṇa Bahādura, the son of Pratāpasiṃha, was a mighty king of supreme kings who, even from his childhood, rendered the breasts of many enemy women worthless (by killing their husbands and making them widows).

With good intelligence and ardent devotion to Bhairavī, the venerable Bahādura Śāha ruled as the regent for the venerable Raṇa Bahādura. At that time, Nepal's northern border was the Gaṅgā River. During this period, the Emperor of China, accompanied by a large army, attacked Nepal with the intention of destroying it but quickly fled after witnessing the destruction of his own troops.

Oh Mother! Oh Bhairavī! Oh, creator of auspiciousness! Out of devotion, the virtuous King Raṇa Bahādura Śāha and Prince (regent) Bahādura Śāha have offered you a golden roof and door, along with other materials. May it be for your love and devotion. Did not Kṛṣṇa sweetly taste *sirauñlā* (fried rice made by boiling and drying husked rice) brought by Sudāmā (Kṛṣṇa's childhood friend) with devotion?

On Wednesday of the bright fortnight of the month Caitra, in the year 1792 CE (1714 Śaka), we, the venerable King Raṇa Bahādura Śāha and the venerable Prince Bahādura Śāha, who made a solemn vow at the time of the Chinese invasion, offered a new golden roof and door to the venerable Goddess Bhairavī with devotion. May it be auspicious.

Edition

चीनविजयोपलकषमा नुवाकोट भैरवी मनदिर दवारको कनकपतर
॥ शरीभैरवी विजयते ॥
निराधारो दवारे सकलसुरसारे कृतजगततरयापतसंहारे हृतभवविकारे जनिभृताम ॥
दयोदारे दीनोदधृतिकृतिपरे भैरवि नमो नवाकोटगरामानतरकृतविहारे कुरु कृपाम ॥१॥
तवया सरवं विशवं रचितमिदमाविरभवति च तवयापनोतयाकृषटं सदयि विलयं
भैरवि शिवे ॥
तवैवालमबातसंहरणपदममबाशु दुरितं निरालमबानां तद वरजति जगदावासजनितम
॥२॥
तवमेव जननी जगजजननि भैरवि तवं पिता तवमेव च गुरुः सुहृततवमसि मे तवमा-
तमासि च ॥
तवमेव रमसे जगननिखिलमेकिकाविशय तन नहि तवदपरं परं किमपि भासते मे
मतिः ।।३।। गोरकषाधीशरकषयामरवरनगरपरोदयदुददामधामगरामगरावाभिरामा-
वनिधरनिकटसथायिगोरषापुरीशः ॥

नेपालाधीशभालाऽऽसथिततिलकमपाकृतय समपरीतचेताः पृथवीनारायणाखयः कषितिपकुलमणिरवरवृतीतिसम लोके ॥४॥
तसय परासतां तनूजौ दयुतिजितमदन राजपुतरागरगणयौ जयायान सिंहपरतापसत-दनुजनिरयं शरीवहादूरसाहः ॥
जयायः पुतरः परतापी सवजनि रणवहादूरराजाधिराजो बालयेनेकारिनारीकुचकल-शयुगवयरथताकारि येन ॥५॥
गङगा सीमा समासीत तदवसरसमायातचीनाधिपोपि नेपालधवंसनोदयनमतिरतिब-हलानधवंसितानसवानविलोकय ॥
अङके तं सथापयितवा शिशुमवनिपतिं शरीवहादूरसाहे भैरवयुददामभावपरकटितसुम-तौ शासति परदरुतोसमिन ॥६॥
हेमनैतद घटितं छदी रणवहादूरेण भूमीभृता भावाद भैरवि भवयभाविनि वहादूरेण पुणयातमना ॥
परीतयै तेरपितमसतु सोपकरणं मातः कपाटं च कि कृषणशचरवयतिसम नालपपृथुकं भकतया सुदामाहृतम ॥७॥
शरीशाके वेदचनदराचलधरणि १७१४ मिते चैतरशुकलाषटमीशाधीशरकषरकषेशजाहे नृपतिरणवहादूरसाहेन भावात ॥
भैरवयै देवदेवयै पटलमभिनवं शरीवहादूरसाहेनायाते चीनचकरेररमपि मनसोददि-षटमेतननयवेदि ॥८
॥ शुभमसतु ॥

2.1.13 Phaṭya Śamśera's Order, VS 1950 (1893 CE)

The document was edited and translated in *Documenta Nepalica*, E_2763_0075, 2021.

Translation (AM, MB, PB)

Hail. From a prince born of a prince, the Southern Commanding General Phatye Samśera Jaṅga Bahādura Varman. Hail [and] greetings to *vakila* Kulānanda who is fit for all [flattering] comparisons.

Uprānta: It turns out that the market rate, in Company mohara [coins], of articles to be bought as presents (*saugāta*[671] and sent [quinquennially] as regular presents to the Emperor of China is written in a *sanada*. It has been made known [to us] from the venerable royal priest [and] treasurer Jñāneśvara Prasāda Paṇḍita, that an order placed

671 *Saugāta* usually denotes presents given to superiors or institutions.

for 24 full lengths (*thān*) [of satin?], 31 full lengths of *pharkāvādī*[672] cloth, 1 full length of *caubisā*[673] which are not available here [in Nepal], should be processed at the exchange rate specified [in the *sanada*] and [the goods] be sent [to us], even if there is a delay of 2/4 months. The rate written in the *sanada* is the usual rate for the purchase [of the goods]. Come to some conclusion on the [purchase] rate there, and even if it is a bit higher or lower complete the task of purchasing and sending. Regarding the sending of these goods, you need not send them immediately. It will be all right to send them after 3 or 4 months. Goods that are recorded as not being available there should not be sent.

Wednesday, the 4th of the bright fortnight of Śrāvaṇa in the [Vikrama era] 1950 (1893 CE).

Diplomatic Edition (AM, MB, PB)

स्वस्ति। श्रीमद्राजकुमारकुमारात्मजश्रीदक्षिणतर्फकाकम्यांडिङ्जनरलफत्येसम्सेर-
जङ्गराणावहादुरवर्मना-म् । स्वस्ति । श्रीसर्वोपमाजोग्येत्यादि वकील कुलानंदके
सलां । उप्रात चीन[का] वादसाहलाइ सौ[गात] पठा[उने] [माल]-
हरु षरिद गर्ने सनदमा मोहर्र कंपनीको दर लेषीयाको रहेछ । कुन हीसावले दर मि
लाई षरिद गर्ने क[?] थान्
२४ फर्कावादी थान् ३१ [चौवी]सा थान् १ जाहा नपाउने र सो माल हालै चलान्
गरि पठाउनु पर्ने र २\४ मैना ढी-लाँ भया पनी हुने भनी जाहेर गऱ्याको वेहोरा श्री
गुरुप्रोहीत षजाँची ज्ञानेश्वर प्रसाद पंडीतज्यूवाट जाहेर भयो । [तसर्थ]
सनदमा लेषीयाका दर साविकमा षरिद भयाको दर लेषीयाको हो । सो दरमा ताहा
को अंज्याम् पुऱ्याई केही क-
मवेसी भया पनी षरिद गरि पठाउने काम गर्नु । सो माल चलान् गर्नालाई हालै चलान्
गर्नु पर्दैन । अव ३\४
मैन्हा पछी चलान् गरि पठाया पनी हुंन्छ । ताहा नपाउने भनी लेषीयाको मालहरु प
ठाउनु पर्दैन । इती सम्व-
त् १९५० साल मीती श्रावण सुदि ४ रोज ४ । शुभ्म् ।

672 Perhaps referring to cloth printing and *zardozi* embroidery work from Farrukhabad, a city in North India.

673 Perhaps silk brocade. According to a list of presents published by V.K. Manandhar, there were "24 rolls of satin, 13 [!] pieces of felt cloth and a piece of silk brocade" (Manandhar 2001, 190 n. 7).

2.2 Chinese Texts

2.2.1 Tributary Letter by the Gorkha King Presented to Peking, 1789/1790

The text comes approaching the end of BLBJL,[674] as the tributary letter presented to the Emperor. The Manchu version was in the First Historical Archive in Peking.[675] It also incorporates the census report from Bajung. The census report is thus read from Bajung's report in the Archive of the Grand Council stored in the Palace Museum in Taipei, as it is closer to the original report.[676] The census report contains mainly proper names and thus is not fully translated here.

Translation

Your humble minister (hereafter, "I")[677] of Balbu (Nepal), Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, along with Bahādura Śāha, the uncle of your humble minister, had joined their palms with sincerity. [We] send this auspicious memorial to the doorsteps[678] of the Great Emperor of ten thousand countries all under heavens, who lives as long as ten thousand years:

674 BLBJL, vol. 25, QL 54/9/6.

675 Cata. Mnc, no. 7809 = 3–2–3273–032.

676 《軍機處檔摺件》, 巴忠　奏, 〈奏為查詢巴勒布地勢情形戶口數目事(附件:巴勒布科爾喀所屬部落戶口數目清單)〉, 乾隆 54 年 08 月 10 日, 故機 042851 號, 件 *2* , 國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統. Reported by Bajung on 28 September 1789, received on 24 October 1789 (BLBJL, vol. 25, QL 54/9/6).

677 The self-reference is always written in small characters, half the size of other words, while imperial words are always placed above a line in the original formular. Given such a formula and the clear reference to classical literature, the translator could have been a trained specialist on literary translation according to the imperial formula in Lhasa. Otherwise, it might have been polished intensively by Chinese literati after translation. That is the reason they could not have done it in Tashilhunpo or Kathmandu immediately upon the departure of the envoy even though there was a Chinese interpreter Zhao Lian 趙璉 together with them (BLBJL, vol. 24, QL 54/8/17; cp. KRKJL, vol. 27, QL 57/4/10; Satō 1986, 730n3). It is later normalised as "I/we".
See also《宮中檔奏摺-乾隆朝》, 鄂輝、成德 奏, 〈奏聞巴勒布貢使已自該寨起程緣由事〉, 乾隆 54 年 07 月 01 日, 故宮 083672 號, 件 *1* , 國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統;《宮中檔奏摺-乾隆朝》, 鄂輝、成德 奏, 〈奏聞巴勒布貢使已自該寨起程緣由事〉, 乾隆 54 年 07 月 01 日, 故宮 083672 號, 件 *1* , 國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統.

678 The Chinese emperor is often addressed only as his [servants at the] doorsteps (陛下 *bi-xia*), as one dare not present the letter directly to the emperor

Since my grandfather, we sincerely wished to pay allegiance to the sacred civilising power[679] and be affiliated with the census and map of the Empire.[680] However, owing to our remoteness and desolation, our humbly sincere intention could not be presented upwards. Last year [in 1788], we sent an auspicious memorial and pleaded to pay tribute, but it was obstructed. Now, upon the imperial grace, the Imperial Special Commissioner [Bajung] despatched some officers [Mukdengga, Zhang Zhi-yuan, and Yan Ting-liang] to proclaim the imperial benevolence. I felt delighted and subdued wholeheartedly. Thus, I am willing to pay allegiance and take refuge in [the heaven-like gracious Emperor] that pervades the world.

[I] humbly show that Balbu (Nepal) is situated to the southwest of Peking. In previous years, there were tribes around Jia-gar (Bengal, Tib. rGya gar) and Phula that mobilised their troops to invade [us]. They were all combatted and defeated by us, thus running away. We were thus not annexed. Previously, it could not be [presented] upward and thus bother the heavenly mirror [of the Great Emperor who rewards his subjects properly]. Now, I particularly stated these [facts] together [with the tribute]. I despatched my headpersons, Balabhadra Khavas and Hari Śāha [Upādhyāya], to offer upwards the auspicious memorial with reverence. Meanwhile, I presented regional products.[681] I piously pleaded for the grace of the Great Emperor to bestow his written edict. We shall abide by it and watch the remote periphery [for the Emperor] for generations. May we, the tiny foreign people around the border [of the imperial domain], permanently receive the pervading and

and place oneself in such vicinity to him. One often hands it to the servants instead.

679 The Chinese word for it is 化 (*hua*), which literally means "transform". The classical model implied is that the Heavenly Dynasty provides an example of civilisation that emits rays of education to the periphery and transforms their barbarous customs. Therefore, it is rendered as "civilising power". In Medieval China, the word was also once used for the translation of Sanskrit *ājñā* "command, authority".

680 The Chinese word here is 版圖 (*ban-tu*), which also had classical references from *the Rites of Zhou* 周禮. It originally referred to the census registration and the of the entire territory, but later developed into imperial sovereignty, especially in the Qing Dynasty. It seems when a territory entered the census and map, the law code would be extended to it (Oidtmann 2018, 22).

681 The word used here is 獻方物 (*xian fang-wu*) "forward the regional products", the most classical term for tribute in the *Hounds of Lü* in the *Book of Documents*, later cited by the Emperor.

diligent[682] grace of the Heavenly Dynasty and perpetually enjoy the fortune of peace and prosperity.

I could not even withstand my extreme excitation and anxiety [while writing to the Great Emperor].[683] I thus prepared the auspicious memorial with prudence to report it to the auricle [of the Great Emperor].

The Inventory of census of the tribes belonging to the Korka (Gorkha) of Balbu (Nepal):

[…27 places and headpersons[684] omitted…]

These are the 27 places with subjects[685] of Gorkha.

There are 12,000[686] households of Gorkha *per se*.

In Balbu Yang-bu (Kathmandu), there are 18,000 households.

There is a place called Ku-kem (Bhaktapur) with 12,000 households.

There is a place called Yi-long (Patan) with 24,000 households.

These three places are the residence of Gorkha now.

In total, there are 30 places, with 220,700 households as subjects.

Edition

巴勒布恭進表文

巴勒布$_{微臣}$喇納巴都爾同$_{微臣}$之叔巴都薩野合掌誠心具表

天下萬國大皇帝萬歲陛下:

自$_{微臣}$祖父以來, 即誠心願歸聖化, 附隸版圖, 祇因僻在遐荒, 區區之心, 未由上達。去歲曾具表懇求進貢, 又有阻遏。今蒙欽差大人遣官宣布皇仁, $_{微臣}$實中心悅服, 情願歸依覆幬。

竊照巴勒布地方在北京西南, 昔年有甲噶爾、普拉各處部落曾出兵致寇, 均經$_{微臣}$攻擊潰逃, 未被侵佔。前此未能上荷天鑒, 茲特一併上陳。謹遣頭目巴喇叭都爾喀哇斯、哈哩薩野等恭進表文, 并獻方物, 虔誠上懇大皇帝恩賞勅書。世守荒服, 俾邊徼小番, 子子孫孫永受天朝怙冒之恩, 長享昇平之福。

$_{微臣}$曷勝激切屏營之至, 謹具表以聞。

682 The term used here is 怙冒 (*hu-mao*), a classical term in the *Book of Documents*, indicating the extensiveness and prosperity of the great achievement of a diligent ruler.

683 This is a common Chinese formulaic expression at the end of a letter.

684 There were also some regions without headpersons.

685 The Chinese word used here is 百姓 (*bai-xing*) "hundreds of surnames", which has been often understood as "commoners". It literally means "hundred surnames", which should actually be understood as "subjects", as opposed to "the only surname", i.e., the Imperial House 一姓.

686 BLBJL gives the number 54,000, the sum of the three places.

巴勒布科爾喀所属部落戶口數目清單:[687]
一處地名達納隆, 大頭人名哈哩古嗎拉, 百姓八千戶
一處地名納木沖, 大頭人名索墨彌隆嗎担, 百姓一萬六千戶
一處地名噶日斯哩特, 大頭人名斯底納担, 百姓八千戶
一處地名巴爾巴爾, 大頭人名吉地嗎當木, 百姓八千戶
一處地名納烏柯克, 大頭人名那拉那藍, 百姓六千戶
一處地名多爾, 大頭人名星布卡, 百姓二十戶[688]
一處地名斯籠, 大頭人名索斯海, 百姓二千戶
一處地名巴湧, 大頭人名申, 百姓二千戶
一處地名格令, 大頭人名甲什恩奪嗎, 百姓二千戶
一處地名力陛, 大頭人名哈哩納拉星, 百姓六千戶
一處地名秘哩骨札, 大頭人名依達拉本布吧坑, 百姓六千戶
一處地名銅籠, 大頭人名康, 百姓六千戶
一處地名噶里骨札, 大頭人名吧嗎喇, 百姓二千戶
一處地名依比嗎, 大頭人(此系遺缺, 該部落尚未補入), 百姓四千戶
一處地名卡奇, 大頭人名申達, 百姓六千戶
一處地名阿爾噶, 大頭人名吧海, 百姓四千戶
一處地名骨爾米, 大頭人(此系遺缺, 該部落尚未補入)百姓八千戶
一處地名八吧, 大頭人名嗎哈達達申, 百姓二萬四千戶
一處地名白烏唐, 大頭人名嗎勒遵達, 百姓一萬二千戶
一處地名噶作地, 大頭人(此系遺缺, 該部落尚未補入), 百姓四千戶
一處地名科克哩, 大頭人(此系遺缺, 該部落尚未補入), 百姓七百戶
一處地名噶作爾, 大頭人(此系遺缺, 該部落尚未補入), 百姓二千戶
一處地名党拉, 大頭人名那申, 百姓八千戶
一處地名吧嶺, 大頭人名薩海, 百姓六千戶[689]
一處地名赤嶺, 大頭人名巴順, 百姓二千戶
一處地名陸空, 大頭人(此系遺缺, 該部落尚未補入), 百姓二千戶
一處地名吧批, 大頭人(此系遺缺, 該部落尚未補入), 百姓六千戶
以上二十七處俱係科爾喀所属百姓。
外有科爾喀本處百姓一萬二千戶[690]
一巴勒布陽布百姓一萬八千戶
一處地名庫科木百姓一萬二千戶
一處地名易隆[691]百姓二萬四千戶

687 Read from Bajung's memorial instead of BLBJL. BLBJL changed 百姓 into 居民, polished the names, and reduced redundancy.
688 BLBJL: 2,000 instead of 20.
689 BLBJL: 8,000 instead of 6,000.
690 BLBJL: 54,000 instead of 12,000.
691 BLBJL gives the placenames as 颺布, 郭卡木, 伊凌, which seemed to be standardised translation from Manchu.

以上三處, 即係科爾喀現居之所。
總共三十處, 百姓二十二萬七百戶有零。

2.2.2 Letters Across the Battlefield, 1792

A small collection of letters sent back and forth on the battlefield is presented here. They are read from WZTZ, vol. 13, printed in 1896. The earlier manuscripts of WZTZ are not available to us.

2.2.2a Letters of Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, 16 July 1792

The letter[692] was brought to Fuk'anggan by the abducted soldier Wang Gang and the Tibetan military officer (*sde pa*) Thang smad. It was the second letter from Gorkha to Fuk'anggan and the first one after the Chinese troops had entered Nepal. It has already been considered as a surrender, given the headings in WZTZ.

Translation

Raṇa Bahādura Śāha sent out the abducted soldier Wang Gang and the Tibetan military officer (*sde pa*) Thang smad. He offered a petition, begging for surrender.[693]

[Peitition 1 to Fuk'anggan:]

Raṇa Bahādura Śāha sends the following petition with prudence under the commander's flag[694] of [Fuk'anggan, who is] the Imperial Special Commissioner, the Duke, and the Great General:

The Great Emperor, Mañjuśrī-Bodhisattva,[695] has bestowed upon us the Great General. The Great General resembles the planets (i.e., Sanskrit *graha*) in the sky that rescue all beings. We were very delighted upon receiving the summon granted by the Great General. We knew that

692 WZTZ, vol. 13.2, 21–22; WZTZ 1982, 398–99; cp. KRKJL, vol. 37.
693 This is the heading made by the compilers of WZTZ.
694 As the Emperor is only to be address by his [servants at] doorsteps, the General is address by his soldiers under the flag.
695 The Great Emperor of China was identified as the incarnation of Mañjuśrī-Bodhisattva by the Tibetans. He was called 'Jam pa'i dbyangs Gong ma bdag po chen po.

the Great Emperor had ordered the Great General to Tibet. We feel deep gratitude.

Formerly, the Tibetans and Gorkha were in a good relationship, as if they were members of one family. Even the Balbu (Tib. Bal po, i.e., Newar) people were in a very good relationship with the Tibetans. Ever since Gorkha's capture of Kathmandu, [Gorkha and Tibet] started to have connections. Because the Tibetans refused to use our silver coins, we had some discords. Furthermore, given the instigation of Shamarpa in Kathmandu, the disturbance was provoked.

When we were combatting each other [in 1788/1789], there were officers [Mukdengga and Zhang Zhi-yuan] from the Heavenly Dynasty to instruct us, while Tibet sent its people to negotiate peace. We considered the Heavenly Dynasty different from other places. We dared not to offend the Heavenly Dynasty. Hence, we ordered somebody to plead for forgiveness. Relying upon the Heavenly grace of the Great Emperor, we were conferred the title of the "King" and the "Duke". We were also awarded many objects, while the Emperor passed down [to us] a very good edict. I felt deep gratitude towards the grace of the Great Emperor and dared not to disturb. We, Gorkha, and the Tibetans are both subordinate to the Heavenly Dynasty and still in a good relationship with each other.

Last year, the Government Minister (*bka' blon*) of Tibet came to the border for a negotiation. We despatched our chieftains, accompanied by Shamarpa, to meet him. Upon our arrival at Nyalam, Shamarpa told our assembly that the Tibetans would not keep their words [of agreement] in 1788 (QL 53) and brought troops to harm us. Upon hearing his words, our assembly thus abducted two Tibetan Government Ministers and four Chinese soldiers to our territory. Then, we robbed the Tashilhunpo Temple. It was all incited by Shamarpa, who told us to mobilise our troops. Supposedly, he was taken advantage of by someone in Tibet. He might have intended to take it as a chance for revenge. Nobody from Tibet could have informed us that Shamarpa was a bad person. We did not know that.

Upon observing the summon granted by the Great General, we realised that he was a bad person. We were about to arrest him and send him out. Unexpectedly, he died of illness. The two Tibetan Government Ministers [Tenzin Peljor and g.Yu thog] and four Chinese soldiers [Wang Gang, Feng Da-cheng, Hu Ting-hai, and Lu Xian-lin] will definitely report the cause of Shamarpa's death.

Tibet and Gorkha share a border as brothers of the same family. There might be quarrels and conflicts even among brothers. Previously, the Prince of Gorkha was in a good relationship with the former Dalai

Lama. We managed everything as we had done before. Recently, there were some slight discords between the two families. I beg the Great General to investigate. Then, you will realise what happened.

The coming of the Great General is the incarnation of the planets. We shall not disobey whatever is instructed. The Great Emperor is the Heaven that we place upon our heads at every moment. Now that the Heavenly Dynasty mobilised troops towards [us], we indeed cannot defend or rival against them. After all, I beg the Great General to memorialise it clearly to the Great Emperor to bestow the same grace to Gorkha as to Tibet. If the Great General grants authorisation, we will prepare a petition and despatch an important headperson to plead at the camp for a second time.

Petition prepared on 16 July (5/28).

[Petition 2 to the officers and soldiers]
Raṇa Bahādura Śāha sends the following petition to the bureaux[696] of all the officers and soldiers who are the imperial special commissioners:

All the officers and soldiers were ordered by the Great Emperor to come to the border. Upon hearing the news, we were very delighted. All the officers and soldiers have benevolence in protecting the living beings.

The former prince was in a very good relationship with the former Dalai Lama. The two families were in a good relationship for years. Unexpectedly, a bad person incited between us and provoked conflicts. Later, a General (Cyāncuna) [i.e., Ohūi] and some big persons (Tājīn) [i.e., Zhang Zhi-yuan, Mukdengga] came to instruct us. We sent someone to Peking to plead for forgiveness.

The Great Emperor bestowed his grace to confer the princely title [upon me]. He also granted his edict and garments, which we are all wearing.[697] The grace of the Great Emperor was very deep so that we were appeased and dared not to raise trouble.

The Tibetans are not following the contract. It is hard for us not to complain in the heart. Surely, Tibetans will also complain about us for our robbery in Tibet.

696 This is a way of expressing respect by addressing the object in front of the addressee instead of the person. Similarly, the Emperor is often addressed by the doorsteps in front of him.

697 Wearing clothes granted by the Emperor was a symbol of submission and integration into the Manchu imperial system. For the vassal states, wearing the clothes given by the Emperor shows not only subordination but also legitimacy and imperial favour. Cp. Ge 2014.

The original cause of the issue was not intentional either for us nor for Tibet. It was, after all, the instigation of somebody. The Great General commanded troops to come for the punishment of the criminal who incited the issue. Surely, all the officers and soldiers know it.

Upon receiving the summon granted by the Great General, we realised that this person was a bad guy. We were about to catch him and send him out. Unexpectedly, he died of illness. The two Tibetan Government Ministers and four Chinese soldiers know and will report the duration of his illness and the cause of his death.

Formerly, Tibet and Gorkha had a very good relationship. Later, we should be even better than before. The Great General came with troops for the discords between the two families. The two families are both the subjects of the Heavenly Dynasty. We shall, by all means, observe everything instructed by the Great General. Upon the authorisation of the Great General, we shall prepare a petition and despatch someone to meet the Great General and plead for the second time.

Petition prepared on 16 July (5/28).

Edition

拉特納巴都爾將裹去兵丁王剛、第巴塘邁送出, 遞稟乞降。

[稟一]

拉特納巴都爾謹稟欽差公中堂大將軍麾下:

今蒙文殊菩薩大皇帝差大將軍前來, 如同天上星宿一樣, 救度眾生。大將軍賞來檄諭, 我們接到了狠喜歡, 知道大皇帝差大將軍到藏裏來, 心裏又狠感激。

從前唐古忒與廓爾喀相好, 如同一家人, 就是巴勒布也與唐古忒狠相好。自廓爾喀得了陽布, 纔通往來。因為唐古忒不使我們的銀錢, 彼此不和, 又因沙瑪爾巴在陽布挑唆主使, 就鬧起事來。

正在打仗時, 有天朝的官員來曉諭, 又有藏裏的人來講和, 我想著天朝不比別處地方, 是不敢得罪的, 所以我們差人去請罪。仰蒙大皇帝天恩, 加封王爵公爵, 賞賜許多物件, 又下狠好的旨意, 我感激大皇帝恩典狠重, 就不敢鬧事。我們廓爾喀與唐古忒天朝的屬下, 依舊彼此相好。

上年有唐古忒之噶布倫到邊界上來說話, 我們打發了頭目同沙瑪爾巴去見他, 到了聶拉木, 沙瑪爾巴向眾人說, 唐古忒不照乾隆五十三年說的話了, 帶了兵來害我們。眾人聽見了這些話, 才把兩箇噶布倫、四箇漢兵裹進來, 就去搶札什倫布, 這全是沙瑪爾巴從中挑唆主使, 叫我們動的兵, 想來是他在藏裏被人欺負, 以藉此報仇的。唐古忒又從沒有給我們一箇信說沙瑪爾巴是箇壞人, 我們也不知道。

今奉大將軍賞來檄諭, 才知道他是箇壞人, 正要把他拿送出來, 不料他就病死了。沙瑪爾巴病死的緣故, 兩箇噶布倫、並四箇漢兵, 自然是要稟的。

唐古忒與廓爾喀邊界相連, 如同一家親兄弟一樣。就是親兄弟, 也有一時間口舌爭端。廓爾喀從前的王子與前輩達賴喇嘛相好, 我們照著從前一般行事。近來兩家有些微不和。求大將軍查一查就知道了。

大將軍前來就是星宿降臨, 不拘怎麼樣分付我們總不敢不遵的。大皇帝就是上天, 我們時刻頂在頭上。如今天朝發大兵來, 我們也實在抵敵不住, 總求大將軍奏明大皇帝, 照施與唐古忒的恩典一樣施與廓爾喀。如蒙大將軍恩准, 再具稟差大頭人到軍營來懇求。

五月二十八日具稟

[稟二]

拉特納巴都爾具稟欽差各位官員官兵台前:

各位官員官兵奉大皇帝旨意, 前來邊界, 我們聽見了狠喜歡, 各位官員官兵都是慈心愛護生靈的。

從前的王子, 與前輩達賴喇嘛狠相好。兩家相好多年, 不料有壞人從中挑唆, 鬧起事來。後來有將軍大人來曉諭, 我們就差人進京去請罪。

蒙大皇帝恩典封了王子, 並有旨意賞的衣帽, 都穿戴了。因大皇帝恩典狠重, 我們才安靜不敢鬧事的。

唐古特不照著合同行事, 我們心里未免抱怨, 就是唐古特因我們搶了藏裏, 自然也要抱怨我們的。

其實起事的根由, 也不是我們有心, 也不是唐古特有心, 總是有人挑唆的。大將軍統兵前來, 原為要治挑唆人的罪, 各位官員官兵自然是知道的。

蒙大將軍賞來檄諭, 才知道這箇壞人, 我們正要拿送出來, 不想他已死了。他死的根由, 病了多少日子, 兩個噶布倫、並四個漢兵都知道, 他們自然是要稟的。

從前唐古特與廓爾喀原狠相好, 往後還要比從前相好些。大將軍因兩家不和底事, 才帶兵前來, 我們兩家都是天朝百姓, 如大將軍怎麼樣分付, 我們怎麼樣遵依, 若蒙大將軍准了, 再具稟差人前來。面見大將軍懇求。

五月二十八日具稟

2.2.2b Summon of Rebuttal from Fuk'anggan on 2 August 1792

This letter[698] was the reply to the previous one, mentioned by Tenzin Peljor.

Translation

The Duke, the Great General, Fuk'anggan sent a summon of rebuttal. On 2 August (QL 57/6/15), the Great General instructed Raṇa Bahādura Śāha in this summon:

698 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 23–25; WZTZ 1982, 400.

Your tribe provoked the conflicts upon some pretexts. You have annexed the border of Tibet and looted the Tashilhunpo Temple. Your betrayal of the imperial grace and caprices became a criminal offence to the Heavenly Dynasty. I, the Great General was commissioned by a sacred edict of the Great Emperor. I commanded powerful troops to carry out the heavenly punitive expedition in particular. Considering your youth and ignorance, and given that your uncle Bahādura Śāha did not know the laws and regulations of the Heavenly Dynasty, [we] could have sentence you with lenience. Therefore, I sent the summons twice to declare the grace and power of the Great Emperor and instruct on the stakes for gain and loss. You should have paid remorse for your offence and submitted your allegiance with sincerity by coming and pleading by yourself. How would I expect that you stay wrongheaded without replying immediately with a petition? Moreover, you did not return the annexed borderland. You counted upon yourself with no remorse or amendment. You asked for your own termination. I will have to assemble the troops and march further to declare your crimes clearly and punish you duly.

I, the Great General, commanding the officers and soldiers, had descended to the border. I held the wise scheme of the Great Emperor. I captured Ca-mu (Jiamu) in the first battle. For the second battle, I eradicated [the enemies] in Mar-xiar-jia (Maga). Upon the third victorious battle, I conquered Kyirong. I have captured or killed almost all your chieftains and soldiers.

Having occupied Rasuvāgaḍhī, the great army entered your realm. However, you did not come to the border of the realm. You dared to take advantage of the natural strongholds and combatted the front rows of my army. I, the Great General, marching forward upon victories, had slayed many of your assemblies. Your well-trained army assembled and stationed as mosquitoes and bees at the natural strongholds such as Syāphrū, Dhunce, and Bor-dong-la. There were pillboxes, passes, and wooden bunkers everywhere in the mountains as if forming a net. Wherever the weapons of our great army point to, the strongholds were destroyed despite their firmness. The rebellious enemies were killed, whose skeletons piled up [in the gorges]. Even if there might be the rest of the assemblies who ran back in a scattered manner, they could only try to rescue the dying and assist the wounded, only to find no routes to run away. Being attacked and combatted by us several times, you should know the military power of our army. If we reach Kathmandu from here directly, we shall eradicate your hideout and annihilate your

race as easily as pulling down a withered tree. We shall memorialise it immediately after the eradication.

Now, relying upon the Great Emperor's virtue that spares the life of living beings, I do not have the heart to annihilate your entire tribe. I spared one thread-like route for you, allowing you to pay allegiance. However, you did not come to beg for forgiveness on your own. Nor did you despatch any important headperson. You merely sent the soldier Wang Gang and the military officer (*sde pa*) Thang smad along with some servants, who were abducted last year. You presented a petition along with them. How dare you think of begging for surrender as such? Your stupidity and delusion reached the extreme.

The Heavenly Dynasty governs ten thousand regions. We make expeditions against those disobedient and become home to those obedient. Should you indeed tie yourself up, come for allegiance, beg for survival, and have an audience with the palace gate and the court [of the Great Emperor], just as the King of Annam (Vietnam), Nguyễn Quang Bình, naturally the Great Emperor would bestow immense grace and forgive your previous offence. However, you sent this petition for surrender by handing it to some of the abducted people to come to the camp and present it. [It is obvious that] you are trying to test us by despatching several persons from the group of abducted people instead of sending them out altogether willingly. It reveals that you have contempt, imprudence, stupidity, confusion, and ignorance within. You had no remorse, fear, or sincerity. It is absolutely hard for me to memorialise your petition.

Upon the grace and authorisation of the Great Emperor, I have read your petition. It is nothing but stammering and equivocation. This is an attempt to delay our advancement to gain a respite. It is not out of your truthful sincerity at all. It is said in your petition that the Tibetans had discords with you. You abducted the Chinese soldiers and the Tibetan Government Ministers (*bka' blon*), etc. You robbed the Tashilhunpo Temple, etc. According to your petition, they had been incited by Shamarpa, and you planned to arrest him and offer him to us. However, he died all of a sudden because of illness.

All these various groundless utterances cannot be trusted. Moreover, Shamarpa had a cunning and deceitful mind. He dared to collude with exterior foreigners to insult the Buddhist realm. Such crime goes beyond words. However, you were instigated and deluded by him. You dared to invade and disturb the border [of Tibet] upon pretexts many times. You have robbed [Tibet] wantonly. Such evil deeds done by

yourself cannot be excused even if you had one hundred mouths. Now, you have passed the buck entirely to somebody else instead of bowing the head down and pleading guilty with your uncle. I, the Great General denounce your crimes and conduct this punitive expedition. How could you be pardoned easily?

[As you said,] had you known that Shamarpa was the culprit, you should have tied him up and sent him out. How could you wait until he died? Now, we cannot put him under inquisition any more. He thus became the place where you can pass the buck of your crimes. Moreover, Shamarpa lived in Kathmandu for years. How could he end up dead when the great army approached the realm? You must have murdered and silenced him to conceal the truth of your evil collusion. Or else, you faked the report of his death of illness and hid him somewhere else secretly. I, the Great General, have insights as a lucent candle, discerning truth or false. How can I be deceived by your concealment?

You mentioned in your petition that you shared a good relationship with Tibet but went into slight discords recently. You asked me to investigate, etc. This only reveals your covetous, stupid, cunning, and deceitful mind. You would not have remorse to ameliorate yourself until your death. This can indeed be loathed. The pretexts that you counted upon to have conflicts with Tibet consisted in the following two issues: [1] Tibetans' not using your coins and [2] not abiding by the contracts. I have already investigated clearly upon my arrival in Tibet. Although Tibet keeps the commercial relationship and trades with you, using your silver coins, the Back of Tibet belongs to the Heavenly Dynasty. They have used your coins properly. The Tibetans are faultless. [Furthermore,] how could you suddenly raise military conflict for these minor transactional reasons? As for the contracts established by Tenzin Peljor, he was fully induced and coerced by you to negotiate [peace] privately. I have already refuted it in my last summon. It has been clearly instructed.

Now, you dare not to speak of it in your petition this time but pleaded for my detailed investigation. You deliberately used implicit and obscure language to show that the Tibetans were not faultless. However, in your petition to the officers and soldiers, you slightly unveiled the issue that the Tibetans did not abide by the contracts. I, the Great General, have already seen through your innermost despite such tactile and deceitful chicanery. The trivialities of your frictions with the Tibetans are indeed not worthy of any further words in my instructions to you.

Above all, you were ungrateful and capricious to the imperial grace. You have excluded yourselves from the internal living subjects within the Empire. Your crimes accumulated as a full string of beads, exceeding the total number of one's hair. I, the Great General, was commissioned to command the army and march forward for the punitive expedition. Our forces are well-trained and powerful, rushing and attacking as the lightning and the wind. We had continuous victories. Upon the victories, I shall march forward to your hideout (Kathmandu). I must intensively annihilate Gorkha, sparing no living beings. It can never be veiled by arguments or groundless utterances.

You and Bahādura Śāha, Bam Śāha, and Shamarpa should come to us in person to plead for forgiveness before our great army reaches Kathmandu. You should put your head in the mud in front of the door of our military camp. I, the Great General shall have insight into your sincerity or hypocrisy. After that, I shall memorialise this to the Great Emperor. The Great Emperor might remit your former crimes and bestow his exceptional grace. This is yet to be ascertained.

I, the Great General, commanding the great army, cannot pause long during my march. You should set your mind on the strategy of survival as early as possible. You should quickly come to plead with sincerity. If our army approaches the city, your tribe will be destroyed immediately. By then, even if you should have remorse for your crimes and beg for surrender, it would no longer be possible [to surrender], as if one tries to bite the navel.

As for the Tibetan Government Ministers, Tenzin Peljor and bKra shis don 'grub (g.Yu thog), as well as the three [Chinese] soldiers [i.e., Hu Ting-hai, Feng Da-cheng, and Lu Xian-lin] by your side, you should have sent them out altogether. However, Tenzin Peljor, etc., made mistakes in their administration. His position as Tibetan Government Minister has already been dismissed. The soldiers failed to guard the borderland but were coerced and abducted by you. They are also criminals. It does not matter at all whether you send them out or not. They are not worth the effort to be asked for. You should never consider them as hostages to put pressure on us.

Tenzin Peljor has sent letters as well as family messages to Tibet, in which he echoed and defended you with words. He must have been instructed by you to write. His words cannot be taken as proof. I, the Great General, command the troops and march for annihilation. How could I be credulous to what Tenzin Peljor, etc., said and thus be lenient on your crimes? You should not find groundless excuses any more. You

should not make any negligent petitions improperly that result in further felonies. Your tribe is about to be destroyed within the blink of an eye or an exhalation. If you stay hesitant, I, the Great General, will then command the troops and march forward for annihilation. By then, you will not only fail to protect your territory and people but also find you and the chiefs of your clan to be killed together with heads in one row. You could no longer ask for any lenience or forgiveness.

Here ends the summon.

Edition

大將軍公福康安發檄駁斥。六月十五日大將軍檄諭拉特納巴都爾知悉:

爾部落藉端構釁, 占據西藏邊界, 肆掠札什倫布, 背恩反覆, 獲罪天朝。本大將軍欽奉大皇帝聖旨, 統率勁兵, 特申天討。猶以爾年幼無知, 爾叔巴都爾薩野罔識天朝法度, 尚可稍從末減, 是以兩次發檄, 宣示大皇帝恩威, 曉以利害。令於大兵未到之先, 悔罪歸誠, 親來籲懇。詎料爾執迷不悟, 不卽稟覆, 所有占據邊界, 仍未退還。是爾怙終不悛, 自取覆滅, 必應整旅進征, 明正爾罪。

本大將軍統率將士, 臨莅邊界, 恭秉大皇帝睿謨, 一戰而卽破擦木, 再戰而殲瑪爾轄爾甲, 三戰三捷, 遂克濟嚨。爾之頭目兵眾, 擒殲殆盡。

及大兵奪據熱索橋, 直入爾境, 爾並未迎於境上, 尚敢恃其地險, 抗我顏行。本大將軍乘勝直前, 屢破爾眾, 如脊布嚕、東覺、博爾東拉等處, 山川險要, 爾之精銳, 蚊聚蜂屯, 碉卡木城, 遍山羅布。大兵戈鋋所指, 靡堅不摧, 斬伐芟夷, 體骨填委。卽有餘眾潰回, 亦皆救死扶傷, 奔逃無路。屢次攻戰, 爾亦當知我兵威, 若從此直抵陽布, 蕩爾巢穴, 殲除爾種類, 直如拉朽摧枯, 蕩平立奏。

今本大將軍仰賴大皇帝如天好生之德, 不忍將爾部落全行夷滅, 寬其一綫, 准令歸誠, 乃爾並不親來請罪, 又不遣大頭人前來, 僅止將上年誘執之兵丁王剛、第巴塘邁及跟役等送出, 附呈一稟, 妄想乞降, 可謂愚妄已極。

天朝統馭萬方, 討逆舍順, 若果如安南阮光平束身歸命, 親覲闕廷, 自當仰蒙大皇帝隆恩, 赦原前罪。今爾具稟乞降, 僅交上年誘執之人來營呈遞, 而於誘執諸人內, 先遣數人前來嘗試, 尚不肯全行送出, 是爾心存藐忽, 愚懵無知, 毫無悔懼眞誠, 斷難為爾陳奏。

仰邀恩准, 披閱來稟, 一味支吾搪塞, 藉為緩兵之計, 全非出於至誠。卽如所稟唐古特與爾不和、誘執漢兵噶布倫等、及搶掠札什倫布等事, 悉是沙瑪爾巴唆使主持, 正擬縛獻, 遽已病故。

種種虛言, 全不足信。沙瑪爾巴居心險詐, 敢於勾結外番, 作踐佛地, 其罪固不待言。然爾被其煽惑, 輒敢藉端侵犯邊圉, 大肆劫掠, 自作之孽, 百喙奚辭, 今爾全諉他人, 並不與叔俯首認罪, 本大將軍聲罪致討, 豈肯輕恕爾乎?

爾若知沙瑪爾巴為罪魁禍首, 早應縛獻送出, 何必待其身死, 無從究問, 始以為諉罪之地。況沙瑪爾巴在陽布居住已閱多年, 何以大兵壓境之時, 適伊身伏冥誅之日。非

爾致死滅口, 掩飾黨惡情眞;卽系捏報病亡, 現尚私藏他處。本大將軍洞燭情偽, 豈爾飾辭所能欺蔽?

爾稟內稱與唐古特本屬相好, 近來微有嫌隙, 求本大將軍查察等語, 可見爾貪愚狡詐之心, 至死不悔, 實堪痛恨。爾之藉端與唐古特尋釁者。卽指不使銀錢、不照合同兩事, 本大將軍到藏時, 早經查明。藏內雖與爾部落通商互市, 行使銀錢, 但後藏系天朝所屬, 照爾處錢法行使, 唐古特毫無過失, 此等交易細故, 何致遽構兵端。至丹津班珠爾等所立合同, 全系為爾誘脅, 私行定議, 前檄嚴加斥駁, 所諭甚明。

今來稟不敢提此事, 只稱懇求詳察, 故作隱躍之辭, 以見唐古特不為無過, 卽呈遞各官員官兵稟內, 又以唐古特不照合同行事, 微露一語, 如此詭辭巧辯, 本大將軍早已洞鑒肺肝。爾與唐古特爭端瑣事, 斷不值復置一辭向爾諭及。

總之, 爾負恩反覆, 自外生成, 罪惡貫盈, 擢髮難數。本大將軍奉命督師進討, 兵力精強, 霆擊風馳, 屢次大捷, 從此乘勝直搗巢穴, 務將爾廓爾喀痛加殲戮, 噍類無遺, 斷非口舌虛辭所能支飾。

若於大兵未抵陽布之前, 率同巴都爾薩野、瑪木薩野、沙瑪爾巴等親來請罪, 泥首軍門, 本大將軍察爾誠偽, 再當奏明大皇帝, 或能赦宥前罪, 逾格施恩, 亦未可定。

本大將軍統率大兵, 不能在中途久待, 爾宜早定自全之計, 速來籲懇。若俟兵臨城下, 爾部落立就滅亡, 雖欲悔罪乞降, 亦復噬臍何及耶。

至於噶布倫丹津班珠爾、札什敦珠布及兵丁三名在爾, 既思投順, 自應概行送出。但丹津班珠爾等辦事錯謬, 已將噶布倫革退, 兵丁不能守禦邊疆, 被爾誘脅, 均系獲罪之人。爾之送出與否, 均屬無關緊要, 不值向爾索取, 爾勿借此為要挾之具。

其丹津班珠爾寄與唐古特書信, 及伊等家信之語同聲附和, 代為說辭, 竟系爾授意令其書寫, 全不足憑。本大將軍統兵進剿, 豈輕信丹津班珠爾等之言, 稍寬爾罪?毋再假托浮辭, 妄行瀆稟, 自取重戾。爾部落滅亡卽在瞬息, 若再游移, 本將軍定卽統兵進剿, 不但爾之土地人民, 不能保守, 卽爾與爾之宗族頭目, 悉當駢首就戮, 斷不能復邀寬貸。

此檄。

2.2.2c Letter of Surrender from Raṇa Bahādura Śāha Received by Fuk'anggan on 25 August 1792

The letter[699] was brought to Fuk'anggan after the Betrāvatī battle as a reply to Fuk'anggan's summon on 13 August. The date of its formulation might have preceded the Betrāvatī battle. As the letter is repetitive of the previous one and the later ones, a summary of the main points is provided by us based on the edition. The summary extracts key claims from the original, while trying to keep the original tone and diction. The paragraphs are in accordance with the edition.

699 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 34–36; WZTZ 1982, 409–10.

Summary

Raṇa Bahādura Śāha sent the previously established contracts, the looted objects from the Tashilhunpo Temple, and the corpse of Shamarpa. He despatched his great headperson to pass the petition and begged for surrender. The Great General received Raṇa Bahādura Śāha's petition on 25 August (QL 57/7/8).

The Great Emperor is like the all-pervasive heavens that breed [every species] and shines like the sun and moon. He commissioned the Great General, under whose flag Raṇa Bahādura Śāha made the petition with prudence:

The tiny one [hereafter, "I/we"] had sent Bhoṭu Pā̃ḍe and Raṃjita Pā̃ḍe. They kowtowed and submitted with allegiance. It was because of the grace that they were not killed.

[1] The robbery of the Tashilhunpo Temple and the abduction of Tibetan ministers and Chinese soldiers were instigated by Shamarpa. It is our fault that we listened to him, as has been instructed by the previous summon (2.2.2b). I here plead for forgiveness. We will follow the instructions on the summon, which are beneficial.

[2] The summon instructed my uncle and me to come in person. Otherwise, the Great General will not memorialise this to the Great Emperor. It was intended that either the nephew or the uncle should come to surrender. However, I was afraid that the power of the imperial fame would melt us like the sun melting the snow.

[3] Formerly the despatched headperson was not the Prime Minister. Now, I despatched two Prime Ministers to plead.

[4] I along with all the subjects were very afraid and also grateful for the instructions. We indeed submit with allegiance sincerely and despatch the Prime Minister to go to Peking to have an audience with the Emperor.

[5] Formerly, Bhoṭu Pā̃ḍe and Raṃjita Pā̃ḍe mentioned to have a written proof of willingness [from the Great General], which was instructed by the Great General to be very improper.[700] I asked them. They replied that it might be a mistake of the interpreter (*tong-shi*).

700 Fuk'anggan on 13 August 1792 (QL 57/6/26) wrote, "Now according to the petition of Bhoṭu Pā̃ḍe, etc., in front of me, you wished to establish and issue the proof of willingness to indicate that you dare not to disturb any more. This is extremely unsuitable". "今著普魯爾邦哩等面稟, 欲將不敢再行滋事緣由, 立具甘結, 所言尤屬不合". The Emperor replied in his edict: "How could the grand Heavenly Dynasty consider it worthwhile to take up a written document with

[6] The Great General made punitive expeditions and annihilations everywhere. Imperial grace was granted elsewhere. I suppose that the grace would also be extended to us.

[7] I dare not think about the peace negotiation with Tibet last time.

[8] Gorkha is like the fish in the fishing net. We are pleading for survival and will perpetually observe whatever is instructed

[9] We could only do cremation for Shamarpa given the hot weather. We are sending his belongings and attendants out.

[10] We are making an inventory of the looted objects from the Tashilhunpo Temple and will send it out. The Bodhisattva could not tolerate the Gorkhalis so that 2,000 to 3,000 people were frozen to death on their way back last year.

[11] The contracts of Kyirong were really the cause of all the mishaps. We send them out.

[12] We are retreating the soldiers. We are like ants trying to make trouble before a human.

Petition sent with prudence.

Edition

拉特納巴都爾呈繳前立合同, 送交札什倫布物件、及沙瑪爾巴屍骨, 遣大頭人遞稟乞降。七月初八日。大將軍接到拉特納巴都爾具稟

如天覆育、如日月照臨、大皇帝欽差、大將軍麾下:

小的前差普都爾幫哩、朗穆幾爾幫哩等前來, 磕頭歸順。大將軍不忍全數誅鋤, 發檄開導, 這是大人的恩寬, 小人的不是, 要求大人寬恕。

[1]所有搶掠札什倫布、裹進噶布倫及漢兵等事, 總是沙瑪爾巴挑唆的。在上的大人已把在下小人錯處分別明白了, 總是感激的。蒙諭這些事情, 雖然是沙瑪爾巴開的, 但小的與小的叔叔聽信了他的話, 就是自己的不是等諭。小的是箇微末番子, 地方偏僻, 不知道天朝法度, 聽了壞人挑唆, 纔行錯了事, 這一切事情, 全都是小的錯了, 如今認了罪, 不加重究, 無非是憐愛眾生靈的意思。前後事情, 大將軍都已知道, 所以發來檄諭, 指示我們, 這都是我們的造化。分付的話, 我們總是在頭上頂著的, 又教照著諭帖上行事, 不但小的與小的叔叔有益, 就是眾百姓也是好的。

[2]檄諭上分付, 要小的與小的叔叔"眞心親自來投誠, 苦苦懇求, 方可奏明大皇帝, 恕你們的罪"等諭, 小的聽見了, 實在感激。小的叔姪兩箇, 原想要出來一箇投降, 因為大皇帝震怒, 大將軍到了這裏, 小的聽見了威名, 就如日光照雪的一樣, 實在害怕得狠。

you?" "以堂堂天朝, 豈屑與汝立結" (WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 30–32). Normally, the Chinese Empire could not offer any written document as proof or treaty. It can only bestow edict to the tributary states.

[3]先差來的, 雖是大頭人, 還不是打頭辦事的, 如今還要打發小的叔姪兩箇底下打頭辦事的人, 出來懇求。

[4]小的聽見大將軍的威名, 正在害怕。又接著檄諭, 説要一直進來, 小的同頭人百姓等愈加害怕了。小的等原都是大將軍底下的小人, 有了大罪, 還蒙施恩指示, 這就是三寶佛爺的保佑。從前大將軍奉旨在各處征剿, 恭順悔過的, 就蒙大皇帝施恩, 發來的檄諭, 把這些事比方著向小的曉諭, 叫小的照著行事, 這都是恩待小的, 説不盡萬分感激。如今小的們皇實在眞心歸順, 務必叫打頭辦事的大頭人跟了進京, 瞻仰大皇帝天顔。

[5]又普都爾幫哩、朗穆幾爾幫哩等面稟大將軍, 説從前的事情已經錯了, 往後再不鬧事, 情願出具甘結等語。蒙大將軍當時分付, 這出甘結的話, 回得狠不是。小的現已向朗穆幾爾幫哩詢問:"你們在大將軍前胡亂説話"。朗穆幾爾幫哩説:"我們並沒有敢回這話, 想來是通事傳錯了。"

[6]大將軍征剿各處, 至誠待人, 各處是知道的。小的心裏想著, 別的地方都肯施恩, 如今在我們身上, 也必是肯施恩的。

[7]又檄内説, 此次斷不能照著從前邊界的大人那樣將就完事等諭。小的如今也不敢想如上次與唐古特講和, 也不敢再提從前的事了。

[8]又檄内説, 如今大將軍奉大皇帝旨意來問罪, 若有意游移, 仍卽統兵進剿等諭, 大將軍仰體大皇帝好生之德, 普天下的生靈都是愛惜的, 廓爾喀如魚入網的一樣, 如今求一條生路, 准小的們投降, 還是俯念小的及眾百姓, 小的實在感激。若是肯在眾生靈上施恩, 凡有分付的話, 自必永遠遵奉。

[9]又檄内説, 令將沙瑪爾巴的屍骨、徒弟、跟役送出等諭。小的想他原是箇挑唆的壞人, 若他尚在, 就該把他拿出來正法, 但他因作了壞事, 已經陰間把他拿去了。他死後, 曾叫噶布倫、漢兵們看過, 就想要把他首級留下, 因為天氣炎熱, 當時把屍首燒了, 如今將沙瑪爾巴的骨殖、徒弟、跟役、並財物等項, 要送出來。

[10]又檄内説, 去年搶的扎什倫布的東西, 都要全數送出等諭。小的們聽了壞人的話, 去年搶了扎什倫布, 造下了罪, 菩薩不容廓爾喀的人, 回來時雪山上凍死的, 就有二三千人, 送到陽布物件, 唐古特都知道, 現在逐一點查, 就要交出來。

[11]又諭, 從前濟嚨講和時, 沙瑪爾巴從中作弊, 立下大小合同二張, 應該呈繳一條, 小的因沙瑪爾巴諸事挑唆, 得了不是, 所立合同實在是禍根。大將軍分付得狠是, 如今大小合同兩張, 都情願送出。

[12]又諭, 堵禦的兵, 都叫撤回去, 若不撤回, 大將軍因此發怒, 帶兵進來, 小的等到大將軍面前, 就如螞蟻一般, 螞蟻在人面前作怪, 只有死的一條路。想來做大人的, 不肯與小人計較。

謹稟。

2.2.2d Letter of Surrender from Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, 11 September 1792

This letter[701] comes at the last of WZTZ, vol. 13.2. It is relatively short and contains new information on the tribute.

Translation

Raṇa Bahādura Śāha arrested the wife of Shamarpa Tshe dbang Lha mo[702] and the female Lama, Tshe dbang *Yan zhu.[703]

The Great Emperor is like the all-pervasive heavens that breed [every species] and shines like the sun and moon. He commissioned the Great General, under whose flag Raṇa Bahādura Śāha made the petition with prudence on 11 September 1792, (QL 57/7/25):

The tribe of the tiny one (hereafter "I/we") looted the Tashilhunpo monastery. Naturally, I should observe the summons and instructions, sending all looted objects out. When the soldiers of our tribe came back from the Back of Tibet last year, many were frozen to death due to the heavenly punishment for their offence. There was something lost on the way. Moreover, some headpersons and soldiers hid something privately on their own. I have arrested those who have hidden and stolen the objects. The Chinese soldiers, Wang Gang, etc., know it. The objects sent to Kathmandu were only this much.

There were some silver ingots that we melted into silver coins and used. Some of them remain in storage. I have made a complete inventory of the ingots and objects and sent them out altogether. I beg the Great General to check. The arbitrary robbery of the Back of Tibet has already become a felony of Gorkha. If I dared to conceal even one piece, I must be craving for death. I ask the Great General to investigate it closely.

Moreover, I wish to obediently submit with allegiance to the Heavenly Dynasty wholeheartedly. If I should enjoy the grace [of the Great

701 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 37–39; WZTZ 1982, 412. Cp. KRKJL, vol. 30; vol. 41, QL 57/9/10.

702 According to Fuk'anggan's report, she was the wife of the attendant of Shamarpa, named Tu-sang, but was raped and seized by Shamarpa (KRKJL, vol. 40, QL 57/9/3).

703 We failed to reconstruct the Tibetan name. The name is Yan-zhu instead of Chan-zhu (cp. KRKJL, vol. 41, QL 57/9/10).

Emperor] that remits my crime with lenience, not only my life but also the entire territory would be spared and awarded by the Great Emperor. The lives of my headpersons and subjects were made intact by the compassion of the Great Emperor.

Now, I am preparing the auspicious memorial and tribute. I am about to despatch the chief headperson to Peking. He will plead for forgiveness and imperial grace upon his audience with the heavenly face of the Great Emperor. Regarding the tribute, I do not know the statutes of the Heavenly Dynasty. I am afraid there might be mistakes. Moreover, since I am in a remote, desolate, and tiny region, there is no good product from [our region]. It is hard to express my tiny mind of reverence and fear. Now, I have [prepared] musicians of Gorkha, 5 elephants, and 5 foreign horses, which are particularly rare in our region. I have altogether prepared the tribute as well. I am not sure whether we have permission to offer the tribute [to the Great Emperor]. I beg the Great General to bestow his grace upon us. Please instruct Ta-man Śāha who has been despatched. Upon your authorisation, I shall present them with the varied regional products. This route [via Betrāvatī] has great mountains that make it hard to cross. The elephants and horses cannot come out of [the Kathmandu Valley]. They have to make a detour to the even regions and take a longer distance. They will be presented to Tibet via other tribes without any question or mistake.

Moreover, the women of Shamarpa, Tshe dbang Lha mo, had escaped formerly. She is now arrested. She is now escorted along with the female attendant lama Tshe dbang Yan zhu.

Petition on 11 September (7/25).

Edition

拉特納巴都爾擒獻沙瑪爾巴妻室策旺拉木、及女喇嘛策旺產珠。[704]

七月二十五日。拉特納巴都爾謹稟

如天覆育、如日月照臨、大皇帝欽差大將軍麾下:

小的部落搶掠札什倫布, 自當遵奉檄諭, 將搶掠各物全行繳出。小的部落的兵, 上年自後藏回來, 干犯天譴, 凍死的狠多, 沿途就有遺失, 還有頭人兵丁私自隱藏下的, 小的曾把隱藏偷竊的收禁, 漢兵王剛們是知道的, 交到陽布物件, 實在只有這些。

704 It should be 彦珠.

元寶銀兩除融化銀錢花用外, 現在還存些, 今將銀兩物件查點齊全, 俱都送出來了, 求大將軍查驗。廓爾喀因擅搶後藏, 已犯重罪, 若再敢隱瞞一件, 更是自尋死路, 還求大將軍詳察。

再, 小的真心歸順天朝, 如蒙加恩寬免, 不但小的性命是大皇帝饒的, 就是所有地方, 都是大皇帝賞的, 頭人百姓的命, 都是大皇帝矜全的。

現在備辦表文貢物, 就差大頭人等進京, 請罪謝恩, 瞻仰大皇帝天顏。所備貢物, 小的不知道天朝規矩, 恐有錯誤, 又因偏僻小地方, 沒有出產的好東西, 一點恭敬畏懼的心, 不能表出。現有廓爾喀的樂工, 又有象五隻, 番馬五匹, 是小的地方狠難得的, 如今貢物一併預備下了, 不知道許進不許進, 懇求大將軍施恩, 分付差來的塔曼薩野, 如蒙允準, 即同各方物一併恭進。這一路山大難行, 象隻馬匹未能出來, 只好繞行平坦地方, 多走些路, 由別部落送到藏里, 不敢違誤。

再, 沙瑪爾巴的女人策旺拉木, 前於中途逃逸, 茲已緝獲, 同跟隨之女喇嘛策旺彥珠, 一併鎖押送出。

七月二十五日具稟。

2.2.3 Official Exchanges Between Gorkha and Qing, 1792/1793

Several official documents that involve the Imperial Institute are collected here, read from miscellaneous works, mainly archival documents, i.e., KRKD.

2.2.3a Official Letter of Surrender to the Emperor from Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, September 1792

The text is preserved in WZTZ.[705] It was presented to the Emperor via Fuk'anggan according to the official imperial procedure. But it was not cited fully in KRKJL or KRKD. The letter was brought to Fuk'anggan and then to Peking by Devadatta Thāpā. As it is rather lengthy, a summary of its main points is provided by us.

705 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.3, 9–13; WZTZ 1982, 422–24. The earlier Chinese translation might be in *Han-wen Lu*-fu 3–157–7619–1. The Manchu version which was translated later can be found in the First Historical Archive (Cata. Mnc. no. 8769 = 3–2–3413–030).

Summary

Raṇa Bahādura Śāha begged the Great General in his petition to memorialise their plead for surrender.

The Great Emperor is like the all-pervasive heavens that breed [every species] and shines like the sun and moon. He commissioned the Great General, under whose flag Raṇa Bahādura Śāha made the petition with Bahādura Śāha:

[To Fuk'anggan:]

[1] The tiny one [i.e., Raṇa Bahādura Śāha] enjoyed the immense grace of the Great Emperor as the subordinate of the Heavenly Dynasty. The tiny one made mistakes because of Shamarpa's instigation. We are very afraid and eager to surrender with sincerity.

[2] Gorkha tribe that [occupies] a small region beyond the western border, was fearless in raising conflicts with Tibet. We pleaded for survival as fish in the fishing net.

[3] It took us a while to make inventory and arrest the wife of Shamarpa. Therefore, we delayed in following the instructions in the summons. We were afraid that the Great General might have been annoyed.

[4] We could not come to Peking to have an audience. I am young, while my uncle is in charge. Now, we despatch the *kājī*, Devadatta Thāpā, who is the person in charge among the four *kājī*s. We also despatched Su-ba Bar-di-man Raṇa, Jia-cha-bla Zaminda Śāha, and Kar-dar Balabhadra to kowtow and plead in front of the Great General.[706] I beg the Great General to memorialise our plead for forgiveness. I beg the Great Emperor to authorise our surrender.

[5] We do not have local products and are not familiar with the legal statutes of the Heavenly Dynasty. We can only express our fear, gratitude, and sincerity in our auspicious memorial. Please instruct us on the rules and regulations of the Heavenly Dynasty.

[6] We are stupid foreigners. We are afraid from within and dare not to be capricious. We will perpetually be subordinate to the Heavenly Dynasty.

706 Ar-zeng Śāha, the nephew of Bam Bahādura Śāha, confessed the titles of the Gorkhali officers on 18 August 1792 (QL 57/7/1). According to him, Su-ba is a military officer leading 1,000–3,000 soldiers. There are nine Su-ba in all. Kar-dar is a minister in charge of the documents, letters, and writings. It is not *kāyastha*, which is transcribed as Ka-yi-sda (KRKD QL 57/7-8, 2).

The auspicious memorial presented with reverence [to the Emperor]:

Your junior minister, Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, along with the uncle of your junior minister, Bahādura Śāha, having kneed down and kowtowed with joint palms and reverence, offered upwards the auspicious memorial to the chariot of the Great Emperor who is like the all-pervasive heavens breeding [every species] and shines like the sun and moon.

The Great Emperor rules ten thousand countries all under heavens. He is placed over the Buddha and *deva*s. He is the most noble and greatest, protecting all beings with compassion. His benevolence and kindness pervade extensively, shining in every world and surpassing the light of the *uṣṇīṣa* of Buddha. His sacred life span equals heaven. He is also like Mount Sumeru that is firm for billions of years. All subjects, sentient and non-sentient beings enjoy his grace to come into being.[707]

[1] Formerly, we were pervaded by the fame of civilisation. We wished to pay allegiance but it was not realised. In 1789 (QL 54), we were conferred the title of the "King" and the "Duke".

[2] We should have restrained ourselves upon the imperial grace, but Bahādura Śāha was misled by Shamarpa and had conflicts with Tibet. It was because of Shamarpa's personal resentment [against the Tibetans]. However, we also committed felonies, being incited and deluded by him. Therefore, we were punished by the heavens, as 2,000 to 3,000 people were frozen to death after looting the Back of Tibet.

[3] Upon the arrival and conquests of the Great General's great army, our entire tribe was torn by fear. We regretted having listened to Shamarpa's words that the Heavenly Dynasty would not come for the expedition. If he were alive, we would capture him and send him out. Now that he died, we sent out his women, attendants, and belongings.

[4] The former contracts of Kyirong and the looted objects of the Tashilhunpo were sent out together.

[5] We will follow the rules of the Heavenly Dynasty and keep a good relationship with Tibet. We will not disturb around the border.

[6] We beg for the forgiveness and lenience of the Great Emperor.

[7] We could not come to Peking to have an audience. I am young, while my uncle is in charge. Now, we despatch the *kājī*, Devadatta Thāpā, who is the person in charge among the four *kājī*s. We also despatched Su-ba-bar-di-man Raṇa, Jia-cha-bla Za-in-da Sa-ye, and Kar-dar Balabhadra to hand in the auspicious memorial and kowtow to

707 The praise is translated fully and literally here.

the Great Emperor. We prepared musicians, tamed elephants, foreign horses, and regional products. We kowtow and present them as our sincerity. We beg the Great Emperor to accept them.

[8] We should send tribute annually. However, owing to the distance, we beg to send quinquennial tribute to be led by a *kājī* every time.

Your junior minister, Raṇa Bahādura Śāha kneed and kowtowed on an auspicious day between 16 September and 15 October 1792 (QL 57/8).

Edition

拉特納巴都爾稟懇大將軍代奏乞降

拉特納巴都爾率領巴都爾薩野謹稟:

如天覆育、如日月照臨、大皇帝欽差、公中堂大將軍麾下:

[1]小的等本系天朝屬下, 受過大皇帝重恩, 頂戴不盡, 只因自己福薄, 聽沙瑪爾巴的話, 得了大罪, 如今斷不敢推諉別人, 總是小的等的不是。屢次具稟大將軍, 懇求投降, 並差普都爾邦哩等前赴大營哀懇。這是小的等十分害怕, 急切投誠, 想蒙鑒察。

[2]廓爾喀部落原是西方邊外一小地方, 不知死活, 與唐古特鬧事, 大皇帝特發大兵前來, 治小的等罪。大兵打仗利害, 一直進來, 自小的等以及闔部落, 人人害怕。小的等畏懼大皇帝天威天兵的聲勢, 萬分懊悔, 從前錯誤, 業已無及, 惟有認罪哀告, 歸順天朝, 叩求大皇帝天恩, 寬恕無知小番, 憐念廓爾喀生靈, 免把廓爾喀剿滅, 小的子子孫孫, 感激不盡。小的等如魚在網裏, 能彀放了不能, 總仰仗大皇帝仁慈作主。

[3]大將軍前發檄諭, 令小的繳出私立合同、並搶掠札什倫布物件、呈獻沙瑪爾巴骨殖、及伊徒弟、女人、跟役、什物, 因查點東西, 搜拿沙瑪爾巴的女人, 耽擱了幾天。惟恐大將軍發怒, 實在害怕得狠, 前已陸續呈繳出來了。

[4]小的叔姪二人, 本應親自到京, 瞻仰大皇帝天顏, 只因小的年幼, 小的叔叔管事, 不能遠離; 今派噶箕第烏達特塔巴來到大營叩求。他家是小的祖父以來輩輩作噶箕的, 他在四箇噶箕中, 是箇正經辦事的人, 所以才打發他出來。同著蘇巴巴爾底曼喇納、甲察布拉咱音達薩野、喀爾達爾巴拉巴達爾三人, 在大將軍前苦苦的磕頭哀告, 替小的們請罪, 只求轉奏大皇帝, 施天大的一番恩典, 准令投降。

[5]叫第烏達特塔巴等進京, 恭進表貢, 備來的貢物, 不過表小的等一點誠敬的心。廓爾喀偏僻小地方, 不出甚麼東西。小的等不懂得天朝制度, 表文內的話, 都是敘小的等畏懼感激誠心, 也不知合式不合式。噶箕等是邊遠地方小番目, 天朝規矩, 都不能知道, 只求教導指示, 好到京裏去見大皇帝, 使小的部落得受大皇帝天恩, 就感激成全的恩典了。

[6]若蒙大皇帝施恩寬宥, 饒了小的等性命, 永遠作天朝屬下, 實在是闔部落的造化, 惟有永遠遵著王法, 萬不敢絲毫鬧事。小的等雖是愚蠢番子, 經過這一番警戒, 從心裏害怕出來, 斷不敢再有反覆, 總求施恩轉奏。

謹稟。

恭進表文一道。

廓爾喀$_{小臣}$拉特納巴都爾率領$_{小臣}$之叔巴都爾薩野恭敬合掌跪叩奉表

如天覆育、如日月照臨, 大皇帝御前:

欽惟大皇帝統御天下萬國, 在佛天之上, 至尊至大, 愛護眾生, 仁慈廣被, 普照一切世界, 勝於佛頂光明。大皇帝聖壽如天, 又如須彌山, 鞏固億萬載, 凡屬人民物類, 皆得永受生成。

[1]$_{小臣}$部落系偏僻番地, 曾被聲教, 早欲投順天朝, 未能如願。乾隆五十四年, 懇請歸誠, 仰蒙大皇帝賞封$_{小臣}$拉特納巴都爾王爵, $_{小臣}$之叔巴都爾薩野公爵, 特賜珍物, 並將差去之把拉巴都爾哈瓦斯等, 加賞翎頂。

[2]$_{小臣}$身受天恩, 至今頂戴。原應謹守部落, 不敢滋事, $_{小臣}$福分淺薄, 不能承受。有沙瑪爾巴從中唆使, $_{小臣}$年齒幼小, $_{小臣}$之叔巴都爾薩野自無主見, 誤聽其言, 與唐古特構釁。此因由沙瑪爾巴懷挾私嫌, 有心簸弄, 然$_{小臣}$等被伊煽惑, 卽係孤負大皇帝恩慈, 身犯重罪, 無可推諉。所以上干天譴, 搶掠後藏之人, 在雪山凍死二千三百餘人, 回至陽布, 所存無幾。

[3]今大將軍奉大皇帝聖旨, 統領大兵, 前來問罪, 大兵一直進剿, 攻克許多地方, 剿殺三四千人。$_{小臣}$及闔部落頭目百姓, 人人震恐, 心驚膽裂, 逃竄慌亂, 不能安居。沙瑪爾巴原說與唐古特相爭, 天朝斷不遠來問罪, 極為慫恿。今大兵從天而降, 如此大加剿殺, $_{小臣}$實屬萬分懊悔, 萬分恐懼。如今自怨自恨, 業已無及。若沙瑪爾巴尚在, 自必生擒獻出。今已病身故, 將伊骨殖、及伊女人與徒弟、什物等項, 全行送出。

[4]從前濟嚨所立大小合同二件, 實系禍根, 必應呈繳。所搶札什倫布物件, $_{小臣}$收到者, [亦一並]交還。

[5]此後遵奉天朝王法, 與唐古特和好, 從前私立合同, 原是錯誤, 此後不敢再提一字。永遠不敢侵犯邊界, 亦斷不敢如上次投誠, 又有反覆, 自取滅亡。屢次具稟, 哀懇大將軍轉奏。

[6]大皇帝俯念$_{小臣}$及$_{小臣}$之叔巴都爾薩野係愚蠢小番, 不識天朝法度, 身陷大罪, 總由誤聽人言, 並非敢於有心背叛, 如蒙大皇帝特沛恩施, 憐念$_{小臣}$年幼, 外番無知, 允准降附, 闔部落生靈皆蒙大皇帝保全, 闔部落境土皆係大臣皇帝天威安撫地方, 子子孫孫, 永當銜結。$_{小臣}$不過微末之人, 比於蟲蟻, 願與微細眾生同遊化宇。大皇帝天地之量, 無所不容, 惟求大皇帝逾格開恩, 宥赦前罪, 以全$_{小臣}$軀命, 實為萬幸。

[7]本應親身朝覲, 而$_{小臣}$年尚幼小, 欲派$_{小臣}$之叔巴都爾薩野赴京, 又因辦事無人, 不能遠離, 茲特派辦事噶箕第烏達特塔巴進京。伊家系$_{小臣}$祖父以來世為噶箕, 深為倚信之人, 令其同蘇巴巴爾底曼喇納、甲察布拉咱音達薩野、喀爾達爾巴拉巴達爾等, 恭賫表文, 代躬叩覲大皇帝天顏, 並虔備樂工, 及馴象、番馬, 並方物等件, 叩首恭進, 敬申微忱, 懇求賞收。

[8]嗣後永遠服屬天朝, 本應年年納貢, 但$_{小臣}$部落距天朝遙遠, 懇請五年一貢, 每次派噶箕一名, 恭賫進京, 伏乞大皇帝俯鑒$_{小臣}$螻蟻微忱, 格外施恩, 寬宥重罪, 小臣無任感激惶悚之至。

乾隆五十七年八月吉日, $_{小臣}$拉特納巴都爾等跪奏

2.2.3b Official Reply from Fuk'anggan, 3 October 1792

The text is preserved only in WZTZ.[708] It was the official reply from Fuk'anggan to accept the surrender. He noted that he wrote this only after receiving the authorisation of the Emperor which allowed him to decide by himself whether to march further or close the case as such considering the upcoming winter.

Translation

The Great General informs Raṇa Bahādura Śāha with this instructive summon:

Your tribe once submitted to the imperial civilising power, listed as one of the vassals. But you credulously listened to the instigation of Shamarpa and caused conflicts with Tibet upon pretexts. The Great Emperor commissioned me to command powerful troops to denounce your crimes. We destroyed the strongholds and overcame the perils. We advanced with no obstacle in front of us. You are thus shaken and frightened by the imperial power and have remorse. You have despatched headpersons to our camp several times and pleaded for the second and the third time. Your confession of your crimes was sincere and genuine. You also despatched Devadatta Thāpā to present the auspicious memorial and tribute and to have an audience in Peking. [You promised] to obey the restrictions [imposed by the Heavenly Dynasty] without causing trouble anymore.

I, the Great General, inspected that you had sincerity within and memorialised it in detail to the Great Emperor. We retreated on both sides and wait for the edict of the Great Emperor. Only after that, your surrender with sincerity can be authorised. You have sent Captain Bhoṭu Pãḍe and Da-sar Narasiṃha.[709] They should be kept at Kyirong to wait for further instructions.

Now, I have received the edict of the Great Emperor. From high above, the Great Emperor inspected your reverence, obedience, remorse, loyalty, fear, and gratitude out of your extreme sincerity. He bestowed the grace that equals the heaven and earth. He remitted your

708 WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.3, 16–18; WZTZ 1982, 428.

709 Captain was transcribed as Ga-bdang. According to the Chinese understanding of the Gorkhali system, there were four captains in all, while Da-sar was the officer in charge of silver coins (KRKD QL 57/7–8, 2).

former crimes and authorised your surrender of sincerity. He ordered that the despatched headpersons should come to Peking to pay tribute and submit the auspicious memorial.

I, the Great General, follow his edict with prudence and receive your capitulation. We thus retreat the officers and soldiers from respective routes. I have instructed Bhoṭu Pā̃ḍe and the other person face to face, sending them back to Kathmandu.

Reverently speaking, the Great Emperor placates and controls ten thousand regions, seeing the internal and external as one family. He will kill the rebellious and remit the obedient. You have submitted with allegiance wholeheartedly. Relying on the [imperial] virtue of sparing lives and the sacred grace, the living beings of your entire tribe are saved and remitted. From now on, you will perpetually be subordinate to the Heavenly Dynasty and observe our restriction with prudence and carefulness. Then, you will be able to enjoy the endowment of grace frequently.

If there happened to be any caprice, the heavenly troops might come again to eradicate your tribe. You would not be able to ask for remission like this time. Punished and wounded as such, you should not dare to provoke trouble.

Yesterday, I received your petition and realised that you fear the grace and power of the Great Emperor, thus abiding by the summons of me, the Great General. You have taken an oath to avoid caprice. You dare not to act recklessly or commit felonies on your own. I have read the issues and words in your petition in detail. They were very respectful and obedient. I, the Great General, was very delighted. If you can hold your mind as such, it is the fortune for you, your headpersons, and the foreign people. The Great Emperor pervades and raises the beings as heaven. He will naturally mirror the concerns of your respect and fear and bestow grace graciously.

Here ends the summon.

Edition

大將軍檄諭拉特納巴都爾知悉:

爾部落曾歸王化, 列在藩封, 乃因聽信沙瑪爾巴唆使, 與唐古特藉端挑釁。大皇帝特命本大將軍統率勁兵, 前來問罪, 摧堅破險, 所向無前。爾卽震懾天威, 幡然悟悔, 屢遣頭人來營, 再三哀懇, 切實認罪, 並遣第烏達特塔巴恭賫表貢, 進京瞻覲, 永奉約束, 不敢再滋事端。

本大將軍察爾出自眞誠, 代為詳悉具奏, 暫撤各兵至邊, 恭候大皇帝諭旨, 方准投誠。爾令噶布黨普都爾邦哩、達薩爾乃爾興隨來, 聽候示諭, 令在濟嚨暫駐。

今已奉到大皇帝聖旨, 俯鑒爾恭順悔罪悃忱畏懼感激出於至誠, 大施天地之恩, 赦宥前罪, 准爾投誠。令所遣大頭人等赴京, 進表納貢。

本大將軍敬謹遵旨受降, 將各路官兵撤回。普都爾邦哩等二人亦卽面加飭諭, 遣回陽布。

敬維大皇帝撫馭萬方, 中外一家, 逆者必誅, 順者必宥。今因爾傾心歸順, 仰蒙聖恩好生之德, 保全爾闔部落生靈, 曲加寬宥, 從此永為天朝屬下, 遵奉約束, 恭謹小心, 自能常受恩施。

倘或稍有反覆, 天兵仍可卽來, 蕩平爾部落, 斷難再邀原赦。爾經此次懲創之後, 諒不敢復行滋事。

昨接爾來稟, 深知畏懼大皇帝恩威, 將本大將軍傳諭之語, 一一遵奉, 誓無反覆, 斷不敢私毫妄為, 自取重罪。詳閱稟內情辭, 十分恭順, 本大將軍甚為嘉悅, 爾如能常存此心, 卽係爾及爾頭人番民之福。大皇帝覆育如天, 自鑒爾敬畏之憂, 優加恩澤也。

此檄。

2.2.3c Edicts, 7 October 1792

The two edicts are found in KRKD, KRKJL, Yuan Yi Lai etc.[710] An edition based on KRKD and KRKJL. KRKJL deleted many phrases from the original. Hence, the summary of their articles is based on KRKD.

Summary

The cabinet[711] follows this public edict on 7 October 1792 (QL 57/8/22):

[1] Gorkha disturbed the Tibetan border of Kyirong because of salt, tax, and numismatic issues in 1788 (QL 53). Bajung failed to clarify the dispute. Meanwhile, the younger brother of the former Panchen Lama, Shamarpa had discord with his elder brother, Drungpa. Gorkha was incited by Shamarpa to provoke strife. Bajung should have been punished.

[2] I thought it was a dispute of debt and commercial interest upon receiving Fusihūn and Yamantai's memorial. If so, it was not worth the expedition. However, later Fusihūn reported their disturbance in

710 KRKD QL 57/7-8, 167–80; KRKJL, vol. 39, QL 57/8/22; Yuan Yi Lai, no. 918.

711 The edict was sent to the cabinet to be processed within the imperial system and thus to inform the entire empire.

the Tashilhunpo Temple. I had to order Fuk'anggan etc., to annihilate them and pacify Tibet. I did not crave their land, as I had expanded the imperial territory beyond 30,000 *li*. I am actually worried that Tibet, which was settled by my grandfather and father, was disturbed by the clown-like Gorkha.

[3] Fuk'anggan marched forward into the Gorkha realm for hundreds of *li*. The tribal chieftain of the enemies, Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, sent out abducted Tenzin Peljor and pleaded for surrender, while Fuk'anggan ordered the uncle and nephew to come in person for surrender. Today, I received Fuk'anggan's memorial on his receiving Raṇa Bahādura Śāha's petition on 25 August (QL 57/7/8). They were frightened and dared not to come in person.[712]

[4] I mobilised the expedition to punish Gorkha. Now, they have surrendered several times. The subjects of Grokhā are also subjects of me. I do not want to kill them all.

[5] We won every battle in the campaign and frightened the enemy. Their repetitive requests of surrender honour us even more than the reception of the capitulation of Annam last time, showing our military power. They dared not come to our camp because of fear now but might admire the imperial grace bestowed upon Nguyễn Quang Bình [, the Vietnamese King,] and wish to pay a tributary visit.

[6] I have ordered Fuk'anggan to pass my edict. I remit their crime, authorise their tributary mission, and receive the capitulation and remorse. Fuk'anggan should immediately retreat the troops back to the inner land [from Tibet]. I had no intention of excessive military campaigns.

[7] Fuk'anggan's memorial was sent on 26 August 1792 (QL 57/7/9), 40 days before my edict. Upon the arrival of my edict, Fuk'anggan might have reached the hideout of the enemy (Kathmandu) and reported victory. However, I am afraid to exhaust the army and decided to close

712 The Emperor remarked that he was also afraid that Bahādura Śāha would seize the throne if Raṇa Bahādura Śāha came out on 24 September 1792 (QL 57/8/9). He intended to catch and punish Bahādura Śāha for his connection with Shamarpa and his deceitful words, helping to re-establish the order in Gorkha court. As reported to the Emperor: "But Shamarpa was only in alliance with Bahādura Śāha in the realm of the enemy. Balabhadra Śāha and other Śāhas all complained about Shamarpa and had discord with Bahādura Śāha. Bahādura Śāha is the most cunning and evil. He already had the intention of seizing the throne." 但沙瑪爾巴在賊境內, 惟與巴都爾薩野交結朋比, 巴喇巴都爾薩野及衆薩野皆抱怨沙瑪爾巴, 與巴都爾薩野不和。巴都爾薩野最属狡惡, 其平日本有佔奪之心 (KRKD QL 57/7-8, 99–103).

the case before the snow blocks the mountain [passes]. If Fuk'anggan had memorialised his victory, I should have paid a visit to the imperial mausolea on both the east and the west to inform the ancestors of such achievement. However, the authorisation of the capitulation is not worth such a grand ritual. I thus inform the internal and external of all issues related to Gorkha. Fuk'anggan's memorials and the capitulations of Raṇa Bahādura Śāha should be copied and sent along with this edict.

Hešen, who is the Grand Secretary and the Earl,[713] on 7 October 1792 (QL 57/8/22), sent this secret edict to Fuk'anggan, who is the Grand Secretary, the Great General, the Duke, and the Counsellors Hailanca and Hui-ling, as well as Heliyen, who is the Chief Minister of Work:

[…Reference to the capitulation on 25 August (QL 57/7/8)…]

Fuk'anggan and Hailanca are courageous. They would definitely march forward if possible. If they had reached the hideout of the enemy (Kathmandu), they should report the victory and retreat. If not, they should follow the previous edicts and receive the capitulation.

[1] Fuk'anggan, Hailanca, soldiers, and officers were really exhausted, while the transportation of provisions and military equipment was poor. The snow might also soon block the mountain [passes]. Therefore, I should not force them to enter further, as the military glory has been amplified and the enemy was frightened. It is thus even better than the capitulation and audience of the King of Annam. They should thus retreat. I have issued an edict via cabinet about this.

[2] One of the [royal] Śāhas should come to the camp and then to Peking. They should also take a vow as proof of willingness to be punished. They should articulate in front of Yamāntaka (Vajrabhairava), burning incense on their heads, "Upon this allegiance to the Heavenly Dynasty, I will never covet Tibet or disturb the border again. If I break the vow, I will be struck by the lightning to death and beget the mischief granted by gods and Buddhas."

[3] The annexed territories should be inspected and returned. Boundary markers are to be put up.

[4] No more commercial connections between Gorkha and Tibet should be down. Even the salt and ghee should not be sold. No one

713 In official documents, the titles of a minister should be indicated. One minister might have a certain position in the government, an aristocratic title, an honour title, etc.

should cross the Tibetan border. If this was offended, the Great General would eradicate the hideout again.

[5] Gorkha should pay tribute to Peking as Korea, Annam, Siam, Myanmar, etc., be it triennial or quinquennial.

[6] Single Soldiers should be stationed in strongholds in the Back of Tibet.

[7] The Newar merchants in Tibet can either become subjects in Tibet or be repatriated upon their wish.

[8] The Newar silver coins should never be used and replaced by the newly minted coins.

[9] As Gorkhalīs should not cross the border, the Tibetans should not go to Gorkha to revere the *stūpa* or trade.

[10] One amban should be stationed in the Back of Tibet.

These issues should be implemented by Fuk'anggan and the amban residing in Tibet according to what I commented last year.

[11] The adjacent tribes, such as Bhutan, Sikkim, Jumla, etc., are not reliable.

[12] Zhe-se-bao, the imperial guard, died on the way back to Syaphru. I shall issue a Manchu edict on that.

This edict will be sent at a rapid speed of 600 *li* [per day] to Fuk'anggan, etc. They also should memorialise the status quo upon receiving the edict. The public edict should also be copied for them.

Edition

乾隆五十七年八月二十二日內閣奉上諭:

[1]廓爾喀系邊外荒徼小部落, 從前未列職方。乾隆五十三年因鹽稅、銀錢細務, 與唐古忒人彼此爭競, 在後藏濟嚨邊界滋擾。因命鄂輝、成德前往該處查辦, 並以巴忠熟悉藏內情形, 令其馳往會辦。詎巴忠以通曉番語, 謬執己見, 不為剖斷明確。又有前輩班禪之弟紅帽喇嘛沙瑪爾巴與伊兄仲巴不和, 廓爾喀聽其唆使, 以致滋生事端。此皆由巴忠初次辦理貽誤所致。使其身尚在, 必當明正典刑。詎伊昨年一聞廓爾喀復行滋擾之信, 即畏罪自盡, 已將伊子僧額布侍衛革退, 令其在護軍上効力行走, 其罪亦無可再加。

[2]至廓爾喀復行滋擾, 初據俘習渾、雅滿泰奏到, 朕尚以廓爾喀向在藏內與唐古忒人雜處貿易, 分爭微利, 致有欠賬未清。如僅因索欠細故擾至邊境, 不值加之撻伐。嗣據俘習渾等奏, 廓爾喀競敢擾至札什倫布, 肆行搶掠, 若仍付之不問, [714]不聲罪致討, 大加懲創, 何以安衛藏而靖邊疆?因特命福康安等及巴圖魯侍衛帶領官兵前往進剿。朕臨御

714 KRKJL omits the four words.

五十七年, 平定準部、回部、大小兩金川, 拓土開疆不下三萬餘里, 區區廓爾喀, 以後藏邊外彈丸, 朕豈值利其土地為窮兵黷武之舉?弟以衛藏為皇祖、皇考戡定之地, 僧俗人衆沾濡醲化, 百有餘年, 詎容小醜侵擾、置之不問?此朕不得已用兵之苦心, 當為天下臣民所共知者。

[3]福康安等自馳抵後藏, 即整兵進剿, 於擦木、邦杏連獲勝仗, 以次收復濟嚨, 攻克熱索橋、協布嚕、東覺、集木集等處, 所向克捷, 痛殲賊衆。深入廓爾喀境數百餘里。賊酋拉特納巴都爾及伊叔巴都爾薩野自知滅亡在即, 畏懼懾伏, 將上年裹去之噶布倫丹津班珠爾等早行送出, 差大頭人朗穆幾爾幫哩等四名赴營遞稟乞降。並以"此次擾至後藏邊界, 皆由誤聽沙瑪爾巴指使, 本欲將該喇嘛送出, 適先病斃"等語, 經福康安等嚴行駁飭, 令該賊酋叔侄親自赴營懇乞, 始准投誠。本日據福康安等奏"七月初八日接到拉特納巴都爾來稟, 所有諭令交送札什倫布什物並呈獻沙瑪爾巴骨殖等款, 俱已一一遵奉。稟內語意多系感戴恩德, 自行認罪, 凡自稱之處俱改為小的。惟於親來一節, 祇婉陳感畏之意, 未敢切實稟覆"等語。

[4]前因廓爾喀自作不靖, 是以加之天討。今既畏懼悔罪, 疊次遞稟乞降, 情詞尚為恭順。朕仰體上天好生之德, 廓爾喀民人猶吾民人也, 不忍多事誅夷。

[5]況福康安等此次帶兵進攻, 每戰必克, 賊匪望風膽落, 故以畏服之詞, 為歸誠之請, 較之前此安南受降納款更足以尊國體而示軍威。但外番素性多疑, 拉特納[715]巴都爾等因滋擾獲罪, 察其畏懼情形, 目下亦未必敢親自詣營。將來歸誠後, 見安南阮光平叨荷崇封, 進京祝嘏, 賞賚駢蕃, 寵榮已極。該賊酋等自必心生艷羨, 或情愿詣闕, 覲光輸誠, 亦未可知。

[6]著福康安等即傳朕旨, 赦其前罪, 准令納表進貢, 悔罪投誠。福康安等亦即撤兵回至內地。此朕始終不欲用兵之苦心, 又當為天下臣民所共見共聞者。

[7]福康安等之摺系七月初九日拜發, 距今已四十餘日。此旨到時, 或福康安等已搗穴擒渠, 馳遞紅旗, 亦未可定。但朕怙冒為懷, 覺勞師久役, 轉不若納款受降, 趁大雪封山以前撤兵凱旋之為完善。朕本欲俟福康安等紅旗遞到, 恭謁東西兩陵告厥成功。今已准其受降完事, 不值詣陵祭告, 行此鉅典, 已定於二十五日啟鑾回京。所有辦理廓爾喀緣由, 著通諭中外知之。[716]福康安等奏摺及所進譯出拉特納巴都爾哀懇稟詞俱著發抄, 欽此。

大學士伯和字寄大學士將軍公福參贊大臣海、惠, 工部尚書和乾隆五十七年八月二十二日奉上諭:

據福康安等奏七月初八日接到拉特納巴都爾來稟, 譯出閱看:如交送札什倫布什物繳出大小合同並呈獻沙瑪爾巴骨殖及伊徒弟、跟役、財物等款。俱已件件遵奉, 惟檄令拉特納巴都爾薩野親來一節祇婉陳感畏之意, 不敢切實稟覆等語。[717]

715 KRKJL:"更足以"至此唯有"尚為妥善"四字.
716 KRKJL ends here.
717 KRKJL omits the quotes.

福康安等帶兵深人賊境, 連次打仗, 所向克捷, 賊匪望風膽落。朕料其必另差人赴營乞降。又因今年節候較早, 慮及藏內氣候驟寒, 若非及早撤兵蔵事, 恐為大雪封山所阻。叠經降旨令福康安等臨機應變, 妥速蔵功。

今閱福康安等奏稱應俟其將合同、札什倫布物件呈交, 並送出沙瑪爾巴骨殖、徒弟、跟役, 看其如何具稟, 再行相機酌辦一節。所見甚是。至所稱"雖賊匪畏懼乞哀, 斷不敢遽存將就了事之見"等語。

福康安海蘭察素性勇往, 當賊匪窮蹙之時, 如有機勢可乘, 自仍鼓勇前進, 斷不肯功虧一簣, 將就完事。計此摺拜發後, 迄今又逾四十餘日, 如竟已直抵賊巢, 擒渠縛醜, 自即奏凱班師, 若有不能即時得手之處, 現在天氣已凉, 恐致雪阻, 自應遵照節次所降諭旨, 受降凱旋為是。

[1]況此次福康安、海蘭察及帶兵將弁官員並兵丁等深入賊境, 冒雨步行, 陟越險阻, 手足胼胝, 於萬山潮濕之地藉以棲止, 實為十分勞苦, 而後路糧運、軍械又諸多竭蹶。現已時屆深秋, 若再與賊相持, 設或氷雪封山, 是進無所取, 退有所阻, 豈不進退兩難?[718]朕斷不肯以萬難辦理之事, 迫人深入之理。且此次官弁兵丁與賊接仗, 無不人思効命, 奮勇爭先, 攻奪碉卡, 殲戮賊匪, 屢戰屢捷, 已深入賊境數百里。軍威已極壯盛。賊匪具稟乞哀, 其情勢窮蹙, 已可概見。以現在情形而論, 賊匪經此次兵威震懾帖服, 不敢再萌故智, 邊境敉寧, 或可保數十年無事。是趁此妥辦收功, 較之安南投誠入覲尚為完善。即拉特納巴都爾、巴都爾薩野自揣罪惡多端, 心懷畏懼, 此時不敢親赴軍門, 或數年之後伊等畏威懷德, 見安南內附後, 叠受恩施, 心生欣羡, 自請入覲, 亦為事理所有。恐福康安等未奉朕旨, 不敢遽行受降完事, 現已明降諭旨, 將此次不得已用兵之故, 及軍威大振, 賊酋窮蹙乞降、俯准納款緣由宣示中外。

[2]此番受降, 拉特納巴都爾、巴都爾薩野即不敢自來軍營, 亦必須令其緊要頭人如薩野者, 前赴軍門, 將來即可帶其來京, 瞻覲具表納貢, 至天朝特派大將軍大學士統領大兵, 聲罪討賊, 畏威乞命, 則不可不令出具甘結, 明立誓言, 以堅其志。福康安當諭令賊匪在雅滿達噶佛前頂香立誓, 以此番投順天朝後, 永遠不敢窺伺藏地, 稍犯邊境, 如違誓, 定遭天雷擊斃, 諸位神佛降之災殃, 庶或心懷警畏, 不敢再有反覆。

[3]並將從前藏內被賊匪佔去地方查詢明確, 逐一令其退還, 分定疆域, 設立界牌。

[4]諭令賊匪嗣後永遠不准與藏內僧俗番衆等交通貿易, 其廓爾喀所需鹽斤、酥油, 亦不許其前來購買, 並不許賊境一人私越邊界, 如有偷越藏界者, 一經拏獲, 即行正法, 倘稍有違犯, 不但神佛不佑, 本大將軍仍帶兵前往, 掃穴犁庭。彼時如賊匪再來乞哀, 斷不肯如此次之俯從所請。[719]

[5]至廓爾喀既已內附, 亦應定以納貢之期, 或三年、五年遣大頭人赴京, 具表進貢, 如朝鮮、安南、暹羅、緬甸外藩各國之例一律辦理, 方成體制。

[6]至將來撤兵回藏, 後藏內自應撥駐兵丁, 以資防守。唐古忒素性懦弱, 達木兵丁亦不甚得力, 自應於屯土兵丁內擇其單身者, 於要隘處所酌留分撥駐防。[720]

718 KRKJL deletes the sentence.
719 KRKJL deletes the whole paragraph.
720 KRKJL deletes the whole paragraph.

[7]其從前來藏貿易之巴勒布人等願留藏內者, 即編入戶口冊內, 永作藏內民人; 其不願者, 即派發官兵押送出境, 令回故土, 庶可永斷葛藤。

[8]藏內行使錢文, 已有旨令藏內設爐改鑄寶藏字樣, 所有巴勒布銀錢嗣後不許再行使用。

[9]自定立疆界後, 廓爾喀人衆固不許私越藏界, 即藏內人等亦不許私赴廓爾喀地方禮塔、貿易, 以弭釁端。

[10]至駐藏大臣二人向俱駐劄前藏, 於後藏事務鞭長莫及, 嗣後自應於後藏地方分駐大臣一員, 以資彈壓, 遇有事務即可就近辦理。

凡此等應辦事宜, 福康安等當會同駐藏大臣, 遵照上年硃筆改定, 令福康安帶去應辦各條, 逐一參酌損益, 詳慎籌畫, 妥協辦理, 以期經久遵行, 庶邊隅永臻寧謐。

並曉諭藏內僧俗番眾共安樂利也。[721]

[11]又摺內所稱"賊匪鄰近部落, 如布魯克巴、哲孟雄、宗木等處僅能自守, 作木朗曾聞與賊打仗, 至今亦無確信"等語。此等外番遲疑觀望, 見大兵與賊相持, 未免心懷兩端, 原不足恃。從前屢經降旨諭知福康安等, 此時既已受降, 更毋庸議。

[12]又另片所奏侍衛哲森保受傷調回至協布魯病故, 已另降清字諭旨, 照陣亡例議卹矣。

將此由六百里加緊傳諭福康安等, 仍著將現在情形及接奉諭旨作何辦理受降撤兵之處迅速馳奏。明發諭旨亦抄寄閱看以慰厪注。欽此, 遵旨寄信前來。

2.2.3d Edict with Articles to Instruct the Gorkha as a Reply to Fuk'anggan's Memorial (25 September), 31 October 1792

This edict is also found in KRKD, KRKJL, etc.[722] It was the reply from the Emperor upon receiving 2.2.3a. KRKJL censored more phrases from the original secret edict. A summary of its main points and articles is presented with the edition.

Summary

Agūi, who is the Grand Secretary and the Duke, and Hešen, who is the Grand Secretary and the Earl, on 31 October 1792 (QL 57/9/16), send this secret edict to Fuk'anggan, who is the Grand Secretary, the Great General and the Duke, Sun Shi-yi, who is the Grand Secretary and

721 KRKJL ends here.
722 KRKD QL 57/9, 71–76; KRKJL, vol. 42, QL 57/9/16.

the Governor-General, the Counsellor Hui-ling, and the Chief Minister Heliyen:

[…Reference to Fuk'anggan's memorial on 25 September concerning Devadatta's kowtowing and begging with tears…]

The tribal chieftain might still have doubts before their tributary envoy arrives at Peking. Fuk'anggan should make a summon to instruct Gorkha after receiving the edict. He should choose a person among the imperial guard who holds the title of *baturu*. The *baturu* should bring an interpreter (*tong-shi*) and go to Kathmandu to instruct Raṇa Bahādura Śāha and Bahādura Śāha as such:

"Your tribe enjoyed the grace of the Great Emperor when you had an audience in Peking last time. However, deluded by Shamarpa, you dared to loot Tashilhunpo. It should have been beyond remission. I, the Great General, should have eradicated your realm and captured you all to punish your crimes.

Upon remorse and fear, your tribal chieftain pleaded for allegiance with sincerity several times, sending out the looted objects and the corpse of Shamarpa. You also despatched Devadatta Thāpā to pay tribute of regional products. I have memorialised your request: [1] You should follow the restrictions perpetually and dare not mention the contracts. [2] You should stop using the Gorkha coins. [3] You should never claim eagles and horses from Kyirong. [4] You should return Dram to Tibet.

We have killed more than 3,000 and 4,000 people this time. Although they were foreigner subjects beyond the border, they were still the innocent subjects of the Heavenly Dynasty whom we did not wish to massacre. It is because of the living beings in the entire realm instead of you alone that the Great Emperor authorised your capitulation. You should turn towards the civilising power [corresponding to Sanskrit *ājñā*], awaiting the imperial grace:

[1] You should still use your kingly title. The official edict will be bestowed to the tributary envoy.

[2] We conquered from Syāphrū, Dhunce, Bor-dong-la, Ga-le-la, Dhaibuṃ, to Betrāvatī, which should be the border. However, we award them back to you upon your capitulation.

[3] Dram, situated beyond Nyalam, used to be under the administration of Tibet. It should be returned to the Back of Tibet. Your tribe should never cross the border there again.

[4] Commerce was the cause of disputes. The trade should be put to an end.

[5] We have settled the quinquennial mission. On the way, you might do fair trade with the Front of Tibet. If you have few regional products or consider the route too dangerous and distant, a decennial mission to show you loyalty is also acceptable.

[6] Tibet and Gorkha should not be connected any more to avoid any dispute perpetually, keeping peace, happiness, and benefits.

Edition

大學士公阿、大學士伯和字寄大學士大將軍公福、大學士署四川總督孫、參贊大臣惠、尚書和, 乾隆五十七年九月十六日奉上諭:

福康安等奏廓爾喀酋長畏威悔罪籲懇投誠, 遣大頭人進京恭進貢表一摺, 内稱譯出表文閱看, 辭意極為恭順, 並據該頭目第烏達特塔巴等伏地哀懇, 叩頭乞命, 至於泣下, 當經面諭該頭目, 准為據情轉奏, 請旨定奪等語。覽奏俱悉, 已批交部頒行矣。[723]

此次廓爾喀經官兵大加懲創之後, 畏威悔罪, 屢次具稟乞降, 今又遣大頭人恭進表文, 呈獻方物, 並自請定立貢期五年一次, 譯出表文, 極為恭順懇至, 是該酋長實係慴伏軍威, 傾心向化, 現經福康安等詳切傳諭, 堅明約束, 准其納款歸誠, 如此辦理藏局已為完善。看來數十年間可期邊境敉寧, 相安無事。[724]福康安等接奉前旨, 自已早經撤兵, 計日内已可回至前藏。但廓爾喀所遣頭人, 雖經福康安等面諭准降, 其所差進獻表貢之大頭人, 到京後回至該處尚需時日。[725]恐該酋長此時尚不免心懷疑慮。福康安接到此旨, 應先作檄諭。於巴圖魯侍衛中擇一明白曉事者帶同通事, 差令賫赴陽布, 傳諭拉特納巴都爾、巴都爾薩野。[726]以:

"爾部落於上次進京朝覲, 仰蒙大皇帝施恩, 錫爾封爵[727], 至為優厚。嗣因悞聽沙瑪爾巴唆使, 又未覩天朝兵威, 輒又敢因[728]邊界細故, 肆行滋擾, 至札什倫布[729], 實屬罪不容誅。本大將軍奉命征討[730], 本應蕩平爾境, 將爾等悉數擒俘治罪。

今因爾酋長畏威悔罪, 稟繳前搶札什倫布物件、送出沙瑪爾巴骨殖[731], 屢次籲懇歸誠。又遣大頭人第烏達特塔巴等恭賫表文, 呈進方物。本大將軍念爾情詞恭順, 實出於至誠, 業經據情轉奏, 並將爾情願[732]永遵約束, [1]不敢再提從前私立合同, [2]及停止行

723 KRKJL starts hereafter.
724 KRKJL deletes the sentence.
725 KRKJL deletes the sentence.
726 KRKJL deletes the setence.
727 KRKJL: "上次業蒙大皇帝恩施封爵".
728 KRKJL has only "此次又".
729 KRKJL deletes the phrase.
730 KRKJL deletes the phrase.
731 KRKJL deletes the two phrases.
732 KRKJL abbreviates the sentences.

使廓爾喀錢文, [3]並濟嚨向給鷹馬亦永遠不敢索取, [4]並將扎木地方[733]仍歸西藏。一一代為陳奏[734]。

今蒙大皇帝念爾愚蠢無知, 因沙瑪爾巴煽惑唆使[735], 妄生衅端, 今畏懼兵威, 真心納款, 並以此次大兵深入, 爾衆被殲者, 已有三四千人, 雖係邊外番氓, 皆属天朝赤子。[736]今仰體上天好生之德[737], 不忍多事誅夷, 特降諭旨, [738]赦爾前罪, 准爾納表進貢。悔罪歸誠, 此不特為爾一人起見, 亦所以[739]保全合境生靈。爾酋長[740]倍當加感畏, 傾心向化, 以期永受恩典。

[1]至爾酋長等前已蒙恩得受王公封爵, 今因自作不靖, 身獲罪愆[741]。具表乞哀, 自應卑辭貶損, 不敢仍稱前受封號。現既蒙大皇帝亦赦罪准降[742], 並有旨嗣後遇有表章文稟, 准爾等仍照舊繕寫王公封號字樣。俟爾所差大頭人到京, 大皇帝自必有恩賚, 賜爾敕書[743]。

[2]至[744]協布魯、東覺、博爾東拉、噶勒拉、堆補木、帕朗古等處, 俱係大兵攻克地方, 本應即以此等處為邊界, 今念爾悔罪投誠, 仍行賞還。

[3]其聶拉木邊外札木地方, 爾請仍歸西藏之處, 札木地方從前本係藏內管轄, 自應仍歸後藏。[745]爾部落不準再有侵越。

[4]又爾部落向與唐古忒互相貿易, 致起爭端, 今思貿易一事, 原為謀利起見, 爾部落與唐古忒人等俱欲貪得便宜, 彼此交易不公, 易生嫌隙, 此後竟應停止, 毋得仍遣交易。

[5]即爾部落或有必需藏地物件, 現在爾自定期五年一貢, 屆期自有貢使來往, 藏地或爾國因道路險遠, 方物無多, 即十年一貢以達悃忱, 亦無不可, 所需物件自可於貢使進京之便, 順道帶至前藏, 憑公交易。亦屬省便。

[6]其平時不必再通貿易, 更可永遠杜爭端, 共安樂利。[746]…

733 KRKJL adds an attribute: “五輩達賴喇嘛管轄之”.
734 KRKJL elaborates as “爾尚知畏懼兵威, 悔罪投誠, 本大將軍已為據情代奏一一上陳”.
735 KRKJL elaborates as “誤聽沙瑪爾巴唆使, 又未覩天朝兵威”.
736 KRKJL deletes the sentence.
737 KRKJL makes the subject clear as “大皇帝”.
738 KRKJL deletes the two phrases.
739 KRKJL deletes the previous phrases in the sentence.
740 KRKJL makes the subject clear as “拉特納巴都爾暨爾叔巴都爾薩野”.
741 KRKJL has also “所有封爵本當革去”.
742 KRKJL has “赦爾罪”.
743 KRKJL has “再行優加賞賚, 另賜敕書”.
744 KRKJL adds “熱索橋以外之”.
745 KRKJL has “其聶拉木濟嚨宗喀本系藏地, 現經大兵收復, 非如前此講和退還可比, 爾部落嗣後不得再藉詞牽涉。爾歸出之扎木地方, 亦系五輩達賴喇嘛管轄之地自應仍歸後藏”.
746 KRKJL has only “所有貿易一事亦照前旨卽行停止, 俟汝貢使之便順道過藏, 憑公交易”.

2.2.3e Oral Instruction from Agūi and Hešen to Devadatta Thāpā, 23 February 1793

The instruction[747] was given by the ministers to the envoy in a face-to-face manner. The original draft is found in KRKD. As the beginning paragraph is repetitious of the former pieces, the edition gave only an excerpt of the instruction, focusing on the new information. A full translation of the excerpt is provided below.

Translation

Agūi who is the Grand Secretary and the Duke, and Hešen (full title omitted hereafter) who is the Grand Secretary and the Earl, instructed the tributary ambassador of Gorkha face to face:

[…] It has been memorialised by Fuk'anggan to get the gracious authorisation from the Great Emperor that: [1] You wished to return Dram under the administration of Tibet. [2] You should never claim eagles and horses from Kyirong. [3] You should pay the quinquennial tributary mission. […]

When Fuk'anggan memorialised [these articles] previously, the Great Emperor first gave it to us for verification, discussion, and further memorialisation. It was thus approved and authorised by the Great Emperor. Now, you are stubborn and deluded, having the unauthorised intention to ask me to offensively memorialise them to the auricle [of the Great Emperor] again. The Great Emperor would again give it to us for verification and discussion. We must check the former decisions and refute it instead of authorising it. This would result in a fault [of duplicating memorials] which causes inconvenience.

When it comes to your petition [this time], you are afraid that other places will raise conflict with you and thus need to rely on the protection and assistance of the Heavenly Dynasty. [It is impossible to take Tibet as a precedence.] Tibet has been incorporated in the census and map of the Heavenly Dynasty for a long time. We designated ambans to reside and administrate. Tibet is thus different from any other tribe. Your disturbance in the borderland of the Back of Tibet was thus an offence to the Heavenly Dynasty. Therefore, we mobilised the troops to denounce your crime with a punitive expedition. Your

747 KRKD QL 58/1-3, 27–31.

tribe surrendered with sincerity and thus became internally affiliated to the Heavenly Dynasty. You should be cautious in offering tribute [to the Heavenly Dynasty] as countries beginning with An-nam, etc. However, you should not use Tibet, which has been affiliated to the census and map of the inner land for a long time, as the exemplary precedent case.

If you keep a good relationship with the neighbours, accept your position, and restrain yourself, how could there be a foreign invasion very soon? If you rely on the grace of the Heavenly Dynasty, bullying and provoking strife with neighbouring countries, the Great Emperor will not mobilise his troops for you to conduct remote expeditions. In the case, as you said, that Hindustan, Feringhi of the Western Ocean, etc., have battles with your country, you come to the Heavenly Dynasty to accuse them and ask for military assistance. What if Hindustan, etc., is bullied by you and they also come to submit and accuse you? How come the Heavenly Dynasty would mobilise troops to conduct a punitive expedition to your country upon their request?

[4] If your country and your neighbouring countries go into conflict and you win over them on the battlefield, you might send an envoy to present your victory. The Great Emperor will definitely be delighted. If you fail to be victorious, or if you cannot even maintain your country and flee to somewhere else, the Heavenly Dynasty has no reason to cross the border and appease the conflict. But if you seek refuge in Tibet, given that you have submitted and become affiliated to the Heavenly Dynasty, you will be treated as the Tibetans. You will be settled so that you will lose a place to stay.

[5] Moreover, the coins in Tibet are now minted with blast furnace by the treasury (*phyag mdzod*) in the Front of Tibet. Given that your country has also become an internal vassal state, your coins will not be prohibited on the occasion of your itinerant trade with Tibet. On other occasions, Tibet will not use your coins. After all, both Tibetan and Gorkhali coins should be minted from completely pure silver ingots [over 98 % purity]. You should not mix it with copper or lead. One coin should be used for one.

[6] Concerning other commodities, you should follow the newly settled regulations and abide by the times prescribed by the amban residing in Tibet. You should do fair trade accordingly.

Thus, we instruct you in detail face to face. You should inform Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, etc. You should observe them with prudence so that you can enjoy the favour and grace of the Great Emperor. If you think or crave anything else recklessly, you are excluding yourselves from

the internal living subjects. We cannot presumptuously memorialise your petition to blasphemy the heavenly auricle of the Great Emperor. You should follow seriously without any imprudence.

Here ends the order on 23 February 1793 (QL 58/1/13).

Edition

大學士公阿, 大學士伯和, 面諭廓爾喀貢使噶箕知悉:

……[1]願將扎木歸還衛藏管理[2]及濟嚨鷹馬永遠不敢索取[3]並五年進貢一次, 俱經福中堂轉奏, 荷蒙大皇帝恩准

從前福中堂奏到時, 大皇帝即先交本爵閣部堂等會同定議奏蒙允准, 今爾執迷不悟, 仍妄思干瀆本爵閣部堂奏聞後, 大皇帝交本爵閣部堂再會同核議, 亦必查照前議駁斥不准,轉致獲咎不便。

至爾所稟, 恐別處與爾尋衅要仗天朝保護幫助各等語, 衛藏地方久隸天朝版圖, 派有大臣駐劄管理, 非他處部落可比。爾國前次擾至後藏邊界, 即屬得罪天朝, 是以發兵聲討。爾國雖經投誠內附, 恪修職貢與安南各國相同, 不得援衛藏久屬內地版圖之例。

爾國若輯和鄰好, 安分自守, 何致即來外侮, 如倚仗天朝恩典欺侮鄰國輒起爭端, 大皇帝亦不能為爾發兵遠涉, 即如爾所云, 痕都斯坦、西洋巴爾機等國與爾國打仗, 爾國前來控訴, 求天朝發兵幫助, 倘痕都斯坦等國被爾國欺凌, 亦來臣服控訴, 天朝豈有因彼來求, 又發兵討爾國之理。

[4]爾國與鄰國近各處因事爭競, 若能打仗得勝, 遣使獻捷。大皇帝必為嘉悅。倘不能得勝, 甚至難以立國, 避往他處, 天朝亦無由越境綏輯。若避至衛藏, 爾國既經臣附天朝, 必當照唐古特一律看待, 妥為安插, 不致爾等失所。

[5]再, 衛藏使用錢文, 現在奏定前藏商上自行鼓鑄, 爾國既已內屬, 若有銀錢到藏行運, 原所不禁, 即無販運, 亦不藉爾國銀錢使用。總之藏內與爾國錢文皆用成色十足紋銀鑄造, 不許攙雜銅鉛, 俱是一個當一個行使。

[6]其餘貿易貨物, 皆當遵照新定章程, 聽駐藏大臣酌擬次數, 公平交易。

為此詳細面諭, 爾等歸國告知拉特納巴都爾等, 謹遵奉, 方可永承大皇帝恩眷, 或思妄生希冀, 則是自外生成, 本爵閣部堂亦不敢冒昧代爾陳奏, 上瀆天聽, 其凜遵毋忽。

此諭。正月十三日。

2.2.3f Letter from Devadatta Thāpā to Gorkha Rāja, 24 February 1793

Several letters were sent between Kathmandu and Devadatta Thāpā.[748] This is the letter translated into Chinese (KRKD QL 58/1, 39–43).

748 Cp. KRKJL, vol. 48, QL 57/12/14.

Translation

Your slave (Mnc. *aha*, Nepali *sevaka*), Devadatta Thāpā kowtowed and made this petition:

Since our departure, we have been very busy on the way. We failed to make petitions and salutations with respect. We arrived at Peking on 3 February 1793 (QL 57/12/23). We meet He-Ṭuṅthāṅa [the Grand Secretary, Hešen] on that day. We had an audience with the Great Emperor on 4 February (12/24). On that day, we were awarded imperial hats [each with a gem on the top,] belts, and clothes. We received instructions on that night. On the next day (5 February), we watched the Cham Dance in the inner court without any edict given to us. Three days later (8 February), we went to Chong-hua Palace (literally, "the palace of doubled brilliance", situated in the northwest of the Forbidden City)[749] to again have an audience with the Great Emperor. We memorialised what the Prince [Raṇa Bahādura Śāha] told us. The Great Emperor was delighted.

In his edict, he says, "You have done wrong things. I ordered the Great General to command troops. He should have annihilated you. I granted my grace to authorise the capitulation of Raṇa Bahādura Śāha and Bahādura Śāha. I confer the title of King to Raṇa Bahādura Śāha and the title of Duke to Bahādura Śāha. I award two clocks, rosary beads, porcelain, glassware, ten pieces of brocades, and two pieces of brocades with golden thread."[750] It was immense grace.

Again, there was another edict after we had seen [the opera at Chong-hua Palace]. The Great Emperor granted us snacks and a residence near the gate of the Palace. We again went to Yingtai Island (literally, 'the platform [of the immortals] on the ocean", situated in Zhongnanhai)[751]. We enjoyed the imperial grace of snacks. The Emperor again awarded the Prince silverware, porcelain, glassware, brocades, and flannel. It was immense grace.

Also, there were objects awarded to us. The Great Emperor awarded the Prince and Bahādura Śāha imperial hats [each with a gem on the

749 The place where QL resided as a prince. Later, it was used for banquets and opera.

750 The list is found in KRKD QL 57/12, 75–84. The Emperor decided the list of gifts earlier.

751 The place was where Kang-xi Emperor (QL's grandfather) pacified the rebels and granted banquets. Emperor Qianlong considered the place as his relief, as he studied here as a prince. He also made paintings of this residence by himself. It is now where the Party leaders of China live and throw parties.

top,] belts, rosary beads, and clothes. Every audience with the Great Emperor resulted in immense grace. The Great Emperor always asked about Gorkha.

Again, the Great Emperor issued an edict to call us to Yuan-ming Yuan (Old Summer Palace, literally "Gardens of Perfect Brightness")[752] upon his arrival there. He ordered us to look at some stuff with fire [probably firecrackers] and other stuff. Again, he awarded us snacks.

Again, the Grand Secretaries [Agūi and Hešen] told us to inform the prince: "You should accept your position in your region. The grace of the Emperor was immense. You should not rely on the grace of the Emperor to be provocative."

After seven or eight days, we went for a salutation to the sacred Emperor and returned. Fu-Ṭuṅthāṅa [the Grand Secretary, Fuk'anggan] has not yet arrived at Peking. We met the Grand Secretary Fuk'anggan's brothers. All these graces were because of the memorialisation of the Grand Secretary Hešen. The instructions of the Grand Secretaries will be reported in detail when we meet face-to-face.

Sent from the Yuan-ming Yuan on 24 February (QL 58/1/14).

Edition

奴才抵悟達德他巴等叩稟:

自從起身以來, 途間甚忙, 未能具稟請安。於十二月二十三日到京, 即於是日見和中堂, 二十四日朝覲大皇帝, 隨於本日賞給頂帶衣服, 是晚接手諭, 次日進內看了挑布扎, 並無旨意。過了三日又是重華宮朝覲大皇帝, 王子告訴的話都奏了, 大皇帝甚是喜歡。

皇帝的旨意說:你們做錯了事, 派大將軍帶領大兵, 本應剿滅。今施恩准拉特那巴都爾、巴都爾薩野投降, 賞拉特那巴都爾王爵, 賞巴都爾薩野公銜, 又賞表二個念珠磁器玻璃東西大緞十疋, 金絲緞二疋, 恩典甚重。

又有旨意著我們看完玩意賞吃食賞的住處緊鄰宮門, 又到瀛台見了大皇帝, 蒙賞吃的, 又賞王子銀器東西磁器玻璃傢伙緞子絨料恩典甚重。

752 It was the residence of Emperor Yong-zheng (QL's father) who received it as a gift from Kang-xi. External Palaces are often used for informal as well as formal audiences with foreigners. The imperial ministry sometimes was not involved in Yuan-ming Yuan, whereas the Imperial Household Department (Mnc. *dorgi baita be uheri kadalara yamun*) was involved. This allowed more flexibility and intimacy (Cp. Swen 2021). The Gorkhali tributary envoy was treated by the Imperial Household Department instead of the Ministry of Rites (*Compilation of the Statutes in the Qing Empire* JQ, vol. 52 *Lifanyuan*, 31b.5).

另有賞我們的東西, 又賞王子及巴都爾薩野頂帶數珠衣服一分。每逢皇上見了恩典甚重, 總是問廓爾喀。

又大皇帝到了圓明園下旨意叫我們上圓明園。叫我們看有火的玩意, 還有別的玩意, 又賞吃食。

又奉中堂們吩咐叫我們告訴王子: 在自己的地方安分。皇上待你們的恩典重, 你們若要仗著皇上的恩典多事, 使不得。

遲過七八日就請聖安回去了。福中堂還未到京。中堂的兄弟我們見了。所有這些恩典都是和中堂奏的。中堂們吩咐的話, 等我們面見了細細稟。

正月十四日, 圓明園寄

2.2.4 Raṇa Bahādura Śāha's Lyric for the Emperor Qianlong, 1792

The Lyric was considered to be composed by the Gorkha King. However, by the poetry of Yang Kui,[753] we might infer that the lyric was actually commissioned by Fuk'anggan after he denied the "authentic" music presented by the tributary envoy. He ordered another tune to be made and was later satisfied by the newly-made song by Narasiṃha. The Nepali text, along with the translations into Manchu, Monglian, and Chinese, is preserved in the imperial libraries, written in golden characters on a dark paper and stored along with other courtly lyrics in Mongolian, Manchu, Burmese, etc. It might also have a Tibetan version in the First Historical Archive.[754]

753 "The peculiar tones and eccentric rhythms [of the Gorkha musicians] are like the clowns and entertainers.
How could these western barbarian dwarfs be affiliated to the Ministry of Ceremonies?
Then, since the ambassador was eloquent in [diplomatic] language,
He responded himself by [playing] the leather and wooden instrument, presenting several stanzas (literally, "3 stanzas", probably *metri causa*, as "6" could not fit in the meters of Chinese poetry here).
[Explanation: the Gorkha] offered two musicians. We tried to inquire about what they sing. The Great General considered it to be undignified or unrefined. The ambassador Narasiṃha made another one on the second day. The new song praised the sacred virtues [of the Emperor]. It was very decently eulogised." 殊音異節類俳倡, 僝侏何堪隸太常, 自是使臣辭令好, 親賡鞏木獻三章。(獻樂工二人, 試詢其所歌, 大將軍以為不莊, 來使乃爾興, 次日另制以進, 歌詠聖德, 頌揚極得體) (Wu 1985, 169).

754 Cata. Mnc. no. 8770 = 3–2–3414–007; Tib. no. 13214 = 3–2–3414–8.

Translation from Chinese

The lyrics of the musical hymn send in obedience and reverence by Raṇa Bahadur.
The gracious virtue of the heavenly dynasty originates in the remote ancient.
Respectfully, I look up in admiration to the utmost venerable, who widely spreads [his] grace and mighty power, like the sun just in the middle [of the sky], like the moon just full.
I am fully [relying on] receiving the sunlight-like nurture, which pervades the vast spaces and oceans.
Stanza 1 [ends].

The multitude of the heavenly army was hard to estimate by number.
Their mighty power has shaken the mountains and rivers, beyond comparison in terms of force.
Wherever the heavenly army attacked, the earth vibrated.
Their power exceeded the *nāga*-elephant (the best of the elephants) so that even the supporting great forces of the earth could not hold.[755]
Stanza 2 [ends].

The gods and powerful ones (*deva*s and *malla*s) could not contend with them.
The miraculous guns and immense cannons sounded like vibrating thunder, aroused lightning, motivated storms, and caused the lions and elephants to tremble [with fear].
The heavenly power is such that has no rival all under heaven
Stanza 3 [ends].

The heaven above heavens could not be considered lofty.
The polar star [as the Emperor] stays distantly over the layers of skies.[756]
The hall [in his palace] is well decorated with solemnity.
It is floored with gold.
[His] breathing sound can be heard, reaching luminously through the God-Emperor in the Heaven.
Stanza 4 [ends].

755 It is believed in China that the four side of the earth was hold up by the feet of a great turtle/crab.
756 The Chinese belief has 9 layers of skies.

Respectfully, I think of the heavenly dynasty.
that accumulated an immense enterprise/foundation.
[The Emperor resembles] a Buddha alive that comes into the world.
If I could have an audience with the heavenly face [of the Emperor]
I would be bestowed with immeasurable merits (*puṇya*),
Just as one pays reverence to Mañjuśrī,[757]
who removes all obstacles by *māra* (the demon).
Stanza 5 [ends].

[He is] the most venerable, the most immense, just as Mount Sumeru,
Which was surrounded by the gods and circumambulated by the seven planets (*graha*s).
[He] issues great lucence, which irradiate the world (i.e., Sanskrit *lokadhātu*) in a billion thousand countries and lands (*kṣetra*), he was supported and respected by all the beings.
Stanza 6 [ends].

Edition

拉特納巴都爾恭頌歌詞。
天朝仁德。溯自邃古。欽仰至尊。恩威並溥。如日方中。如月方盈。胥蒙煦育。遍及寰瀛。
一章。
天兵眾多。難以數擬。威震山川。強勁莫比。天兵所擊。大地動搖。力逾龍象。難擎巨鰲。
二章。
天神力士。莫能抗衡。神鎗巨礮。聲如震霆。電激颼馳。獅象戰慄。如此天威。天下無敵。
三章。
天上之天。猶不為高, 宸居北極。迥出層霄。寶殿莊嚴。黃金布地。呼吸聲聞。昭通天帝。
四章。
欽惟天朝。積累丕基。生佛出世。壽與天齊。得覲天顏。獲福無量。如禮文殊。永除魔障。
五章。
至尊至大。如須彌山。諸天高拱。七曜迴環。放大光明。照臨世界。億萬國土。群生共戴。
六章。

P1 स्वस्ति श्री त ....का चरनतल रणबहादुर
साहले कुर्नेस दंदोत गरि दंन्दोत गरि
चटा वाके रागव तुसै जोत
बडे पातसाहके क्षेत है तप जारा

757 The Emperor himself was called so by the Tibetans.

P2 अर्न सुर्ज भन्दा ठुलो जोति भयाक पातसाहको
तपस्याको वलले भयको हो त्य
जके … दलको पिचले धरति डगत
चंद्र चषोर कुर्मो कंपित सुघत रहत
P3 ह क्षे स के सिस फपि तेर प्रर्ल रको
हिनी दल भया रिस सग हिष क्तदषु
दाध रति भंत्पा कंपि लिड ग्या सुर
P4 कास काचं द्रम तिकं घोप न्ताल काकु
र्मप निउ ग्यौ सेस नाग को फनि पनि भ ग्या
चढ तंवि रइ व्रध र्मल द्रुर्त गत
गंध र्वक …लो इतो पतो मर
P5 गंर्ध नल देड रादि तभ याप्य लच हौव रस्रल
वोत मुव दुव दुपि रली यासो दुद्रसं गदुदु गर्त
नाद जया जोड द्रस वक्रँ डव गंध
र्वद रुनि यालो रलो रलो डग
P6 त्प तोप वदुष पद्रक द मामे घाग र्मा
जहि भयार सको धुवले स्रंव्रभ यो सु र्त को
तेज पति छोपी दिया चरेव रक दिर्ग जको
चित्त पति लिर रहे वधा सवा दसह
P7 कप्र तप लट चेउ चन निसु गेरु पर्वत उचे
चित तष तपु ररत वष चित सिध सता
वैठवो लतत्प्र
तहव तुसहा
P8 मोटि मुग स्रते कर तन लेष श्रीत
भय कोमिं हहा तम तसि स्रक सव तिभै
तदे वत हरु वोल धलदे वतह रु दे षिदैत व्याहार
P9 र्लवव्रि लिभ न्दभ लय्ये सुमे रु पर्व
तसु मेरु पर्व तभ द्रप्र विस्र लगो सव
तिल ६१ कोव दुव दुमु निज तव साको
स्रति रम तित भया कोचि तस रुर तिर
P10 लालि तसो भौ लेसं गव दस्र हा
लेवो लदछ तध ल्पपु स्रके तिधि
सुर तव तिसु र त वती रक वर …ल दु
P11 सहवे गिदर सला
दिवकु टतहि स्रग्या तोर
सर्ल धस धसु न्पुन्प धेरै धम्म
मरि पतसहको जन्म भया वहुतै
रामरो देवताहरुको जस्तो सरुप भको
P12 व्यहो वदु छल वदसहको दरसव जो पउन्य(?)
तरको पपद्रु टिक्र टिछुं गगव

गिरि केहो रध ति हे रोसु ट
सुटल होधु वके ज्वेर भुमंडल
P13 के जस जे गया स्रर्ल गगत भलु
स्रक्र सागि रिभ तुप रव तको
वद सह तम्रो धुर्व जस्तो स्रट
लक्र हिले नफि र्सभु भधु प्रिन्तो पिन्तो
P14 जसस वैत सिले सिघा

2.2.5 Emperor Qianlong, Potala Inscription (1792): 御製十全記 (Yu-zhi Shi-quan Ji) "Essay on the Ten Complete Martial Glories by His Majesty", 1792

This is the Chinese text of an inscription by Emperor Qianlong at the foot of the Potala Palace, dated 14–24 November 1792. The Palace also holds some copies (Figures 21–22). We rely mainly on the silk-woven scroll with the commentary written by the Emperor Qianlong himself (Autumn 1792, see Figure 23), whose edition has been published online.[758] We also made some minor corrections of this online edition according to the original printed version of KRKJL[759] (Winter 1794) and the edition of the inscription in Lhasa (Winter 1792) published in Zhang 1988. The punctuation and paragraphs were made here. Previous translations (Landon 1976, vol. 2, App. XXI, 272–74; Regmi 1975, 499–510) do not take the Chinese auto-commentary into account and are often imprecise, especially regarding the tone of the language.

758 清人緙絲乾隆書十全記卷 / 授權人: 國立故宮博物院 / 公眾領域貢獻宣告(CC0) @ 國家文化記憶庫 https://tcmb.culture.tw/zh-tw/detail?indexCode=NPM_Painting&id=中絲00000900000. (accessed on 16 Dec. 2024)

759 https://curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/chinese-rare-books/catalog/49-990080859020203941. (accessed on 16 Dec. 2024).



御製十全記
昨准廓爾喀歸降命凱旋
班師詩有十全大武揚之
句蓋引而未發茲特叙而
記之
夫記者志也虞書朕志先
定乃在心周禮春官掌邦
國之志乃在事旅禦志以
道寧則慮心與事而言之
然揔不出夫道得其道乃

Figure 21: Transcription of the “Imperial Record of Ten Great Campaigns” 1792 (source: National Palace Museum Taipei, 清王杰書御製十全記冊。國立故宮博物院, 台北. CC BY 4.0. www.npm.gov.tw. 故書 000864N000000000)



Figure 22: Potala inscription album 1792 (source: National Palace Museum Taipei, 〈御筆十全記〉玉冊。國立故宮博物院, 台北. CC BY 4.0. www.npm.gov.tw. 中玉 000632N000000000)




Figure 23: Silk Tapestry (Kesi) of Qianlong Emperor's Record of Ten Great Campaigns by Qing Dynasty Embroiderers (source: National Palace Museum Taipei, 清人緙絲乾隆書十全記卷。國立故宮博物院, 台北. CC BY 4.0. www.npm.gov.tw. 中絲000009N000000000).

Translation

[1 *The Imperial Intention*]

Record on the Ten Complete Martial Glories by His Majesty, 1792

[Preface:] Formerly,[760] when I authorised the surrender of Gorkha and ordered the victorious withdrawal of my army, [I composed] a poem with the phrase, "the wide dispersion of the fame [of my] ten complete great martial glories". I had only mentioned that without explanation. Thus, I recount and commemorate it here in particular.[761]

760 The literally meaning here is "yesterday". However, the date of this text was not immediately after the authorisation of the surrender. The date of authorisation was actually 25 October 1792 (QL 57/9/10), when the Emperor issued an edict to the cabinet, thus further to the whole empire. The silk-woven colophon indicates that the text was written in the same lunar month. However, the date of the production of this text in four languages can be verified by both the inscriptional colophon and a later edict to Fuk'anggan and others. This piece of text was announced in full completion in four languages on 16 November 1793 (QL157/10/3). Cp. KRKJL, vol. 41–42.

761 This paragraph serves as a preface. It also has its parallel in Tibetan, whereas Richardson incorrectly considered the Tibetan paragraph not to be found in the Chinese (1974, 43 n. 1).

[The term], "record"[762], [can be glossed as] "resolution" [or] "chronicle".[763] The *Book of Documents* says in the *Book of Yu [Dynasty]*, "My resolution was determined beforehand", which refers to the [internal] heart. The *Rites of Zhou* says in its chapter on "Ministry of Rituals" (literally, the Minister of Spring) "holding the chronicles of the state", which refers to [external] events. *Hounds of Lü* in the *Book of Documents* says, "the resolution would be settled by Dao, the righteous path", which encompasses both the heart and events. Ultimately, both do not exceed Dao, the righteous path. Once one attains this righteous path, he accords with Heaven. Thus, he can expect the bestowment [from Heaven]. Therefore, my ten complete great martial glories should well agree with that. Should it [not] be recorded by such "resolution" [and] "chronicle"?

The ten glories consist in the twice pacifications of Dzungar, the stabilisation of the Islamic tribes, the twice conquests of Jin-chuan [Tib. bTsan lha rGyal po and Chu chen rGyal po], the tranquillisation of Taiwan, the respective subjugations of Annam [i.e., Vietnam] and Myanmar, and now the two receptions of the surrenders of the Gorkha. These amount to ten. The three minor rebellions in the inner land are not worthy of inclusion.

> [Autocommentary: …][764] I had no other alternative in these eight times of military involvement. Therefore, all these successes were reliant on Heaven.[765] Now, combined with the two obedient surrenders of the Gorkha, the ten great glories are accomplished by me. Having dispersed the fame of my martial glories, I attribute them to the abundance of my luck. The [following] three events—killing Wang Lun [the rebel in Shandong killed in 1774], annihilating Su Si-shi-san (literally 43) [the rebellious

762 The word here is the one also used in the title. The Tibetan version reads *ming byang* "memorial inscription" (Richardson 1974, 40–44). The Chinese character 記 (*jì*), means "record".

763 The gloss was given as "志"(*zhì*), a character of the same rhythm as 記 (*jì*). This is a common practice in Chinese glossaries.

764 The Emperor also wrote commentary to his own text in smaller characters. The auto-commentary explains the events that are referred to in the arguments of the root texts. The details of the first eight campaigns are omitted in translation.

765 As Chinese emperors were often criticised by Chinese literati for their excessive military movements that cost quantitative money, the Emperor was trying to refute the criticism here and resorting to Heaven.

Jahrīyya Akhund in Gansu killed in 1781], and extinguishing Tian Wu (literally 5) [the rebellious Jahrīyya Akhund in Gansu killed in 1784],—are all the rebels in the inner land. I swiftly pacified them with punitive expeditions. There is no need to eulogise these events. Therefore, they are not listed among the martial glories, etc.

[2 *The First Tibeto-Gorkha Conflict: Bajung's Failure*]

Regarding the former surrender of Gorkha in 1789 (QL Ji-You), when they disturbed the Tibetan border, I sent a secondary force to punish their offences.[766] However, [officials] beginning with Ohūi whom I despatched failed to announce my martial glories. Bajung further acquiesced and closed the case. Thus, Gorkha was not afraid. Therefore, they came again last year (1792).[767]

[3.1 *The Outbreak of the War*]

They severely sacked the Back of Tibet (i.e., Tsang in Ü-Tsang)[768] and returned with all desires fulfilled.[769] If such [actions were not checked] for long, they would then annex the Tibetan territory and intimidate the various foreigners[770]. Thereby, even the entire Sichuan Province would never have a peaceful year.[771]

766 On 28 August 1788 (QL 53/7/27), the Emperor heard the news at Jehol and immediately sent Ohūi and Zhang Zhi-yuan to Tibet. Meanwhile, he informed Cengde in Sichuan to mobilise the troops (BLBJL, vol. 1).

767 On 5 August 1791 (QL 56/7/5), the conflict between Tibet and Gorkha broke out in Nyalam. This was reported by Bootai on 21 August (QL 56/7/22) and received by the Emperor on 19 September (QL 56/8/21) (KLKJL, vol. 1).

768 The Gorkha soldiers encircled Tashilhunpo on 17 September 1791 (QL 56/8/20) according to the memorial by Bootai received on 22 October 1791 (QL 56/9/25) (KRKJL, vol. 3).

769 Local military officer of Shigatse, Xu Nan-peng reported the sudden retreat of Gorkha from Tashilhunpo after the robbery of the embedded gems on the golden *stūpas* on 4 October 1791, according to the memorial by Bootai received on 6 November 1791 (QL 56/10/11). (KRLJL, vol. 4).

770 番 (Mnc. *fandz*) is rendered as "foreigner" instead of "barbarian". "Barbarian" is reserved for 蠻夷 (*man-yi*). Here, "foreigners" refer probably to the Qiangic people (Sun 2002). They resided and still reside in the Tibetan-Ngwi corridor at the eastern Tibetan border. Oidtmann noticed that both the Chinese and Manchu terms of Tibetan (*tanggūt*) and the barbarians (*fandz*) were rendered by Tib. *bod* (2018, 251 n. 50). The term might not be as derogative as "barbarian" 夷 (*yi*).

771 This paragraph seems to be missing in the Tibetan version (Richardson 1974, 41, 44). These pieces of information might be deliberately kept from the Tibetans.

[Autocommentary:] In 1788 (QL Wu-Shen), when Gorkha first provoked the conflict, I ordered Ohūi and Chengde to command mighty troops to eradicate them. At that time, given Bajung's familiarity the Tibetan[772] language, I ordered him to arrange a solution together [with Ohūi and Chengde]. Who could expect Bajung to have monopolised my authority and acted on his own?[773] Eventually, Bajung, along with the *bka' blon* (i.e., Tibetan Government Minister) Tenzin Peljor and other [Tibetan officers], privately negotiated with Shamarpa. They made an agreement that Tibet should acknowledge an annual payment of 300 ingots to Gorkha in exchange of the withdrawal and the return of the annexed [Tibetan] territory. They also formalised two agreements[774], a large and a small one. Ohūi and Chengde were fooled by Bajung. They both followed his [decision]. They did not demonstrate the power of my army to Gorkha. Therefore, Gorkha dared to invade and disrupt again last year (1791). Having abducted Tenzin Peljor and others as hostages, they robbed the Tashilhunpo Temple of its treasure and properties. Their recklessness and savagery had reached the extreme. I was compelled to order the mobilisation of the army. I denounced their offences and initiated the punitive expedition. Moreover, Gorkha had invaded and annexed its adjacent tribes for years. It amalgamated the three tribes of Bal-pu (Kathmandu Valley). Thus, they became neighbour to Nie-lam (Nyalam/Kuti), Ji-long (Kyirong), and Zong-ka (rDzong dga') in the Back of Tibet. But for severe punishment and great destruction, they would further

772 When the Tibetan ethnic group or culture was referred to in Qing Dynasty text, the authors often use 唐古特 Tangut (< Mnc. Tanggūt). It was also used here. Cp. Oidtmann 2018, 23.

773 The classical term used here 擅專 (*shan-zhuan*) was often used by Emperor to criticise the ministers for being arbitrary. It means "unauthorised dominance". The emperors of the Qing Dynasty were supposed to monopolise the authority, as was articulated by the son of Qian-long, "Sacred emperors succeeded in sequence in our dynasty, the Heavenly principle is held exclusively. My father […] never put his absolute authority aside during his sixty years' reign. (我朝列聖相承, 乾綱獨攬, 皇考高宗純皇帝臨御六十年……大權從無旁落)" in an Edict on 27 March 1802 (JQ7/2/24) cited from *The Veritable Records of Wise (Sunggi-yen/Ruì) Emperor Ren-zong (Jia-qing)*, vol. 94, 22. (Cp. Bartlett 1991, 240).

774 This refers to the "Kyirong Treaty 1789". As a treaty (約) would be a disgrace to the Qing Empire, it was referred to as a contract (券) or agreement (合同) in the sense of transaction (交易). Thus, the Emperor once misunderstood that Tibetans owed the Gorkha people money in the course of trade.

invade and annex the Front and Back of the Tibetan territories. [If so], the places around Sichuan and Da-jian-lu (Dartsemdo) would have no year of peace anymore.

[3.2 *Preparation for Expedition*]

Therefore, I punished the mediocre ministers[775], chose prominent generals, encouraged the assemblies of militants,[776] and prepared for the storage of provisions.

[Auto-commentary]: Last autumn, in the hunting ground of Mu-lan (Mnc. Muran-i aba)[777], I heard the message that Gorkha invaded and disrupted Tibet again. Initially, I, the Emperor, viewed it merely as a conflict with Tibet for the sake of a coinage [dispute] and debts, and therefore, had no intention to send any army. However, Bajung immediately committed suicide upon hearing this event. I began to suspect there might have been malpractice in this event. I instructed Ohūi to investigate and submit a memorial. I realised that there was the event of the agreement of payment in silver [ingots] for the redemption of territory. Amidst Gorkha's robbery, the amban residing in Tibet, Fusihūn (i.e., Bootai) not only failed to command any army to wipe them out but also wanted to move the Panchen Erdeni and the Dalai Lama to Tai-ning (in Garzê, Sichuan), etc. Fortunately, the Dalai Lama did not follow his word. Fusihūn intended to abandon the Tibetan territory. He should have been immediately sentenced to capital punishment at that spot. [However,] I recalled that his father, Nam-zhar,[778] died on the battlefield. I just added the wooden collar to him in the Tibetan territory as

775 This refers both to Yamantai and Bootai (*alias* Fusihūn), the two ambans in Lhasa. The Emperor issued an edict dated 26 November 1791 (QL 56/11/1) to punish Bootai and Yamantai for their deceitful memorials (KRKJL, vol. 7).

776 The Emperor issued two edicts through the Grand Council, calling Fuk'anggan to the Palace on 22 and 25 October 1791 (QL 56/9/25, 28) (KRRJL, vol. 3). The Emperor issued an edict through the cabinet, appointing Fuk'anggan as the General on 27 November 1791 (QL 56/11/2). Hailanca and Kuilin were appointed as counsellors in the same edict (KRRJL, vol. 7).

777 It is situated at the southern rim of the Mongolian-Manchurian Steppe where the Emperor hunted with the Mongolian rulers in autumns.

778 A Mongol bannerman, an important military officer, Namjal, 納穆札爾, who died in 1758 (QL23) during the expedition against the Islamic ruler, Younger Khoja (小和卓). His major contribution was the capture of Chingünjav at the border with Russia in 1757.

a punishment with leniency. However, Yamantai, the co-amban residing in Tibet, had sent memorials with Fusihūn under the same title [as a transgression]. He thus [should be subject to the same punishment] and wore the wooden collar alongside Fusihūn to emphasise the severity of my punishment.

Immediately, I consider this event to have immensely significant relations [to the Empire]. Given Fuk'anggan's reputation for his strategies and courage, he was reliable as for this task. I thus ordered him along with Hailanca, other *baturu*s (Mnc. "courageous warriors"), imperial guards (Mnc. *hiya*), military officers (Mnc. *janggin*), and the trained troops and men at the garrisons of the Solon people[779] to embark on a grand punitive expedition.

After Fuk'anggan began his march from Ca-mu (present day Jia-mu Village), he advanced victoriously and continuously. I rewarded [him and the army] promptly. The army provisions and martial equipment were of utmost importance. Last winter, I had already ordered Sun Shi-yi to dash toward [Tibet] for these arrangements. This spring, I further ordered Heliyen to swiftly reach Tibet for administration. I made Hui-ling responsible for the transportation back and forth beyond Kyirong. For months, I worked diligently on these arrangements and strategies, [getting dressed] before dawn and [eating meals only] after dusk. Indeed, my mind knew no rest, not even for a single moment.

[4 *Expedition to Nepal*]

[My officers and soldiers] beginning with Fuk'anggan held my imperial favour deep in their grateful hearts. They spared no effort. In the winter month of last year (i.e., the 11th lunar month, November/December 1791), they led the well-trained troops from Solon, Sichuan, and the surrendered [Jin-chuan] foreigners and marched in sequence from Xi-ning (the major city of Qinghai, near the Kokonur Lake) despite the snow.[780] They approached the enemy's realm and reclaimed the Tibetan border. They captured the territories of the enemy.[781] They traversed

779 A subgroup of the Ewenki people.

780 Fuk'anggan arrived at Xi-ning on 21 December 1791 (QL 56/11/26, Fuk'anggan' memorial received on 3 January 1792 QL 56/12/10) (KRKJL, vol. 11).

781 The Tibetan text used *rkun* "robber" for 賊 (*zei*) (Richardson 1974, 42). Here, I translated it as "enemy" instead of "robber", as the term 盜 (*dao*) would be the equivalent of "robber", while 賊 originally means "harm", "traitor", etc. In the Qing Imperial rhetoric, it was often used for enemies in general, even though the robbery might have also been stressed.

treacherous narrow thread-like trails as if walking on the plains. They crossed the swift and turbulent rivers as if going over the hoof-made puddles. They baffled and attacked the enemy from various altitudes. They firmly hit the enemy by the throat.[782] Their hands and feet hardened with corns and calluses. Regardless of [the hardships], they fought seven battles and won seven times.[783] The enemies had lost their guts.

[4.1 *Reclaiming Tibet*]

[Auto-commentary:] On 17 May 1792 (QL 57/ intercalary 4/27), Fuk'anggan arrived in [Lhasa,] Tibet. The troop marched from Di-li-lang-gu (= Ding ri glang khor, Tingri). On 24 June 1792 (QL 57/5/6), he reached around Jiamu. Using the cover of rain, he immediately mobilised the army during the night. He divided them into three groups [to commence] the punitive expedition. Hailanca, and others attacked the stockade head-on. Fuk'anggan commanded the officers and soldiers to capture the pillboxes. The enemy had already been astonished and frightened.

On 26 June 1792 (QL 57/5/8), the army advanced around Ma-gar-xiar-jia (Tib. Mar dkar = Maga).[784] There were cliffs and deep forests. More than 300 people of the enemy were hiding within. The officers and soldiers killed dozens. Fuk'anggan sent soldiers to set up ambushes partway up the mountains. He deliberately left one group [exposed] in order to lure the enemy upwards. As the enemy climbed halfway up, he led the groups of soldiers to strike directly. The enemy thus ran and fled away. They were chased until Bang-xing, with countless casualties on the way.

On 27 June 1792 (QL 57/5/9), [Fuk'anggan] arrived at the official stockade of Kyirong. He separated soldiers into groups

782 The Tibetan text reads "They captured the important points and seized the side roads at the same time". (Richardson 1974, 45). The Chinese term 埋根 (*mai-ge*) is a classical expression for the firmness of the army that does not retreat. 批吭 (*pi-hang*), also a classical expression, might mean "in den Rachen greifen"; "grab in the throat".

783 Namely, the battle at Ca-mu (Tib. sKya mo = Jiamu), Ma-gar and Xiar-jia (Tib. Mar dkar = Maga) or Bang-xing (Tib. sPang zhing), Ji-long (Kyirong), Re-suo Bridge (Rasuvāgaḍhī), Xie-blu (Syāphrū), Dong-jue (Dhunce), Pa-lang-gu Bridge (Betrāvatī). The seven battles were also commemorated by painting. Jiang Zhen-xi's private military diary was also arranged in the same sequence.

784 The modern name is Maga Village (瑪噶村). The Tibetan word Mar dkar also means "white butter", which might be the etymology of this placename.

to attack and extinguish the enemy [from various angles]. The enemy had to face rivals everywhere. Thus, the enemy could not support each other. At 3–5 a.m. on 28 June 1792 (QL 57/5/10), the troop regrouped and marched forward. They swiftly ascended the southeast ridge of the mountain, striking the defensive enemy gathered inside the Lama temple. The troop also set fire to the stone pillboxes immediately to destroy them. The officers and soldiers surrounded and attacked the enemy despite the rain, thus wiping them out. At 9–11 p.m. on that day, they broke into the official stockade and thus reclaimed the entire Tibetan territory.

[4.2 *Entering Nepal*]

On 3 July 1792 (QL 57/5/15), they arrived at Rasuvāgaḍhī, beyond which it belonged to the enemy's realm. On the one hand, Fuk'anggan and others despatched a group of soldiers upstream to Mount E-lü[785]. They tied their rafts and crossed the river directly there. They then straightly rushed toward the passes held by the enemy. On the other hand, the officers and soldiers remained on the straight route [to Rasuvāgaḍhī] and built a bridge upon the victory of the other group. Both groups succeeded in crossing the river at the same time. Generals and soldiers were all striving courageously, driven by the intensive determination to annihilate and slay [the enemy].

On 5 July 1792 (QL 57/5/17), they advanced further forward 160–170 *li* (circa 10 kilometres), deep into the enemy's realm. The name of that place is Xie-blu (Syāphrū). A east-westward fast-flowing, and deep river was in front of the route. However, the bridge bases had already been destroyed by the enemy. On 11 July 1792 (QL 57/5/23), Fuk'anggan and others led the troop upstream to construct a bridge with a withered tree. The enemy fired their guns endlessly. Thus, Fuk'anggan posed a retreat at dusk while it was raining. At midnight, when the enemies returned to their hideouts, [the army] hurriedly tied the great [withered] tree to cross the river and divided themselves into three groups. At the dawn of 12 July 1792 (QL 57/5/24), they suppressed the enemy in combined forces, completely burnt down the stockade of the enemy and slayed a large number of them. On

785 Satō 1986 considers it to be Shishapangma in the Tibetan territory (Map 2).

12 July, after the capture of Syāphrū, the troop marched head-on from Ga-duo (Bharko) to the mountain ridge of Zu-mu-gu La-ba-zai (possibly, Tib. la po rtse "mountain top"/"mountain pass at peak").[786] There was an east westward river. Dhunce lay opposite this great mountain. Fuk'anggan and Hailanca divided the army into two groups. Fuk'anggan inspected and found the dense forests upstream in Bharko, where the forces could be hidden. Thus, he detoured. On 24 July 1792 (QL 57/6/6), [the hidden forces] descended to the foot of the mountain. They swam across the river. The officers and soldiers strived courageously to annihilate and slay the enemy. They captured all the pillboxes, passes and wooden bunkers. Meanwhile, after days of covert marching in disguise despite the rain, Hailanca reached the top of Mount Bor-dong-la[787] at the dawn of 24 July 1792 (QL 57/6/6). Thus, [his group] had circumvented the passes controlled by the enemy. They thus destroyed all the wooden bunkers and stone passes. Hailanca immediately reassembled the troop and joined Fuk'anggan at the same place. Combining the forces, they chased to annihilate.

On 27 July 1792 (QL 57/6/9), they reached around Yong-ya (Ramche). Because the officers and soldiers had been climbing across the perilous [mountains], they were exhausted and took a temporary rest. Meanwhile, the tribal chieftain [the Gorkha Mahārāja] despatched someone to beg for surrender. It was seriously refuted and rebuked by Fuk'anggan.

[4.3 *The Betrāvatī Battle*]

However, the place was surrounded by layers of mountains, while there was another east-westward river between Dhaibuṃ and Mount Jiar-gu-la (Gerkhuṭār). Fuk'anggan and others divided the officers and soldiers into groups. The group on the left [i.e., in the east] made a detour upstream of this river and attacked there, while another group on the right [i.e., in the west] attacked the bridge at Pa-lang-gu (Betrāvatī) to rush toward Mount Gerkhuṭār. The enemy put up rows of guns to shoot continuously with no pause, whereas our army marched diligently

786 The two placenames are yet to be identified. They are mountains located between Syāphrū and Dhunce.

787 The placename is also to be identified.

on the momentum. We captured the bases of the bridge, slaying times than before.

From Jiamu, Bangxing, Kyirong, Rasuvāgaḍhī, Syāphrū, and Dhunce to Betrāvatī, there were seven battles in all. We attained complete victory every time. We killed more than 20 headpersons of the enemy and 3,000–4,000 of their men. We captured more than 200 alive. Even though the mountain paths were hazardous and narrow, even though the rivers were flowing swiftly, Fuk'anggan and others boosted their courage and marched forward as if stepping on the plains or crossing over puddles caused by the hooves. The force of the enemies was exhausted and much reduced. Formerly, they had despatched headpersons to the camp to submit with allegiance. At this moment, they were much more shaken and frightened, imploringly wishing and begging for surrender. Whatever we ordered, they would follow.

[5 *The Surrender and Submission of Gorkha*]

As our army approached Yang-bu (Kathmandu), the enemy repeatedly despatched their headpersons to plead for capitulation in a crawling manner. Everything required by the General in letters was followed with deferential discretion [by them]. Nevertheless, [the chieftains of the enemy] did not dare to come to [our] camp alone. Probably owing to their previous deed—-trapping the Tibetan Government Minister Tenzin Peljor, they dared not come out of [their stronghold, Kathmandu].

[Auto-commentary:] After our officers' and soldiers' repeated militant victories, the enemy could not sustain their forces. They begged for survival with humble words, dropping their hearts and guts. They prudently observed every instruction that Fuk'anggan and others announced in their summons and directives. Firstly, they escorted the abducted Tibetan Government Minister Tenzin Peljor and others [back to our camp]. Then, they returned the golden and silver utensils they had sacked last winter from Tashilhunpo. Moreover, they presented the remains of Shamarpa as well as the two privately agreed contracts. They no longer dared to speak about the disputes of coinage and debts with the Tibetan people. Moreover, they said they were beguiled by Shamarpa in the past. Indeed, no repent could match with such. "We only beg the Great Emperor to be compassionate to all beings and open one side of the net [to allow us to flee and

> survive].” Their fear, as such, seemed to be genuine and sincere. Their tribal chieftain, Raṇa Bahādura Śāha, along with his uncle, Bahādura Śāha, dared not to come to our camp, expressing their fear of being captured and killed due to the gravity of their crimes and evilness in their trap and abduction of the Tibetan Government Minister in the past. Therefore, they dare not to come out of [Kathmandu]. Such sentiment must be their genuine [intimidated] emotion that should not be considered peculiar.

Since the fame of my martial glories has been dispersed, there must be expectations that I should obliterate their stronghold and raze[788] their court, sparing not even a piece of shell (i.e., leaving no trace behind). [However, such action] disregards the [merciful] intention of Heaven to spare lives. Even if I did fully seize their territory, given its thousands of *li* distance from the Tibetan border and its impossibility of cultivation and defence, it would eventually be given to others.[789] Hence, I passed my edict downwards to authorise their surrender and ordered the victorious withdrawal of my forces, bringing this event to an end.

Formerly, the Tai-zong Emperor of the Tang Dynasty urged Illig [i.e., the last ruler of Eastern Turkic Khaganate] with these words, “As I have shown to you that I shall certainly conquer [you], peace will thereafter be enduring”. By no means would Gorkha be comparable to Illig. The foreigners’ border [far beyond] was also different from [Illig’s] proximity to Chang-an [, the capital of the Tang Dynasty]. Nevertheless, they pleaded for their survival and implored my grace. They

788 The Chinese word here is literally “plough over” (犁), which is the classical term for the eradication of the enemy.

789 Regarding the clause, the Tibetan text reads, “Since it is more than a thousand stages from our frontier with dBus and gTsang, it would have been difficult to cultivate the land and look after it. But as it would not do to leave the people on their own”. The Manchu text translated by Elliot reads, “Therefore, saying that this region was completely taken over, we abandoned another thousand li beyond the borders of Western Tibet, giving up having it farmed and administered [within the empire]. In the end, there was nothing for it but to let it be taken by someone else” (2009, 106). According to Kam who also corrected Elliot’s Manchu translation, the word “defence” (守) conveys the sense of “taking the barbarians in the four directions as the fence” (守在四夷) (2019, 89). That is to say, if the emperor should take the righteous path, the barbarians would take the responsibility of guarding the exterior borders of the great empire, while the Heavenly Dynasty needs no military interference.

spare no time [to wait for my] authorisation. How dare they speak of negotiating peace?[790]

However, as our military power had been announced to them, the enemy showed their true intention to surrender and submit with allegiance, which indeed reflects the theory of Tang Tai-zong. I recall that in the previous event on [the returning of] the Turhūts (Torghut), the [difference between] the surrender with allegiance and the submission with allegiance had been discussed [by me] in detail. Gorkha has now apologised for their crimes and begged for survival. They thus offered both the surrender and the submission with allegiance,[791] provided with their sincerity in repenting their faults and eagerness to offer their lands. It is appropriate to say so.

> [Auto-commentary:] Previously, in the *Records upon the Submission with Allegiance of the Turhūts*, [in 1771 (QL36)] I said, "If one in the first place offends the order [of the Heavenly Dynasty] and was eventually solicited to submit [under our military pressure], it is called 'the surrender with allegiance'; whereas if one becomes subordinate [willingly] without any expedition, it is called 'the submission with allegiance'." In the case of the Torghuts who pledged allegiance, they offered a submission with allegiance instead of a surrender with allegiance. Now, speaking of Gorkha, they were intimidated by our [military] power and repented for their crimes. Therefore, theirs is a surrender with allegiance after all. Yet by their offering upwards the region of Ca-mu (Dram)[792] back to Tibet, they do have sincerity towards the civilising power [of the Heavenly Dynasty]. Thus, it is not only a surrender but also a submission with allegiance.

[6 *Heavenly Blessings*]

I thus know that one who guards the Middle Kingdom could not speak merely of the cessation of military [practices] and the advancement

790 The Tibetan text reads, "it would really be not at all suitable even to mention a treaty" (Richardson 1974, 46).

791 The two terms are "surrender" (歸降) and "submission" (歸順). The Tibetan text reads, "The manner in which through fear they came to adhere to us and how they continue to adhere because they are in agreement with us", stressing the motivation (Richardson 1974, 46).

792 It should be understood as Dram (Zhangmu), instead of Jiamu (Ca-mu, sKya mo). The return of Dram was mentioned in the letters of surrender, stressing the willingness (情願) of Gorkha to pay allegiance.

of literary power. This will reveal the weakness of oneself (i.e., the Middle Kingdom). If one ceases military [practices] and accomplishes only the literary ones unendingly, it is bound to cause the failure of defence and, thus, the abandonment of what one used to hold. This should not be unknown. "Know to advance" "know to retreat", declared the *Book of Changes*. Indeed, I am convinced wholeheartedly and dare not to forget them. In my every military endeavour, I contemplated it. I was determined in my "resolution" of the event, which should be sought to align with the [righteous] path. It was fortunate that I completed the ten complete martial glories within 57 [reigning] years. How could there be no blessings from Heaven?

However, the more profound the blessings from Heaven, the more intense my fear. I dare not say that I bear [the blessings] in mind gratefully [enough]. I am indeed afraid of the incapability to bear [the according responsibilities]. Cautiously and conscientiously, I wait for the favour of Heaven with respect.[793] I retreat from [the merits of] governance and [cultivate myself as] a perfect person. What more is there to be said?

QL 57 Ren-Zi, written by the imperial pen in the first ten days of the beginning of winter [i.e. 10th lunar month, 14–24 November 1792].[794]

793 The Tibetan text reads "Since the grace of Heaven is, in that way, so very profound, I am also a devout believer in it. And although I bear a constant burden of responsibility and know well the extreme weakness of my powers. I pray in my heart that I may continue to enjoy the kindness of Heaven and I eagerly hope that it may make me a man of perfect uprightness." (Richardson 1974, 47). Meanwhile, the Manchu text translated by Elliot reads, "For the greater Heaven's favor, the more sincere my reverence for Heaven. Not daring to presume to know how to express my thanks, I can only beg helplessly for Heaven's blessing with utmost reverence and trepidation. Having abstained from rule, I can only hope fervently for the time that I will become a completed person" (2009, 106). The tones are a bit different, tailored for the Chinese who favoured modesty, the courageous Manchu, and the pious Tibetan audience.

794 The colophon is taken from Zhang 1988, which is the same as the Tibetan colophon in Richardson (1974, 47). It cannot be found in KRKJL. The jade album inscription in the Palace did not specify the ten-day period (中玉 000632N000000000 from the Palace Museum), indicating "early winter" only. However, the silk woven version has 乾隆壬子季秋御筆 ("Late Autumn, QL Ren-zi/9") and two woven sigils: 八徵耄念之寶 ("Treasure of the Eighty-year-old who concerns himself with the Eight Signs") and 自彊不息 ("Self-improvement with no pause").

Edition

昨准廓爾喀歸降, 命凱旋班師。詩有"十全大武揚"之句, 蓋引而未發, 茲特敘而記之。

夫"記"者, 志也。《虞書》: "朕志先定", 乃在心。《周禮·春官》: "掌邦國之志", 乃在事。《旅獒》: "志以道寧", 則兼心與事而言之。然揔不出夫道。得其道, 乃能合於天, 以冀承乎貺。則予之十全武功, 庶幾有契於斯。而可志以記之乎。

十功者, 平準噶爾為二, 定回部為一, 掃金川為二, 靖臺灣為一, 降緬甸、安南各一, 即今二次受廓爾喀降, 合為十。其內地之三叛幺麽, 弗屑數也。

> 平準噶爾者二, 乙亥年以達瓦齊篡奪, 諸部瓦解。朕因其部落接踵內屬, 乘機致討, 以成前志。未半載, 遂俘達瓦齊。不意阿睦爾撒納潛逃, 欲占伊犁。於是復命進剿, 逆賊竄入俄羅斯, 以患痘身斃。俄羅斯傳送其屍, 伊犁遂平。定回部者一, 當大兵西伐時, 逆回小和卓木, 背恩反覆。因命兆惠等統兵追剿, 傳檄拔達克山縛獻, 於是其弟兄大小和卓木一擒一斃。掃金川者二, 先是金川娑羅奔搆釁鄰番。戊辰歲, 命傅恆厚集諸路官兵, 將擣其中堅, 而逆酋稽首請降。至壬辰, 兩金川聯結作亂, 命阿桂統師進剿。至丙申遂平其全境。靖臺灣者一, 丁未逆民林爽文、莊大田, 創立天地會名目, 煽誘匪徒, 謀為不軌。命福康安海蘭察等統兵過海, 將二逆悉行擒獲就誅。降緬甸者一, 因緬匪侵擾邊境, 命傅恆為經略前往, 屢破賊壘, 而彼即詣營請降, 因而罷師。至戊申, 其國長孟隕奉表入貢, 乞恕前罪, 遂允其請。降安南者一, 初黎維祁為阮光平所侵, 命孫士毅統兵, 為之克復黎城, 復封黎維祁為王。乃阮光平再至, 而黎維祁即棄國奔內地, 更命福康安前往剿除。而阮光平備陳情事, 再四籲懇乞降, 並請於庚戌年親來瞻覲祝釐。朕既先有天厭黎氏之語, 而安南又無人可付, 亦即允其歸降。凡此八次, 用兵皆非得已, 而俱荷天佑成功。今并此廓爾喀兩次降順, 蓋已十葴大功。我武既揚, 實屬厚幸。至於誅王倫、翦蘇四十三、滅田五三事, 則係內地亂民, 旋即討平, 弗薾其事, 茲故不列於武功云。

前己酉廓爾喀之降, 蓋因彼擾藏邊界, 發偏師以問罪。而所遣鄂輝等未宣我武, 巴忠乃遷就完事, 致彼弗懼。而去歲復來, 以至大掠後藏, 飽欲而歸。使長此以往, 彼將占藏地, 嚇眾番, 全蜀無寧歲矣。

> 戊申歲廓爾喀滋事之始, 命鄂輝、成德, 統率勁旅往剿彼時, 因巴忠素曉唐古特語, 令往會同籌辦。詎意巴忠諸事擅專, 竟與噶布倫丹津班珠爾等, 私同沙瑪爾巴定議: 每歲令藏中許給廓爾喀元寶三百箇, 退還侵地, 並立大小合同二紙。鄂輝成德為其所愚, 隨同附和, 未曾示以兵威, 是以廓爾喀去歲復敢侵擾, 既將丹津班珠爾等裹去為質, 並搶掠札什倫布廟財物, 披猖已極, 不得不命將興師, 聲罪致討。且廓爾喀年來侵佔附近部落, 兼并巴勒布三部, 與後藏之聶拉木濟嚨宗喀等處毗連, 若不大加懲創, 必至搶佔前後藏地。蜀中打箭鑪一帶將無寧歲矣。

是以罪庸臣, 選名將, 勵眾軍, 籌儲餉。

去秋於木蘭圍場中, 聞廓爾喀復來侵擾之信。朕謂不過與唐古特因錢債啟釁, 初未有發兵之意。而巴忠一聞此事, 旋即自戕, 始疑此事必有弊端, 諭令鄂輝查奏, 始知有許銀贖地之事。駐藏大臣俘習渾, 當廓爾喀搶掠之時, 既不帶兵剿殺, 又欲將班禪額爾德尼及達賴喇嘛移駐泰寧等處。幸而達賴喇嘛未從其言。是竟欲委棄藏地, 本應即行正法, 念其父那木扎爾曾經陣亡, 從寬令於藏地枷責。雅滿泰同係駐藏大臣, 俘習渾此奏, 竟與聯銜因令一併枷責, 以示嚴懲。

旋念事關重大, 福康安謀勇素著, 足堪倚任。因命同海蘭察等, 率領巴圖魯、侍衛章京及索倫屯練兵丁前往, 大張撻伐。

福康安自擦木進兵之後, 連次克捷, 隨時褒賞。軍糧軍械尤為緊要。去冬即命孫士毅馳往籌辦。今春更命和琳馳抵藏中辦理。其濟嚨以外, 令惠齡往來專司轉運。數月以來, 宵旰籌謀, 實未嘗一刻置懷也。

福康安等深感朕恩, 弗辭勞苦, 於去歲冬月, 即率索倫、四川、降番等精兵, 次第由西寧冒雪而進。今歲五月, 遂臨賊境, 收復藏邊, 攻克賊疆, 履線險如平地, 渡溜要若蹄涔。繞上襲下, 埋根批吭, 手足胼胝, 有所弗恤。七戰七勝, 賊人喪膽。

福康安等到藏, 於今歲閏四月廿七日自第哩浪古帶兵起程。五月初六日至擦木地方, 即乘陰雨, 連夜發兵, 分隊進討。海蘭察等由正路直攻賊寨。福康安督率官兵, 攻克碉座。賊人即已驚怖。

初八日行抵瑪噶爾轄爾甲地方, 峭壁深林, 內藏賊匪三百餘名, 官兵擊殺數十名。福康安又派兵埋伏半山, 故留一路, 誘賊上山。及山半帶兵橫衝, 賊眾奔竄, 直追至邦杏地方, 沿途剿殺無算。

初九日直抵濟嚨官寨, 分遣兵丁攻撲, 使賊人處處受敵, 不能相顧。初十日丑刻, 同時並進, 搶上東南山梁, 攻得喇嘛寺屯聚賊匪, 又將石砌碉座立時焚燬, 官兵等冒雨攻圍, 殲戮賊眾殆盡。亥刻遂攻破官寨, 藏地全復。

十五日至熱索橋, 過此即屬賊境。福康安等一面遣兵, 由上游戕綠山下, 扎筏徑渡, 直撲賊卡。而正路官兵, 乘勝搭橋, 一時並濟, 將士無不人人奮勇, 痛加剿殺。

十七日復行前進, 深入賊境一百六七十里, 地名協布魯。該處當路有橫河一道, 水深溜急, 而橋座賊已拆毀。福康安等於二十三日帶兵繞至橫河上游, 借接枯樹搭橋。賊匪鎗聲不絕。因於日暮大雨時, 佯令各兵徹退。至夜半, 賊匪回寨, 趕緊接縛大木過河。分為三路於二十四日黎明併力壓下, 盡行焚燬賊寨。痛殲賊眾。

二十四日攻克協布魯後, 自噶多正路至足木古拉巴載山梁山下。有橫河一道, 對面大山, 即係東覺。福康安與海蘭察分為兩路, 福康安探得上游噶多普山上樹木茂密, 可以藏身, 因繞行。於六月初六日下至山麓鳧水渡河, 官兵奮勇剿殺, 將近河碉卡、木城盡行奪據。而海蘭察亦連日潛伏, 冒雨步行, 初六日黎明徑登博爾東拉山巔, 繞至賊卡之上, 將木城、石卡全行拆毀, 旋與福康安會合一處, 併力追剿。

於初九日至雍鴉地方, 因官兵等冒險登陟, 辛勤已甚, 暫令休息。而賊酋遣人乞降, 經福康安嚴行駁飭。

惟是該處大山層疊, 而堆補木與甲爾古拉兩山之間, 又有橫河一道。福康安等將官兵分為數隊。左一路由橫河上游繞道進攻。右一路由帕朗古攻橋進撲甲爾古拉。賊匪排鎗連環不斷。我兵乘勢競進, 奪據橋座, 剿殺更倍於前。

計自擦木、邦杏、濟嚨、熱索橋、協布魯、東覺、帕朗古, 前後凡七戰, 皆獲全勝。共殺賊目二十餘名、賊匪三四千名、生擒二百餘名。雖山徑險仄, 河溜湍急, 福康安等鼓勇直前, 如履平地, 如渡蹄涔。賊勢甚為窮蹙, 前已屢遣頭人詣營納款。至此次益加震讋, 哀懇乞降, 無不惟命是從矣。

及兵臨陽布, 賊遂屢遣頭人, 匍匐乞降, 將軍所檄事件, 無不謹從, 而獨不敢身詣軍營。蓋彼去歲曾誘藏之噶布倫丹津班珠爾等前去, 故不敢出也。

賊人經官兵屢戰屢勝之後, 其力實不能支, 卑辭乞命, 心膽俱落。凡福康安等檄諭之事, 無不一一遵奉。先將裹去之噶布倫丹津班珠爾等送出, 繼又將上冬搶去扎什倫布廟之金銀器皿悉數繳還, 並沙瑪爾巴骨殖及前私立合同二張亦俱呈出, 不敢再提唐古特錢債一事。且言: 從前為沙瑪爾巴所唆, 實已悔之無及。惟乞大皇帝憐憫全部生靈, 網開一面。其畏懼情形, 似屬真誠。其賊酋拉特納巴都爾與其叔巴都爾薩野, 不敢親自來營, 自謂: 從前誘裹噶布倫等一事, 罪惡已極, 懼干擒戮, 故不敢出此。亦真情, 無怪其然也。

我武既揚, 必期掃穴犁庭, 不遺一介, 亦非體上天好生之意。即使盡得其地, 而西藏邊外又數千里之遙, 所謂不可耕而守者, 亦將付之他人。[795]乃降旨允降班師, 以蕆斯事。

昔唐太宗策頡利曰: "示之必克, 其和乃固。"廓爾喀非頡利之比, 番邊殊長安之近。彼且乞命籲恩, 准之不暇。又安敢言和乎?
然今日之宣兵威, 使賊固意求降歸順, 實與唐太宗之論有所符合。昔予訛土爾扈特之事, 於歸降歸順, 已悉言之。若今廓爾喀之謝罪乞命, 歸降歸順, 蓋並有焉。以其悔過, 誠而獻地, 切也。

向著土爾扈特歸順記云: "始逆命而終徠服, 謂之歸降; 弗加征而自臣屬, 謂之歸順。"言土爾扈特之投誠, 乃歸順, 非歸降也。若今之廓爾喀畏威悔罪, 雖屬歸降。然其悔罪之意極為真摯, 並請定期五年一貢, 永遵約束, 又將邊外扎木地方獻歸西藏, 是則誠心嚮化, 不但歸降而且歸順矣。

迺知守中國者, 不可徒言偃武修文以自示弱也。彼偃武修文之不已, 必致棄其故有而不能守, 是亦不可不知耳。"知進""知退",《易》有明言, 予實服膺弗敢忘。而每於用武之際, 更切深思, 定於志以合乎道。幸而五十七年之間, 十全武功, 豈非天貺?

795 Zhang 1988 lost the texts from 亦非體上天好生之意 till here.

然天眎愈深, 予懼益切, 不敢言感, 惟恐難承, 兢兢惶惶, 以俟天眷, 為歸政全人, 夫復何言。

乾隆五十七年歲次壬子孟冬月之上浣, 御筆。

2.2.6 Zhao Yi, *The Pacification of Gorkha*, 1793–1799

The edition provided here is based on the printed version kept in Harvard University[796] with hand-written annotations by a scholar from Ning-hai, Chen Tan, which is so far the only early witness to our knowledge. The text was later adapted by Zhao-lian, who made many corrections and changes. These differences from Zhao-lian are marked by blue colour. Wei Yuan (see Part II, 2.2.8) also adapted the report extensively without giving references. The subtitles and numbering in the texts are made for comparison with Zhao-lian and Wei Yuan.

Translation

Summary of the Narratives [of Yu Jue] on the Pacification of Gorkha

[1 *Basic Information about Tibet and Gorkha*]

Historically, Gorkha was not connected to the Middle Kingdom (i.e., China). It is a large tribe to the west of Ü-Tsang[797], the ancient Buddhist country. Ü-Tsang is now divided into the Front and Back of Tibet. Travelling westward for 72 stations from Da-jian lu (Dartsemdo) in the Province of Shu (Sichuan) brings one to the Front of Tibet (i.e., Lhasa). Continuing for 12 more stations leads to the Back of Tibet (Shigatse). After 12 more stations, one arrives at Ji-long (Kyirong). With another 30 stations, one arrives at Zah-soh Bridge (Rasuvāgaḍhī)[798], the extreme frontier of the Back of Tibet. Westwards beyond the bridge lies Gorkha.

796 Accessed through https://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL:4889882 on 16 Dec. 2024).

797 Reads Us-zang (烏斯藏), the earlier name for Wei-zang (衛藏) before the Qing Dynasty. The difference resulted from the phonological changes in the Tibetan language.

798 The Chinese reads 石宿橋 (literally "the bridge where the stone resides"), which appears as a translation of the placenames at first glance. However, it should be a calque, the first part being a phonetic transcription of Rasuvā. It might result from the dialect spoken by them, which is Wu-Chinese that

In the Front of Tibet, there is a living Buddha, named Dalai Lama. He was said to be the later birth of Tathāgata. He turns the wheel [of *saṃsāra*] to continue [the Dalai Lama lineage] generation by generation. When he is about to die, he reveals the location of his [next] rebirth. His chief disciple follows his words to seek for the reincarnation. Once he finds an infant, he worships him and returns [to Lhasa], claiming that [the infant] is the rebirth of the previous Lama. The truthfulness or falseness cannot be known.[799] However, Zhun-gar (Dzungar) and Kar-ka (Khalkha)[800], as well as the [other] Mongolian barbarians across hundred-thousands of *li* (1 *li* = ca. 576 m) all venerate him and believe in this [reincarnation of the Dalai Lama]. Therefore, [Tibetan Buddhism] becomes a large sect of Buddhism. The Panchen in the Back of Tibet is another living Buddha. He ranks slightly lower than the Dalai Lama in terms of his fame and position, but all barbarians revere and worship the Panchen Lama with prudence. The two regions of Tibet were originally not subordinate to the Middle Kingdom. In the Yuan Dynasty, ‘Phags-pa was the instructor of the Emperor Shi-zu (Kublai). In Ming Dynasty, the Emperor Cheng-zu (Zhu Di) conferred to Ha-li-ma (Kara, De-bzhin-gshegs-pa) the title “The Great Treasure Dharma King” by his imperial edict, while they both did not treat Tibet with the rites for suzerainties.

pronounces 石 as /zəʔ/ or /zɑʔ/, instead of shí. Hence, it should be Wu-Chinese Zah-soh Bridge.

799 Interestingly, in another book by Zhao Yi 1810 簷曝雜記, he wrote in the passage “Mongolian reverence for the Lamas” and regarded it to be “faked” (其實偽也) and the Mongolians to be “stupid but pitiable” (雖愚而可憫然) (1877, vol. 1, 17).

800 The Mongolian people were divided into many groups. During the Qing dynasty, there were internally affiliated Mongolians (e.g. the Chachars), Inner Mongolians in the South of the Gobi Desert (e.g. the Khorcin Mongols), and Outer Mongolians. The Outer Mongols referred to the Kalkha Mongols living in the north of the Gobi Desert as well as various groups of Mongols living in the Kokonur Steppe and further west. There were also the Kalmyks and Buryats (under Russian control). The Oirats were also turkicized Mongols. They once established Khoshut Khaganate and were also once the protector of Tibetan Buddhism. The Dzungars were another group of the Oirat Mongols, living in the west of the Gobi Desert. They established the Dzungar Khaganate as the largest rivalling threat to the Manchu emperors. During Qian-long’s reign, they were finally eradicated. All these Mongols believed in Tibetan Buddhism. Therefore, the Emperor Qian-long had a famous policy to proliferate the Gelug religion and stabilize the Mongols (興黃教, 安蒙古). In addition, many of the ambans were ethnically speaking Mongols. The Tibetans were also good at the Mongolian language.

It was in our Dynasty that they affliated themselves internally and became an external vassal [of the Heavenly Dynasty]. By the end of Kang-xi era, it was usurped and occupied by Dzungar. [The Emperor Kang-xi] mobilised a large force to recapture [Tibet from Dzungar]. Since it has become [one of] our external vassals, we must protect them against any external aggression. It concerns the national prestige immensely. Previously, the King of Tibet oversaw the state affairs. [The second King] Zhur-mut Nam-zhar (Tib. Gyur med rnam rgyal) conspired to rebel but was killed by the ambans residing in Tibet, Fu-qing (Mnc. Fucing) and Labdun [in 1750]. Afterwards, Tibet no longer had an established king. [Afterwards], the Dalai Lama and the Panchen in general administrate state affairs. Henceforth, they, as religious leaders, concurrently hold the kingly responsibilities. They especially count heavily on the Heavenly Dynasty.

[2 *Causes of the Gorkha Expedition*]

There was a person named Dan-jin Ban-zhur (Tenzin Peljor), who was originally the headperson under the Panchen's command. After he was dismissed for his crime, he fled to Gorkha and became acquainted with the tribal chieftain La-te-mu Ba-dur (= Raṇa Bahādura). Their people broke into the Back of Tibet. They tore down the golden tiles[801] on the hall [in the Tashilhunpo Monastery] and robbed the precious utensils, which was the event in 1788 (QL 53).

[3 *Preparation of Expedition*]

The Panchen and the Dalai Lama quickly sent memorials. The Emperor did not intend to mobilise troops due to the distance. He planned to despatch people to instruct them and resolve [the conflict]. However,

801 According to Fuk'anggan's investigation in the Tashilhunpo Temple on 19 March 1792 (QL 57/2/27), the golden tiles were not damaged. The buildings were still intact. The people ran away owing to the fear of smallpox. However, the panels around the commemorative *stūpa*, the golden plates inscriptions, the utensils, and the statues were either robbed of or vandalised (KRKJL, vol. 26, QL 57/4/3). He also reported that Bam Śāha resided in the room of the Panchen, which annoyed the Emperor largely (see Yuan Yi lai, no. 902, 727). It is probably because the Emperor once visited the room of the sixth Panchen in the replica of Tashilhunpo at Jehol (PC6, 942). See also Sun Shi-yi's poem to Fuk'anggan, "They should have known that the Buddha were born from the heavens and regret having robbed the *dhvaja* with *utpala* and *saptaratna*. The Gorkha robbers disturbed up to Tashilhunpo and pierced the base of *stūpa* of the previous [sixth] Panchen Lama" 送大將軍敬齋相國還朝: 早知生佛來天上, 悔劫蓮華七寶幢。廓匪擾至扎什倫布, 並剝取前輩班禪塔座 (Sun, vol. 10, 21).

the enemy lingered around Nie-lam (Nyalam), Rongxia (Rongshar), Ca-mu (Jiamu Tib. sKya mo), Ma-ga-shar-jia (Tib. Mar dkar), disrupting [the Tibetan territory] with increasing rampancy. Reports of emergencies from the Panchen had almost become a routine.[802] The Emperor considered the event should not end up as such. He thus ordered the Duke of Auspicious Courage, Fuk'anggan, to serve as the Great General and the Duke of Extraordinary Courage, Hailanca and Hui-lin, the Governor-General of Sichuan, to be counsellors (Mnc. *hebei amban*).[803] He assembled the Manchu and Chinese officials and soldiers, as well as the local foreign[804] troops stationed in Sichuan. They were ordered to prepare for the conquest and eradication [of Gorkha]. Sun Shiyi, the Grand Secretary (Mnc. *ashan bithei da*) was tasked with the army provisions along the eastern Tibetan routes. Heliyen, the amban residing in Tibet, oversaw [the provisions] along the western Tibetan routes. Hui-ling was responsible for the routes beyond Kyirong.[805]

[4.1 *Reclaming Tibet*]

In 1792 (QL 57) Fuk'anggan and others reached the Back of Tibet (i.e., Shigatse) via Qinghai.[806] They began their expedition on the 16 June (QL 57/4/Yi-wei). He first despatched the Troop-Leading Amban Cengde and Dai-sen-bao to advance from Nyalam [to the south][807] and the chief military officer Zhu-shen-bao (Jušenboo) to be stationed at Rongshar to prevent the enemy from detouring and launching a surprise attack from the rear. Fuk'anggan and Hailanca fought with the enemy at Jiamu and Maga and then directly reached Kyirong. Cengde also captured Nyalam and fought forward to enter [the enemy's realm].

802 He did not mention the trade conflict and the first war which was supplemented by Zhao-lian. This is probably because of his identity as Han-Chinese. He also confused Tenzin Peljor and Shamarpa.

803 It should be mentioned that Kui-lin 奎林 was also appointed as counsellor in the first place, but he died on the way to Tibet. KLRLJL, vol. 7: The Emperor issued an edict through the cabinet, appointing Fuk'anggan as the General on 27 November 1791 (QL 56/11/2). Hailanca and Kuilin were appointed as counsellors in the same edict.

804 "Foreign" here specifically referred to the people from Jinchuan.

805 Eastern Tibetan routes probably referred to the routes from Sichuan or Chamdo to Lhasa, while routes from Lhasa to Shigatse and further west were the western Tibetan routes.

806 Hešen was not mentioned by Zhao Yi, as he was still in position till 1799.

807 Cp. KRKD QL/57/12, 95–96. Cengde and Dai-sen-bao captured Dram on 10 July 1792 (QL 57/5/22). They conquered the bridge of iron chain on 14 July 1792 (QL 57/5/26).

They reclaimed all territories in the Back of Tibet once annexed by the enemy.

[4.2 *Entering Nepal*]

On 21 July (QL 57/6/Geng-wu), [Fuk'anggan] thus entered the realm of the enemy. The enemy mobilised their entire force to resist at Bharko (between Syāphrū and Dhunce). Fuk'anggan divided the front force into three groups and ordered Hailanca to command them. He further divided the front group into two [sub]groups, taking command himself. He despatched the Adjutant of Guard Troops (Mnc. *bayarai tui janggin*), [named] Taifingga, to engage the enemy in Mount Mu-gu-la (= Zu-mu-gu-la-ba-zai in Potala Inscription). Fu[k'anggan] hence launched an assault against the enemy's camp via an intermediate route [i.e., shortcut]. Hai[lanca] manoeuvered around the mountain and appeared above the enemy camp, joining the force of Fu[k'anggan]. They together conquered dozens of wooden fortresses and stone passes.

After chasing the enemy to Yong-ya (Ramche), Fuk'anggan captured a certain headperson,[808] while Cengde also captured the iron chain bridge and arrived at Li-ti (Listi).[809] Fuk'anggan further urged Zhu-shen-bao (Jušenboo) to Listi to amplify the noise and power of the army. As a result, the entire [Gorkha] country was surging with fear. They despatched someone to come and beg for capitulation. Fu[k'anggan] said, "It is an attempt to delay our advancement to gain a respite, which shall not be permitted." He seriously announced a summon of rebuttal against it.[810]

On 20 August (QL 57/7/Geng-zi), carrying provisions, they marched forward for a second time, crossing over [Mount] Ga-le-la[811], Dui-bum (Dhaibuṃ), Te-pa-lang-gu Bridge (Betrāvatī), Jiar-gu-la (Gerkhuṭār),

808 It might refer to the return of the Chinese soldier Wang Gang on 5 August 1792 (QL 57/6/18) and Tenzin Peljor on 5 August 1792 (QL 57/6/28), reported in memorials received on 20 & 24 September 1792 (KRKJL, vols. 37–38, QL 57/8/5–9). They were accompanied by the Gorkha headperson (cp. WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 21–28; WZTZ 1982, 398–404).

809 According to Dai-sen-bao, it happened on 24 July 1792 (QL 57/6/6) (KRKD QL 57/12, 95–96). Cengde later received the letter of surrender issued on 27 July 1792 (QL 57/6/9). After Fuk'anggan's decision of retreat, they also retreated to Tingri.

810 This probably refers to the letter from Raṇa Bahādura on 16 July 1792 (QL 57/5/28) and Fuk'anggan's reply on 2 August 1792 (QL 57/6/15) (WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 21–25; WZTZ 1982, 398–400; KRKD 57/7–8, 58).

811 This place is yet to be identified. Satō proposed Kharkigan, which could not be identified as well (1986, 685).

Jim-ji (Jibjībe), etc. [They covered] the distance of more than 700 *li*. [They covered] the distance of more than 700 *li*. All six battles were won.[812] More than 4,000 people were killed.

[5 *The Surrender of Gorkha*]

Raṇa Bahādura was even more frightened and despatched someone to beg for surrender for a second time. He first returned the corpse of Tenzin Peljor, as he was the chief criminal.[813] [He] handed over all the plundered treasures, including the golden tiles and other items [of the Tashilhunpo Temple][814] They ordered the great headperson Ga-ji Di-wu-da-te Ta-ba (*kājī* Devidatta Thapa) etc. to present an auspicious memorial[815] to the Emperor with both hands and to reverently offer upwards tamed elephants, foreign horses and a sect of musicians. There were also other uncountable regional products.[816]

The Emperor, seeing their sincerity, thus acknowledged [Fuk'anggan] to receive their capitulation. On 10 October (QL 57/8/Ding-hai), the army withdrew from the front, observing the imperial edict.[817]

For this campaign, the troops were employed at a distance of 20,000 li. The achievement was accomplished within one year. Speaking of the perils, [it resembles] Deng Ai's marching through [the narrow path of] Yinping [from Gansu to Sichuan, to annihilate the Shu Han Kingdom in 263 CE]. Speaking of the distance, [it is akin to] the

812 As the army reached Betrāvatī, they should have already fought 7 battles. The number was deliberately minus 1. In traditional Chinese historiography, one must pay attention to even one character, as "a subtle word contains profound meaning" (微言大義). The change from seven battles in the official commemorations to six battles, as well as grouping the letters of "surrender" together might be a deliberate choice that conveys the judgement of the historiographer.

813 When he returned Tenzin Peljor, he also sent a letter. The letter from Raṇa Bahādura was dated on 27 July 1792 (QL 57/6/9) (WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 26–28; WZTZ 1982, 402–4).

814 When he returned the treasure, contracts, and the remains of Shamarpa, he also sent a letter. The letter from Raṇa Bahādura was dated on 25 August 1792 (QL 57/7/8). (KRKJL, vol. 39, QL 57/8/22; WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 34–36; WZTZ 1982, 409–10).

815 The letter was dated September 1792 (QL 57/8), while the *kājī* arrived the Chinese camp on 23 September as the ambassador (QL 57/8/8) (KRKJL, vol. 45, QL 57/9/16; WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.3, 6–13; WZTZ 1982, 422–24).

816 The Chinese term used here is 方物 (*fang-wu*), a canonical term for tributes brought by the various barbarians. It was already used in the *Book of Documents* and the *Book of Han.*

817 From the next paragraph on, the two texts differ completely from each other, as Zhao-lian (2.2.7) commented in a different way.

Mongolian expedition towards Kipchaks. Both cannot surpass [our achievement].

This was a punitive expedition against the rebels, the inclusion of the obedient, and the perpetual pacification of distant and isolated realms. [All the merits] are attributed to the Sacred Son of Heavens [i.e., the Emperor]. He extensively implemented His wise scheme and had insight into the crucial points of an event as a lucent candle. He organised the transportation of provisions, mobilised troops, and was decisive in awards and punishments [according to merits and demerits]. Therefore, the commanders were encouraged to die on battlefields, while soldiers were grateful for the warmth of the imperial grace, as they donned wadded jackets. Therefore, [the martial glory] was accomplished. Is it not grand?

[6 *Notes on Tibet and Gorkha*]

My fellow countryman, Yu Jue, the chief official of a prefecture, accompanied Fu[k'anggan]'s army. He was among the troops and thus had the sincerest experiences and memories. I asked him and wrote it down with a brush. Yu [Jue] also told me [the following notes]:

The residencies of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen all have gold-casted tiles on the halls. All the precious seats, girders, columns, and rails were embedded with pearls, jades, and gems. Their colours gleam so brightly that one cannot look at them closely. They are indeed well-decorated (*avataṃsaka*) storeyed pavilions furnished with seven jewels (*sapta-ratna*) [as mentioned in the Buddhist *sūtra*s].

There is no promulgated calendar among the folks.[818] 300 days count as a year. Regarding agriculture, they count days for climatic terms without fault as well. Only highland barley, buckwheat, and maize are cultivated. They grind them into flour, mix the flour with butter and tea, add salted water, and then eat them. [This dish] is called *tsampa* (*rtsam pa*). There is occasionally rice, but it is not attained in abundance. Only bovine and caprine animals are produced. There are no chickens, pigs, geese, and ducks.

The people are prudent but clumsy, knowing nothing about the five moralities[819]. They make no separation between male and female. The

818 In the Chinese imperial system, the time and climatic terms for agriculture were always managed by the emperor (敬授民時), while it did not extend to the Tibetan realm (cp. Zhang 2016, 167–74).

819 五倫 (*wu-lun*) are "the five ethical principles" of the Confucian model. They are the relation 1) between monarch and ministers, 2) between father

women paint their chins and cheeks with vermillion, a makeup style said to originate from Tang Princesses when they were married down [to the Tibetan Kings]. [Women] are free to go out and be sexually active at the age of 14 or 15. They then conduct a common-law marriage (literally, "conjugation in the wilderness").[820] Sometimes, our soldiers in Tibet become intimate with them. They always come to live together, washing clothes and cooking for the soldiers. They do not consider it peculiar. When the soldiers fulfil their three-year garrison term, women allow them to carry the sons back, but not the daughter.[821]

In the state [of Tibet], there are also criminal laws but no instruments such as punitive rods (*daṇḍa*).[822] People with misdemeanours are kept in a dark room without even a beam of light. The length of such a sentence is determined by the severity of the crime. When the days are fulfilled, the criminal gets released. Those with felonies are escorted to a cave filled with scorpions to let them be sucked to death by swarms of scorpions, which constitutes capital punishment.

The transactions there do not involve bronze coins. Instead, they all cast silver coins in various sizes to facilitate marketing and selling. Researching the accounts of the various states in the Western Realms in the *Records of the Grand Historian* and *the Book of Han*, all used silver [coins] as money. This practice must be time-honoured.

There is formerly a large path from the Back Tibet to Gorkha.[823] [However,] Fuk'anggan found a shortcut which was very perilous and narrow. Often, there are cliffs on the left side and rapid streams on the right. Even two horses cannot be side by side.[824] Fu[k'anggan] also walked. Moreover, there was a mountain with no place to camp, which

and sons, 3) between husband and wife, 4) among brothers, and 5) among friends.

820 Bajung reported this during the first war and prohibited such cases. (Cata. Mnc. no. 7377 = 3–2–3224013.1).

821 Tenzin Peljor also spoke of the Tibeto-Chinese male descendants in Chengdu. They were born to Chinese soldiers and Tibetan mothers, trading between Sichuan and Tibet (TP 919).

822 The most common punishment in Imperial China was using bamboo sticks to strike criminals by the thighs.

823 This probably referred to the Nyalam–Dram/Khasa–Listi route.

824 Yang Kui wrote a poem titled *The mountainous way marching from Syāphrū was extremely perilous. There was a place where two rocks pressed from both sides as if a closing mouth. The narrowness could not allow a horse [to pass]. My fellow people commented it as the pass between the teeth of tiger.* 自脅布魯進兵, 山路奇險, 有一處巨石夾立, 如口翕張, 隘不容馬, 同人戲謂之虎牙關. He noted that Rasuvā and Dhunce also had narrow and low routes like threads where the weather was also capricious. (Wu 1985, 164–65).

is approximately 120 *li* in distance, with ups and downs. One has to cross it within a day. If it becomes slightly late, the darkness of night makes it impossible for one to find the way.

Snow-fortresses refer to the cities made of non-melting snow from remote ancient times. In these cities, there are caves of dozens of *zhang* depth resembling the city gates, enabling comings and goings. There are gods in charge of them. If one utters few words of arrogance, there will always be heaps of snow as large as houses falling[825] and wrapping him/her. One will be frozen to death immediately.[826]

People often reside in pillbox-like buildings. They are usually two-storeyed, with the upper level for people, while the lower or bovine and caprine livestock. [People] pile stones to create firm and thick walls. Our troops once attacked the largest pillbox, spending a full day without breaking into it. [We] dug [a tunnel] to its underground, filled [the hole] with gunpowder, and then detonated it. People [inside] and the pillbox were both crushed into ashes.[827] Therefore, the enemy was even more frightened.

825 It is probably an avalanche. The letter from Raṇa Bahādura dated on 25 August 1792 (QL 57/7/8) reported that 2,000–3,000 men were frozen to death on their way back after the plunder of the Tashilhunpo temple (WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 34–36; WZTZ 1982, 409–10).

826 Most similarly, Sun Shi-yi wrote that Hui-ling's attendants were buried by the snow in Mt. Dan-da (present-day Banbar, Chamdo) 丹達山雪中吊亡者並序 Preface: "The snow piles up several zhang on the routes in the mountains. The local people dig caves as tunnels, calling it the snow-fortress. In the end of spring, Hui-ling passed by. Two attendants were buried. I pass here now and lament them" 山徑積雪高數丈, 土人穴其中, 以通往來, 謂之雪城。三月中惠瑤圃制軍過此, 二從者壓焉, 余過而弔之。 Poem has "The layers of fortress were not only lofty, but also surrounded by flying snowflakes. The horses falter and retreat, while the people resemble ants that are drown in spirals. The fierce wind assists the brutality and pushed the jade-like mountain. The flesh and blood of two boys were thus covered by wilderness" 層城既嵯峨, 飛霙覆繚繞。馬如鷁退飛, 人比蟻旋潦。罡風倏助虐, 玉山忽推倒。遂使二童子, 膏血埋野草 (Sun, vol. 12, 17–18). Yang Kui's *Miscellaneous Poems in the Foreign Territory* 番地雜詩 wrote "There was *zhang* of snow in the previous years. The merchants from the west were buried under the snow and became skeletons by the white mountains" 此地前年丈餘雪, 西來估客雪底埋, 山畔皚皚作枯骨 (Wu 1985, 156). He-ying also wrote in January 1792 on his way to Tibet with Hailanca, "There are buried camels in the snowy mountain peak" 雪嶠有埋駝 (He-ying 1823, vol. 1, 20–21).

827 This referred to Ohūi's attacking Nyalam on 15 February 1792 (QL 57/1/23), memorial received on 22 March 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 22, QL 57/2/23). Zhurhang-a prepared the trigger, while Ohūi, Cengde, Zhang Zhi-yuan, Mukdengga, and Zhang Zhan-kui were the main fighters. It was reported Bam Bahādura Śāha's nephew Ar-zeng Śāha was caught by then. He was later sent to Peking under inquisition and confessed the military system of Gorkha (KRKD QL 57/7–8, 2–3).

Their warcraft still follows the ancient method.[828] One has to send a military letter, set a date, and then fight on that day. Our troops disregarded the timing. We always engaged in combat, whenever convenient. They were often caught off guard and taken advantage of by us. They even mocked that the Chinese army went on a cunning path, which was not ancient. However, they ultimately could not guard or defend, suffering huge casualties. Then, they dared not resist. Thus, they came and paid their allegiance, and surrendered their sincerity, etc. These are all what Yu [Jue] experienced, and therefore, I took them down all along.

Edition

平定廓爾喀述略

廓爾喀自古不通中國, 烏斯藏以西一大部也。烏斯藏卽古佛國, 今分為前後兩藏。自蜀省打箭爐西行七十二驛至前藏; 又十二驛至後藏; 又十二驛至濟隴; 又三十驛至石宿橋, 為後藏極邊地。過橋以西, 則廓爾喀矣。

前藏有活佛, 號曰達賴喇嘛, 相傳如來後身, 世世轉輪為之。每將死, 則自言其往生處, 其大弟子如言物色之, 得嬰兒即奉以歸, 謂前喇嘛所托生也, 其真偽不可知。而準噶爾喀爾喀及各蒙古萬餘里夷人皆尊信之, 為佛教大宗。後藏 亦有活佛, 號曰班禪, 其名位視達賴喇嘛稍次, 而諸夷亦崇奉惟謹。此二藏本不隸中國。元世祖時, 有八思巴專為帝師, 明成祖時有哈立麻冊為大寶法王, 皆未嘗待以屬禮也。

入我朝始內附為我外藩。康熙末為準格爾所竊據, 以大兵克復之。既為我外藩, 則或有外侮不得不護持之。所關於國體甚鉅。先嘗藏王主國事朱爾默特那木扎爾謀不軌, 為我駐藏大臣傅清、拉布敦所誅, 遂不復立王。以國事統歸達賴喇嘛及班禪管理, 於是, 以教主兼國王之事, 尤倚天朝以為重。

有丹津班珠爾者, 本班禪部下頭人, 以罪被黜, 竄入廓爾喀, 結其酋喇特木巴都爾。突入後藏, 拆殿上金瓦及掠寶器而去, 乾隆五十三年事也。

班禪及達賴喇嘛飛章馳奏。上以地遠不欲用兵。將遣人諭解之。而賊又盤踞聶拉木、絨轄、擦木、瑪噶轄爾甲等處, 日肆擾。班禪等告急之奏狎至。上念事不可已, 乃命嘉勇公福康安為大將軍, 超勇公海蘭察、川督惠齡為參贊大臣, 調集滿漢官兵及蜀省屯土番兵備征剿。其饋餉則命大學士川督孫士毅主藏東路, 駐藏大臣和琳主藏西路, 濟隴以外則惠齡主之。

828 He referred to the time before the Warring State (before 476 BCE).

五十七年, 將軍等由青海至後藏, 以四月乙未出師。先遣領隊大臣成德、岱森保由聶拉木進, 總兵諸神保駐絨轄, 防其抄襲後路。福海二公與賊戰於擦木, 戰于瑪噶轄爾甲, 直抵濟隴。成德亦由聶拉木轉戰而入。凡賊所佔[829]後藏地悉復。

六月庚[午]{子}[830], 遂入賊境, 賊舉國來拒於噶多普。福公分前隊為三, 令海蘭察統之。又分前隊為二, 公自統之。遣護軍統領台斐英阿, 在木古拉山與賊相持, 福公即從間道衝賊營, 海公又繞山出賊營之上, 與福公合勢共克木城、石卡數十。

追奔至雍雅, 俘其頭人。成德亦克鐵索橋, 進至利底。福公又檄諸神保亦至利底, 以聲威。於是舉國洶懼, 遣人來乞降。福公曰:"是緩我兵也, 弗可聽。"嚴檄斥之。

七月庚子, 裹糧再進, 歷噶勒拉、堆補木, 特帕朗古橋、甲爾古拉、集木集等處, 七百餘里。凡六戰皆捷, 所殺四千餘人。

喇特納巴都爾益震懾, 遣人再乞降。先歸丹津班朱爾之屍, 以其首禍也。獻所掠金瓦寶器等物。令大頭人噶[箕]{莫}, 第[烏]{馬}達特塔巴等賫表, 恭進馴象番馬及樂工一部。其餘方物不可數計。

上鑒其誠, 乃許受降。八月丁亥奉詔班師。[831]

是役也, 用兵在二萬餘里之外, 成功於一年之間。語其險則鄧艾之走陰平, 語其遠則蒙古之征欽察, 俱無以過, 而討叛舍服, 永靖遐陬, 良由聖天子睿謨廣運, 洞燭事機, 轉餉調兵, 信賞必罰, 是以將厲死綏, 士感挾纊以成此大勳也。豈不盛哉?

余同鄉人余州牧名珏, 隨福公出師, 身在行間, 覩記最切。余問之得以援筆記之。余君又為余言:

達賴喇嘛、班禪所居, 皆鑄金為殿瓦, 凡寶座、梁柱、欄檻悉嵌珠玉寶石, 五色晃耀, 不可逼視。真所謂華嚴樓閣, 七寶裝成者。

民間無時憲書, 常以三百日為一歲, 其種植則計日為節候, 亦不爽。所種惟青稞蕎麥包穀, 磨為麪, 以牛酥茶汁雜鹽水調食之, 謂之糌粑。間有稻米, 然不可多得也。物產惟牛羊, 無雞豚鵝鴨。

人性愿而蠢, 不知有五倫, 男女尤無別。女皆朱其頤及兩頰, 謂昔唐公主下降時粧飾如此。年十四五, 即聽其出游, 野合為夫婦。我駐藏兵有所昵, 輒來同居, 為之洗衣作爨, 無所怪。三年班滿有子聽攜歸, 女則否。

國中亦有刑法而無笞杖等具。罪小者閉置暗室中, 無一隙光, 以所犯輕重定日之多寡, 日滿釋之。甚重者, 押入蠍洞, 聽群蠍嗾死, 此其大辟也。

交易無銅錢, 皆鑄銀為之, 大小不等, 以便市鬻。考史記、漢書所載西域諸國, 皆以銀為錢, 則由來久矣。

829 This was supplemented by the annotation of CHEN Tan 陳坦.
830 In the sixth lunar month of this year, there is no Geng-zi day. It must be Geng-wu
831 From here on, it is completely different from Zhao-lian (2.2.7).

後藏至廓爾喀故有孔道, 福公覓間道入, 極險仄, 往往左峭壁, 右急湍, 兩馬不得並。福公亦步行, 又有一嶺, 上下百二十里, 中無可駐處, 須以一日過, 稍遲則夜黑不能覓路矣。

雪城者, 太古以來至雪, 凝結不化, 遂成城。中有洞, 若城門, 深數十丈, 可通往來, 有神司之。或稍出慢語, 輒有雪塊大如屋者, 壓而裹之。頃刻凍死。

人家多碉樓, 分兩層, 上處人, 下處牛羊。牆壁皆壘石為之, 極堅厚。我兵嘗攻一最大碉, 竟日不能破, 掘地至其下, 實火藥轟之, 人碉皆粉碎, 以是益震懾。

其戰猶彷古法, 先下兵書, 約日而後戰。我兵不計早晚, 伺便輒入殺, 往往猝不及防, 為我所乘。猶笑中國兵行詭道, 以為非古, 然終以不能備禦, 被殺多, 遂不敢再抗, 歸命投誠云。此亦余君所親歷, 故幷記至。

2.2.7 Zhao-lian, *The Surrender of Gorkha*, 1820s

The text is in Zhao-lian's notes, *Miscellaneous Records in the Pavilion of Whistles,* composed in the 1820s. The book only existed in manuscripts among the high-ranked royalties and officials before its first printed version in 1880. Most versions have already been explored and commented in Lo 2014, whereas provided with a newly scanned manuscript <校> in the National Library of China (no. 13876), we see that the 1880 version relied on this manually edited manuscript. Despite the censoring and abbreviating in this recession, it standardised some transcriptions and is thus useful, as noted in Lo 2014. The 1880 version also influenced *Categorised anthology of petty matters from the Qing period* 清稗類鈔.

Concerning the other recension, two other manuscripts <鈔> and <天> of the different recension are also available, respectively in the National Library of China (no. 02384) and in Tianjin Library[832]. The latter one seems to be the root version. Most modern punctuated versions mainly follow <鈔> or <天>.

Since both recessions are of certain significance and merits, all the versions consulted are listed before the edition, while the important variant readings from both recensions and two conjectures are made in the edition provided here.

832 Printed in *The Supplement to the Large Imperial Series Complete books of the Four Storehouses*, vol. 1179.

Translation

The Surrender of Gorkha

[1 *Basic Information about Tibet and Gorkha*]
Historically, Gorkha was not connected to the Middle Kingdom (i.e., China). It is a large tribe to the west of Ü-Tsang[833], the ancient Buddhist country. Ü-Tsang is now divided into the Front and Back of Tibet. Travelling westward for 72 stations from Da-jian lu (Dartsemdo) in the Province of Shu (Sichuan) brings one to the Front of Tibet (i.e., Lhasa). Continuing for 12 more stations leads to the Back of Tibet (Shigatse). After 12 more stations, one arrives at Ji-long (Kyirong). With another 30 stations, one arrives at Shi-su qiao (Rasuvāgaḍhī),[834] the extreme frontier of the Back of Tibet. Westwards beyond the bridge lies Gorkha.

In the Front of Tibet, there is a Hutuktu called the Dalai Lama. He was said to be the advanced disciple of Tsongkhapa. He turns the wheel [of *saṃsāra*] to be [the Dalai Lama] generation by generation. When he is about to die, he reveals the location of his [next] rebirth. His disciples follow his words to seek for the reincarnation. Once they find an infant, they worship him and return [to Lhasa], claiming that [the infant] is the rebirth of the previous Lama. The truthfulness or falseness cannot be known. However, Zhun-gar (Dzungar) and Kar-ka (Khalkha) as well as the various Mongol Princes and Dukes of the internal tribe[835] all venerate and believe in it all venerate him and believe in this [reincarnation of the Dalai Lama]. Therefore, [Tibetan Buddhism] becomes a large sect of Buddhism. The Panchen Erdeni in the Back of Tibet ranks slightly lower than the Dalai Lama in terms of his fame and position, but all foreigners revere and worship him with prudence. The two regions of Tibet were originally the ancient [Great] Tibetan (Tu-fan/Tib. Bod chen po) [Empire]. In the Yuan Dynasty, ‘Phags pa was the instructor of the Emperor Shi-zu

833 The name was written as Us-zang, 烏斯藏, the earlier name for Wei-zang 衛藏 before the Qing Dynasty. The difference resulted from the phonological changes in the Tibetan language.

834 The place name can only be found in Zhao Yi’s text (2.2.6), as it is particular to the Wu Chinese dialect, which is telling of Zhao-lian’s source.

835 Zhao-lian’s re-writing was correct. The inner Mongolian people also revered Dalai Lama. The Emperor once worried that the amban residing in Tibet, Sungyūn, might be too engaged in his personal belief, as he was a Mongolian bannerman (Qianlong Manchu Secret Edicts, vol. 24, no. 4190 QL 59/8/1).

(Kublai). In Ming Dynasty, the Emperor Cheng-zu (Zhu Di) conferred to Ha-li-ma (Karmapa, De bzhin gshegs pa) the title "The Great Treasure Dharma King" by his imperial edict, while they never treated Tibet with the rites for suzerainties.

During Emperor Wen (Fulin, the Shunzhi Emperor) in our dynasty, the fifteenth] Dalai Lama recognised the emergence of a sacred person in the Great East. He sent an envoy for an auspicious audience. Later, the seventeenth] Dalai Lama was held hostage by the Elut (Oirat)[836]. Emperor Sheng-zu Ren (= Kang-xi) ordered his fourteenth imperial son Yun-ti to serve as the Great General. He commanded the troops in Tibet to retain the lost lands, guarding the Dalai Lama back [to Lhasa] and complete the enthronement ceremony[837] at Potala, which was considered the strategy to pacify the Mongols. Initially, the foreign chieftain, Pho lha nas, was conferred the princely title due to his meritorious service [in expelling the rebels in 1727–1728]. He oversaw the affairs of the two Tibetan regions. His son Zhur-mu-te (= Tib. Gyur med) rebelled and thus, was no longer granted the princely title. The Dalai Lama and the Panchen in general administrate state affairs. Henceforth, they, as religious leaders, concurrently hold the kingly responsibilities. They especially count heavily on the Heavenly Dynasty.

[2 *The First Tibeto-Gorkha Conflict: Bajung's Failure*]

There was a person named Dan-jin Ban-zhur (Tenzin Peljor), who was originally the headperson under the Panchen's command. After he was branded in the face for his crime, he fled to Gorkha and became acquainted with the tribal chieftain Lat-mu Ba-dur (= Raṇa Bahādura). Again, there were some [dispute on] trade affairs.[838] [In

836 It probably referred to Dzungar invasion in 1717. The Dzungar chief Tshe dbang rab bstan killed the Lha bzang Khan of the Khoshut Khanate and annexed Lhasa. Blo bzang bstan 'dzin, the uncle of Lha bzang brought the Dalai Lama away. Later the seventh Dalai was guarded by the Manchu Prince Yun-ti back to Lhasa in 1720.

837 The Chinese word for this literally reads "sitting in the bed". Tibetan word is *khri la bzhugs* means "seated on the throne/in the bed or platform". They all refer to the inauguration of the Lama.

838 This probably referred to the brothers of the Dalai Lama and the treasury officer (*phyag mdzod*), who were said to be very greedy in accumulating wealth (Komatsubara 2006, Deng 2007b). The port at Nyalam thus charged the Newari merchants with excessive taxes, as reported by Kinglin and Yamantai (BLBJL, vol. 6, QL 53/9/11). It might also refer to the Tibetan salt of inferior quality sold to Gorkha, reported by Ohūi at his arrival in Lhasa on 2 December

addition,] someone[839] in the Back of Tibet (Shigatse), relying on the Panchen's influence, did not pay the proper value. [Gorkha] came into a grudge [with the Back of Tibet]. Their people broke into the Back of Tibet and occupied [the Tibetan territories][840], which was the event in 1788 (QL 53).

Emperor Chun (Qian-long) ordered the Governor-General of Sichuan, Ohūi, and the General of Chengdu, Cengde, to command the troops and eradicate [Gorkha]. Furthermore, considering that the subminister of *Lifanyuan*[841] (Mnc. *tulergi golo be dasara jargan-i ashan-i amban*) Bajung was proficient in the language of the foreigners (i.e. Tibetan), [the Emperor] appointed him as the supervisor of the army. Bajung was a minister in proximity [to the Emperor].[842] He no more placed himself under the command of both [Ohūi and Cengde]. He despatched the foreigners (i.e., Tibetan people) to negotiate peace with Gorkha, proposing an annual payment of 1,000 ingots[843] to redeem the territories. Gorkha desired to establish a transactional contract or treaty as reliable proof. Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama deemed it unfeasible.[844]

1788 (QL 53/12/6) (BLBJL, vol. 14, QL 53/12/6). It might also refer to the coinage dispute, as coins were used in trade.

839 This referred to Drung pa Hutuktu, the brother of Shamarpa and the sixth Panchen Lama. He held all the endowments to the late sixth Panchen in his hand, not sharing the inheritance with Shamarpa who considered himself to be entitled to it. (*Poem on the event of the Tashilhunpo Temple* 扎什倫布廟誌事 written by the Emperor in the replica of Tashilhunpo Temple at Jehol, in KRLJL, *Poems by the Emperor*, part 1, 18–20; Zhang 1988, 465–66).

840 This probably referred to Nyalam, Rongshar, Jiamu, and Kyirong.

841 It can be understood as the Board of Exterior Provinces, especially in regard to Central Asia, Mongols, Russia, Islamic people, and Tibet. Li-fan-yuan was also translated as "Kolonialministerium" (Haenisch 1938, 21). It was of great significance in the imperial system of Qing (cp. Schorkowitz and Chia 2016).

842 In the Manchu court, the closeness to the Emperor was significant, as "in front of the emperors" was designated to few (cp. Swen 2021, 126).

843 According to Tenzin Peljor, it was 300 ingots (TP 638, 640, 647–48), which probably equals "fifteen thousand Indian silver coins (rupees)." (Komatsubara 2017, 184 n. 8). Many other Tibetan officials in Tibet also gave the same amount of payment, reported by Fuk'anggan's memorial received on 20 February and 20 March 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 18, QL 57/1/20, vol. 20, QL 57/2/28). The confession of Tenzin Peljor on 3 January 1793 also gave the same story (KRKD QL 57/10–11, 200–17). However, in the letter from the Gorkha court to Bootai, the amban residing in Lhasa, it says it was 50,000 coins annually, which was calculated by Fuk'anggan as the equivalent of 300 ingots that is 15,000 *liang* (KRKJL, vol. 23 QL 57/3/9). He-ying gave 1,000 *huan* (千鍰) in his poem, which might be an approximate number (He-ying 1823, vol. 1, 20–21).

844 It seems that Dalai was in fact well aware of the treaty (DL8, 291). Meanwhile, his uncle served as the head of government (Komatsubara 2017; TP 605).

However, Bajung was eager to conclude the case and returned after the treaty was agreed upon.[845]

[3.1 *The Outbreak of the War*]

In more than a year [in 1791], the headperson of Gorkha demanded the annual payment, while the Dalai Lama withheld it due to his parsimony.[846] Their auspicious memorial submitted to the Emperor lacked reverence and obedience in terms of language. Moreover, it was concealed by the amban residing in Tibet, lest it would be heard [by the Emperor].[847] The headperson of Gorkha then grabbed the chief in Tibet, Marqin[848] as hostage and again connected troops into the Back of Tibet. They pillaged and returned [with booties]. The amban in Tibet, Bootai, held the troops from rescuing and desired to abandon the Front of Tibet and return [to the inner land]. The Dalai Lama was not willing to

However, in the memorials by Fuk'anggan received on 20 March 1792, the Dalai Lama was not satisfied and considered that Bajung's resolution would not bring an end to the conflict (KRKJL, vol. 20, QL 57/2/28). Fuk'anggan further reported the Dalai Lama's intention to have a war with the Gorkha that did not believe in the Buddhist religion, received on 18 May 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 28, QL 57/4/28).

845 The Emperor rebuked Bajung for rushing back to the capital, ordering him to at least meet Shamarpa on 10 August 1789 (BLBJL, vol. 23, QL 54/6/20). He later issued another edict on 14 November, saying that Bajung should not rush back before the tributary envoy, even though he missed his family (BLBJL, vol. 26, QL 54/9/27).

846 The Dalai Lama's unwillingness of payment was also reported by Fuk'anggan's memorial received on 20 March 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 20, QL 57/2/28).

847 There was a letter brought by Fan Zhong from Kathmandu on 21 November 1791 (QL 56/10/26) to Tibet that arrived at Cengde's place on 31 December 1791 (QL 56/12/7), reported by Cengde's memorial received on 14 February 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 18, QL 57/1/22). It was later translated in Fuk'anggan's memorial received on 31 March 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 23, QL 57/3/9). The letter addressed Bootai, accusing him of not presenting their previous letter to the Emperor and accusing the Tibetan of disobeying the contract that prescribed the annual payment and the exchange rate of new coins. However, later in an imperial Edict on 9 December 1792 (QL 57/10/26), the Emperor investigated Pu-fu. He found out it was Ohūi who held the letter (KRKJL, vol. 44, see also Part II, 2.2.8) The letter might be the one in WZTZ, which was found out by Heliyen on 9 November 1792 (QL 57/9/25) (1896, vol. 13.3, 25–31; 1986, 434–36).

848 Mar-qin might not be Tenzin Peljor. It might be the Jasaγ Lama, sKal bzang bstan 'dzin, who was also abducted. He was returned to Tibet earlier than Tenzin Peljor, arriving on 30 December 1791 (QL 56/12/6), reported by Ohūi's memorial received on 28 January 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 16, QL 57/1/5).

imprudently relinquish the significant treasures. The [movement] was thus prevented from happening.[849]

[3.2 *Preparation for Expedition*]

Such an event heard, the Emperor became furious. In fear of punishment, Bajung committed suicide by drowning.[850] [The Emperor] ordered that Bootai be stripped of his title and renamed Fu-xi-hun (Fusihūn).[851] In the national language (i.e., Manchu), it means "a lowly servant". He instructed Fuk'anggan, the Governor-General of Canton, and Hailanca, the Interior Minister leading imperial guards (Mnc. *hiya kadalara dorgi amban*) to command soldiers and people [in service] from various areas including the Solon tribes, Jilin (Girin [Ula]), Sichuan and Shaanxi.[852] Sun Shiyi, the Grand Secretary (Mnc. *ashan bithei da*) was tasked with the army provisions along the eastern Tibetan routes. Heliyen, the amban residing in Tibet, oversaw [the provisions] along the western Tibetan routes. Hui-ling was responsible for the routes beyond Kyirong.

In the Spring of 1792, Fuk'anggan began the march via Qinghai. The green grass was not yet luxuriant then, while the horses were thin, weak, and tired. The provisions were cut off multiple times. The Provincial Administration Commissioner (Bu-zheng-shi), Jing-an,[853] who

849 This happened immediately upon the arrival of the Panchen at Lhasa on 22 September 1791 (QL 56/8/25). The Dalai Lama refused to move from Lhasa to Tai-ning because this would intimidate the Tibetan people, reported by Bootai's memorial received on 17 October 1791 (KRKJL, vol. 2, QL 56/9/20). In the biography of the eighth Dalai Lama, Bootai requested the Dalai and the Panchen to move to Chamdo instead, whereas the Dalai Lama predicted the retreat of the Gorkha. He requested the ambans to send memorials, while other senior monks refused to move the Dalai and the Panchen in fear of intimidating the Lhasa residents. They were afraid that the Gorkha might thus plunder Potala and rob the significant Buddhist sculptures and relics, which would annoy the Emperor even more (DL8, 318–20).

850 Bajung drown himself on the night of receiving the news from Bootai on 19 September 1791 (QL 56/8/22). The Emperor immediately issued an edict to Ohūi and Cengde, blaming Bajung and encouraging them, on 22 September (KRKJL, vol. 1, QL 56/8/25).

851 The Emperor issued an edict to change Bootai's name to Fusihūn on 31 March 1792, given that his name was the same as the second *hošoi elgiyen cin wang*, the son of Kang-xi's second brother (KRKJL, vol. 23, QL 57/3/9; WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.1, 30; WZTZ 1982, 371–72).

852 The former two were in the Northeast where Tungusic people resided. The latter two were at the border with the Tibetan area.

853 Jing-an was a relative of Hešen, two generations below him in their clan. He was an officer in Gansu. His name assisted the transportation in Qinghai, reported by Fuk'anggan's memorials (KRKJL, vols. 18, 21).

was in charge of transporting grains was instructed by Hešen who desired to cut off their provisions to let Fuk'anggan die on his own.[854] Owing to the rapid marching of Fuk'anggan, they arrived at the Front of Tibet in 40 days. They began their expedition on the 16 June (QL 57/4/Yi-wei).

[4.1 *Reclaiming Tibet*]

He first despatched the Troop-Leading Amban Cengde and Dai-sen-bao to advance from Nyalam [to the south] and the chief military officer Zhu-shen-bao (Jušenboo) to be stationed at Rongshar to prevent the enemy from detouring and launching a surprise attack from the rear. Fuk'anggan and Hailanca fought with the enemy at Jiamu and Mar-xia (i.e., Maga) and then directly reached Kyirong. Cengde also captured Nyalam and fought forward to enter [the enemy's realm]. They reclaimed all territories in the Back of Tibet once disrupted by the enemy.

[4.2 *Entering Nepal*]

On 21 July (QL 57/6/Geng-wu), [Fuk'anggan] thus entered the realm of the enemy. The enemy mobilised their entire force to resist at Bharko (between Syāphrū and Dhunce). Fuk'anggan divided the front force into three groups and ordered Hailanca to command them. He further divided the front group into two [sub]groups, taking command himself. He despatched the Adjutant of Guard Troops (Mnc. *bayarai tui janggin*), [named] Taifingga, to engage the enemy in Mount Mu-gu-la (= Zu-mu-gu-la-ba-zai in Potala Inscription). Fu[k'anggan] launched an assault against the enemy's camp via an intermediate route [i.e., shortcut]. Hai[lanca] manoeuvred around the mountain and appeared behind the enemy camp, joining the force of Fu[k'anggan]. They together conquered dozens of wooden fortresses and stone passes.

After chasing the enemy to Yong-ya (Ramche), Fuk'anggan captured a certain headperson, while Cengde also captured the iron chain bridge and arrived at Li-ti (Listi). Fuk'anggan further urged Zhu-shen-bao (Jušenboo) to Listi to amplify the power of the army. As a result, the entire [Gorkha] country was surging with fear. They despatched

854 This might also be verified by Yang Kui's *Miscellaneous Poems in the Foreign Territory* 番地雜詩. He wrote "Around mid-night, people woke up to chop the ice with axes to wash rice. However, the porridge was not ready by 3–5 a.m… People had no meals, while horses could not get their beans" 三更淅米爭斧冰, 五更哺糜糜未成…人不得餐馬無豆 (Wu 1985, 156).

someone to beg for capitulation. Fu[k'anggan] said, "It is an attempt to delay our advancement to gain a respite, which shall not be permitted." He seriously announced a summon of rebuttal against it.[855]

[4.3 *The Betrāvatī Battle*]

On 20 August (QL 57/7/Geng-zi), carrying provisions, they marched forward for a second time, crossing over [Mount] Ga-le-la, Dui-bum (Dhaibuṃ), Te-pa-lang-gu Bridge (Betrāvatī), Jiar-gu-la (Gerkhuṭār), Jim-ji (Jibjībe), etc. [They covered] the distance of more than 700 *li*. All six battles were won. More than 4,000 people were killed.

Upon reaching the Bridge of Re-suo,[856] Fuk'anggan felt as though [the troops] had smashed into the enemy's territory, as if splitting bamboo. Confident of a success within a day, he grew particularly arrogant and self-assured. Guarded in his palanquin,[857] he waved a feather fan, comparing himself with the Marquis of Military [Zhuge Liang, the strategist during the Three Kingdom, whose implements were often a palanquin and a feather fan]. Likewise, he commanded. Our troops released their quivers and hung [weapons] from the horses, resting against their firearms. The enemy seized such a lapse to break in with a sudden counterattack. Our forces fell back in disarray. Taifingga was killed in this [skirmish], along with numerous other military officers who perished on the battlefield.[858]

855 This probably refers to the letter from Raṇa Bahādura on 16 July 1792 (QL 57/5/28) and Fuk'anggan's reply on 2 August 1792 (QL 57/6/15) (WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 21–25; WZTZ 1982, 398–400; KRKD 57/7–8, 58).

856 It was written as Rasuvāgaḍhī (Re-suo Bridge) but should be a mistake of Pa-lang-gu Bridge, which is Betrāvati.

857 There were rumours that Fuk'anggan liked to mount an extravagant palanquin, which was one of the most famous scandals of Fuk'anggan in China.

858 According to Tenzin Peljor, there was a handsome person with imperial garments shot by Bam Bahādura Śāha in his forehead at Betrāvati, while the Chinese soldiers fell into the river as the excrement of goats (TP 892–893). This event on 20 August 1792 (QL 57/7/3) was also reported by Fuk'anggan in a memorial received on 6 October 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 39, QL 57/8/21). Taifingga, having killed two headpersons in red, were shot to death. Earlier on the day before, the Imperial Guard Mergenboo, Tur-dai, the chief Zhang Zhan-kui, and other military officers were also killed on the battlefield. Initially, the Emperor did not believe that Taifingga was killed and inquired Fuk'anggan for confirmation in his edict on the day of reception (KRKD QL 57/7–8, 155–56). Yang Kui also wrote about the loss "(During that night, I dreamt of many officers and soldiers begging me to guide their ways.) I desired to leave immediately at day and was fortunate that I was not buried in these deserted mountains. Looking back at where [we] resided earlier, I say piles of skeletons on the low walls that already have withered grass on

[5 *The Truce*]

The enemies despatched people to beg for a truce again. Thus, Fuk'anggan admitted their request. The enemies handed over all the plundered treasures, including the golden tiles and other items [of the Tashilhunpo Temple][859] They ordered the great headperson Ga-ji Di-wu-da-te Ta-ba (Kājī Devidatta Thapa) etc. to present an auspicious memorial[860] to the Emperor with both hands and to reverently offer upwards tamed elephants, foreign horses and a sect of musicians.

The Emperor, seeing their sincerity, thus acknowledged [Fuk'anggan] to receive their capitulation. On 10 October (QL 57/8/Ding-hai), the army withdrew from the front, observing the imperial edict.[861]

[6 *Comments on the Failure*]

For this particular campaign, Bajung had already disgraced the national [prestige] earlier, while Fuk'anggan further ruined the army afterwards. Yet, the timid and flinching barbarians were intimidated and awed by the might and virtue of our state. Therefore, they presented the auspicious memorial[862] to the Emperor and paid allegiance with sincerity, thus closing the case. Future military endeavours in such a remote distance should take it as a cautionary example.

Edition

The first recension is followed here with variants from both given in the notes.

them. (Therefore, we suffered from great loss during this expedition)." (是夜夢陣亡將士無數, 環乞引路)天明欲去不敢留, 此身幸未埋荒邱。回頭試看昨宿處, 衰草短垣堆髑髏(由此觀之, 此次出師損失不少) (Wu 1985, 172) Sun Shi-yi also wrote laments for them (Sun 1804, vol. 11, 6–7).

859 When he returned the treasure, contracts, and the remains of Shamarpa, he also sent a letter. The letter from Raṇa Bahādura was dated on 25 August 1792 (QL 57/7/8). (KRKJL, vol. 39, QL 57/8/22; WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.2, 34–36; WZTZ 1982, 409–10).

860 The letter was dated September 1792 (QL 57/8), while the *kājī* arrived the Chinese camp on 23 September as the ambassador (QL 57/8/8) (KRKJL, vol. 45, QL 57/9/16; WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.3, 6–13; WZTZ 1982, 422–24).

861 From the next paragraph on, the two texts differ completely from each other, as Zhao-lian (2.2.7) commented in a different way.

862 A variant understanding of "presented the auspicious memorial to the Emperor" 獻表 could be "capitulation", while a variant reading in the second recession says "pay tribute" 獻貢.

Sigla:
Recension 1: The text is situated in vol. 6 in this recession.
MS <天>天津圖書館藏鈔本 (copy-printed in 續修四庫 vol. 1179, 496–97)
MS <鈔>國圖鈔本 no. 02384
This MS-recension derive the following Printed Version:
a) 19XX 商務印書館, 98–99 (Berlin Stabi: no. 445979)
b) 廣文書局 1987 reprinted ≈ 1911 stone-printed version, 28–30 (copy-printed in 1993 by 巴蜀書社 in《中國野史集成》, vol. 49)
c) 中華書局 1980, 173–76
d) 上海古籍出版社 2012, 124–25

Recension 2: The text is situated in vol. 3 in this recension. It corrected some transcription and shortened the text.
MS <校>國圖 no. 13876 校訂鈔本
This MS derives
e) <九> 九思堂本 1880 (國圖 no. 18003), vol. 3, 41–45 (copy-printed in 1967 文海出版社)
f) <稗>清稗類鈔

廓爾喀之降 [863]

廓爾喀自古不通中國, 烏斯藏以西一大部也。烏斯藏卽古佛國, 今分為前後兩藏。自蜀省打箭爐西行七十二驛至前藏; 又十二驛至後藏; 又十二驛至濟隴[864]; 又三十驛至石宿[865]橋, 為後藏極邊地。過橋以西, 則廓爾喀矣。

前藏有胡土克圖[866]曰達賴喇嘛,相傳為宗卡布及門[867]高徒, 世世轉輪為之。每將死, 則自言其往生處, 其[868]弟子如言物色之, 得嬰兒即奉以歸, 謂前喇嘛所託[869]生也, 其真偽不可知。而準噶爾喀爾喀及內部落各蒙古王公皆尊信之, 為佛教大宗。後藏班禪額爾德尼[870], 其名位視達賴喇嘛稍次, 而諸蒙古番人亦崇奉惟謹。此二藏古吐番地。元世祖時, 有八思巴專為帝師, 明成祖時有哈麻立[871]冊為大寶法王, 未嘗待以屬禮也。

863 清稗類鈔 gave the title as 福康平降廓爾喀. It also has many further abbreviations and excerptions based on the 2nd recension. Hence, it is not considered here.
864 <鈔>誤作"涕"
865 <鈔>誤作"霜"
866 <九>=<校>:"呼圖克圖"
867 <九>:"宗喀巴";<校>:"宗喀巴", 刪去"及門"
868 <校>刪一字
869 <九>=<校>;<鈔>:"托"
870 <九>=<校>:"呢", 下俱同
871 <鈔>:"嘛", All versions are incorrect here. It should be "哈立麻".

我朝[872]文皇帝[873]時, 達賴喇嘛知大東有聖人出, 遣使萬里相[874]朝賀, 其後為厄[875]魯特所劫去[876]。聖祖仁皇帝命皇十四子允禵[877]為大將軍, 統兵入藏, 收復其地。擁達賴喇嘛歸, 坐牀於布達拉, 以為綏安蒙古之計。初有[878]番目頗羅鼐以功封王爵[879], 統兩藏事。[880]其子朱爾默特叛事見後卷, 遂不復封王。以藏事統歸達賴喇嘛及班禪管理, 於是, [881]以教主兼國王[882]之事, 尤[883]倚[884]天朝以為重。

有丹津班珠爾者, 本班禪部下頭人, 以罪被黜, 竄入廓爾喀, 結其酋喇特木[885]巴珠爾。復以通商事, 後藏人倚班禪勢不與其[886]值, 遂相結怨。其人[887]突入後藏據之[888], 此乾隆五十三年事也。

純皇帝命川督鄂輝成都將軍成德, 統兵剿之, 又以理藩院侍郎巴忠通諳番人語, 遂命監其軍[889]。巴忠自恃為[890]近臣, 不復為鄂成二人[891]所統屬, 遂[892]自遣番人與廓爾喀講和, 願歲納元寶一千錠以[893]贖其地。廓爾喀欲立券約以[894]為憑[895]信, 時[896]達賴喇嘛以為[897]不可, 而巴忠欲速了其局, 如約而歸。

872 <校>刪一字
873 <九>:“皇帝”作“廟”, 下同
874 <校>“相”改為“來”
875 <九>=<校>:“額”
876 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
877 All but <稗><中> give name in small characters as commentary.
878 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
879 <九>:無“爵”字
880 <校>“厥後”, 刪去“厥”, <九>從之
881 <校>:從“叛”至此刪至“奪爵於是達賴喇嘛及班禪額爾德呢”, <九>從之
882 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
883 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
884 <廣>=<商>:“荷”
885 <天>:“一”
886 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
887 <校>刪, <九>:脱此二字
888 <鈔>誤作“據據”
889 <校>從“通”至此刪作“諳番語命監軍”, <九>從之
890 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
891 <校>刪, <九>脱此二字
892 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
893 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
894 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
895 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
896 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
897 <校>刪, <九>脱此二字

踰年, 廓爾喀頭人索歲[898]幣, 達賴喇嘛吝[899]不與。其[900]有呈進表文, 語不恭順, 復為駐藏大臣匿不以聞。廓爾喀頭人遂劫藏中頭目瑪[901]爾沁以[902]為質, 復構兵入後藏, 擄掠而歸[903]。駐藏大臣保泰擁[904]兵不救, 並欲棄前藏歸, 賴[905]達賴喇嘛不肯輕棄重器以免[906]。

事聞, 上震怒, 巴忠畏罪[907], 投河自斃。乃命褫保泰爵, 改名俘習渾, 國語所謂賤役[908]也。乃[909]命粵督福康安領侍衛內大臣海蘭察為大將軍[910], 統索倫吉[911]林及川陝諸路兵人討之。其糧[912]餉則命大學士孫士毅主藏東路, 駐藏大臣和琳主藏西路, 濟隴以外則惠齡主之。

五十七[913]年春, 福康安[914]由青海路[915]進兵。時青草未茂, 馬皆瘠疲, 糧餉屢絕, 運糧布政使[916]受和珅指, 欲絕其餉, 以令其自斃。賴福康安行走速疾[917], 於[918]四旬至前藏, 以四月乙未出師。

先遣領隊大臣成德、岱森保由聶拉木進, 總兵諸神保駐絨轄, 防其抄襲後路。福康安、海蘭察二人與賊戰於擦木, 戰於瑪爾轄, 直抵濟隴。成德亦由聶拉木轉戰而入。凡賊所侵後藏地悉復。

六月庚{子}[午][919], 遂[920]入賊境, 賊舉國來[921]{據}[拒][922], 於噶多溥。福康安[923]分前隊為三, 令海蘭察[924]統之。又分前隊為二, 福[925]自統之。遣護軍統領台斐英阿, 在木古拉山與

898 <天>:"藏"
899 <校>=<九>脱一字
900 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
901 <鈔>誤作"馮"
902 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
903 <校>刪, <九>脱此二字
904 <鈔>誤作"奏擢"
905 <校>脱"賴"刪, <九>脱此二字
906 <校>刪, <九>脱此二字
907 <天>:"死"
908 <校>=<九>:"卑賤"; <鈔>:"賊役"
909 <校>=<九>:"改"
910 <鈔>誤作"果"
911 <鈔>誤作"言"
912 <校>:"其饋", 刪去"其";<九>從之
913 <天>誤作"一"
914 <校>=<九>:"文襄"
915 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
916 <校>=<九>:錄名"景安"
917 <鈔>:"疾速"
918 <校>刪"以令其自斃。賴福康安行走速疾, 於"作"福行速", <九>從;<天>脱
919 There seems to be no Geng-Zi day in the 6th lunar month. It should be Geng-Wu according to the inscriptions. 21. Jul.
920 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
921 <鈔>誤作"未"
922 <天>, <九>:"拒"
923 <校>"福", <九>"福帥"
924 <校>"海", <九>"海帥"
925 <鈔>誤為"福二"

賊爭[926]持, 福康安[927]由間道衝賊營, 海蘭察[928]又[929]繞山出賊營後, 與福相合勢共[930]克木城、石卡數十。

追奔至雍雅, 俘其頭人某。成德亦克鐵索橋, 進至利底。福康安又檄諸神保亦至利底, 以壯[931]軍威。於是舉國洶懼, 遣人乞降。福康安曰:"是緩我兵也, 弗可聽。[932]"嚴檄斥之。

七月庚子, 裹糧再進, 歷噶勒[933]拉、堆補木, {特}帕朗古橋、甲爾古拉、集木集[934]等處, 七百餘里。凡[935]六戰皆捷, 所[936]殺四千餘人。

至熱索橋, 福康安以為勢如破竹, {且}[旦][937]夕可奏功[938], 甚驕滿, 擁肩輿揮羽扇以[939]戰, 自比武侯也[940]。我兵皆解橐鞬負火槍以休[941]息。賊乘間入, 我兵狼狽而退[942], 台斐英阿死之, 武弁亦[943]多陣亡者。

賊復遣人乞和, 福康安遂允其請。賊獻所掠金瓦寶器等物[944], 令大頭人噶[箕]{木}[945]第[烏]{馬}[946]達特塔巴等賫表恭進馴象番馬及樂工一部。

上鑒其誠, 乃許受[947]降。八月丁亥班師。

是役也, 巴忠[948]既辱國於前, 福康安[949]復僨師於後。猶賴夷人畏葸, 為國家威德所懾, 故爾獻表投誠, 以結其局。後之[950]用兵絕域者, 應引以為戒歟。

926 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
927 <校>=<九>:脱二字, 下俱作"福"
928 <校>=<九>:脱二字
929 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
930 <校>刪"相""勢共", <九>從
931 <鈔>誤為"杜"
932 <校>刪, <九>脱三字
933 <鈔>誤作"勤"
934 <天>脱二字
935 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
936 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
937 All versions have 旦. But it might be actually 旦.
938 <校>刪, <九>脱五字
939 <校>"以督"刪"以", <九>從
940 <校>=<九>脱五字
941 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
942 <校>六字作"我兵遂敗"刪"我兵", <九>從
943 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
944 <校>刪, <九>脱二字
945 It might be actually 箕.
946 It might be actually 烏. From these mistakes, it is very clear that Zhao-lian adapted Zhao Yi.
947 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
948 <校>刪, <九>脱一字
949 <校>"福帥"刪"帥", <九>脱一字
950 <校>從"猶賴"此刪改至"猶賴國家威德, 獻貢投誠", <九>從

2.2.8 Wei Yuan, *Qian-long's Expedition to Gorkha*, 1842/1846

The book *Sheng Wu Ji* (*Accounts for the Noble/Sacred Martial [Enterprises]*) was first published in 1842, revised in 1844, and in 1846 in Yangchow. The information from Yao Ying were added in the 1846 version, and thus, the passage was almost re-written (cp. Mosca 2013, 279). The book was reprinted for many times in 1878, 1881, and 1936 (twice). Modern editions were published in 1970, 1984, and 2011. The edition here is based on the scanned copies of the block-printed versions in 1842 and in 1846 accessed through the c-text project. The 1867 printed version of Yao Ying's work[951] and *The General Chronicle of Sichuan* printed in January 1816 (JQ20/12) are also consulted to verify the quotations. As the text appears to be less lucid but more miscellaneous than the previous ones, subtitles and numberings were added to improve the understanding of the embedded quotations and enable comparisons with the previous historiographies. The blue colour marks the paragraphs that were largely revised in the 1846 edition.

Translation

Qian-long's Expedition to Gorkha

[1 *Basic Information about Tibet and Gorkha*]
Ü-Tsang (Tibet)[952] lies west of Sichuan and Yunnan, while Gorkha is located southwest of Tibet (Lhasa). To the southwest of Gorkha are the Five Indias,[953] the ancient Buddhist countries. The Five Indias are situated southwest of the Pamir Mountains and near the sea. These lands

951 Accessed through https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044068017441&seq=1 on 16 Dec. 2024.

952 Ü-tsang is Tibetan *dBus gTsang*. The former refers to the region centring Lhasa, while the latter centres Shigatse or Saskya. The traditional name in Chinese for Tibet is "West-Tsang" which comes from the latter part of it. "West" was translated from the Manchu term *wargi dzang*. Earlier, Saskya region was the religious and administrative centre of Tibet. Therefore, the region named gTsang became the short form for Tibet in Chinese.

953 In traditional Chinese understandings, India was divided into five parts, East, West, Middle, North, South, based on the monks who went on pilgrimage in Medieval times.

are approximately 2,000 *li* from Tibet. Some[954] mistook Tibet for the ancient Buddhist country, which is incorrect.

Travelling westward a distance of 20 stations from Da-jian lu (Dartsemdo) in the Province of Shu (Sichuan) brings one to the Front of Tibet (i.e., Lhasa). Continuing for 12[955] more leads to the Middle of Tibet. Another 12 more stations lead to the Back of Tibet (Shigatse). After 20 more, one arrives at the bridge of the iron chain[956] (Rasuvāgaḍhī) of Ji-long (Kyirong), the extreme frontier of the Back of Tibet. Westwards beyond the bridge lies Gorkha.[957]

Gorkha used to be the country of Bal-pu (the Newar people), which was formerly divided into [three tribes], namely Ye-leng (Yala/Patan), Bu-yan[958] (Kathmandu), and Ku-[ku]m (Khopva/Bhaktapur). They respectively presented upwards an auspicious memorial on golden leaves to the Emperor [Yong-zheng] in 1731 (YZ9)[959] and paid tributes of their regional products. Later, the three tribes were annexed into one. [Gorkha] thus became the neighbour of Tibet. The territory of Gorkha extends thousands of *li* from the east to the west and more than one thousand *li* from the south to the north. Their hideout is called Yang-bu (Kathmandu). It takes a distance of 11 or 12 days from the [Tibetan] border [to reach Kathmandu]. There are also historical traces of Buddha. The Tangut (Tibetan) people go there annually to revere the *stūpa*s and to whitewash them. Historically, Gorkha was not connected to the Middle Kingdom (i.e., China). Its battles with China started with its invasion of Tibet in 1790 (QL 55).[960]

954 As Wei Yuan's text is an adaptation of Zhao Yi and Zhao-lian, "some" probably referred to them here. Also, Zhou Ai-lian, the assistant of Sun Shi-yi considered Tibet to be India (1804).

955 In 1842 version, it was written as "42".

956 This should be Re-suo Qiao or Shi-su Qiao, which was mistaken as the suspension bridge of iron chain, Tie-suo Qiao (at Nyalam) by Wei Yuan.

957 The numbers of stations are erroneous according to WZTZ, vol. 4. Moreover, Wei's invention of a new term, "the Middle of Tibet", seems to be unclear. The Tibetan name for "the Front of Tibet" is *dbus*, which already means "middle".

958 This should be a mistake of Yan-bu, which originated from the Tibetan name Yam-bu for Kathmandu.

959 According to the quotes from Yao Ying who further quoted *The General Chronicle of Sichuan*, the three kingdoms paid tribute in 1733 (YZ11) instead.

960 This date is problematic. The conflict should be either counted from 1788 or 1791, see below.

[2 *The First Tibeto-Gorkha Conflict: Bajung's Failure*]

First of all, in 1781 (QL 46), th[e] [6th] Panchen Lama of the Back of Tibet (Shigatse) came to the Emperor [Qian-long] for a respectful audience and congratulated him on his 70th birthday.[961] Domestic and foreign donations (corresponding to Sanskrit *dāna*) [to the Panchen Lama] overflowed like oceans and piled up like mountains. The Panchen Lama died in the capital (Peking).[962] [The court] sent his relics back to Tibet along with properties. The fortunes were held by his elder brother Zhong-ba Hutuktu (Drung pa *alias Phyag mdzod,* "treasurer" of the Tashilhunpo Temple). Drung pa made no donations to the temples or the Tibetan troops. Furthermore, he rejected his younger brother Shamarpa due to his Red Religion[963] and refused to share the grace [i.e., the treasures]. Therefore, Shamarpa angrily turned toward Gorkha and falsely accused[964] the Back of Tibet of accumulating wealth and Drung pa of dictatorship and extravagance. He provoked Gorkha to invade and plunder [the Tashilhunpo Temple].[965]

In April/May 1790 (QL 55/3),[966] Gorkha found pretexts that the commercial taxes increased and that the Tibetan salt [sold to them] was mixed with clay. They thus mobilised troops and crossed the frontier. The Tibetan troops could not defend themselves. The imperial guard (Mnc. *hiya*), Bajung, was despatched by the court to assist [Tibet] and annihilate [the enemy] along with Generals Ohūi and Cengde. They tried to bring an end to the event by bribing peace. They secretly

961 The Tibetan term for it is *mtshams zhu* "regard on health"/"congratulation", which was later adopted by the Gorkha as well, according to Tenzin Peljor (TP 646–47, 858, 861).

962 On the way back, the relics of the Panchen also received enormous donations from the Mongolian people (Turner 1800, 473).

963 This is incorrect. Shamarpa is Kagyu (the White-clad Religion) instead of Nyinga (the Red-clad Religion). He is understood as the red-hat lama but not the red-religion lama. The sixth Panchen, Drung-pa, and Shamarpa ("Sum-hur") were born to the same mother (probably Nyi-zla-dbang-mo) from an aristocratic family (Macartney and Staunton 1797, 52; Huber 2008, 408n4). Drung-pa was the elder brother (*phu-bo*) (PC6 846).

964 The Chinese word 愬 (*su*) here might have multiple meaning. It might mean "report", "accuse", "falsely accuse", and "turn toward".

965 The source of this paragraph seems to be the Jehol inscription of Qian-long Emperor (*Poem on the event of the Tashilhunpo Temple* 扎什倫布廟誌事 written by the Emperor in the replica of Tashilhunpo Temple at Jehol, in KRLJL, *Poems by the Emperor*, part 1, 18–20; Zhang 1988, 465–66), which might also be found in his anthology of poems.

966 The episode referred to the conflict in 1788–1789. Hence, the date was incorrect. The outbreak of the Gorkha invasion was on around July 1788 (QL 53/6) (BLBJL, vol. 1, QL 53/7/23).

ordered the Tibetan Khenpo (Tib. mKhan po) to privately promise an annual payment of 15000 ingots while holding the army from battle. At that time, the Dalai Lama did not agree.[967] However, Bajung polished his memorial, saying the enemy had surrendered.[968] [Bajung and others] tactfully persuaded the Gorkha tribal chieftain to pay tribute and be conferred the title of [Erdeni] King.[969] For this campaign, not even one weapon was involved in a battle, whereas provisions cost millions [of ingots]. In August/September [1789] (QL[54]/7),[970] Gorkha despatched an envoy to Tibet to present their auspicious letter and tribute. They also sent a letter to the amban residing in Lhasa, asking him to follow the treaty [of Kyirong]. Ohūi feared that the previous event [of bribing peace] might be unveiled. He thus held the letter from memorialisation.

[3.1 *The Outbreak of the War*]
In the next year [1791][971], Tibet again disobeyed the treaty of annual payment. Therefore, Gorkha further entered deeply into the Back of Tibet, justifying it as a punishment for the irresponsibility [of Tibet in their failure to pay the ingots].

[3.1* *Strategical Reflections (quoted from Sungyūn)*]
Southwest to Tashilhunpo, there are Qu-duo (Tserdo = Tib. mTsher tho = present day Ciduo Village) and Jiang-gong (Jagong = Tib. Bya gong = present day Qianggong Village) on the left [i.e., southern] side and Mount Peng-cuo (Tagten Phüntshog Ling = Tib. Phun tshogs gling) on the right [i.e., northern] side.[972] Cliffs and mountains there are nat-

967 In fact, Dalai Lama agreed and gave blessings to the negotiators (DL8 291).
968 The 1842 version has "immediately begged for capitulation", rendered by "had surrendered" here.
969 The title given in the imperial edict was Erdeni Wang, "Precious King", different from the common princely titles given to the Mongolian leaders (BLBJL, vol. 26, "concluding edict"). The 1842 version has "because of this [invasion into Tibet without Chinese interference], Gorkha belittled the inner land [of China]", deleted here.
970 It was meant here 1790 (QL 55) according to his context. However, the previous date was incorrect, leading to a further mistake here. The date is now supplemented according to. The arrival date of the first envoy at Tashilhunpo was 4 September 1789 (QL 54/7/15) (BLBJL, vol. 24, QL 54/8/17). They were led by Yan Ting-liang, a military officer.
971 As the previous paragraph was on 1790 in Wei's conception, "the next year" would probably refer to 1791.
972 When one stands at Tashilhunpo, facing the direction of the Gorkha invasion, the right-hand points to the northwest, while the left-hand points to the

ural strongholds like [narrow] gorges. The enemy had thousands of infantrymen from Nyalam [during the 1791 invasion]. If the foreign (i.e., Tibetan) and Chinese officers and troops had been divided into two groups, one holding Tserdo and Jagong confronting them [on the major way between Nyalam and Shigatse], the other detouring to Phun tshogs gling to cut their [minor way] behind, Gorkha would have been deep in [the realm] without aids, defeated without any battle.[973]

[3.2 *Failures of the Ambans*]

As soon as the amban residing in Lhasa, Bootai, heard of the enemy's arrival, he moved the Panchen to the Front of Tibet (i.e. Lhasa). He exaggerated the power of the enemy and requested to move the Dalai to Xining (= Tib. Zi ling, by the Kokonor lake) and Panchen to Tai-ning (= Tib. mGar thar, in Sichuan) in memorials,[974] intending to leave the Tibetan territory to the enemy.

Moreover, the Tashilhunpo Temple is backed by a mountain facing the river. Its terrain is firm and precipitous. The thousands of lamas could have used the high walls [of the temple] to defend and wait for the aids. However, Drung pa Hutuktu carried the properties and ran away in advance. Furthermore, there were two lamas, Ji-zhong (Tib. *rTse drung* "monastic government official") and Zha-cang (Tib. *Grwa tshang* "learned monk in the academy") [in the Tashilhunpo Temple]. They did divination [in front of the goddess,] Palden Lhamo (Tib. dPal ldan Lha mo, the tantric wrathful form of Śrīdēvī). [The Goddess] declared the inappropriateness of fighting [with the enemy]. They took it as an excuse [to avoid defensing] and ruined the confidence of the masses. [975] The enemy robbed the Tashilhunpo Temple severely. The entire Tibet was shaken.

southwest. The place names can be found in Sungyūn's map (1966, 28–30, map 7). Brunnert mistook Qu-duo and Jiang-gong for one place. In fact, they are two places on the way from Saskya to Shigatse.

973 The geographical account was quoted from Sungyūn (cp. Wu 1985, 111). Sungyūn meant to say that there were only two ways from Nyalam to Saskya and further to Shigatse, one through Jagong, and the other through Phüntshog Ling. If the two passes were cut off, the Gokrhā could not have retreated.

974 The 1842 version has only "move the Dalai and the Panchen to Xining".

975 This was reported by Bootai and Yamantai in their memorial received on 1 November 1791 (KRKJL, vol. 4, QL 56/11/1). It was said that Drung pa ran away on 16 September 1791 (QL 56/8/19). On the next day the enemy arrived. Two lamas, rTse drung and mKhan po, did divination in front of Palden Lhamo and decided not to fight. Therefore, the lamas ran away, leaving

The two great lamas [i.e., the Dalai and the Panchen] quickly sent memorials to report the emergencies. By then, the imperial guard, Bajung, was escorting the imperial carriage at. Upon hearing the incident, he drowned himself to death in fear of a sentence. Meanwhile, Ohūi served as the Governor-General of Sichuan, while Cengde was the General of Sichuan[976]. They thus blamed all crimes on Bajung, claiming that because [only] Bajung knew the Tibetan language, all private negotiations were done by him alone. The two [allege] that they did not know [about the previous event of annual payment]. They followed the order to annihilate [the enemy] in defence but restrained their speed according to the stations and marched slowly.

[3.3 *Preparation for Expedition*]

The Emperor knew that both [Ohūi and Cengde] were unreliable. He thus ordered the Duke of Auspicious Courage, Fuk'anggan as the General and the Duke of Extraordinary Courage, Hailanca as the counsellor (Mnc. *hebei amban*). He assembled the Manchu and Solon soldiers, as well as the stationed local foreign troops. They were ordered to prepare for a punitive expedition. Sun Shiyi, the Grand Secretary (Mnc. *ashan bithei da*) was tasked with the army provisions along the eastern Tibetan routes. Heliyen, the amban residing in Tibet, oversaw [the provisions] along the western Tibetan routes. Hui-ling was responsible for the routes beyond Kyirong. He ordered Bootai to wear a wooden collar in front of the army.

He ordered the great troops to march via the Kokonor steppes towards Tibet, which was 30 stages [journey] less than the route from Dartsedo in Sichuan. The enemy habituated the previous "campaign" when bribed for peace [last time]. [They were thus fearless,] carrying all the booties back to their country. A thousand [Gorkha] soldiers were stationed by the border without leaving. [977]

Ohūi and Cengde, holding 4,000 soldiers, did not attack those [slowly escaping] enemies who were loaded [with booties]. Nor did they attack the rest [who were stationed in the Tibetan territory].

Tashilhunpo to the enemy who entered on 18 September 1791(QL 56/8/21). However, the Shigatse stockade, guarded by Xu Nan-peng, remained intact.

976 In fact, Cengde was the General of Chengdu. There was no General of Sichuan in Qianlong's reign. The establishment of General of Chengdu was in 1776 for the Jinchuan campaign.

977 The 1842 version reads "Half carried the booties back, while half were stationed around the border."

They merely captured the stockade of Nyalam and slayed more than 100 enemies. [They] thus reported the enemy's retreat and intended to bring the event to an end, not even speaking of the enemy at Kyirong and Rongshar. The Emperor rejected[978] and did not tolerate this.

[4.1 *Reclaiming Tibet*]

In February/March 1792 (QL 57/2),[979] the General [, Fuk'anggan,] and Counsellor [, Hailanca,] arrived in the Back of Tibet (i.e., Shigatse). In May/June 1792 (QL 57/intercalary 4), the 2,000 mobilised Solon soldiers and 5,000 local stationed soldiers from Jinchuan (i.e. rGyal rong region) had assembled, as well as 3,000 official soldiers in Tibet. In total, they bought 70,000 buckets of [highland] barley and wheat, 20,000 sheep and bovines, which would be enough for a year's consumption for thousands of people, saving the trouble of transporting from the inner land. In June/July (QL 57/5),[980] the army went on defeating the enemy stationed around the border and reclaimed the entire Tibetan territory.

[4.2 *Entering Nepal*]

By the end of July 1792 (QL 57/6 beginning), [our army] entered deeply. In fear of the enemy circumventing to attack their way back, [Fuk'anggan] despatched the troop-leading ambans, Cengde and Dai-sen-bao, as well as chief military officer Zhu-shen-bao (Jušenboo). They were ordered respectively to lead their groups on the east and the west sides in order to distract the enemy forces.[981] Meanwhile, the main army went head-on.

978 The 1842 version gives 切責, which means "severely reproached", whereas in the 1846 version, 斥 "reject" was used.

979 Literally, it reads "the second lunar month of the next year". As the previous episode happened in 1791, this must be 1792. Moreover, the year had an intercalary month between the fourth and the fifth lunar month, as was indicated by Wei in the next sentence. It can be ascertained that Wei meant to say 1792 here. In addition, the exact date of Fuk'anggan's arrival at Tashilhunpo would be 21 March (QL 57/2/29), according to the memorial (KRKJL, vol. 26, QL 57/4/3).

980 The entire shaded paragraph was not in the 1842 version. It only gives the date when Fuk'anggan reclaimed the Tibetan territory, which was an incorrect date, i.e., "April/May 1792 (QL 57/4)". Fuk'anggan just started marching from Tingri by then. He started marching on 16 June 1792 (QL 57/intercalary4/27).

981 Literally, it was written as "the left and the right routes", which was ambiguous. If we took Fuk'anggan's route as the middle way, there should not be a route on the right-hand side, i.e., the west side. Given Zhao-lian's account, which was consulted by Wei (cp. Wei 1846, vol. 3), Jušenboo was guarding Ronghar, while the other two were in charge of marching via Nyalam. Both

Hailanca commanded three detachments as the front band, while Fuk'anggan commanded two detachments that followed.

80 *li* away from Kyirong was Rasuvāgaḍhī, the first checkpoint into the realm of the enemy. The enemy broke the bridge, using nature as their stronghold. Fuk'anggan was locked in a stalemate with the enemy, while Hailanca secretly marched upstream [probably sKyid grong gTsang po or Lende Kholā, the two tributes of the Trishuli river], where he crossed the river by rafts. Hailanca detoured behind through the mountains and appeared above the enemy camp. Fuk'anggan took the chance to build a bridge and grab the pass. They together attacked the enemy's camp. They chased 160 *li* to annihilate the enemy up to Xie-blu (Syāphrū). There was no place to camp on the way, hence no enemy.[982]

After more than 100 *li* toward Mount Dhunce, there were cliffs on both sides with an east-westward deep river in the middle, flowing rapidly. Our troops marched along the route sideways. The perils equalled that at Rasuvāgaḍhī, etc. They took the chance of darkness and rain at night, divided the troops upstream and downstream, used a dead tree near the river to build a bridge, and finally grasped the stronghold.[983]

On 27 July 1792 (QL 57/6/9),[984] they reached Mount Rāmche. Gorkha was shaken and frightened.[985] They despatched the embassy to

are on the east, i.e., the left side, whereas Fuk'anggan took the Kyirong route, to the west of them. The division of the army into the Kyirong and the Nyalam routes can also be verified by the quotations from Bahādura Śāha in Tibetan source (TP 860–61). Wei might have not understood the geography, taking Rongshar, Nyalam respectively to the east and west of Kyirong, therefore formulating it as "the left and the right routes".

982 This was probably Wei's inference based on Zhao Yi's text, in which Yu Jue said there was a mountain to be crossed within a day. The paragraph would be quoted again later in Wei's text.

983 The 1842 version quotes Zhao Yi or Zhao-lian with some deletion here: "The enemy occupied Mount Mu-gu-la (= Zu-mu-gu-la-ba-zai in Potala Inscription), taking the river as a natural stronghold of defence. The General despatched the Adjutant of Guard Troops (Mnc. *bayarai tui janggin*), [named] Taifingga, to engage the enemy. Hailanca manoeuvered around the mountain and appeared above the enemy camp. Fuk'anggan launched an assault against the enemy camp via an intermediate route [i.e., shortcut]. They together conquered dozens of wooden fortresses and stone passes."

984 Wei might have drawn the date from the text of the Potala inscription or some other documents, as both Zhao Yi and Zhao-lian did not specify the arrival date.

985 The 1842 version quotes Zhao Yi or Zhao-lian with some deletion here: "After chasing the enemy to Yong-ya (Ramche), Cengde also captured the iron chain bridge and arrived at Li-ti (Listi). The entire country of Gorkha was shaken

the front of the army to beg for a surrender, whereas the General and the Counsellor seriously announced a summon of rebuttal against it.

Without reply [from Gorkha] for days, they further marched and attacked in three routes.[986] They had six battles[987] and thus six victories, crossing over two great mountains, killing 4,000 enemies. [They covered] the distance of more than 700 *li*, approaching the place of their state capital, Kathmandu.

[4.3 *The Betrāvatī Battle*]

Before here, the mountains featured on the east and west sides, with the river in the middle [running from north to south]. From Rāmche onward, the mountains were on the south and north sides, with the river in the middle [running east and west]. The enemy occupied the two mountains in defence, with one bridge crossing in the middle. In the latter half of September 1792 (QL 57/8 beginning), our army, in three ways, attacked and held the mountain on the north bank of the river. They defeated the enemy at the north of the bridge. The great mountain on the southern bank of the river extends tens of *li*, behind which their state capital is situaed.[988] The enemy stationed around the mountains in ten camps, where the defence was firm.[989]

Hailanca wished to establish a camp, guarding the river [against the enemy above them], whereas Fuk'anggan rejected and crossed the bridge to launch an attack. He climbed up the mountain for more than 20 *li* distance against the rain. When he arrived at the extremely steep and isolated place, the enemy took advantage of their altitude and poured down wood and stones. The enemy started their attack via three routes, crossing the river and climbing over the [two] mountains. Our troops fought while retreating, suffering from quantitative injuries and death. It was Hailanca who supported the army across the river.

and frightened". The deletion showed that Wei might have not understood the geography of the borderland clearly. He was confused between the Nyalam route and the Kyirong route.

986 The 1842 version gives "They marched further in August/September 1792 (QL 57/7)." "Three route" in the 1846 version must have been again Wei's misunderstanding of the geography.

987 Officially, the six battles were remembered as Jiamu, Maga, Kyirong, Rasuvā, Syphrū, and Dhunce, which were all before the further march toward Betrāvatī (cp. Potala inscription). Wei might have misunderstood Zhao Yi and Zhao-lian's texts, taking 凡 as a reference for "afterwards", instead of "in total".

988 The 1842 version has only "There were mountains across the river".

989 The 1842 version has "They guarded the river. The mountains were extremely steep and isolated, behind which situated their state capital".

Eldemboo who controlled the bridge and fought courageously. Therefore, the enemy retreated.[990]

[4.4 *Foreign Interference*][991]

At that moment, the southern neighbour [of Gorkha], in the place of India, there was a place named Pi-leng (Tib. Phe rang < Persian Firingī > Feringhee)[992] which had long been a subordinate state of Ying-ji-li (English). They accumulated conflicts with the Gorkha barbarians.[993] When Fuk'anggan marched forward, he urged those neighbours of the Gorkha barbarians, including Zhe-meng-xiong (Sikkim = Tib. 'Bras mo gshongs), Zong-mu (Tib. Gro mo),[994] and Bluk-[ba] (Bhutan = Tib. 'Brug pa) in the southeast, as wells as Zuom-lang (Jumla = Tib. Jum lang) in the west, Jia-gar (Bengal = Tib. rGya gar) and Feringhee in the south to attack at the same time. He promised that the Gorkha territory was to be divided and distributed after the incident.[995] Then, the Gorkha barbarians turned for aid to the Feringhee. The Feringhee pretended to transport their battleships for aid but secretly made aggression into the borderlands.[996]

990 The 1842 version has "Fuk'anggan wished to attack by crossing the river, while Hailanca arduously held the opposite opinion. Fuk'anggan drew troops to cross the bridge and attack upward on his own, which proved to be unsuccessful. It was because of Hailanca's support that the enemy retreated."

991 Feng 1996 and Gao 1998 refuted this paragraph. It was totally fake news. Mosca 2013 analysed the reason why Wei misled his readers (290).

992 Cp. Laufer 1916 no. 141; Petech 1950b, 334–35 n. 5; Mosca 2013; Atwill 2014. The term was used for many things. It might refer to the British people in India, the government of British India in Kolkata, India in general, and the city of Kolkata.

993 夷 (*yi*) was translated as "barbarians" here. For the intricacies of this word, cp. Wong 2013.

994 Satō 1986 considers it to be Gro mo (694).

995 Fuk'anggan reported that Jumla was attacking Gorkha at the same time in his memorial received on 6 April 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 24, QL 57/3/15). Fuk'anggan was criticised by the Emperor for summoning the neighbouring tribes in the imperial edicts on 31 March and 5 May 1792 (KRKJL, vol. 23, QL 57/3/9 and 4/15). The Emperor worried that the other tribes would either be bullied by Gorkha or capture Kathmandu and waste the effort of sending imperial troops.

996 The 1842 version has "Upon hearing that the Gorkhali barbarians were afflicted by the troops from China, they also mobilised troops to attack the borders." For the British perspective on their own role, see also Macartney and Staunton 1797, 57.

[5 *The Surrender of Gorkha*]

Faced with two powerful enemies, the Gorkha barbarians were surging with fear, out of strategy. They were also afraid that our army might be encouraged upon hearing [the news of approaching the capital]. They despatched somebody for the second time in front of [our] army to beg for compassion in humble words. By that time, our army just encountered a failure.[997] The realms of the enemy were more and more perilous, while after October 1792 (QL 57/8) the snow would block the mountains, resulting in difficulties to return. Their capitulation was approved. They handed over the previously established treaties, the robbed Tibetan treasures and gems, the golden head of the *stūpa* [of the Panchen Lama], and the golden plates and the seal [which was given as the imperial inauguration of the Panchen Lama by the Emperor]. They returned the previously abducted Tenzin Peljor, etc. and handed over the corpse of Shamarpa. They paid tributes of tamed elephants, foreign horses, and musicians. They plead to follow [our] restrictions.

[Our] troops retreated. The Emperor planned to divide the land,[998] distribute and give it to the local chieftains (Tu-si = Tib. Tho'u si = Mnc. *aiman-i hafan*) and reward Fuk'anggan with the title of Jun-wang (Tib. Jun wang = Mnc. Giyūn wang, "the king of a county")[999]. Upon hearing that Fuk'anggan had received their capitulation, the Emperor approved the request.[1000] Three thousand foreign soldiers, as well as 1,000 Han-Chinese and Mongol soldiers, were stationed to guard Tibet,

997 The 1842 version has "The General and Counsellor discussed that the army should not stand longer because the further perils in the realm of the enemy. Moreover, as the snow would block the mountains, the army should not be exhausted."

998 The 1842 version has "after the pacification of the incident", deleted here.

999 Cp. KRKJL, vol. 45, QL 57/10/17. The Emperor said that if Gorkha were annihilated by Fuk'anggan, he would grant a princely title to him, which would not be auspicious for his future generations given the excessiveness because he was not from the House of Aisin Gioro that monopolised princely titles. Therefore, the Emperor concluded that it was better that Fuk'anggan did not reach Kathmandu.

1000 It should be noticed that in the Potala inscription, the Emperor used 准 (*zhun*) "authorise", while Zhao Yi and Zhao-lian used 許 (*xu*) "acknowledge", "tolerate", etc. Here, Wei used 允 (*yun*) "approve", "permit", etc. The difference in their overtones is significant, as the Emperor used the strongest term to assert his absolute authority, whereas the truth was Fuk'anggan already accepted the "surrender" and the Emperor was only to grant his permission upon Fuk'anggan's request.

which became the beginning of [imperial] official troops stationed in Tibet.[1001]

[6 *Comments on the Hardships*]

From the Back of Tibet (Shigatse) to Gorkha, there is a large route via Ding-jie (Dinggyê/Tib. gTing skyes). One has to detour via Bhutan and other tribes. The detour takes more than a month. Therefore, our army entered through the closer way via Kyirong.[1002] There are cliffs on the left and rapid streams on the right. Even two horses cannot be side by side. The General and the Counsellor also marched on foot from time to time.[1003] Therefore, the elephants presented by them as tribute detoured the large route and arrived at the Front Tibet (Lhasa) in the spring of the following year (1793, QL 58).[1004]

Moreover, there is a mountain, approximately 120 *li* with ups and downs. One has to cross it by exhausting the effort within a day. If it becomes slightly late, the darkness of night makes it impossible for one to find the way. There are also snow-cities as the gates and the caves, tens of *zhang*s (1 *zhang* = ca. 3.5 m) in depth. People come and go but dare not to speak. Otherwise, there will always be some heaps of snow as large as houses falling and wrapping him/her to death.[1005]

When Gorkha invaded and plundered Tibet, 2,000 people who [tried to] transport the booties back to the country were frozen to death while crossing a mountain.[1006] This must be the southern ridge of Pamir,[1007] which was set by Heavens to determine [the border of] the

1001 This is definitely incorrect considering the Chinese sources. The beginning of Chinese imperial troops in Tibet was in 1751, according to the "13-Article Ordinance for the More Effective Governing of Tibet" after the Gyur med rNam rgyal revolt. By the time of the Gorkha invasion, there had already been several Chinese military officers in the Back of Tibet, such as Wang Gang who was abducted together with Tenzin Peljor and Xu Nan-peng who defeated Gorkha beside Tashilhunpo.

1002 The 1842 version has "There is traditionally a large route, which was tightly guarded by the enemy. Therefore, our army found an extremely steep short-cut", which seems closer to Zhao Yi's original.

1003 This is an adaptaion from Zhao Yi's report of Yu Jue's experience. The words are almost identical despite some abbreviations.

1004 The 1842 version has "[The elephants] could not make their way".

1005 The paragraph was quoted from Zhao Yi.

1006 According to Sungyūn (1966, 24–26, 6), it is Mt. Xia-wu-la. The narration can be found in the letters between Fuk'anggan and Gorkha Mahārāja (WZTZ 1896, vol. 13.3, 9–13; WZTZ 1982, 422–24).

1007 The conceptualisation of the geographical details reveals Wei's ignorance of the actual landscape. Pamir lies northwest to Tibet, whereas Gorkha were

Middle [Kingdom] and the West. It is much more perilous than Jinchuan and much further than the Islamic tribes [in Middle Asia]. Even the Han and the Tang Dynasties could not extend their military power thus far. It was fortunate that the soldiers of Gorkha were all [fighting] barefoot.[1008] They often set a date first and then fight. Our army disregarded it. Thus, they always mobilised first and caught them off. They were often taken advantage of by us without defence.[1009] Ever since such a great wound, they still pay tribute unendingly till now (1846).

[7 *Conflicts Between British India and Gorkha*]

Gorkha neighbours Kesh-mir (Kashmir) of North India to the west. To their south is Bengal, which is called Bang-ga-la or Meng-jia-la in the *History of Ming*. [Bengal] has long been subordinated to the English in the Western Ocean (Atlantic Ocean). The capital city is Feringhee, or Gal-gada (Kolkata).[1010] When the English ambassador [George Macartney] came to pay tribute in 1795 (QL 60), he said that years ago, when General [Fuk'anggan] commanded troops to the Di-mi tribe (i.e., Nepal] southwest of Tibet, the battleships from their country also assisted. [He also said] if the Western troops were needed later, they were willing to contribute. Thus, the court realised that in the previous Gorkha campaign, Gorkha had border urgencies and external threats on its southern borders.[1011]

When the English barbarians invaded and plundered Canton and Zhejiang in 1840, Gorkha despatched somebody to make a petition to the amban residing in Lhasa [Mengbao,] saying that "our small country neighbours the place of Feringhee, which is subordinate to Li-di (the British), constantly being invaded by them. Now I heard that the British are battling with the subordinates of Peking. The subordinates of Peking often win. As your officer, [I] desire to command what I manage. I desire to attack the subordinates of the British to assist

frozen to death in the Tong-la mountain pass around Nyalam, which was Mt. Xia-wu-la according to Sungyūn.

1008 The 1842 version has one more sentence, "They follow the ancient methods whenever there is a battle."

1009 This paragraph was quoted from Zhao Yi.

1010 The 1842 version has "Their country neighbours the Five Indias to its southwest. The southern sea is named the Indian Ocean. Recently, states such as Bengal and Mumbai have become subordinates of the English in the Western Ocean (Atlantic Ocean)."

1011 Cp. Macartney and Staunton 1797.

the punitive expedition of [the] Heavenly [Dynasty].”[1012] By then, the amban residing in Lhasa did not know that British is English. What they called “the subordinates of Peking” is the Canton Province in China. What they called the subordinates of the British[1013] is Bengal of East India[1014]. [The amban] replied, “The mutual attack between two small countries for a minor interest is never questioned by the Heavenly Dynasty.” He thus refused. Although the state capital of the English is remote beyond the Atlantic Ocean, their subordinate state, India, shares borders with Gorkha. They had generations of enmity and fought for conflicts. Therefore, when we attacked Gorkha, the English barbarians took the chance. When we attacked the English, the Gorkha barbarians also desired to assist, etc.

[8 *Wei Yuan's Suggestions*][1015]

The officer Yuan says,

“Gorkha shares a border with Tibet and East India[1016], maintaining itself amidst two powerful rivals[1017]. But they internally pay tribute to China instead of to the Indian barbarians.[1018] Recently, the English barbarians had battles with Russia in the West[1019] and had conflicts with China in the East (i.e., the First Opium War). Therefore, Gorkha wanted to take advantage of the power of the two great states to attack India, etc. India produces opium, which annually yields a number of customs, adding up to 80,000,000 [silver coins]. When the battleships [of the English] invaded China, 90% were people from Bengal. If only we could grant permission to the request of sending troops from the Gorkha barbarians,

1012 The source here might be Mengbao's *Memorials on Tibet* 西藏奏疏, vol. 3 *Summons and Instruction to the Gorkha King* 檄諭廓爾喀王, which printed memorials related to the request of Gorkha and Mengbao's rejection according to the imperial statutes.

1013 The 1842 version has “Li-di”, which means the British.

1014 The 1842 version has “India”.

1015 In traditional Chinese historiography, after the narration of an event or a biography often comes a suggestion, an epilogue, or comments from the historiographer. Here, Wei made his suggestions on “using the barbarians to attack the barbarians”. Such an epilogue is essential for understanding the text, as it reveals the historiographer's judgement and intention, which is often conveyed subtly in the main text.

1016 The 1842 version has “Russia”. This was corrected in the later version because of Yao Ying's information (Mosca 2013, 279).

1017 The 1842 version has “great states”.

1018 The 1842 version has “Therefore, they pay tribute both internally to China and also to Russia”.

1019 This probably referred to the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1838–1842.

award its loyalty and obedience, disturb the fertile territory [of the British], attack the emptiness, impede their internal aspects, cause the Western barbarians to lose their enterprises of fortune and power, and thus become in collusion [with Gorkha]. Gorkha would make a rare contribution [to the Heavenly Dynasty] beyond the oceans.

Russian territory has an extension of 20,000 *li*s, sharing a border with China at both its beginning and end. It has a vast territory and powerful troops, which frightens Western barbarians. The trade between Russia and us has only overland routes but not maritime ones, whereas the English barbarians' trade with us has only maritime routes instead of land. Recently, Russia and the English barbarians were contesting over the land of Da-da-li (Afghanistan). Russia [intended to] expand itself to the southern sea (Indian Ocean). If Russia attains it, it can plan to annex India. Therefore, they fought fiercely with the English barbarians continuously for years.

> [Auto-commentary by Wei Yuan:] In 1727 (YZ5),[1020] Russia attacked Wu-lu-mu 5,000 *li* southwest of Tibet[1021], where people preferred Buddhism and despatched people to China to learn Lamaism. It must be somewhere near Gorkha.

If we could permit Russian ships to trade in Canton while contacting America and France, who are also enemies and rivals of the English barbarians, the battleships of the English barbarians would not dare to leave their realm and invade China from afar.[1022]

> [Auto-commentary by Wei Yuan:] There are only one hundred large battleships of the English barbarians in India, half of which invaded and robbed China, whereas all others guarded the territories respectively without leaving in case other countries could take advantage of such emptiness.

1020 The date probably referred to the Treaty of Kyakhta.

1021 There could not be any territory southwest to Tibet in such a distance which adhered to Tibetan Buddhism and became annexed by Russia. Supposedly, this referred to the Mongolian territory north to Tibet, e.g., Uriankhai.

1022 The part is also found in *Hai-guo Tu-zhi* (*Atlas and description of the countries beyond the seas*) (Wei 1871, vol. 2). It was based on Lin Ze-xu's information, translated from English newspapers and books gathered in Macau.

Using one barbarian to attack another barbarian is effective. However, it might be regarded by the short-sighted as a circuitous strategy. Between the reigns of Qian-long and Jia-qing (i.e. the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century), it was by conferring the title to [the ruler of] Siam (Thailand) that sufficed to restrict Myanmar in the west and An-nam (Đại Việt) in the east. Skilful chess players might use an intermediate step to bring life to the entire game, let alone [the Heavenly Dynasty]. [We] can stay in the Middle Kingdom and control the externals, restricting the barbarians that [had their own] conflicts and rivals in their four directions.

[9] Appendix: *The Travel of the Light Wagon Kang* [all by Yao Ying[1023] around 1845][1024]

[9.1 *Three Notes on Gorkha and Feringhee*][1025]

[9.1a *Conflicts Between British India and Gorkha*]

Tian-zhu (Hindu) or Shen-du (Sindhu) is the ancient countries of the Five Indias. It takes month's travel westward from the Back of Tibet. Gorkha lies south of the Back of Tibet. Feringhee is the name of a seaport beyond a small sea in the west. That seaport is East India. There is a coastal place named Meng-jia-la (Bengal), which is to the south of Feringhee. In the *History of Ming,* it was called Bang-ga-la. Originally, it belonged to East India but was occupied by the English. The English tempted Feringhee (Indians) with interests to subjugate it. China did not know that Bengal was the frontier port occupied by the English. It was just known as Delhi Bādśāha(i.e., the ruler of Delhi, Chin. Di-li-ba-ca).[1026] Since the English had occupied the place and

1023 Yao, as an officer stationed in Taiwan, was involved in the Nerbudda incident during the First Opium War (see Mosca 2013, ch. 7). After the war, he was "exiled" to Tibet and gathered information there. He wrote the book *The Travel of the Light Wagon Kang.* The book existed in manuscripts till its printed version in 1867. Wei Yuan here cited the related passages in Yao's book on Gorkha. The following numberings were done by XY, according to Yao's book in its 1867 printed version.

1024 In the 1846 version, Wei added appendices to each volume, citing the works that he consulted, including Zhao-lian's book and here Yao Ying's notes. Although Wei had integrated some information into the main text, the original quotations are still valuable as they appear to be the source of Wei's knowledge.

1025 This title was given in Yao Ying's book.

1026 Cp. Mosca 2013, 62.

tempted Feringhee (Indians) to be its subordinate, it tempted again the neighbouring places to be its subordinates.

In 1792 (QL 57), Gorkha invaded the Back of Tibet and demanded assistance from British India. The tribal chieftain Guor-nar (= Governor,[1027] i.e., Charles Cornwallis) refused by saying that his fellow country people were trading in Canton Province, well treated by the Heavenly Dynasty.[1028] As Gorkha was pacified and conquered by the great troops, dissatisfaction grew between British India, Feringhee (Indians), and it. In 1839 (DG19), they requested Tibet for provisions to attack Feringhee, which was not permitted. By then, the English were already as greedy and ferocious as a falcon opening its wings [and craving for its games]. The English intended to annex Gorkha and thus peep into Tibet.

The inaugural wife and the secondary wife of the Gorkha King (Rājendra Vikrama Śāha)[1029], respectively, gave birth to young sons. The secondary wife (Rājyalakṣmī Devī) enjoyed the favour. The inaugural wife (Sāmrājya Lakṣmī Devī) feared that her own son could not be coronated. She ordered people to poison the secondary wife's son when he was ill. There was a minister, Bi-xing (Bhīmasena Thāpā), serving as the great *kājī*, the most noble official. When the King investigated the crime of homicide by poison, the criminal complaint implicated Bhīmasena Thāpā. The King killed him. His nephew Ma-da-ba-xing (Māthavarasiṃha Thāpā) ran to Feringhee. In 1840 (DG20),[1030] when the two *kājī,* who were the tributary ambassadors [to Peking], were not yet back from their mission, Māthavarasiṃha came back to abolish the King and establish the son of the inaugural wife, with the assistance of Feringhee. He killed all those involved in the trial of Bhīmasena Thāpā. The two tributary ambassadors were in association. Their family properties were thus confiscated. The two ambassadors

1027 Rockhill 1910, 59 n 1.

1028 This might be quoted from Fuk'anggan's memorial in 1793 (KRKJL, vol. 51, QL 58/3/8).

1029 The Chinese name for him was Re-zundr Bi-kr-ma Sa-ye 熱尊達爾畢噶爾瑪薩野. Cp. 《宮中檔奏摺-道光朝》, 關聖保、訥爾經額 奏,〈奏報接待廓爾喀貢使〉, 道光18年09月19日, 故宮107949 號, 頁 *2*, 國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統.

1030 The date is incorrect. The return of the two ambassadors was in 1843. It was the 1842 mission led by Jagat Bam Pande (Manandhar 1986, 26). The Chinese name for him was Za-gad Bam Bang-zhe 褚噶達拔蒙幫哲 (Mengbao 1840s, vol. 3, 12). Cp.《宮中檔奏摺-道光朝》, 寶興 奏,〈為委員護送廓爾喀貢使自省起程進京奏祈聖鑒 (附件:奏章嘉呼圖克圖赴藏看視達賴喇嘛坐床事)〉, 道光22年10月27日, 故宮113035 號, 頁 *1* , 國立故宮博物院 ⋈ 清代檔案檢索系統.

heard the incident on their way back to Tibet. They dared not to go back and ran into Feringhee in the middle of their way.

Earlier, Feringhee sent a gift of a firmly locked wooden box to the Gorkha King, saying that all in it were treasures and gems to be opened by the King himself. The ministers doubted that it was a conspiracy. They ordered a prisoner to open it in an open space. The bomb blasted [from that wooden box] and killed the prisoner. Thus, Gorkha had even more grudges against the Feringhee.

Upon the English incident in Canton, the Gorkha ambassador told Tibet that he heard that British India[1031] was battling with the subordinates of Peking. [Gorkha] desired to lend provisions to assist the attack. The amban did not know that Delhi Bādśāha was British India, while the subordinates of Peking referred to Canton. This was reported to the court. The Emperor [Dao-guang] ordered an investigation and a reply. [The Grand Council] inquired thoroughly and found in the *Poetic Essay on Tibet* by the former amban in Tibet He-tai-an (He-ning/He-ying). It read "Di-li-ba-ca (Delhi Bādśāha, i.e., British India) is a great state outside the southwest border."[1032] The ministers replied in a memorial as such and closed the incident. Gorkha took advantage of the emptiness in Bengal and attacked there with troops on its own, gaining a lot in 1842 (DG22). By then, the English were just wantonly disturbing Zhejiang and Jiangsu, demanding insatiably. Upon hearing of their defeat in British India, they immediately divided the troops to return for rescue. When they arrived at Bengal, they bribed Gorkha substantially for peace and redemption of around a thousand abducted men and women. Gorkha achieved its will, while their request to Tibet was rejected many times, causing their grudge. Therefore, they belittled China.

[9.2 *Quotations from a Local Chronicle*][1033]
The General Chronicle of Sichuan has the following:

[9.2a *Gorkha*]
Gorkha was originally a small tribe in Balbu. The distance from Zha-ge-da eastward to Ba-la-da-la-han takes 10 days. The distance from

1031 In the original text of this piece of quotation from Yao Ying, the name was specified as Charles Elliot.
1032 Here, He-ying's poetic essay was further cited in Yao Ying.
1033 In the second part of his "Three Notes" (A2), Yao quoted several passages from the volume on "the Western Realm" in *The General Chronicle of Sichuan* 1816. He also added his comments afterwards (A2.3).

Balbu (Kathmandu Valley) southward to Ni-nuo-te-ke takes 7 days. The distance westward to Kur-ka (Gorkha) takes 6 days. The distance northward to the town pass of Kyirong in Tibet (here specifically Lhasa) takes 2 days. From Kyirong to Tibet, it takes 20 days.

There were three khans of the Newari people, namely the khan of Kathmandu, the khan of Patan and the khan of Bhaktapur. They became internally affiliated [to the Heavenly Dynasty] in 1731 (YZ9). In 1733 (YZ11), they presented upwards an auspicious memorial to the Emperor [Yong-zheng] and paid tributes. Eventually, they were annexed by Gorkha.

In 1788 (QL 53), the tribal chieftain of Gorkha, Raṇa Bahādura annexed Sikkim, Jumla, Luo-min-tang (Mustang), and other tribes. Then, they had a disturbance with Tibet due to trade. The imperial army[1034] made an expedition to Xie-gar (Shelkar). Gorkha was shaken and frightened. They thus surrendered with sincerity, despatching a chieftain, Mam Sa-ye (Bam Bahādura Śāha = Tib. Bham Sa heb), to pay tribute.[1035] In 1791 (QL 56), they induced the Tibetan Governmental Minister Tenzin Peljor [to come] and abducted him. They plundered the Tashilhunpo Tmeple via Sa-jia (Saskya) and Tingri with rampancy. The rest of the enemy were stationed in Kyirong, Rongshar, and Nyalam. Between 24 January and 21 February 1792 (QL 57/1), the Great General Fuk'anggan, along with the Duke of Extraordinary Courage Hailanca and the Governor General of Sichua Hui-lin, made a punitive expedition. When the Great General arrived at Tibet (Lhasa) from the Kokonor route, the enemy in Nyalam had already been defeated by Cengde, the troop-leading amban. Between 21 April and 20 May 1792 (QL 57/4), the troops arrived at Tingri and attained Kyirong directly. Then, the army approached the enemy's realm and conquered Rasuvāgaḍhī. On 21 July 1792 (QL 57/6/Geng-wu), they arrived at Bharko. On 24 July 1792 (QL 57/6/Gui-you), they conquered tens of wooden fortresses and stone passes. The troops in Nyalam also conquered the enemy at the bridge of iron chain and other mountain ridges, marching to Listi. The enemy at Rongshar ran away. Gorkha was immensely frightened and begged for surrender, which was rejected. Between 18 August and 15 September 1792 (QL 57/7), they further battled at Dui-bum (Dhaibuṃ) and Jiar-gu-la (Gerkhuṭār), arriving at Lang-gu (Betrāvatī). The tribal chieftain of Gorkha despatched

1034 It referred to the army led by Cengde during the first Gorkha campaign.
1035 This probably referred to the treaty negotiation.

somebody to the camp for the second time, returning Tenzin Peljor, etc. They handed over what they had robbed from Tashilhunpo. They ordered their *kājī* Di-wu-da-te Ta-ba (Devīdatta Thāpā) to present tamed elephants, foreign horses and a sect of musicians, along with uncountable other things. They presented upwards an auspicious letter to the Emperor and pleaded allegiance with sincerity. The Great General inscribed a cliff[1036] to record the achievements and returned.

[9.2b *British India, etc.*]

Again, Feringhee is a large tribe in the southwest. The route is distant and perilous. It lies even farther than Gorkha. It calls itself Kolkata. Other tribes call it Feringhee. The foreign people there revere the Islamic religion. The headperson of the tribe was appointed by British India, who has a religion other than Buddhism. There was only one Buddhist temple[1037] of Ācārya Lama (probably Purangir, the translator of Warren Hastings),[1038] not far from the official stockade of the tribal headperson. There was a lama in the official stockade translating letters and documents. In 1793 (QL 58), he despatched Lama Da-qi-ge-li (= Daljit Giri) to Tibet, sending petitions. That was very respectful and obedient.[1039]

Again, British India has more extensive territory and the most subordinates among the tribes of Bengal. Kolkata is a large tribe among the subordinates of British India. It borders the south of Gorkha and is the country outside the extreme frontiers.

There is a small tribe in Feringhee named Bar-di-sar[1040]. It connects Gorkha to the west and Bhutan to the west. In 1793 (QL 58), the tributary elephants and horses detoured from Gorkha via the Bar-di-sar tribe. The tribal headperson prepared rice, grass, and workers to escort. This was reported to the court in memorial and awarded.

1036 In fact, it was a stele inscription, with the text written by Yang Kui. 'Cliff' might be the orthodox expression of the bearer of a commemorative inscription after an expedition.

1037 It probably referred to Bhot Bagan Moth, reported by Gaur Das Bysack. The Panchen Lama might have some properties in Bengal, managed by Purangir (Wang 2013, 71).

1038 Cp. Mosca 2013, 157.

1039 Cp. KRKJL, vol. 51, 18 April 1793 (QL 58/3/8). Daljit Giri arrived at Lhasa on 23 February 1793 (QL 58/1/13).

1040 This was probably somewhere in Darjeeling.

[9.2c. *Comments by Yao Ying*]
My (Yao Ying's) comments:
The *General Chronicle [of Sichuan]* was compiled between 1796 and 1820 (JQ). The mentioned tribes beyond Tibet were based on the documents in Tibet and the memorials on the pacification of Gorkha. By then, we only knew that Feringhee was a subordinate tribe of British India and considered British India a large tribe in Bengal, not realising that it was just the English. It mentioned, "Feringhee people there revere the Islamic religion. The headperson of the tribe was appointed by British India, who has a religion other than Buddhism." That should be Christianity.…[Information about Bhutan][1041]

[9.3 *Sikkim submitted to Feringhee's opening the route*][1042]

[9.4 *Nine Stūpas in Gorkha*]
The Military Officer [from the Green Standard Army] Xie says:
"There are nine *stūpa*s in Gorkha, which were said to have flown from India. There are not many flowers in the Western Regions. Flowers are rare there. However, all flowers are equipped on the top of these nine *stūpa*s, including all the Chinese flowers not present in the Western Regions. Every 12 years, the Dalai Lama despatched somebody to renovate the *stūpa*s. Recently, a golden top of one *stūpa* suddenly flew away with no one knowing its destination. The foreigners consider it to be a miracle."…[Yao Ying's comment][1043]

[9.5 *Ladakh tempted S-in pa to invade Tibet*
(i.e., the Dogra-Tibet War)]

Edition

Sigla:
<22>: 1842 (DG22, vol. 5, 33–46;
<26>: 1846 (DG26) vol. 5, 42–52.

1041 As it is not related to Gorkha and contains lots of dubious placenames, the paragraph is omitted here.
1042 As notes 9.3 and 9.5 from Yao Ying are not related to Gorkha, they are omitted here.
1043 Given the irrelevance, Yao Ying's comment on his only family history is omitted here.

乾隆征廓爾喀記

四川雲南之西為烏斯藏, 烏斯藏之西南為廓爾喀, 廓爾喀之西南為五印度。印度古佛國, 在蔥嶺西南, 瀕大海, 去烏斯藏尚[1044]二千里。或以烏斯藏即古佛國者, 非也。

自四川打箭爐西行二十餘驛至前藏, 十二[1045]驛至中藏, 又十二驛至後藏, 又二十驛至濟隴之鐵索橋[1046], 為後藏極邊地, 逾橋而西則廓爾喀矣。

廓爾喀本巴勒布國, 舊分葉楞部、布顏部、庫[庫]木部, 於雍正九年各奏金葉表文, 貢方物。後三部吞並為一, 遂與後藏鄰。東西數千里, 南北千餘里。其巢穴曰陽布 , 距邊約十一二日程。其地亦有佛迹, 唐古特人歲往朝塔, 拭白土焉。[1047]自古不通中國, 其與中國搆兵, 則自乾隆五十五年內犯西藏始。

初, 後藏班禪剌麻以四十六年來朝, 祝高宗七旬嘏, 中外施舍, 海溢山積。及班禪卒於京師, 資送歸藏, 其財皆為其兄仲巴呼圖克圖所有, 既不布施各寺廟與唐古特之兵, 又擯其弟舍瑪爾巴為紅教, 不使分惠。於是舍瑪爾巴憤懟廓爾喀, 以後藏之封殖、仲巴之專汰, 煽其入寇。

五十五年三月, 廓爾喀藉商税增額、食鹽糅土為詞, 興兵闖邊。唐古特兵不能闕, 而朝廷所遣援剿之侍衛巴忠, 將軍鄂輝、成德等復調停賄和, 陰令西藏堪布等私許歲幣萬五千金, 按兵不戰。時達賴剌麻不可[1048], 而巴忠擅以賊降飾奏[1049], 諷廓爾喀酋入貢, 受封國王。是役未交一兵, 而糜餉百萬。七月廓爾喀遣人至藏表貢, 並致駐藏大臣書, 請如前約。鄂輝恐發覺前事, 屏不奏。[1050]

次年, 藏中歲幣復爽約, 於是廓爾喀以責負為名, 再舉深入後藏。

札什倫布西南, 左有曲多、江鞏, 右有彭錯嶺, 峭壁[1051]連岡, 咽喉天險, 賊步卒數千, 自聶拉木入。其時蕃、漢官兵若分兩路, 一扼曲多江鞏遏其前, 一繞赴彭錯嶺截其後, 則廓爾喀深入無援, 可不戰潰也。

駐藏大臣保泰一聞賊至, 則移班禪於前藏, 幷張皇賊勢, 奏[1052]請移達賴於西寧, 班禪於泰寧[1053], 欲以藏地委賊。

1044 <22>“尚遠”
1045 <22>“四十二”
1046 “之鐵索橋”<22>“又三十驛至石宿堡”
1047 <22>無此段
1048 <22>無此句
1049 此句<22>“遽以賊蹙乞降飾奏”
1050 <22>無此段, 唯“廓爾喀既侮藐内地”
1051 <26>“璧”, 誤也。
1052 <22>無五字
1053 <22>“幷請移達賴班禪于西寧”

且札什倫布寺負山面江, 形勢鞏峻, 剌麻數千, 乘墉可守以待援。而仲巴呼圖克圖挈貲先遁[1054], 剌麻濟仲、札蒼等復託言卜諸吉祥天母, 不宜戰, 眾心遂潰。賊大掠札什倫布, 全藏大震。

兩大剌麻飛章告急。侍衛巴忠扈駕熱河, 聞變畏罪, 自沉水死。時鄂輝為四川總督, 成德為四川將軍, 因盡以罪委之, 謂巴忠解唐古特語, 故私議皆其一人所為已, 二人不知也。及奉命赴藏剿禦, 又按程緩進。

上知二人不足恃, 乃命嘉勇公福康安為將軍, 超勇公海蘭察參贊, 調索倫滿兵及屯練土兵進討。其軍餉則藏以東川督孫士毅主之, 藏以西駐藏大臣和琳主之, 濟隴邊外則前川督惠齡主之。枷保泰於軍前。命大兵由青海草地進藏, 較四川打箭爐近三十程。[1055]賊狃於上年賄和之役, 盡[1056]運所掠歸國, 留千賊[1057]屯界不去。鄂輝、成德等擁兵四千, 既不擊其飽颺, 又不攻其餘賊, 僅破聶拉木寨賊百餘, 遂奏賊退, 欲即以蔵事, 竟不言濟隴、絨轄二處之賊。上斥不許。[1058]

明年二月, 將軍、參贊由青海至後藏, 閏四月, 所調索倫兵二千、金川各[土]{士}屯兵五千皆集, 並藏內官兵三千, 共采買藏中稞麥七萬石、牛羊二萬餘, 足供萬數千人一年之食, 毋煩內地轉運。[1059]五月[1060], 連敗其屯界之賊, 盡復藏地。

六月初[1061], 大舉采入, 恐賊繞襲後路, 遣領隊大臣成德、岱森保及總兵諸神保各出左右一路以分賊勢, 而大軍出中路。海蘭察將三隊為前軍, 福康安將二隊繼之。距濟隴八十里之鐵索橋, 初入賊界第一隘也, 賊斷橋阻險, 福康安以正兵與賊相持, 而海蘭察潛由上游筏渡, 繞山後, 出賊營之上。福康安亦即乘勢造橋奪卡, 合沖賊營, 追剿百六十里至協布魯, 沿途無地立營, 故無一賊。又百數十里至東覺嶺, 兩厓壁立, 中隔橫河, 水深溜急, 我兵緣徑側行, 險與鐵索橋等。乘晦夜雨, 分兵上下游, 接河側枯樹為橋而渡, 始奪其險。[1062]六月九日, 至雍雅山, 廓夷震懾, [1063]遣使詣軍前乞降。將軍、參贊嚴檄斥之。

數日不報, 復三路進攻, [1064] 六戰六捷, 踰大山二重, 先後[1065]殺賊四千, 涉賊境七百餘里, 將近其國都陽布之地。

1054 <22>“逸”
1055 <22>無此段
1056 <22>“半”
1057 <22>三字作“半”
1058 <22>此段作“鄂輝、成德等遂奏賊退, 欲以蔵事, 上切責不許”
1059 <22>無此段
1060 <22>“四月”
1061 <22>“遂”
1062 <22>此段作“賊據木古拉山, 阻水拒險, 將軍議令護軍統領台斐英阿與賊相持, 而大軍別趨間道。海蘭察繞山後, 出賊營之上。福康安由間道合衝賊營, 共克木柵石卡數十”
1063 <22>此段作“追奔至雍雅, 而成德諸神保亦克鐵索橋, 進會利底。廓夷舉國震懾”
1064 <22>此二句作“七月再進”
1065 <22>無此七字

前此, 山勢皆東西夾河, 自雍雅以後, 山皆南北夾河。賊踞守兩山, 中亙一橋。八月初, 我兵三路攻奪其北岸之山, 並破其橋北之賊。其南岸大山數十里, 山後即其國都也。[1066]賊以十營踞山, 守禦甚固。

海蘭察欲扼河立營, 福康安不可, 逾橋攻之, 冒雨上山二十餘里, 至斗絕處, 賊乘高木石雨下, 隔河隔山之賊三路來犯, 我兵且戰且卻, 死傷甚眾。賴海蘭察隔河接應, 而額勒登保扼橋力戰, 乃退賊。[1067]

方是時, 其國境南鄰印度之地, 曰披楞者[1068], 久為英吉利屬國, 與廓夷積釁。福康安進兵時, 曾檄近廓夷東南之哲孟雄、宗木、布魯克[巴], 西面之{巴}作木朗、南面之甲噶爾、披楞等部同時進攻, 許事平分裂其地。及是, 廓夷南告急於披楞, 披楞佯以兵船赴援, 實陰偪其邊鄙[1069]。

廓夷兩支強大敵, 洶懼無計, 且恐我軍聞而氣奮也。再遣人詣軍卑詞乞哀, 時我師方挫, 而賊境益險, 且踰八月即大雪封山難返[1070], 乃允其降。盡獻還所立合同及[1071]所掠藏中財寶、金塔頂、金冊印, 歸前被執[1072]之丹津班珠爾等, 並獻沙瑪爾巴之尸, 貢馴象、番馬、樂工, 請永遵約束。

班師。上本欲[1073]裂其土分[1074]授諸土司, 而酬福康安以郡王爵, 及聞已受降, 乃允其請。留番兵三千, 漢、蒙古兵一千戍藏。是為官兵駐藏之始。

後藏至廓爾喀, 有定結大路, 必遶布魯克巴等部, 迂道月餘。故我師由濟隴近路入[1075], 左壁右湍, 不容一騎, 將軍、參贊亦時步進。故所貢象遶大路次年春始至前藏。[1076]

而烏拉嶺上下百二十里, 必窮一日之力踰之, 稍昏黑即不能覓路。且有雪城若門洞, 深數十丈, 人往來者不敢語, 否輒有雪大如屋壓而殛之。

廓爾喀寇藏時, 運貲歸國者二千人, 過嶺凍死殆盡。蓋蔥嶺之南脊, 天所以限中西也, 險倍金川, 遠踰回部, 為漢唐兵力所未至。幸其士卒皆跣足, [1077]先約期而後交綏, 我軍不顧, 輒先發揜襲, 往往猝為我乘。自大創以後, 至今貢獻不絕。

1066 <22>此段作"隔河大山"
1067 <22>此段作"嚴守水, 深山斗絕, 山後即其國都也。福康安欲逾橋攻之, 海蘭察力持不可, 福康安自引兵渡橋仰攻, 果不利, 賴海蘭察接應退賊"
1068 <22>無此四字
1069 <22>此段作"聞廓夷受兵于中國, 則亦出兵攻其邊鄙"
1070 <22>此句作"將軍、參贊議以賊境益險, 而踰八月即大雪封山, 不可老師"
1071 <22>無此五字
1072 <26>"報", 誤也
1073 <22>較<26>多"俟事平"
1074 <22>無此字
1075 <22>此段"故有孔道, 賊嚴守之, 故我師覓間道入, 其峭絕處"
1076 <22>此句"竟不能達"
1077 <22>多"每戰仿古法"

其國西鄰北印度克什彌爾, 南鄰東印度甲噶爾, 即明史之榜葛剌, 一作孟加臘, 久屬大西洋英吉利, 其都城則披楞也一名噶里噶達。[1078]乾隆六十年, 英吉利使臣入貢, 自言前歲大將軍率兵至西藏西南之的密部落時, 彼國兵船亦曾相助, 倘嗣後有需用西洋兵者, 情願效力。朝廷始知前此廓爾喀之役, 其南界亦有邊警外患也。

道光二十年, 英吉利夷人入寇粵浙, 廓爾喀亦遣人稟駐藏大臣, 言:“小國與里底所屬之披楞地相鄰, 每受其侮。今聞里底與京屬搆兵, 京屬屢勝, 臣願率所部往攻里底屬地, 以助天討。”時駐藏大臣未知所稱里底即英吉利, 所稱京屬即謂中國之廣東省, 所稱披楞[1079]屬地即東印度孟加臘[1080], 顧[1081]答以“蠻觸相攻, 天朝向不過問”卻之。蓋英吉利國都雖遠在大西洋, 而其屬國印度則與廓爾喀接壤, 世仇搆釁。故我攻廓則英夷乘之, 我攻英則廓夷亦願助之云。

臣源曰:廓爾喀界西藏及東印度[1082], 攝兩勃敵[1083]之間, 然內貢中國而不貢印度夷[1084]。近日, 英夷西與鄂羅斯搆兵, 東與中國結釁, 故廓爾喀欲乘兩大國之勢以攻印度云。印度地產鴉片煙, 英吉利關稅歲八千萬計。其兵船入犯中國者, 十九皆孟加臘之人, 誠能聽廓夷出兵之請, 獎其忠順, 擾彼腴疆, 擣其空虛, 牽其內顧, 使西夷失富強之業, 成狼狽之勢, 亦海外奇烈也。

鄂羅斯地袤二萬里, 與中國首尾相接, 地大兵強, 西洋所畏。其與我互市之地則有陸而無海。英夷之與我互市, 則又有海而無陸。近日鄂羅斯屢與英夷爭達達里之地, 其地橫亙南洋, 鄂羅斯得之, 則可以圖並印度, 故與英夷連年血戰。

雍正五年, 俄羅斯攻取西藏西南五千里之務魯木, 以其地尚佛教, 遣人至中國學剌麻, 當即與廓爾喀相近之地。

若能許鄂羅斯海舶赴粵貿易, 聯絡彌利堅、佛蘭西等國, 皆英夷仇敵, 則英夷之兵舶不敢舍其境而遠犯中國。

英夷在印度大兵船止百艘, 以其半入寇中國, 其餘皆分守各境, 不敢遠離, 恐他國乘其虛也。

夫以夷攻夷之效, 咫見者視為迂圖。乾隆、嘉慶間一封暹羅, 遂足以西制緬甸, 東制安南。善弈者或一間著, 而全局皆生, 況以宅中馭外之勢, 制鼸釁四結之夷哉?

附錄:康輶紀行[1085]

[1]

古天竺國, 一名身毒, 即五印度也, 地在後藏之西, 約一月程。後藏南為廓爾喀, 西渡小海港地名披楞, 即東印度。披楞之南有地濱海, 名孟加剌,《明史》作榜葛臘, 本東印度

1078 <22>此段作“其國西南與五印度相鄰, 其南海號印度海, 近日印度之孟加臘及孟買等國為大西洋英吉利所屬”
1079 <22>作“底里”
1080 <22>作“印度”
1081 <22>無此字
1082 <22>作“鄂羅斯”
1083 <22>“大國”
1084 <22>此句作“故內貢中國亦兼貢鄂羅斯”
1085 <22>無此, 僅有”廓爾喀附記”及”澳門月報”兩篇, 論英印、俄羅斯等歐亞事, 不錄。所引出康輶紀行 Accessed through https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044068017441 on 16 Dec. 2024, vol. 3, 3–6. 廓爾喀披楞三條

地, 為英吉利所據, 以利誘披楞, 為其所屬。中國不知孟加剌為英吉利所據之馬頭, 但相傳為第哩巴察而已。英吉利既據此地, 誘屬披楞, 復誘其傍地皆屬之。

乾隆五十七年, 廓爾喀侵後藏, 求助於第哩巴察, 其酋果爾那爾謂其國人在廣東貿易, 天朝待之厚, 卻之。廓爾喀既為大兵平服, 遂與第哩巴察及披楞有隙, 道光十九年請於西藏, 求借兵餉擊披楞, 不許。其時英吉利先已鴟張, 欲謀併廓爾喀以窺西藏矣。

廓爾喀王之正妃與次妃各生一子, 皆幼, 次妃有寵, 正妃恐已子不得立, 因次妃子疾潛使人藥殺之。大臣有畢興者為大噶箕[1086]當國, 王究藥殺, 狀辭連畢興, 王誅之, 其姪[馬]{烏}大巴興逃入披楞。道光二十年, 廓爾喀王遣使臣兩噶箕入貢未返, [馬]{烏}大巴興因披楞之助, 回國廢其王, 立正妃之子, 盡殺治畢興獄者, 二貢使在其黨中, 乃籍沒其家。二使臣返至藏中聞變, 不敢歸國, 中道亦逃入披楞。

先是, 披楞貽廓爾喀王木櫝, 鐍封甚固, 曰:"中皆珍寶, 須王親啟。"大臣疑有詐, 使囚於空地啟之, 礮發斃囚, 益怨披楞。

廣東方有英吉利之事, 廓爾喀使告藏中曰:"聞第哩巴察[1087]與京屬打仗, 願借兵餉助擊之。"大臣不知所云第哩巴察者即英吉利, 京屬即廣東也。奏入, 上使查覆, 乃徧詢得前駐藏大臣和泰庵所著《西藏賦注》, 有"第哩巴察乃西南徼外一大國"[1088]語覆奏, 事遂寢。廓爾喀乘孟加剌之虛, 自以兵往襲之, 大獲。此二十二年事也。英吉利方肆擾浙江、江蘇, 要求無厭, 聞第哩巴察敗, 亟分兵回救, 至孟加剌厚賂廓爾喀, 贖還所擄男婦千人以和。廓爾喀既得志, 又以數請助藏中不許, 懷怨, 至是乃輕中國矣。

[2]

今四川通志西域[1089]:

[2a]

"廓爾喀, 本巴勒布中一小部落, 其地正東自札格達至巴拉打拉罕計程十日, 正南自巴爾布即巴勒布至尼諾忒克計程七日, 正西至庫爾卡計程六日, 正北至西藏[1090]之濟隆城卡二日, 自濟隆至藏計程二十日。巴勒布本三罕, 曰:布顏罕、葉楞罕、庫庫木罕。"雍正十年內附, 十一年奉表入貢[1091]。嗣為[1092]廓爾喀所並。

"乾隆五十三年, 廓爾喀酋長剌納巴都爾又兼併哲孟雄、作木朗、洛敏湯諸部, 遂與西藏以交易滋擾。王師遠涉至脇噶爾, 震懾投誠, 遣酋瑪木[1093]野入貢。五十六年, 復誘執西藏噶布倫丹津班珠爾, 由薩迦、定日肆掠札什倫布而去。餘賊屯濟隆、絨轄、聶拉木。五十七年正月, 福大將軍同超勇公海蘭察、四川總督惠齡進討。大將軍自青海至藏, 聶拉木之賊先已為領隊大臣成所破[1094]。四月, 大兵次定日, 直取濟隆, 臨賊境, 克熱索橋。六月庚午次噶多, 癸酉克其木城碉卡數十, 聶拉木兵亦克鐵索橋、隴岡賊卡, 進至利底,

1086 <康>注"最貴官名"
1087 <康>下有其名"莫斯黨", 注曰:"頭目之稱, 謂義律也"
1088 原文為"第哩巴察, 人隔重洋, 西南徼外一大國"
1089 <四川通志>1816 (JQ21), vol. 194, 23–35, it is a loose quotation here.
1090 <通志>多"所管"
1091 <通志>載奏文及賞賜
1092 <通志>多"其族"
1093 <通志>"薩野"
1094 <通志>"率兵掩襲, 聚爾殲焉"

絨轄之賊遁去。廓爾喀大懼, 乞降, 不許。七月, 復戰於堆補木、甲爾古拉, 直抵朗古, 廓爾喀酋再遣人詣營, 歸丹津巴珠爾等, 獻札什倫布所掠, 使噶箕第烏達特塔巴進馴象、番馬及樂工一部, 不可勝計, 奉表歸誠。大將軍磨崖紀功而還。

“聶拉木兵亦克鐵索橋、隴岡賊卡, 進至利底, 絨轄之賊遁去。廓爾喀大懼, 乞降, 不許。七月, 復戰於堆補木、甲爾古拉, 直抵朗古, 廓爾喀酋再遣人詣營, 歸丹津巴珠爾等, 獻札什倫布所掠, 使噶箕第烏達特塔巴進馴象、番馬及樂工一部, 不可勝計, 奉表歸誠。大將軍磨崖紀功而還。”

[2b]

又曰:“披楞, 西南一大部落, 道路險遠, 在廓爾喀外, 自稱為噶哩噶達, 其別部人稱為披楞。其蕃[1095]民奉回教, 部長乃第哩巴察所放, 別為一教, 不信佛。惟阿雜拉剌麻有佛廟一, 距部長官寨不遠, 令剌麻一人在官寨通譯文書。乾隆五十八年, 遣剌麻達齊格哩至藏投稟, 極恭順。”

又曰:“第哩巴察, 在甲噶爾各部落中地土較廣所屬最多。噶哩噶達為第哩巴察屬部中大部落, 與廓爾喀南界毗連為邊外極邊之國。

“披楞[1096]有小部落, 名巴爾底薩雜[1097]爾, [西]{言}通廓爾喀, 東通布魯克巴。乾隆五十八年, 廓爾喀貢象馬, 由巴爾底薩爾部中繞行, 其部長備米草人夫護送, 奏賞之。”[1098]

[2c 姚瑩]

余按:”通志修於嘉慶中, 所謂西藏外諸部落皆據藏中文案及平定廓爾喀奏章, 當時但知披楞為第哩巴察屬部, 以第哩巴察為甲噶爾之大部落, 初不知其即英吉利也。又稱“披楞民信奉回教, 以部長乃第哩巴察所放, 別為一教, 不信佛”, 蓋即天主教也。又稱披楞之小部落巴爾底薩雜爾西通廓爾喀, 東通布魯克巴。是時布魯克巴猶未為廓夷所併也。布魯克巴[1099]本紅教剌麻地, 與噶畢分為兩部, 其部長諾彥林親, 乾隆元年賜額爾德尼第巴印, 掌教剌麻為札爾薩立布嚕克谷濟呼畢勒罕, 俱住布嚕克巴蜂[1100]湯德慶城中。有大小城五十餘, 人民四萬餘戶, 剌麻二萬五千餘人。其界東至綽囉烏嚕克圖部落, 計程八日, 南至額納特克國, 計程十日, 西至巴木鍾嶺, 計程十日, 正北至帕克哩城, 乃西藏屬也。見《西藏賦注》。巴木鍾嶺疑即哲孟雄與披楞隔界之大嶺也。”[1101]

[3] 又曰:

“前藏西南小部落, 名哲孟雄, 西南鄰廓爾喀, 南接披楞, 去後藏之帕里三日程, 北至江孜三百餘里, 又北一百餘里即札什倫布, 舊屬廓爾喀。乾隆五十七年, 廓爾喀平後, 修好於唐古忒, 貢服王化。人強健而地小, 素畏披楞。其通披楞之處中隔大山, 有道一線僅容

1095 <通志>“番”
1096 <通志>“第哩巴察”
1097 <康>維
1098 <通志>文繁意同
1099 This part was quoted from 西藏賦, but read incorrectly.
1100 <西藏賦>作“蚌”
1101 同上見“噶畢諾彥林親, 布魯克巴之兩解”下注“正西至巴木嶺鍾為界”

羊行, 天生險隘也。藏人言近為披楞鑿寬此道, 設卡其上, 哲孟雄不敢較。蓋披楞欲窺西藏, 為廓爾喀所阻, 哲孟雄路近而小弱故取道於此。”[1102]

[4] 又曰:

“謝都閫言: ‘廓爾喀有九塔, 相傳自天竺飛來。西域花卉不多, 亦不常有, 惟此九塔上諸花咸備, 中國名花西域所無者皆有之。每十二年達賴剌麻遣人往修塔一次。近有一塔金頂忽飛去, 不知所之, 蕃人以為神奇。’ 余謂塔者, 佛之表識, 觀其來去, 可以卜地之興衰。余家自明萬歷間先副使宅內, 忽一鐵鍁飛至, 滿貯麥飯猶熱, 自後人物科名益盛。乾隆中, 鐵松中丞改宅建祠, 鍁貯樓上, 今猶無恙。塔之飛也, 亦猶是耳。興則為禎祥, 敗則為妖孽, 天之道也。”[1103]

[5] 又曰:

“後藏之西為阿里, 其西北界近底穆岡城, 東有拉達克城, 本一小部落也。東西境長一千五百餘里。北至葉爾羌十八站, 西北為克食米爾, 西南為森巴, 南為哲孟雄、洛敏湯、廓爾喀, 又西南為披楞。其西境內有茫玉納山。自茫玉納山以西有地曰補仁, 又西曰達壩噶爾, 又西曰雜仁, 又西北曰堆噶爾本, 又西北曰茹妥, 皆拉達克之地。堆噶爾本產金, 五輩達賴剌麻盛時, 奪取此五處, 拉達克不敢較。道光十年, 有張格爾餘黨自葉爾羌逃至其地, 拉達[克]酋長擒獻, 賞五品頂戴。又嘗入藏禮達賴、班禪。後為西界外野蕃森巴侵占其地, 走唐古忒求救, 駐藏大臣拒之弗納, 拉達克怨, 反投森巴, 誘之寇唐古忒, 欲復茫玉納山西故地。森巴者, 其部有三: 最大而遠者曰然吉森, 次曰索熱森, 曰谷朗森。道光二十一年, 索熱森酋俄斯爾遂因拉達克來侵藏, 遣噶布倫往禦, 卒少不勝, 補仁五處皆為所奪。大臣以聞, 發唐古忒大兵剿之。森巴勇悍, 善鎗箭銅礮而不耐寒。藏有紅教剌麻宜瑪湯者, 能誦經祈雪, 深數尺, 森巴大凍, 唐古忒乘雪以連環鎗進攻, 森巴大敗。陣斬俄斯爾, 擒八百餘人, 盡復所奪地, 追至森巴界河而營。督唐古忒兵者噶布倫策墊奪吉、戴琫比喜也。俄斯爾之妻率衆繼至, 聞敗大懼。然吉森以為俄斯爾之勇猶陣亡, 又森巴得唐古忒營中護法神像忽自行動, 大驚, 乃使人請和。未成, 決河水淹唐古忒營。兵皆走依山, 策墊奪吉、比喜單騎入森巴營, 責讓之, 森巴乃奉約而退, 還所侵拉達克地, 以處其酋。”[1104]

1102 Vol. 6, 21. 哲孟雄聽披楞通道
1103 Vol. 7, 21. 廓爾喀九塔
1104 Vol. 6, 20–21. 拉達克誘森巴犯藏

2.3 Tibetan Texts

As the Biography of the eighth Dalai Lama and those of the seventh Panchen Lama, as well as the eighth Tatsag had only limited references to the war, they were given in footnotes. We present the excerpt from Tenzin Peljor and Kun dga' dPal ldan, along with two English letters from Tashilhunpo. Please note: Numbering in Part II (Sources) corresponds to Part I (The Wars), but only selected sources are edited and translated.

2.3.2 Autobiography of Doring Tenzin Peljor, 1806

Tenzin Peljor's biography existed in the form of manuscripts before the first edition in Chengdu 1987. Shakabpa might resorted to another recension of the text and thus differed largely from the Chengdu edition. We here present Mr. Shakabpa's summary with proper names supplemented and a series of excerpt from the Chengdu edition. (a) was studied, edited, and translated by F. K. Ehrhard 2007, while (b) was studied and translated by Li Ruo-hong 2002. The edition in (b) was typed in by XY. (c) to (e) were selected and typed in by XY but translated by PPP with a revision on proper names and voices of discourses by XY.

Summary by Shakabpa 1967, 166–68.

"The Tibetan army began to attack the Gurkhas at Shigatse and continuously cut off their supplies. An epidemic broke out among the Nepalese troops and this, together with the harassment they received from the Tibetan army, made them retreat to She[l]kar [Shikarajong] and Dzongka, taking with them the spoils of Shigatse and Tashilhunpo. In the fourth month of 1792, the Tibetans drove the Gurkhas farther back to Nyanang [Nyalam] and Kyirong. At that point, thirteen thousand imperial troops arrived in Tibet under the command of the Manchu general Fu K'ang-an [Fuk'anggan], who was a relative of the Ch'ien-lung [QL] Emperor and also Viceroy of Liang-kuang [Governor General of Canton]. Tibetan troops numbered ten thousand, of which seven thousand were from the district of Gyarong [rGyalrong] near the province of Szechuan [Sichuan] and three thousand from Ü-Tsang. (…)

In the seventh month, fighting took place at Kyirong and Nyanang, and the Tibetan army repulsed the Gurkhas at the fire encounter. When

news of the defeat reached Nepal, along with rumours that countless Tibetan and Chinese troops were marching on the country, there was an immediate improvement in the treatment shown to Kalon Doring and the other Tibetan prisoners.

After taking Kyirong and Nyanang, the Tibetans and the Manchu army—well supplied with rations and arms—entered Nepalese territory under the joint command of the Kashag minister, Horkhang,[1105] and the Manchu general. Fu K'ang-an. The Gurkhas, after their first defeat, lost confidence and retreated rapidly, offering only token resistance to the advancing forces. They sent an envoy to India to request military aid from the British, and Rana Bahadur Shah ran away on the pretext of going on a hunting expedition. The Shamar Trulku [Shamarpa] poisoned himself.

A request came to Kalon Doring [Tenzin Peljor] from the Nepalese king's uncle, who was then acting as ruler for the young monarch, asking that he go to the Tibetan camp and request them to halt their advance. All blame for the hostilities was placed on the decreased Shamar Trulku. Nepalese willingness to negotiate for peace was heavily stressed. Kalon Doring replied that it would be better if either the King himself or his uncle accompanied him on such a mission; but the uncle did not agree with this suggestion. Instead, Kazi Ratna Patte [Ramjit Pande] was sent with Kalon Doring in the direction of Kyirong, and Taksa Narayan Sinha [Narasimha] with Kalon Yuthok [G.Yu thog] and Tengyeling Dzasa towards Nyanang to plead for peace. Kalon Yuthok. and his party met the Tibetan troops coming from Nyanang at Nawakot [Nuwakot],[1106] only twenty miles from Kathmandu, while Kalon Doring's party met those coming from Kyirong at Theepung [Dhaibung], fifty miles from the Nepalese capital.

At Theepung, Kalon Doring met Phajo Lhakhang[1107], the Tibetan general in command of the Ü-troops [Central troops]. The next day, he proceeded on ahead one day's journey and met the Manchu general, Fu

1105 This person was not identified in the Chengdu edition. It might be mixed with lCang can who died days ago in front of Tenzin Peljor. Or it might be Tenzin Peljor's grandfather (Dar han gung Paṇḍi ta) or his father Tha'i ji Pa sang Tse ring who also passed away by then.

1106 Geographically, it was incorrect, as Nuwakot was in the south of Dhaibung, while Nyalam was far away. According to the Chengdu recension, G.Yu thog and Tenzin Peljor went together with Chinese officer Wang Gang, and Tibetan officers from Nyalam and Tashilhunpo. Hu Ting-hai, another Chinese soldier took the Nyalam route back to the camp of Chengde.

1107 This person was not identified in the Chengdu edition.

K'ang-an, from whom he learned that the Tibetan joint commander, Horkhang, had died a few weeks earlier, leaving Fu K'ang-an solely in command. The Nepalese representative with Kalon Doring was held as a hostage, while his attendants were allowed to return to Kathmandu with a message giving the conditions for peace. The conditions were that the Shamar Turlku's wife and followers were to be handed over to the Tibetans and all valuables taken from the Tashilhunpo monastery returned; only then would orders be issued to halt the advance of the army. The Gurkhas were asked to send a responsible man to Theepung to make decisions on behalf of his government. By that time, a replacement for Horkhang, the deceased Tibetan commander, would have arrived for the negotiations.

A few days later, Hor Kunga Paljor Shatra,[1108] another Kashag minister, arrived as the replacement for Horkhang; and a week later, the Gurkha negotiators arrived, led by Bhim Sahib [Bam Saheb] and Kula Bahadur.[1109] A treaty was drawn up and even though a Tibetan copy of it is not available, its essence was recorded by Kalon Doring in his memoirs:

"The Gurkhas agreed to send an envoy to Peking every five years to pay his country's respects to the Emperor. Delegations would be sent to demarcate the boundaries between Nepal and Tibet, and both sides expressed the desire to forget past ill feelings. The Gurkhas agreed to hand over the followers of Shamar Trulku and all Tibetan prisoners taken during the war. The Tashilhunpo spoils would also be returned."

2.3.2a Outbreak of the 1788 Conflict

Source: Ed. 1987 Chengdu, 555.5–557.8 (Ehrhard 2007, App. A).

Translation

Quoted from: Ehrhard 2007, 119–20.
"Following that, the reasons [will] now [be laid out] why a crisis and fighting arose between Tibet and Gorkha: Earlier, in the wood dragon

1108 This sounds like Phyag na rDo rje, the title given to Hailanca, Tib. Had gung, in the Chengdu edition. It might also be somebody else attested in Shakabpa's recension of TP.
1109 This was probably Balabhadra, Tib. Bha la sBa dur, in the Chengdu edition.

year [= 1784], the one known as the Tenth in the line, which holds the crown of the Red Hat of the Karma [Ka'-brgyud-pa] and the noble reincarnation Chos-kyi mgon-po of bDe-chen chos- 'khor dgon of the tradition of the 'Brug[-pa bKa'-brgyud-pa] went together with their entourage to Nepal to perform a pilgrimage and to meet the Buddhist receptacles [there]. Thus they resided in a region of Nepal. Also, a monk official, dGa'- ldan bKa'-bcu[-pa], and a "doctor" (*em chi*) from the private treasury of the [Eighth] Dalai Bla-ma departed from Tibet, as was the custom, in order to offer a whitewash to the two *stūpa*s [of Svayarnbhunath and Bodhnath] and to [procure substances to] make incense and medicine.

At about that time, when not only the evil king of Gorkha, possessed by the chief of demons and cursed with the thought and deeds of a jealousy that could not bear the wealth and prosperity of others, had brought all the three regions of Nepal [= Yambu/Kathmandu, Ko-khom/Bhaktapur, Ye-rang/Patan] under his power, but also [his successor,] the true king of Gorkha, called Ratnabahadur, was himself of tender age, the one responsible for all internal and external matters, both great and small, the uncle of that [latter] evil king, known as Bahadur Sahib [= Rana Bahadur Shah (1775–1806)], the prime minister of Gorkha, reported the following to the two [Tibetan government officials] mentioned above, who wanted to erect Buddhist receptacles in Nepal:

> The black *taṃkas*, which were circulating since the olden days of the rulers of Kathmandu are one and all adulterated, whereas the taṃkas struck new during our own Gorkha reign are like pure ones. Therefore, because it is not proper that both the copper taṃkas and the silver taṃkas circulate in Tibet and gTsang [at the same time] indiscriminately, it is necessary that henceforth, these black taṃkas should not circulate at all, and although earlier a series of letters was sent to the king of Tibet (i.e. the Eighth Dalai Bla-ma)[1110], no outcome was achieved [in

1110 It seems not to be the Dalai Lama but the regent of Tibet, Cp. the preceding paragraph TP 554.11–17 *bka' nan phebs pa'i dgongs don ltar 'di lo chu stod zla ba'i tshes bzhi bdag cag gi ston pas 'khor lnga sde bzang po la bden bzhi'i chos 'khor bskar ba'i dus chen nyin gangs can lha gcig skyabs mgon rgyal dbang thams cad mkhyen cing gzigs pa chen por gtsug phud phul te rab byung ma sgrub bcug par chos ming la rje btsun ma blo bzang chos 'dzoms zhes pa bstsal te chos sgor bcug pa las* | Dalai is often referred to as *nyin gangs can lha gcig skyabs mgon rgyal dbang* or in short *skyabs mgon* | *rgyal dbang*. He

> this matter]. If now, when no resolution has been forthcoming from Tibet, as stated above—and given that the three regions of gNya'-nang, Rong-shar [and] sKyid-grong together with [Tibetan] government officials were seized before, during the olden days of the rule of Kathmandu—[these regions] will henceforth be regarded as being under our own Gorkha power. And not only that (for it is not good if we have to fight)—you two who want to erect Buddhist receptacles [in Nepal] also give thought to sending a letter, if necessary, to the king of Tibet detailing what has happened and what may occur. As long as there is no clear answer of a proper solution, you will have to remain as hostages in Nepal.

This and the like was told to them. At the end of various acts of injury, the religious person [and] the layman, [these] two, (i.e. the monk official and the doctor), who wanted to erect Buddhist receptacles, considered that they would be held up at the door (i.e. would not be allowed to leave Nepal). Fearing that the proverb: "The danger of watching a spectacle is to be abducted to Lanka" might come true, the reincarnation of [bDe-chen] Chos-'khor [dgon],[1111] the righteous one, together with his entourage, immediately halted the process of visiting the sacred sites and Buddhist receptacles and left Nepal in the nighttime, returning via sKyid-grong safely back to Tibet.

But Zhva-dmar-pa [Chos-grub rgya-mtsho]—the teacher and his retinue—probably considered first in what way proper action should be taken, or whether the necessity of a deception such as "changing the sounds of arrows into [the music of flutes]" was suitable. For many days they mediated between the minister of the king of Gorkha and the pair of the religious person [and] the layman who wanted to erect Buddhist receptacles for the [Tibetan] government, but reached a deadlock. Finally, as the essential point, for the pair [of the religious person

was also called *chos rgyal*. Probably this "King of Tibet" (*bod rgyal po*) refers to one of the Demo Hutuktus, who acted as regents during this time, or to the regent Ngag dbang Tshul khrims rGya mtsho (1721–1791) instead; for the list of the regents see Schwieger 2015, 224–25. *Bod rgyal po* ranked lower than the Dalai Lama and had a more secular sense.

1111 The 'Brug pa incarnation from bDe chen chos 'khor in gTsang who had been in the company of the Tenth Zhwa dmar pa was the Fifth Chos mgon 'Jam dpal rdo rje (1761–1798); for his biography see Mi pham ''phrin las rgya mtsho: *gDams ngag bka' rgya chen lnga yi bla ma brgyud pa'i rnam thar*, 334–44.

and the lay man] who wanted to erect Buddhist receptacles in Nepal, there remained nothing but annoying discussions and they would return to Tibet. As a substitute for the [two] who wished to erect Buddhist receptacles, the Zhva-dmar-pa [himself] together with his retinue would remain, and up to such time as an official reply in the way of a proper solution arrived, they would stay in Bal-yul."

Edition

de rjes bod gor sde gzar 'khrug 'dzing yong ba'i rgyu rkyen yang | de sngon shing 'brug lo nang karma zhva dmar cod paN (= pan) 'dzin pa'i rabs bcu par grags pa dang | 'brug lugs bde chen chos 'khor dgon gyi rje btsun chos kyi mgon po'i sprul sku 'khor bcas bal yul du gnas bskor dang | rten mjal la bskyod gnang gis nai pā la'i yul grur bzhugs pa dang | bod nas bal yul mchod rten rnam gnyis la sku dkar gsol zhing | spos sman sgrub pa sogs la rtse drung dga' ldan bka' bcu dang | rtse 'phral nang em chi gnyis sngar rgyun ltar thon skabs | yid srubs bdag pos brlams te gzhan 'byor phun tshogs mi bzod pa'i phrag dog gi bsam sbyor dang ldan pa'i log smin pa gor rgyal ngan pa nas bal yul gling gsum yongs la mnga' dbang bsgyur skabs ma zad | de dus gor rgyal ngo ma rarna (= ratna) sba dur du 'bod ba[1112] *de bzhin na tshod phra stabs phyi nang gi bya gzhag ehe phra tshang ma'i 'gan 'khur rgyal ngan de'i a khu bâ dur sa heb du grags pa nas byed bzhin yin 'dug stabs bal yul rten bzhengs pa gong gsal gnyis la gor kha rgyal bion nas rgyu mtshan zer rigs su | yam bu'i rgyal thog rnying dus nas dar ba'i tarn nag 'di rnams lhad can sha dag dang | gor kha rang gi rgyal thog slar gsar rgyag byas pa'i tarn ka 'di dag lhad med Ita bu bcas des na zangs tarn dang | dngul tarn gnyis bod gtsang du khyad med 'gro rgyugs byed pa ma 'os gshis | phyin chad tarn nag 'di rigs 'gro rgyugs gtan nas med pa mdzad dgos kyi de sngon rim par bod rgyal por yi ge phul rung don smin ma byung ba bcas | da sgos gong gsal bod nas don smin mi byed tshe gzhung zhabs gnya' nang dang | rong shar | skyid grong bcas khag gsum po de sngon yam bu'i rgyal thog rnying dus su yang 'dzin lam byung 'dug stabs phyin chad gor kha rang gi mnga' zhabs su rtsis sprod byung na dang | de min dmag gtong dgos byung na mi legs pas de rtsis rten bzhengs pa gnyis nas kyang 'di byas 'di byung gi bod rgyal por yi ge gtong dgos yod na thong | byed bde'i Ian gsal ma byung bar du bal*

1112 Orig. pa.

yul rang la mi gte Ita bur sdod dgos zer ba sogs bsun gtser sna tshogs kyi mthar rten bzhengs pa ser skya gnyis po sgor bskyil byed rtsis byas 'dug skabs bden don chos 'khor gyi sprul sku 'khor bcas ni has mo blta nyes ling kar (= lang kar) tshud pa'i dpe don Itar byung dogs de 'phral gnas rten mjal rgyu 'phro bzhag gis bal yul nas mtshan brgyab ste skyid grong brgyud bod du bde bar phyir log mdzad 'dug pa dang | zhva dmar ston 'khor rnams kyang thog ma'i char bsam par lhad med sbyor bar rtsub zhugs byang ba'am | yang na mda' skad gling bsgyur gyi g.yo skor dgos pa mdzad pa ji Itar yin rung gzhung rten bzhengs pa ser skya sprel po dang | gor kha rgyal bion gyi bar du legs 'dum yin tshul gyis nyin mang po'i bar lab sne sprad thog | yang tig mthar gyi 'jog po'i rdo khar/ bal yul rten bzhengs pa sprel por gor rgyal nas bsun gtser med pa bod du phyir slog byed rgyu dang | rten bzhengs pa'i tshab tu zhva dmar ba 'khor bcas bzhugs nas byed bde'i bka' lan ma phebs bar bal yul du sdod rgyu |

2.3.2b Rebuke from the Regent

Source: Ed. 1987 Chengdu, 724.4–725.4.

Translation

Quoted from Li 2002, 134
"In the earth-monkey year (1788), the little barbarian country of the Gurkha even dared to invade our state of Buddhism. You, ministers and local chieftains, brought up by milk, are such a group of cowards. [Qing] generals [referring to Bajong (Ba-zhong), E'hui and Chengde] cheated the great Emperor and covered up the truth. You not only did not insist on declaring a war against the Gurkha, but, even signed the Tibeto-Gurkha peace treaty, turning such an important matter into trivia. Particularly you. Duke Bstan 'dzin dpal 'byor, bright and quick-minded at a young age, were at one time considered a reincarnated lama. I had a very high hope on you and had assumed that you would be up to serving the government just as well as the former minister Tshe ring dbang rgyal and your own father Pandita. But I was wrong. I cannot believe that you agreed to hand over such a large amount in payment to the Gurkha."

Edition

sa spre lo nang gorkha kla klo'i rgyal phran chung du zhig nas dbus gtsang chos gyi zhing sar dgra tshur rgol byed skab dung dkar 'o mas gsos pa dang 'dri ba'i khyeng bka' mda' sogs bod kyi mi drag rnams nas pho ma skyes par brten | 'jam dbyangs gong ma bdag po chen po nas bod kyi bstan 'gro'i bde skyid la dgongs te rgya sog rgyal rong gi dbung dmag mang ba gtong gnang mdzad bzhin du de dag gi 'go dpon rnams nas kyang gong ma chen por dbu g.yogs kyi dri ngan sa g.yogs byas 'dug skabs khyod rnams nas dbung 'jug mthar skyel dgos pa'i zhu nan tsan yang ma byas pa'i thog tu | da dung bod gor mthun grub kyi yig dan bzhag pa yin ces yang tig gyod 'go ri las lci zhing | gyod mjug chu las ring ba 'di byed dgos pa'i rgyu mtshan ci yin | lhag don bka' blon gung khyod de snga na tshod phra rung shes rig sbyang khul ma zad |
bla ma'i skye srid yin par brten phugs bka' blon mdo zhabs drung tshe ring dbang rgyal dang | dga' bzhi gung paṇḍi ta gnyis kyi shul zin pa'i gzhung zhabs 'degs su 'gyur ba zhig ye yong bsams nas nged kyis re ba chen po byas pa yin kyang | drod che sa [725] *nas dbyar chu skam zer ba'i dpe ltar gorkha la sa rin 'bor che sprod rgyu'i yig dan 'jog pa sogs gzhung mtshan don la mi bsams pa'i bya ba tshabs chen 'di khyod nas mda' shes gzhu nyos kyis byas pa yin 'dug stabs | phyin chad kyang rang btsugs kyi zam par rang thar ba byed dgos gsungs ba soṭ (= sogs) |*

2.3.2c Abduction of Tenzin Peljor, etc. from Nyalam

Source: Ed. 1987 Chengdu, 783.13–786.6.

Translation (PPP, XY)

[page 783.13] Two persons named rDzar mun Subhidar (*rdzar mun su bhi rdar*) and Duhar Baldrub Simha (*'du har 'bal grub shing*) with skilled bilingual translator 'Gyur med rNam rgyal, a monk student of Shamarpa himself put [us] in custody. The army chief lCang [can] could not walk on foot. Hence, he was put in a palanquin. We proceeded on foot in plain area without excuse like chased by a falcon. We arrived in the hell-heat valley (*rong*) of Nepal in the sixth month in summer. It is stated in *sūtra* system ("exoteric teachings" *mdo lugs*) if you commit suicide you will not take human rebirth until 500 births.

[784] In the *mantra* system ("esoteric teachings" *sngags lugs*) it is said that own's aggregates (*skandha*), sense spheres (*dhātu*), and inner seats (*āyatana*) are divine in nature. We cannot even perform transference of consciousness [i.e., death] when time has not come. I could not decide what conduct would be right at that moment.

In the thought of the foreigners [to Buddhist teachings/Tibet] (*pha rol pa*), we would do suicide by jumping in the crack of rock. Therefore, they helped to cross narrow path by holding hands as mother is guiding babies holding hands from front side and pushing from backside. While we were moving like that way, two junior Chinese military officers, including Wang Ka [i.e., Wang Gang], walking with us, told us, "You Tibetans lost in earlier times and suffered intensely. Now you are doing various activities in no accordance with Shamarpa. We two are also lost due to supporting your side." They were moved by contemplating on sorrow and scolding with bad words, beating the chest with hands like sticks.

The trail from Nyalam to the centre of Nepal was almost one narrow footpath trodden by hundreds of travellers in single [footprint]. The trail was narrow and rocks were rugged and steep. All the valleys were like a hair comb in upside position. There were lots of rugged crevices. Rivers were also full of turbulent waves. We could not hear each other's voice even if we shouted. [785] Wild animals like tigers, leopards, bears, snakes etc., were roaring, shouting, and murmuring. The dense forest of lower valleys (*rong*) of Mon [i.e., South of the Himalayas] were so dark that even the light of sun and moon could not enter. Human flesh-eating leeches (*srin bu*) like Pema or Serpata were falling down from trees on our body like rainfall. The route was muddy and swamp. Shaggy rope-like twigs were coming down from trees which made it difficult to walk on ground also.

Neither could we hear the names of the refuge-teaching Buddha, nor the words of holy Dharma of true refuge. We could not find any companion sangha who could help us. Our stock of nutritious food like meat, tsampa, etc., was finished in the dark valley of Mon. Travelling like a beggar in desert and eating lowland foods like rice flour and rock-like dried food (*rdo bro*) etc, we arrived nearby Nepal's three districts (*gling*). At that time, Lama Shamarpa arrived with his entourage following us. He said, "These two Chinese junior military officers were residents from Zi tshon Chin thu (Sichuan Chengdu) they could go with us to the royal palace in Kathmandu (Yambu) of Nepal because they can bear heat. Ministers, army chief and Tibetan people should stay

here during the time of summer." [786] They put us on a high hill called Mahādevasuli[1113] nearby the big stone statue of lying Maheśvara (Lha chen dBang phyug) [probably Budha Nilakantha]. That was higher and cooler. We stayed on a small hut built by hay. We stayed there almost one month with Gorkha watchmen. Shamarpa and two Chinese junior military officers went to the town of Kathmandu.

Edition

rdzar mun su bhi rdar zhes pa dang| 'du har 'bal grub shing zer ba gnyis la skad gnyis smra ba'i kha pa zhwa dmar rang gi grwa rigs 'gyur med rnam rgyal bcas srung bya'i do dam du bskos te sde mda' lcang rkang 'gros ma 'pher stabs 'do li zhig gi nang du bcug cing | de 'phros nged rnams rkang thang rang du byi'u khras 'ded pa bzhin du mi 'gro dbang med kyis dbyar [|]

zla drug pa'i nang bal yul tsha ba'i rong du 'khrid byung skabs mdo lugs la'ang rong srog rong gis bcad na skye ba lnga brgya'i [784] *bar mi lus mi thob par gsungs shing | de mtshungs sngags lugs la ni rang gi phung khams skye mched thams cad lhar gsol gshis dus la ma babs na 'pho ba tsam yang mi rung bar bshad stabs mtha' mi chos don mi go ba rnam kyi spyod tshul ltar byas pas ci la 'thus kyang |*

pha rol pa rnams kyi bsam par gad g.yang sogs la lcebs mchongs byas dgos lam bca' 'phreng dam par byis pa chung ngu la ma mas byed pa ltar bzung zhing skyor ba'am | rgyab tu 'kher ba sogs byas nas skyod skabs wang ka can rgya mi dpon chung gnyis kyang nged rnams dang lhan cig mnyam 'khrid yod gshis | khyod bod pa rnams kyis sngon ma yang mi thub bzhin du thal song gi bya ba tshubs chen de byas thog | da lam yang bla ma zhwa dmar bar bltos med sna tshogs byas pa la brten nas khyod tsho'i zhor la nged gnyis kyang 'phung song zhes mya ngan gyi sgom dang | tshig ngan gyi bzlas pa byed cing | rang lus kyi brang rnga rang lag gi dbyu gus rdung bzhin du 'gro gi 'dug pa dang phyogs mtshungs nged bod mi rnams kyang bskyod pa na |

gnya' nang nas bal yul lte bar ma 'byor bar gyi lam thams cad mi brgya rkang gcig gi shul du bgrod dgos pa'i bca' 'phrang dam zhing g.yang rong gzar ba dang | ri klung thams cad skra shad kyi kha gyen du bslangs

1113 F.X. Erhard commented because of cursive wiring, "It is likely: Śivapuri. S and p are often confused in the editions of TP's autobiography." (Erhard 6 May 2025, personal communication).

pa dang mtshungs pa'i gzar zug che zhing lung hral mang ba | chu klung rnams kyang rba rlabs kyi ral pa gnams du gsig cing | 'ur sgra drag po sgrog pas phan tshun gyi [785] *'phros gtam skad shugs che cher byas kyang mi thos pa | stag gzig dom sbrul la sogs pa gcan gzan ma rung pa du mas mi snyan pa'i ngar skad gsang mthor sgrog pa | mon rong ljon shing gi nags tshal stug por 'khrigs pas nyi zla'i snang ba yang cher mi gsal zhing | shing nags kyi khrod nas srin 'bu bda'am | 'bu serpa ta bya ba sogs mi'i sha khrag la dga' ba'i 'bu sbrang rnams yas nas lus la char ltar 'bab cing| brlan zhing gsher ba'i 'dam rdzab dang | ljon shing gi sba thag 'dzings pas 'og gzhi kun khyab ste rkang pa'i 'degs 'jog kyang bsgyur dka' ba |*

skyabs ston pa po sangs rgyas kyi mtshan yang mi thos shing | skyabs dngos dam chos kyi sgro tsam yang mi grags pa | skyabs sgrub pa'i gling du bod kyi sha rtsam sogs bza' btung ro bcud dang ldan pa rnams kyang rim pas zad nas 'bras rtsam dang | rdo bro dogs mon zas kyi 'tsho ba ma chad tsam la brten nas mu to ba mya ngam gyi thong la bgrod pa bzhin du bal yul gling gsum dang nye ba'i char slebs pa na | bla ma zhwa dmar ba 'khor bcas kyang nged rnams kyi rjes zin 'byor nas "rgya mi dpon chung gnyis po zi chon chin thu hu'i mi rigs yin gshin tsha ba thub yong bas nged dang stabs mtshungs bal yul yam bu'i rgyal khang du 'gro | bka' mda' mtshon bod mi rnams dbyar sgong gi mon tshad ma chog par 'dir sdod ces lha chen dbang phyug [786] *chen po'i rdo sku che ba zhig mtsho nang du gan rgyal la bzhugs pa'i nye 'gram ma haa de wa su li zhes ri mtho zhing cud zad bsil ba zhig 'dug pa der rtsa khyim ched bzos byed bcug pa'i nang du nged rnam dang | srung bya'i gor mi rnams lhan cig zla ba gcig tsam gyi bar bzhag nas bla ma zhwa dmar 'khor bcas dang | rgya mi dpon chung gnyis po lhan cig bal yul yam bu'i grong khor du sngon la song zhing |*

2.3.2d Dialogue Between Tenzin Peljor and Bahadur Shah

Source: Ed. 1987 Chengdu, 856.2–867.14.

Translation (PPP, XY)

[Bahadur Shah:] "Tibet and Gorkha are performing virtuous acts in good ways since the time of the successive reigns of the kings (*rgyal thog rim pa*). When dogs fight with each other they don't hurt the skin. Likewise, there is dispute and fighting these days but there is no significant

reason. However, this Lama which is called Shamarpa is not invited by the Gorkha King, ministers, or people. Either you, Tibetans dispatched to Nepal or [Shamarpa] Lama came by himself. Whatever might be the case, when Shamarpa came with his entourage, there were many people from the Tibetan Regent including a treasurer Ganden Kachu (rtse drung dGa' ldan dka' bcu) who used to prepare incense and medicines. There were both monastics and laymen [with him]. We talked about exchange of old and new silver coins (ṭam kha). At that time Lama Shamarpa put forth his intention in the meeting, pretending to have good intention. In the Earth monkey year, when Gorkha had decided to send an army to Tibet, we asked Shamarpa and his group: 'Do you have a plan to return to your motherland from Nepal where you are living here?"'

He [Shamarpa:] said: 'We look for whatever happens in Gorkha, happiness or suffering. We entrust you and we will not return Tibet anyway.'

[Bahadur Shah:] "To convince us, king and ministers Shamarpa and his group took an oath in front of Maheśvara and Viṣṇu according to our custom. They also took oath at the two *stūpa*s (i.e., 'Phags pa shing kun and Bya rung kha shor) according to Tibetan culture voluntarily. Furthermore, during the time of dispatching a Gorkha army in the Earth Monkey year, Shamarpa himself came to our door and distributed his group to lead the Gorkha army. At that time, all of them were active to work with Gorkha."

[Bahadur Shah:] "Also during the time of the sKyid grong (Kerung) Treaty, Shamarpa himself accepted that he would help for the benefit of Gorkha. In the beginning, he considered to take you Tibetans into hostage but changed his mind later and charged [you] a huge amount [of silver]. After that Tibetan people came to break the agreement to pay ransom money. ['']In the case of such big amount, Tibetans wanted to break the treaty. They invited Chinese for help which was not good for both of us.['] [858] This was the opinion of king and ministers."

[Shamarpa:] 'There are gift envoys (*mtshams zhu mi sna*) and merchants (*tshong pa*) from Tibet's Ü-tsang to China. From the Chinese side, there are ambans and a small number of armies stationed regularly in Tibet. In general terms, Tibetans are under the Chinese Emperor (*gong ma*). But in fact, Tibetans need not pay the slightest amount of tax to China. Likewise, there is no significant cause [for the Chinese] to support Tibetans in any case.'

[Shamarpa:] 'Fundamentally, the Chinese Emperor was very powerful and has more armies. The cause of the entry of the Chinese army into

Nepal might be to cross independent states from Yerkhen (Yarkhant) to Ladhak etc. The route is very crooked and difficult to cross. There is no other route than passing through Ü-tsang. It is feared that before reaching Nepal, Tibetans would be displaced. To prevent this kind of situation from happening, the Tibetans would prioritise their own interest. Previously, a small army from China and Tibetan army from Ü-tsang could not display power against Gorkha in the Earth Monkey year.'

[Shamarpa:] 'Now [859], the exchange [rate] of coins not immediately decided. Therefore, it looks like a bug with a tail. As per the previous contract, important and powerful Tibetans certainly sufferred loss. Some of them can be taken in custody by skillful means of gentle deception instead of killing. They are in total loss to pay ransom money. Especially, this Tashilhunpo monastery became richer than the government those days. My elder brother, the previous protecter (*skyabs mgon*) Panchen was an expert in both [Buddhist] dharma and worldly activities. He was revered by all Chinese, Tibetans and Mongols etc. Particularly, the Emperor invited him to the royal Palace (*rgyal khab*) in Peking and worshipped him. That property does not belong to the attendants of Tashilhunpo, including the treasurer and ordinary monks, but belongs to Panchen himself. [As a saying goes,] these days, without an owner holding, the door-keeping dog becomes the owner. The treasurer (*phyag mdzod*, the other brother of Panchen) and steward in charge of food (*gsol dpon*) are enjoying that property, pretending not knowing that I myself am a real brother of the previous Panchen. Now, as a saying goes, thrown into water is the dog [whose rope] is cut off decisively. Likewise, real goods of Tashilhunpo should be taken by Gorkhas. It should also be done as the aforementioned way to achieve the wish.'

[Bahadur Shah:] "The ways of taking you and dispatching an army into Tashilhunpo etc., was essentially learned [from Shamarpa] as stated above. [860] [Formerly,] whatever told by the Lama himself was beneficial for Gorkha. Although having seized you, we were not satisfied. Dispatching an army to Tashilhunpo was different from many big and small kingdoms in Mon area where their lands are captured. We did not wrongly repay the kindness of Lama Shamarpa and his entourage. His desire became stronger and became proud also."

[Bahadur Shah:] "Now extremely big armies of Chinese, Mongol, Khampa[1114] etc. (*rgya mi dang sogs po khams pa*) are coming from Nyalam and Kyirong. They killed Gorkha armies stationed in Nyalam

1114 Khampa here might refer to rGyalrongic people.

and Kyirong and approached three places of Nepal. By that incident, Shamarpa either poisoned himself or whatever happened, he was no longer in his residence which was nearby the Nepal *stūpa*."

[Bahadur Shah:] "So Doring Kāji should go to meet the leader of Chinese and Tibetan armies coming down from Kyirong. He is Chinese Emperor's internal minister (*nang blon* = Mnc. dorgi amban, 内大臣) *alias* Krung thang. [Doring Kāji] please go to meet him and tell him that all those bad things happened were due to Lama Shamarpa. Now, he passed away. The Gorkha king and ministers did some mistakes following the advices of Lama Shamarpa, which was not a grave fault. By making those events clear [to the Chinese Krung thang], Doring Kājī should himself plead considerately." [861]

[Bahadur Shah:] "The most important thing is to halt and reverse the Chinese and Tibetan armies before entering the three places of Nepal. For the time being, there shall not be a long-term stationed army in this region of Nepal as under the system in Tibet. Goods from Tashilhunpo as well as goods taken from the Tibetan ministers and military chiefs should be returned if originals are obtained. Otherwise, there should be substituted for real goods The compensation payment (*dge stong*) should be performed for the deceased Chinese and Tibetan soldiers according to Tibetan tradition. Injuries should be treated at cost according to the regulations. Later, gift envoys (*mtshams zhu mi sna*) should be sent to Great Emperor of China and to the *Jinas* of Tibet, father and son, these two (i.e., the Dalai Lama and Panchen *bod kyi rgyal ba yab sras gnyis*) annually. This type of service should be done immediately with accountability. We should avoid doubts. We do according to whatever we promise without delay."

The sunrise cannot be disturbed. Like teeth cannot hold vomiting, he could not hold it within and cried out the fox-talk (*wa skad*). It is said in a proverb that as a poor person had an experience with the dog, dogs would run away if there is a spike on the waist.

Similarly, I [Doring Tenzin Peljor] spoke with an elevated voice, "Whether it is true that Shamarpa had secretly made instigation, in fact, the Gorkha King and ministers showed behaviours of ingratitude to the kindness of the teachings and beings of the snow land Tibet [862]. It should not be forgotten in the heart of the experiencers whatever wrong behaviour done previously. The result of actions is infallible and does not fail the suffering of them at maturation. The effect of Karma will ripen even in this life. Whatever experiences we feel now are the results of our previous actions and subtle obscuration without any doubt."

[Tenzin Peljor:] "When we Tibetans formerly requested to go back to our country, you did not send us, [detaining us] for more than one year. Due to the compassion of the triple gems, we did not die. Now we are acquainted with the local condition of earth and water. Our spiritual practices developed through everyday recitation. Now we are not willing to go but we are moving to welcome Chinese and Tibetan armies. They will come to this land anyway. As we will know upon their arrival as such, there is no reason to leave without deliberation."

[Tenzin Peljor:] "Moreover, Lama Shamarpa was a famous and great Tibetan Lama. Especially, he was close to the *Jinas* of Tibet, father and son, these two (i.e., the Dalai Lama and Panchen *bod kyi rgyal ba yab sras gnyis*). Whatever might be the activities of this Lama, we Tibetan people do not lose faith and respect him. Now, there is doubt whether his mind has been absorbed into Dharmadhātu (death). If it would be true, the Gorkha King and all his ministers held him as the embodiment of triple gems while he was alive. [863]. It was said that he did not speak even a little improper word between Tibet and Gorkha. Henceforth, how would the Chinese and Tibetan lords (*bla dpon*) abide by the issue of the life or death of the Shamarpa? We, Chinese and Tibetan living here will be responsible for giving an answer only when we return to our countries altogether. I could not go myself alone."

[Bahadur Shah:] "Shamarpa is indeed dead. We have to see the reality about the rumour about him as he was dead or still alive. One might think that it is kept secret intentionally. Furthermore, one might think we, King and ministers killed him due to ill-will. Doring Kāji himself should visit the residence of Lama near the *stūpa* Bya rung Kha shor (Boudhanath) and should investigate his dead body, checking whether he is dead or alive."

[Bahadur Shah:] "Likewise, instigation of [Shamarpa] Lama between Gorkha and Tibet was not clarified by the King and ministers, as it is considered to be beneficial for Gorkha itself. Nobody ever thought it would happen as such that there is no [benefit for the Gorkha] people and us. Because of [our] actions following the other's word, given that the one who made the plan is dead himself, it will not make happy the beings living in the three places of Nepal."

[Bahadur Shah:] "As for whether Lama Shamarpa instigated between Tibet and Gorkha, though Lama passed away, there are alive Lama's family, member, the capable person of acting as treasurer, [the consort] called Bu mo lags, *gsol dpon* rJe drung and so forth [864]. We should verify [with them], as fish emerge visible in clear water."

[Bahadur Shah:] "If Doring Kāji could not go there alone, there are two Chinese junior military officers (*rgya mi dpon chung*) taken last year from Nyalam with you. There are also two Chinese junior military officers taken from Kyirong. There are four Chinese junior military officers in Kathmandu now. Two of them can go to Kyirong with Doring Kāji, while [the other] two of them can go to Nyalam with one servant of Doring Kāji (Sri gcod Tshe ring). When you, Chinese and Tibetans are completely sent back, Chinese and Tibetan armies will penetrate Nepal. If you returned to your own country alone in the manner of criminals freed from prison, there are concerns that the message is not clearly done."

[Bahadur Shah:] "Therefore, as discussed before, Doring Kāji, his servant, and the four Chinese junior military officers should [be divided in two groups and] sent to Kyirong and Nyalam. G.Yuthog Kāji, the Nyalam military officer, and representatives of the monasteries of Saskya and Tashilhunpo (*sa bkras*) stay as hostages (*mi gte*) here in Gorkha at their will. Doring Kāji should meet the Chinese and Tibetan officers and solidiers immediately to pull the situation into pieces. When it is carried out, he should return here and then, they will be sent back all at once. Then, it is suitable for all to go back" [865].

I [Tenzin Peljor] said in response, "If you have doubt whether I will cheat, I will not go. If you believe me, why would I do something not in congruent with words and thoughts? I could even speculate whoever of you two, King Rarna Badur [Rana Bahadur Shah] or uncle Badur Saheb [Bahadur Shah], together with me, and any of the Chinese or Tibetans here, come jointly to Krung thang [Fuk'anggan] together. Like what has been told to me, all misdeeds were incited by Lama Shamarpa. Whether the King and ministers of Gorkha had participated can be inquired with all the Chinese and Tibetans here. Forgiveness will be granted when it is made clear. Furthermore, having regretted the past deeds, Gorkha itself should commit not to repeat the same thing again from now on. After that, we, all Chinese and Tibetans here, will support what you said. By this, your desired result will be realised. Otherwise, if we, one or two Chinese or Tibetans, go to do as you wish, your desired result will not be realised. We, the petitioners, will not foresee the consequential guilt. I will definitely not go alone"

After that, Gorkha King [here in fact, Prince Bahadur Shah] and ministers discussed about in a certain house. At the end, they told me,

[Bahadur Shah, etc.:] "We have great hope with Doring Kāji. We have trust in you. All of you, Chinese and Tibetans, can leave within three days if you cannot leave tomorrow. If a Tibetan and a Chinese cannot go to Nyalam, you all Tibetans and Chinese should go together to Kyirong and meet the Chinese and Tibetan armies. The two places, Nyalam and Kyirong, are valleys in the manner of a limited size. [Not knowing what takes place in Kyirong], the Chinese and Tibetan armies from the Nyalam direction are pressing towards Nepal. You can make connection and stop the armies to enter here."

[Bahadur Shah, etc.:] "Gorkha King Rana Bahadur Shah is young and has escaped to the Indian border. It is certain that he is indeed not here. The Royal family member, Bham Saheb [Bam Bahadur Shah], is in command around Kyirong and now retreating to Balpo rDzong [Nuwakot]. These days I, Badur Saheb [Bahadur Shah], am in charge of everything. Otherwise, there is nobody in charge. Hence, I cannot go in person. However, I can send two or three ministers with you. As Doring Kāji said, you should make a petition to Krung thang [Fuk'anggan] with the Chinese and Tibetans here."

In that evening, I myself, minister G.Yu thog, Nya [lam] Sho [pa] sNe stod, Tashilhunpo Thang smad Nor dbang and the Secretary (*drung yig*) of Saskya monastery, left the hut in the forest at the foothill of the mountain. All the four Chinese junior military officers in Nepal [Kathmandu] who were seized by Gorkha also came together with us to the *stūpa* of Bya rung Kha shor. When we, Tibetan and Chinese, went to investigate the corpse (*sku gdung*) of Lama Shamarpa, about ten monks from Yangs pa can Monastery were performing death ritual for him. The actual corpse was wrapped with cotton, adorned with all objects of consecration, and put in squatted position. It seems to have been five or six days since his death. Because of the hot weather of Nepal in the sixth month in summer, it had almost decayed and emitted a strong smell. To investigate the condition, we opened the cotton and saw the wart of the right hand and the mole at the face. We gained certainty by observing everything and came to the belief in his death in the form of an agreement by all the Tibetans and Chinese present, which was not dependant on mere arguments of conventional truth. Thus, we decided to return within three days from there. That night, in the hut on the mountain slope to the north *stūpa* of Bya rung Kha shor, the four Chinese junior military officers were also instructed to return.

Edition

bod dang gor kha gnyis rgyal thog rim pa'i dus nas dkar 'tsho legs lam la gnas mus su song gshis khyi 'thab shor kyang khyi lpags mi ral ba'i dpe ltar deng skabs kyang 'khrug 'dzing zlos rtsod sogs gzhi che gang yang yong don med kyang | bla ma zhwa dmar ba zer ba 'di nged gor kha rgyal blon 'bangs dang bcas pas ched gnyer kyi bos pa zhig gtan nas min rung | khyed rang bod pa rnams kyis bal yul 'dir brdzangs pa'am | bla ma rang gi rang shed kyis yongs pa ji ltar yang don du zhwa dmar ba 'khor bcas bal yul du slebs bstun bod rgyal po'i mi sna spos sman sgrub mi rtse drung dga' ldan dka' bcu can ser skya sbrel po dang | nged rnams dngul Tam kha gsar rnying gi 'gro rgyug 'dza' khyad skor la 'phros mol byed skabs bla ma zhwa dmar rang nas bsam bzang yin khul gyis bod gor lab gzhi'i bar du rang shed 'dod 'tshangs byas gshis |

de sngon sa spre lo gor khas bod du dmag gtong bar thog chod du zhwa dmar ston 'khor rnams skye sa bod dang | sdod sa bal yul du byas par brten yul zhen blos ma thongs par phyi lag nang gros sogs byas dgos bod du phyir log byed dogs kyi rgyu mtshan nan che rim por mol lan du | nged 'khor bcas la skyid sdug legs nyes ci 'dru 'chol rung gor kha rang blos gtad kyi sdod pa las da cha bod du 'gro thebs med ces zer bar brten | de [857] *ltar yin na nged rgyal blon rnams yid 'ches phyir zhwa dmar ston 'khor tshang mas gor kha dang blo sems 'dun ma gcig sgril byed pa'i mna' skyel dgos labs par ngo g.yog tshang mas dbang phyug dang | khyab 'jug gi gnas yul du gor kha rang gi lugs srol dang mthun pa'i mna' skyel dang | de mtshungs mchod rten rnam gnyis kyi drung du bod pa'i rang lugs kyi mna' skyel bcas dwang blangs kyis byas song yang da dung yid ma ches par sa spre lo bod du dmag gtong skabs bla ma zhwa dmar rang 'di gor sgor thog zla gros rnams khag bgos kyis gor dmag gi sa sne lam rgyus su btang bar de dag tshang mas gor kha dang khyad med kyi hur bskyed byas byung ba ma zad |*

skyid grong du chings sgrig skabs kyang bla ma zhwa dmar rang nas gor kha'i gtam don la phan pa byed rgyu yin zhes khas blangs ngos bskyod byas song skabs thog ma'i char khyed rang bod po rnams de skabs 'dzin bzung byed rtsis la rjes su blo sems 'gyur nas 'dzin thal ma byas 'dug kyang dngul 'bor chen len rgyu yod pa sogs gtam don la slebs che ba byas byung gshis | nged rang rgyal blon tshang mas nang gcig gi mi dang khyad med kyi bdag rkyen che ba byas shing | de rjes bod nas rdzong sgo'i bslu rin chag zhu bar mi sna ser skya sbrel po snga phyir rim 'byor byung dus | dngul 'byor che thog bod pas kyang nad mi theg pa bden tshod bcas da cha chings khra zur pa'i don bzhin chag ma btang

bar da dung mthar skyel rang byas na bod kyi rgyab rtsar rgya mi yod [858] *gshis slar rang gzhan tshang mar mi legs pa yong 'dra zhes nged rgyal blon rnams nas labs pa yin rung* |

de'i lan du bla ma zhwa dmar rang nas zer rigs su bod dbus gtsang nas rgya nag tu mtshams zhu mi sna dang de zhor tshong pa'i 'gro lam yod cing | *rgya nag nas kyang bod du am ban dang* | *dpon dmag nyung bsdus shig gtan sdod byas stabs bod pa rnams rgya nag gong ma'i mnga' 'og yin, tshul spom g.yor du gleng ba tsam las* | *don du bod nas rgya nag la khral 'bab skar li tsam yang 'bul ma dgos stabs rgya nag nas kyang do gal che pos bod kyi rgyab gnyer ni gtan nas byas mi yong* |

gzhi nas rgya nag gong ma chen po stobs 'byor che zhing dpung mang ba yin 'dug rung | *bal yul du dpung 'jug mthar skyel byed par 'gro lam ni yang na gong ma rang gi mnga' zhabs yer khen nas la dwags sogs rgyal khag mi gcig pa'i lung pa khad 'chus brgyud yong dgos gshis sa thag shin tu ring zhing 'gro lam mi bde ba'i babs kyis yong ma bde zhing* |

de min bod dpus gtsang nas ma brgyud par yong lam med stabs gor kha'i sngon la bod pa rang yang brlag dogs de rigs mi yong ba'i thabs 'khos bod pa rang nas kyang bdag don bdag gces byed pa gzhir bcas shing | *rgya nag gi dpung nyung bsdus dang bod dbus gtsang gi dmag mis ni de sngon sa spre lo dang khyad med pas gor kha la nus po thongs mi yong bas* |

da lam dngul sprod len skor kyang 'phral du thag ma [859] *bcad par 'bu mjug ma can du bzhag thog sngon ma'i chad don ltar bod kyi mi drag gras gces la phangs pa 'ga' zhig 'jam bslus thabs mkhas kyis 'dzin bzung byas nas ma bsad par sgor skyil byas tshe de dag gi bslu rin sogs ci shor phangs med sprad yong zhing* | *lhag don bkra shis lhun po 'di deng dus gzhung las kyang lhag pa'i chas dngos phyug pa yod cing* |

de yong ba'i rgyu rkyen nged kyi jo jo skyabs mgon paṇ chen sku gong ma chos 'jig rten gnyis kar mkhyen rgya che stabs rgya bod hor sogs tshang mas 'dud pa dang | *lhag don gong mas pi cing rgyal khab tu spyan drangs nas mchod bsnyen bkur pa'i mthu las byung ba ma gtogs bkra shis lhun po'i phyag mdzod kyis mtshon zhabs gras rnams dang* | *gra dmangs kyi nor bsags pa las byung ba min kyang* | *deng dus mi bdag bdag dang bdag po sgo khyi'i dpe bzhin nged paṇ chen gong ma'i spun ngo ma yin bzhin du khab sngo skud skya tsam la longs su spyod dbang me par de dag tshang ma phyag mdzod dang gsol dpon sogs nas byed spyod pa bcas* | *da sgos gtam dper chur skyur bya khyi kho thag chod pa'i dpe bzhin bkra shis lhun po'i dngos zog rnams kyang gor kha rang nas len thub pa byed dgos la gong gsal khag gi 'dod don 'grub thabs kyang 'di 'dru byed dgos zhes* [|]

khyed rang rnams 'dzin bzung byed lugs dang | bkra shis lhun por dmag gtong lugs sogs tshang ma'i nang gnad bslabs byung don bzhin sngar phan bla ma rang [860] *nas gang zer la spang blangs byas par gor kha'i gtam don la phan slebs che ba byung gshis de don la cha bzhag nas khyed rnams 'dzin bzung byas pas de tsam gyi nom pa che ba ma byung rung | bkra shis lhun por dmag btang ba la ni de snga phan mon rgyal khag che chung mang po'i rgyal sa blangs pa dang mi 'dra ba'i yong sgo che ba byung gshis bla ma zhwa dmar ba 'khor bcas la'ang drin lan log 'jal du ma song bar 'dod blo khengs pa byas pa yin rung |*

deng dus rgya mi dang | sogs po | khams pa sogs kyi dpung dmag shin tu mang ba gnya' nang dang | skyid grong gnyis ka brgyud nas yong ste gnya' skyid du yod pa'i gor dmag sa srung pa rnams kyang bcom ste da cha bal yul gling gsum dang thag nye ba'i sa char 'byor 'dug stabs der brten bla ma zhwa dmar ba ni dug 'gams pa'am ji ltar yang bal yul mchod rten du sdod bzhin thog 'das nas mi 'dug pas |

de sgos rdo ring ka ci rang sang nyin las mi 'gyangs pa skyid grong br gyud yong mi'i rgya bod dmag dpung gi 'go yod rgya nag gong ma chen po'i nang blon krung thang zer ba zhig yod 'gud pa des sku mdun du ngos bskyad thog sngar phan gyi bya ba ngan pa thams cad byed pa'i gros 'don bla ma zhwa dmar ba yin rung da cha 'das tshar ba dang | gor kha rgyal blon rnams bla ma zhwa dmar ba'i kha rjes su 'brengs ba'i nyes pa tsam las le khag che ba med luṭ kyi babs gsed dgongs pa gsal dwangs yong ba zhig rdo ring ka ci rang nas zhu phyogs gang [861] *zab byas te |*

yang tig don gyi snying po da lam 'phral du rgya bod kyi dpung dmag rnams bal yul gling gsum 'dir ma lhags pa'i phyir bzlog thub pa zhig dang | phugs yun kyang bal yul gyi ljongs 'dir deng dus bod la'ang gang byed kyi srol lam ltar rgya mi'i dpon dmag gtan sdod byed ma dgos pa zhig byung rjes bkra shis lhun po'i sku chas dang | kyed rang bka' mda' sogs kyi chas dngos blangs pa rnams la ngo yod ngo dang | ngo med tshab sgrig byed rgyu dang | rgya bod kyi mi drag shi rmas byung ba rnams la bod lugs kyi dge stong rmas 'jal yang khrims srol ltar sprod dgos byung rung mi sprod ka med thog | phyin chad nas rgya nag gong ma chen po dang | bod kyi rgyal ba yab sras gnyis la lo ltar mtshams zhu mi sna'i gdong babs mtshungs 'grub tshod kyi dpya khral tsam 'bul dgos byung rung bka' gnong ltar le thogs phra bzung med pa phul chog pa zhu rgyu yin pas de rtsis snyan zhu byed par 'phral thon byed dgos zhes sngar lugs spom g.yor rjig spom gyi spros pa dor nas |

nyi shar sbar mos ma khebs shing | ngan skyugs sos ma zin par kha zhe mdo sbug med pa'i wa skad shor byung ba na | 'jig rten gyi gram dper khyi nyams sprang pos lon na khyi rgyug sked pa gzer |

zhes pa'i dpe ltar kho bo rang nas kyang mgrin pa gzengs su bstod de gong gi gtam lan du bla ma zhwa dmar ba nas shog sbug rlung bskyod byas pa bden min ji ltar yang | don du gor kha rgyal blon rnams nas bod gangs can [862] *gyi bstan 'gro spyi sgos la drin lan log 'jal gyi bya spyod ngan pa snga phyir ji byas byed pa rnams kyi sems la'ang ma brjed gsal bar yod pa gzhir bcas gshis | rgyu 'bras mi bslu ba'i bden mthus rnam smin gyi myong bya 'khur mi dgos pa ni ci la yong yang da lam skye ba 'di ga rang la mthong chos myong 'gyur gyi 'bras bu 'phral du smin thub pa 'di yang las sgrib srab mo zhig yin pa gor ma chag cing |*

de snga phan nged bod mi rnams rang yul du log chog pa mol du ni gtan nas ma btang bar lo 'khor gcig lhag tsam gyi ring sdod dgos byung rung dkon mchog gi thugs rjer na shi rkyen dbang du ma gyur pa'i thog sa chu yul babs kyang 'dris nas 'khos dpags kyi kha 'don dge sbyor 'phel par yod stabs da cha phar 'bad rtsol gyi 'gro mi dgos par tshur rgya bod gyi dmag dpung bsu bar yod gshis | de dag rnams yul 'dir slebs bstun 'gro 'dug ji ltar byed nged rang rnams kyis shes pa las da lta 'phral du gya tshom gyis 'gro dgos don mi 'dug [|]

lhag don bla ma zhwa dmar ba ni sbyir nas bod kyi bla chen yongs grags dang | bye brag skyabs mgon rgya dbang yab sras gnyis ka'i sku'i nye dur gyur gshis | bla ma rang mdzad spyod ci 'dra gnang yang | nged bod mi tshang ma dad gus mi bzlog pa'i gnas bcas | da lam dgongs pa chos dbyings su thim tshul zer ba'ang bden yod min som nyi dang | gal te bden pa yin srid rung sngar phan zhul bazhugs dus gor kha rgyal blon tshang mas kyang skyabs [863] *gsum kun 'dus su 'dzin pa las | bod gor bar la 'os min byas gleng tsam zer mi med par da cha shi gson thug pa'i gtam la rgya bod bla dpon tshang mas cha 'jog ci la mdzad gshis nged cag rgya bod 'dir yod tshang ma phyogs mtshungs su phyir slog byed nas las | kho bo gcig bu sngon la 'gro thal byed mi nus zhes mol ba* [|]

de'i lan du bla ma zhwa dmar ba rang shi nges las | ma shi bar shi grags bskyed pa nas dgos dbang sbug zhugs kyis sbas pa dang | yang nged rgyal blon tshang mas bsam ngan gyis bsad pa sogs yin min rdo ring ka ci yid ches kyad zhib lta byed dgos yod rung da lta bla ma'i phung po mchod rten bya rung kha shor gyi nye 'gram bla ma rang gi sdod khang du yod 'dug pas der ngos bskyod shis gson ci byas zhib 'jug gyis |

de mtshungs bod gor bar du bla mas shog sbug rlung bskyod byas skor sngar phan nged rgyal blon sus kyang mi zer ba ni gor kha rang gi gtam don la phan slebs che ba sngar mus bzhin yod shag kho na las | mi med rang med 'di 'dra byas yong bsam pa ma byung rung | gzhan zer kha rjes su 'brangs pa'i bya ba la brten nas da cha 'char 'don byed mi rang

yang shi bas ma chog bal yul gling gsum gyi 'gro ba rnams kyang sdod bzod mi bde ba'i bya ba 'di la thug song zhing |

bod gor bar du bla ma zhwa dmar bas dkrugs shing byas min gyi thad bla ma rang 'das tshar rung | bla ma'i nang mi phyag mdzod kyi go chod bu mo lags zer ba dang | gsol dpon rje [864] *drung sogs da lta ma shi bar bsdad yod stabs de dag dang ra sprod rang byas tshe chu dwangs nya gsal yong ba yod |*

rdo ring ka ci rang gcig rkyang 'gro ma nus tshe snga lo gnya' nang nas rgya mi dpon chung gnyis khyed rang tsho dang dus mnyam du 'dzin bzung byas pa dang phyogs mtshungs su skyid grong du'ang rgya mi dpon chung gnyis 'dug pa yang de skabs 'dzin bzung gi da lta rgya mi bzhi ka [y]am bu rang du yod gshis rdo ring ka ci rang gi thog de gras nas rgya mi gnyis skyid grong du btang ba dang dus mnyam du rdo ring ka ci'i g.yog po gcig dang | rgya mi gnyis sprel gyis gnya' nang du gtang chog pa byed pa las khyed rgya bod 'dir yod tshang ma sdebs gcig la phyir slog byas tshe rgya bod kyi dmag dpung rnam bal yul du btang shor gyi thog nas khyed rang rnams kyang nyes can btson rwa nas thar ba ltar lam rkyang rang yul du log 'gro shag las phar song gi mi la tshur yong gi lan gsal tsam yang ma byung dogs bcas |

des na snga 'phros rdo ring ka ci ngo g.yog dang | rgya mi dpon chung bzhi po gnya' skyid so sor khag bgos kyis bskyod thog de'i bar g.yu thog ka ci dang | gnya' nang sde pa | sa bkras kyi sku tshab bcas 'di gor gang dga' gang skyid du mi gte lta bur sgor ba'i rdo ring ka ci nas rgya bod kyi dpung dmag rnams la babs gsed byas te don smin gyi thog nas tshur 'khor byung 'phral 'dod khengs kyi rdzong ba dang bcas 'dir yod tshang ma sdebs gcig la phyir log byas chog pa byed rgyu yin zhes [865] *zer bar |*

de lan du kho bas | nged nas mtha' ngan byas dogs yid mi ches pa yod na ni 'gro rgyu yang mi 'dug cing | yang yid ches blos 'gel byed rgyu yin na ni kho bos kha zhe mi mtshungs pa ci la byed pas nged rang gi bsam tshod ltar na rgyal po rarna sba dur ngo ma'am a khu sba dur sa heb gnyis po su rung zhig nged rgya bod 'dir yod rnams dang mnyam sbrel gyis krung thang sku mdun du phyin thog da lam nged la gang zer ltar 'os min gyi bya ba tshang ma byed mi bla ma zhwa dmar ba yin pa las | gor kha rgyal blon la le khag med nges bcas de don dngos gnas yin min rgya bod 'di yod rnams la bka' dri phebs phyin dgongs dwangs yong ba yod luṭ kyi babs gsed zhus thog | slad char yang sngon byas la 'gyod sems dang | phyin chad sdom sems zhus chog pa zhes sngon la gor kha rang nas sems chung gis zhus mthar | de rjes mu mthud du nged rgya bod tshang mas khyod rang tsho'i rgyab skyor gyi zhu phyogs gang drag

byas nas 'dod don smin pa yong rigs las | de min nged rgya bod re gnyis nas gong bzhin snyan zhu byas rung khyod rang tshor don smin mi yong ba'i thog tu nged snyan zhu byed mi rnams la'ang dgongs phyogs kyi nyes skyon ji yong mi shes pas gtan nas 'gro mi nus zhes labs pa na |

de 'phral gor kha rgya blon rnams khang pa yan pa zhig la zur tshogs kyis gros bsdur yun ring tsam byas mthar | yang tig gi rdo khar |

de ltar yin na rdo ring ka cir re ba chen pos blos bkal nas [866] *yid mi ches pa byas pas ma 'thus stabs song nyin rang 'phral thon ma thub kyang | nyin gsum las phyir 'gyangs med pa rgya bod 'dir yod tshang ma mnyam thon byas 'thus la | de gras nas bod mi gcig dang | rgya mi gcig mnyam sbrel gyis gnya' nang phyogs ma thon na rgya bod tshang mas skyid grong brgyud phyin tshe skyid grong phyogs kyi rgya bod dpung rnams 'then thub kyang gnya' skyid gnyis lung pa khad 'chus stabs gnya' nang phyogs kyi rgya bod dpung rnams bal yul du lhags nyer bcas de don bzhin byed pa dang | gor rgyal raṭṇa sba dur ni na tshod phra stabs deng dus rgya gar kyi sa mtshams su bras byol la thon nas bsdad med nges dang | rgyal brgyud bham sa heb ni skyid grong phyogs nas lhags pa'i rgya bod dpung dmag gi gdong len sa srung la deng dus bal po rdzong du thon song stabs rgyal khang srid kyi bya ba byed mi sba dur sa heb nged rang las sdod mi gzhan 'os med gshis nged rang ngo ma 'gro ma thub kyang blon po gtso drag gnyis gsum zhig rdo ring ka ci rang gi gang zer ltar khyed rang rgya bod 'dir yod rnams dang lhan cig krung thang la zhu 'bul byed par btang chog pa byed ches zer bar brten* [|]

de'i nub mo rang bka' blon g.yu thog dang | gnya' sho sne stod | bkras lhun thang smad nor dbang | sa skya'i drung yig bcas ri ldebs kyi nags khrod rtswa khyim de nas 'bod mi ched rdzong byas shing | de mtshungs rgya'i dpon chung bal yul du 'dzin bzung sgor skyil byas pa bzhi po yang 'bod [867] *mi btang ste nged rnams mtshod rten bya rung kha shor du 'dzom dus byas thog nas nged rgya bod tshang mas bla ma zhwa dmar ba'i sku gdung la zhib 'jug byed la phyin dus yangs can dgon kyi grwa rigs bcu skor nas gshin chog cig gtong gi 'dug cing | sku gdung ngo ma ras kyis bsgril zhing dbang rdzas tshang ma g.yogs nas de dbus tsog pur bzhag rung | grongs nas zhag lnga drug song 'dug pa ma zad | bal yul tsha ba che thog gshegs dus kyang dbyar sgang zla drug pa'i nang du song gshis rul dri shin tu che ba 'dug rung | bden rdzun nges shes 'drongs khyad pur ras rnams bshig nas tshang mas zhib lta byas par phyag g.yas kyi 'dzer pa dang | zhal ras kyi sme ba sogs gang ci ngo nor med pa nges shes 'drongs nges las kun rdzob rigs min par rgya bod tshang ma kha mthun yid ches byung stabs de nas zhag gsum las ma 'gyungs par bod du phyir log byed par thog bcad de de nub rang nas mchod rten bya rung*

kha shor gyi byang phyogs ri ldebs nags khrod rtswa khyim du rgya dpon chung bzhi po'ang mnyam khrid kyi phyir log byas |

2.3.2e The Betrāvatī Battle and Thereafter

Source: Ed. 1987 Chengdu, 890.6–894.5; 898.5–11.

Translation

[890.4] He [Fuk'anggan] put two of them, sTag gsar Nar sing Mi sar [Dasar Narasiṃha = 達薩爾乃爾興] and Shri Kisiṇa (Śrī Kṛṣṇa = Bhoṭu Pāṇḍe 西爾噶斯納) in Krung thang [Fuk'anggan]'s camp and sent again Ka ci RarNa ji Sāre (= Pāre) [Kāji Raṃjita Pãḍe = 朗穆幾特邦哩] to the headquaters (rDzong) within one [of the three] places (*gling*) in Nepal. During that time, Krung thang [Fuk'anggan] made a plan to enter the camp of Bham Saheb [Bam Bahadur Shah] who led the guardians of the foreigners [Gorkha]. He consulted the heroic warrior Had Gung [Hailanca], an embodiment of Vajrapāṇi, about the timing. Hailanca performed divination and boldly suggested Fuk'anggan that it would be better to halt because it would be impossible to conquer the enemies if they should attack on that day. But Fuk'anggan did not follow his advice, as there is a saying, "A young person desire to talk and young horses desire to run". He dispatched Manchu, Solon, and rGyalrong soldiers in the command of sBa dur (Mnc. *baturu* "warrior") Hailanca. Fuk'anggan himself was in back side to mobilise the army in an open palanquin which is called *yi bya'u* [*yu-jiao* 輿轎] in the Chinese language. At that time, I met the Chinese military officer, Krang rDa lo ye [Zhang Zhi-yuan Da-lao-ye 大老爺] who worked with me as vanguard in the Earth Monkey year [1788] in upper (*stod*) Dingri [Tingri].

When he had to walk, Fuk'anggan took a hat and was dressed in a light and easy way, He left the palanquin, etc., with us and joined the army. He told us "It is shameful to behave like pitiful women and children as you have done. We, soldiers of the Heavenly Dynasty (*lha dmag*) of the Emperor (*gong ma*) will demonstrate a spectacle to the army of the enemies." Then officers and soldiers left us for fighting. We were approximately hundred persons including those of use for the Chinese and Tibetans who were freed from Nepalese sides, those Solon *baturu* and rGyalrong warriors wounded by weapons during the war,

and the sick people due to change of earth and water. Camps of both sides were on the slopes of mountains. Although it would take longer time to cover the distance by walking, we could see each other closely.

G.Yu thog and I climbed on a deodara cedar tree and watched there. Phuzi [Fuk'anggan], Gung [Duke], the Great rDa Krung thang [literally the Grand Secretary] and the retinues were remaining below the mountain. There was commander *baturu* Hailanca who was almost seventy years old. There were Ü [Central Tibet], Solon, Manchu, rGyalrong armies. They crossed the river to the other side without hesitation and climbed the mountain where the Gorkha armies were stationed.

[892] There were Gorkha armies in the command of Bham Saheb [Bam Bahadur Shah] on the right side and in the command of Ka ci 'Dam rdar Sa ras (= Paras) [Kāji Damodara Pā̃ḍe] on the left side. They were fighting to enclose [the Qing army] with firing of guns. Smoke was coming like vapor during summer. The sound of firing and loud noises resembled thousands of thunders at one time.

The Gorkha armies of Kāji Damodara Pā̃ḍe on the left side were not steady or pretending to be unsteady. Anyway, they retreated. Chinese military chief Zhang Zhi-yuan led the troop of about one hundred rGyalrong soldiers like a hero without backing. They dispersed from the centre of their own side and followed the enemies to the other side. Just before they reached the top of the mountain, many Gorkha armies came out of the forest immediately. The retreating [Gorkha] army from the left side came back with a counterattack. Hence, armies of military chief Zhang Zhi-yuan and the dispersed hundred rGyalrong soldiers had broken through inward and continued forward without a single turning back.

Meanwhile, the Gorkha armies of Bam Bahadur Shah on the right side in the hideouts and the Chinese, Mongol, rGyalrong armies of *baturu* Had Gung also fought for a long time. The commanders of both sides were not hurt but many Gorkha soldiers were killed.

[893] On our side, among the four Kalandha [„commanders" Mnc. Kadalara 統領], there was a person whose name was unknown [probably Taifingga]. He was a handsome person wearing a hat with coral on top and peacock feathers as decoration [珊瑚頂戴, 孔雀花翎] and reckoned highly by Krung thang [Fuk'anggan]. Struck by Bham Saheb's bullet on the forehead, he was killed on the battlefield. Because of some Ü (middle/Tibetan) forces were victimised, Fuk'anggan ordered to retreat on our side. During the retreat, they were crossing a narrow bridge made by the trunk of a tree that was cut off over the big river of

Yol mo Gangs ra [Betravati]. The foreigners were chasing our forces closely. Some of our forces were caught by foreigners. [Some] could not find the way to cross bridge and fell down on the river like dung pellet of sheep carried away by dark waves in the river. On that day, we had immensely great loss on our side.

As it is said in the *Skye bo gso thig* [a work by Nāgārjuna, *Nītiśāstra-jantupoṣaṇabindunāma*] "Not listening to instructions, a tortoise losing its wood stick."[1115] Mainly because of the merits of the Great Emperor (*gong ma chen mo*) and particularly the skills of the heroic warrior Hailanca, who was an embodiment of Vajrapāṇi, Krung thang himself formerly had many victories on the battlefields But, just as it is said like after having made ones mouth muddy with butter, one broke the teeth with porcelain clay. Fuk'anggan requested but did not accept the advice of Hailanca. Thus, there was somewhat misfortune on our side. [894] By this incident, Fuk'anggan himself regretted and remained in solitude for one month without meeting any Chinese and Tibetan whoever important or insignificant. We had to stay in his camp in total oblivion for 28 days without doing anything.

[898.5] The person in charge of us prisoners, the liason officer, together with the best among the heroes. Hailanca's son Sir Lan (Lan rda rin) [An-lu 安祿] as well as Solon *baturu* Mung (rda rin) [Meng-xing-bao 蒙興保] left Fuk'anggan ,s army camp. When we were coming out Gorkha's minister Kāji Tarna dzi Saras [unknown, probably Devīdatta Thāpā] together with Shamarpa's family member, [the consort] Bu mo lags, and 8 or 9 servants of both male and female genders came to report Fuk'anggan. We heard their voice but did not see them.

Edition

[…] *stag gsar nar sing mi sar dang | shri ki si ṇa gnyis krung thang sgar thog tu sgor te ka ci rarṇa ji sā ras bal yul gling nang du skyar rdzong mdzad | 'di dus nyin gcig krung thang nas pha rol pa'i sa srung gdong len bham sa heb can gyi sgar thog tu dpung 'jug rtsis mdzad song bar lag na rdo rje'i rnam sprul dpa' bo had gung nas kho rang gi lag gzhur brtag dpyad byas te de ring tshur rgol byung na ni mi 'jigs ka med*

1115 The story concerns a bird was carrying a tortoise by a wood stick. After being told not to open the mouth, unfortunately, the tortoise opened his mouth and dropped from the sky.

las dgra phar rgol byed rgyu lam 'gro yong ba mi 'dug pas ngang 'then mdzad dgos nan gyis zhus 'dug kyang krung thang rang nas pho gsar gtam 'dod dang | rta gsar rgyugs 'dod kyi dpo bzhin ma nyan par manydzu so long | rgyal rong sogs kyi dpung rnams brdzangs te dmag sne sba dur had gung rang gis 'khrid cing | dpung mjug sgril ba'i rgyab snon du krung thang rang 'gyogs byams thogs med rgya skad la yi bya'u zer ba de'i nang du 'khod nas phebs song skabs | de sngon sa spre dus gzir lo la stod ding rir kho bo dang mnyam sbrel gyis sa sprung la sdod mi rgya dpon krang rda lo ye rang yang dpung dmag 'go byed gras su 'dug gshis |

rkang thang du 'gro dgos la brten zhwa gos bde zhing yong ba [891] *rnams gyon nas ma 'khyogs pa rnams kho bor bcol nas bzhag byung zhing | krung thang rang yang dmag thog tu thon nyer nged rnams la bka' phebs su kyod tsho lta bu'i thabs sdug bud med dang byis pa'i spyod tshul de 'dra ngo tsha bas nged gong ma'i lha dmag rnams kyis de ring pha rol pa'i sa sprung gdong len rnams la ci 'dra byas song ltad mo ltos zhes gsungs nas dpon dmag rnams phebs song ba |*

krung thang sgor nang du bal du dgra lag nas thar ba'i nged rang rgya bod rnams kyi thog so long sba dur dang | rgyal rong dpa'i bo mtshon gyis rmas pa dang | sa chu ma thub par nad kyis mnar nas dmag thog tu 'gro ma thub pa brgya zin zhig 'dug pa las de byings tshang ma thon song stabs pha rol pa'i dpung dmag sdod gnas dang |rang phyogs rgya bod kyi dmag sgor gnyis ri phan tshun la song gshis phar 'gro tshur yong la gyen thur lam thag ring ba ma gtogs mig gis blta bar thog nye gshis |

kho bo dang | g.yu thog sogs nas kyang thang shing gi sngong po chen po'i rtser 'jegs nas zhib blta byed skabs phu zi gung rda krung thang chen po 'khor bcas chu tshu ri'i ri gsham du bzhugs nas dmag dpon sba dur had gung bgres po dgung lo bdun cur nye ba des dbus so long dang | manydzu rgyal rong sogs kyi dpung dmag dgra thog tu dpa' ba rnams chu pha ri brgal te tsham tshom med par pha rol po gnas yul gyi ri ldebs der gyen du 'dzegs song ba na |

gor dbung phyogs nas kyang [892] *g.yas rur bham sa heb dang | g.yon rur ka ci 'dam rdar sa ras kyis sne 'khrid de ru khag gnyis bsgrigs nas thur du yong ba mda' rgyang tsam gyis ma 'dzoms pa'i sa nas phan tshun me mda'i 'khrul 'khor bsnun res byed pa'i me rdzas kyi du zhags dbyar gyi sa rlangs brdol ba lta bu dang | me mda'i sgro skad dang ku co 'brugs stong ldir ba lta bu 'dug skabs |*

ka ci 'dam rdar sa ras phyogs kyi g.yon ru'i gor dmag rnams kyi ma brtan pa'am | ma brtan pa'i khul byas pa ji ltar yang phyir 'then byas song ba na | rgya dpon krang rda lo yes dmag sne 'khrid de rgyal rong

gi dmag mi brgya skor zhig dpa' bo rgyab chad lta bur rang phyags kyi dpung dmag dkyil nas span chod du pha rol pa'i rjes 'ded la song bar | ri rtse ma zin tsam la slebs dus nags khrod nas gor dmag mang ba glo bur du don zhing | g.yon ru bros 'gro khul rnams kyang phyir ldab kyis yong nas rgya dpon krang rda lo ye can rgyal rong gi dpung dmag span chod du 'gro mi brgya zin de dag la phar nang brgal nas ded song bar yong tig gcig kyang log rgyu ma byung zhing |

de mtshungs bham sa heb can gor dmag g.yas ru rnams dang | rang phyogs kyi sba dur had gung can rgya sog rgyal rong gi dpung rnams kyang 'thab 'dzing yun ring tsam byas song rung phan tshun gyi dmag dpon gtso drag gnyis por skyon ma byung 'dug pa las gor dmag kyang mang tsam shi song zhing |

rang phyogs kyi ka landha bzhi po'i nang gi [893] *gral 'gor sdod mi dngas ming mi shes rung krung thang gi thugs rtsis che zhing | byu ru'i zhwa tog dang | rma bya'i sgro mdongs yod pa gzugs bzang zhig 'dug pa de'i dpral ba'i dkyil du bham saheb kyi me mda' phog nas dmag thog tu srog shor bas dbus 'ga' zhig rkyen lam du gyur par brten | krung thang nas rang phyogs rnams phyir 'then byed dgos gsungs te log yong skabs yol mo gangs ra'i chu chen po der thang shing sdod po bcad nas btsugs pa'i zam pa mda' gcig ma'i thog tu rang phyogs tshang ma shong 'tshangs kyis phyir log byed skabs pha rol pos rjes bdas kyis yong bar brten 'ga' re pha rol pa'i lag 'og dang | byings che zam pa'i steng du ma shong zhing lam ma thob par chu nang du lhungs nas lug gi ril ma chur btab pa bzhin du nag yer yer la 'khyer 'gro ba sogs de nyin rang phyogs kyi dbung la gzan god shin tu che ba byung song ba ni |*

《skye bo gso thig》[1116] *las | bslab pa'i kha la ma nyan na | rus sbal kha na shing shor yong | zhes gsungs pa ltar | gtso bor gong ma chen po'i sku bsod dang | yang sgos lag na rdo rje'i sgyu 'phrul dpa' bo chen po had gung gi sgyu rtsal la brten de snga phan krung thang rang gis ci mdzad lam du song ste g.yul las rnam par rgyal gshis mar gyis kha brnyogs nas dkar gong gi 'gram so gcog pa'i dpe ltar had gung gis zhus par ma gsan pa'i babs kyis rang phyogs la byus nyes phran bu byung* [894] *bar brten krung thang rang ngo gnongs te de nas bzungs zla gcig ma zin tsam gyi bar rgya bod drag zhan su yang sku mdun du mi gtong bar bzhugs song stabs | nged rnams la'ang phyin chod kyi 'gro sdod skor sogs 'di bya 'di bgyi gang yang med par nag thom mer krung thang sgar thog rang du zhag ma nyi shu rtsa brgyad kyi bar yan sdod byed dgos byung gshis |* [...]

1116 The brackets mark the name of a text.

[898.5] *nged rnams kyi rgyab rdzi sne shan dang sbrags dpa' bo'i khyu mchog had gung gi rigs sras lan rda rin zer ba dang | so long sba dur mung rda rin gnyis bsko bzhag bstsal don bzhin krung thang dmag sa nas thon nyer yod dus gor kha'i blon po ka ci tarna dzi sa ras dang lhan cig bla ma zhwa dmar ba'i nang mi bu mo lags dang | g.yog pho mo brgyad dgu zhig 'byor nas gong gsal rnams krung thang la rtsis 'bul zhus skad zer ba rna thos las mig mthong ma byung zhing |*

[…]

2.3.3 Men Gompa Künga Peden's Unedited Biography

The text and translation are both from Ehrhard 2007. It was the biography of this physician who served the Shamarpa Lama, written in 1807. The text was read from NGMPP microfilms.

Translation

Quoted from Ehrhard 2007, 127–28 [= Appendix e]
"[At the age of] fifty-seven years, in the water-male mouse year [called] *paridhārin*, [= 1782], as [Kun-dga' dpal-ldan] was completing the renovation of the assembly hall of [the monastery] Padma-chos gling [in] Yol-mo, mKhas-dbang Siddhi Rinpo-che came from Brag-dkar [rta-so] for [the painting of] the murals there. When he arrived in the presence of this lord (i.e. Kun-dga' dpal-ldan) he was granted the reading authorization of the *rnam thar* and the *lam yig* chapters from the collected writings of the glorious [Kah-thog] Rig-'dzin [Tshe-dbang nor-bu], together with some minor writings. The mind of teacher [and] disciple melted into one, [and] this was the beginning of their connection in the noble doctrine.'

Not long afterwards in Bal-yul the time was near when the Zhva-dmar-pa would condense [his being] in the final spiritual field, [and] although [Kun-dga' dpal-ldan] had given whatever kind of health care was necessary when [Chos-grub rgyamtsho] had been sick for a long time, the means for effective help having [now] been exhausted, on the fifteenth day [i.e. the full moon] of the fourth Tibetan month the descent into [a state of] meditational calm was [finally] induced, after which [Kun-dga' dpal-ldan] performed everything suitable that was wished for up to the point where the reliquary [containig the ashes] was attached to a string. Then he returned to his own place in Yol-mo.

At that time were united into one all [the armies], including the Chinese one in charge of the pair of generals [called] Ho-si khang-thang [probably a mistake of Phu-zi Krung-thang i.e., Fuk'anggan] and Hyagu [i.e., Hailanca], who were appointed by the ruler 'Jam-db-yangs Gong-ma, the king of the east (= Qianlong)—the army itself being despatched as relief troops for assisting the subjects of the king of Tibet (i.e. the Eighth Dalai Bla-ma)[1117]—the Mongol [armies] and the ones from rGyalmo long, and from dBus [and] gTsang, [namely] the four horns of the Tibetan realm, [together with the armies] from Khams, Kong[-po] and so forth. Surrounded by great reinforcements, they prepared for the annihilation of the lord of the domain of Nepal and his subjects. They marched up to [a distance of] one day from Nepal, reaching what is called Nuvakot. By fierce fighting here and there with the great armed forces of the king of Gorkha, many living beings narrowed [the defences] of Yam-bu (= Kathmandu) in the south by means of weapons and [the skillful use of] rivers. In the end, a proper peace treaty was concluded [containing] the plan of a promise that the Maharaja of Gorkha together with his retinue should be for the time being the subject of the [Chinese] ruler, an unsurpassable [state of] rest of well-being set in for all the beings of Bal[-yul] and Tibet."

Edition

Tibetan text edited by Ehrhard 2007, App. E.

Kun dga' dpal ldan rnam thar, fol. 51al5-bl6.

dgung lo nga bdun pa yongs 'dzin te chu pho byi ba'i lor yol mo dgon padma'i chos gling gi 'du khang zhig sos grub par logs bris kyi phyir brag dkar nas mkhas dbang siddhi rin po che pheb pa (= phebs pa) rje 'di'i spyan sngar mjal du byon par dpal rigs (= rig) 'dzin rje'i bka' 'bum nang nas rnam thar dang lam yig le mtshan (= le tshan) sogs 'jags lung thor bu bcas stsal zhing dpon slob yid gcig tu 'dres te dam pa'i chos kyi 'brel ba'i thog ma yin / de nas mi ring bal yul du rje zhva dmar ba nyid zhing khams mtha' ma bsdu bar nye bas yun ring du sku shin tu bsnyel bar (= bsnyal bar) 'phrod rten gyi thab (= thabs) tshul ci yang zhig mdzad kyang phan thabs zad par gyur te snron gyi zla ba'i tshe bco lnga la zhi bar gzhol bar thugs dam bskul ba song nas sku gdung zhags su

1117 See note to Tenzin Peljor's report above Part II, 2.3.2a.

zhen pa'i bar gyi mthun 'gyur du 'os pa rnams mdzad nas rang gnas su phebs / de'i tshe dpur rgyal (= spur rgyal) bod 'bangs rnams kyi ram zla dpung gnyen du bskul ba shar phyogs kyi rgyal po 'jams dbyangs gong ma bdag pos lung gis bsngags pa'i dmag dpon ho si khang thang zhes pa dang / hyagu zhes pa zung la rgya nag dang / mong gol dang / rgyal mo rong dang / bod khams ru bzhi dbus gtsang kham kong sogs thams cad gcig tu 'dus shing sdom pa'i dpung eben pos bskor te ne pā la'i rgyal khams rje 'bangs bcas pa brlag par chas te bal yul dang zhag geig gi bsgrod pas nye ba kot zhes pa'i bar du phyin te gor rgyal gyi dmag gi g.yul eben po dang phan mtshun thab (= thabs) 'grugs drag pos skye 'gro srog ldan du ma zhig mtshon kha (= mtshon cha) dang chu klung gi lam las lho phyogs ya ma(= yam bu)'i khrong khyer dog por bgyis pa'i skabs / mthar gyi gor gha mahārāja 'khor bcas re zhig gong ma bdag po'i 'bangs su bgyi bar khas blang rtsis la phab pa'i legs 'ching gi mtshams sbyar bas bal bod kyi skye rgu thams cad la phan bde'i ngal so bla na med par gyur pa ni /

2.3.7 Letters of the Teshu Lama

Because of the many spelling errors and irregularities in these letters, we have partially corrected or smoothed out the spelling in the following.

2.3.7.1 Letter of January 22, 1789

Published in *Calendar of Persian Correspondence* (CPC), vol. VIII (1911), no. 977, 403–4.

"From the Teshu Lama.
Says that about 20 years ago the Gorkhali Raja killed the Raja of Nepal and took possession of the whole country. He also ruined the other neighbouring Rajas. This year again in the month of Ramazan (May) he sent a large number of troops towards this quarter and by violence took possession of several fortresses of the country of Bhutan. He brutally massacred the inhabitants of these places and plundered all their effects. Near about Kuti, he plundered a place called Kounea which belonged to the writer. When the Chinese *subbās*, who are in Lhasa, heard of this incident they reported the matter to the Emperor

of China. Is sure that the Emperor will soon send troops to punish the aggressor.

God alone knows what will be the plight of the riots when the troops arrive. In order to save the riots from this impending doom he was desirous of making peace with the Gorkhali and had sent an *arjī* to the Emperor of China (Kien-Lung) [Qianlong] requesting him to withhold sending his army. But the (Gorkhali) Raja's intentions seem to be different and he does not abide by his engagements. The Lamaji Lhasa Wallah (Dalai Lama) on learning of the Gorkhali's evil intentions wrote to the Raja Jumla Wallah [the Lama of Jumla] to annihilate the aggressor. But the Jumla Wallah is not powerful enough to wage a successful war.

So he (Teshu Lama) requests his lordship to send a large force against the Gorkhali Raja in order to annihilate him. In the meantime, he (the writer) shall try to make peace with the said Raja. Requests his lordship not to give any military help to the Gorkhali. In case his lordship sends troops towards Nepal he should act as from himself and not as on behalf of the writer. The name of the writer and the correspondence that passes. between them should be kept a secret because if it comes to light it may lead to his destruction. For further particulars, refers him to his two *vakils* whom he is sending to his lordship (with this letter)."

2.3.7.2 Letter to Cornwallis (1793)

Source: Diskalkar 1933, no. 18, 395–98.

"From the Teshoo Lama
Received 28th June 1793
I have received your kind letter through Diljit [Daljit] Gosain purporting that your Lordship had received mine on the subject of the dispute with the Gorkhali, and other points; I now again write that it is four years since the Gorkhali marched to this quarter with an evil design and laid waste the country. The first time he came as far as Shuggher [Shelkar] and thence returned to his own confines. The second time he came to Chugcha [Dzongka], plundering as he went and laid that country quite waste. Being therefore compelled to give information of this to his Imperial Majesty, the Vizier and other ambans were deputed with a very large army to chastise that misguided Sett [Gorkhali?], and

arrived in the Month of Rejib [Rajab] 1206 (Feb. or March 1792). The Vizier, Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama resolved in concert that as an ancient friendship had subsisted between your Lordship and the former Panchen Lama, on the strength of that to write you a letter in terms of great regard accompanied by presents, and transmit them through Poorun Geer [Purangir] Gosain, which was done.

I also wrote you a letter in Persian purporting that the Gorkhali Rajah would solicit your Lordship for assistance and represent untruths, and desiring you not to give credit to his words. The letter written by the Vizier was in the Tibetan Language, to desire your Lordship would send troops against the Rajah and chastise him as he deserved. You understood the Persian letter, but the Tibetan Letter from, not knowing the Language you could not understand, whatever is past is past. Poorun Geer [Purangir] was prevented by illness and the unfavourableness of the climate from returning here. The following was the purport of your Lordship's answer to my letter (recapitulating the letter written 25th September 1792).[1118] Your Lordship's letter and the Verbal Message delivered by the Gosauyeen Agree [Gosain, Ācārya Lama], I am highly pleased to learn what you write. The Vizier, from experiencing your friendly conduct, concurred that without doubt you were a sincere well-wisher of his Majesty. He perhaps sent a letter to you by a Dawk Chokey at the time of the rains when the war with Gorkhali was at the highest, and from that letter you will have learned the Rajah's submission.

The Imperial Troops arriving in the height of the Rains in the Neighbourhood of Nepal which belongs to the Gorkhali some severe engagements took place, and numbers of the Rajah's men were killed, many places of his country came into possession of his Majesty's army. In all these places troops were stationed. The army had advanced to within one day's march of the Rajah's capital and it was resolved to proceed onward, in a few hours, and capture the place of his residence. When at length the Rajah finding himself unable to contend, threw down the shield and in the field of battle sent his principal people to the Vizier and in the humblest and most supplicative manner sued for peace. Submitted to the yoke of obedience confessed their misconduct and entreated forgiveness. The Rajah also sent his Minister, called in that Country Ranjee as his Vakeel with various sorts of presents and rarities and an *arjī* to his Majesty; Several large Elephants and excellent

1118 Edited in Diskalkar 1933, n. 15.

horses together with other uncommon things composed the present and he wrote in his *arjī* that, if his Majesty would pardon his past offences he would pay an annual tribute and for the rest of his life would never be guilty of rebellion and presumption.

The Vizier conveyed information of all this to his Majesty who was pleased to issue his commands to this effect that it was a Country of very small extent and the inhabitants of a foreign tribe, that as they had submitted, they should be spared from destruction and be allowed quarter and, the Conquered country be restored to the Rajah.

The Vakeel [Devadatta Thapa] and people of the Rajah who went to the royal presence had an interview with me in this city [Shigatse, on 4 November 1792, according to KRKJL, vol. 45] when the Vakeel made apologies for the injuries that had been done acknowledging that the fault was all on their side and that they hoped for pardon. As your Lordship wrote that you would depute a person in your confidence, with presents to accommodate matters between me and the Rajah, this afforded me a great deal of pleasure. My Lord, the Rajah has now become one of the Servants of his Imperial Majesty and therefore any person's going now were mere trouble; do not put yourself to the inconvenience of giving your agent the trouble of repairing to the Rajah to bring about an accommodation, as now no dispute whatever exists with the Rajah and this amicable system will for ever remain. It is to be hoped that hereafter the peace and security of the inhabitants of this country will not be disturbed. Your Lordship is pleased to consider us among the number of faithful friends, God reward you, preserve you from evil and gratify you with good. Be pleased to keep open the gates of Epistolary Correspondence which forms the foundation of Friendship. I hope your Lordship will frequently call me to remembrance by letters.

I have sent as a token of remembrance some articles of this country which are not in fact worth your acceptance; they will be presented! by Dilgeet Geer Gosayin [Daljit Giri Gosain] and I hope you will accept them.

Appendices

A) Place Names

Many of the names in the sources originate from a variety of languages, including Nepālī, Newari, Chinese, Manchu, Tamang, Tibetan, and its dialects. *Qin-ding Xi-yu Tong-wen Zhi*, vol. 18 gave the Chinese and Manchu of some Tibetan placenames Haenisch (1959) gave a Manchu-Chinese-Tibetan list of names, based on edicts and memorials. Satō (1986) compiled numerous Chinese names (from KRKJL and BLBJL), Tibetan names (from sources like DL8), and Nepali names. Tang (1995) identified Tibetan proper names in the Tenzin Peljor's Biography alongside Chinese names. Deng (2007b) largely followed their methods of identification. Komatsubara (2022) was able to identify additional names with the assistance of a Tibetan informant who speaks Tamang, Kyirong dialect, Nepali and English. Her research revealed that by the late eighteenth century, the Gorkhali and Nepālī influences had apparently not yet reached the region around Rasuwa, where Tamang and Kyirong dialect were used for placenames.

For Tibetan place names, we give the classical Tibetan transcription, while modern Chinese transcription and "Tibetan Pin-yin" can be found in the following website: https://www.eki.ee/knab/valik/cn54inf.htm. Along with this link, all links in the Appendices are accessed in December 2024.

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Alakha-naṃdā				See Part II, 2.1.4
Amdo region		Qing-hai 青海	mTsho sngon po	Kokonor Steppes
Annam		An-nan 安南; Mnc. An nan		Vietnam
Balbu, Balebu, Bal-pu		Balbu 巴勒布/ Barbu 巴爾布; Mnc. Balbu	Bal (yul)/ Bal (po) (rarely) Nai pā la	Chin. and Tib. name for Newar and the Kathmandu Valley
Bang-xing	Pāṅgsīṁṭāra (Pasingtar, Pangusi)	Bang-xing 邦杏/幫興	sPang zhing	A place near Kyirong town
Bathang	Vāthāṃ	Ba-tang 巴塘; Mnc. Batang	'Ba' thang	In Garzê, Sichuan https://viaf.org/viaf/143519663
Beijing	Pecin	Bei-jing 北京	Pi cing/ Pe cing	
Bengal		Jia-gar 甲噶爾, Bang-ga-la 榜葛剌 Meng-jia-la 孟加臘	rGya gar	The Tibetan term refers to India in General, while the Chinese loan word Jia-gar refers only to Bengal.
Betravati	Betrāvatī	Pa-lang-gu (Bridge) 帕朗古(橋)	Yol mo gangs ra'i chu chen po (the great river of Yol mo gangs ra)	River and place https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betrawati,_the_Uttar_Gaya
Bhaktapur	Bhaktapura, Bhadgaon, Khopva	Kukum 庫庫木/ Guokam 郭卡木; Mnc. Bok' am	Ko khom	
Bhutan		Bluk-ba 布魯克巴/Zhu-ba 竹巴	'Brug pa	
Bor-dong-la		Bor-dong-la 博爾東拉		A mountain near Dhunce

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Boudhnath	Baudhanā-tha (Bodh-nath, Baudha)	Jia-long-ke-chu 甲龍克楚	Bya rung kha shor	Stūpa in the Kathmandu Valley
British		Li-di 里底		
British India		Di-li-ba-ca 第哩巴察	‘De li spa cha, Ti ling pa ca	Delhi Bādśāha
Caphādi				Fort near Dudhiya
Camu		Ca-mu 擦木	sKya mo	Village southeast of Dzongkha, Present-day Jia-mu 加木. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dzongka
Chamdo		Chamduo 察木多; Mnc. Camdo	Chab mdo	Present-day Chang-du 昌都 https://viaf.org/viaf/480714875369 5541320000
Changu Naranyan	Cãgu Nārāyaṇa		Khyung rang byon / gtsang kun ṇa raṇ	Vaishnava place north of Bhaktapur
Chengdu	Cuṃdu, Chen-tu Ṭhiṃḍaphu	Cheng-du 成都; Mnc. Cengdu	Krin thu / Chin thu [hu]	
Chusang, Chusum	Chusāṃ	Chong-dui 沖堆	Tshung ‘dus	Present-day Chong-duipu https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nyalam_Town not to be confused with Chu-‘dus 春對, which is on the way from Shel-dkar to Sa-skya
Cokde	Cokde			Near Betravati; see Part II, 2.1.4
Cugdi	Cugdi			A place between Dhaibung and Nuvakot
Da-jian-lu, see Kangding	Tārcandeu (Dartsemdo)	Da-jian-lu 打箭爐; Mnc. Dachi-yen Lu	Dar rtse mdo	

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Deurali	Deurālī (Devarāli)			A place on top of a hill near Dhunche
Dhaibung	Dhebuṃ	Dui-bum 堆補木	Dha dpung / rDe dpung	In the Rasuvā district near Betrāvatī; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhaibung
Dinggyê		Ding-jie 定結; Mnc. Dinggiyei	gTing skyes	South to Shigatse, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dinggy%C3%AA_County
Dram, see Khasa		Zham 扎木 Zhangmu 樟木	‘Gram	A border town near Nyalam-Listi
Dudhīya (mountain)	Dudyā, Dhudhyā			A place between Dhaibung and Nuvakot
Digarca, see Shigatse	Ḍigarcā			
Dhunche	Dhuṃce, Dhunglang (Tamang)	Dong-jue 東覺		Near Deurālī
Dudhya hills	Dudhyā			Near Betravati
Dzongkha, Dzongka, Jhonga,	Jhubgā, Jhuṃgā, Jhuṅga Jongka, Zong-ka, Zongga, Chugcha	Zong-ka 宗喀 / Zong-ga 宗嘎; Mnc. Dzungk’ar	rDzong dga’ / rDzong dkar	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dzongka
Dzungar		Zhun-gar 准噶爾	Jun gar	Oirat Mongolian group in Central Asia
Ga-duo-pu	Thulo Bharko, Bharkhu (Tamang)	Ga-duo(-pu) 噶多(普)		Mountain between Syāphrū and Dhunce
Ga-le-la		Ga-le-la 噶勒拉		Mountain near Dhaibuṃ
Gerkhuar	Gerkhuṭāra	Jiar-gu-la 甲爾古拉		Mountain near Betravati

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Jehol		Re-he 熱河	Zhe hor	Mountain resort and summer capital for the Qing emperors
Jagong		Jiang-gong 江鞏	Bya gong	Qiang-gong village near Shigatse 強公村
Jiamu, see Ca-mu				
Jim-ji	Jijībe	Jim-ji 集木集		Mountain near Betravati
Jinchuan		Jin-chuan 金川; Mnc. Cucin, Zanla	bTsan lha rGyal po & Chu chen rGyal po	Places where previous battles of pacification were ordered by QL
Jumla		Zuom-lang 作木朗	Jum lang	
Kabhre	Kābhryā, Kamāryā-gaḍha			A place between Dhunce and Dhaibung (Acharya VS 2011, 15)
Kangding	Dartsedo	Ta chien-lu / Da-jian-lu 打箭爐 = 康定	Dar rtse mdo	Border town between Sichuan and Tibetan regions in Southwest China
Khalka		Kar-ka 喀爾喀		Mongolian groups
Kathmandu	Kāṭhmaṇḍu, Kāntipura	Yang-bu 陽布/颺布; Mnc. Yambu	Yang bu / Yan bu / Yam bu	
Kauḍyā				Near Dhaibung; see Part II, 2.1.4
Ke-dui	Khedi (Tamang)	Ke-dui 克堆		A stockade 17.28 km eastwards from Syaphru
Kerung	Keruṃ, Keruṅ, Kirong, Kyirong, Gyirong, Keyrong, Keerung	Ji-long 濟嚨/吉隆; Mnc. Jirung	sKyid grong	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyirong_Town; not to be confused with present-day Kyirong County. It is a part of the Tibetan Mang-yul.

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Khams		Kang 康 / Gans 甘思 / Kam 喀木	Khams	Eastern Tibetan Territory, centring Chamdo
Khartal	Khartāla			A region west of Namche Bazaar
Khasa	Khāsā, Dram	Zhangmu 樟木; Zha-mu 扎木	'Gram	Tibeto-Nepalese border town in Tibet, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhangmu
Kolkata	Kalkattā, Calcutta	Gal-Gada 噶哩噶達	Ka li ku ta	
Kukurghat, see Ca-mu	Kukuraghāṭa	Ca-mu		North of Kyirong town near Dzongka
Kuti (= Nyalam)	Kuṭī, Nyālama, Nilam, Nyanang	Nie-lam, 聶拉木; Mnc. Niyelam	gNya lam / gNya' nang	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nyalam_Town
Lacabuk	Lacābuka			A place between Dhaibung and Nuvakot
Langur	Languragaḍha, Lugula Himal, Mahālangur Himal			= Khumbu Himal https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lugula_Himal
Lan-Tsang-Kiang river	Mekong River	Lan-cang Jiang 瀾滄江		A river in Yunnan that flows to South-east Asia
Lhasa		La-sa 拉薩 Mnc. Lasa		Often referred to as the Front of Tibet (Mnc. julergi dzang) or Potala (Mnc. and Chin. Budala)
Listi	Listi	Li-ti 利底		Near Sindhu-palcok, https://nepal.places-in-the-world.com/7995041-place-listi.html and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Listikot

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Lithang	Lithāṃ	Li-tang 裡(/里/理)塘; Mnc. Litang	Li thang	In Garzê, Sichuan, https://viaf.org/viaf/142117266
Lohit Valley				Connect-ing Assam with Tibet
Maga		Ma-gar-xiar-jia 瑪噶爾轄爾甲 (瑪噶村)	Mar dka	Northwest of Kyirong
Mi-li-ding (Mount Peak of Mi-li)	Milī (Kyirong dialect), Lingling (Tamang)	Mi-li-ding 密哩頂		17.28 km away from Rasuwa, probably the mountain of 160 *li* distance to be covered within one day's march
Mustang		Luo-min-tang 洛敏湯	Glo smon thang	Northern part of Mustang District (formerly Kingdom of Lo)
Nuvakot, Nuwakot	Nuvakoṭa	Bal-bu Zong (County of Balbu) 巴勒布宗	Bal po rDzong	A town beyond Betravati
Nyalam, see Kuti			gNya' lam, gNya' nang	
Palangu, see Betrāvatī	Palanggu (Tamang, Kyirong dialect), Panboche	Pa-lang-gu Bridge 帕朗古橋	Yol mo gangs ra	= Betravati
Pangusi	Pāṅgusi Paṅgsīṇṭāra	Bang-xing 邦杏	sPang zhing	
Patan	Pāṭan, Lalitapura, Yala (Newari)	Ye-leng 葉楞/ Yi-leng 伊凌; Mnc. Yereng	Ye rang	
Peng-cuo		Mt. Peng-cuo 彭措嶺	Phun tshogs gling	Monastery west of Tashilhunpo
Phalavan, Phula	Phalavāṇ, Phalyak, Phalak	Pu-la 普拉	Phu lak	A hamlet near Dzongka, See under https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dzongka

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Pi-leng	Feringhee	Pi-leng 披楞	Pherang / Phe rang	Persian Firingī, i.e., the English people in India
Qu-duo	Tserdo	Qu-duo 曲多	mTsher tho	Present day Ciduo Village between Saskya to Shigatse
Ramacya, Ramche, Ramchaya	Rāmacyā, Rāmcyā Jyongyang (Tamang)	Yong-ya 雍雅		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramche,_Rasuwa
Rasuwa (bridge)	Rasuvā (bridge)	Re-suo Bridge 熱索橋; Wu Chinese dialect Zah-soh Bridge 石宿橋	Ri sog Zam pa (Bridge)	Border town in the Langtang Himal, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rasuwa_Fort
Rongshar		Rong-xia 絨轄	Rong shar	https://viaf.org/viaf/216623393859604209 2
Saga		Sa-ga 薩噶 / Sa-ka薩喀	Sa dga'	North of Kyirong and Dzongka, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saga_County
Saskya monastery	Sakyā, Shakya	Sa-jia 薩迦	Sa skya	The Sākya Monastery west of Shigatse = Ḍigarcā; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sakya_Monastery; not to be confused with Saga 薩喀/薩嘎
Se-dam	Sedang (Tamang)	Se-dam 色達木		= Timure
Shaanxi		Shan-xi 陝西	gZan shi	Chinese province
Shelkar, see Shikarjong				
Shigatse, see also Digarca	Ḍigarcā	Ri-ka-ze 日喀則; Mnc. Žig'adze	gZhis ka rtse	Place of Tashilhunpo, often referred to as the Back of Tibet (Mnc. amargi dzang)

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Shikhar-jong, Shikarajang	Śikhārajaṅg, Shekar Dzong, Shelkar, Sheldkar Shikar jong, Sikhārjuna (*Nepālik-abhūpava-ṃśāvalī*) or Shugger	Xie-gar 協/脅噶爾; Mnc. Hiyeg'ar	Shel dkar (rDzong)	On the way to Shigatse; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelkar 28°39′30″N 87°07′20″E in Shigatse Prefecture, Tingri County
Sichuan, Szechuan		Si-chuan 四川; Mnc. Secuwan	Si khron / Zi chon	Province in China
Sikkim		Zhe-meng-xiong 哲孟雄	'Bras mo gshongs	
Sindhupal-chok	Sindhupāl-coka			District in Nepal, east of Kathmandu
Sirmur	Śrīmoriyā			One of the 18 Shimla Hill states
Solon		Suo-lun 索倫; Mnc. Solon	So long	A group of people in Manchuria and East Siberia
Svayambhu-nath	Svayam-bhū-nātha		'Phags pa Shing kun	Stūpa in the Kathmandu Valley
Syāphrū	Syaphru	Xie-blu 脅布魯		
Tai-ning		Tai-ning 泰寧	mGar thar	In Garzê, Sichuan https://viaf.org/viaf/436417288232081623 0006
Tanahu	Tanahun			District in central Nepal
Tashilhun-po		Zha-shi-lun-bu 扎什倫布; Mnc. Jasi-lumbo	bKra shis lhun po	Also spelled Teshu / Tesho

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Ta-tsian-loo, see Kangding				
Tsang		Zang 藏; Mnc. (Wargi) Dzang	gTsang	The term is used for the Shigatse region in Tibetan, which is called “the Back of Tibet” (後藏) in Chinese. It was also used as a short from for Tibet (cp. Ü-tsang) in both Chinese and Manchu.
Timure	Ṭimure Sedang (Tamang)	Se-dam 色達木		A town south of Rasuvā Fort, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timure
Tingri	Ṭingri (Ṭigari), Tigri	Ding-ri 定日, Di-li-lang-gu 第哩浪古; Mnc. Dirilanggu	Ting ri / Ding ri glang khor	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tingri_County
Trishuli river	Triśulī	Ji-long River 濟嚨河 (= Kyirong River) Mar-zang 瑪爾臧	sKyid grong gTsang po	
Tuinthala	Thuinthalā			A place between Dhaibung and Nuvakot
Ü-Tsang		Wei-zang 衛藏; Mnc. Wei Dzang	dBus gTsang	Central Tibet, not including Amdo, Khams, or mNga-‘ris
Wang-dui	Wangbi (Tamang)	Wang-dui 旺堆		A place where Trisuli and Langtang meet
Wang-gar	Wanggal (Tamang)	Wang-gar 旺噶爾		A place east to the Bhote Koshi River (i.e. Trisuli)
Xi’an		西安府	Sing nga hu	In Shaanxi
Xining		Xi-ning 西寧; Mnc. Si-ning	Zi ling	City near the Koko-nor lake

English	Nepālī / Nevārī	Chinese (Manchu)	Tibetan	Location, Source
Ya'an		雅安		In Sichuan
Yang-bu, see Kathmandu				
Yibin		宜賓		In Hubei
Yolmo			Yol mo	Betravati
Yongya, see Ramche	Jyonggyang (Tamang, Nevārī)	Yong-ya 雍雅		= Ramche
Yunnan		雲南	Yun nan	Province in South-west China
Zhingsa		Xing-sha / Xing-sa 興沙/興薩	Zhing sa	Near Dinggyê and Saskya
Zu-mu-gu La-ba-zai		Zu-mu-gu La-ba-zai 足(/作)木古拉巴載	*la po rtse ("mountain top")	Perhaps "the pasture of the Zom"
Zy-yul	Zayü	Cha-yu 察隅	rDza yul	South Tibet

B) Personal Names

The following table includes mostly names that have variants in other languages. For name searches, we also recommend using the search function in the open-access version.

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Abhiman Simha	Abhimāna Siṃ			*kājī*
Agūi		A-gui 阿桂	Ā krung thang	Hešen and Fuk'anggan's colleague
Aitu, see G.Yu-thog	Aitu Kājī, Itu Kājī	Yu-tuo Zha-shi-dun-zhub 玉陀扎什敦珠布	g.Yu thog pa bKra shis don 'grub	*bKa'-blon*, colleague of Tenzin Peljor
Amar Singh Thapa, Ambara Simha Thapa	Ambarasiṃ Thāpā			*sardāra* in West Nepal, *kājī*
An-lu		An-lu 安祿	Lan rda rin	Hailanca's son who escorted Tenzin Peljor to Peking
Ar-zeng Śāha		Ar-zeng Sa-ye 阿爾曾薩野		A nephew of Bam Bahadur Shah, captured and sent to Peking
Bahadur Shah	Bahādura Śāha	Badur Sha-ye 巴都爾薩野	Bā dur sa heb/ sBa dur sa heb/ 'Ba' ju sa heb	Regent 1785–1794, uncle of King Rana Bahadur Shah
Bahadur Saukata Janga	Bahādura Saukāta Jaṅga			Received the Report of VS 1850 in Kolkata

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Bajung		Pa-chung, Ba-zhong 巴忠/ Mnc. Bajung	dPa' (chung)	The imperial guard, special commissioner in the Gorkha-Tibet War
Balabhadra Khavasa	Balabhadra Khavāsa	Ba-lba-dur-ka-was 巴拉叭都爾喀哇斯; Mnc. Balbadurk'awas		*vakila* Ambassador of the first tributary mission in 1789–1790
Bam Shaha	Bam/Bom Śāha, Bom Bahādura Śāha	Ma-mu Sa-ye 瑪木薩野	Bham sa heb	Captain, *kājī*
Bhagu Khawas				See Part II, 2.1.5
Bhakti Thāpā				See Part II, 2.1.4
Bharat	Bhārata Khavāsa			*Subbā, sardāra*; see Regmi 1975,1, 464; Part II, 2.1.5
Bhaskara Thaleta	Bhāskara Ṭhaleta	Ba-sa-kar 巴撒喀爾		*subedāra*
Bhotu Pande	Bhoṭu Pā̃ḍe, Bhotu Pāḍe	Pu-dur Bang-li 普都爾幫哩		*Kājī*
Bishnu Shankar	Viṣṇu Śaṅkara			*kharadāra* (superintend-dent)
Bootai		Baotai 保泰/ Fu-xi-hun 俘習渾 (Fusihūn) from 31 March 1792	sPa'o (am ban)/ Pa'u amban/ dPa' am ban	Amban residing in Tibet when the Sino-Nepalese War started
Cancun, see Ohūi	Cān Cun, Cyāncuna, Chanchoo	Jiang-jun 將軍; Mnc. jiyanggiyūn	lCang jun	Chinese title for generals, mostly Ohūi; sometimes it also refers to Cengde.
Chasak Lama	Chasaka Lāmā, Chāsaklāmā	Zha-sak Lama 扎薩克喇嘛 Gal-sang-dan-jie 噶勒桑丹結 = Mon. Jasaγ Lama Mnc. Jasak Lama	Dza sag Bla ma sKal bzang bstan 'dzin	Ministerial Monk abducted to Nepal

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Chengde, Cengde, Shen T'ai-tu		Ch'-eng-the / Cheng-de 成德; Mnc. Cengde	Khrin thi'i thu < Ceng ti du 成提督; Khrin lcang jun 成將軍	General of Chengdu, sometimes referred to as Cān cun in 1791–1793
Chyagamlo-can	Cyāgaṃ-locan	Jiang-jie 將結	lCang lo can	Army officer (Tib. *dpon*), abducted and died in Nepal
Chödrup Gyatso, see also Samarpa Lama; Chögyi Hyatso		Sha-mar-pa 沙瑪爾巴	Chos grub rgya mtsho, Zhwa dmar pa	The tenth Sāmarpā Lāmā 1742–1792, "Holder of the Red Crown," step-brother to the sixth Panchen Lama
Cin Devuka, see Devuka				
Charles Cornwallis		Guornar 果爾那爾 (< Governor)		British army officer and Governor General
Cundun Najima	Cundūn Nājīmā			*sardāra*
Dai-sen-bao		Dai-sen-bao 岱森保		Troop-leading amban in the Sino-Nepalese War fought with Cengde
Dalai Lama	Potālā (Putāla) Lāmā	達賴	Dalai Bla ma	
Daljit Gosain; Diljit Gosain		Da-qi-ge-li 達齊格哩		Messenger from Kolkata to Tibet after the war
Damodar Pande	Dāmodara Pā̃ḍe	Dan-mu-dar Pang-li 旦穆達爾邦哩	'Dam rdar sar ras (= 'Dam rdar pa rdas)	1752–1804, first Prime Minister (*mūlakājī*) of Nepal and senor most *kājī*
Devadatta Thapa; Deo Dutt Thappa	Devadatta Thāpā, Devidatta Thāpā	Di-wu-da-te Ta-ba 第烏達特塔巴 / 抵悟達德他巴		*vakila* of the 2nd mission

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Devanidhi Panta				See Part II, 2.1.5
Devuka, Devuki	Dibuk, Cin Devuka, Khajāñcī Divuka	Di-bu-ba 第卜巴	rTsis dpon bDe sbug pa	Tibetan treasurer sent to Nepal, witness in 2.1.3
Ḍhevā Lopsāṅ Thinden				Witness in 2.1.3
Dhyamju Kaji	Dhyāmju Kājī			*kājī*
Dhokal Siṃha	Dhokal Siṃ			*kājī*
Ḍhuṇḍu Pheñjelikha				The translator Don-'grub?, witness in 2.1.3
Dhurin, see Tenzin Peljor	Kājī Dhurina, Dhuren			*kājī*
Doring Pandita		公班智達 Gong ban-zhi-da	Rdo ring Paṇḍi ta Mgon po dngos grub rab brtan	Cabinet minister of Tibet, 1740–1783. Nominal grandfather of Tenzin Peljor but biological father in fact.
Drung-pa Hutuktu		Zhung-ba Hutuktu 仲巴呼圖克圖 Mnc. Jungpa Kūtuktu	dMa pa Phyag mdzod chen mo Drung pa Hu thog thu Er dem thu No mon han Blo bzang sbyin pa	Elder brother of the Panchen Lama, Treasurer of Tashilhunpo
Eldemboo		El-deng-bao 額勒登保		Imperial guard, army chief in 1791–1792, amban in 1792
Eseṭhācyān		Yi-shi Jiam-can 依什甲木參	Ye shes rgyal mtshan	Lama from Potala present in Part II, 2.1.3

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Fan Zhong	Pān Cūyā	范忠		A Chinese soldier as messenger between Kathmandu and Lhasa
Feng Da-cheng		馮大成	Hung rDa khrin	A Chinese soldier abducted together with Tenzin Peljor from Nyalam
Fu-qing		傅清 Mnc. Fucing	Phu ching	Amban, who, with Labdun, killed Zhurmut Namzhar
Fuk'anggan, Fu'kangan, Fu Kang'an, Tu Thang, Tu Thyang, Thoong-Than, Sun Fo Phu-(zi)-krung-thang	Ṭumṭhyāṅ, Ṭuṅthāṅa, Tumṭhvāṅga	Fu-kang-an 福康安; Mnc. Fuk'anggan;	Phu zi gung rda Krung thang (The Duke, the great Grand Secretary whose name begins with Phu)	Chinese minister and leading general. The name Tung Thyang is his title as Grand Secretary loan from Chinese 中堂 Zhong-tang via Tibetan Krung-thang.
Fusihūn, see Bootai		俘習渾 (Mnc. Fusihūn)		Bootai's later name
Gajaraj Mishra	Gajarājā Miśra			Resident in Benares, Raj-guru of King Rana B. Shah
Golya Khawasa, Golayan Khawas	Golyā Khavāsa			*kaptāna* (captain) in West Nepal
Gosauyeen Agree; Surangir Gosain; Atsala		Azala Lama 阿咱拉喇嘛 Su-na-ge-li 蘇納格哩		Lama sent by Panchen to Kolkata
G.Yu-thog	Aitu Kājī; Itu Kjī,	Yu-tuo Zha-shi-dun-zhub 玉陀扎什敦珠布	g.Yu thog pa bKra shis don 'grub	*bKa' blon*, together with Tenzin Peljor

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Haikuna, Hailanca		Hai-lan-cha 海蘭察; Mnc. Hailanca	(dpa' bo chen po sba dur) Had-gung / Lag na rDo rje	Minister from Solon, Councellor to Fuk'anggan. The Tibetan name comes from his Manchu-Chinese title *baturu gung* 巴圖魯(海)公.
Ha-li-ma		Ha-li-ma 哈立麻	Karmapa, De bzhin gshegs pa	Karmapa, head of the Kagyu lineage
Hari Hara Upadhya	Har Hara Upādhyā; Hari Shah (Rose 1971, 45)	哈哩薩野; Mnc. Harisaye / Ha-li U-pa-diwa 哈哩烏巴第哇	Ha ri Sa heb / Ha ri Hor Urpa de wa	*vakila*, treasurer, ambassador of the first tributary mission
Heliyen		He-lin 和琳	Ho am ban	Amban in Tibet 1792–1795
He-ning / He-ying		He-ning / He-ying 和寧 / 和瑛		Amban in Tibet 1793–1800
Hešen		He-shen 和珅	Ho krung thang	Elder brother of Heliyen, the most powerful minister in the Qing Empire
Hui-ling		Hui-ling 惠齡	[nang blon] Hu'i rtsong thu /btsong thu < 惠總督	Governor-General of Sichuan
Hu Ting-hai		胡廷海	Hu dga'	A Chinese soldier abducted from Kyirong
Ito Kājī, see G.Yu-thog				
Jagatsera Khatri Chetri Sijapati; Jagat Sher, Juggut Ser, Juggut Share	Jagatsera Khatri Sijāpati	Za-gad Xier 咱噶達寫熱		*kājī,* ambassador of the 1866 mission
Jagaval	Jagaṃvala			*subedāra*

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Jagit Pande	Jagita Pā̃ḍe			*kājī*
Janga Bahadur Rana, Jung Bahadoor	Jaṅga Bahādura Rāṇā			Prime Minister (1846–1877)
Jayanta Śāhī		Ja-cha-bu-la Ja-yin-ta Sa-ye 甲察布拉咱音達薩野		Son of Jeṭhabudha Narasiṃha Taksārī
Jing-an		Jing-an 景安		Officer in Gansu, relative of Hešen
Jogamalla				Military officer?, 2.1.4
Jurgangga		Zhur-hang-a 珠爾杭阿 (Mnc. Jurgangga)		The military officer who accompanied Devadatta Thapa to Peking
Jušenboo		Zhu-shen-bao 諸神保		Manchu chief military officer
Kalu Pande	Kālu Pā̃ḍe			*kājī*, R.B.Ś's letter
Kinglin, see Qing-lin				
Kirkpatrick, William	Valiyam Kirikpātarik	Ji-li-ba-di 幾哩巴底		
Kirti Man Simha	Kṛtimāna Siṃha			*mūlakājī* (chief minister)
Lobsang Palden Yeshe			Blo bzang dPal ldan Ye shes	The sixth Panchen Lama, also known as Tashi Lama
Lu Xian-lin		盧獻麟	Lu'i dga'	A Chinese soldier abducted from Kyirong
Qianlong		Qian-long	'Jam dbyangs Gong ma; Lha skyong rgyal po	Emperor
Ma Ting-xiang		馬廷相		Sino-Nepalese Translator

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Men Gompa Künga Penden			sMan bsgom pa Kun dga' dpal ldan	"Physician" of Shamarpa Lama
Mingyur Sönam Penjor		Min-zhur Suo-nom Ban-zhur 敏珠爾索諾木班珠爾	Mi 'gyur bsod nams dpal 'byor,	1784–1834, Tenzin Peljor's son
Mukdengga, Mutajin	Mutājin	Mu-ke-deng-a 穆克登阿 Mnc. Mukdengga	Mu am ban	Military officer, often together with Zhang Zhi-yuan
Narasim Shahi	Narsiṃha, Narasiṃha	Nair-xing 乃爾興	Nang sing mi gsar	Treasurer (*taksārī*)
Ohūi, O-hui (Haenisch 1959, 9), Ao-hui (Manandhar 2004, 769		E-hui 鄂輝, (*alias* O-hui); Mnc. Ohūi	Nga'o lcang jun (鄂將軍)	Army chief and Governor-General of Sichuan, often referred to as Cān Cun
Panchen Lama, Penchen Lama		Ban-chan Er-de-ni 班禪額爾德尼; Mnc. Bancen Erdeni	Paṇ chen bla ma	One of the most important figures in Gelug tradition.
Pa-Chung, see Bajung	Pān Cūyā	Ba-zhong 巴忠, Mon. Bajung	dPa' chung	
Paotai, see Bootai		Pao-t'ai 保泰		Amban in 1790–1791
Phuvara	Phuvāra			*subbā*
Pho-lha-nas		Po-luo-nai 頗羅鼐	Pho lha nas	Former Lorder of men (*mi dbang*) of Tibet, who was conferred with the Manchu kingly tilte *giyūn wang* by Qianlong.
Pratiman Rana	Pratimāna Rāṇā	Su-ba Bra-ti-man Rana 蘇巴巴爾底曼喇納		*subbā*

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Praval Rana	Parvala Rānā			*sardāra*: cp. Regmi 1975/1, 464 and Rose 1971, 61
Pu-fu		普福 Mnc. Pufu	Phu am ban	Amban 1789–1791
Purdun		Bor-dong 博爾東	sPor gdong pa	Representative at Kyirong for the treaty, see Part II, 2.1.3
Qianlong, Kien-lung Ch'ienlong		Gao-zong Chun-huang-di 高宗純皇帝		Chinese Emperor
Qing-lin > Kinglin		Qing-lin 慶麟 (Mnc. Kinglin)	Ching am ban	Amban in 1783–1788
Krishna Shah	Kṛṣṇa Śāha	Xir-gasna 西爾噶斯納	Shri ki pi ṇa	*Cautariyā*
Ramjit Pande	Rāṃjita Pā̃ḍe, Raṇajita Pā̃ḍe	Lang-mu-ji-te Bang-li 朗穆幾特邦哩	Rarṇa ji Sa ras = (Pa ras)	*sardāra, kājī*
Rana Bahadur Shah	Raṇa Bahādura Śāha; Prabal Rānā	La-tna Ba-zhu 拉特納巴珠爾 Mnc. Ratnabahadur	Rarṇa sba dur	King of Gorkha 1776–1806, r. 1777–1799
Rana Keshara Pande	Raṇakesara Pā̃ḍe			Military officer
Rindzin Chöying Dorjé, 1772–1838)			Rig 'dzin Chos dbyings rDo rje	
Samarpa Lama, Shamarpa Lama, Shamar Rinpoche; see Chödrup Gyatsho	Sāmarpā Lāmā, Syāmarpā Lāmā,	Sha-mar-pa 沙瑪爾巴, She-ma-rh-pa (She-mar-pa) 舍瑪爾巴	Zhwa dmar ba / Zhwa dmar pa	The tenth Samarpa Lāmā Chödrup Gyatso, witness in 2.1.3
Sākya Jhinapuna			Sa skya gzim dpon	Officer *gzim-dpon* from Saskya, witness in 2.1.3

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Sākya Lāmā			Sa skya Khri 'dzin	Head of Saskya Monastery and the Saskya lineage of Tibetan Buddhism
Satrubhanjana Malla	Śatrubhañjana Malla			Commander of troops at Kerung (Stiller 1975, 206)
Satru Sala	Satru Sāla			*sardāra*
Shen T'ai-tu, see Cengde		Cengde Cheng-ti-du 成提督	Khrin thi'i-thu < Ceng ti-du 成提督	Leader of the Chinese army
Sheng-zu Ren Emperor		Kang-xi 聖祖仁皇帝	bDe skyid rgyal po	Emperor, Grandfather of QL
Shu-lian		舒濂 Mnc. Šuliyan	Shu am ban	Amban 1788–1790, 1792
		Se-jue Qi-li 色角七哩	Sri gcod Tshe ring	Tibetan attendant who brought Tenzin Peljor's letters to Tibet
Sungyūn		Song-yun 松筠	Sung am ban	Amban after the war 1794–1799
Sun Shi-yi		孫士毅	Srun Krung thang	Governor-General of Sichuan in charge of provisions
Syamarpa, see Samarpa				
	Śyāmalāla Pāṇḍe			Treasurer, witness in 2.1.3
Taifingga		Tai-fei-ying-a 台斐英阿 (Mnc. Taifingga)		An imperial guard who died at Betravati
Tashi Lama, Teshu Lama, Tasilemum Lama	Ṭesu Lāmā	Banchan Erdeni 班禪額爾德尼	Paṇ chen bla ma	The Tashilhunpo Monastery, one of Tibet's most important Geluk monasteries

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Tatsag		Ji-long Hutuktu 濟隆呼圖克圖/ Gong-de-lin Trülku 功德林活佛/ Da-ca 達擦	rJe drung/ rTa tsag/ Kun bde gling, Ye shes Blo bzang bsTan pa'i mgon po	Tibetan Regent
Tava Kāji	Ṭāvā Kāji			*kājī*
Tenzin (Tendzin) Peljor, Sonam Tenzin Peljor, Tsering, Dhurin Kazi Tenzin, Doring Kazui Sonam Oajo Ochsering, Kazo Dhorin,	Dhurin (Kājī)	Dan-jin Ban-zhur 丹津班珠爾 Mnc.Dajin Banjur	rDo ring bsTan 'dzin dpal 'byor	Grandson of Doring Pandita, cabinet minister of Tibet 1783–1791; see https://treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Doring-Tenzin-Peljor/5306
Teshu Lama, see Tashi Lama				
Tshe dbang Lha mo		Ce-wang La-mo 策旺拉莫	Bu mo lags	Shamarpa's consort
Trungpa Trülku, see Drungpa		Zhong-ba Hu-tuk-tu	Drung pa sPrul sku Blo bzang sbyin pa	Elder brother of the sixth Panchen Lama
Tulārāma Subedāra		Du-lar-mu 杜爾拉木		Gorkha head-person at Jiamu
Tumth-vang, cp. Fuk'anggan	Ṭumṭhvāṅg, Ṭuṁthān	Zhong-tang 中堂	Krung thang	Title granted to cabinet members, "Grand Secretary"
	Tuṇḍup			The seventh Panchen's father, dPal-ldan Don-grub, witness in 2.1.3
Ucui	Ucui	Wu Guo-ying 吳國英/Wu Zong-yew 吳總爺		Military officer escorting Jagatsera

English	Nepālī	Chinese, Manchu	Tibetan	Function / Commentary
Vishnu Prasad	Viṣṇu Prasāda			Secretary, witness in 2.1.3
Wang Gang		Wang Gang 王剛	Wang dga' / Wang ka	Chinese Soldier who was abducted together with Tenzin Peljor from Nyalam
Yamantai		Ya-man-tai 雅滿泰	g.Ya' am ban	Co-amban in Tibet 1786–1791
Yan Ting-liang		Yan Ting-liang 嚴廷良	Nyan bTsong ye (嚴總爺)	Chinese military official who went to Kath-mandu in 1789
Yang Kui		楊揆		Fuk'anggan's clerk
Zhang Zhi-yuan Tanga Tajin	Ṭāṅga Tājīn, Tagta Jin	Zhang Zhi-yuan 張芝元	Krang am ban	Military officer from Songpan, Sichuan
Zhe-sen-bao		Zhe-sen-bao 哲森保		Manchu military officer who died in Syaphru
Zhou Rong-ting		周榮庭		A Chinese soldier who served as messenger between Lhasa and Kathmandu
Zhou Ai-lian		周靄聯		Chinese officer under Sun Shi-yi
Zhurmut Namzhar		Zhurmut Namzhar 珠爾姆特那木札爾	Gyur med rnam rgyal	King of Tibet in 1750, son of Pho-lha-nas

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